PH.D. THESIS
“LAW, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, AND ADVANCING DIVERSITIES IN A MUSLIM MAJORITY COUNTRY. A LESSON FROM INDONESIA”
By:
JOENI ARIANTO KURNIAWAN Matricola: 557177
Academic year: 2016-2019
Supervisor:
Chiar.mo Prof. Pierluigi Consorti
UNIVERSITÀ di PISA
DIPARTIMENTO di GIURISPRUDENZA
PISA 2019
LAW, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, AND ADVANCING
DIVERSITIES IN A MUSLIM MAJORITY COUNTRY. A
LESSON FROM INDONESIA
By:
i TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary ……… v
Chapter I: Introduction ……… 1
Chapter II: The Concept of Islamic Fundamentalism ……… 14
II.1. Fundamentalism ……… 14
II.2. Islamic Fundamentalism ……… 18
II.3. Some Related Categories ……… 26
II.3.1. Islamic Radicalism ……… 26
II.3.2. Islamic Reformism, Modernism, and Traditionalism ……… 28
II.4. Conclusion ……… 29
Chapter III: The History and the Dynamic of Islam and Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia ……… 32
III.1. Pre-Colonial Period ……… 33
III.2. Colonial Period ……… 36
ii
III.4. Conclusion ……… 88
Chapter IV: The Politics of Recognition of Difference ……… 95
IV.1. Multiculturalism ……… 95
IV.2. Interculturalism ……… 108
IV.3. Translating the Principles into Legal Frameworks and Policies ……… 112
IV.3.1. Intercultural Policies and MCPs ……… 112
IV.3.2. Intercultural Law ……… 116
IV.4. Theoretical Reflection on Indonesian Context ……… 118
IV.5. Conclusion ……… 124
Chapter V: The Laws and Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia ……… 128
V.1. The Pancasila ……… 128
V.2. The Constitution ……… 138
V.3. The Anti-Blasphemy Law ……… 146
V.3.1. The Background and the Content of the Law ……… 146
iii V.3.2. Some Cases under
Anti-Blasphemy Law ……… 150
V.3.3. The Constitutional Court’s Decision regarding
Anti-Blasphemy Law ……… 154
V.4. The “Sharia Province” of Aceh ……… 161
V.4.1. The Historical and the
Sociological Context ……… 161
V.4.2. The Laws Regarding the Formal Implementation of Sharia and the Sharia Court in Aceh
……… 165
V.5. Conclusion ……… 171
Chapter VI: Advancing Diversities through Law in Indonesia. A Lesson from a
Muslim Majority Country ……… 177
VI.1. A Brief Reflection ……… 177
VI.2. Addressing Islamic
Fundamentalism and Advancing Diversities through Law in a
Muslim Majority Country ……… 183
VI.2.1. Liberalism and Diversities ……… 184
iv VI.2.3. Constructing the Legal
Framework (within the
Indonesian Context) ……… 192
VI.3. Conclusion ……… 201
Bibliography ……… 208
v SUMMARY
Indonesia is a diverse country, if not one of the most diverse ones in the world. Due to its geographical fact as the largest archipelago in the world, Indonesia's territory has been inhabited by not less than 1340 different tribes who speak more than 600 local/traditional languages since ancient times. It is also the territory where there were some prominent Hindu-Buddhist ancient kingdoms, such as Srivijaya and Majapahit, in which their existence determined the civilization existing in South East Asia today. Once Islam came into this archipelago, it then quickly became the dominant religion, and this then makes Indonesia the biggest Muslim country in the world without changing its status as a place for people from various religions to live and co-exist with each other. Those all shape the existence of Indonesia today. The world's biggest Muslim country with its inherent diversities that have been existing since long before the establishment of this country.
However, such a fact of diversities, especially in the matter of religious life, has been under threat. There have been many cases where the religious minority groups encountered marginalization, discrimination, or even persecutions, in which it happened in the relationship with the Muslims as the dominant religious group. Resistances against the establishments of churches or other worship places of the non-Muslims that is more and more frequent happening in various places in Indonesia, or resistance against non-Muslims to be the governmental leaders, such as what happened during the moment of the provincial election in Jakarta in 2017, are examples of how some Muslims in Indonesia are getting intolerant towards their fellow citizens from different religions. Even worse, such an emerging tendency of intolerance didn't only happen towards non-Muslims, but also towards the minority groups within the Muslims too. The persecution against the members of the Ahmadiyya sect in the village of Cikeusik, province of Banten, in 2011, as well as the one against the Shiites in the town of Sampang, province of East Java, in 2012, which resulted in the deaths of some Ahmadiyya members and the displacement of the whole Shiite community in Sampang, obviously highlighted the condition of how such diseases of intolerance and hatred have been significantly growing among some Muslims in Indonesia towards those who differ. Surely, the problem is not with Islam per se, but instead with how Islam is interpreted, practiced, and used by some people in Indonesia. As such, I argue that this problem derives from the so-called Islamic fundamentalism.
vi It is from this context, the research through this Ph.D. thesis is carried out. Through this research, I investigated how Islamic fundamentalism has been developing in Indonesia since the beginning through historical analysis (Chapter III). From such an investigation, I then investigated and analyzed further the existing legal frameworks in Indonesia regarding how these all have failed in properly dealing with the paradigm of Islamic fundamentalism (Chapter V). Surely, all those works are done after I conducted the necessary elaboration and clarification regarding the concept of Islamic fundamentalism (Chapter II). And since pluralism is the core value embraced in this research that needs to be protected from the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, I also made theoretical elaborations on some principles and approaches under the umbrella of the politics of recognition of difference to protect and advance diversities (Chapter IV). I close this Ph.D. thesis with a chapter (Chapter VI) where I proposed what I argue as the best legal framework possible to combat Islamic fundamentalism as well as to advance diversities in Indonesia as a Muslim majority country. There, I argued that some key principles developed in the Western world are indeed necessary to serve as the fundamental basis for such a legal framework.
Key words:
1 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Pluralism. That is the main keyword, the basis, as well as the fundamental value embraced in this research, and there are strong reasons for that.
First, mankind in its most natural sense is in fact diverse, and diversities are everywhere facts of life. One can take this back to very basic principles. Everyone is born different from the other. Even a twin is not totally the same. So, if every human is basically different from any other, then in a society, diversities are the inherent element of society.
Second, since diversities are the inherent element of a society, then in today’s global world, where social mobility and interconnection are getting eased more and more, every nation-state in this world is also inevitably getting more and more diverse, partly through migration of ‘others’ into a specific territory or space. The people in a state will have to deal with difference much more than before. In such situations, more tensions and conflicts will always potentially happen, and there is no other way to manage the differences in a peaceful way except by embracing the value of pluralism as the basis of the social system.
