BRITAIN’S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE BRITAIN’S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE BRITAIN’S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE BRITAIN’S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE BRITAIN’S RELATIONS WITH FRANCE In 1886 the French hoisted their flag at Dongarita, half-way between Zaila and Berbera and the Zaila police removed it. The French protested vigorously and claimed to have entered into engagements with the Jibril Abokr and other tribes and a long correspondence ensued. The matter ended in the Agreement of 1888 with France by which, as already stated, the limits of the British pro-tectorate were fixed. As compared to the Franch the British protectorate on the west and on the coast stood on solid ground and was well defined.
The British also established their position vis- a- vis other European Powers by communicating to them their treaties with the following tribes concluded on the dates shown below:
(1) Habr Awal, July 14, 1884. Prohibition to cede or part with territory save to the British Government;
permission to British vessels to trade with all Habr Awal ports; protection of British subjects in Habr Awal ter-ritory; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British Agents at Berbera or elsewhere in Habr Awal territories.
(Appendix Nine)
Habr Awal, March 15, 1886. Protection by Her Majesty of Habr Awal tribe and territories; prohibition of correspondence or treaty with foreign Powers.(Appendix Sixteen)
(2) Gadabursi, December 11, 1884. Prohibition to cede or part with territory; free permission to British vessels to trade; protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British Agents. (Appendix Ten)
(3) Habr Toljaala, December 26, 1884. Prohibition to cede or part with territory; free permission to British vessels to trade, and protection of wrecks and crews of the same; protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British Agents. (Appendix Eleven) Habr Toljaala, February 1, 1886. Protection by Her Majesty; prohibition of correspondence or treaty with foreign Powers. (Appendix Sixteen)
(4) Esa, 31 December 1884. Prohibition to cede or part with territory; free permission to British vessels to trade;
protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade;
appointment of British Agents. (Appendix Thirteen) (5) Habr Garhajis, January 13, 1885. Prohibition to cede or part with territory; free permission to British vessels to trade; protection of British subjects; abolition of slave trade; appointment of British Agent. (Appendix Twelve)
Habr Garhajis, February 1, 1886. Protection by Her Majesty; prohibition of correspondence of treaty with foreign Powers. (Appendix Sixteen)
(6) Warnsingli, January 27, 1886. Protection by Her Majesty; prohibition of correspondence or treaty with foreign Powers; assistance to wrecks and protection of crews of wrecked vessels; abolition of slave trade; ap-pointment of British Agents; assistance to British officers, and acceptance of their advice. (Appendix Fifteen)
The existence of these treaties was communicated to France, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Belgium on
various dates in 1885 to 1887, in accordance with Article XXXIV of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin dated February 26, 1885, which required that acts of assumption of a protectorate on the African coast should be communicated to the other signatory Powers, in order to give them an opportunity of making good any claims of their own.
BRITAIN’S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY BRITAIN’S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY BRITAIN’S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY BRITAIN’S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY BRITAIN’S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY W. Lee-Warner of the Political and Secret Depart-ment, India Office, wrote the following report:
“As regards Egypt and Turkey, I have explained that Zaila stands on a different footing from the rest of our Protectorate. Egypt communicated, on 19th November 1884, to the Porte its abandonment of the coast from Massowah to Zaila, and we rescued the Egyptian garri-son from Harrar. The Egyptian flag continued to fly until 1888, and since then its abandonment may perhaps be regarded as final and unreserved. But we certainly offered Zaila to the Porte in July 1884. As the Porte failed to take possession, our title to occupy is good. But is it equally good to hold or assign to another? If we assign to another Power, might not the Porte urge that its reversionary rights are good? When the Porte claimed the annual payment of Pound T. 15,000 we declined to recognise it although our Government hesitated, and the Foreign Office (22nd November 1888) wished to propose a pay-ment to the Porte “in commutation of the tribute.” So late as 25th October 1889, the treasury agreed to contribute 50,000£, in consideration of India contributing a similar sum, to the Porte, in order “to acquire a properly consti-tuted title,” if it was thought essential for the public interest, that the title of Zaila should be secured for this country. When the Porte claimed arrears of rent from Egypt, Egypt failed to pay. It seems then that the Porte might have something to say if Zaila were assigned, for
instance, to Abyssinia; although it is true, as reported by India (letter 31st January 1888) that the sovereignty of Turkey over Zaila has “never been formally admitted, and that a British occupation has actually been established, with ample notice to the Porte.” But, if such occupation ceases, would not the position be altered? I need only add that, throughout the discussions on this point, the es-sential connection of Zaila with the rest of the Pro-tectorate, and its importance to Aden, were insisted upon by the Indian authorities.”
