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RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Nel documento policy process and the role of donors” (pagine 99-105)

This study analyses the policy process related to the design and implementation of the IAIPs initiative, in a rapidly changing political economy context, and answers two questions:

1. How have different stakeholders influenced the policy process of design and implementation of the IAIPs?

2. Have major policy decisions been influenced primarily by stakeholders’

interests (political, personal, institutional) or ideas (ideological paradigms, policy models, evidence)?

The analysis of the role of the major stakeholders will focus on issues of ownership of development programmes and influence over their design and implementation, with a particular attention to the role of governments and development partners. We will look at different aspects, such as the selection of the participants in the policy process, the setting of the agenda, the coordination and alliances between different stakeholders, the funding of the initiative.

We acknowledge in principle the primacy of domestic politics (de Renzio, 2006) in the determination of policy choices, but this case study allows us to investigate how, beyond the role of fiscal crises in strengthening donors’

influence (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997), also political change can open new spaces for policy dialogue and thus increase their role (Lavers and Hickey, 2016). This is particularly relevant in the Ethiopian case, where, as Borchgrevink (2008) and Brown and Fisher (2020) point out, meaningful policy dialogue between donors and domestic authorities has been usually limited, because of a combination of several factors, such as the relevance of the country in geo-political terms, the strong assertiveness of the government with respect to the determination of the country’s development path, its capacity to deliver in terms of broad based economic growth, the poor coordination among donors and their lack of capacity to reach domestic civil society organisations, all of which result in the weak donors’ influence over government policies (108).

(108) Interestingly, according to Brown and Fisher (2020), because of their historical weakness in engaging Ethiopian authorities on governance and human rights issues the donors’ community was “blindsided by the resignation of Meles’ successor Hailemariam Desalegn…and his unexpected replacement by a reformer, Abiy Ahmed” (Ibidem, p. 189) and their influence is very weak “at a time when the Ethiopian regime is debating major political reform.” (Ibidem, p. 185). In a similar vein, a recent UNDP memo to the UN Secretary General, while highlighting that both federal government and TPLF bear a share of responsibility for the devastating conflict undergoing in Tigray, stressed that the international community failed to understand the implications of the TPLF intransigent and counterproductive position against the new government over the past two years (Foreign Policy, 2021d).

The literature on policy processes in developing countries (Keeley and Scoones, 1999; Sumner et al., 2011) has variously identified as the main drivers of policy decisions the interests of powerful stakeholders, the policy ideas/discourse/narratives and the role of institutions. This literature departs from the traditional government centred, technocratic and linear model of the policy process and recognises instead that there are multiple sources of policies in a process that has been described as “…a chaos of purposes and accidents.” (Clay and Schaffer, 1984 p. 192).

This literature highlights as well the relevance of global policy processes which have emerged in these last two decades with governments, international organisations and non-state actors trying to answer to transboundary problems (such as migrations), common property problems (such as climate change) and simultaneous problems of nations experiencing similar development challenges (Deacon, 2006). These processes have led to new forms of ‘soft’ authority that complements the traditional ‘hard’ authority of states (Arthur, 2001) and to increasing ‘policy transfer’ (Evans, 2004) and reference to international policy models perceived as successful (Crewe and Young, 2002). Finally, the literature highlights the role of new players, such as international actors-networks - composed by international agencies, international non-governmental organisations and business networks - (Keeley and Scoones, 1999) and epistemic communities - that can build alliances with the other actors - (Stone, 2008), as well as the role of their agency in changing policy narratives (Sumner et al., 2011).

We will thus take an actor-oriented approach (Sumner et al., 2011) and explore the different strategies employed by development partners in a more open “strategy space” (Rodrik, 2014): mainly the mobilisation of transnational actor-networks (in our case study, like-minded donors, development banks and UN organisations) and epistemic communities (in our case study, academic and policy makers involved in agro-industrial development in Europe) to advocate for different approaches and models.

The political economy literature has long focused on the role of interests in the determination of policy outcomes.