Third, in the specific context of Indonesia as the main locus of this research, diversities have long been a pre-existing fact since far before the existence of this country on August 17, 1945. Comprising an area across thousands of islands from the tip of Sumatra island in the west until the island of Papua in the east, “Nusantara”, the particular name given by the Indonesian people for the geographical area which now becomes the Indonesian territory, has been inhabited by various ethnic groups and tribes since thousands of years, and such situation remains until today. Statistically speaking, there are at least 1.340 different tribes existing in Indonesia according to the Indonesian Statistical Bureau (Anonymous, 2016, p. 165). There have been also at least six major religions embraced by the population in Indonesia since prior to the establishment of this country, which are: Islam, Catholic, Protestant Christian, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism.1 Alongside these six major
1 Though Catholicism and Protestant Christian were historically one religion, which is Christianity, in Indonesia
2 religions, there are also many traditional religions embraced by the so-called indigenous people or masyarakat adat (the people of adat), which is a social group in Indonesia using the adat laws (the Indonesian customary laws) as the basis of their social groupings. According to Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara or AMAN (the Indigenous People Alliance of the Archipelago), as the most notable organization working on indigenous people in Indonesia, there are 2.332 indigenous communities existing in Indonesia constituting members of this organization. According to such facts of diversity, the state of Indonesia formulated an official motto derived from the Sanskrit language which says “Bhinneka
Tunggal Ika” that more or less means “unity in diversity.”
Having a fact of diversities on the one side and managing diversities on the other side, however, are different things. This means that though diversities (which means a plurality of pluralities) have been a globalized fact, managing such diversities is still an issue many countries are struggling to deal with.
In the western worlds, where diversities mainly come from migration, there has been a re-emergence of conservatism as a reflection of fear and hesitation in dealing with diversities. This can be seen in countries like England with its “Brexit” decision and the US which elected Donald Trump as the new President, as well as the emerging popularity of far-right parties that often use the sentiment of anti-immigrant and xenophobia in their political propaganda in the EU countries (Anonymous, 2018). These phenomena happened due to a shared similar background, involving anger against globalization and immigration and thus involving an expectation for more stringent policies towards migration and basically more state control over the movement of people.
In Indonesia, where the diversities of ethnic groups, tribes, religions, and cultures have been the pre-existing condition and thus they are the foundation that the establishment of this country is laid on, managing such diversities is still an issue as well. Between 1967 – 1998, Indonesia was ruled by an authoritarian military regime under the leadership of General Soeharto. There were so many suppressions on those perceived as a potential threat for the government, including some religious and cultural expressions. However, even after 20 years since Soeharto’s downfall, instead of being settled, the issue of managing plurality is getting more challenging in Indonesia.
3 One of the most recent prominent cases is when the provincial election for the Governor of Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, was held in 2017. During this moment, right before the election, there was a huge movement conducted by conservative Muslim groups opposing Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, popularly called Ahok, who is a Christian Chinese-descent person and was the incumbent governor, to run in the election.2 What makes this movement significant is because it was supported by hundreds of thousands of Muslims who started a series of rallies in Jakarta. These rallies were conducted as an expression of the demand for punishment of Ahok, based on an allegation of “blasphemy against Islam” through a speech delivered by him a couple of months before the election day. Though these rallies were claimed not to be political, and just demanding the law enforcement for the blasphemy case, there is nevertheless a strong signal of political motives reflected by some aspirations uttered during the rallies, encouraging Jakarta’s Muslims to only elect Muslim candidates in the election (Anonymous-1, 2017). The end of this case is really bitter for Purnama/Ahok. The movement was successful to convince the majority population of Jakarta which made Ahok lose the election, and the trial for the blasphemy case he faced resulted in a judges’ verdict which decided that he was guilty and thus he had to be imprisoned for two years. Many believe that Ahok’s case is a strong indication that religious sentiment is still powerful to be used as a political trick or tool to obtain power in Indonesia.
Ahok’s case is not the only case of religious sentiment which led to socio-political turmoil in Indonesia. Since the moment of Soeharto’s downfall, or famously called in Indonesia as “Era
Reformasi” (the era of reform), there have been quite a lot of cases influenced by or at least
with a relation to religious sentiment. For instances, there were frequent incidents where some Muslim groups apparently fought against the establishment of worship places of other religions, especially churches. According to the Indonesian Committee of Religions for Peace, just in one year from 2009 until 2010, at least 17 churches were brutally targeted by Islamic radicals or even local authorities for various reasons (Hariyadi, 2010). One of the recent cases is what happened in March 2017 with St. Clara Church in Bekasi regency, province of West Java, where a group of radical Muslims named Forum for Bekasi Muslims Friendship (Majelis Silaturahmi Umat Islam Bekasi) made a rally demanding to stop this
2 Previously, Purnama / Ahok served as the Vice Governor. He then became the Governor to fill the position left
by the Ex-Governor Joko Widodo, a Muslim as well as Ahok’s partner in leading Jakarta’s provincial administration who run in the presidential election in 2014 and eventually became the 7th President of the
4 church’s construction. This rally then resulted in a chaotic fight with the police force (Anonymous-2, 2017).
The trend of intolerance did not only happen between different religions. Even in the same religion, there were also some cases of persecution over minority sects within Islam. One example is what happened on February 6, 2011, at a village named Cikeusik in the province of Banten. At that moment, 6 members of the Ahmadi sect died as the result of an attack by thousands of people who demanded the stopping of Ahmadi members’ gathering in a house in this village (Anonymous, 2011). What happened in Cikeusik was only one of various incidents involving the Ahmadi sect as the result of continuous marginalization and persecution over this sect, though the existence of this sect in Indonesia can be traced back since a couple of decades before the establishment of this country (Shishkin, 2011).
The Ahmadi sect is not the sole victim of persecution among religious minority sects in Indonesia. Another Islamic minority sect, which is Shiite, also experienced the same bitterness. One of the cases is what happened in a town in Madura island named Sampang in the province of East Java. In August 2012, 30 houses of Shiite members in Sampang were attacked by a mob of hundreds of people, resulting in the death of one Shiite member and displacement of the whole Shiite community in Sampang, just because they are seen as “heretics” (AFP, 2012). Like what happened with the Ahmadis, the incident that happened in Sampang is not an independent case. Rather, it is a result of a prolonged marginalization, discrimination, hatred and persecution of the Shiite sect for a long time (Wardhani, 2016).
All those cases might be only a few examples, but these have been more than enough to show that Indonesia is in a state of red alarm regarding its capability in defending differences and maintaining diversities.
The issue becomes more important if one also considers the position of Indonesia as in fact the world’s biggest Muslim population, as well as the country believed to be the example of Islam with a moderate and tolerant face which can walk side by side with democracy.
