Dipartimento di Civiltà e Forme del Sapere
Laurea Magistrale in Scienze per la Pace: Trasformazione dei
Conflitti e Cooperazione allo sviluppo
Tesi di Laurea
REWRITING THE FUTURE: EMPOWERING SYRIAN REFUGEE
CHILDREN THROUGH ACCESS TO EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
IN JORDAN
Relatore
Prof. Arturo Marzano
Candidata
Karen Arias Obando
Table of contents
Acknowledgements ... 4
Acronyms ... 5
Introduction ... 1
Chapter 1 ... 4
The Syrian war and the refugee crisis from 2011 onwards ... 4
1.1 The beginning... 4
1.2. The various actors involved in the Syrian war ... 6
1.2.1. The Internal actors ... 8
The Ba’ath Party ... 8
The National Defense Forces ... 11
Free Syrian Army ... 12
National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces ... 13
The Syrian National Council ... 13
Al-Nusra Front ... 14
The Islamic Front ... 15
ISIL ... 16
People's Protection Units ... 17
1.2.2 The regional and international actors ... 19
Turkey ... 20 Saudi Arabia ... 20 Iran ... 21 Hezbollah ... 23 Russia ... 26 United States ... 27 1.3. Political Negotiations ... 31 1.3.1 Geneva Process ... 31
1.3.2. Vienna Peace Talks ... 32
1.3.4. The Sochi peace talks ... 33
1.4. Syrian Refugee crisis spillover ... 36
1.4.1. Turkey opened the borders... 38
1.4.2. Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon: An Overview ... 40
1.4.3. Refugee Camps in Jordan ... 44
Zaatari Camp ... 44
Azraq Camp ... 47
Rukban Camp ... 48
Chapter 2 ... 51
The impact of conflict on education. Considering education as a strategy to overcome conflicts ... 51
2.1. Education as an unalienable human right ... 51
2.2. Education in emergency situations ... 53
2.3. The “Education for All” Movement ... 55
2.4. The impact of conflict on education ... 57
2.5. Education as a strategy to overcome conflicts ... 60
2.6. Educating children within conflict zones ... 62
2.6.1. Rwanda: a case study ... 63
2.6.2. The Burundian refugees education strategy in Rwanda ... 68
Chapter 3 ... 71
Empowering Syrian refugee children in Jordan ... 71
3.1. Syrian Education before the war ... 71
3.2. Syria’s education facilities under attack ... 73
3.3. Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Schools ... 76
3.4. Syrian Refugees in Jordan Schools ... 81
3.4 Government of Jordan educational response ... 85
3.4.1 The Jordan Compact ... 89
3.4.2. Jordan Response Plan ... 90
3.4.3. Education Strategic Plan (ESP) ... 93
3.5. Empowering Syrian Refugee children in Jordan: The roll of International Organization and NGOs ... 94
3.6. Empowering Syrian Refugee children in Jordan: the case of Caritas Jordan . 98
3.6.1 Caritas Educational Services... 100
3.6.1.1. Learning Support Services/classes (LSS/LSC) ... 100
3.6.1.2. The Catch-up program ... 101
3.6.1.3. The Remedial Program ... 102
3.6.1.4. Kindergarten/Pre-schooling (KG1-KG2) ... 104
3.6.2. Other educational Services... 104
3.6.2.1. Life/Soft skills training for adolescents ... 105
3.6.2.2. Literacy and numeracy for parents ... 105
3.6.2.3 Psychosocial Services... 105
3.6.2.4. Teacher training ... 106
3.6.2.5. Bus escorts training ... 106
3.7. Caritas holistic education approach ... 107
3.7.1. Personal hygiene ... 107
3.7.2. Child Protection ... 107
3.7.3. Getting the mothers involved ... 108
Chapter 4 ... 109
Addendum ... 109
Conclusions ... 126
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I want to thank God for his never-ending grace, mercy and love. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Prof. Arturo Marzano, for the continuous support, for his patience, enthusiasm, and immense knowledge. For
caring for this thesis as much as I do.
A tutte le persone che la vita mi ha fatto incontrare in questa avventura in Italia: a Giuditta per il suo "sì" senza conoscermi. Grazie perché mi hai aperto le porte di casa tua e mi hai fatto conoscere Ele e Lili, le nostre sorelle italiane, che amo con tutto il cuore tanto quanto te. Grazie a voi tre per tutto quello che abbiamo condiviso
e per aver fatto di casa il nostro “Hogar, Dulce Hogar”. Anto, Cecco, Chiara, Edo, Giabba, Peppe, Pierpa & Lavi: grazie perché quello che è cominciato con un gioco di
Contacto piano piano è diventata una bellissima amicizia. Alle mie colleghe ed amiche, Anna e Chiara, perché mi avete accompagnata in questa meravigliosa Laurea, perché mi avete detto dal primo esame: “dai che manca poco”. Alla mia famiglia del Movimento dei Focolari perché mi avete sostenuta nei momenti dolorosi
e perché avete gioito con me nei momenti di felicità.
To my dear friends of the Restaurant of Mercy, thank you for teaching with your way of living the real meaning of the present moment. To the Awwad’s and Al-Homsi’s for
making me part of their families, for their love and care. May God richly bless all of you. I want to express my deep gratitude to Ameer, Dima, Francesca, Hadeel, Hanadi, Rami, Shady and Kareem for being always there. To my best friend, Nimeh,
that always managed to make me feel special, for being my source of support when things get a bit discouraging. Thank you for giving me a million reasons to be
thankful for.
A mis amigos, los gen de Costa Rica, que me recordaron que cuando se ama de verdad no importa la distancia. A la familia Segura Agüero por amarme como una hija y estar siempre conmigo. A mi mejor amiga, Fernandita, porque creyó en mi en
mis momentos de dudas, por sus oraciones, por celebrar mis logros como suyos. A mi familia por el amor incondicional en todos los momentos de mi vida, por sus
consejos, por creer en mi, por enseñarme que mi trabajo en la vida es ser feliz. Estoy acá gracias a ustedes, gracias por darme esta grandiosa oportunidad. Este
logro es nuestro: Pa, Ma, Erick, Keki, Mari, Luis y Tita Isa.
The last word goes for Abuelita Amparo, for her suffering when she was deprived to continue studying and for her understanding of the importance of education. Her light has given me the extra strength and motivation. This thesis is dedicated to her.
