21st Century democracy in Europe : data dossier

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BRIEF

POLICY

Issue 2019/10

May

2019

21st Century Democracy

in Europe

2-4 May 2019, Florence

Authors: Caterina Francesca Guidi, and Gaby

Umbach

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21 ST

CENTURY

DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE

DATA DOSSIER

information mutate into weapons of mass distraction and disorientation. Legitimate online discourse is subverted by cyber threats and manipulation. In short, liberal democracy is in danger of losing its pow-er to genpow-erate the consensus and compro-mises so vitally needed for the cohesion of our pluralistic societies.

At the same time, however, there is hope for democracy. Citizens actively make their voices heard. People want to have their say in politics, participate and interact with the political system also between general elections. Social move-ments are on the rise and strengthen civil society. Requests for deliberative democ-racy increase, and participatory practice supports de-politicisation and consen-sus-building, as two Irish referenda on highly contested topics have exemplified. Debunking becomes a central corrective instrument within the public debate, and post-factual argumentation is increasing-ly uncovered and denounced as such. Cit-izens feel more attached to the EU than ever before. European and global youth have mobilised to protect and shape their own future, and to demand their say in safeguarding the global commons.

This EUI SOU 2019 Data Dossier il-lustrates key trends in democratic tran-sitions, political parties and elections, inclusive and sustainable democracies, trust and the Single Market, as well as EU external action and global governance through facts and figures. It has been cre-ated by the GlobalStat team to inform the discussion about the state of democracy within the EU. It seeks to inspire reflec-tion on past democratic trends and on trajectories for possible futures for de-mocracy in the 21st_century.

GABY UMBACH GlobalStat Director

INTRODUCTION

T

hings taken for granted become pre-cious when we are about to lose them. This is the case of democracy in Europe and around the world today. Hence, we need to critically reflect on the future of the type of democracy we want in the 21st century. The European University Insti-tute’s The State of the Union Conference 2019 (SOU) provides a much-needed op-portunity to do so at European level.

After the end of World War II and the fall of the Iron Curtain, liberal democra-cy became the foundation of European societies and the European Union (EU). By the dawn of the 21st_{century, most EU} Member States (MS) had a long-standing democratic tradition. Where this was not the case, citizens fought hard for liberal societies and democratic transition.

Liberal democracies protect individu-al freedoms, participatory rights, and the rule of law within societies. They guar-antee representation, procedural equity, lawful decision-making, legitimate polit-ical action, accountable actors, impartial bureaucracies, and independent judiciar-ies and media.

Thus far the ideal. Two decades into the 21st_{century, we witness a decline in} key democratic features in an increasing number of countries within Europe and around the world. Rules-based organ-isations and core institutions of liberal democracy are under siege. Populism is on the rise and identity politics divides societies into ‘us and them’; politicisa-tion accompanies this division, rendering politics confrontational and hard-line; patterns of authoritarian leadership ap-pear and ‘strong men’ are back in politics. Truth and facts become strategic tools; ideology, ‘post-factual evidence’, and

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mis-Source: V-Dem, Varieties of Democracy data, (2019) 0.00

0.25 0.50 0.75

1.00 high // V-DEM liberal democracy score

low

1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2017

Austria, Denmark, Belgium, France, (Western) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands all followed a similar trajectory, picking up quickly, then steadily after the Second World War

Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech

Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Romania democratise

after the end of the Cold War

Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech

Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Romania democratise

after the end of the Cold War

Greece democratises briefly, while Cyprus picks up steadily

Greece, Portugal and Spain emerge from dictatorships

Finland, Ireland and Sweden were virtually unphased by the Second World War

Fledgling democracies after the First World War

50% of 178 sampled countries scored below this dot in 2017 50% of 178 sampled countries scored below this dot in 2017 Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Republic Germany Denmark Spain Estonia Finland France United Kingdom Greece Croatia Hungary Ireland Italy Lithuania Luxembourg Latvia Netherlands Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Sweden United Kingdom Spain Sweden Slovakia Slovenia Portugal Romania Netherlands Poland Lithuania Luxembourg Italy Latvia Hungary Ireland Germany Greece Finland France Denmark Estonia Cyprus Czech Republic Bulgaria Croatia Austria Belgium 1900 2017 1900 2017 Source: V−Dem, (2019) 11 00

