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Assessment of the Protectorate

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5th—The effects of the Italian withdrawal;

6th—The action proposed.

Extent of the British Protectorate

From Lahadu, a point just east of Ras Jibuti, in about the forty-third parallel of Greenwich longitude, to Bandar Ziada on the 49o longitude the coast line of the British protectorate extends as settled with France in 1887. The limits in the interior were only highly sketched in the letter which M. Waddington wrote on the 11th May 1887 to Lord Salisbury: “Le Gouvernement de la Republique Francaise reconnait le Protectorate de l’Angleterre sur la cote a l’est du Djebouti jusqu’a Bender-Ziadeh, ainsi que sur les habitants, le tribus, et les fractions de tribus, situees a l’est de la ligne ci-dessus indiquee.” When this agreement was arrived at, an assurance was given to the Sultan of Turkey that we would abstain from any inter-ference with the just rights of the Sultan. It was also agreed with France that the caravan route from Zaila to Harrar, passing by Gildessa, should be open throughout to the commerce of both nations. The further delimitation of the frontier in the interior was arranged seven years later at Italy’s request with that country. According to the protocol, dated Rome, 5th May 1894, the boundary, starting from Gildessa, runs towards 8o north latitude, leaving Gildessa and Milmil on the right. It then follows the 8o parallel till it is intersected with 48o longitude, thence running to the intersection of 9o latitude with 49o longitude, which meridian it follows to the sea. Our neighbours therefore are the French on the north-west, Abyssinia and Harrar on the west and south-west, and the Mijertain Somalis on the east and south-east sup-posed to be under the protection of Italy. Our southern-most limit is on the eight degree of latitude north of the Equator, and the territory of the late British East Africa Company bound by the Webi Ganana and River Juba was

not far removed from the point where the Somali pro-tectorate approached the Webi Shabehli in its south-westernmost corner.

The chief value of the protectorate centres in the ports of Zaila, Bulhar, and Berbera for the country behind them is mostly a sandy plain up to the Golis mountains with the waterless Haud plateau on the south-west behind them. But through Zaila the Abyssinian market is tapped via Harrar. The total area is some 75,000 square miles and the nomad tribes which usually occupy it are half of the Easa, the Gadabursi, numerous Habr Awal, Habr Gerhajis, Habr Toljaala, and Warsangli. Our earliest treaty was with the Habr Awal made in 1827. A British ship trading to Berbera had been plundered and a man-of-war was sent to exact reprisals. The treaty then con-cluded secured an indemnity, peace, and commercial privileges.

With Sheikh of Zaila and Tajurrah we made treaties in 1840, and with the other tribes in 1884.

The value and dangers of its maintenance

As stated above, British trade with Berbera existed before 1827. Since the establishment of the protectorate this trade has increased so much that notwithstanding French competition at Jibuti the Customs receipts pay the whole of our expenditure in Somali Land.

The total volume of trade was of course much larger, at Zaila alone the total value of imports exceeded a value of 28,00,000 rupees.

The export of live-stock (over 73,000 animals in 1892-93) is considerable and benefits the Aden garrison. The chief imports are country grey shirting, American grey shirting, cotton piece-goods, glass-ware, and rice and jowari. The exports are ostrich feathers, ivory, hides and skins, shells, gum Arabic, fibre, ghee, and live-stock.

Besides the extent of this trade, which may increase

to very large proportions when the interior gets settled, it is of no small value to commerce that shipping is protected by our control over tribes who in former days made profit of shipwrecks. It tends moreover to peace that the coast opposite Aden should be in the hands of British officers, and not be held by European powers who might be hostile to us. The prevention of the slave trade is also secured by our occupation.

Under British protection the country attracts a num-ber of sportsmen and explorers whose exploits have created a public sentiment in favour of maintaining our inexpensive protectorate which is a point not beyond notice.

Lastly, there is always a possibility of good ports like Berbera taking a high position in the future of Africa. As African distances go, the protectorate is not far from the limits fixed by the Anglo-German Agreements of 1st November 1886, and 1st July 1890, for the British East African sphere, part of which lies on the river Juba. Even from Uganda over which a protectorate was declared on 19th June 1894 the distance to the southern limit of the Somali protectorate is not much greater than Zanzibar.