Acronyms
CJ Caritas Jordan
EEPCT Education in emergencies and post-crisis transition
EFA Education for All
EiE Education in Emergencies
FSA Free Syrian Army
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
IDPs Internally displaced people
INEE Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
IS Islamic State
MEHE Ministry of Education and Higher Education of Lebanon
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MoE Ministry of Education
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDF National Defense Forces
NFE Non-formal education
NSAAs Non-state armed actors
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UHNCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund
RAND Research and Development Corporation
RSD Refugee Status Determination
SDF Syrian Democratic Forces
SNC Syrian National Council
TEP Teacher Emergency Packages
YPG People's Protection Units
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
1
Introduction
The international community is struggling to respond to the daunting humanitarian crisis not just inside Syria but also in the neighbouring hosting countries. Political actors cannot reach a solution or agree on how to end the war, but at least they do seem to agree that humanitarian assistance is needed.
At the end of 2015 after five years of civil war the severe death toll was of more than 470.000 Syrians according to the Syrian Center for Policy Research. The intensification of the war led 5.582.018 Syrians to seek refuge in neighbouring states such as Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan and 6.5 million internally displaced people, the biggest internally displaced population in the world. According to the data provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, out of the total population of Syrian refugees 47.4% are children under 18 years. The limited capacities of education systems across the region have left an estimated 731.000 Syrian refugee children out of school. In 2018, more than 5 million Syrian refugee children will require education assistance.
Nevertheless Jordan’s efforts to improve the educational systems, the influx of Syrian refugees in the country are a huge difficulty to provide learning opportunities to 230.000 school aged Syrian children. The efforts of the Ministry of Education and partners as UNICEF or host NGO’s like Caritas Jordan are helping to reach more children without compromising the quality of the education.
Between July and October 2017, I have spent five months in Jordan as an intern in Caritas Jordan, working in the educational field. In particular, I
2
have been familiar with the different types of education given to the Syrian refugee in Jordan in order to provide them with new opportunities.
The choice of the subject occurred almost in a natural and spontaneous way, given the importance Caritas Jordan has given to the educational projects in the past years. With my field visits I got the chance to meet the communities and schools of Madaba, Karak, Salt, Irbid, Mafraq and Amman.
The purpose of this thesis is to show the importance of education in the post-conflict reconstruction period and how the hosting countries can improve their educational programs in order to empower refugees. Often, post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian strategies only focus on short-term economic and political outcomes, thus leaving the social components of recovery to a later stage.
This work is divided into four chapters that range from the most general to the most specific topics. The first one describes the beginning of the crisis and why the destabilizing factors in the MENA region make it considered riskier than it was at the beginning of the Arab Spring. In this chapter, I mention the various actors involved in the Syrian war and how the distrust between them and within states, is on the rise, making politics and identity even more fractured and polarized. The final part of the chapter presents some of the political negotiations and peace processes carried out in order to give an end to the seven years war.
In the second chapter I focus on the impact of conflict on education and how when nations suffer a war, one of the first institutions to fail is the education system. Furthermore, I concentrate on the role of education in rebuilding fractured post conflict societies and preventing and overcoming future conflict.
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I also emphasize the role of education in influencing positively or negatively the development of a State and how in emergency situations the help of several actors is urgently required. One of the main points of the chapter is why violent conflicts are a phenomenon that deserves better attention in the education program not just of the country in conflict but also in hosting countries, as Rwanda did with Burundian refugees.
The third chapter starts with Syria’s educational situation before the uprising and includes also the current situation, when schools are under attack and an entire generation of children fighting for their future and right to education. Additionally it explains the influx of Syrian school-age refugees into Jordan, and how Caritas together with the Ministry of Education UN agencies, INGOs, and NGOs introduced programs to address the gaps in Syrian children’s education caused by the war.
Finally, the fourth chapter is an addendum that presents my experience working with Caritas Jordan in some schools around Jordan. In particular, I enquire why their approach is a way of empowering Syrian refugee kids to rebuild their nation if they need to go back home one day.
“One day I will write the story about how the Syrian Youth went back home to rebuild their country. But we can’t do it without education”. Muzoon
4
Chapter 1
The Syrian war and the refugee
crisis from 2011 onwards
1.1 The beginning
In December 2010 a wave of widespread popular protests erupted in Tunisia, well-known as Arab Spring1. Civilians went out to protest their regime after decades of oppression. This expression has been used to define the widespread uprisings against authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria.2 The protests spread across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region were seen as a desire of a better future. People decided to raise their voices and ask the authoritarian leaders to leave the power. Furthermore, they asked improvements in the economy, justice, freedom and participation in public life. In January 2011 the fall of the regime in Egypt and Tunisia made the other countries from the Arab world realized that this could be also their opportunity to have a new beginning and that the long nightmare was about to finish, however the reality was not the same for all the countries, the worst part was just about to start in Syria.
1 Manfreda, P. What is the Arab Spring?, «ThoughtCo.», February 7th 2018, in
https://www.thoughtco.com/definition-of-the-arab-spring-2353029, last access 03-30-2018. 2 VT Digger. https://vtdigger.org/2013/06/09/dunsmore-mideast-arab-spring-morphs-into-sectarian-conflicts/#sthash, last access 03-30-2018.
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The protests in Syria started in March 2011 in the southern city of
Daraa, 5km from the border with Jordan. A group of teenagers wrote on the
walls of the local school some phrases against the regime.3
“No teaching, no School, till the end of Bashar’s rule.” “Leave, Bashar”.
“Your turn is coming, Doctor”
None of them thought that their teenage rebellion was the beginning of a new revolution in their country that would later evolve into a civil war. The young guys were arrested, beaten and interrogated by the regime security forces that took and put them in police custody for a month. The families did not know where their kids were or what was happening. After this incident, residents of Daraa took the streets demanding the Ba’ath regime to release the kids but the only thing they received was the violent response of the police opening fire to the crowd as if the protests were a riot.
The government’s handling of the protests was inept. Syria’s police force was a conformed of a few thousands only, which obstructed the deployment of security forces at the beginning of the demonstrations. These forces were trained to fight against external actors and terrorists but not in handling internal disturbances. There were many instances of use of excessive force.4
Moreover, the position of the police forces of the regime and the later news with photos of the kids with serious injuries were the detonating of a
3
MacKinnon, M. The Graffiti kids who sparked the Syrian War, «The Globe and Mail», December 2nd, 2016. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/the-graffiti-kids-who-sparked-the-syrian-war/article33123646/. Last access 03-30-2018.
4 Haran, VP (2016), Roots of the Syrian Crisis, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, p. 16.
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spillover of peaceful protests demanding democratic freedoms not just in
Daraa but in so many other important cities as Latakia, Damascus, Homs, Vanyas, Hama, North Aleppo and East Al Raqqa. The upsing began.