A

mong representative democracies, liberal democracies stand out for their participatory patterns, the protec-tion of individual freedoms – including those of most vulnerable groups – and the rule of law. This type of democracy prevails among EU MS and is especially strong in Scandinavian countries, while some MS in Central and Eastern Europe are currently facing challenges to their liberal democratic practice.

As a result, and regardless of the overall good track record and their long-stand-ing tradition, democratic politics within the EU are currently being challenged by bottom-up, grassroots protest movements and new political parties. Consequently, liberal democracy is increasingly contest-ed, and various authoritarian patterns of leadership are appearing within the EU and beyond.

DEMOCRATIC

TRANSITIONS

IN EUROPE

TO WHAT EXTENT IS

LIBERAL DEMOCRACY ACHIEVED?

V-DEM SCORE, 1900-2017

THE SHAPE OF RISE

AND DECLINE

V-DEM SCORE, 1900-2017

17 parliamentary

democracies

among the 28 Member States of the EU.

4 (semi-)presidential systems,

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KPO ALO VGO VGO KPO Martin LIF Fritz TS FDF RW Ecolo AGL−Gr RvA−UpD FN SDS-ts BNRP ROSSEM KzB|DL V LD|LDD Pp PAME DISY AKEL EnKe KOP ED NO KSC SPR-RSC HNS HSP-1861 ELAM SYM SF LC KrF FrP FK Gron NLA A TPSL KD POP VIHR NSP EKo EVP Rt SP|P MR V LO droite FN PRG PRG GE V V LO MNR eco LCR CPNT MNR MF REM DLR|DLF DFU NPD B90/Gru Rep B90/Gru Li/PDS DVU AfD KP LAOS OP TelEK EKTP TP ANEL LS−CALS−CA ANEL LS−CA DISY DX DX D−FS AASA NPD SFWP SF FKgP MMP PD Green NP SP PBPA DS RI DP R FdLV LN Rete LKP TSKP LKP LKDP FI−PdL AD NPSI DE IdV M5S SC FiD PSI Greng NB GAP DL GLA KPL PID AD AD Bp D66 GPV MP RPF GPV PZPR SD ZSL CD SP LN LPF PVV 50+ FvD PDC CDS-PP MES UDPFSP POUS PSR PRD PSoDR PNL SZS KDH NSI SSS BE PCTP/MRPP PAN PDR CDS AP-P PCE|IU PTE−UC BNG CC ERC UPyD C−PC P KD MP NyD SD SNP UUP UUP UKIP GP BNP

Source: Emanuele, V. (2016), Dataset of New Parties and Party System Innovation in Western Europe since 1945, Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali (CISE), (2019)

Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus RepublicCzech Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia LithuaniaLuxembourg Malta NetherlandsPoland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden KingdomUnited

spread and arithmetic centre of party system

political centre weighted by parties’ votes far right far left

party newly elected to parliament party re-elected to parliament

KEY

1945 2018

POLITICAL

PARTIES AND

ELECTIONS

O

pen democratic societies rely on legitimate and accountable political institutions and on democratic elections that allow citizens to express their preferences with regard to politics. In view of the 2019 European Elections – as with democratic elections and participatory processes in general – ensuring free and fair demo-cratic voting and practice is hence imperative. This even more so against the backdrop of a growing electoral volatility over the past two decades, in which the stability of the West European party sys-tems eroded due to new political parties and political protagonists emerging at the fringes of party systems.

