DOI: 10.4018/IJSVR.2019010102
Copyright©2019,IGIGlobal.CopyingordistributinginprintorelectronicformswithoutwrittenpermissionofIGIGlobalisprohibited.
Visualizing Theatrical and Novelistic
Discourse with Bakhtin
Susan Petrilli, University of Bari “Aldo Moro”, Bari, Italy
ABSTRACT AconstantvisioninMikhailBakhtin’sworks:polyphonicdialogue,thisaboveallinthenovel,but hislovefortheatreshouldnotbeneglected.Consequently,acentralfocusinBakhtin’sreflections isthepolyphonicnovelwhichhefirstidentifiesinDostoevsky’snovels.Bakhtinestablishesaclose relationbetweenthenovel,popularcultureandcarnival,evidencingthecarnivalcomponentof novelisticdiscourse,thereforeoflife.Moreover,asherecountsinhis1973conversationswithVictor Duvakin,hisinterestinthenoveloverlappedwiththeatre,inparticulartheMoscowArtTheatre.In Bakhtin and Theatre,DickMcCawrelatesBakhtin’svisionofartandlifetotheatreasvisualized byStanislavksy,MeyerholdandGrotowski,eachofwhomoperateda“revolution”intheirown originaltermscomparabletotheso-called“Bakhtinianrevolution”inphilosophyoflanguageand literarycriticism.Withthedifficultsocio-politicaleventsofthetimeonthebackground,thisessay exploresimportantaspectsoftherealdialoguebetweenthesethreemastersofthetheatreandof theidealdialogueestablishedbetweenthelatterandBakhtin,therebycreatingaspecialperspective ontheatrewithspecialreferencetotheBakhtinianconceptsof“polyphony”and“dramatization”. Overallareevidenced,forthequalityoflife,theimportanceofsuchvaluesasdialogism,otherness, participativeunindifference,creativitywhichalsoemergeascharacteristicsthatspecifytheartwork, whethernovelisticortheatrical,therebyshowinghowartandlifearevitallyinterrelatedandcapable ofenhancingeachother. KeywoRDS
Carnival Imagery, Dialogic Vision, Otherness, Polyphony, Unfinalizability
1. SPeAKING oF THeATRe: BAKHTIN IN CoNVeRSATIoN wITH DUVAKIN
ThatMikhailM.Bakhtin(1895-1975)dedicatedalmostallofhisworkstonovelisticdiscourse isrenowned.Wealsoknowthathewasfascinatedbyitsmanifestationinthepolyphonicformas conceivedbyFyodorDostoevsky(1821-1881).Thus,organisedthenovel,thatis,thepolyphonic novelwasBakhtin’sgreatlove.
Inthesecond1963editionofhismonographonDostoevsky,Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo (Eng.trans.Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics,1984)–thefirsteditionwaspublishedin1929 underthetitleProblemy tvorčestva Dostoevskogo(RussianandItaliantranslationnowavailable inBachtineilsuocircolo2014:1053-1423)–,Bakhtinintroducesanewelement:theconnection betweennovel,polyphonyandpopularculture,thelatterbeingcharacterisedbythatorientation andworldviewdescribedas“carnivalesque”.Dostoevsky’spolyphonicnovelavailsitselfofthe carnivalesquecomponentinthenovelisticgenre.Bakhtinpursuedhisstudiesonpopularcultureand the“carnivalesque”withspecialreferencetoFrançoisRabelaisandhisnovelGarantua e Pantagruel
duringthetimeofhisexile.Infact,onlytwoyearsaftertheappearanceofthe1963editionofhis Dostoevskymonograph,Bakhinalsopublishedhis1965monographTvorčestvo Fransua Rable i narodnaja kul’tura srednevekov’ja i Renessansa(Eng.trans.Rabelais and His World,1984) (elaboratingonwhatwasoriginallyhisdoctoraldissertation,writtenduringthe1940s,whichthe commissarsjudginghisworkdidnotappreciate).Thesecond1963editionofBakhtin’sDostoevsky bookwasinevitablyinfluencedbyhisreadingsofRabelais. Astotheatre,thoughnotacentralfocusinBakhtin’swork,itseemsthatso-called“arttheatre” toowasoneofhispassions.WasBakhtininlovewiththeatreaswell,asaspectatoratleast?This isaquestionViktorDuvakinaskedMikhailBakhtinduringtheirsecondconversationofsix,allof whichtookplacein1973(Besedi VD Duvakina s M. M. Bachtinym 1973,firstpublishedin1996). BakhtindeclaredthathisexperienceoftheMoscowArtTheatrewasnotrelatedtoMoscow(where indeedhevisitedeverynowandagain),buttoOdessawherehetookhisuniversitycourses. BakhtinnarratesthatasafanofKonstantinS.Stanislavsky(1863-1938),co-founderofthe MoscowArtTheatreinauguratedin1898,hewouldgotothe“LondonHotel”andwithhisfriendsthey wouldwatchthisgreatmasterofthetheatrethroughthegreatwindowonthefirstfloor,overlookingthe road,ashesatintherestauranteatinghismeals.ThisnarrationledtoDuvakin’squestion:“Therefore, youlovedtheatreasaspectator?”(inBakhtin,2002,p.9);andBakhtin’sanswer:“Ican’tsaythatI lovedit.Ilikedit,ithadaneffectonme,Irememberseeing…,Brandtoverwhelmedme,”asthough toimplythathisgreatlovecontinuedtobethepolyphonicnovel.
2. BAKHTIN AND THeATRe, A BooK By DICK MCCAw
InBakhtin and Theatre. Dialogues with Stanislavsky, Meyerhold and Grotowski,publishedin2016, theauthorDickMcCawrelatesBakhtin(seeFigure1)tothetheatredirectors,KonstantinStanislavsky (seeFigure2),VsevolodE.Meyerhold(1874-1940)(seeFigure3)andJerzyMarianGrotowski (1933-1999)(seeFigure4),creatingaspecialperspectiveontheatrewhichwewillnowexplore. Theword“dialogues”inthesubtitleofthisbookalludestothedialoguethateffectivelytook placeinreallifebetweenthethreemastersofthetheatre,Stanislavsky,MeyerholdandGrotowski.But “dialogue”canalsobeinterpretedasalludingtotheimaginarydialogueandidealrelationestablished betweenthelatterandBakhtin.McCawrelatesthearchitectonicsofBakhtin’sthoughtsystemto theatreasvisualizedbythesemasters,withinsightsthatarenoteworthy.Stanislavsky,Meyerholdand Grotowskieachoperateasortof“revolution”intheirownoriginalterms,comparabletoBakhtin’s revolutioninphilosophyoflanguageandliterarycriticism,the“Bakhtinianrevolution”(seePonzio, 1997,2015;Petrilli,1996,2012a;Petrilli&Ponzio,2005). StanislavskyfoundedtheMoscowArtTheatrein1898,givingrisetoanintenseandcomplex dialoguewithMeyerholdandeventuallywiththeyoungPolishstudentGrotowski,whoinasense challenginghispredecessorsinventedthe“PoorTheatre”lessthantwentyyearsafterStanislavsky’s deathandMeyerhold’sassassination.Bakhtinhadsimilarrelationstomembersoftheso-called “BakhtinCircle”,allbeingconnectedwithhimandeachotherbyresearchitinerariesandopen dialogue,evermoretopicalinthepresentdayandage(Petrilli2016b,2016c,2017). McCawdevelopstheimplicationsofBakhtin’sreflectionsonthedifferencesbetweennoveland theatre,referringtoaseriesofcentralnotionsinhisdiscourse,includingthe“chronotope”(seein particularthefollowingpublicationsbyBakhtin:Toward a Philosophy of the Act[1920-1924],1993; “FormsofTimeandoftheChronotopeintheNovel”[1937-1938],inBakhtin,1981,pp.84-258; “AuthorandHeroinAestheticActivity”[1920-1924],inBakhtin,1990,pp.4-256;Russianoriginal inBakhtin,1979).Ourownfocusinthisessayisonthedifferencebetweennovelandtheatrewith referencetotheconceptof“polyphony,”ittoopivotalinBakhtin’swritings.Thequestionofpolyphony absorbedBakhtin’sattentionduringthe1920s,ensuinginthefirst1929editionofhismonograph onDostoevsky,publishedthesameyearashisarrestandexiletoKustanajinKazachstan;andthe questionofpolyphonycontinuedclaiminghisattentionfromthe1930sonwards,forthewholetime
ofhisexile,leadingintotheenlarged1963editionofhisDostoevskymonograph,whichmarkedhis firstimportantreturntotheintellectualscene. ThoughBakhtinwasmostlyconcernedwiththenovelratherthanwithdramaticgenres,he devotedagreatpartofhisattentiontotherelationbetweenauthorandhero.Theherocanbea characterofthenovelasmuchasacharacteronstage.Moreover,à proposDostoevsky(asanticipated, inventorofthenewnovelisticformdenominatedbyBakhtinasthe“polyphonicnovel”)andhisuse of“dialogue,”Bakhtinevidencedtheconceptof“dramatization”(seePonzio,2016,2018;Ponzio, Petrilli&Ponzio,2012). “TheimportantthinginDostoevsky’spolyphonyispreciselywhathappensbetweenvarious consciousnesses,thatis,theirinteractionandinterdependence”(Bakhtin,1963,p.36).Accordingto Bakhtin,theprofoundoriginalityofthecreativeprocessasactualizedbyDostoevskyliesinthelatter’s searchforwordsandplotsthatprovoke,tease,extortandultimatelydialogize(p.39).Dostoevsky’s essential dialogismisnotexhaustedinexternaldialogue,inotherwordsitisnotlimitedtoformal dialogue,totheexchangeofrejoindersamongcharacters:“The polyphonic novel is dialogic through and through.Dialogicrelationshipsexistamongallelementsofnovelisticstructure;thatis,theyare juxtaposedcontrapuntally,”asBakhtinsays(p.40).Dialogismpermeateshumanspeechgenerally, allrelationshipsandallmanifestationsofhumanlife,allthathasmeaningandsignificance.Thisis whatBakhtindenominates“substantialdialogue”bycontrastto“formaldialogue”(seealsoPetrilli, 2010,2012a,2014a,2014b,2014c):
Dostoevsky could hear dialogic relationships everywhere, in all manifestations of conscious and intelligent human life; where consciousness began, there dialogue began for him as well. […] Thus all relationships among external and internal parts and elements of his novel are dialogic in character, and he structured the novel as a whole as a “great dialogue”. Within this “great dialogue” could Figure 1. Bakhtin and Freud. Painting by Luciano Ponzio for the cover of V. N. Vološinov, Freud e il Freudismo (It. trans. by L. Ponzio, Milan, Mimesis, 2012)
be heard, illuminating it and thickening its texture, the compositionally expressed dialogues of the heroes; ultimately, dialogue penetrates within, into every word of the novel, making it double-voiced, into every gesture, every mimic movement on the hero’s face, making it convulsive and anguished; this is already the “microdialogue” that determines the peculiar character of Dostoevsky’s verbal style.
Asmuchastheauthor’svoice,thenarratingvoice,canbeheardinthepolyphonicnovel,the characterenjoyshighlevelsofautonomyfromtheauthorasinthetheatricalartwork.Withrespect todramaticgenresthedifferenceisthatinDostoevsky’spolyphonicnovelarelationofmutual interferenceisestablishedbetweenauthorandhero,whereasinthetraditionalnovel–toexemplify BakhtinindicatesBalzac–thecharacterbecomesthe“object”ofauthorialdiscourse.Inthe polyphonicnovel(notonlyDostoevsky’sbutinworksresultingfromhisinfluence)initsdifferent formsthroughtothepresentdayandage,thecharacterisautonomous,hasawordofhis/herown, remainsintheroleofsubjectwithrespecttotheheroinarelationofdifferenceandatonceof interference:“dialogicalinterference,”“substantialdialogue,”precisely.Thecharacterspeaksandacts autonomouslyandsomehowrespondstotheauthor–withoutbeingconditionedbytheauthor–and isoften“unpredictable”.Bakhtinusestheadjective“unfinalizable”toindicatethatinthepolyphonic novelthecharacterisnotdefinedonceandforall,isnotpresentedinallitsaspects,isnotdescribed exhaustivelybytheauthorasoccurs,instead,inthetraditionalnovel. Onthisaccount,intheepistolarynovelPoor Folk(Dostoevsky’sfirst),theprotagonist,Makar Devushkin,criticizesNikolajV.Gogol’(1809-1852),authorofThe Overcoat,forreducinghis personageAkakyAkakievichBashmachkintothestatusofanobject.Gogol’authordescribesthis charactermeticulouslyasthoughheknewhimperfectly,tothepointthatDevushkininPoor Folk complainsaboutthewayhiscolleague,awhite-collarworkerlikehimself,ispresented:“it’sas thoughhewerealreadydeadbeforedying”.Instead,inDostoesvsky’spolyphonicnovel,thevoiceof theauthor,nolongeranomniscientauthor,seemsitselftobethevoiceofacharacter,asthoughthe authortoowereonstageinanopendialoguewithhischaracters.OfDostoevsky’sworks,McCaw paysspecialattentiontoThe Double(Двойник,Dvojnik)whichpresentstheliterarytoposofduality differentlyfromhowithadbeenpresentedtraditionallyinthenovelandintheatre.Inthecaseofthis noveltoowecanspeakof“theatralization,”“dramatization”.
Polyphonyistheatralizationtoamaximumdegree.And,infact,inBakhtin and Theatreamajor “justification”forrelatingBakhtintoKonstantinStanislavsky,VsevolodMeyerholdandJerzy GrotowskiisBakhtin’svisionofDostoevsky’spolyphonicnovel.Underthisrespect,ofparticular interestinMcCaw’sbookaretheparagraphs:“Dostoevskyandtheatre,”“HeroinDostoevsky,” “Dialogueinnovel,theatreandlife,”“Time,spaceandthechronotopeinnovelandtheatre”,“Masksof therogue,theclownandthefool”,“Carnivalandtheatre”(McCaw,2016,pp.39-56).Mostsignificant isreferencetothatpopularcomical-satiricalgenreknownas“Menippeansatire”thatBakhtinderives fromthecarnivalesquetradition(pp.42-44). ViewedthroughMcCaw’sreadingsofBakhtin’sworks,itwouldseemthatDostoevskytoowas involvedintheatricaldiscourse.Becauseofthespecialformofdramatizationheinventsthrough recoursetopolyphony,thoughamasterofthenovelisticgenre,Dostoevsky’sartworkscouldeven bedescribedintermsof“metatheatre”morethan“metanovel”.
McCawreferstoBakhtin’sworksinEnglishtranslation:Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics,but also(especiallyfortheBakhtinianconceptionoftheauthor-herorelation),The Dialogic Imagination, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,“AuthorandHeroinAestheticActivity,”Toward a Philosophy of the Act;animportantroleisattributedtoBakhtin’sRabelais and His World.Bakhtin’sfocusonthe carnivalesqueprovidesMcCawwithargumentsthatsupporttheconnectionheestablishesbetween Bakhtinandthesethreeartistsofthetheatre.
Inhisintroduction,“Methodology:questions,imagesanddialogue,”McCaw(2016,p.2)also referstoRolandBarthes,specificallytothe1982essaycollectionL’ovvie et l’obtus(Theobvious andtheobtuse).Inthelanguageofgeometry,theobtuseangleisanopenanglebycomparisontothe
acuteangleandtherightangle:metaphorically,theobtuseangleindicates“hospitality,”“responsive understanding”(“answeringcomprehension”),touseanexpressionintroducedbyBakhtin.“Obtuse” alsosignifies“stupid”.Inthecarnivalesquetopsy-turvyworldoffolkloreandpopularfables,theidiot isthecharacterwhoendsupsolvingproblemsthatseemedunsurmountable. GivenBakhtin’scloserelationswithmembersoftheBakhtinCircle,McCaw’scomparison betweenBakhtinandStanislavsky,MeyerholdandGrotowskiinvolvestheworksoftheseauthors aswell,andnotonlythosesignedbyBakhtin.Referencehereinparticularistotheworksofmajor expondentsoftheso-calledBakhtinCirclesuchasPavelN.Medvedev,authorofFormal’nyj metod v literaturovedenii(1928),andValentinN.Vološinov,authorofFrejdizm(1927)andMarksizm i filosofija jazyka(1929).LevPumpianskyisanotherBakhtiniantakenintoconsiderationbyMcCaw. InadditiontothesecondaryliteratureonBakhtinandhisCircleauthoredbyCraigBrandist, KaterinaClark,CarlyEmerson,MichaelHolquist,GarySaulMorson,TzvetanTodorov,McCaw evokestheworkofothertheatredirectorssuchasBertoldBrechtandEugenioBarba,aswellasother scholars(somehowrelatedtoBakhtin’swork)whoshedlightonthethemesunderanalysis.These includeLevVygotsky,ViktorShklovsky,MauriceMerleau-Ponty,Jean-PaulSartreandMartinBuber. WilliamShakespeareisalsoinvestedwithasignificantroleinMcCaw’sbook.
CentralthemesorientinghisresearchinBakhtin and Theatre,listedinhisintroduction,include: “timeandspace,”“bodyandimage,”“characterandauthor,”“realismandrevolution”–considerthe socio-politicaleventsonthebackgroundofBakhtin’sworks–,“artandlife”.“PartI”isdedicated specificallytotherelationbetweenBakhtin(andhisCircle)andtheatrewithspecialreferencetohis worksonDostoevskyandRabelais;“PartII”relatesBakhtintoStanislavsky;and“PartIII”relates BakhtintoMeyerholdandGrotowski.AfundamentalthesisdevelopedbyMcCawisthat“Bakhtin’s ideasaboutthenovelcanilluminatequestionsthatarecentraltotheatre,”andviceversaproblems ofthetheoreticalandpracticalordersrelatingtotheatreserve“totestsomeofBakhtin’sideasabout dialogueineverdaylifeanddialogueinthenovel”(2016,p.59).
3. NoVeL, THeATRe AND LIFe Bakhtin’swritingsshedlightontheworkofthethreetheatredirectorsunderconsiderationandon theatricalworks,ondramaticgenresgenerally.Theoppositeisalsotrue,nodoubt,butonthisaccount deeperinsightsintoBakhtin’sideasarerelevantinsofarastheycontributetoabetterunderstandingof theatricalgenres.ForsomebodylikemeinterestedinBakhtin,thisisagreatmeritofMcCaw’sbook. Studiesonthenovelisticgenre,onthewordinthenovel,Bakhtin’slife-longinterest,alsobenefit fromMcCawscomparativestudy.Thenovel’sspecificityemergesevenmoreclearlywhenrelated totheatricalgenresconsideredfromaBakhtinianperspective.Thisstudyalsoshedslightonwhat Bakhtincallstheprocessof“novelization,”onhowthenovel,includinginits“polyphonicbend”, hasinfluenced,orcouldpotentiallyinfluence,theatricalgenres. WeshouldnotforgetthatBakhtinneitherconsideredhimselftobea“philologist”nora “literarycritic,”ashedeclaredtwoyearsbeforehisdeath,inhis1973conversationswithViktor Duvakin:“I’maphilosopher,Ialwayshavebeenandalwayswillbe”.OverallBakhtin’swritingsare philosophical,pertainingparticularlyto“moralphilosophy,”evenwhenhefocusesonliterarywriting, onDostoevsky’sworks,throughwhichheevidenceshowthelifeofeachoneofusisinexorably implicatedinthelifeofeveryother;aswellasonRabelais’sworks,throughwhichhejuxtapposes today’sindividualisticandegocentricvisionoftheworldtoancientformsofpopularculturewhere eachsingleindividualexperienceshisownbodyinarelationshipofinvolvementwiththebodyof othersinsofarastheyarelivingbodies,whetherhumanornonhuman,plantlifeincluded.Theso-called“grotesquebody,”thusdenominatedbyBakhtin,playsanimportantroleinthemultiform manifestationsofpopularculture,influencingthehistoricalconfigurationoftheatricalgenresas muchasthenovelinitspolyphonicform. Bakhtinmakeshisfirstappearancein1919,withhisarticle“ArtandAnswerability”(inBakhtin, 1990,pp.1-3).Thiswasfollowedbyanessayfromthetwenties,publishedinEnglishtranslation asToward a Philosophy of the Act(Bakhtin,1993).InBakhtin and Theatre,McCawreadsthe wholecourseofStanislavsky’sworks–histheatreproductionsandhiswrittentexts,includinghis autobiographyMy Life in Art,andAn Actor’s Work(abookintwovolumesunpublishedduringhis lifetime)–inthelightoftheseearlywritingsbyBakhtin,andspecificallyhisstudiesonethicsand Figure 3. Vsevolod E. Meyerhold
aesthetics,Toward a Philosophy of the Actand“AuthorandHeroinAestheticAcitivty”.Fromdifferent persepctives,BakhtinandStanislavskybothfocusontheinterconnectionbetweenartandlife.
AccordingtoBakhtin,thetaskofmoralphilosophyistodescribetheconcretearchitectonics oftheactual,realworldoftheperformedact;nottheabstractscheme,buttheconcreteplanofthe worldoftheunitaryandsingularact.InthefollowingpassagefromToward a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtindescribesthefundamentalmomentsoftheact,theirmutualarrangementintheconstruction oftheact.Hisreflectionsevidencethebroadscopeofhisvisionandthecentralityofthenotionof theactinhismoralphilosophy:
These basic moments are I -for-myself, the other-for-me, and I-for-the-other. All the values of actual life and culture are arranged around the basic architectonic points of the actual world of the performed act or deed: scientific values, aesthetic values, political values (including both ethical and social values), and, finally, religious values. All spatial-temporal values and all sense-content values are drawn toward and concentrated around these central emotional-volitional moments: I, the other, and I-for-the-other. The first part of our inquiry will be devoted to an examination of these fundamental moments in the architectonic of the actual world of the performed act or deed— the world actually experienced, and not the merely thinkable world. The second part will be devoted to aesthetic activity as an actually performed act or deed, both from within its product and from the standpoint of the author as answerable participant, and [2 illegible words] to the ethics of artistic creation. The third part will be devoted to the ethics of politics, and the fourth and final part to religion. (Bakhtin, 1993, pp. 53-54) Inhis1919article,“Artandanswerability”,asortofprogramatictext,a“manifesto”forhis ensuingresearch,Bakhtindescribestwoworlds,theunofficialworldoflivedexperienceandthe officialworldofculture,ofthesocial.The“unofficialworld”givesexpressiontothesingularity,the uniqueness,theothernessofeachperson,participativeandunindifferenttotheothernessofothers; instead,the“officialworld”ofthesocialismadeofrelationsamongidentities,roles,individuals, definedandclassifiedonthebasisofcoordinatesthatassumetheseidentities,theserolesand individualsasrepresentativesofaclass,system,agglomerationofsomesort.“Representatives”are indifferenttoeachother,inotherwords,theypartakeinrelationsamongdifferencesthatareindifferent toeachother(seePetrilli,2014b;Petrilli&Ponzio,2003;Ponzio,2002).WhatBakhtindescribes is,ontheonehand,thesingularity,theunreplaceabilityofeachoneofus,thespecificityofone’s ownspecialrelations,experiences,spatio-temporalandaxiologicalcoordinates;and,ontheother, relationsofexchangeamongindividualrepresentativesofagroup,system,class,role,community, collectiveofsomesort. In“ArtandAnswerability”Bakhtinevidenceshowtofullyliveoutthesignificanceoflifeand thevitalityofartrequiresjustthis:thatwerecognisehowartandlifeareconnectedonthebasisof theothernessrelationship,whichinvolvesrecognizingthesingularityofeachoneofus,inrelations ofunindifferenceofonetotheother.Unityamongtheconstitutiveelementsofthehumanpersonality isguaranteedbyanswerability,thatis,responsibility/responsiveness:“Ihavetoanswerwithmy ownlifeforwhatIhaveexperiencedandunderstoodinart,sothateverythingIhaveexperienced andunderstoodwouldnotremainineffectualinmylife”(inBakhtin,1990,p.1).Andcontinuing: Nor will it do to invoke “inspiration” in order to justify want of answerability. Inspiration that ignores life and is itself ignored by life is not inspiration but a state of possession. The true sense, and not the self-proclaimed sense, of all the old arguments about the interrelationship of art and life, about the purity of art, etc. – that is, the real aspiration behind all such arguments – is nothing more than the mutual striving of both art and life to make their own tasks easier, to relieve themselves of their own answerability. For it is certainly easier to create without answering for life, and easier to live without any consideration for art.
Art and life are not one, but they must become united in myself – in the unity of my answerability. (p. 2). Thoughrelegatedtotheprivatespherethesingleindividual’sotherness,uniqueness,and participativeinvolvement,unindifferencetotheother,totheother’ssingularitysubtendofficiallife, thesocial,thecultural,thepublic,theconventionalwiththeirrelativerolesandresponsibilities, formalresponsibilities,responsibilitieslimitedbyalibis:itisthankstotheotherwhoturnstowards meanddemandsanattitudeof“responsiveunderstanding,”thatItooappearunique,unreplaceable, responsiblewithoutthepossibilityofresortingtoalibis(seePetrilli,2016a,pp.195-217,pp.222-225). OnBakhtin’saccount,toinvesttheexistenceofeachlivingbeingwithpurelyformal,technical valueasestablishedbylaw,asthoughthelawhadawillofitsown,leavingasidethesingularityof theuniqueevent,cangenerateirresponsibilityanddevastation.InToward a Philosophy of the Act, Bakhtincomparesabstractcognitiontotechnologicalprogress:
The detached content of the cognitional act comes to be governed by its own immanent laws, according to which it then develops as if it had a will of its own. Inasmuch as we have entered that content, i.e., performed an act of abstraction, we are now controlled by its autonomous laws or, to be exact, we are simply no longer present in it as individually and answerably active human beings.
This is like the world of technology: it knows its own immanent law, and it submits to that law in its impetuous and unrestrained development, in spite of the fact that it has long evaded the task of understanding the cultural purpose of that development, and may serve evil rather than good. Thus instruments are perfected according to their own inner law, and, as a result, they develop from what was initially a means of rational defense into a terrifying, deadly, and destructive force.
All that which is technological, when divorced from the once-occurrent unity of life and surrendered to the will of the law immanent to its development, is frightening; it may from time to time irrupt into this once-occurrent unity as an irresponsibly destructive and terrifying force. (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 7)
Theofficial,formal,general,universalallacquiresenseandvaluebeginningfromsingularity, fromthesingleindividual’suniqueplaceintheworld.Recognitionofsingularity,of“non-alibiin existence”investsthegeneralwithsenseandvalue:“Non-alibi”means“withoutexcuses,”“without escape”;anditalsomeansthe“impossibilityofbeingelsewhere”withrespecttotheplacethatonly theunique,singularbeingcanoccupyinlife:thespatio-temporalandaxiological“architectonics” ofthesingleindividualinone’suniquenessconferssenseandvalueuponabstractidentity,uponthe individualinone’ssocialrole,asarepresentativeofagroup,class,concept,asthememberofagiven community,withlimitedresponsibilitiesandalibis:
What underlies the unity of an answerable consciousness is not a principle as a starting point, but the fact of an actual acknowledgment of one’s own participation in unitary being-as-event, and this fact cannot be adequately expressed in theoretical terms, but can only be described and participatively experienced. Here lies the point of origin of the answerable deed and of all the categories of the concrete, once-occurrent, and compellent ought. I, too, exist [et ego sum] actually – in the whole and assume the obligation to say this word. I, too, participate in being in a once-occurrent and never repeatable manner: I occupy a place in once-occurrent Being that is unique and never-repeatable, a place that cannot be taken by anyone else and is impenetrable for anyone else. In the given once-occurrent point where I am now located, no one else has ever been located in the once-once-occurrent time and once-occurrent space of once-occurrent being. And it is around this once-occurrent point that all once-occurrent being is arranged in a once-occurrent and never-repeatable manner. That which can be done by me can never be done by anyone else. The uniqueness or singularity of present-on-hand Being is compellently obligatory.
This fact of my non-alibi in Being, which underlies the concrete and once-occurrent ought of the answerably performed act, is not something I come to know of and to cognize but is something I acknowledge and affirm in a unique or once-occurrent manner. (p. 40)
AccordingtpMcCaw,toestablisharelationbetweenartandlifeinBakhtin’scasemeanstocreate averbalimageofaperson’slife;inStanislavsky’scaseitmeanstoenterthemindofacharacterand bringthisverbalcreationtolifeonstage(McCaw,2016,p.64).Asevidencedinthetitleitselfof hisautobiography,My Life in Art,Stanislavskytoosearchesforlifeinart,specificallyintheartof acting–andactingisgoodwhenitisalive:“Thissenseofthelive-nessofgoodactingconstituted hisdefinitionofwhatis‘real’anddefinesStanislavsky’srevolutionintheartofacting,”asMcCaw claims(p.65). Whatunitestheart-worldandthelife-worldisnottechnicalorformalresponsibility,butmoral responsibility,responsibilitywithoutalibis,connectedtotheuniqueeventofthesingular,participative, unindifferentact(seePetrilli2012a,2012b,2012c).InBakhtin’sphenomenology,centrallyimportant istheconceptof“event”(inRussiansobytie).Referredbothtotheactandtotheliterarywork,the eventcanbeconnectedtoexperienceandvalue.Thesenseoftheevent,asMcCawsays,rendersan actoritsrepresentation“real”inaphenomenologicalsense:aperformanceisaneventinvolving twogroupsofparticipators,onthesideoftheactorandofthepublic;aperformanceperceivedand actualisedthroughbodilyexperienceratherthanthroughintellectualreflection. ThepoliticalcontextatthetimeBakhtinwaswritinghisearlytextsandStanislavskywasworking onhisowntextswasmarkedbyepochaltransformations:thebirthoftheSovietUnion,Lenin’sdeath in1924,theensuingstruggleamongtheBolsheviks,endingonlyin1928withStalin’srisetopower. In1929,Bakhtinwasarrestedforreligiousactivities.In1930hewastakentotrialandcondemned toexile.ValentinN.Vološinov,amajorexponentoftheBakhtinCircle,authorofMarxism and the Philosophy of Language,1929,inwhichheunderlinestheneedforstudiesinMarxistcircleson problemsoflanguageandideology,diedin1936.TheStalinpurgesbeganin1937andBakhtin’s friendandcollaborator,PavelMedvedev,authorofThe Formal Method in Literary Scholarship,1928, wasalsoarrestedandsoonafter(17July1938)executedbyafiringsquad.Afterhisarrestin1939, Meyerhold,whomStanislavskyconsideredhisonlyheir,wastorturedandexecuted(February1940). BothBakhtinandStanislavskysufferedtheeffectsofStalinistrepressionduringthemostcreative yearsoftheirintellectualproduction:the1920sand1930swerecentralyearsinBakhtin’slifeand coincidedwiththefinalcreativephaseinStanislavsky’slife,whenhefocusedonhis“Methodof PhysicalActions”andonhisbook,An Actor’s Work.
BakhtinreferstoStanislavsky’stheatreproductioninhisnotesofthe1970s:“Stanislavskyon thebeautyofplay–theactor’sdepictionofanegativeimage.Mechanicaldivisionisunacceptable: ugliness–anegativecharacter,beauty–aperformingactor”(“FromNotesMadein1970-71,”in Bakhtin,1986,p.155).Stanislavsky’stheatrevalidatesBakhtin’stheoryontheessentialunitybetween artandlife,thematizedinhisphilosophicalwritings.Mechanicalactingisactingunresponsivetolife, actingwithoutthebody,withoutimagination,repetetiveandindifferenttotheother:thiswasacentral concerninStanislavsky’stheatreworksandonewhichBakhtindevelopedinthephilosophicalsphere. McCawbelievesthatStanislavsky’sreflectionsresoundinBakhtin’swhentheformermaintains that“therearepositivethingshiddenamongnegativephenomena”andthat“thereisanelement ofbeautyeveninthemostugly,justasthebeautifulcontainsthingswhicharenotbeautiful”(An Actor’s Work,ascitedinMcCaw,2016,p.68);andBakhtinclaimsthatthespecificityoftheartistic visionisgivenbythecapacitytolove:“inaestheticseeingyouloveahumanbeingnotbecauseheis good,but,rather,ahumanbeingisgoodbecauseyoulovehim.Thisiswhatconstitutesthespecific characterofaestheticseeing”(Bakhtin,1993,p.62;seealsoPetrilli&Ponzio,2014).BothBakhtin andStanislavskyevidencetheaestheticproductivityoflove.Infact,forBakhtintheconditionfor aestheticcreationislove,loverenderstheuglybeautiful.Loveevenrendersthehatefullovable,as theAmericanphilosopherandsemioticianCharlesSandersPeirce(1839-1914)hadalsoclaimedwith
hisevolutionaryphilosophy:“growthcomesonlyfromlove,[…]fromtheardentimpulsetofulfill another’shighestimpulse.[…]Love,recognizinggermsoflovelinessinthehateful,graduallywarms itintolife,andmakesitlovely”(Peirce,1931-1958,para.6.289;seealsoPetrilli,1990b,1993,2010). ButtoreturntoBakhtinandStanislavsky,thoughtheirviewsonaestheticcreationcanberelated, therearesignificantdifferences.WithrespecttoBakhtin,Stanislavsky’sperspectivechangesinsofar asheturnshisattentiontotheactor/artistwhomustcreatethecharacter,afullyroundedcharacter, andnotjustastereotype:“Youloveyourselfintherolemorethantheroleinyou.[…].Learntolove theroleinyourselves”(McCaw,2016,p.68).AndwhileforBakhtinitistheauthorwholeadsthe game,forStanislavskyitistheactor:“Theauthor’screativeworkendswithafinishedcharacter,the verypointwheretheactor’screativeworkbegins”(pp.68-69). Inlightoftheconnectionbetweenartandlife,bothBakhtinandStanislavskyanalyzetherelation betweencharacterandlivingperson,andbetweencharacterandauthor,distinguishingbetween theatricalcharacter,theactor/artist,andthecharacterinliterarywriting,thehero,andagainbetween thecharacterandthereader/audience(seePetrilli,2015b;Petrilli&Ponzio,2006,2016).Thenotions ofcharacter,action/act,event,Iandother,authoriality,value,responsibility,responsivenessareall centrallyimportantinBakhtinandStanislavsky.Amongthethemesthatunitethesetwoauthors beyondthosealreadymentioned:thequestionofthechronotope,oftimeandspaceinthenoveland intheatre,theroleofexperiencebycontrastwiththelifeofreflection,thegivenandthecreated, value,sense,meaningandsignificance,corporeality,theinternalandtheexternalimage,creativity, theunconscious.
4. BAKHTIN IN PoLyPHoNIC DIALoGUe wITH STANISLAVSKy, MeyeRHoLD AND GRoTowSKI
Theideal“dialogue”establishedbyMcCawbetweenBakhtinandStanislavsky,Meyerholdand GrotowskiinBakhtin and Theatreinvolvespositionsthatareverydifferent,andundercertainaspects evenopposedtoeachother.Moreover,asportrayedinthiswell-documentedbook,therealdialogue amongthethreetheatredirectorsevidenceshoweachoneofthemtheseisinnovative,sui generisto thepointofbreakingwitheachother,butalwaysinrelationsofcontinuity,offeringanextraordinary exampleof“polyphony”inthetermstheorizedbyBakhtin. WhileStanislavsky’sideas,hisoverallprojectcanbereadinthelightofBakhtin’searlywritings, Meyerhold’sworkresonateswithideaselaboratedbyVološinovandMedvedevinthe1920s,andby thelaterBakhtin.TherelationshipbetweenMeyerholdandStanislavskydevelopedacrossdifferent phasesasthetwomensometimesagreedwitheachotherandothertimesclashed,drivenatonce bysharedinterestsandprofounddivergences.Theirdialogueevolvedfromtheircommonlovefor theatre,orientedindirectionsthatwerealtogetherdifferent,evendiametricallyopposedintermsof thephilosophy,aestheticsandpedagogyanimatingtheirrespectivevisions(pp.149-150).Inany case,theirrelationshipwasalwaysintense,mutuallyparticipativeandchallenging–thecreative encounterofalife-time. IflikeStanislavsky,Meyerholdtooaimedtoelevatetheatretothestatusofanartinitsownright –Bakhtinspeaksof“arttheatre”forthetypeoftheatreheenjoyed–,unlikeStanislavsky,Meyerhold identifiedthetruthoftheatrein“theatricality”.Meyerholdwasfascinatedbythe“Commediadell’Arte” andbypopulartraditions.Hewasinterestedinthespecificityoftheatricalsignification:theatremust betheatrical.Onthecontrary,Stanislavskyrejected“theatricality,”consideringitanegationoftheatre. AccordingtoMeyerhold,in“theatricaltheatre”theaudiencemustnotforgetthattheactoris acting,justastheactormustnotforgetthatheisinatheatre,onastage(MeyerholdinMcCaw,2016, p.149).Hisvisionofthe“theatricaltheatre”ledhimtorejectthe“literarytendency”characteristic oftheMoscowArtTheatre.Instead,StanislavskychosetobringtheThe BluebirdbyMaurice Maeterlinck(Nobellaureateforliterature)tothetheatre(seePetrilli2015c,2016,pp.233-258);and Nemirovich-DanchenkoadaptedDostoevsky’snovelThe Brothers Karamoztothestage.
InMacCaw’sinterpretationMeyerholdreversesBakhtin’sconceptionofthenovelizationof theatreandmaintainsthatDostoevskyshouldbeconsideredadramatist.Meyerholdopenedthestage totheaudience,extendingitintotheauditorium,consolidatingapracticethatseemedtocontradict Bakhtin’svisionoftheatreasaclosedgenre.However,MeyerholdandBakhtinwereinaccordon certainissues:theybothevidencedtherelationoftheatretopopularculture;andtheybothdrewon imagesfrompopulartheatreviathemediationofPuškinwhoalsoassertedthepopulartradition.In McCaw’sview:“Meyerhold’srevolutionintheatreinvolvedhimrejectingtherealistassumptionsthat providedacommongroundbetweenStanislavskyandBakhtin”(p.150).“Revolution”forMeyerhold meantrejectingrealistassumptions;insteadforStanislavskyandBakhtintheywereconnected. LikeBakhtin,bothStanislavskyandMeyerholdwerepreoccupiedwiththequestionoftime. Bakhtinhadfocusedonthequestionofthe“chronotope,”aspace-timeparadigmforhumantime andhistory,whichheappliedtoliterarygenres,particularlythenovel,fromtheverybeginningof hisresearchitineraries. Asherecountsinanotetohisessay“FormsofTimeandoftheChronotopeintheNovel.Notes TowardaHistoricalPoetics”(inBakhtin,1981,pp.84-258),Bakhtininthesummerof1925attended alectureonthechronotopeinbiologybythephysiologistA.A.Ukhtomsky.Bakhtinofcoursewas interestedinthechronotoperelatedlytoaesthetics,anaspectUkhtomskyalsotouchedupon.As Bakhtinobserves: Wewillgivethenamechronotope(literally“timespace”)totheintrinsicconnectednessof temporalandspatialrelationshipsthatareartisticallyexpressedinliterature.[…]Whatcountsfor usisthefactthatitexpressestheinseparabilityofspaceandtime(timeasthefourthdimensionof space).Weunderstandthechronotopeasaformallyconstitutivecategoryofliterature.(p.84) ThoughBakhtin,MeyerholdandStanislavskyallpayspecialattentiontothequestionofrhythm, Meyerhold’sperspectivewassignificantlydifferent:forMeyerholdrhythmwasrelatedto“amusical conceptionofperformancetime,”timeconcernsacting;instead,forStanislavskyandBakhtinit concerns“thedoublestructureofnarrativetime”(McCaw,2016,p.150). LikeStanislavskyJerzyGrotowskialsoaimedto“revolutionisethetheatreitself”(inKumiega, 1985,p.83,ascitedinMcCaw,2016,p.184),constantlyquestioningitssenseandpurpose.Grotowski distinguishedbetween“theatreasformandactingasanactivity,”theguidingthemeofMcCaw’s book(2016,p.184).LikeStanislavskyandMeyerhold,Grotowskiengagedincreatinganewtypeof theatre,thusanewtypeofactorforhisproductions.Tothisendhededicatedanimportantpartofhis attentiontoactortrainingandrelativeteachingmethodologies.AccordingtoMcCaw,thisexplains thesymbioticrelationshipbetweenGrotowskitheactor-trainerandGrotowskithedirector.Grotowski wasnotinterestedintrainingactorsaccordingtoafixedsystem,asthoughtoprovidethemwitha “theatricaltoolkit”(p.185).Ratherthanteachactinghisintentwastoworkontheactorandwiththe actorinordertoachievethe“totalact,”whichmeanttodevelopthemostsubtlenuacesoftheinner lifewithintheframeworkoftherole(GrotwskiinHodge,2000,193,ascitedinMcCaw,216,p.185). McCawevidencesthecontactpointsbetweenGrotowskiandBakhtin,forexample,theyboth startfromthesameimageof“incompleteness”andforboththeconceptof“act”iscentral.Allthe same,despitepointsofcontactMcCawshowshowBakhtinandGrotowskitakedifferentdirections andpresentsignificantvariations:inBakhtin’svision,forexample,theproblemof“incompleteness,” “unfinalizability”isapositivehumanconditionwhichdistinguishesthecharacterofthepolyphonic novel;instead,forGrotowskithegreatestachievementattheatrewastoaccomplishthe“totalact”. The“totalact”meanstotranscendincompleteness,thereforeitmeanstoovercomeseparationbetween thoughtandfeeling,thoughtandperception,bodyandsoul,consciousnessandtheunconscious, seeingandinstinct,sexandreason(GrotowskiinKumiega,1985,pp.128-129,ascitedinMcCaw, 2016,p.185). ForGrotowski,theproblemoftherelationbetweenartandlifeiscentrallyimportant.However, whilstBakhtin,StanislavskyandMeyerholddealwiththeissueintheoreticalterms,Grotowski makesitapracticalconcern:theatreislife,theactormustdevelopinstrumentsandskillstoaccess
one’sowncreativity,humanityandthusovercomethelimitationsofone’sownselfintheencounter withtheother,withlife. WhilstStanislavskyworkedonrole,Grotowskiprivilegedphysicalactionsleadingtotheactors workonhisinnerself.LikeStanislavskyandMeyerhold,Grotowskiengagedinsituatinghiswork inrelationtoartandlife,butunlikehispredecessors,asMcCawsays,“hisproject,firstlyinthe TheatreofProductionsbutmoreobviouslyintheTheatreofParticipation,aimedtocollapsethese twocategories,”forinGrotowski’stheatricalproductions“aestheticmeansaredevelopedinorderto workononeself,”andthismeantone’sbody(p.186). Grotowski’s“TheatreofParticipation”projectstheatricalityasencounterandasameansto reconnectwithlife,torivitalise,regeneratelifeitself.Moreover,giventhepositioningoftheatrical performanceintime,thatis,inthepresentmoment,actingprovidedamodelfortherelationbetween actorandaudience,“aconflationofartandlife”(p.187):theaestheticandtheethical,formand experience,artandlifeinGrotowski“becomeone”(p.191).
Grotowskiwasinterestedinactortrainingand,asherecountsinhisbookTowards a Poor Theatre, 1991,heassumedtheBohrinstituteasthemodelofreferenceforhislaboratory.LikeStanislavsky andMeyerhold,Grotowskialsobelievedthatresearchconnectedwiththeatreshouldbescientific andmethodologicallyrigorous.BakhtinandhisfriendsMedvedevandVološinovcouldonlyagree, butwithoutreducingtheartoftheatretoascientificdiscipline,asrightlyobservedbyMcCaw(pp. 191-192;alsoPetrilli,1992,2014c,2015a). Grotowski’sapproachtoactortrainingischaracterizedbythetwoLatinexpressions:via negativa andconjunctio oppositorum.Paradoxically,trainingasanactorinvolvedgettingridofoldhabits, morethanlearningnewskills(cf.Grotowski,1991,pp.17,96-97,177,ascitedinMcCaw,2016,p. 192).ForGrotowskitheactor’screativitywasanegotiationbetweenformandexperience:“Creativity, especiallywhereactingisconcerned,isboundlesssincerity,yetdisciplined:i.e.articulatedthrough signs.[…]Andastheactor’smaterialishisownbody,itshouldbetrainedtoobey,tobepliable[…] itdoesnotofferresistance.Spontaneityanddisciplinearethebasicaspectsofanactor’sworkand Figure 4. Jerzy Marian Grotowski
theyrequireamethodicalkey”(p.193).Thetensionbetweenthe“objectiveelements”and“purely subjective”work,accordingtoGrotowski,isthe“contradictionofacting”andthe“kerneloftraining”. McCawpointsouthowtherelationbetweenIandotheriscentralinbothBakhtinandGrotowski, onceagainhowevertheirperspectivesaredifferent.Grotowskihighlightsthemultiplicityofselves thatconstitutetheI’sidentity,theactor’sidentity.AccordingtoGrotowski,throughdialoguewith thecharacterasothertohimself,theactorisabletoidentifyhisownI(or“Ident”touseaneologism introducedbytheEnglishphilosopheroflanguage,VictoriaLadyWelby,seePetrilli,1990a;2009, pp.640-670;2016a,pp.172-174).ContrarytoBakhtinandStanislavksy,forGrotowskithecharacter isnotanotherhumanbeing,anotheridentity,withalifeofone’sown.AsMcCawobserves,the otherisnottheotherinBakhtin’ssense,theenablingother.Rather,inGrotowski’scasetheotheris aninstrument,ameansfortheactortoreachself-discoveryandcanevenbetheimageofanother personfromadifferentepoch.Theactorencountersthecharacter:inotherwords,ratherthanillustrate Hamlet,theactormustmeethim(McCaw,2016,pp.200-201). UnlikeBakhtin,Grotowskiisconcernedwiththeactor’sidentitymorethanthecharacter’sidentity andclaims(withanimagethat,accordingtoMcCaw,evokesAntoninArtaud’s“crueltheatre”)that theactormustusehisrolelikeasurgeon’sscalpel,todissectoneself.Thoughactorsworkontheir charactersnottotorturethem,buttodiscovertheirowntrueidentity(Grotowski,1991p.88,ascited inMcCaw,2016,p.2000;Petrilli,2003). Freedofthesocial,oftheimagination,ofone’smasks–“life-masks,”whichGrotowskiassociates tosuperficialityanddeception–,theindividualapproachestruth,one’sowntrueself.Therefore,in therelationtoone’saudience,aspartofaprocessofexteriorizationofone’sownself,thetaskofthe actoristorevealhimself,notinthesenseofexhibitionism,showingoff,butratherinthesenseof revelation(cf.p.201).Grotowski’saestheticsissubjecttoanethicaldemand:theactorstripshimself ofhisinauthenticsocialmasksthroughapublicactofself-revelation. TherelationbetweenactorandaudienceiscentralinGrotowski’sdefinitionoftheatre.Itsubtends hisapproachtotheatreandhiseventualabandonmentoftheatre(cf.p.210).Acomplexofthree relationscharacterizeshisconceptionoftheatricalspaceandrelations:actor-director;actor/director-character;actor-audience.AccordingtoMcCaw:“BakhtinandStanislavskybothconsideredthata characterhadarelationtoahumanbeing,”and“thisrelationbetweentheactor/authorandthecharacter includeddegreesofempatheticidentificationandaestheticdistance”.Instead,Meyerholdconsidered thecharacterinalmostsculpturalterms:dependingoncorporeality,physicality,voice,movement, theactorwouldbeconsideredsuitableornotforagivenrangeofroles.InBakhtin,Stanislavsky andMeyerhold,thecharacterhascontentandisendowedwithfeaturesthatarerecognizableforthe audience.Instead,forGrotowskithecharacterisameansthroughwhichtheactorcomestoknow himselfandcanrevealhimselftotheaudiencehic et nunc(hereandnow):“‘Selves’and‘roles’we constructthroughoursocialdevelopmentarerejectedasinauthenticmasksthathavetoberemoved toaccesstheunderlyingtrueself.Grotowskirejectsthepossibilityorvalueofunderstandingoneself asacharacter.” In“FormsofTimeandoftheChronotopeintheNovel,”Bakhtinproposesanoppositestrategy whichconsistsinputtingonthemask,ratherthantearingitoff(pp.200-201).Maskshavedeep rootsinpopularcultureandareendowedwithextraordinarysignificance.Withspecialreferenceto threefigures–therogue,theclownandthefool–,Bakhtindescribestheconnectionbetweenthe characteristicmasksofpopularculture,maskspopulatingthepublicsquare,ononehand,andmasks ofthepublicspectacleandtheatre,theatricalmasks,ontheother.Moreoverthesemasks,asBakhtin says,donothavea“direct,butratherametaphorical,significance”(Bakhtin,1981,p.159),indeed “theirexistenceisareflectionofsomeother’smodeofbeing–andeventhen,notadirectreflection. Theyarelife’smaskers;theirbeingcoincideswiththeirrole,andoutsidethisroletheysimplydonot exist.”BakhtinelaboratesonthemetaphorofthemasktothematizetheI-otherrelationandone’s righttootherness,toextraneousness,strangeness,towhatwecanalsocall“extracommunitariness” (Petrilli,2013,pp.147-160,200-219):
Essential to these three figures is a distinctive feature that is as well a privilege—the right to be “other” in this world, the right not to make common cause with any single one of the existing categories that life makes available; none of these categories quite suits them, they see the underside and the falseness of every situation. Therefore, they can exploit any position they choose, but only as a mask. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 159) Thoughunitedintheircommonefforttorecognisethegapbetweenthesocialmaskand “authentic”identity,BakhtinandGrotowskielaboratevisionsandmethodologiesthatarealtogether different:Grotowskibelievesthatonemustripoffone’smaskstoreachthetrueself,thereal,authentic self;Bakhtinresortstotheoppositestrategyandsearchsforsenseandmeaningintheplayofmasks, intheconditionofdialogismthatthisplayofmasksevidences.ForBakhtinidentityisconstitutedin therelationamongmultiplemasks,intheintercorporealrelationbetweenIandother:
In the struggle against conventions, and against the inadequacy of all available life-slots to fit an authentic human being, these masks take on an extraordinary significance. They grant the right not to understand, the right to confuse, to tease, to hyperbolize life; the right to parody others while talking, the right to not be taken literally, not “to be oneself”; the right to live a life in the chronotope of the entr’acte, the chronotope of theatrical space, the right to act life as a comedy and to treat others as actors, the right to rip off masks, the right to rage at others with a primeval (almost cultic) rage—and finally, the right to betray to the public a personal life, down to its most private and prurient little secrets (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 163). UnlikeBakhtin,inGrotowskidialogueismonological,aunidirectionalandunivocalexchange, thatneithercallsforaresponsefromtheother,norexpectsit(McCaw2016,p.202).However,in asubsequentphaseofhisworkandwithoutgivingupthede-maskingmetaphor,Grotowskilike Bakhtinnolongerinsistsonthecharacterasaninstrument,ameanstoknowingone’sowntrue identity.Instead,hetoointerpretsidentityintermsoftherelationwiththeother,intheterminology oftheFrenchphilosopherEmmanuelLevinas,with“theotherman,”asrecitesthetitleofhis1972 book,Humanisme de l’autre homme(Humanismoftheotherman).Grotowskiendsupvalorizing theactornotforactingfortheaudience,butforencounteringtheother. Grotowskiwasinterestedintheatreasasystemofsigns,whichrevealedthehumanpersonality andwhichheidentifiedinthebody,sound,voice,image,gestureandmovementmorethaninthe verbalsign.Hebecameevermorecriticalofverbalcommunicationandtheplayofforms.Against fearprovokedbytheabsenceofsense,Grotowskiadvisedthevia negativa:itwasnecessarytounmask onself,todisarm.McCaw(2016,p.209)citesGrotowskifromSchechnereWolford(1997,p.221): “Wearmourselvesinordertoconcealourselves;sinceritybeginswherewearedefenceless.Sincerity isnotpossibleifwearehidingourselvesbehindclothes,ideas,signs,productions,effects”.Like StanislavskyandMeyerhold,Grotowskiemphasisedthecreativeresponsibilityoftheactor.However, theparametresoftheactor’sresponsibilityweredefinedbythedirector. BycontrasttoMeyerhold’s“TotalTheatre,”Grotowski’sgoal–asdirector,teacherinactingand authorofmontages,engagedinrespondingtotheadvanceoftechnologicalsophisticationsandthe expressivecapacityofcinemaandtelevision–wasthetotal act of the actorina“PoorTheatre”.This totalactwasachievedthroughtheprogressivesheddingofallthatmakestheatre–nomoresetting, nomorehistoricalcontext,andnocharacters,nomoretheatricalmeansandconventions.Allthat remainsisthesimplefactofco-existenceandtheperformanceofactions:asanticipated,Grotowski effectivelytransitsfrommakingtheatretoitsabandonment. LikeMeyerholdbeforehiminRussia,Grotowskialsolivedunderarepressiveregime,thatof Polishcommunism.Hewasprofoundlycriticalofthesocialwhichherefusedwithhisconception ofthepost-theatrecommunity,fullyimmersedinthehic and nunc,butseparatefromtheinauthentic realworld.Movinginthisdirection,Grotowskiendeduprejectingtheatreasagenreinfavourofa
newkindofinteractionwithpeople,madeofco-existence,livingtogether,actions,communionrather thancommunication,withoutnarrationsorimages.InMcCaw’sinterpretation,Grotowskirejected theoptimisticsocialdiscourseofMedvedevandVološinov,justasherejectedBakhtin’snotionof dialogism:“hispointofconnectionwithBakhtinwasinrootinghisideasinthebody,butonethat neitherrejoicesinnoracknowledgesthematerialbodilylowerstratum.Itisacarnivalofsorts,but withoutthelaughter”(p.211). 5. CoNCLUSIoN WewillnowconcludehereourconsiderationsonMcCaw’sanalysesofStanislavksy,Meyerhold andGrotowskiandfocusonBakhtin.Infact,ourinterestinthisessayfromtheverybeginningis fundamentallyBakhtin.Thesamecanbesaidoftheauthorofthebookwehavebeenreferringto. Heinfactconfrontsperspectives,experiencesandinterestswithBakhtinthataredistantfromhis research,butnotextraneoustoit. Underthisaspect,mostinterestingisthatoneofthelastparagraphsintheconclusiontoMcCaw’s bookisentitledàlaBakhtin“Other,Iandthou”.Init,McCawreturnstotherelationshipbetweenthe IandtheotherasdescribedbyBakhtininhisearlywritings,withoutfailingtoreferencedevelopments inhislaterresearchaswell. InBakhtindialogueisnotsomuchaquestionoftheexchangeofrejoindersbetweenanIanda you.Instead,Bakhtiniandialogueistantamounttoinvolvement,unindifferentparticipationwiththe other,co-implication,intercorporeality.Itbringsintoplaybothvoiceandgesture.Theconstitutive multiplicityoftheother’sidentityasmuchasofone’sown,wherethedifferentvoicesdonotconverge withtheI,isbestgraspedthroughthegazeatadistance,throughtheeyesoftheother.AsBakhtin observesin“AuthorandHeroinAestheticActivity”(1920-1924):“Ethicalandaestheticobjectification requiresapowerfulpoint d’appuioutsideitself;itrequiressomegenuinesourceofrealstrengthout ofwhichIwouldbecapableofseeingmyselfasanother”(Bakhtin,1990,p.31). Bakhtindescribestheothernessrelationshipintermsofmutualinterdependencyamongvoices andbodiesandofmutualunderstandingandenhancementofsense.AccordingtoMcCaw(2016,p. 230),“altruism”alsocomesintoplayhereinadditiontootherness.AsobservedbyBakhtin: […] one can speak of a human being’s absolute need for the other, for the other’s seeing, remembering, gathering, and unifying self-activity – the only self-activity capable of producing his outwardly finished personality. This outward personality could not exist, if the other did not create it: aesthetic memory is productive – it gives birth, for the first time, to the outward human being on a new plane of being. (pp. 35-36)
TheotherasunderstoodbyBakhtinshouldneitherbeconfusedwithJacquesLacan’sOther, norwithTzvetanTodorov’sinterpretationoftheother(1984),norwithMichaelHolquistwhocalls onMartinBuber’sich und du.Bakhtin’s“other”isneither“anotherI,”“anothermyself”thatdiffers relativelyfrommebecause,withrespecttome,itbearsthepersonalpronouns“he”or“she”or“it”; norisitthesubjectofanaddresssuchas“you”or“thou.”Theotherisotherinitself,onitsown account,independentlyandautonomouslyfromtheself,eveniftheothermayappeartotheselfas animage:“theotherpersongraspedvisuallyortransformedintoaverbalimage”(McCaw,2016,p. 231;seealsoPetrilli,2018a,2018b). Butthe“other”isnotonlytheotherfromme.Theotherisalsotheotherofme,whichIreach outtoknowandevencontrolandgovern,whichcomestomyconsciousness,butwhichremains other,becausetheselfof“comingtoconsciousness,toself-awareness”isotherfromtheI,something differentfromtheI. Astotherelationbetweennovelandtheatre,withBakhtinwecanmaketheclaimthatwith respecttothenovel,theatreislesscapableofportrayingthepolyphonythatresoundsinthevoiceof