An opposition movement against the authoritarian rule of Assad and the Ba’ath party soon spread from economically disadvantaged rural regions to become a national phenomenon.5
The situation was a serious democratic deficit in Syria. There was no political opposition; the Ba'ath party structure was formulated in a way to maintain its monopoly. Any political demonstration outside the Ba'ath party was strongly sanctioned.6
However, the manifestations against the regime did not have serious economic or social problems. Bashar felt that Syria will not face problems like the other countries in the region stating that the situation was different.
What he had not factored in was that Syria’s foreign policy was resented by many in the Arab world and the West who viewed the Arab Spring as an opportunity to get rid of an inconvenient regime.7
1.2. The various actors involved in the Syrian war
Within the conflict there are some actors who are politically, militarily, economically, and socially invested in the trajectory of the conflict. These actors’ interests are not always publicly disclosed. They are not always
5
Popp. R, Möckli. D, (2012), The Syrian Civil War: Between escalation and intervention, Center for Security Studies, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, Zürich, p. 2.
http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSS-Analysis-124-EN.pdf, last access 03-30-2018.
6 Haran, Roots of the Syrian Crisis, p. 16. 7 Haran, Roots of the Syrian Crisis, p. 4.
7
rational, and in some cases, they may not be evident to the actors themselves.8
The historic lack of consensus in the region mainly in political issues have made that the actors involved have still to agree on even the fundamentals. They appear more unanimous about what they are against. Distrust between different actors, both between and within states, is on the rise, making politics and identity even more fractured and polarized.9
Additionally, decisions of actors not just in the Syrian conflict but in any other conflict, are guided by the own interpretation of the context around them, and in large part of their self-interested.
Today, because of many destabilizing factors the MENA region is considered riskier than it was at the beginning of the Arab Spring. A growing number of non-estate armed actors have been one of the principal factors of this new insecure environment, as they have contributed to the weakness of the security in the MENA region.10
Since the outbreak of the uprising in Syria, the external actors have also been protagonists of the conflict outcome. External players «include neighboring countries that seek to contain spillover effects, such as Turkey and Iraq; aspirants for regional power, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia; and extra-regional actors that have their own particular equities, such as Russia».11
8
Ernstorfer, A (2016), The Syrian Conflict: a systems conflict analysis, ARK Group DMCC, Cambridge, p. 16
9
Youngs, R. (2014), From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed, Carnegie Europe, p. 10. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/arab_spring_reframed.pdf, last access 03-30-2018. 10
Kardaş, T. Yeşiltaş, M. (2017), Non-State Armed Actors in the Middle East, Springer International Publishing AG, Switzerland, p. 23.
11
RAND Corporation research report. Syria as an Arena of Strategic Competition
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR213/RAND_RR213.pdf, last access 29-03-2018
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1.2.1. The Internal actors
The Ba’ath Party
The Ba’ath Party was officially founded in Damascus in 1947. The organization aspired to Arab unity on the basis of socialism and nationalism. A 1963 Ba’athist coup established the Ba’ath Party as the only legal political party in Syria. In 1946 Hafez al-Assad, who came from an Alawite family, decided to join the Ba’ath Party. In 1963 after a putsch the Alawite branch started to have important positions inside the Party. The changes happened in a progressive way and in 1966 the Alawites took the power. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad seized power in a coup12.
The Alawite branch is a minority that had suffered persecutions and humiliations during the time of the Ottoman Empire. Syria suffered wars and conflicts for various reasons, but one of the main realities that divide this country is the sectarianism.
The French mandate that replaced the Ottoman Empire empowered minorities and weakened the older Sunni elite, while Alawites begged the French to grant them a separate state. Minorities, especially Alawites, later saw the ruling Baath party and its pan-Arab ideology as a way to transcend narrow sectarian identities, while state employment and the military offered opportunities for social advancement and an escape from poverty.13
The secularism of the party is an important source of legitimacy. It is estimated that about 25 percent of the population of Syria are non-Sunni Muslims (Alawites, Druze, Isma’ilis), or non-muslims (Christians). Others are Sunni non-Arabs (Kurds, Circassians, Turkomans) who are traditionally less orthodox than Sunni Arabs and
12
Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00634A000400010052-5.pdf, last access 26-03-2018.
13
Rosen, N. Assad's Alawites: The guardians of the throne, «Al Jazeera», October 10th 2011.
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/10/20111010122434671982.html, last access 29-03-2018
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also fear the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. For this large minority, Ba’th secularism is a bulwark against Sunni domination and Islamic fundamentalism.14
In 1973, the Syrian constitution was amended to give the Ba’ath Party unique status as the leader of the state and society, with the possibility to rule in all areas of public life.15
Article 8: The leading party in the society and the state is the Socialist Arab Baath Party. It leads a patriotic and progressive front seeking to unify the resources of the people's masses and place them at the service of the Arab nation's goals.16
Bashar al-Assad, the second son of Hafez al-Assad, rose to power in 2000 after his father’s death. «He promoted full-scale neoliberal reform without any welfare balances which led to an increase in poverty, unemployment, and income disparity».17
Assad maintained, with some slight modifications, the system his predecessor, Hafez al-Assad built. He was unwilling, and in some cases unable, to introduce political and economic reforms.18
14
Bar, S (2006) Bashar’s Syria: The Regime and its Strategic Worldview, Institute for Policy and Strategy Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel. p.359.
http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2590Bashars.pdf, last access 29-03-2018. 15
BBC News. Profile: Syria's ruling Baath Party. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18582755, last access 03-30-2018.
16
Carnegie Middle East Center. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50255?lang=en, last access 03-30-2018.
17
Harvard Divinity School. https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/baath-party-syria, last access 30-30-2018. 18 Rabinovich, I. (2018), The struggle for Syria, Chapter Two.
10
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate) from 1969 to 2011.
Figure 1. Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate) from 1969 to 2011.19 Retrieved from
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=SY
As noted above, the unemployment went from 2,3% in 2000 to 11,2% in 2001. By the end 2011 the unemployment was 14,9% and continuing with the same pattern for the next 5 years.