Indeed, Islam as the religion of over 86 percent of a total 265,6 million population in Indonesia must serve as a certain factor in the dynamic of this country in maintaining its diversities. Thus, according to the case examples described in the paragraphs above, there
5 will be an inevitable question among the observers whether Indonesia, as the world’s biggest Muslim population, has started to swing towards political, radical and intolerant Islam which in the end will endanger the nation’s diversities. This question is really crucial especially if one considers that Indonesia is a country which always boasts its “Pancasila”, as the state’s philosophical/ideological fundament attached in the Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution, which is frequently claimed as a set of secular ideological ideas in the sense that it is not a religion-based ideology (Ichwan, 2011, pp. 1-2).3
Furthermore, there are some provisions in the Indonesian Constitution, which are Articles 28E (1) and (2), 28I (1), and 29 (2), firmly stating that freedom of religion and faith are part of fundamental human rights that can not be deprived for any reason, and it is the responsibility of the state to protect such rights. So, due to such context, there will be questions raised, such as: Did the Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution fail to prevent the country to swing towards Islamic fundamentalism or even Islamic radicalism? Are today’s Indonesian Muslims really more interested in Islamic fundamentalism that makes them intentionally neglect the Pancasila and the constitutional regulations above?
In relation to such questions, there has been a survey conducted collaboratively by Indonesian Survey Circle (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia / LSI) and the Wahid Foundation which shows some frightening findings. According to this survey among over 1.520 respondents from all 34 provinces in Indonesia, 59,9% of the respondents said that they have hatred towards some groups of their fellow citizen, such as those who are non-Muslims, people of Chinese descent, communists, etc. (Hakim, 2016). Among this 59,9 % of respondents, 92,2% of them said that they highly oppose a person coming from those groups to become a governmental leader, and 82,4% of these people even said that they do not want to have a neighbor coming from those groups (Hakim, 2016). This survey also shows another far more frightening result, in which 7,7% of these respondents admit that they are willing to engage in violent actions, such as attacking the worship places of other religions, as well as targeting the places that they think of as something against the sharia (such as nightclubs, bars, stores selling alcoholic drinks, etc.) (Hakim, 2016). According to Yenny Wahid, who is the chairperson of the Wahid Foundation, though 7,7% is a relatively small number, it reflects a population of
3 The term “Pancasila” comes from two Sanskrit words, which are: Panca which means “five”, and Sila which
means “principles”. Pancasila is a set of state’s philosophical principles/ideology, serving as the basis as well as the spirit of the Indonesian Constitution, which are: 1. Belief in One and Only God, 2. Humanism, 3. Nationalism, 4. Democracy, 5. Social Justice.
6 11 million Muslims in Indonesia and knowing that 11 million of Muslims in Indonesia are willing to commit such violence is really frightening (Hakim, 2016).
Though the results of the survey by the LSI and Wahid Foundation might seem rather frightening, such finding is not something exaggerated, since many analysts also argue that Indonesia is currently swinging towards Islamic fundamentalism. Such a conclusion can be found, for example, in the work of Lindsey and Pausacker et. al. (2016), or in the work of Martin van Bruinessen et. al. (2013). By citing van Bruinessen, Lindsey and Pausacker (2016, p. 40) argued that the development of Indonesia since Soeharto’s fall has greatly changed the image of Indonesian Islam and the existing perception of Indonesian Muslims as tolerant and inclined to compromise. The image of Indonesian Islam as tolerant and moderate Islam or Islam with “a smiling face”, is, as Lindsey and Pausacker further argued (2016, p. 40), ill-founded, since it was simply a product of repression of Muslim identity by Soeharto’s regime as an alteration of religious and ethnic identity to help the construction of “a sanitized and anodyne national image”. That is why, as argued by Lindsey and Pausacker (2016, p. 35), though Islamic legal traditions are frequently a rival source of legitimacy for any modern nation-state, in Indonesia, as an impact of such repression, the issue is not so much about whether the bureaucratic nation-state will be replaced by conservative ulama, but rather to what extent Islamic groups can capture it and direct it. Therefore, since the fall of Soeharto, the strategies of most conservative Muslims groups as well as the proponents of “Shariaisation” are not seeking a way to displace the state, but using the state’s secular structure to strengthen their position as well as using the state’s legal mechanism, which was previously used to restrict Islam, to force the state to accept a normative role for it and to adopt the conservative norms they propose (Lindsey & Pausacker, 2016, p. 35). This group’s aim is to transform and remake the state in their own image, and in doing so, they use several means including proposing regional and national legislations (Lindsey & Pausacker, 2016, p. 36).
The argument by Lindsey and Pausacker above is correct indeed, as it can be seen in Indonesia that since the downfall of Soeharto, there have been several laws which are quite Islamic-biased. One of the most apparent examples is the formal implementation of Sharia law and the establishment of Sharia Court in the province of Aceh, in the northern tip of Sumatra island, through the enactment of Law Number 18 of 2001 which was then subsequently substituted by the newer Law Number 11 of 2006. Such Sharia Court in Aceh is
7 a State’s Court particularly designed to accommodate the aspiration of most Muslims in this province of demand for the full implementation of Sharia as state law within the province. This court has a jurisdiction which does not only cover family law matters such as marriage or inheritance but also includes (sharia) penal laws. It even determines some matters as crimes if they are deemed contradictory with the Sharia and thus punishable by a kind of ancient punishment through public whipping, even if those matters are not crimes according to the national laws. One example is the criminalization of unmarried cohabitation, as well as the criminalization of homosexuality. In Aceh, since unmarried cohabitation and homosexuality are deemed as violations against the sharia, they are then determined as crimes and thus punishable by public authorities. One example of such a case happened in May 2017, when a homosexual couple was caught and then punished with a public whipping by the local authorities, which is ironically done exactly at the moment when the world commemorates the International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia, and Biphobia (IDAHOT) (Emont, 2017).
What happened in Aceh then becomes a kind of “precedence” for the other regions in Indonesia. Many of them, either at the level of regency or even province, also enacted Regional Regulation which are, though not as formal as in Aceh, also highly influenced by the Sharia. Such Regional Regulations (Indonesian: Peraturan Daerah / Perda) are then famously called today as “Perda Sharia”. The provinces or regencies that enacted Perda
Sharia are usually -but not always- those which are led by a governor or regent who came
from an Islamic party. As recorded by Muhtada (2014, p. 2), until mid-2013, there were at least 422 Perda Sharia legislations enacted by 29 provinces and 174 regencies, in which still according to Muhtada (2014, pp. 5-6), such enactments are the result of “marriage” between the demand of the local people and the elite’s political interest wanting to get political support from Muslim constituents.
The enactment of Sharia law and the establishment of Sharia Court in Aceh, as well as the enactment of Perda Sharia in various regions in Indonesia, clearly show the trend of “Islamization” through the state’s legal instruments.
