The Potential Benefits of Establishing an Independent Electoral Commission in St.Vincent and the Grenadines

I

Acknowledgements

The author would like to extend special thanks to the following people who have helped in undertaking this research:

Professor Jeff Fischer, Senior Electoral Advisor for the Electoral Education and Integrity Practice Area at Creative Associates International, Inc for his supervision, expert guidance and mentoring throughout this thesis.

The Electoral Commision of Jamaica for authorising an intership program for the

II

purposes of equipping me with knowledge and experience of the functions and operations of an independent electoral commission.

The Electoral Office in St.Vincent and the Grenadines: Supervisor of Election Ms Sylvia Findlay Scrubb and Staff, for providing professional guidance and support during the preparation of this thesis.

III

Statement of Authenticity

The work submitted is expressed in the author’s own words and it incorporates his ideas and judgements.

All the information contained therein are true, and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief. I am aware that plagiarism is a crime and can be the ground for explusion.

IV

Abstract

This thesis considers the potential benefits of establishing an independent electoral commission on the democractic quality and technical adminstration of elections in St.Vincent and the Grenadines. The underlined hypothesis is that the establisment of an independent electoral commission will yield a potential increase in the democratic quality and technical administration of elections. The thesis is built on research work, coupled with

V

conclusions by related documents that provide guidelines on the subject which have been issued or endorsed by international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). In addition, field reports from international assistance agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International

VI

Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in the United States almost unanimously indicates that independent electoral bodies serve democratic stability better than elections run by the executive branch and that they have the potential to impact democratic quality and the technical administration of elections. During the course of this current research it has been identified that Electoral Management Bodies EMBs) are the front-line agencies for electoral governance

VII

and ideally they should seek to follow certain fundamental guiding principles, including independence, impartiality,

integrity,transparency,efficiency,

professionalism and service mindedness which is believed could impact the democratic quality and the technical administration of elections. Internationally, three main motives have been identified to explain the creation of such bodies (OECD, 2008) .The first refers to a widely-held desire to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government entities with

VIII

specialised functions. The second reason focuses on improving legitimacy and the expertise of decision making. The third emphasises political motives, where a new body may be set up as a political response to demonstrate commitment to an issue or cause.

Findings in this research support the hypothesis of the thesis, by confirming that Independent Electoral Commission do yield potential increase in the democratic quality and technical administration of elections

IX

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements- I Statement of Authenticity- III

Abstract- IV

Table of Contents- X

Introduction- XIV

Methodology- XXII

Section 2-Literature Reciew

2.1.Building Independent XXIV Important and Professional

Electoral Managenment 2.2. EMB Models XXXVIII

X

3. Policy rational for establishing an Electoral

Commissionn XLVI 3.1.Legal framework LII 4.Organisation Structure,

roles and responsibilities LV 4.1 Composition LX 5.Cost of an Electoral

Commission LXIII 6. EMB Sustainability LXIX Section 3. Research Findings

3.1. Political Structure of LXXVI St. Vincent and the Grenadines

XI

3.2.Electoral Framework

and Electoral Administration LXXIX 3.3.Establishment of

an Independent LXXXIII Electoral Commission

3.4. The current system

and its costs XCIV 3.5.Membership of an XCVII Electoral Commission

3.6. Accountablity and Performance CI Section 4.Potential Benefits of establishing an Independent Electoral Commision CIII 4.1. Lesssons Learned CXII

XII

Section5.Conclusion

and Recommendation CXVI 5.1. Conclusion CXVI 5.2. Recommendation CXIX Bibliography CXXIII Appendices CXXXIV Appendix 1 CXXXIV Appendix 2 CXLIII

XIII

Introduction

Electoral systems are the primary vehicle for choice and representational governance, which is the basic foundation for democratization (UNDP, 2000). It is widely acknowledged that these systems must provide opportunities for all, including the most vulnerable of society, to participate in and influence government policies and practices.

According to research, effective management of electoral systems requires

XIV

institutions that are inclusive, sustainable, just and independent which includes in particular electoral management bodies that have the legitimacy to enforce rules and assure fairness with the cooperation of political parties and citizens (UNDP, 2000). It is commonly suggested that the democratic quality and technical administration of elections is greatly enhanced where, electoral authorities are established as independent institutions which are structurally independent administrative agencies operating at arms

XV

length from politics, to insulate them from executive or legislative meddling.

Historical evidence, coupled with conclusions by observers and advocacy by electoral professionals, indicates that independent electoral bodies serve democratic stability more efficiently than elections run by the executive branch and that they have the potential to impact democratic quality and the technical administration of elections.

Several intimitant factors support the move for the establishment of independent

XVI

electoral commission. Among them are the long standing traditions of democractic elections experienced by many of these established democracies; the high confidence placed in the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) and since the third wave of democratic governance, independent electoral commissions have become the preferred choice. Additionally, related documents that provide guidelines on the subject have been issued or endorsed by international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union (EU),

XVII

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). In like manner, field reports from international assistance agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) in the United States almost

XVIII

unanimously point to these conclusions (UNDP, 2000).

