D
irect British involvement in Somalia began in 1880 when the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Earl Granville sent a letter to E.B. Malet, HM’s Agent and Consul-General in Cairo, in which he said:“The Indian Government (British Authority) are an-xious that one of the Assistants attached to the (British) Resident at Aden should be furnished with a Consular Commission, which would give him jurisdiction over the territory from Tajurrah inclusive to Ras Hafoon, and enable him to visit the Somali Coast at frequent intervals, thereby obviating the necessity of employing a Native British Agent at Berbera, a system which does not appear to have succeeded.
“I have expressed myself in favour of this proposal, but before sanctioning the issue of a Commission to the officer who may be recommended for this duty by the (British) Government of India, I should be glad to learn your opinion as to whether such an arrangement will coincide with the views of the (Turkish) Egyptian Government.”
Malet replied to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs: “I have spoken to Moustapha Pasha Fahmy, Minister for
Foreign Affairs (of Turkish Authority in Egypt) on the subject and His Excellency, after communicating with the Khedive and Riaz Pasha, has informed me that the (Turkish) Egyptian Government has no objection to make the proposed appointment, but that they are anxious that in the letter notifying it no mention should be made of the fact that the nominee is an Assistant to the Resident at Aden, and that they hope that the person appointed will technically be under my orders.”
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Earl Gran-ville agreed to the suggestion and told the Consul General that Captain F.M. Hunter, Bombay Staff Corps, 2nd Assistant to the Resident at Aden, has been appointed Consul for the East Coast of Africa from Tajurrah to Ras Hafoon.
For the British, the appointment of some one who should work for their interests in Somalia, was very important as there were other powers which coveted the area. In fact, this was indicated in a letter sent by Major-General F.A.E. Loch, Political Resident at Aden to the Chief Secretary to the British Government at Bombay, C.
Gonne. On February 8, 1881, Loch wrote:
“I would suggest the necessity of Captain Hunter being invested with Consular powers without any further delay, and that the (British) Home Government may be urged by wire, if necessary, to forward his Exequatur by the first mail.... This in my opinion is most necessary to enable us to keep up the prestige of Great Britain in those waters and in the Red Sea.”
By the year 1884, the British were planning to take over the Somali territories in case of withdrawal of the Turkish forces from the coast. The Hon. J.B. Richey, Acting Secretary to (British) Government of Bombay, wrote from Bombay Castle on July, 4, 1884 in a letter marked confidential) to C. Grant, Secretary to the (British) Government of India, Foreign Department, that
“... orders have been issued in accordance therewith for the deputation of Major Hunter to the Somali Coast.”
At the time of his appointment as Consul to the Somali Coast, F.M. Hunter was a Captain and three years later he was promoted to the rank of Major and became the architect of the British plan for the occupation of the Somali territories.
Prior to the eventual withdrawal of the Egyptian (Turkish) garrisons from the Somali Coast, Major Hunter, then officiating Political Resident at Aden, wrote to Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for India, India Office, London, in 1884 (without date):
“I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship’s Secret No.2 of the 23rd May 1884.
“It has fallen to me in the absence of the Resident to furnish the remarks and suggestions desired by Your Lordship relative to the measures to be adopted in the event of the Egyptians being withdrawn from the Somali Coast.
“The accompanying memorandum nevertheless con-tains, I have reason to believe, the opinions and views of General Blair, V.C., who is now in England. Our neglect to temporarily occupy Berbera and possibly other Somali ports on their evacuation by Egypt will render their falling into the hands of France and Italy more than probable.
“In conclusion I have only to observe (as my name is especially mentioned in connection with the execution of treaties with the Somal(is), that from my knowledge of the race there will certainly be a difficulty, if not a total miscarriage, in the execution of our intentions, unless the inevitable be accepted in the form of a temporary oc-cupation. In fact a reversion to the position of affairs which existed before the Egyptian occupation is not possible, because circumstances are entirely altered, and there are several novel considerations to be taken into
account, especially the extension of French influence in Abyssinia.”
In the 1884 Memorandum, Major Hunter pointed out:
“What has to be considered is the fact that the Porte was actually in possession of Zaylah in 1873. If Egypt is to be considered the vassal of Turkey, it might be argued that we have acquiesced in the Ottoman claim of Zeylah.
If however the Khedive holds his African possession as an independent power, the Porte has no more right to Zeylah than the Portuguese or any other casual conq-ueror. The difficulty in the matter is, that if Egypt eva-cuates, and Turkey does not step in, there is no local chief who has any claim to the port.”