POLITICAL CENTRES

AND NEW PARTIES

ELECTIONS SINCE 1945

As regards citizens’ preferences for EU politics, their attachment to the Union has increased over the past eight years from 62% in 2010 to 70% in 2018: more Europeans than ever before perceive themselves as EU citizens. Moreover, 52% of EU citizens have trust in the EU, show-ing that they identify the EU as a beacon of freedom that guarantees the possibility of travelling, studying and working free-ly within its territory. Yet, this positive perception has so far not translated into European Elections turnout: from the highest participation rate of 61.99% in the European elections of 1979, turn out constantly decreased, leading to the low-est rate ever registered, with 42.61% in the last elections of 2014.

almost

80%

of those below

30 years

in Austria, Italy and Malta

voted at any level of government

in the past three years, as

opposed to 35 to 40% of Belgians,

Irish and Luxembourgers

Source: Eurobarometer, (2018)

13 national

parliaments

in EU Member States moved

towards the right in

their last elections, as

opposed to 11 parliaments

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Source: European Environment Agency, (2019) 20% target EU-28 EU-28 32 49 18 8 2 40 17 6 33 235 296 24 24 15 148 4 6 4 1 65 94 22 31 16 7 117 47 182 −16 −16 −13 −13 −13 −13 −12 −12 −9 −9 −8 −8 −5 −5 66 10 10 13 13 22 22 23 23 56 56 33 33 11 33 22 99 19 19 12 12 −57 −56 −53 −49 −43 −41 −38 −34 −31 −30 −26 −25 −23 −25 −22 −29 −24 −20 −20 −12 −12 −9 −9 −18 −18 0 0 −10 −10 −8 −8 −2 −2 −15 −15 −8 −8 −6 −6 −8 −8 −10 −10 −18 −18 −14 −14 −10 −10 −18 −18 on target short of target Primary energy consumption, Mtoe (2016) Gap between GHG projections and 2020 target in Effort Sharing sectors % of 2005 base year emissions GHG emissions reductions Change 1990 vs 2017 Lithuania Latvia Romania Estonia Slovakia Bulgaria United Kingdom Czech Republic Hungary Denmark Germany Sweden Croatia Belgium Finland Italy France Poland Luxembourg Netherlands Greece Slovenia Austria Malta Ireland Spain Portugal Cyprus Source: GlobalCit, Electoral Law Indicators, (2019)

Austria Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic France Germany Greece Italy Latvia Malta Poland Romania Spain United Kingdom Portugal Hungary Slovakia Slovenia Belgium Estonia Lithuania Luxembourg Netherlands Ireland Denmark Finland Sweden Austria Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Republic France Germany Greece Italy Latvia Malta Poland Romania Spain United Kingdom Portugal Hungary Slovakia Slovenia Belgium Estonia Lithuania Luxembourg Netherlands Ireland Denmark Finland Sweden exclusive inclusive

third country nationals in local elections non-resident citizens in national elections EU-28 average EU-28 average EU-28 average EU-28 average

2000

2018

United Kingdom

Sweden

Spain

Slovenia

Slovakia

Romania

Portugal

Poland

Netherlands

Malta

Luxembourg

Lithuania

Latvia

Italy

Ireland

Hungary

Greece

Germany

France

Finland

Estonia

Denmark

Czech Republic

Cyprus

Croatia

Bulgaria

Belgium

Austria

0

0 60%

60%

0.7

2.4

8.5

10.7

0.4

2.3

1.5

1.4

0.6

2.2

8.4

2.6

0.4

0.6

3.6

5.2

0.8

0.1

1.4

1.5

1

1.6

1.9 Source: Europe 2020 indicators –

employment, Eurostat (2019).

gap

female

male

Y

oung Europeans are growing up in

difficult times. The financial, eco-nomic and migration crises, coupled with climate change, are deepening the inter-generational gap in opportunities and re-sponsibilities. Any sustainable democracy depends on the material and immaterial resources that are passed from the present to the next generation. To preserve plan-etary resources and to combat climate change, the EU aims at a climate-neutral circular economy by 2050. Reduction of resource input, reusage of material and recycling of waste are key elements of Eu-ropean climate neutrality.