It is important to note that the context of the enactment of sharia law in the Muslim world, including in Indonesia’s case, is different from what happens in the Western world regarding the issue of Islamic law. In the West, such as in European countries, the concern is about the
8 demand for recognition (by the state) of a Muslim’s personal compliance to certain Islamic norm in order to have a legal status in the realm of family law of the person concerned, such as in the matters of marriage, inheritance, etc. Meanwhile, what happens in the Muslim world, including in Aceh, is that the state uses sharia law, which means a set of strict Islamic rules, as the state’s law regulating all people uniformly. So, it is not a matter of private law but a public one. Therefore, through such an institutionalization of sharia, all people are forced to be under the rule of certain interpretations of Islamic laws, regardless of the fact that not all people are Muslims as well as not all Muslims follow such interpretations or practices. That’s why it has been an issue that threatens diversities.
According to all elaboration above, we can clearly see that there has been a rising of the so-called Islamic fundamentalism and intolerance in Indonesia in the post-Soeharto era, and these are surely threats for religious difference and diversities. As we can see for instance in the establishment of the Sharia Court in Aceh as well as in the existence of Perda Sharia in various regions in Indonesia, such trend of Islamic fundamentalism and intolerance is reflected by, and thus manifesting in, Indonesia’s legal dynamic since the fall of Soeharto, and that is the issue addressed by this research.
Therefore, this research is carried out with several objectives, which are: First, to give an understanding of the socio-legal context of the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia’s post-authoritarian era. Second, to figure out the best socio-legal framework possible to combat Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, as a Muslim majority country, to advance diversities. Third, to figure out to what extent the discourses of multiculturalism, as the most prominent political theory regarding diversities, as well as the discourse of interculturalism, which is the critique of multiculturalism, can contribute to the second objective above.
According to such objectives, then, this research aims to answer several questions, which are: First, what are the factors leading to the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia’s post-authoritarian era?
Second, why did Indonesia’s legal frameworks, especially the Pancasila, as Indonesia’s state ideological basis, and the Constitution, fail to prevent the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism?
9 Third, to what extent have the discourses of multiculturalism and/or interculturalism been involved in Indonesia’s legal frameworks to deal with diversities? And to what extent can this discourse contribute to the need to combat Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia?
Fourth, according to the analysis result of the research question number 3, what does it contribute to the formulation of the best legal frameworks possible to combat fundamentalism in particular and to advance diversities in general in Indonesia?
All those questions above are sought to be answered by this research through several
methods, which are:
First, conceptual elaboration through literature research about the nature of Islamic fundamentalism. This is to give a brief understanding about what Islamic fundamentalism is.
Second, historical reconstruction through literature research about the development of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. It is done to understand how Islamic fundamentalism has emerged in Indonesia, which then has got stronger since its post-authoritarian era.
Third, conceptual/theoretical elaboration through literature research about the discourses of multiculturalism and interculturalism. This is to give an understanding of what multiculturalism and interculturalism are, especially about how diversities should be dealt with according to these discourses.
Fourth, juridical elaboration and analysis on the Indonesian laws concerning religion and religious diversities, especially the Pancasila, the Indonesian Constitution, some relevant legislations, as well as some relevant cases. The objective is:
• To understand how the Indonesian laws basically regulate religion and religious diversities in Indonesia.
• To understand why the Indonesian laws failed to prevent the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in the post-authoritarian era.
10 • To understand to what extent the discourses of multiculturalism and/or interculturalism are incorporated in the existing Indonesian laws, especially in regard with religion and religious diversities that have been existing in Indonesia.
Fifth, juridical reconstruction on the answers of the second and the third research questions above, to get the formulation of the best legal frameworks possible to combat fundamentalism in particular and to advance diversities in general in Indonesia.
In answering all questions through methods as described above, this research will be elaborated in a structure as follow:
Right after this introductory chapter, which serves as Chapter I, Chapter II will address the nature of Islamic fundamentalism which will briefly elaborate on the concept of Islamic fundamentalism, including its characteristics and all-important matters related to it.
The next chapter, which is chapter III, will address the history and the dynamics of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. It will be the elaboration about the historical reconstruction of the development of Islam and especially Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, especially about how it emerged and got stronger in Indonesia’s post-authoritarian era.
Chapter IV will be the elaboration on the concepts regarding the politics of recognition of difference. It will address the fundamental principles for maintaining diversities in a multicultural country according to the relevant concepts, such as multiculturalism, and the new approach as the critique for multiculturalism, namely interculturalism.
Chapter V, entitled “The Laws and Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia.”, will elaborate on the issue of the correlation between the main Indonesian legal framework and Islamic Fundamentalism. It will be done by examining the most relevant legal materials regarding the matters of religion and religious freedom. Thus, this chapter is divided into five subchapters. Subchapter V.1 will be about the Pancasila, which is Indonesia’s philosophical/ideological basis from which the Indonesian Constitution takes its normative inspirations. The elaboration on Pancasila is important since, given its role as the state’s ideological basis,
11 and religion in Indonesia, as well as to answer the question whether Indonesia is a secular country or not. Subchapter V.2 will give elaborations on the provisions in the Indonesian Constitution regarding religion and religious freedom. Then, subchapter V.3 will elaborate on a law which gives such big impact on religious freedom in Indonesia, which is the Anti-Blasphemy Law. This subchapter will also include elaboration on some important cases related to this law, as well as a brief examination of the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s verdict regarding the plea of judicial review on this law. The implementation of sharia and the Sharia Court in Aceh will be elaborated in detail in subchapter V.4, and subchapter V.5 will be the conclusion of this chapter.
Lastly, Chapter VI, entitled “Advancing Diversities through Law in Indonesia. A Lesson from A Muslim Majority Country”, will be the elaboration on the juridical reconstruction of the formulation of the best legal frameworks possible to combat fundamentalism in particular and to advance diversities in general in Indonesia. This chapter will also wrap up all previous chapters.
12 References:
AFP. (2012, December). Indonesia Shias persecuted as "heretics" lived in limbo. Retrieved from Dawn: https://www.dawn.com/news/770305
Anonymous. (2011). Kronologi Penyerangan Jamaah Ahmadiyah di Cikeusik. Retrieved from Tempo.co: https://nasional.tempo.co/read/311441/kronologi-penyerangan-jamaah-ahmadiyah-di-cikeusik
Anonymous. (2016). Statistik Politik 2016. Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik.
Anonymous. (2018, September 10). Europe and Nationalism: A country-by-country guide. Retrieved from BBC.com: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006 Anonymous-1. (2017). Mass Rally Against Purnama Ahead of Jakarta Vote. Retrieved from
Aljazeera.com: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/mass-prayer-demo-ahok-jakarta-vote-170211040259858.html
Anonymous-2. (2017). Police Fire Tear Gas at Bekasi Church Protestors. Retrieved from Thejakartapost.com: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/03/24/police-fire-tear-gas-at-bekasi-church-protestors.html
Bruinessen, M. v. (2013). Contemporary Development in Indonesia Islam. Explaining the
Conservative Turn. Singapore.