The countries within the Caribbean region can boast of holding regular competitive elections in compliance with their constitutions which do frequent results in a change of government. This is not to suggest that their elections are held without blemish. Some have been subject to justifiable criticisms. There is always room for improvement. Repeated calls have been made by Election Observation Missions including the Commonwealth and the OAS

XIX

to establish an independent electoral commission in St.Vincent and the Grenadinesas as a means to improving the electoral quality (The Commonwealth, 2015).

This research is intended to explore the potential benefits that the establishment of an independent electoral commission would have on the democratic quality and technical administration of Elections in St.Vincent and the Grenadines. It examines the policy framework for establishing an electoral commission as permanent public institutions

XX

of governance in a democratizing world and will discuss the organisation structures, roles and responsiblities of an electoral commision; the independence of the electoral commission; cost of the electoral commission and the sustainability of the electoral commission.

XXI

Methodology

The methodology used in the preparation of this paper is a combination of literature reviews on the related subject areas; an internship at an independent electoral commission which provided practical knowledge and expereince in the functions and operations of an electoral commission and a focus group forum with electoral stakeholders to discuss the potential benefits of establishing an independent electoral

XXII

commission in St.Vincent and the Grenadines.

XXIII

Section 2 Literature Review

2.1.

Building Independent, Impartial

and

Professional

Electoral

Management

Electoral officials are the front-line agencies implementing electoral laws and regulations. It is imperative that officials ideally meet several general guiding principles and values which are common in public sector management and which are thought to ensure legitimate and credible processes and

XXIV

outcomes, meeting international standards. These principles include de facto independence from undue interference in their activities from the executive branch or partisan forces integrity so that the process is free of fraud and corruption, transparency to build trust in the accuracy and honesty of the process, efficiency so that services are delivered effectively, equitably, and within budget, impartiality so that officials are not biased towards any single contestant, and professionalism so that staff have the

XXV

training, expertise and resources to manage tasks well (IDEA, 2006).

Similar principles are echoed in many of the practical guidelines designed to strengthen electoral administration, such as by International IDEA, IFES and the OSCE. The organizational structure, legal mandate, and administrative functions of electoral agencies vary substantially from one country to another. However, as does the de facto autonomy of these agencies according to their constitutional and legal status, their scope and mandate, provisions for the

XXVI

nomination, appointment, and removal of members, the capacity for external actors and other branches of government to overrule the agency’s decisions and oversee its operations, and the body’s financial independence. The primary models of electoral administration, concern whether the main actors are governmental or independent agencies which I refer to as the horizontal axis and whether decision-making and regulations are largely centralized or localized conversely on the vertical axis. Based on these distinctions, St,Vincent and

XXVII

the Grenadines electoral administration is primarily governmental-centralized.

Among all countries worldwide, International IDEA estimates that around one quarter continue to use the governmental model for running elections. (IDEA, 2006) In this model, there is a fair degree of centralization to ensure professional standards and uniform practices operate across the whole country, such as on basic matters of voter registration and balloting procedures, with accountability to the national legislature.

XXVIII

The department located within a central government is typically responsible for administering elections, staffed by permanent civil servants and headed by a cabinet minister who is directly accountable to the legislature, and thus indirectly to the electorate. With very few exceptions they have no ‘members’. Their budget falls within a government ministry and/or under local authorities (UNDP, 2000). This model persists in several European countries and the day-to-day administration of elections, such as maintaining voter registries,

XXIX

organizing balloting, running polling places, and counting ballots, is devolved to the government authorities charged with electoral affairs ( Louis Massicotte et al, 2004).

One potential advantage of the governmental-centralized model is that electoral authorities in many democracies such as the UK can call upon the existing resources of the public sector to run elections, including commonly deploying the permanent pool of skilled, experienced, and trained full-time employees at national

XXX

and local authority levels to administer contests. Electoral authorities can also use the existing technological and communication infrastructure of national and local governments, reducing overhead costs and the duplication of services. At the same time, however, the main danger is that where electoral administration is the responsibility of civil servants working in central ministries or local authorities, and thus subject to executive control and legislative oversight, the process is thought vulnerable to either the actual or the

XXXI

perceived abuse of power and the risk of manipulation to benefit the interests of the governing party or parties. What works in Sweden, Belgium, and Denmark may therefore be far from appropriate in newer democracies which also have a governmental model of electoral administration.

Independent EMBs first appeared in the Americas in the early 20thcentury in countries such as Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica in their transitions from

XXXII

oligarchic government to more liberal democracies. In a sense, independent EMBs began as fragile state institutions. In Venezuela and Costa Rica, EMBs were constitutionally established as a fourth branch of government along with the executive, legislature, and judiciary.Canada established the office of Chief Electoral Officer in 1920.In Asia, India was the first country to establish an independent EMB, in 1950. Other countries that had established EMBs before the “third wave” of democracy

XXXIII

were Kenya and Malta (1960), Ghana (1968) and Bangladesh (1973) (AEC, 2000). Today two-thirds of all countries have established an independent administrative agency which is legally separate from government to manage elections found in 131 countries out of 187 independent nation-states worldwide or 70% (IDEA, 2006). Recent years have seen several post-industrial countries adopting new public sector management reforms where several government functions are transferred from central department of state to specific

XXXIV

administrative and regulatory agencies in the public sector ( Christopher Pollitt and Gerrt Bouckaart, 2004).