Major Hunter wrote in his memorandum: “Zeylah although situated in the Easa country is virtually as much Dankali as Easa—apart from the indirect interests of the Habr Awal and Gadabursi in the place. It is the port of Southern Abyssinia, Shoa, Harrar, the Galla country and to some extent Agaden (Ogaden) it possesses considerable commercial importance, although, owing to long periods of misgovernment, its popularity and usefulness have been sadly impaired. In 1883-84, the value of the trade of Aden with Zaylah and Tajurrah aggregated $100,000, the imports and exports being about equal.”
“If the Turks go back to Zaylah they will eventually go to Harrar, and meanwhile they will make it impossible to develop trade. Egypt has had enough in this respect, but it is not possible to measure the evils which will result to general commerce from an Ottoman occupation”, Major Hunter said in his memorandum.
He added: “What therefore is to become of Zaila? Her Majesty’s Government do not wish to occupy it, Turkey should not be allowed to return there; there is no local Chief who could advantageously be put in; France and Italy are anchored hard by, waiting their opportunity. Such are the facts on which a decision will have to be based.”
About 1500 A.D. Zeylah fell into the hands of the Porte as suzerain of Yemen. It was captured by the Portuguese early in the 16th century but does not seem to have been permanently occupied by that power. Zeylah eventually passed quietly under the Imams of Sanaa and during the period of their ownership the Treaty of 1840 was made by the British with Sayed Muhammad Bar.
“Tajourra is differently situated, and if need be its independence could possibly be secured by treaty; but in this, as in other cases, we may have to pay for the pri-vileges attached to an engagement such as that entered into with Socotra”.
Hunter believed that any foreign establishment in the Gulf of Tajourra can only be viewed as a base from where foreign influences could be extended. He said: “This Residency has no knowledge of, or concern with, Abys-sinian politics; but with France at Tajourra, Turkey at Zeila, and Italy at Assab, Southern Abyssinia will be pretty well dominated by the other European powers.”
Major Hunter came up with an anti-Somali idea as regards Tajourra and Zeila, “There is one alternative which can be suggested as regards Tajourah and Zeylah,
“but”, he said: “it is not possible for this Residency to pronounce on its merits.”
He wrote:
“Let Tajourra and Zeila be offered by the British to King Menelek of Shoa on such conditions as Her Majesty’s Government think suitable. The local tribes, there is reason to believe, would not oppose such a course, and if we do not give Menelek a port, France or Italy will, for Obokh and Assab were acquired, we all think here, principally with the object of treating favorably with the King of Shoa.”*
* Letter No. 3478, dated Bombay Castle the 4th July 1884 (Confidential) Foreign Department, NAI, New Delhi.
From the earliest ages the African coast of the Gulf of Aden has been in the hands of Arabs from the opposite shores. In (the) 14th century, according to Major Hunter’s memorandum, “the Arabs were frequently driven back on their harbor, and were even occasionally expelled there-from by the Abyssinian Kings only to reconquer their port with greater slaughter. By this time the original Arab race had culminated in a half-African descendant. This type of race is noted for its endurance, courage and religious fanaticism, and is only equalled, perhaps, by the Soudanese of the Red Sea, whose antecedents are similar.”
“At Berbera the Egyptians have done much to improve the port. A light-house has been built, an excellent pier has been run out into the harbour, and water has been brought in from a distance of eight miles, and is dis-tributed all over, what may be called, a new settlement.
Two musjids (masjids), besides barracks, a hospital, store-rooms and other public buildings have been cons-tructed of a substantial nature, and would do credit to any administration.”
He reported to the Government, “When the Egyptian occupation of the African Coast of the Gulf of Aden was impending almost all the Somali tribes, and specially the Ayyal Ahmed, implored the British Government to take them under its protection, and the Ayyal Yunus of Bulhar maintained a sort of half independence long after the Ayyal Ahmed had been completely brought into subjection.”
Major Hunter warned that “unless Her Majesty’s Govern-ment are prepared to give the Ayyal Ahmed and the Ayyal Yunus some substantial guarantee that they will protect Berbera against all comers, those tribes, if opportunity offered, might seek French or Italian support.”
Major Hunter sent the following telegram dated Aden, July 13, 1884, to the Secretary of State for India, through
the British Governor in Bombay in which he said among other things.
“Zeylah should be at once temporarily occupied by us with Khedive’s consent to overawe Somalis and treaty made with latter.”
The Secretary of State for India replied to Major Hunter in a telegram on August 2, 1884:
“Before taking steps you recommend, we have thought it right to warn Porte that, unless it take immediate measures for Turkish occupation of Zaylah, British troops will be sent. You are, however, authorised to make nece-ssary preparations to reinforce Zeylah garrison from Aden as you suggest, and further to occupy it without reference home if you consider step cannot safely be deferred.”