In February 2012, after nearly a year of anti-government protests that threatened the dominance of the Assad family and the Baath Party, the
19 World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=SY, last access 03-30-2018.
11
constitution and the political party law were changed. They did not, however, have much of an impact at the subsequent parliamentary elections in May, which were boycotted by the opposition and saw pro-government parties win almost all the seats.20
Assad has a consistent foreign policy directed against the US and Israel, while promoting Syria’s association with Iran, the Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Hamas.21
Evidently, military and economic assistance from Iran and Russia has been a critical factor that has helped the regime cling to power. But another key element of the regime’s survival has been its ability to claim that the Syrian state, under Assad, has remained the irreplaceable provider of essential public services, even for Syrians living in the many areas that are outside the regime’s control.22
The National Defense Forces
Formed in 2012, by far the largest militia network in Syria with approximately between 65.000 to 80.000 militants.23 The NDF was a way to formally unify local Popular Committees and other pro-Assad armed groups. Local committees and other volunteers were unified and formalized as a reserve force under the command of the Syrian military.24
20
BBC News. Profile: Syria's ruling Baath Party. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18582755, last access 03-29-2018.
21
Popp, R. Möckli, D. The Syrian Civil War: Between escalation and intervention, p. 1. 22
Khaddour, K (2015) The Assad Regime’s hold on the Syrian State, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, p.4. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/syrian_state1.pdf, last access 03-29-2018
23
Sputnik News. Foreign Troops Make Up Just 20% of Syria's Pro-Government Forces
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201711091058947330-foreign-troops-syria-government/, last access 03-29-2018
24
The Carter Center. Syria: Pro-Government Paramilitary Forces, p.8.
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/pro-governmentparamilitaryforces.pdf, last access 30-30-2018.
12
«It has predominantly been comprised of troops from Syria's religious minorities, including Alawites, Christians, and Druze».25
NDF members are licensed and receive salaries and military equipment from the government. Although the NDF has played an important role in the survival of the Syrian regime, its future is becoming increasingly uncertain. Therefore financial help of their allies is of vital importance, «Russia has sought to wield greater influence in Syria since it began its direct military intervention in September 2015, and the Iranian-backed NDF may no longer fit into Russia’s grand scheme».26
Free Syrian Army
In the summer of 2011, various local resistance groups and neighbourhood militias came together under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The FSA, founded by defectors from the regular Syrian armed forces, helped coordinate the resistance and professionalized its military operations. Colonel Riyad al-Asad, the founder of the FSA, since the beginning affirmed the main purpose was to «protect peaceful protesters demonstrating against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and to initiate resistance operations against his security forces».27 Initially the fight consisted in some protests and resistance, however gradually turned into a dispute for the control of Syria.28
25
Sputnik News. Foreign Troops Make Up Just 20% of Syria's Pro-Government Forces
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201711091058947330-foreign-troops-syria-government/, last access 03-29-2018
26
The Syria Institute. National Defense Forces. http://syriainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NDF-Cheat-Sheet_Secure.pdf, last access 03-27-2018. 27
Lister, C (2016) The Free Syrian Army: A decentralized insurgent brand, Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings, Washington. p.4.
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/iwr_20161123_free_syrian_army.pdf, last access 03-30-2018.
28 CSS Analysis in Security Policy (2012), The Syrian Civil War: Between escalation and intervention, P. 1.
13
National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces
After some meetings between members of oppositional groups and politicians discussing options and ways to unify the effort, a decision was reached on November 8th, 2012 in Doha. The result was an agreement between the oppositional groups and the Syrian National Council stablished the National Syrian Coalition.
The goal of the coalition, as the other actors against the regime, seeks the displaced of the Assad regime looking forward a free and democratic country.29
The Syrian National Council
Sometimes known as the Syrian National Transitional Council or the National Council of Syria, was the biggest and most significant Syrian opposition group in exile until November 11th, 2012, when it joined the broader National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. «Previously, the SNC was the main point of reference for countries backing the opposition. On April 1st, 2012, the over 100 countries in the Friends of Syria group recognized it as the umbrella organization under which Syrian opposition groups are gathering».30
On October 31st 2012, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in her visit in Croatia spoke about their position about the SNC to the President Ivo Josipovic.
29 National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and opposition forces.
http://en.etilaf.org/about-us/goals.html, last access 04-02-2018
30 Carnegie Middle East Center. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48334?lang=en, last access 04-02-2018
14
This cannot be an opposition represented by people who have many good attributes but have, in many instances, not been inside Syria for 20, 30, or 40 years. There has to be a representation of those who are on the frontlines, fighting and dying today to obtain their freedom. We’ve made it clear that the SNC can no longer be viewed as the visible leader of the opposition. They can be part of a larger opposition, but that opposition must include people from inside Syria and others who have a legitimate voice that needs to be heard.31
The SNC has faced a lack of leadership and a serious difficulty maintaining internal unity and cohesion.32
Al-Nusra Front
Al Nusra first emerged in January 2012. In 2013 they became an
important ally to Al Qaeda. The front is known as a Sunni terrorist group allied with rebels.
Abu Mohamad Al Jolani in July 2016 announced the rebranding of Al Nusra: «Al Nusra would change its name to Jabhat Fated Al Sham (Front of the Conquest of Syria) and thanked the commanders of Al Qaeda for having understood the need to break ties».33
According to Charles Lister the Director of the Extremism and Counterterrorism Program at the Middle East Institute in his Twitter account, «the change aimed to secure a long-term future as a mainstream rebel group, rather than be targeted like the Daesh terror group by foreign powers».
31
U.S Department of State. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State. Zagreb, Croatia. (2012)
https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/10/199931.htm, last access 04-02-2018
32 Carnegie Middle East Center.
http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/04/03/syrian-opposition-s-leadership-problem-pub-51373, last access 04-02-2018.
33 Jordan Times. (2016) The Syrian Al Nusra Front.
15 Jabhat al-Nusra operates with external sources of financial donations
to sustain its operations.34 According to Sky News, Qatar is their principal financial support owing to the fact that it represents their presence in Syria.35
Like the other Salafi-Jihadist movement, Jabhat al-Nusra visualizes an Islamic Caliphate that embraces the Muslim world.36
The Islamic Front
This was a Sunni Islamist rebel group founded in November 22, 2013. After several groups left the National Coalition they decided to form a new front. The last result was a coalition of the seven main Islamists brigades in Syria: «The Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement, The Suqour al-Sham Brigades, The Tawhid Brigade, The Haq Brigade, The Ansar al-Sham Battalions, The Islam Army, and The Kurdish Islamic Front».37
Their main goal is to topple the Assad regime and build an Islamic state. According words of Hassan Abboud, the head of Ahrar al-Sham, the Islamic Front is «an independent military, political, and social formation striving to completely overthrow the Assad regime and to build an Islamic state in which God’s law alone rules sovereign».38
34
Lister, C. (2016), Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra. Brookings Institution, Center for Middle East Policy, p.31.