Emont, J. (2017). 2 Men in Indonesia Sentenced to Caning for Having Gay Sex. Retrieved from Nytimes.com: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/world/asia/indonesia-gay-caning.html?_r=0
Hakim, R. N. (2016). Survei Wahid Foundation: Indonesia Masih Rawan Intoleransi dan
Radikalisme. Retrieved from Kompas.com:
http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/08/01/13363111/survei.wahid.foundation.indo nesia.masih.rawan.intoleransi.dan.radikalisme?page=1
Hariyadi, M. (2010). Bekasi, Anti-Christian Persecution Continues. A Protestant Church
Targeted. Retrieved from Asianews.it:
http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Bekasi,-anti-Christian-persecution-continues.-A-Protestant-church-targeted-17563.html
Ichwan, M. N. (2011, February). Secularism, Islam, and Pancasila. Political Debates on the Basis of the State in Indonesia. Nanzan University Asia-Pacific Research Center
Bulletin No. 6, 1-43. Retrieved from Center for Asia-Pacific Studies Nanzan
University: https://www.ic.nanzan-u.ac.jp/ASIAPACIFIC/documents/110228-0301_Ichwan.pdf
Lindsey, T., & Pausacker, H. (2016). Religion, Law, and Intolerance in Indonesia. New York: Routledge.
Muhtada, D. (2014). Perda Syariah di Indonesia: Penyebaran, Problem, dan Tantangannya. Semarang: Fakultas Hukum Universitas Negeri Semarang.
13 Shishkin, P. (2011). The Persecution of Indonesia's Ahmadi Muslims. Retrieved from
Newsweek: http://www.newsweek.com/persecution-indonesias-ahmadi-muslims-68737
Wardhani, W. K. (2016, June). Muslim and Minority: Shias’ Struggle in Indonesia. Retrieved from Magdalene.co:
http://magdalene.co/news-852-muslim-and-minority-shias%E2%80%99-struggle-in-indonesia.html
14 CHAPTER II
THE CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
Given the elaboration in Chapter I, we can see that as a country full of diversities, Indonesia is now under a threat regarding its status as the world’s biggest Muslim country. It is by no means that the threat comes from Islam per se, since such a threat, which is the threat of fundamentalism, doesn’t exclusively happen in the Islamic world but also happens everywhere with any religion. Nevertheless, given the context of Indonesia, which could also be the case for the other Muslim worlds, this phenomenon does happen within Islam. In my point of view, this phenomenon is what is so-called Islamic fundamentalism.
In using this term, I mainly follow the concept developed by Bassam Tibi (1998) (2012). In line with what I argue above, Tibi also believed that such a threat is not a threat of Islam as a religion. Instead, it is a political threat, developed from an attempt to politicize Islam, which might also happen to other religions (Tibi, 1998, p. ix).
Since it is a phenomenon that may happen within any religion, it is thus necessary to elaborate on the phenomenon of fundamentalism in its general sense, before elaborating further on the so-called Islamic fundamentalism.
II.1. Fundamentalism
It is important to acknowledge here that given the common term “fundamental” as the basic word for the term “fundamentalism”, many may use and interpret it in various ways. This fact then leads to at least two different kinds of approaches to the usage of the term “fundamentalism”, which are the maximalist approach and the minimalist approach (Marczewska-Rytko, 2007). The maximalist approach is the approach perceiving the term “fundamentalism” broadly, which then makes it almost synonymous to terms such as traditionalism, nationalism, orthodoxy, or communalism (Marczewska-Rytko, 2007, p. 215). Meanwhile, the minimalist approach, which is also the approach the scientific world commonly uses (as to be distinguished from the use of the term in journalism), is the usage of this term limitedly referring to the phenomena which firstly appeared within
Christian-15 Protestantism in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century (Marczewska-Rytko,
2007, p. 215). As such, the usage of the term “fundamentalism” here follows the latter approach (the minimalist approach).
Given the minimalist approach, it can be traced that the origin of the so-called “fundamentalism” came from a Protestant Christian movement in the US that started in 1910. This movement was initiated by two devout Christian businessmen brothers named Milton and Lyman Stewart, who disseminated a pamphlet written by American and British conservative theologians titled “The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth” (Ruthven, 2007, p. 7) (Weinberg & Pedahzur, 2005, p. 4). This movement aimed to stop the erosion of what the Stewart brothers and the editors of the pamphlet believed as “the fundamental beliefs of Protestant Christianity”, which are: the inerrancy of the Bible; the direct creation of the world and humanity out of nothing (ex nihilo) by God; the authenticity of miracle; the virgin birth of Jesus, His crucifixion, and bodily resurrection; the substitutionary atonement (the doctrine that Christ died to redeem the sins of humanity); and Christ imminent return to judge and rule over the world (Ruthven, 2007, p. 7). Then, the so-called “fundamentalist” originally means as those who will fight for “the Fundamentals”. Within this context, fundamentalism was a movement against any criticism either on the Bible, known as higher criticism, or on its extant manuscripts, canon, and variant reading, known as lower criticism, as well as against liberalism.
From that origin, the concept of fundamentalism then also developed into the context of other religions. In the Islamic world, the very early usages of the word “fundamentalism” in English can be found in: First, the letter written in May 1937 by the British Minister in Jeddah, named Sir Reader Bullard, who stated that King Abd. Al-Aziz Ibn Saud has been a fundamentalist by condemning women who mix with men. Second, in the book by an orientalist named H. A. R. Gibb, entitled “Mohammedanism” or “Islam”, which referred Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, a political activist and pan-Islamic reformer, as an Islamic fundamentalist (Ruthven, 2007, p. 18). Ruthven (2007, pp. 18-20) argued that those two instances can fall into the general category of fundamentalism indeed, since, both expressed a defense of religious tradition, perceived or claimed being challenged or threatened by modernity, by seeking to return to the 7th century scriptural roots of Islam which is stripped of customs, doctrines, and traditions that had been developing along with the development of Islam in subsequent centuries.
16 Comparing the development of fundamentalism in its original context within the Protestant movement in the US and the one in the Islamic world, Ruthven (2007, pp. 11, 28) argued that there is both a difference and a similarity between the two. The difference is that the fundamentalists’ struggle in the Protestant movement against liberalism was done within the Church. The objective was only encouraging the Christians to believe the content of the Bible as what it is, preventing them from any attempt to criticize or to re-interpret it in a way different from the developed tradition. On the other side, the objective of the Islamic fundamentalists is to reintegrate the religious, cultural, and political life of the society to be in line with Islam, which is, in its shortest way, through the restoration of the sharia. Meanwhile, the similarity is that both contain an idea of political order governed by God.