In recent decades Anglo-American countries, including New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Australia, the tendency has been to establish more specialized organizations central agencies for managing elections. Similar trends have been observed in Canada, France and the Netherlands, although they are thought to be less marked in Belgium, Finland, Germany, and Sweden. (Pippa Norris, 2014)

XXXV

Independent regulatory and administrative agencies have been established in the public sector to provide delegated authority over many policy areas, such as environmental protection, food safety, pharmaceuticals, and telecoms. It is widely believed that this separation of specialized agencies from direct government control avoids political interference and potential conflicts of interest, as well as being more efficient, and thus strengthens the delivery of goods and services in the public interest. (Chris Hanretty and Christel Koop, 2013).

XXXVI

Reflecting this development, many countries transferred responsibilities for election management from government departments to legally independent administrative agencies, with chief executives composed of experts or partisan members, which operate at arm’s length from the executive. The name of these bodies varies in different countries and they are often called electoral commissions, electoral tribunals, electoral boards, electoral courts, departments of elections, election institutes or election councils, and so on, known generically as

XXXVII

election management bodies (EMBs) (IDEA, 2006).

2.2

. EMB Models

In order to place the fragile state EMB in context, a global survey of EMBs is required to ascertain the range of models currently being employed. The models can be examined from the standpoints of their relationships with governments, appointment process, and membership (Rafael Lopez-Pinter, 2000) .The relationship of an EMB to the government is

XXXVIII

considered a very critical issue, since it is central to the legitimate independence of the EMB from government and consequently, other political influences.

International IDEA stated that there are five degrees of independence that can be ascribed. Firstly, the EMB is a fourth branch of government separate from the executive, legislature, and judiciary as is the case in Costa Rica and Venezuela. Second, there is a commission established in either the constitution or legislation but which is structurally independent from the

XXXIX

government in policy, operations, and funding. Examples of this model are Mexico and India. In the third model, two or more separate bodies, all independent from the government, are statutorily responsible for the conduct of the election as seen in Colombia and Jamaica. In the fourth model, the government administers the election; however, its administration is under an independent supervisory and, often, judicial authority. France and Argentina reflect good examples of this model.

XL

Finally, the government administers the elections, usually through the Ministry of Interior, or some other relevant ministry without outside supervision; as obtained in most caribbean countries including St.Vincent and the Grenadines (IDEA, 2015).

In order to ascertain the prevalence of each model, a survey was undertaken in 2001 which distills these six models into three: 1) independent EMBs; 2) government administered with independent supervision; and 3) government administered. The

XLI

survey shows the predominance of independent EMBs (53 percent) as compared to government administered with supervisory bodies (27 percent) and government administered (20 percent) (IDEA, 2015).

Independent Electoral Model create ‘arms-length’ separation from the government through the mechanism of establishing de jure formal legal independence (Pippa Norris, 2014). The independent model has often been established to run the first elections following regime transitions, as

XLII

was the case in Poland with the establishment of the National Election Commission, the Independent Election Commission in South Africa, and the Central Election Bureau in Romania (UNDP, 2000). This model has also become increasingly popular among established democracies; for example, through agencies such as the Australian Electoral Commission (since 1984), and the UK Electoral Commission (since 2000) (The Commonwealth Electoral Network, 2016).This type of arrangement is described

XLIII

by International IDEA as those where “elections are organized and managed by an EMB which is institutionally independent and autonomous from the executive branch of government, and which has and manages its own budget (IDEA, 2006).

Under the Independent Model, an EMB is not accountable to a government ministry or department. It may be accountable to the legislature, the judiciary, or the head of state. Consequently, EMBs under the Independent Model may enjoy varying degrees of financial autonomy and

XLIV

accountability, as well as varying levels of performance accountability. They are composed of members from outside the permanent civil service. (IDEA, 2006). The main advantage of the independent model is that by insulating electoral officials from outside pressures, this helps to curb any potential conflict of interest, partisan meddling, and the abuse of power by external forces, especially where it is suspected that the electoral arbitrator is biased towards incumbent politicians, political parties, the governing party, or

XLV

powerful elites (AEC, 2000). By delegating responsibility for electoral administration to independent agencies, politicians agree to abide by the rules, strengthening the credibility of the electoral process (IDEA, 2006).

3.

Policy rationale for establishing an

Electoral Commission

The credibility and legitimacy of electoral processes is inextricably linked to electoral integrity. The Global Commission on Democracy, Elections and Security

XLVI

identified five major challenges to the conduct of elections with integrity in its 2012 report: building the rule of law to substantiate claims to human rights and electoral justice, developing professional and competent electoral management bodies (EMBs) with full independence of action, creating institutions and norms of multiparty competition and division of power, removing barriers to universal and equal political participation, and regulating political finance (IDEA, 2015). Since the mid-1980s, there has also been an

XLVII

unprecedented commitment to electoral reforms around the world, driven by the realization in political and electoral administration circles that changing social environments required a rethink of electoral arrangements, by the critical attention of the media and election observers and by the emergence of global and regional organizations promoting democracy (IDEA, 2006).

Public interest has more often been focused on reforming electoral systems to enhance representation (The Electoral Intergrity

XLVIII

Project, 2016). Yet it is observed that reforms to the machinery for organizing and administering electoral events are of equal importance. These include a trend toward establishing autonomous electoral management bodies with wide-ranging powers and responsibilities, and the improvement of electoral organization in order to deliver higher-quality electoral services more effectively, while enhancing the freeness and fairness of electoral events (IDEA, 2015).

XLIX

Furthermore, as the administration of elections receive more scrutiny, it has also become more conscious of the need for professionalism in its operations. Today, electoral managers have learned from experiences within their own system and that of non-electoral organizations from which they have formed linkages and networks creating an avenue through which ideas and best practices are shared and electoral standards may be raised.

As electoral administration develops through greater professionalism, it has had to

L

respond to greater challenges (Rafael Lopez-Pinter, 2000). In addition to their tasks related to implementing election laws and managing electoral technicalities, some EMBs have assumed responsibilities in highly political areas, for example the oversight of political finance, the registration and oversight of political parties, the role and activities of the media during elections, and the promotion of political participation (IDEA, 2015).

LI

3.1

Legal framework

Electoral processes are complex, standardized activities that require clear, simple and relatively comprehensive legal definition in order to promote consistency, equity and a common understanding of electoral frameworks by all electoral stakeholders (IDEA, 2006).

The electoral legal framework within which an EMB operates may be defined in many different types of instruments including international and regional treaties, the constitution, national and subnational statute

LII

law, and EMB and other regulations. International and regional treaties and agreements provide a framework of norms against which a country’s electoral legal arrangements can be defined and assessed (AEC, 2000).

There is a trend toward defining key electoral issues in the constitution, as this may provide a workable means of protecting electoral norms from manipulation by the ruling party. Similarly, electoral arrangements may be further defined in statute law, secondary legislation and

LIII

regulations; these electoral statute law may either be a single law or multiple laws that need to be kept in harmony.

Furthermore, the EMBs or the executive branch of government may be able to issue regulations to fill in gaps in the law; set their own administrative policies, usually these would be subject to some form of judicial or other review (Rafael Lopez-Pinter, 2000). A key pre-requiste in election processes is building confidence and trust, since political mistrust is very expensive. It is important that all parts of the electoral framework

LIV

,treaties, constitution, statute laws, and EMB and other regulations, as well as administrative policies are freely and publicly available, and that changes are discussed and shared with key stakeholders (IDEA, 2015).

4.

Organisation Structure, roles and

Responsibilities

of

an

Electoral

Commission

Each EMB needs to develop an organizational structure that facilitates cost-effective achievement of its strategic

LV

objectives by designating the necessary numbers of skilled staff at appropriate locations and levels of seniority who are subject to effective lines of accountability (IDEA, 2006). An EMB’s powers and functions may not be separately identified in its legal framework, however, these powers and functions can cover a greater or lesser variety of tasks, depending on factors such as the structure of the state, the electoral system, and the number and type of organizations that provide electoral services.

LVI

The essential or core role and functions of an EMB are: determining who is eligible to vote; receiving and validating the nominations of electoral participants (for elections, political parties and/or candidates); conducting polling; counting the votes; and talling the votes. Other functions that may be undertaken by an EMB include voter registration, boundary delimitation, political party regulation and the adjudication of electoral disputes (IDEA, 2015).

LVII

There are many advantages and disadvantages which need to be carefully assessed, when assigning some electoral activities such as boundary delimitation, compiling data for electoral registers; registering and funding political parties; monitoring political campaigns; voter education and information; and validation of election results since EMBs creditbilty is parmount (IDEA, 2015).

It is generally acknowledged that the EMBs may have behavioural and access

LVIII

responsibilities to the communities they serve and thus may extend beyond the minimum requirements of the electoral legal framework. Among these responsiblities are the following: promoting gender balance within the EMB itself and political life, dealing fairly with issues of ethnicity, promoting equality and equity in electoral contests, providing equality of access to electoral services for all and especially for marginalized members of society, and recognizing customary practices where these

LIX

are in harmony with electoral management principles (IDEA, 2015).

4.1

Composition

There is no optimal number of EMB members, and no general principle to indicate that either full- or part-time membership is preferable, however the electoral and administrative circumstances will dictate the approach (IDEA, 2015). The size of the country and its population, economic and geopolitical issues; the EMB’s powers and functions; the strength of

LX

its secretariat; and whether electoral management follows the Independent or the Mixed Model may determine the size and work schedule of the EMB membership. Under the Independent and Mixed Models membership may be from multiparty (nominated by political parties qualified to do so) or expert (politically non-aligned members appointed on the basis of their professional skills) or a combination of political and professional appointees.

The type of membership that is suitable for a particular country will depend on its

LXI

political environment and stage of democratic development (UNDP, 2000). Fixed and secure terms of office for EMB members would allow for institutional confidence and renewal. Additionally, staggering EMB members’ terms of office minimizes disruption and helps retain an EMB’s institutional memory (The Commonwealth Electoral Network, 2016). EMB members need to develop decision-making and management mechanisms that are suitable for the type of EMB and the country’s management culture. They also

LXII

need to adopt standing orders that ensure transparent EMB meeting and decision-making processes, and internal regulations for the effective administration of the EMB. It is considered very useful for the EMB membership to form subcommittees that deal with different aspects of electoral administration (IDEA, 2015).