Anthony Downs in his seminal book “An Economic Theory of Democracy”

(1957) argued that in multiparty democracies politicians seek a place in government not with the intent to maximise social welfare, but rather to pursue their own selfish motives (which could include the pursuit of power, income or prestige) and formulate policies in order to win elections. On the other hand, voters support the politicians which formulate policies that provide them with the highest possible satisfaction. Thus, the political arena is characterised by self-motivated individuals that exchange policies for votes. In Downs view’s ideologies play an instrumental role, as by embodying the policy positions of political parties on various issues, they can reduce the

costs faced by voters for seeking information about the different policies promoted (Downs, 1957).

The role of interests has been central in theories of interest groups, since the seminal work of Mancur Olson, “The Logic of Collective Action” (1965).

According to Olson, the existence of common interests is not a sufficient condition for the formation of effective interest groups, rather self-interested individuals join interest groups only if the expected benefits (such as cheaper access to good and services, material benefits derived from policies implemented thanks to the lobbying activities of the group) outweigh the cost of membership (such as time, effort, acquisition and dissemination of information). However, Olson recognised as well the fulfilment of ideological objectives as intangible benefits.

Finally, the economic theory of regulation (Stigler, 1971; Peltzam, 1976;

Becker, 1976) highlights how voter maximising politicians and rent seeking interest groups interact in the political market arena.

Interests are at the centre of Niskanen (1973) model of bureaucracy:

bureaucrats are self-interested, looking for power, wealth and privileges, all factors that are associated with a higher budget for their agencies. Thus, bureaucrats seek to maximise budgets, which lead them to actually pursue institutional interests.

The role of interests in explaining the behaviour of policy makers is an essential part of Drazen (2008) general model of political economy: interests can be political (achieve or retain power) or personal (accumulate wealth, enjoy privileges). In the model, also the personal interests of the selectorate and the coalition that support the policy makers play a key role in determining policies. However, Drazen recognises as well the role of ideological preferences in the utility functions that both policy makers and selectorate try to maximise.

The well-established literature investigating the rise of the developmental state model in East Asian countries has highlighted the pivotal role played by internal and external political threats to shape the rise of autocratic governments and to spur their initiatives to achieve developmental goals. For instance, the threat of communism, in the forms of either the rise of foreign economic powers or the rebellion of the domestic peasantry, has been variously identified as the main drive behind the nature of policy choices made by political elites, interested in retaining their power but also securing economic and social stability (Campos and Root, 1996; Islam and Chowdhury, 2000; Poulton, 2014; Clapham, 2018). However, as Hickey (2013, p. 16) points out “Ideas and ideology have also emerged as significant in studies of elite commitment…” in developmental states. Moreover, as we

have seen above, Gebregziabher (2019) analysing the Ethiopian political economy context, pointed out that different ideological paradigms arising during key political junctures, contributed to legitimise and strengthen the power of the state over the society.

Finally, the literature on politics and development (Di John and Putzel, 2009;

North et al, 2009; Khan, 2010; Khan, 2012; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2013) focuses on how political bargaining leads to the establishment of political settlements which determine the quality of institutions and the allocation of rents, thus shaping the prospect for future development. This last stream of literature has put elites’ political interests at the centre of the development process. However, according to Lavers and Hickey (2016, p. 393) it has downplayed the role of ideas in policy determination and “is unable to predict which policies (economic or social) will actually be selected by a particular coalition”.

The relevance of ideas in shaping policies is being re-evaluated by several authors.

Rodrik (2014) argues that taking ideas into account along with vested interests, “allows us to provide a more convincing account of both stasis and change in political-economic life” (Rodrik 2014, p. 190). He points out that ideas can influence the basic building blocks of the political economy: the objective function of political actors (“who we are?”), their perception of the reality and the constraints under which they operate (“how the world works?”) and their perception about feasible policies or the “strategy space”

(“what can be done?”).