Ruthven (2007, p. 23) then argued that in general, the surge of fundamentalist movements, which can also be called religious revitalization, is nothing but a response to globalization and, to be more specific, to the crisis for believers following the recognition that there are various ways of believing different from what they believe as their tradition’s version of deity (Ruthven, 2007, p. 23).1 As such, fundamentalism is a negative reaction to modernity (Brekke, 2012, pp. 3, 11-12).2 Thus, fundamentalists will always tend to reject pluralism and
diversity, since both are the defining characteristics of the modern world. Such tendency derives from the fact that before the ways of travel and communication are made easy by modernity, which then leads people living in different cultural systems to be aware of each other, most people assumed that their own belief systems or ways of life were the norms (Ruthven, 2007, p. 30).
1 Given such general tendency, Ruthven (2007, p. 23) criticized that it is an undeniable fact that the prophets of
any religion uttered the divine words in a specific language to particular group of people in particular place in particular time, and thus, the original social context of the Holy Book of the religion concerned can never be recovered, and this leads to an inevitable conclusion that religious pluralism is an inescapable feature of modernity.
2 Brekke (2012, pp. 3, 11-12) argued that the essence of fundamentalism among various religious traditions is
that it is a worldview that believes and aspires that politics and religion are originally tied in an organic way. Thus, among fundamentalists, separation of politics and religion is a tragedy, and they perceive such a separation of religion from other spheres like law, education, or science is a negative effect of modernization and secularism. As such, Brekke argued that fundamentalism is a movement that emerged exclusively in the modern era (after the 19th century) since it is a religious reaction against the great changes that happened in the modern world, especially against the changes which were brought about by Western political and cultural dominance, modernization, and globalization, which started making an impact only in the 19th century. Meanwhile, the pre-modern conservative currents, such as what happened in Islam with Islamic revivalism, were not the result of changes by modernization but as the impact of internal dynamics within the religion concerned and thus, according to Brekke, this cannot fall under the category of fundamentalism.
17 Ruthven (2007, p. 32) added that the fundamentalists, especially within the Abrahamic monotheist religions, reject pluralism because accepting pluralism means relativizing the truth, meanwhile according to them, the truth is exclusive since belief in the truth held by one tradition necessarily excludes all others. So, fundamentalism is nothing but a response to the crisis of faith due to the awareness of difference (Ruthven, 2007, p. 33). Therefore, it can be said here that fundamentalism will lead to intolerance of difference.
Ruthven then concluded that among various manifestations of fundamentalism in various religions, there is nonetheless an element that can be considered as the “family resemblance” of fundamentalism among those various religions. Such a family resemblance is neither in inerrancy nor in literalism, but in the attitude of collapsing myth into history and perceiving the scripture as the manuals for practical actions, instead of as the personal inspiration or moral guidance (Ruthven, 2007, pp. 52, 54-56).3
In line with this, Marczewska-Rytko (2007, pp. 220-221) pointed out several general features of fundamentalism, which are: First, fundamentalism is strongly critical of the elites in power for having departed from religious law and order. Second, there is always an idea to return to religion, or religious rebirth, as well as the invocation of a holy book as the source of absolute knowledge. Third, there is always a claim by the fundamentalists to grasp the intentions of the absolute, to have the monopoly for truth and the knowledge of all the answers (right knowledge of the right truth). Fourth, everyone else is treated by the fundamentalists as the enemy, or at least as wrong and misguided. Fifth, there is a tendency to extend the religious order to cover all other areas of human existence, such as the economic and political life. As such, both political and legal powers are legitimized by the religious order. Sixth, fundamentalism is highly active on the social and political stage in its attempt to abolish the existing social order and replace it with a new one. Seventh, there is a desire for isolation within the boundaries of the advocated values, and therefore, hampering the attempts for
3 Ruthven (2007, p. 52) explained that literalism and/or inerrancy are indeed the framework of fundamentalism,
but not all literalists and/or inerrantists are fundamentalists. For instance, most Catholics are inerrantists, but at the same time, they are also not fundamentalists. Also, most believing Muslims are Quranic inerrantists, since they believe that the Quran is truly God’s words. Thus, inerrancy can’t be the determining element of Islamic fundamentalism. In line with Ruthven’s argument, Ralph W. Hood Jr., Peter C. Hill, and W. Paul Williamson (2005, pp. 2-3) argued that fundamentalism exhibits its distinguishing quality in how the sacred text is understood, read, and implemented. They called it “intratextuality”, which is a condition when a single text is absolutely authoritative and judged to be the final arbitrator of all other textually based knowledge, or in other words, other texts are judged by their compatibility with this single text.
18 dialogue between particular civilizations and cultures. Eighth, fundamentalism opposes the secular state and its drive towards development and modernization.4
II.2. Islamic Fundamentalism
From the overview of the general concept of fundamentalism above, I will now focus on the development of fundamentalism within Islam, or simply said, the Islamic fundamentalism.
As mentioned earlier, if the fundamentalism within Protestant movement tended to stay within the Church, the objective of the fundamentalists within Islam, who are also called Islamists, is to put Islam also outside the mosque, by regulating the public sphere under the sharia. To do so, one of the main justifications frequently used by the fundamentalists is the history of Islam itself, during the age when the Prophet Muhammad developed Islam in the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century.
Indeed, as also argued by Ruthven (2007, p. 27) as well as Armstrong (2002), a large part of believing Muslims believe that Islam doesn’t recognize any formal distinction between the religion and the world, and this has been one of the reasons for most of the Islamic world to hardly accept secularism. Armstrong (2002, pp. xi, 13), further argued that:
“Politics is the arena where the Moslems experience God and which enables the divine to function effectively in the world, and that in Quranic vision there is no dichotomy between the sacred and the profane, the sexuality and worship. The whole of life was potentially holy and had to be brought into the ambit of the divine.”5
Regarding the history of Prophet Muhammad in developing Islam, there is one important fact worth to note, which is that Muhammad was not only a religious leader but also a political one.
4 In line with these features, especially the first, the second, and the sixth, Brekke (2012, pp. 12-14) called the
fundamentalists as “radical conservatives”. The reason is that while the fundamentalists are conservative in their approach towards their socio-political views, such as their critical stance against the development of family patterns and sexual norms, they are at the same time also radical in terms of rejecting the religious authority associated with the traditional religious hierarchy and organization.
5 Given such notion, there was a practice during Muhammad’s era since he was the leader of the ummah, the
society of Yathrib (now called as Medina), in which he built the mosque with a courtyard as a place for the people to gather and discuss any matter of social life (Armstrong, 2002, pp. 12-13).