35 Kiley, S. West’s important ally against Islamic State, «Sky News», October 23rd, 2014.
https://news.sky.com/story/wests-important-ally-against-islamic-state-10384627, last access 04-02-2018
36
Cafarella, J. (2014), Jabhat Al-Nusra in Syria. Middle East Security Report 25, Institute for the study of War, p.12.
37
BBC News. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24403003, last access 04-02-2018. 38 Carnegie Middle East Center. (2013) Say Hello to the Islamic Front.
16
Liwa al-Tawhid spokesman Abu Firas announced to the AFP news agency: «The doors are open to all the military factions, and a committee is working to study the entrance of all groups that also want to join».39
ISIL
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), it is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) or by its Arabic language acronym Daesh. ISIS is a Sunni jihadist group with a violent ideology known for beheading victims on camera and instigating deadly terrorist attacks. Their main goal is to build a caliphate that will rule the world.40
In 2006 through a jihadist website the Mujahidin Shura Council declared the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq.41 In the statement they also said that supporters were growing and the organization of the group had started with self-sufficiency.
ISIS’s military surge in Syria and Iraq in 2013 and 2014 was a rude awakening for regional and global powers. ISIS marks a new peril to the regional security order at a time of fierce social and political struggle within Arab societies and creeping sectarianism fueled mainly by the geostrategic rivalry between Shia- dominated Iran and Sunni- dominated Saudi Arabia.42
39 BBC News. (2013) Leading Syrian rebel groups form new Islamic Front.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25053525, last access 04-02-2018. 40
Withnall, A. Isis, a year of the caliphate: What is it that the so-called ‘Islamic State’ really wants?, «The Independent», June 29th, 2015. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-a-year-of-the-caliphate-what-is-it-that-the-so-called-islamic-state-really-wants-10352950.html, last access 04-02-2018.
41 Shamieh, L. Zoltan, S. (2015) The Rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), AARMS Vol 14, p.366. 42 George, F. (2017). ISIS: A History, Princeton, New Jersey, United Stated of America, p.4
17 The expansion to Syria provided ISIS with strategic and significant economic resources.43 In October in a Statement, the U.S President Donald
Trump announced the defeat of ISIS in Raqqa, the city that they made capital of the terror:
The defeat of ISIS in Raqqah represents a critical breakthrough in our worldwide campaign to defeat ISIS and its wicked ideology. With the liberation of ISIS’s capital and the vast majority of its territory, the end of the ISIS caliphate is in sight.
We will soon transition into a new phase in which we will support local security forces, de-escalate violence across Syria, and advance the conditions for lasting peace, so that the terrorists cannot return to threaten our collective security again.44 As a result, ISIS strongholds in Mosul and Raqqah have fallen. We have made, alongside our coalition partners, more progress against these evil terrorists in the past several months than in the past several years.
People's Protection Units
Originally formed in 2004, it officially declared its existence in 2012. It is a Kurdish militia branch of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) that provides security in most of Syria’s Kurdish areas. Predominantly Sunni Muslim but with recent influxes of other groups: the Turkmen, Arabs, Armenians and Assyrians.
Since the creation of the modern states of Turkey, Syria and Iraq nearly 100 years ago, the Kurdish populations of each country have struggled – in the face of widespread ethnic discrimination – to secure equal rights of citizenship and expression.45
43
George, F. (2017). ISIS: A History, Princeton, New Jersey, United Stated of America, p.17 44
White House. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-defeat-isis-raqqah/, last access 04-02-2018.
45 Gunes, C. Lowe, R. (2015) The Impact of the Syrian War on Kurdish Politics Across the Middle East, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatam House, London. p.3.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150723SyriaKurd sGunesLowe.pdf, last access 04-02-2018.
18
The ethnic discrimination against the Syrian Kurds is still a major issue inside Syria: Kurds «were denied citizenship throughout the rule of both Hafez and Bashar Assad and were thereby relegated to permanent second-class status».46
It is important to say that the main enemy of the YPG is not the Ba’ath regime, but the Islamic State and other rebel groups. The problem between the YPG and the Islamic State is that they see each other as ideological enemies and rivals for control of territory and resources.
In May 2017 the American president Donald Trump gave authorization for the Defense Department to equip Kurdish elements in Syria to arm the YPG prior to the battle of Raqqa, it was a clear revealing that his government do not distinguish between the YPG and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).47
In a statement, chief Pentagon spokesperson Dana W. White said:
The Syrian Democratic Forces, partnered with enabling support from U.S. and coalition forces, are the only force on the ground that can successfully seize control of the Syrian city of Raqqa in the near future. We are keenly aware of the security concerns of our coalition partner Turkey. We want to reassure the people and government of Turkey that the U.S. is committed to preventing additional security risks and protecting our NATO ally.48
The conflict has generated concern for the government of Turkey because of the difficulty in controlling the border between the two countries and the Kurdish problem as well.
46
Institute for the Study of War. Syrian Kurds and the Democratic Union Party (PYD).
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Backgrounder_SyrianKurds.pdf, last access 04-02-2018.
47
Schøtt, A. (2017) From the Forgotten People to World-Stage Actors: The Kurds of Syria. Royal Danish Defence College, Denmark, Copenhagen P. 16.
48 U.S Department of Defense.
19
The Kurds do not want to favour the Syrian conflict, by contrast they want to consolidate the Kurdistan state on their border and this reactivate tensions with Turkey.
1.2.2 The regional and international actors
Syria’s Civil War has been a complex and devastating fighting that woke up the interest of multiple foreign powers since it broke out in 2011. For some of them was an opportunity to gain a presence in Middle East.
Uri Friedman, writer at The Atlantic Magazine, in one of his articles said: «If the coming defeat of ISIS and rebel forces in Syria was supposed to bring an end to the seven-year conflict there, no one told Iran, Israel, Turkey, Russia, or the United States».49 As Uri Friedman continued explaining in his
article, it is more than clear that we are watching a «confrontation between the world’s two largest military powers, America and Russia; between two NATO members, America and Turkey; and between sworn enemies, Israel and Iran».50
The world powers at the beginning of the Syrian War justified their presence for diplomatic support, when the war started to get worst it was also economic support such as money or army for fighters. Now, they are fighting themselves directly.
49
Friedman Uri. (2018) Syria's War Has Never Been More International, The Atlantic magazine.