Our position in Somali Land is therefore a possession not lightly to be surrendered. Our rivals, the French, are established at Jibuti and at Obokh 120 miles from Aden.

The fact that the East India Company secured treaties with the tribes in 1827 and 1840 proves that, in their opinion, exclusively Indian interests were involved in the maintenance of British influence on the Somali Coast.

That opinion has been held by many Viceroys of India in succession. The Somali Coast is certainly not less im-portant to us in 1896 than it was seventy years ago. On the other hand, one risk overshadows all these ad-vantages however substantial. Abyssinia is flush with success, and it needs ports for trade and for arms. It has claimed the Somali Land as part of its empire. If India

has to defend this outlying protectorate, the Government of India must now recollect that the Afghan question may at any moment entail heavy demands upon its military resources, whilst its eastern frontier on the borders of Siam and China is not free from danger. Trade, the protection of ships, the exclusion of foreign Powers from the coast opposite Aden, the food supply of Aden, the repression of the slave trade, and some control over the importation of arms into Abyssinia are objects of interest both to India and Great Britain. But if they entail a serious risk of conflict with Abyssinia, whenever it pleases Russia or France to embroil us, then their cost may be more than we care to pay for advantages that may be secured perhaps without the risk involved in occupation.

We are awaiting from India a definite reply to our question as to the value of the Somali Coast to Aden and to India. Looking, however, to the anxiety of the East India Company to secure the Somali ports seventy years ago, and to the outcry raised at Aden when the Egyptian occupation and temporary disturbances on the coast raised the cost of Aden’s food supplies from Africa, I cannot doubt that India’s interests in the coast, or at any rate in the ports, are very substantial.

If the question of entire or partial withdrawal is to be considered, it becomes absolutely necessary to review the past history of British relations with Somaliland: other-wise the complicated questions of the rights, if any of Turkey, Egypt, or Abyssinia cannot be dealt with. The period of Somali history which closed in 1884 naturally falls into two divisions:

(a) The period before 1877;

(b) The period after 1877.

The period before 1877:

During this period, not without hesitation and dis-sent, the British Government acted upon the assumption

that the sovereignty of the Ottoman Porte and of Egypt did not extend to Berbera or even to Zaila. As this theory was contested by France, repudiated by the actions of Egypt, not recognised by Turkey, and questioned by the Britain’s own officers, it is probable that it may yet be contested in the future.

It is necessary for a moment to leave Zaila and look at the position at Berbera. In 1827 a man-of war was sent to exact reprisals for the plunder of a trading brig. the Marianne, and in February 1827 the Government of Bombay entered into a treaty of peace and commerce with the Habr Awal tribes there, and obtained monetary compensation for the outrage. In 1854 an expedition was sent to examine the country between Berbera and Zanzi-bar and the party was attacked in the following year.

Berbera was consequently blockaded, and a fresh treaty concluded with the tribes, securing free trade, the aboli-tion of slavery, and the protecaboli-tion of British interests.

At Tajurrah, to the west of Zaila, a treaty of peace and commerce was negotiated by the British with the Sultan on 18th August 1840, of which one condition was that the Chief would not enter into any treaty with other European Powers without reference to the British Government.

Such was the position on either side of Zaila when British determined to conclude a treaty with Zaila itself.

The action taken is significant. The head of the Arab tribes near Zaila, by name Seid Muhammad Bar, was Commander-in-Chief of the forces at Mocha. To Mocha Captain Moresby proceeded, and having entered into a treaty of commerce in respect of Mocha with the Sheriff of Mocha on 1st September 1840, he next negotiated on 3rd September an independent treaty with the Governor of Zaila, the aforesaid Commander-in-Chief of the Mocha forces, providing for British commerce and peace with Zaila, and binding the Governor to enter into no treaty with other European Powers without reference to Aden.