19 It is believed that Muhammad was born in Mecca in 570, and he received the first revelation in 610. Since then, he bore a role as a prophet and started to disseminate and develop Islam as a new monotheistic religion in Mecca. However, his preaching in Mecca was still limited only to his closest relatives and colleagues, until he left Mecca to migrate to Yathrib / Medina. There are some factors that made Muhammad decide to migrate to Yathrib, which are (Armstrong, 2002, pp. 11-12): First, on Muhammad’s side, he suffered a moment of crisis due to the suppression by the Quraysh, the major merchant tribe in Mecca as well as Muhammad’s tribe, who perceived Muhammad and his teaching as a serious threat for their community. Second, the people of Yathrib, who were heterogeneous agricultural settlers composed of various cultural groups, also suffered a crisis of being in a never-ending conflict with each other. Thus, they desperately needed a person who could be the mediator of this never-ending conflict. When they met Muhammad in the pilgrimage rituals at Kabah in Mecca (which had been an old tradition among the Arabian society at that time), they quickly found that Muhammad, as an asylum seeker from the oppressive Quraysh people in Mecca and therefore a neutral party in the local conflict in Yathrib, perfectly fitted with this need.
Once Muhammad migrated (the term for this is hijra) to Yathrib in 622, he then led the enactment of a peace agreement among the conflicting plural communities of Yathrib and became their leader. Due to this background, during his rule, Muhammad never forced the people of Yathrib to convert to Islam but led such a heterogeneous society, called ummah, under his teaching. Therefore, since his migration to Yathrib, which was then called Medina (literally means as “the city”), Muhammad played a double role, which is both as a religious and a political leader, and this situation continued until he successfully took over Mecca from the Quraysh in 630 and practically became the ruler of all Arabian tribes in the peninsula until his death in 632 (Armstrong, 2002, pp. 11-12, 20).
Until Muhammad died in 632, only two years after he successfully re-conquered Mecca from the Quraysh, there was no single word he told about who should succeed him as the leader of the ummah (which now covered almost half of Arabian Peninsula) or about how the ummah should be led after him. This matter was a source of debate at the time when the Prophet died, which was then concluded through deliberation among the leading Muslims (Armstrong, 2002, pp. 21-22). This should indicate that there is no specific political system embraced by
20 Islam.6 It is proven by different mechanisms in electing Muhammad’s successor among the
four Rashidun (Muhammad’s closest companions), which then changed radically since the time of caliph Muawiyyah, who then established a political dynasty of Umayyad.7
Nevertheless, this fact is simply ignored by the fundamentalists since they use such a historical background as the pretext for their objective in politicizing Islam, through what Bassam Tibi (2012) called as “the invention of tradition”. In line with Tibi, Guilain Denoeux, as cited by Mohammed Ayoob (2008, p. 2), in defining Islamism argued:
“Islamism is a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations that pursue political objectives, in which it provides a political response to today’s societal challenge by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on
re-appropriated and reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition.”
Indeed, as argued by Tibi (1998, p. ix), Islamic fundamentalism is nothing but a movement of politicization of religion (of Islam). Or, it can be called conversely as “religionized politics” (Tibi, 2012, p. 1). It is the use of religion in the pursuit of non-religious ends. As such, the term “Islamic fundamentalism” is synonymous with the term “political Islam”. Furthermore, since political Islam is also known as the ideology of “Islamism” (Fuller, 2003) (Ayoob, 2008) (Tibi, 2012), the term “Islamic fundamentalism” is thus also synonymous with “Islamism”.8 Therefore, the Islamic fundamentalists, who are the actors who attempt to
actualize the agenda of Islamic fundamentalism, are also called the Islamists.
6 The same argument is also given by Bassam Tibi (2012, p. 1), who argued that Islam per se does not
presuppose a political order of government, though as faith and ethical framework, it surely implies certain political values. Therefore, Tibi firmly believed that though Islamism (which is synonymous with political Islam or Islamic fundamentalism) grows out of a specific interpretation of Islam, Islamism is not Islam.
7Among the four Rashidun, who were also the four first caliphs (the leader of the ummah) after Muhammad’s
death, Abu Bakr was elected as the first caliph (reigned 632-634) through voting mechanism among the leading Muslims at that time. His successor, Umar (reigned 634-644), was chosen by Abu Bakr himself right before his death. Once Umar was murdered by a Persian prisoner in 644, Uthman (reigned 644-656) was elected to be Umar’s successor by the Prophet’s companions.Uthman was then assassinated by a group of Muslims who felt discontent with Uthman’s rule and preferred Ali, who was known as the closest figure to the Prophet as well as Muhammad’s son in law (alongside Uthman, who was also the Prophet’s son in law), to be the leader of the Muslims. Ali was then declared as the next caliph following Uthman’s death. However, Muawiyyah and the Umayyad family, who was Uthman’s family, rejected Ali and successfully deposed Ali from his reign in 657 through arbitration among Muslims at that time. Since then, Muawiyyah became the next caliph and he subsequently established a political dynasty under the Umayyad’s family. Ali was eventually murdered by his ex-supporters named the Kharajis in 661, who opposed both to Muawiyyah and to Ali due to his willingness to accept Muawiyyah’s rule. See: Armstrong (2002, pp. 20-30).
8 In his work, Fuller’s point of view is a bit different from Tibi’s. For Fuller (2003), an Islamic Fundamentalist
must be an Islamist, but being an Islamist doesn’t necessarily mean that the person concerned is an Islamic Fundamentalist. Thus, for Fuller, Islamic fundamentalism is part of the ideology of political Islam / Islamism. However, there is a specific qualification that makes not all Islamists are Fundamentalists. For Fuller (2003, p. xii), such a specific qualification that makes an Islamist a Fundamentalist is a literal and narrow reading of the
21 In the same tone with Tibi, as a well-known Muslim scholar in Islamic studies in Indonesia, Azyumardi Azra (2012, p. 233) argued that political Islam is the opposite of the so-called cultural Islam. If cultural Islam is Islam having an orientation to develop socio-cultural aspects of Islamic life through the non-political way, political Islam is a belief in Islam that has a strong orientation towards politics and power.
It is worth to note here that the concept of Islamic fundamentalism is quite a fuzzy concept since this term is also frequently equated with the other term, mainly “Islamic radicalism.” Such a stance can be seen, for instance, in the works of Hadiz (2008) or Fealy (2004).9 In my opinion, both terms should not be equated. My reasons are: First, in line with the argument from Tibi (1998, p. ix), Islamic fundamentalism is only part of the common phenomenon of (religious) fundamentalism. Thus, in referring to such a phenomenon, we must consider its historical root as I elaborated earlier in subchapter II.1. As such, I think it is more appropriate to use the term “fundamentalism” instead of “radicalism”, as it is in line with the historical root concerned. Second, following Fuller, I argue that Islamic radicals are the Islamic fundamentalists / the Islamists who commit to a form of extremism. Thus, Islamic radicals must be fundamentalists, but not all Islamic fundamentalists are radicals.10 According to
Quran and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (the hadith and the sunnah), that makes the Fundamentalists believe that they have a monopoly on the sole correct understanding of Islam and demonstrate intolerance toward those who differ. I disagree with Fuller’s point of view because he defined political Islam in a very broad sense. For him, political Islam is the ideology believing that Islam has something important to say about how political and social life should be constituted and seeks to implement such interpretation in some ways (Fuller, 2003, pp. xi, 47). The problem is, almost all religions have normative notions not only regarding the relationship between men and God but also regarding the relationship among men. Thus, every religion must have something to say about how political and social life should be constituted, and it doesn’t necessarily mean an ideology, even if such belief is sought to be implemented. That’s because the implementation of such a belief can be in a form of moral inspiration or personal ethical guidance for someone in his or her social and political life.As a political ideology, Islamism or Political Islam should be more than that. Therefore, I think it is correct if Bassam Tibi put the term political Islam or Islamism as the synonyms for Islamic fundamentalism, which is the politicization of religion (of Islam), which implies more than as simply serving as moral inspiration and ethical guidance in social and political life.