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/syria-civil-war-next/553232/
last access 04-02-2018 50 Ibidem
20
Turkey
Turkey’s policy towards Syria over the previous decade has been in evolution. Before the uprising Turkey’s policy was not interfering in the neighboring countries affairs. «Turkey faces several challenges to its internal stability, while the geopolitical struggle fuelled by the Syrian war sees Turkey as one of the main actors but not the dominant one».51
Turkey’s main concern is the rise of an autonomous Kurdistan in Syria under the control of the PYD. In order to achieve this aim, Turkey is ready to cooperate with Iran and Syria, also because of the interest of both countries in preventing a bigger role for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK)/PYD in the region.52
Turkey is opposite to the United States’ ideas and acts. Turkey sees the support of Syrian Kurdish militias by the U.S. against ISIS as a serious threat, given that the Turkish government makes no distinction between the Kurdish militia Syria and the PKK. Turkey sees its national security in danger following the possible emerging Syrian Kurdish region aligned with the PKK along its border.53
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia and the US have a close relationship in political-commercial issues and internal security. They also have similar positions regarding the Iranian nuclear program, fight against terrorism and
51
Istituto Affari Internazionali, The Evolution of Turkey’s Syria Policy.
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1728.pdf, last access 03-25-2018. 52 Ibidem
53
Brookings. Order from Chaos: The new geopolitics of Turkey, Syria, and the West.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/14/the-new-geopolitics-of-turkey-syria-and-the-west, last access 04-02-2018.
21
maintenance of regional security. Saudi Arabia has called «for a no-fly zone to be imposed to protect civilians from bombardment by Syrian government forces».54 The existing sectarian division between Sunni and Shiite groups, has caused actors such as Iran and Saudi Arabia to be faced indirectly by supporting the pro and the regime, two powers that seek to establish their domination at the regional level. Saudi Arabia has helped the rebels not just financially but with weapons and training.55
Iran
The strategic geographic position of Iran made it the principal potential threat to freedom of navigation and the flow of resources in the Gulf, hence the respect gain in the Syrian War.56
As stated or in a joint Report by AEI’s critical threats project & Institute for the Study of War:
The Iranian security and intelligence services are advising and assisting the Syrian military in order to preserve Bashar al-Assad’s hold on power while setting conditions to ensure its regional interests.
The Assad regime has provided crucial access to Iranian proxies, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, allowing Iran to move people, weapons, and money to these groups through Syrian territory. Iran has provided technical support to Syria’s chemical weapons programs such as scientists, equipment and precursor chemicals, and technical training.57
54
BBC. Syria crisis: Where key countries stand. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23849587, last access 04-19-2018.
55
Mazzetti. M, and Apuzzo. M, U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels, «The New York Times», January 26 2016.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudi-money-to-support-syrian-rebels.html, last access 04-19-2018.
56
Mueller, K. Wasser, B. Martini, J. Watts, S. (2017) U.S. Strategic Interests in the Middle East and
implications of the Army, RAND Corporation. P.4.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE265/RAND_PE265.pdf, last access 04-02-2018
57 Fulton, W. Holliday, J. Wyer, S. (2013), Iranian Strategy in Syria. AEI’s critical threats project & Institute for the Study of War, p.9.
22
Russia and Iran share a complicated history, but what unites them the most is their joint interest in reducing American influence, and because of these interests they have been able to put their differences aside and cooperate.58 According to Paul Bucala, former Iran analyst at the American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project,: «The scope of Iranian combat operations in Syria guarantees that Iran will remain a dominant player on the ground, regardless of any shifts in Russia’s official position on Iranian involvement».59
The shared interests between Russia and Iranian across Middle East are a clear indication that any U.S. effort of pacification to persuade Russia to abandon to its ally, Iran, will be unsuccessful.60
Iran is helping Assad to regain control of Syrian territory, providing it with the necessary logistical and financial support. The aim is to try to rebuild the Syrian state in its entirety or at least in the form closest to the one before the conflict.
The Syrian Electricity Minister Mohammad Zuhair Kharboutli and Iran's Deputy Energy Minister Sattar Mahmoudi met in November 2017 in Tehran. As stated by Mahmoudi: We want to play a role in Syria's reconstruction. Iran's capabilities in the water and power sectors will be pivotal for renovating Syria's power infrastructure.61
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf, last access 04-02-2018.
58
Borshchevskaya, A. (2017), Russia's Strategic Objectives in the Middle East and North Africa, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/BorshchevskayaTestimony2017 0615.pdf, last access 04-02-2018
59
Bucala, P. (2017). Iran’s New Way of War in Syria, Institute for the study of War. P.1. 60
Bucala, P. (2017). Iran’s New Way of War in Syria, Institute for the study of War. P.13.
61 Financial Tribune.
23
For Iran, Syria is also a key ally. It is the largest conduit to the Shiite Hezbollah militia in Lebanon, the route through which Iran can threaten Israel. Iran finances amounts of money and resources to Lebanese Hezbollah, to expand its regional reach and strengthen the corridor to the Eastern Mediterranean, which it established from Iraq, via Syria, to Lebanon.62
Hezbollah
His meaning in Arabic is “Party of God”. It is a Lebanon Shia militia group and political party that emerged after the Israeli invasion of that country in 1982. Because of this, Hezbollah was known as a resistance party by large segments of the Arab population who supported it because of their resistance against the Israeli occupier and internal reconciliation.
Defeating the Israel Defense Forces in 2006 was a unique accomplishment of Hezbollah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah. The victory made them emerged as heroes in the Arab World because it was the first militia to achieve a victory against the Israeli Forces.63 According to a statement made by Amer Sabaileh, a political analyst, «After the war in 2006, Hezbollah reached the peak of its popularity. Hezbollah had the consensus of people when it came to resistance, credibility and speaking the truth».64
For some countries Hezbollah is composed of two wings: the political wing and the military wing. Naim Qaseem, Hezbollah deputy secretary general argued in October 2012:
62
Federation of American Scientists https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44017.pdf, last access 04-23-2018.
63 Encyclopaedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hezbollah, last access 03-27-2018 64
Hu, Z. The history of Hezbollah, from Israel to Syria, «Al Jazeera», December 20th, 2016.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/history-hezbollah-israel-syria-161031053924273.html, last access 03-29-2018
24
We don't have a military wing and a political one; we don't have Hezbollah on one hand and the resistance party on the other. Every element of Hezbollah, from commanders to members as well as our various capabilities are in the service of the resistance, and we have nothing but the resistance as a priority.65
The UE currently makes difference between the political and military wings, nevertheless countries like U.S. does not differentiate between the two wings and ask the European countries to do the same.66
In March 2016, Saudi Arabia led Sunni Gulf Countries and the Arab League to declared Hezbollah as a terrorist organization67. «Hezbollah has been accused of carrying out a string of bombings and plots against Jewish and Israeli targets and is designated a terrorist organisation by Western states, Israel, Gulf Arab countries and the Arab League».68
Progressively, Hezbollah's position in the Arab world seems to be drawn against sectarian lines, basically Sunni against Shia.69The presence of Hezbollah fighting against the Sunni community in Syria was not well received by Sunni in Lebanon. «I say to all the honorable people, to the mujahedeen, to the heroes, I have always promised you a victory and now I pledge to you
65 Levit, M and Prohov, J (2013) There Is No Distinct Hezbollah 'Military Wing,' So Why Ban It?, Washington Institute, Washington. http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/there-is-no-distinct-hezbollah-military-wing-so-why-ban-it, last access 03-27-2018
66 The Daily Star, Hezbollah terrorism designation up to EU states: Mogherini.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Mar-22/442641-hezbollah-terrorism-designation-up-to-eu-states-mogherini.ashx, last access 03-27-2018
67
Al Jazeera and agencies. GCC declares Lebanon Hezbollah a ‘terrorist’ group, «Al Jazeera», March 2nd, 2016. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/gcc-declares-lebanon-hezbollah-terrorist-group-160302090712744.html, last access 03-27-2018
68
BBC News. Profile: Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10814698, last access 03-27-2018
69
Hu, Z. (2016) The history of Hezbollah, from Israel to Syria.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/history-hezbollah-israel-syria-161031053924273.html,
25
a new one. Syria is the backbone of the resistance; we will not let this bone break»70 Nasrallah said in his speech in television on May 25, 2013.
Just 12 hours after Nasrallah’s speech acknowledging their involvement in fighting Sunni rebels for control of the Syrian border town of
Qusair, one rocket struck a building in Shiyyah, a historically Christian town
but partly inhabited by Shias, while a second one hit close to the nearby Mar Mikhael Christian church.71
Despite its political power in Lebanon, Hezbollah has been dependent on the support it receives from Syria and Iran such as extensive material, financial, training, and logistical assistance.72 Its support for Syria's Shia Alawite president and alliance with Iran has also seen a deepening of hostility from Gulf Arab states, led by Iran's main regional rival, Saudi Arabia.73
Sunni-Shia violence increasingly spread across Syria’s borders during 2012 and 2013. Tensions have intensified as Lebanon’s Hezbollah has extended its incursions into Syria, helping the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gain an upper hand in the conflict.74
Hezbollah participated and continues to participate in ground operations alongside the Syrian military, especially in situations where its interests are directly threatened.75
Hezbollah participation in Syrian War increased since 2013.76 Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri said Hezbollah must stop being in the
70 Almanar TV. http://archive.almanar.com.lb/english/article.php?id=95030, last access 04-16-2018. 71
Ibidem 72
Sullivan, M (2014) Hezbollah in Syria, Middle East Security Report 19, Institute for the Study of War, Washington. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hezbollah_Sullivan_FINAL.pdf, last access 03-27-2018
73
BBC News (2016). http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10814698, last access 03-29-2018 74
Youngs. R, From Transformation to Mediation: The Arab Spring Reframed, p. 10. 75
Public Intelligence.Threat Tactics Report: Syria, United States Army Training and doctrine command.https://info.publicintelligence.net/USArmy-SyriaThreats.pdf, last access 03-29-2018
26
middle of regional conflicts, saying he postponed his resignation of October 2017 to discuss ways to disassociate Lebanon from was in neighbouring countries.77
Russia
Russia insists on the territorial unity of Syria and of Iraq as well where recently Russia refused to support the independence for Iraqi Kurdistan.
Russia for decades had relationships with the Kurdish in Middle East. It seems that it is not a problem for Russia that is used to balancing its relations with the Kurds and with their Arab, Turkish, and Iranian neighbors. It is Russia’s national interest in maintaining contacts with all the relevant players that will win out.78
After the war is over and with the beginning of the rebuilding of Syria, Russia realizes that other actors will arise, such as Europe, Japan or China. Moscow will seek to partner with them to secure a piece of the lucrative reconstruction effort, which will be financed by international donors.79 One of the main interests of Russia presence in Syria is to secure its military bases in Tartus and facilitate the access to the Mediterranean and other countries in the Asia region.80
According to Anna Borshchevskaya in a testimony submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa:
76
Filkins, D. Hezbollah Widens the Syrian War, «The New Yorker», May 26th, 2013.
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/hezbollah-widens-the-syrian-war, last access 03-29-2018.
77 Al Jazeera News. Hariri: Hezbollah's regional positions 'unacceptable'.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/hariri-hezbollah-regional-positions-unacceptable-171126081552149.html, last access 03-29-2018.
78
Trenin, D. (2017), Putin’s plan for Syria: How Russia wants to end the war. Foreign Affairs Magazine.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-12-13/putins-plan-syria, last access 03-29-2018 79
Ibid
80 Reuters.
27
Vladimir Putin himself wanted to restore Russia's superpower status. He wanted the United States to recognize Russia as an equal without which Washington could make no major international decision. In the Middle East, he did so by regaining political, diplomatic, and economic influence, using increased cooperation and diplomatic exchanges, arms and energy sales, and provision of high-technology goods such as nuclear reactors.81
United States
Since the beginning of the war the position of the United States was clear. In August 2011 President Barack Obama called Bashar al-Assad to resign after an estimate of more than 2.000 Syrian civilians killed in five months of crackdown.
These violations of the universal rights of the Syrian people have revealed to Syria, the region, and the world the Assad government’s flagrant disrespect for the dignity of the Syria people.
The future of Syria must be determined by its people, but President Bashar al-Assad is standing in their way. His calls for dialogue and reform have rung hollow while he is imprisoning, torturing, and slaughtering his own people. We have consistently said that President Assad must lead a democratic transition or get out of the way. He has not led. For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for President Assad to step aside.
As a part of that effort, my Administration is announcing unprecedented sanctions to deepen the financial isolation of the Assad regime and further disrupt its ability to finance a campaign of violence against the Syrian people.
I have signed a new Executive Order requiring the immediate freeze of all assets of the Government of Syria subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibiting U.S. persons from engaging in any transaction involving the Government of Syria. This E.O. also bans U.S. imports of Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products; prohibits U.S. persons from having any dealings in or related to Syria’s petroleum or petroleum products; and prohibits U.S persons from operating or investing in Syria. We expect today’s actions to be amplified by others.82
81
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Russia's Strategic Objectives in the Middle East and
North Africa
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/BorshchevskayaTestimony2017 0615.pdf, last access 04-02-2018.
82
Obama White House Archives.
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/08/18/president-obama-future-syria-must-be-determined-its-people-president-bashar-al-assad, last access 04-03-2018.
28
The U.S. has presented to the world their ideas for which the government of Damascus was to be replaced by a government led by armed militia that the United States trained before the conflict and who armed and financed seven years for its entire course.
According a publication of RAND Corporation: «The traditional definition of U.S. interests in the Middle East has centred on ensuring the free flow of natural resources and maintaining relationships with key allies and protecting them from external threats, in part to ensure access for U.S. military operations».83
In 2013, The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) implemented with the United States Secretary of State, John Kerry, and the Russian Foreign Minister, Serghei Lavrov, an agreement about chemical weapons. The Syrian government had seven days to list the type of chemical weapons they had and the sites in which they were kept and produced. The US-Russian agreement was established in a UN Security Council resolution on 27th September:
Deeply outraged by the use of chemical weapons on 21 August in a Damascus suburb, as concluded by a United Nations investigation team, the Security Council this evening endorsed the expeditious destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons programme, with inspections to begin by 1 October, and agreed that in the event of non-compliance, it would impose “Chapter VII” measures.
Unanimously adopting resolution 2118 (2013) in a fast-breaking evening meeting, the Council determined that the use of chemical weapons anywhere constituted a threat to international peace and security, and called for the full implementation of the 27 September decision of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which contains special procedures for the expeditious and verifiable destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons.
Specifically, the Council prohibited Syria from using, developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, stockpiling or retaining chemical weapons, or transferring them
83 Mueller, K. Wasser, B. Martini, J. Watts, S. (2017) U.S. Strategic Interests in the Middle East and
implications of the Army, RAND Corporation. P.2.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE265/RAND_PE265.pdf, last access 04-04-2018
29
to other States or non-State actors, and underscored also that no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer such weapons.84
At the beginning of 2017, the Trump administration considered that Bashar al-Assad was elected by his citizens and that he was therefore in the power in a legitimate way. Besides, on March 30, 2017, the United States ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, even confirmed that the overthrow of the Syrian president was not a priority for the current US government.85 However in April 2017 after suspected chemical attack in Khan Sheikhoun, President Trump and his Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, considered that Assad’s regime was responsible for the attack:
I think what happened in Syria is a disgrace to humanity. He's there, and I guess he's running things, so something should happen. I think was Assad did is terrible. I think what happened in Syria is one of the truly egregious crimes. And it should not have happened, and it should not be allowed to happen.
These heinous actions by the Assad regime cannot be tolerated. The United States stands with our allies across the globe to condemn this horrific attack and all other horrific attacks, for that matter.86
Vladimir Putin rejected the accusations of the use of chemical weapons by Bashar al-Assad, and asked for an investigation before blaming the Syrian regime. Additionally he argued that he will continue supporting Assad regime and widening the gap between Moscow and the president of the United States.87
84
United Nations. https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11135.doc.htm, last access 04-03-2018. 85
Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/03/nikki-haley-bashar-al-assad-syria-170331005600046.html, last access 04-04-2018.
86
Bash, D. Herb, J. Starr, B. Diamond, J. Trump on Syria's Assad: 'Something should happen', «CNN», April 7th, 2017. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/06/politics/donald-trump-syria-options/index.html, last access 04-04-2018
87
Patel-Carstairs, S. US planning more missile strikes in Syria claims Putin, «Sky News», April 11th, 2017 https://news.sky.com/story/us-is-planning-attacks-on-damascus-to-blame-assad-claims-putin-10833716, last access 04-04-2018.
30
On April 6, 2017 for the first time since the civil war started in 2011, the United States targeted a Syrian Regime airfield.
In President Trump speech he said: «Tonight I ordered a targeted military strike on the airfield in Syria from where the chemical attack was launched. It is in this vital national security interest of the United States: to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons».88
In February 2018, doctors of Ghouta Oriental reported that the area suffered a chemical attack because of the symptoms of the people that matched with exposure to chlorine gas.89
As noted above, Assad’s regime was supposed to dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal, but because of their diverse uses the chlorine was not included.90 One of the U.S. disarmament official affirmed that: «Russia had violated its commitments as guarantor of the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile and preventing the Assad government from using them».91
U.S continues as an important external power involved in the region, but with the difference that nowadays it faces a region in which not just local actors but long-established partners, are defining their own national and economic interests in ways that usually diverge from those of the U.S.92
88 NBC News.
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-launches-missiles-syrian-base-after-chemical-weapons-attack-n743636, last access 04-04-2018.
89 Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-chemicalweapons/exclusive-chemical-weapons-watchdog-investigates-ghouta-attacks-sources-idUSKCN1GB12O, last access 04-03-2018.
90 Shaheen, K. Russia 'on wrong side of history' over Syria chemical weapons – US, «The Guardian», February 28,2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/28/russia-on-wrong-side-of-history-over-syria-chemical-weapons-us, last access 04-03-2018.
91 ibidem
92 Mueller, K. Wasser, B. Martini, J. Watts, S. (2017) U.S. Strategic Interests in the Middle East and
implications of the Army, RAND Corporation. P.5.
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE265/RAND_PE265.pdf, last access 04-02-2018
31
1.3. Political Negotiations
Even in times when Syria seems to be in the background of global attention, we cannot forget that it continues to suffer from one of the worst emergency situations on the world. Its pacification is essential to end the worst humanitarian crisis since the end of the Second World War.
Russia, United States, Turkey and Iran seem to have their own agendas for Syria, which not only they do not coincide, but often crash with the other actors’ agenda as well contributing to complicate the situation on the ground and every negotiation process: «Throughout the war, peace talks have focused on a government of unity, but no bilateral actors have seriously supported that idea. This has left the regime, the opposition, and a shifting configuration of international actors to battle over territory».93
1.3.1 Geneva Process
It is the longest running and legitimate U.N. Syrian peace process.94 Since 2012, after a failure for a ceasefire and demilitarization of the Syrian War, Syria’s government and opposition have participated in U.N. negotiations under the framework of the Geneva Communiqué. One of the results of the I Conference was seeking the formation of a power-sharing government that would include the regime and the opposition.95
The II Conference in 2014 quickly failed owing to the lack of consensus in which groups to consider the opposition and also because of the weak relationship between U.S and the currently Assad regime.
93 Brookings. 7 years into the Syrian war, is there a way out?.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/03/16/7-years-into-the-syrian-war-is-there-a-way-out/, last access 04-02-2018. 94 ibidem