The island of Aubad was also to be made over to the British, and facilities for trade with interior through Zaila were promised. The French, however, looked to Turkey as the suzerain of Zaila, for in 1859 they charged the Governor of Zaila with having instigated the natives to murder M. Lambert, the French Consular Agent at Aden, and they obtained from the Porte an indemnity of 30,000 dollars for its subordinate’s alleged outrage. But the British continued to act upon the assumption that the Chiefs of the tribes of Zaila, Tajurrah, and Berbera were independent, until other events occurred, which gradually culminated in the recognition of Egyptian control.

In 1848 Zaila was farmed to Haj Shermarke by the Turkish Governor of Mocha and Hodeida. In 1866 the Sultan granted a firman to Egypt under which Egypt claimed Somali Land as a dependency. In July 1875 Zaila was farmed to Egypt by the Porte for Pounds T. 15,000.

Tajurrah was, all this while, tributary to Zaila. In Feb-ruary 1870 a Turkish man-of-war, the Khartoum landed troops at Berbera, and in 1873, the Egyptian corvette Surka treated Her Majesty’s ship Dalhousie as if the country belonged to Egypt. The position got strained, and the Government of India addressed us in letter No. 184, Foreign, dated 9th October 1874, on the whole question.

In their opinion, since “Egypt has openly committed herself to an assertion of authority by stationing gar-rison,” and “serious differences are undesirable,” whilst

“our own interests and obligations contracted with the tribes have compelled us to oppose the proceedings of the Turkish authorities,” an amicable settlement was re-quired “in regard to the commercial and other advantages which we wish to preserve at Berbera and elsewhere.” On April 23, 1875 Lord Salisbury replied, by Secret Despatch No 12, that Her Majesty’s Government agreed as to the advisability “of coming to an amicable arrangement with the Khedive with reference to the claims of the

Egyptian Government to sovereignty over the Somali Coast.” The claim of the Porte to the Somali Coast had been consistently disputed for many years, but the matter was settled by a Convention signed at Alexandria on 7th of September 1877, by which Her Majesty’s Government recognised the Khedive’s jurisdiction under the suzerainty of the Porte over the Somali Coast as far as Ras Hafun. The agreement was to come into operation under the terms of Article V, as soon as the Sultan should have given a formal assurance to Her Majesty’s Govern-ment that no portion of the territory of the Somali Coast would be ceded on any pretence to any foreign Powers.

One of its terms was that Berbera and Bulhar should be free ports, and that the duties at Zaila and Tajurrah should not exceed 5 per cent. on imports or one per cent on exports.

The assurance required to make the Convention operative was never given. But the settlement composed differences for the moment. The Egyptian occupation of Berbera commenced in 1873, and continued undisputed till 1884. Zaila was held by the Egyptians, who had also a garrison up country at Harrar. There were frequent complaints, whilst the Egyptian occupation lasted, re-garding the revival of the slave trade, and the imposition of higher duties and restrictions upon commerce. The supplies needed for Aden became more difficult to obtain and more expensive, and the Egyptian occupation might have proved intolerable if other events had not brought it to an end.

As a result of troubles in the Soudan it was decided that Egypt should withdraw from the Somali Land; and on 17th July 1884 the British Ambassador at Constan-tinople intimated to the Porte that, if it was ready to take steps on the withdrawal of the Egyptians to maintain its authority over Tajurrah and Zaila, Her Majesty’s Govern-ment would be willing on certain conditions to recognise

the authority of the Sultan over that part of the coast, including Zaila. The Porte took no steps, but the Egyptian Government notified on 19th November to the Porte its withdrawal from Zaila which had been effected by British help. The Egyptian garrison left Berbera in August 1884, and a British officer was sent to administer the place.

Zaila was occupied on August 18, 1884 by a British force, and Harrar was evacuated in June 1885.

After the departure of the Egyptian garrison from Berbera in the summer of 1884 an Assistant to the Resi-dent at Aden was sent there as a Vice-Consul and Colonel Stace taking this as the starting point of the British occupation, had submitted a first decennial report on the Protectorate for the period ending March 31, 1893.

The first steps taken were to secure peace by provi-ding armed police and a small garrison, and to obtain revenue by imposing customs duties at the ports. These were fixed at one per cent ad valorem on all exports except cattle, sheep and goats, and five per cent on imports. At this time treaties had been entered into with the Habr Awal, Habr Toljaala, Esa and Gadabursi tribes by which they bound themselves not to cede or sell their territory except to the British Government, to give free permission to trade, to grant protection to British agents and sub-jects, and to abolish slavery.

On 18th June 1884,* the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, C. Grant wrote to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bombay informing him that her Majesty’s Government have sanctioned the deputation of Major Hunter to the Somali Coast. The objects which the British Government had specially in view were to facilitate arrangements for the withdrawal of Egyptian control from the Somali Coast, and to

anti-* Foreign Department, Letter No. 1547E, dated Simla, NAI, New Delhi.

cipate the contingency of local disturbances or any attempt at Foreign occupation by entering into direct agreements with the Sheikhs of the local tribes.

According to the Secretary’s letter, the part of the African coast, which was included within the scope of Major Hunter’s mission, extended from the east of Zeyla to the headland of Ras Hafun.

The letter said:

“It is the intention of Her Majesty’s Government to decline, as heretofore, to admit any Ottoman rights on the coast line from Zeyla to Ras Hafun, and Major Hunter may at once proceed to secure the objects of his mission by entering into direct negotiations with the local tribes.

The most important of these tribes appear to be the Habr Owuls, the Habr-tel-Jaolis, the Wursungalis, (sic) and the Mijjerteyn Somalis. The chief ports are Bulhar, Berbera, Meyt, Bander Ghassem, Bander Khor, Bander Marayah, and Hafun.

The object of Major Hunter’s mission, was, as the British Secretary, Mr. Grant, said, “to endeavour, on the retirement of the Egyptians, to renew and supplement on the lines of the agreement made with the Sultan of Socotra in January 1876, the agreements which were concluded with the local Sheikhs in 1827 and 1856”.

In a Memo dated Aden, September 27, 1884, on the situation at Berbera, Major F.M. Hunter said: “The Egyptian garrison will leave as soon as the Abyssinia can take them away.

Mr. Walsh will then assume charge of the adminis-tration of the port on behalf of the Somalis.

Customs dues will be levied at 5 per cent, (except on live-stock) ad valorem on imports, and 1 per cent on exports (except on live-stock).

No other dues will be exacted.

Mr. Walsh has at his disposal about 45 armed police, besides 10 unarmed constables. He has also 30 spare

carbines, and 3,360 rounds of spare ball ammunition, with which on an emergency he could arm all the em-ployees under him.

Mr. Walsh has order to consult the Officer comman-ding Her Majesty’s ship in any emergency.

Major Hunter, who was the British Consul for the Somali Coast, sent the following instructions* to Mr. L.P.

Walsh, British Agent and Vice Consul at Berbera and Bulhar:

“After the departure of the Egyptian garrison from Berbera you will be guided by the following observations in the performance of your duties there and Bulhar:

2. It has primarily to be borne in mind that both the above-mentioned ports are independent and owned by the Somalis. Your functions are those of an administrator in a Native State. You will arrange for the collection of the customs (at Aden and on the spot). You will keep the peace of the ports, exercising the power of a first-class magis-trate. You have no civil jurisdiction, except over British subjects, and in regard to the latter, you will perform the various services usually required of a Vice-Consul.

3. It must be well made known and understood that you will afford to the subjects of all foreign nations the same protection and privileges as you accord to British subjects, and in the case of crimes of violence committed by foreigners (other than Arabs or Somalis) you will only use sufficient force to preserve the peace until an oppor-tunity offers of ascertaining the wishes of the defendant’s Consul at Aden.

4. Although you have the ample general powers of a first-class magistrate, you must avail yourself sparingly of the authority to punish by fine and imprisonment;

whipping should not be resorted to. Your sentences should

* Foreign Department, dated Aden, 27th September 1884, NAI, New Delhi.

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