9 In his work, Hadiz (2008, pp. 638-639) defined the term “Islamic radicalism”, in which he used such term
interchangeably with “political Islam”, as the ideology of those who seek the establishment of an Islamic state or caliphate or the promulgation of the Sharia as the source of all laws, with or without violence. Similarly, Fealy (2004, p. 105) argued that the so-called “Islamic radical groups” can be defined through two characteristics, which are: First, they believe that Islam must be implemented in its full and literal form as set out from the Quran and Hadith without any compromise. They usually give emphasis on the sections of the Quran dealing explicitly with social relations, devotions, and criminal punishments. Second, they are reactive towards secular, materialist, or deviational forces, and tend to be hostile towards the status quo and see the fundamental teaching of Islam as providing the basis for rebuilding society and the state.
10 In this sense, Youssef M. Choueiri (2010) argued that Islamic fundamentalism is a hallmark of particular
movements within Islam, namely Islamic revivalism, Islamic reformism, and Islamic radicalism. As such, Choueiri conceptualized fundamentalism in a bit broader sense than the one by Tibi, Ruthven, and Brekke, since
22 Fuller (2003, p. 51), such extremism manifests in the commitment to the establishment of a pan-Islamic state / Islamic caliphate and/or in the commitment to violence in actualizing their mission.11
Then what does Islamic fundamentalism have as its essence? Basically, as part of the common phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, it is a paradigm perceiving religion as an ideology or a world view. As such, religion is claimed to provide a manual about the
comprehensive system of how to rule the world in every aspect of human life. As a world
view, then, it seeks to establish its own order and, thus, separating the people of the religion concerned from the rest of humanity while claiming for their worldview a universal standing (Tibi, 1998, p. xi).
Bassam Tibi argued further that Islamic fundamentalism or Islamism is an attempt to revolt against the secular-nation state system, claimed as the legacy of western civilization, and seeks to change it with the claimed-Islamic system. The Islamic fundamentalists build a claimed vision of the government of God. It is a promotion of a political order believed to emanate from the will of Allah and is not based on popular sovereignty. Thus, they reject the idea of democracy (in the substantive sense and not simply as instrumental electoral mechanism through general election) and the western model of secular nation-state since they deem them as heresy or, at the very least, as “imported solution” from the external source outside Islam (Tibi, 1998, pp. 3-4, 6-8, 25-26) (Tibi, 2012, p. 1). In a short sense, the
these scholars identified fundamentalism as (a usage of religion) as a negative reaction against the cultural product of modernity, namely liberalism and secularism, which were institutionally cemented through the emergence of nation-states in western civilizations. Meanwhile, the point of departure for Choueiri in developing his concept of Islamic fundamentalism is the phenomenon of religious revitalization within Islam, regardless of the fact that such a phenomenon was rather an internal dynamic than a reaction of an external force, which can be traced back, according to him, at least to 1749 in Central Arabia in the political alliance done by a Muslim scholar (ulama) named Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab and a tribe leader named Muhammad bin Al-Sa’ud, who developed one of the earliest Islamic revivalism movement which is later known as Wahhabism. For Choueiri (2010, p. 8), it is only Islamic radicalism which he perceived as the direct reaction to the growth of nation-state and the peculiar problems of the 20th century. Given such a conceptualization, Choueiri’s concept is obviously a bit different from the concept of fundamentalism in the general sense as I elaborated above.
11 As a comparison, Zachary Abuza (2007, pp. 9-11) proposed three broad categories of Islamist groups, which
are:
1. Political Islam, which is political parties and national institutions that support a greater role of Islam in political and social life, including the implementation of sharia.
2. Militant Islam, which is the radical groups mainly supported by disaffected youth that engage in low-intensity conflict and that also support a greater role of Islam in political and social life.
3. Islamist terrorism, which is highly radical militant organizations that use terrorist tactics to bring about a radical political and social realignment.
23 ideology of Islamic fundamentalism / Islamism is an ideology connecting din (religion) and
dawla (state) in a sharia-based political order. Therefore, the major creed of this ideology is
“din wa dawla” (the unity of state and religion), under a system of constitutionally mandated sharia law (Tibi, 2012, pp. 2-3).
As a form of politicization of religion or religionization of politics, the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism / Islamism is embedded in three things, which are (Tibi, 1998, p. 35): First, the concept of Islamic order (nizam Islami), as opposed to the concept of secular order. Second, the concept of sharia / Islamic law, as opposed to the concept of (secular) human / positive law. Third, the idea of God’s rule or hakimiyyat Allah as a supreme form of authority and order.
Therefore, apart from Tibi’s work but which I still see in a connection, it is correct if Fuller (2003, p. xii) also added that the fundamentalists will insist on the absolute primacy of
applying Islamic laws as the sole touchstone of Islamic legitimacy. For the fundamentalists,
the law is the most essential component of Islam, and such belief then leads to an overwhelming emphasis on the sharia, which is usually narrowly conceived, resulting in a high degree of social conservatism (Fuller, 2003, p. 48). That’s why, in line with this, Ruthven (2007, p. 28) also argued that the objective of the Islamic fundamentalists is to reintegrate the religious, cultural, and political life of the society to be in line with Islam, which is in its shortest way through the restoration of the sharia.
As such, in principle, the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism / Islamism / political Islam can be summed up into three points: First, it believes that Islam is not only a matter of faith but also a political ideology. Thus, this ideology seeks to connect religion with politics and the state. Second, as a consequence of the first principle, this ideology will always challenge and even reject secularism. Third, as the most basic as well as the shortest implementation of such notions, this ideology will always advocate the formal implementation of sharia by the state.
About why this ideology emerges, Fuller (2003, pp. 1-4) examined that at least two major factors are serving as the psychological reality of political Islam today, which are: First, the decline of Islamic civilization from its glorious past, which then leads into the second factor, which is its inability or its struggle to compete with the Western civilization today. Most of the Muslims have always been believing that the glorious past of Islamic civilization was the