INCLUSIVE AND

SUSTAINABLE

DEMOCRACY

VOTING RIGHTS

ELECTORAL LAWS PER EU MEMBER STATE

The future of the EU strongly depends on its youth and on migration. Both have important effects on the intergenerational equity and political participation with-in the EU. One of the most direct ways of promoting political participation of migrant populations is granting them the right to vote. Yet, so far, no Europe-an Member State grEurope-ants national voting rights to all foreign residents. EU citizens can vote in local elections in other EU MS. Only 12 MS grant local voting rights to all foreign residents.

FRAMEWORK FOR

CLIMATE AND ENERGY

GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS AND TARGET ACHIEVEMENT

Regardless of economic and labour mar-ket recovery, the EU still faces strong dif-ferences between MS in terms of youth unemployment and economically inactive young people. Mitigation options could include allocating shares of MS European Social Fund resources to especially target structural reforms for young people.

9 percentage

points (pp)

Within the EU-28

youth unemployment decreased

by almost 9 pp from a

peak of 23.7% in 2013

to 15.2% in July 2018

Source: Eurostat, (2019)

6.2%

national youth

unemployment

rate

in Germany is the lowest in

the EU in 2018, followed by

the Czech Republic (6.7%)

and the Netherlands (7.2%).

It has risen to critical

39.9% in Greece, 34.3% in

Spain and 32.2% Italy

6.2%

national youth

unemployment

rate

in Germany is the lowest in

the EU in 2018, followed by

the Czech Republic (6.7%)

and the Netherlands (7.2%).

It has risen to critical

39.9% in Greece, 34.3% in

Spain and 32.2% Italy

26%

GHG emissions

reductions

below 1990 levels by 2020 and

32% by 2030, thus falling

short of the self-set goal

of 40 % reduction by 2030

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Austria | €46.4 bn_{Belgium | €43.8 bn} Bulgaria | €6.1 bn _{Cyprus | €3 bn} Czech Republic | €18.8 bn Germany | €318.3 bn Denmark | €41.1 bn Estonia | €3.1 bn Greece | €26.6 bn Spain | €120 bn Finland | €28.4 bn France | €309.3 bn Croatia | €8.6 bn Hungary | €19.4 bn Ireland | €21.8 bn Italy | €221.3 bn Lithuania | €4.4 bn Luxembourg | €5.9 bn _{Latvia | €3.1 bn} Malta | €1.3 bn Netherlands | €78.3 bn Poland | €59.5 bn Portugal | €27 bn Romania | €17 bn Sweden | €99.4 bn Slovenia | €5.6 bn Slovakia | €8.5 bn United Kingdom | €287.4 bn

Royal Dutch Shell | €12.9 bn_{Volkswagen Group | €11.1 bn}

HSBC Holdings | €9.1 bn_{BNP Paribas | €7.2 bn Allianz | €6.5 bn}_{Total | €7.1 bn} Daimler | €10 bn _{Banco Santander | €6.8 bn}

AXA Group | €5.7 bn _{BP | €3.6 bn} BMW Group | €8.6 bn _{Anheuser−Busch InBev | €6.7 bn}_{Siemens | €6 bn}