Indeed, ideas about nationalism, class, ethnicism can shape the narrative around the objective function of political leaders. Ideological paradigms, such as the Washington Consensus, the developmental state model, the international consensus around the need for both stronger states and markets, can influence their perception of the reality.

Finally, in relation to the strategy space (i.e., what choice sets are available with which to maximise the objective function?), innovative policies are similar to innovative technologies: they can move a society closer to the production possibility frontier, without threatening the current and/or future power of the political elites. Innovative policies can thus result in policy change that improve social welfare. In the words of Rodrik, “New ideas about what can be done - innovative policies - can unlock what otherwise might seem like the iron grip of vested interests” (2014, p. 194) and “Just as we think of technological ideas as those that relax resource constraints, we can think of political ideas as those that relax political constraints, enabling those in power to make themselves (and possibly the rest of society) better off without undermining their political power.” (2014, p. 197).

In Rodrik’s view, the world is replete with examples of innovative policies, especially in processes that led elites in power to promote industrialisation, despite the perceived threat that newly empowered economic actors could replace them. In this regard, Rodrik (2014, p.199) mentions the cases of England, Germany and Japan where “State-directed industrialization, gradual concessions to the rising industrial classes, diversification into commerce and industry, alliance with industrial interests, and similar choices ensured elites could benefit from industrialization while retaining much of their power”.

Another interesting example of innovative policies is the dual-track reform process in China, implemented in both the agricultural and industrial sectors (Rodrik, 2014, pp. 199-200). In the agricultural sector, China’s elites had a strong interest in maintaining the compulsory delivery of grains at controlled prices, because this allowed them to raise taxes and ensure urban workers access to cheap food. At the same time price liberalisation would generate significant efficiency gains in the countryside. Therefore, starting in the late 1970s, they allowed farmers to sell at market prices, only after they made the planned deliveries at state-set prices. This “shielded the prevailing stream of rents from the effect of the reform” (Rodrik, 2014, p. 200), thus relaxing political constraints on policy change.

According to Rodrik (2014, p. 200), “China’s special economic zones functioned similarly. Rather than liberalize its trade regime in the standard way, which would have decimated the country’s inefficient state enterprises, China allowed firms in special economic zones to operate under near free-trade rules while maintaining restrictions elsewhere” … “This enabled China to insert itself in the world economy while protecting employment and rents in the state sector. The Chinese Communist Party was strengthened and enriched, rather than weakened as a result”.

According to Rodrik (2014), innovative policies arise because of perceived inefficiency of actual policies, learning by doing, crises and emulation.

Finally, the author stresses the role of “political entrepreneurs” (Rodrik, 2014, p. 2002) in developing efficiency enhancing proposals that take political feasibility into account. Indeed, while inefficiency creates opportunities for political entrepreneurship, the role of political entrepreneurs in producing change points at an action-oriented approach to explain policy processes.

In his critique of the power-centred approach of the political settlement literature, Hickey (2013) highlights the role of perceived legitimacy amongst citizens as a determinant of political stability, the importance of elite commitment for explaining national development, the influence on policies of transnational flows of ideas and epistemic communities, and the role of political change as source of new ideas.

Political instability and change are also key factors for explaining policy

change according to Lavers and Hickey (2016, p. 394): “It is only during periods of institutional instability or ‘Knightian uncertainty’ - when agents are not only unsure of how to achieve their interests, but also unsure of what their interests are - that actors re-evaluate the core paradigms that guide their decision making and seek new approaches”. In the words of Blyth (2007, p. 762) “in moments of uncertainty, crisis-defining ideas not only tell agents ‘what has gone wrong’ but also ‘what is to be done’.”

Drawing from this conceptual framework, the present research analyses the policy process of design and implementation of the IAIPs initiative. In particular, we’ll focus our analysis over a period of rapidly changing political-economy context and social and political turmoil (2014-2020) to highlight whether and to what extent policy stakeholders’ interests and ideas have shaped policy stasis and change.

5. RESEARCH METHODS AND CASE

Nel documento policy process and the role of donors” (pagine 99-105)