The Lee-Warner report continued: “We have estab-lished Civil and Criminal Courts on the coast, have rebuilt Berbera in 1888, fortified the ports, erected jails, and in many effective ways established ourselves. Our garrison consists of barely 200 men scattered about. The duties we levy are one per cent ad valorem on exports and five per cent on imports. We pay stipends to headmen of the tribes in the interior, and have punished the tribes with small expeditions from time to time. Karam is a port from which a small trade is carried on with Aden, where the duties are levied. Besides this there are other ports capable of development. The revenue of Somali Land has increased so as to pay all expenses.”
SOMALI TERRITORIES TO ABYSSINIA SOMALI TERRITORIES TO ABYSSINIA SOMALI TERRITORIES TO ABYSSINIA SOMALI TERRITORIES TO ABYSSINIA SOMALI TERRITORIES TO ABYSSINIA The British Official said: “The main effect of the withdrawal of Italy is to leave our frontier in the interior exposed to attack by the Abyssinians, flushed with victory and irritated by our support of Italy, without any limit accepted by our neighbours. For many years we have declined direct negotiations with Makunan, and it must be confessed that the reed upon which we leaned for the external relations of the Protectorate has broken in our hands. We are at the same time firmly established on the coast, and have a nexus of agreements with the tribes
which we are bound to protect, with France our neigh-bour, and with the Powers that signed Berlin Act.. We have no force at Aden or on the coast which can resist Abyssinian incursions. If we remain, the settlement of our limits with Abyssinia seems an urgent and immediate necessity. If we retire, we had better do so in accordance with settled plan and without unnecessary appearance of compulsion. The failure of Italy to hold her African pro-tectorate without collision with Abyssinia has its lessons.
If we only want food supplies from the coast, we can still get them without asserting by force our right to the whole of the Protectorate as delimitated with Italy. Three solu-tions are possible. Events will show which is the best of them.
(1) We can abandon not merely Biyo Kaboba actually held by Abyssinia, but also a considerable part of the hinterland, retaining the ports.
(2) If that will not secure peaceful occupation, we can give Abyssinia one of our ports.
(3) If events prove that we cannot remain on the coast without a strong military establishment there, we might retire altogether, making a treaty with Abyssinia that live-stock shall be exported free, that imports and exports from Zaila and Berbera shall not be charged more than the present, and that the ports shall not be given to any European power without our leave.
The action proposed—There is plenty of room for concession, and the question now arises as to what action we should take at once in the direction of amicable settlement.
I think that it should be our last, and not our first, step to send a mission to Harrar as proposed by the Government of India.* At present we should await events,
* Foriegn Department, Secret letter No. 189, dated 28th October 1896, NAI, New Delhi.
allow Abyssinia’s claims to formulate themselves and clear away difficulties that lie in the way of action. We want, for instance, to ascertain whether it is Makunan or Menelek with whom we have to reckon, and whether the surrender of Zaila to Abyssinia would call forth French or Turkish remonstrance.
I. The first step, I think, is to prevent Colonel Ferris writing any letters whatsoever to Makunan without our knowledge or the Resident’s approval. This seems a trivial matter, but I submit it after ten years’ personal ex-perience of Aden and Somali affairs. Every Resident in that period has complained that, as he is not Consul-General, he cannot
II. Control the Consul. We have lately pointed out the fallacy of this reasoning, but the present Consul on the coast has written many letters to Makunan, and it seems to me that we should at this critical stage take the lead, and direct the
III. Resident to report by telegraph the purport of any communications he may receive from Harrar, and to send no answers pending instructions. The answer should go from the Resident and not from the Consul, thus em-phasising the Resident’s responsibility.
The next step, I think, is to follow the precedent of 1877, and address the Foreign Office an enquiry whether:
(1) We must deal in this matter with Makunan or with Menelek?
(2) We can assign Zaila to Abyssinia, if such a sur-render seems desirable (a) without further reference to Turkey, (b) without reference to France our neighbour at Jibuti.
As to whether it is fair on the tribes, with whom we have protectorate treaties, to abandon them, that is a question which we must consider ourselves.
(3) The third step will be to send a mission, and the name of Captain H.G.C. Swayne, R. E., is suggested by
the Government of India. It will disappoint the local officers especially the Consul, Colonel Ferris, if an out-sider is sent. Captain Swayne would in many ways be a good selection, I think, but much will depend on whether the mission goes to Makunan or Menelek.
By the time these preliminary points are settled, we shall be able to instruct the agent sent as to what he is to agree to. Probably his presence will be needed here. The value which India really places on the retention of the coast will meanwhile be known to us, and until we get the expected letter it would be premature to formulate other proposals for action. In particular it seems to me that, whether we retain Zaila or transfer it, the question of imperfect title must be settled for us by the Foreign Office.
It will prepare the ground for a decision, which may have to be taken quickly, to get this matter discussed. I append in a note (of) a Minute recorded by the Political Com-mittee in 1890 on this question.
W. LEE-WARNER Political and Secret Dept., India Office The 25 November 1896.