ING Group | €4.7 bn

Intesa Sanpaolo | €7 bn _{Enel | €3.9 bn}

Deutsche Telekom | €3.3 bn BASF | €6 bn

British American Tobacco | €40.9 bn

Lloyds Banking Group | €3.4 bn Bayer | €7.1 bn

AIRBUS | €2.5 bn Unilever | €5.8 bn

Rio Tinto | €7.4 bn _{UniCredit Group | €5.2 bn}

Telefónica | €2.9 bn Fiat Chrysler Automobiles | €3.8 bn

Renault | €4.9 bn _{Generali Group |}

€2 bn

Credit Agricole | €3 bn Christian Dior | €2.1 bn

ArcelorMittal | €3.9 bn _{Société Générale | €2.2 b}

n

Royal Bank of Scotl

Continental | €3 bnDeutsche Post | €2.6 bn L'Oréal Group | €3.6 bn _{Danske Bank | €2.5 bn}

E.ON | €4.1 bn _{Danone | €2.4 bn}_{Volvo Group | €2.2 bn}_{Peugeot | €1.} 9 bn

Aegon | €2.2 bn Royal Ahold

Delhaize N.V. | €1.9 bn Safran | €3.8 bn

LyondellBasell Industries | €4.5 bn _{Henkel | €2.5 bn}_{Merck | €2.5 bn} Rolls−Royce Holdings | €4.6 bn

Telecom Italia | €1.1 bn Philips | €1.5 bn

Novo Nordisk | €5.2 bn

Erste Group Bank | €1.3 bn Swedbank | €1.9

bn

Pernod Ricard | €1.5 bn Svenska Handelsbanken | €1.6 bn Barclays | €−1.9 bn Deutsche Bank | €−1.2 bn EU Member State Multinational Enterprise 500 50 100 150 50 0 50 100 150 50 0 50 100 150 500 50 100 150 500 50 100 150 50 0 50 100 150 50 0 50 100 150 50 0 50 100 150 500 50 100 150 500 50 100 150 50 0 50 100 150 thousands thousands Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden United Kingdom 1900 2016

negative public wealth private wealth

public wealth

T

he creation of the Single Market is

one of the EU’s major achievements and best assets within economic globali-sation. The concentration of econom-ic and financial power is still a threat to global economic equity that favours mul-tinationals in only some countries.

The global financial and economic cri-ses also revealed weaknescri-ses in the eco-nomic governance of the EU and in the Euro. They triggered a retrenchment of cross-border banking and financial activi-ties, and led to an intensified debate about risk-sharing and risk-reduction initiatives within the Economic and Monetary Un-ion (EMU). While related reforms have built-up a common regulatory and super-visory framework, banking and financial activities are still regulated nationally, even within the Euro area. As stabilising factor for the EMU and the Euro, national tax revenue accounts for the main share of public resources.

TRUST AND THE

SINGLE MARKET

COUNTRIES’ TAX REVENUE

AND SOME EUROPEAN

MULTINATIONALS IN

FORBES’ TOP 500

2017 TAXES ON PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS LESS SUBSIDIES

AND 2018 PROFITS, € BN

Sources: Eurostat, (2019); Forbes, (2019)

NET PRIVATE AND

PUBLIC WEALTH

INDIVIDUAL AVERAGE, PPP, 1900-2016, CONSTANT 2017 €

This level of economic inequalities is confirmed when comparing net private wealth and net national income. Data show a general rise in net private wealth since 1970, from 200% to 350% of na-tional income in most rich countries, to 400% to 700% today. This trend was large-ly unaffected by the 2008 financial crisis or by the asset price bubbles in countries like Japan and Spain. Transition countries such as China and Russia have also wit-nessed large increases in private wealth with private wealth-income ratios ap-proaching levels observed in France, the UK, and the United States.