5.

Cost of an Electoral Commission

Election costs are measured with different levels of comprehensiveness and under different circumstances in various countries,

LXIII

making cost effectiveness comparisons difficult (Rafael López-Pintor and Jeff Fischer, 2005). It well documented that funding must be approved by the legislature and disbursed to the EMB through a government ministry, though this may affect perceptions of the EMB’s ability to act independently and in a timely manner (IDEA, 2015).

In emerging democracies, a large proportion of electoral funding may come from donor agencies and while donor assistance can have a positive impact on election technical

LXIV

standards and integrity, it needs to be carefully targeted and be subject to appropriate controls to allow the EMB to effectively use the funds (IDEA, 2015). An EMB that controls its own expenditure processes and cash flows is more likely to be a credibly institution and may be better able to disburse electoral funds in a timely manner.

The financial management of EMBs must be in accordance with the principles of transparency, efficiency, effectiveness, integrity and sustainability (IDEA, 2015).

LXV

Almost invariably, electoral budgets are prepared by the electoral authority and processed through the finance ministries for approval in the legislature. In Australia, for example, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) receives the major part of its funding through government appropriations, which are acts of Parliament that authorize expenditures and appropriate money from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to provide agreed levels of budget funds to government agencies (IDEA, 2015).

LXVI

A very significant factor in explaining cost variations is duration of previous experience with multi-party elections. In countries with longer multi-party democratic experience, elections are consistently less costly than in countries where such elections constitute a new undertaking. This trend cuts across regions, levels of economic development, and even interruptions of electoral practice by military breakdowns (Rafael López-Pintor and Jeff Fischer, 2005). Low electoral costs, approximately $1 to $3 per elector, tend to manifest in countries with

LXVII

longer electoral experience: the United States and most Western European countries; Chile ($1.2), Costa Rica ($1.8), and Brazil ($2.3) in Latin America; Benin ($1.6), Botswana ($2.7), Ghana ($0.7), and Senegal ($1.2) in Africa; India ($1) and Pakistan ($0.5) in Asia; and Australia ($3.2) (IDEA, 2015).

These findings support the idea that establishing and consolidating a permanent electoral administration as the repository for managerial capacity development with regard to elections within both the political

LXVIII

and the administrative systems is a cost-effective practice.

6.

EMB Sustainability

Despite the axiom that ‘you can’t put a price on democracy’, making democratic elections more sustainable is a principle that should be embraced by all EMBs (IDEA, 2015). There is continuous pressure on EMBs to increase their capacities and performance in order to promote effectiveness and efficiency. Sustainability refers to electoral policies and practices that are cost effective

LXIX

and realistic, and meet the needs of all stakeholders in the electoral processes, both now and in the future.

It is a greater challenge in new and emerging democracies. (IDEA, 2015) It is important that EMBs aim for financial and economic, institutional, sociopolitical and environmental sustainability in their activities, to enhance stakeholder confidence in the electoral process and to ensure their own survival. The main elements of sustainability are institutional, financial and economic, and human resource

LXX

sustainability and a comprehensive picture of an EMB’s sustainability and capacity is only feasible if accurate evaluations of all the main elements are combined (Rafael Lopez-Pinter, 2000).

Research work suggest that systemic, organizational and individual needs assessments can help an EMB identify sustainability issues. Furthermore, in new and emerging democracies, donor support levels and commitment can have a major impact on EMB sustainability. Consequently, donor support may have

LXXI

positive and negative effects: it may improve the quality of a specific election, but its influence and any dependence by an EMB on it may have a negative impact on its sustainability (IDEA, 2015).

Importantly, donors have a responsibility to ensure that their support promotes EMB sustainability, this for example can be achieved through coordination of EMB needs and support for skills transfer. While new technologies are seductive to EMBs, and often attractive to donors, EMBs need to make objective decisions based on their

LXXII

long-term usefulness and impact on EMB sustainability. The extent to which new technologies are used by an EMB should be determined by the level of the country’s resource endowment and the benefits to be derived from their use over time. (Rafael Lopez-Pinter, 2000).

It must be understood here that aiming for sustainability could affects choices of electoral systems, legal frameworks and procedures for costly, complex and integrity-demanding electoral processes such as boundary delimitation, voter

LXXIII

registration, voting, and vote counting and tabulation (Pippa Norris, 2014). Consequently, the EMB would need to carefully consider the necessary levels of integrity required and the technology used for these processes, and their effects on financial and socio-political sustainability. Another critical component for consideration is Human resources element. This could be deemed an EMB’s greatest asset.

Accordinly, investment in developing and retaining human resources, and in ensuring

LXXIV

that institutional memory survives the loss of experienced staff, is an essential ingredient of EMB sustainability. Similarly, effective materials design, procurement and management policies based on rigorous needs and cost-effectiveness analyses, and tools such as life cycle assessments contribute significantly to EMB sustainability (IDEA, 2015).

LXXV

Section 3. Research Findings

3.1

Political Structure of St.Vincnet

and the Grenadines

St Vincent and the Grenadines is a constitutional monarchy and representative democracy, with Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State, represented by a Governor-General. The legislature is unicameral, with a House of Assembly comprising 15 members of

LXXVI

Parliament elected at least every five years by universal adult sufferage (plus Speaker and Attorney-General) and six senators appointed by the Governor-General (four on the advice of the Prime Minister and two on that of the Leader of the Opposition). The leader of the majority party in the House of Assembly becomes Prime Minister and selects and heads a Cabinet (The Commonwealth, 2015).

In February 2005 the Constitutional Review Commission proposed far-reaching reforms which included the replacement of the

LXXVII

British monarch as Head of State by an indirectly elected President, the establishment of a non-partisan ‘Council of Elders’ to advise on public appointments and issues of the day, and reconstituting the legislature to include representatives of civil society as well as directly elected and appointed members and the establishment of an idependent electoral commission among many other things.

A two-thirds vote was needed to approve the constitution and folllowing a referendum on November 25th 2009 the final results

LXXVIII

declared by the Electoral Office showed that 56 percent of those voting had voted “no” and 43 percent had voted “yes”. The new constitution was thus rejected (Sylvia Findlay-Scrubb, 2009).

3.2.

Electoral Framework and Election

Administration

St Vincent and the Grenadines is divided into fifteen electoral constituencies. Each constituency elects a Member of Parliament on a first-past-the-post basis, for a five-year term. The key documents providing the legal

LXXIX

and regulatory framework for the conduct of general elections are the Constitution of St Vincent and the Grenadines (1979, since amended) and the Representation of the People Act (1982, since amended).

Under Section 33 of the Constitution, the country is divided into constituencies with polling divisions within each one. Each polling division consists of one or more voting centres based on the number of registered voters in the area (Legal Affairs, 1979).

LXXX

Section 34 of the Constitution establishes the office of the Supervisor of Elections, appointed by the Governor-General to exercise general supervision over the registration of voters and over the conduct of elections of representatives. The Supervisor of Elections is not constitutionally subject to the direction or control of any person or authority. Whenever the Supervisor of Elections considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he/she must report to the House on the exercise of his/her functions. The report

LXXXI

must be submitted to the Minister responsible for matters relating to the election of Representatives and that Minister shall, not later than seven days after the House first meets after he has received the report, lay it before the House (Legal Affairs, 1979).

Creating a new electoral commission will necessarily involve wide-ranging legislative and administrative change. Applying the standard comparative terms used internationally, St. Vincent and the

LXXXII

Grenadines’s current model of electoral management is categorised as being ‘Governmental’ (IDEA, 2006) and ‘centralised’ (López-Pintor, 2000).

3.3.

Establishment of an Independent

Electoral Commission

Proposals from the Constitutional Review Commission of 2005 , political parties, international observers and other bodies show a consensus in favour of establishing an electoral commission in St.Vincent and the Grenadines. This was reaffirmed in

LXXXIII

2015 when all the election observation missions who participated in the general elections held on December 9th, recommended the setting up of such a body. The Commonwealth observeration mission had this to say:

“The public’s perception of the actual independence enjoyed by the Office of Supervisor of Elections continue to raise concerns considering it is one of the departments which operated under the Prime Minister, who also has Ministerial responsibility for elections . An example of

LXXXIV

the inherent tension of this set-up, is that the Supervisor of Elections must request budgetary needs from the Permanent Secretary assigned to the Ministry responsible for elections rather than directly to Parliament. The Team believes the time has arrived in St Vincent and the Grenadines for this situation to be improved. In this regard, the Team strongly advises that consideration be given to amend the laws in order to enable the creation of an independent electoral management body. The Team urges the

LXXXV

Commonwealth Secretariat to support any request in this regard that might arise from St Vincent and the Grenadines” (The Commonwealth, 2015).

The Organisation of American States (OAS) also felt strongly on this matter:

“The Mission recommends that consideration be given to the establishment of an Independent Electoral Management Body, whose membership should be comprised of independent actors with a strong technical focus. In keeping with best practices across parts of the OECS and the

LXXXVI

wider CARICOM area, such a body ought to be endowed with a structure and a range of powers that will speak to its autonomy and independence” (OAS, 2015).

The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CARICOM) was very intentional in their recommendation likewise:

“Provisions should be made for the appointment of an independent Electoral Commission to administer the conduct of elections in St. Vincent and the Grenadines” (CARICOM, 2015).

LXXXVII

The National Monitoring and Consultative Mechanism ( NMCM) a local observation agencies also indicated in their general election report that further efforts should be made and systems developed towards ensuring that the Office of the Supervisor of Elections function independent of the Government save the provision of allocated funds for the execution of the office and other necessary relations and that these systems be deliberately designed to engender a culture of confidence and

LXXXVIII

transparency with respect to the office (NMCM, 2015).

The Supervisor of Elections indicated that serious consideration needs to be given to a comprehensive review of the Representation of the People Act No. 7 of 1982 to address the creation of an independent Electoral Management Body (Sylvia Findlay, 2015). However, while there is consensus in favour of establishing an electoral commission, there is a range of opinions on the precise functions to be assigned to an electoral commission and the roles that should

LXXXIX

continue to be performed by those who currently have responsibilities in this area.

As a principle of good governance, it is advisable that the functions of any new public body be clearly defined when it is being set up. These functions should then inform its organisational design. The motive, purpose and goals in setting up the electoral commission should therefore be clearly identified from the outset.

XC

As a next step, it is necessary that the functions to be assigned to the electoral commission be defined more precisely. Stakeholders at the focus group raised this matter when asked what are the pros and cons of establishing an idependent electoral commission. This is what some had to say: ‘ the functions of registering political parties and regulating campaign finances is a crucial one’

‘selection and training of election day workers should be given greater priority’

XCI

‘the need for greater attention given to voter education’

Experience with the establishment of the Australian Electoral Commission in 1984 and in the reforms to the electoral register in Canada in 1997 point towards the importance of a cross-party approach in achieving a level of consensus as specific proposals are developed and implemented. Seeking agreement among stakeholders on a vision for change, and maintaining such support over time as change is implemented, can aid the process.

XCII

Statutory provision for the electoral commission’s independence would be a necessary condition of its autonomy, but not the only one. Other aspects of autonomy concern issues affecting its management, policy making, structures, finance, and the degree to which the commission can be directed by government. It will be necessary to specify the functions of Ireland’s electoral commission first, and then match these with the most suitable organisational form. Some key questions for consideration are:

XCIII

1. Which functions should be assigned to an electoral commission?

2. What roles would / should those currently involved in electoral management continue to perform, specifically: (a) What role would the current returning officers continue to perform, and who is to be responsible for the organisation of elections on the ground? (b) Who should be responsible for voter registration? (c) Should responsibilities of the Constituency Boundary Commission be assigned to an electoral commission? (d)Should an electoral commission have an

XCIV

oversight role in respect of campaign financing and registration of political parties?

3.4.

The current system and its costs

The current centralised nature of electoral governance in St.Vincent and the Grenadines means that expenditure is incurred by the electoral office performing its statutory duties. This sometimes means limited resources to carry out its mandate. The sakeholders at the focus group forum identified finance as one of the major

XCV

foreseeable challenge to be encounted with the potential establishment of an independent electoral commission.

Research has shown that independent electoral commissions are better for democratic stability and are more cost-effective. However, it cannot simply be assumed that economies would be achieved in setting up a new body. It is possible that net savings may not be achieved. Nonetheless, the establishment of an electoral commission may still be desired based on its potential to improve the

XCVI

effectiveness of electoral governance and the legitimacy of the system in the eyes of the electorate and other stakeholders ( Oireachtas, 2016). Nevertheless, an electoral commission could bring greater transparency to electoral costs by combining various functions under the same umbrella.

3.5.

Membership of an electoral

commission

Electoral management bodies internationally vary in their number of members and there

XCVII

are differing views on the membership that should comprise an electoral commission.

The focus group discussion held on the establishment of an Electoral Commission in St.Vincent and the Grenadines among electoral stakeholders addressed this matter of the commission’s membership and it was recommended a five member commission be considered that comprise ‘a chairperson, who would be a judge or former judge of the Supreme Court or High Court, Two representatives from the political parties

XCVIII

who sit in parliament, civil society and , the chief executive officer of the commission who would be titled the Chief Electoral Officer’. Additionally stakeholders argued strongly that ‘all appointment to the commission should be made by the Governor General following consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition’.

As obtained in Jamaica, the commission has four nominated members representing the two political parties in parliament and four selected members who are appointed by the

XCIX

Governor General after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition (ECJ, 2014).

In the UK four of the ten commissioners come from a political background, although with a detachment from current active politics ( Oireachtas, 2016). In the case of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the appointment of members of the electoral commission is provided for in a manner that seeks to guarantee their independence.

C

In Canada, while there is an electoral management body called ‘Elections Canada’, responsibility ultimately rests with one person in the form of the Chief Electoral Officer (1X Inter American Meeting of EMBs, 2014). Again some key questions should be considere here:

1.Who should be the members of an electoral commission?

2. How should the members be appointed? 3.6.

Accountability and performance

Accountability of the electoral commission will be very important, but accountability

CI

will need to be achieved in a manner that does not compromise the independence of the commission. Experience in other countries points to both the desirability and necessity of having accountability mechanisms linked to democratic institutions.

As observed during the internship at the Electoral Commision of Jamaica, these include formal reporting arrangements to a designated parliamentary committee, the identification of a specific government minister as a liaison with the electoral

CII

commission, audit by the independent state auditing body and the publication of documents against which performance can be assessed – for example, a statement of strategy, budget plan and annual report (ECJ, 2014).

In common with other jurisdictions; for St Vincent and the Grenadines any establishment of an electoral commission should be advised to have an audit committee and other oversight structures be put in place to assure good internal

CIII

governance and appropriate external financial accountability.

Section 4. Potential Benefits of

establishing an independent electoral

commission

Laking (2002) advises that a decision by government to create a new agency should be made on the basis of the organisations’ contribution to the general principles of good governance in the public sector. He proposes that the purpose of the body should

CIV

be clear and that the benefits of the organisation should be defined in one or more of the following two sets of criterias: improved economy, efficiency or effectiveness through specialisation of function; improved public credibility of governmental operations through enhanced impartiality or legitimacy of decision making and operations.

Both of these purposes are valid in relation to the establishment of an electoral commission. However, issues of economy

CV

and efficiency on the one hand, and of credibility and legitimacy on the other, gives rise to different considerations. This is particularly the case in respect of accountability relationships which are a vital element in the external governance of public bodies and their oversight by elected representatives and citizens.

Mayer sums up a crucial question in the design of electoral commission structures as being, “how best to balance neutrality with the need for accountability” (Mayers, K.R, 2007). Similar considerations have been

CVI

identified in the design of corporate governance arrangements for agencies, where a key challenge has been to find the right balance between accountability, autonomy, openness and performance management (OECD, 2008).

Internationally, three main motives have been identified to explain the creation of such bodies (OECD, 2008) .The first refers to a widely-held desire to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government entities with specialised functions. The second reason focuses on improving

CVII

legitimacy and the expertise of decision making. The third emphasises political motives, where a new body may be set up as a political response to demonstrate commitment to an issue or cause.

Potential benefits of greater autonomy would arise through improved legitimacy, transparency and public confidence. However, Verhoest et. al. (2004) note that autonomy may not necessarily lead to improved performance, observing that the relationship between the two concepts is inconclusive.

CVIII

Evidence internationally has shown that independent electoral commissions are better for democratic stability and are more cost-effective than ad hoc arrangements (López-Pintor, 2000).

Two sets of key reasons for the establishment of agencies in general and electoral commissions in particular were identified as enhanced legitimacy and public confidence on the one hand, and improved performance and cost-effectiveness on the other. It was also shown that an important consideration in institutional design involves

CIX

achieving a balance between independence and accountability. However, there is no generally applicable formula in determining how the relationship between these two elements of governance should be configured.

A challenge in St.Vincent and the Grenadines in developing the electoral commission structure will be to seek an optimal balance appropriate to its particular functions and organisational shape.

Elklit and Reynolds (2005) identify four performance indicators for assessing

CX

electoral management. These can be summarised as: the perceived legitimacy and acceptance of the electoral management body by political parties and voters; the perceived degree of impartiality, the perceived quality in the delivery of services; andthe perceived degree of transparency. Another important benefit of establishing electoral governance would be regarding arrangements for the allocation of funding and oversight in its use. These issues lie at the intersection between accountability and performance. The level of financial

CXI

independence an electoral commission can exercise provides an indication of its autonomy (Verhoest et. al., 2004).

On the other hand, how an electoral commission is funded and how it spends its budget are central questions in assessing ‘internal’ and ‘external’ performance. Internal performance is concerned with matters of risk, management and operating systems, while external performance covers issues of efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public money (McGauran et. al., 2005).

CXII

4. 1.

Lessons Learned

1. Because electoral commissions have proved vital to the sustainability of democratic government, they should enjoy constitutional protection rather than ordinary legal regulation

2. Electoral bodies are also better protected when their members are appointed either by multi-party parliamentary approval or from lists approved by a multi-party parliamentary consensus or some other kind of all-party or social assembly.

CXIII

3. Electoral legislation, including the status and composition of electoral bodies, is more widely accepted and effective when all political parties participate in its drafting. 4. An electoral authority can be party-based and still operate neutrally and independently.

5. Strong leadership by electoral bodies is particularly important at the early stage of democratization.

6. EMBs with a very large membership are usually less effective.

CXIV

7. When a permanent electoral administration is largely staffed with professional civil servants, it can operate at acceptable levels of efficacy and efficiency even without the support of high-technology equipment.

8. Though it is difficult to enforce, the control of party funding and campaign finance is frequently a full or partial responsibility of electoral commissions. 9. It is important to avoid using the electoral administration as an employment program. The system should be devised with a view

CXV

towards sustainability and therefore should correspond to the limited financial capabilities of the national government. 10. Political mistrust is expensive.

11. The presence of international observers contributes significantly to creating an atmosphere of confidence and transparency (UNDP, 2000).

Section

5

Conclusion

and

Recommendation

CXVI

This paper has considered issues arising in the establishment of an electoral commission in St.Vincent and the Grenadines. Setting up such a new body will be a significant undertaking. .

In moving forward, it is necessary to have a full understanding of the present system and the implications of change.

It is evident from published reports and policy documents from across the political spectrum that there has been a general convergence of opinion in recent years in

CXVII

favour of having an electoral commission in St.Vincent and the Grenadines.

There are relevant examples in other countries where electoral commissions have been set up and have operated effectively. For example in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada potential lessons are identified.

Experience with major reforms affecting electoral matters in St.Vincent and the Grenadines and in other countries highlights the value of consultation and the

CXVIII

development of a common vision for change. The electoral system involves a large number of stakeholders and it is important that a wide range of opinion is heard. The needs of citizens and voters must be a central consideration in this process of change

CXIX

1. Members of the electoral body should be appointed in a manner that ensures the confidence of public and political parties alike; they should be served by a secretariat accountable entirely to them.

2. Political parties should participate in all phases of the electoral process. They should be consulted before important decisions are taken, including the appointment of members of the electoral body. The

CXX

electoral body should regularly inform them of all relevant matters. 3. The electoral body should be

responsible for all phases of the electoral process, including the registration of voters, the distribution of any voter identification cards and the compilation of the voters roll. The EMB should also be responsible for continuous revision of the voters roll and for ensuring its reliability through adequate submission to public inspection well in advance of