Source: World Inequality Dataset, (2019)

40.2 percent

of EU-28 GDP equaled

taxes applied to capital,

labour and consumption, as

well as compulsory social

contributions taxes in 2017

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Peace and Security

Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union

Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group EP delegations

EP committees

Crisis Management (with EEAS)

Overall policy direction

Crisis Management (with Council)

Crisis Response

Security Policy and Conflict Prevention

Field Coordination EP Secretariat EP Secretariat European Parliament European Parliament Political bodies Political bodies European Council/ Council of the EU European Council/ Council of the EU European External Action Service European External Action Service European Commission

European Commission _{Foreign Policy} Instruments (FPI) EU Humanitarian Assistance and Civil Protection (ECHO) EU Development Programming

and Implementation (DEVCO)

EUPOL COPPS EUPOL COPPS EUPOL COPPS EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories EUTM Mali EUTM Mali EUTM Mali EUTM RCA EUTM Somalia EULEX Kosovo EULEX Kosovo EUMM Georgia EUMM Georgia EUMM Georgia EUMM Georgia EUNAVFOR MED EUNAVFOR MED EUNAVFOR MED (Operation Sophia) (Operation Sophia) (Operation Sophia) EUNAVFOR Somalia EUNAVFOR Somalia (Operation Atalanta) (Operation Atalanta)

EUCAP Sahel Mali

EUCAP Sahel Mali EUCAP Sahel Mali EUCAP Sahel Mali EUCAP Sahel Mali EUCAP Sahel Mali EUCAP Sahel Mali

EUCAP Sahel Niger EUCAP Sahel Niger EUCAP Sahel Niger

EUCAP Somalia EUAM Iraq EUAM Ukraine EUAM Ukraine EUAM Ukraine EUBAM Libya EUBAM Rafah EUBAM Rafah EUBAM Rafah civilian military 542 516 172 377 905 765 261 318 92 ₂₃ 16 95 139 142 27 173 Common Foreign and Security Policy

Decentralised Agencies Development Cooperation Instrument

European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights European Neighbourhood Instrument

EU Aid Volunteers Initiative Guarantee Fund for External Actions Humanitarian Aid

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace

Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation Instrument for Pre−accession assistance Macro−Financial Assistance Other Partnership Instrument

Union Civil Protection Mechanism

2014 2017 2018 2020

2014-2020

(based on 2014 projections)

ADOPTED

BUDGETS COMMITMENTSPROJECTED TOTAL

2,339 154 19,662 1,333 15,433 148 1,193 6,622 2,339 225 11,699 565 1,167 955 145 327 20 3,168 189 2,440 22 241 945 273 62 2,115 46 159 134 21 354 23 3,275 202 2,447 27 85 981 354 33 1,771 84 167 163 21

E

ver since the Lisbon treaty, EU

exter-nal action has gained in importance. In light of the global challenges lying ahead, democratising the policy field fea-tures high within the political debate.

Current EU decision-making in ex-ternal action displays multi-layered, in-ter-institutional dynamics that reflect its connected, complex foreign policy issues. The EU seeks to improve the effectiveness of its external action and its consistency with EU values, as prerequisite for a sus-tainable contribution to peace and securi-ty around the world.

EU EXTERNAL

ACTION AND GLOBAL

GOVERNANCE

WHO DOES WHAT IN THE

EU INSTITUTIONS?

Source: European Parliamentary Research Service (2019), Peace and Security in 2018 - Overview of EU action and outlook for the future

COMMON SECURITY AND

DEFENCE POLICY MISSIONS

AND OPERATIONS

NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AS OF DECEMBER 2017

Source: EU Institute for Security Studies, (2018)

MFF HEADING 4 OVERVIEW

2014-2020, € MILLION

Funding for ‘Global Europe’ activities supports joint efforts of EU MS and EU institutions, each of which relates to the peace and security agenda and has a spe-cific geographic or thematic focus in or-der to maximise impact and visibility of EU external action.

Source: EU Institute for Security Studies, (2018)

6%

Within the 2014-2020 Multiannual

Financial Framework, 6% of the EU budget

support ‘Global Europe’ activities

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GlobalStat is a public information tool for users around the world that off ers a large amount of statistical data free

of charge from international sources for all 193 UN member states, from 1960 to present day. It focuses on the

economic, environmental, political, social, and cultural performance of nations and its ultimate aim is to provide

information about the way human beings live, the freedoms they enjoy and the limitations they face.

ABOUT

Today’s increasing relevance of statistics translates only slowly into a transparent visibility of data within the public domain. In order to close the gap between data proliferation and their actual use, new tools are needed to improve the clarity and speed with which statistical data can be accessed as important independent sources of information. GlobalStat takes up this challenge.

It is structured in 12 thematic and three horizontal areas. Th ematic areas are divided into sub-themes that include statistical data series. Horizontal areas off er insight into data on cross-cutting aspects of sustainable livelihood, national wealth, human well-being and quality of life. GlobalStat currently contains over 600 indicators and is designed to grow over time.

May 2019 | GLOBALSTAT - factsheet Robert Schuman Centre www.globalstat.eu

By presenting data as diverse as income distribution, water resources, migration, land use, food production, nutrition, or life expectancy, GlobalStat contributes to a better understanding of the potential interrelations between human development and globalisation trends. All data and metadata are accessible free of charge for personal information purposes and research.

PROJECT PARTNERS

PROJECT TEAM:

TIMELINE

Partnership between the European University Institute’s Global Governance Programme (GGP) and the Francisco Manuel dos Santos Foundation Gaby Umbach is the Founding Director of GlobalStat

Offi cial launch of the GlobalStat website

GlobalStat starts a

collaboration with the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS)

Launch of joint publication series with EPRS

GlobalStat is embedded in the EPRS website

GlobalStat starts a collaboration with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) GlobalStat becomes offi cial supporting partner of the EUI’s State of the Union Conference Launch of upgraded GlobalStat

September 2011 May 2015 2011 June 2016 May 2016 October 2015 June 2016 March 2018 January 2019

Since October 2015, a partnership between GlobalStat and the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) off ers an ever-increasing portfolio of data-based services and publications to GlobalStat users and Members of the European Parliament (EP). Since September 2016, GlobalStat is also integrated as the new ‘Statistics Warehouse’ resource into the EPRS’s intranet in order to provide direct access to GlobalStat for EPRS clients.

A cooperation with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) started in mid-2016 and is ongoing with the creation of new GlobalStat website with SDMX updates and data visualisation tools.

Project Director: Gaby Umbach

Research Associates and Fellows: Caterina

Francesca Guidi (Project Coordinator); former team members: Laura Bartolini, Luca Mancini, Laura Puccio, Martiño Rubal Maseda, Marta Russo, Trajche Panov

CONTACTS:

European University Institute

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Villa Schifanoia - Via Boccaccio 121 - I-50133 Florence

globalstat@eui.eu www.eui.eu @GlobalStat_eu

Text developed by Caterina Francesca Guidi and Gaby Umbach

Data visualisation created by Christian Dietrich With the financial support of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

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16 ■ RSCAS | Policy Brief | Issue 2019/10 | May 2019

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Th e Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laﬀ an, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, Euro-pean societies and Europe’s place in 21st_{century global politics. Th e Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and}

hosts major research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. Th e research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, refl ecting the changing agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world.

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Th e Global Governance Programme (GGP) is research turned into action. It provides a European setting to conduct research at the highest level and promote synergies between the worlds of research and policy-making, to generate ideas and identify creative an innovative solutions to global challenges. Th e Programme is part of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute, a world-reknowned academic institution. It receives fi nancial support from the European Commission through the European Union budget. Complete information on our activities can be found online at: globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu

Content © Caterina Francesca Guidi, Gaby Umbach, Christian Dietrich. Views expressed in this publication refl ect the opinion of individual authors and not those of the European University Institute or the European Commission. © European University Institute, 2019

QM-AX-19-010-EN-N

doi:10.2870/017755 ISBN:978-92-9084-731-1 ISSN:2467-4540 Global Governance Programme

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies European University Institute Via Boccaccio, 121

50133 Florence Italy

Contact GGP: