Muslims in Europe : a new identity for Islam

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EU I W orking Paper E C S N o. 93/1

M uslims in Europe: A new Identity for Islam

Michael King

European University Institute, Florence

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EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY IN STITU TE, FLO R EN C E EUROPEAN CULTURE RESEARCH CENTRE

EUI Working Paper ECS No. 93/1

Muslims in Europe: A new Identity for Islam MICHAEL KING

BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)

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No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form without permission of the author.

Printed in Italy in September 1993 European University Institute

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Italy © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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-M uslim s in E urop e; A new Id e n tity fo r Islam By M ichael KING

SUMMARY

This p a p e r arose out of ideas generated in the E.U.I. W orkshop on M uslim F am ilies in Europe which took place in October 1992. The presence in E uropean countries of several million M uslim s, m ost of whom have arrived during the last th irty years from countries where social life is organized in ways which accommodate Islam as the p red o m in an t, if th e not th e official state, religion ra ise s serious questions of ad ap tation . W hat is considered h ere a re two such processes of adaptation. The first is th e way th a t th e religion of Islam , w hen confronted w ith a secular social environm ent w here the values of ration ality and individualism prevail, is forced to produce social identities for its adherents which reduce in importance (or even deny) any notion of faith as offering a uniquely religious, sp iritu al experience. The production of th e concept of 'The M uslim Fam ily' is referred to as an exam ple of th is first process of secularization. Secondly, th e p a p e r d em onstrates how Islam is transform ed into som ething other th a n religion when it enters into the sem antic realm of and is reconstructed by other social system s, such as law, politics and health.

The pap er draw s upon sociological theories which em phasise both the evolutionary n a tu re of society, the function of social system s and the processes th rough which knowledge and reality are constructed. It pays p a rticu la r atten tio n to th e ideas of N iklas L uhm ann as set out in his book, F unktion der Religion. These theoretical concepts are applied to th e evolution of Islam as it enters the modern world.

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-M uslim s in E u ro p e: A new Id e n tity fo r Is la m 1 By M ichael KING

The essence o f the Qur'anic and the prophetic teaching is based upon w illingness to abandon the world a nd all attachm ent to it and, indeed, to experience 'death' before biological death. The Prophet said: "Die before you die", m eaning transcend all sense and reason.

Shaykh Fadhlalla Haeri, The Elements o f Islam (1992) INTRODUCTION

The original idea of th is paper on the complex subject of law and religious id e n tity arose from th e pap ers and discussions a t th e W orkshop last October on M uslim Fam ilies in Europe, which I am now in th e process of editing for publication2. While th e W orkshop w as d e lib e ra tely narro w in its scope and u n th e o re tic a l in its approach, it did raise several difficult issues of a g eneral n a tu re concerning religious identity in m odern W estern societies and the e n c o u n te rs b etw een tra d itio n a l relig io n s an d m o d ern social in stitu tio n s, such as law. In purely practical term s the very recent phenom enon of over five million M uslims moving to and settlin g in Europe h as already caused serious problems for W estern liberalism as the am bivalent response to the Rushdie affair has dem onstrated. If one sees the encounter between Islam and th e W est as a b a ttle betw een two irreconcilable value systems, it is difficult to u nderstan d how M uslims would be able to exist as M uslim s’ in W estern countries w ithout building an im penetrable wall around them selves and th eir beliefs. Indeed th ere appears to be a paradox in very existence of large num b ers of people in Europe who, on the one h and , seem increasingly to prefer to em phasise the cultural/religious identity of Islam over nation al or linguistic identities and, on th e other hand, seem able for th e m ost p a rt to integrate them selves successfully into E uropean society. This should lead us to question the ra th e r simple idea of 'two worlds' a t le a st as a model for an alyzing w h a t is happening to M uslims and Islam in Europe.

* I am especially grateful to the European Commission and lo the European Culture Research Centre at the EUI., Florence, whose generosity made this research possible. I should also like to thank Uli D’Oliveira, Emile Noël. Anton Schütz and Gunther Teubner for their suport and encouragement.

~ A book based on the Workshop proceedings will be published by Grey Seal Publications in 1994. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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-The problem sta rts with the attem pts by social theorists to construct a unitary , comprehensive notion of European or w estern Society and to juxtapose th is w ith another unitary and comprehensive construction called, 'Islam'. This is not to say th a t these ’two worlds' do not exist, b u t r a th e r th a t such an approach cannot account for th e dynam ic n a tu re of social in stitu tio n s and social re la tio n s and it is th is dynam ism which is of vital im portance if we are to u n d e rsta n d w hat is happening to the Islamic identity. It is certainly tru e th a t m odern w estern society is characterised by secularism w ith its em phasis on rationality, hum anism , personal responsibility and individualism and th a t these attrib u tes pervade all areas of social life, b u t w ithin th is generalized philosophical frame exist several different social m eaning system s all involved in interpreting, in m aking sense of the chaos or 'noise' of th e social world. In modern societies these m eaning system s have developed into separate, functionally-specific in stitutio ns of, for example, science, economics, law, health, politics and religion. This is not simply a m atter of each explaining the social world in th eir own term s or th e ir different perspectives on social phenom ena. R ath er each can be seen as constructing its own version of reality according to its own procedures for tru th validation. This fragm ented epistemic world of modern societies contrasts w ith traditional societies w here a single version of tr u th and reality ten d s to pervade all a re a s of know ledge an d w here social d ivisions te n d to be b a sed on s tra tific a tio n such as race and class r a th e r th a n functio ns [Luhmann,1986,p.5ffl

In th is paper I first w ant to examine th e idea of a d istinct M uslim religious id entity, which w as claimed by several sp eak ers a t the Florence W orkshop and emerges in m any of th e contributions to the collection of Workshop papers. Let me take as my sta rtin g point the contrast betw een th e fixed and unchanging notion of Islam , as both a religious faith and a code of conduct covering alm ost every aspect of private and public life, th a t was presented by Abdel H am id Chirane and M anazir A hsan and by Lawrence Rosen's anticipation of the em ergence of 'a distinctive E uropean M uslim culture'. B oth these positions have th eir resonances in the idea of an Islamic identity. On the one han d th ere is the tra d itio n alist view which would accept as M uslim s only those who had been brought up in th e fa ith or had openly recognized God's u n iq u en e ss and M oham m ed as his m essenger. It would reject as M uslim all those who had renounced or abandoned th e ir faith or forfeited th eir right to be called 'Muslim' th ro u g h m arry in g a non-believer or living th e ir lives in clear contradiction of M uslim law. On the other, th ere exists a very different notion of a Muslim identity where Islam and 'being M uslim ’ rep re sen t an aspect of 'self' for all those rational, free individuals who live th e ir lives in th e modern, secular world. H ere religious

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identity does not depend upon recognition by others or conformity to rules im posed by some extern al authority; it is r a th e r som ething accepted and projected by the individual. Thus M uslim women who m arry non-M uslim m en m ay continue to refer to th em selves as M uslim and to expect others (except the most orthodox M uslims) to accept th is p a rt of their identity.

It was such ambivalences in th e definitions of personal identity and social id en tity and th e relations between th e two th a t led me to re exam ine th e idea of religious id en tity as a process of evolution u n d e rta k e n by religion itself, ra th e r th a n as m erely an artefact of individual or social discourses. T hat th is evolutionary process is determ ined by th e social environm ent (including people) in which and upon which religion has to operate is the major factor in deciding w hat identities religion produces for its adherents and for society and its sub-systems.

My p a p e r tra c es th is qu est for a way of u n d e rsta n d in g religious identity first by exam ining briefly the modern notion of identity, then by analyzing in much more detail the identity th a t religious system s construct for them selves in response to societal problems. I take the exam ple of Islam , not because it is in any way unique am ong th e world's religions, b u t because the abru p tn ess of its tra n sp o rta tio n into m odern W estern societies m akes its evolution all th e more dram atic an d sudden and all th e more in terestin g for s tu d e n ts of religion and religious identity. The section headings are

Identity in the Modern World The social Identity of Religion

The Evolution of the Religious Identity of Islam Religion in Modern Society

Religion and the Family

The Construction of Religion as a Secular Identity Islam and Modern Law

The Reconstruction of religion within Religion

ID E N T IT Y IN TH E M O D E R N W O R LD

1. Generally, w ithin modern, secular societies 'an identity' is seen as som ething which allows one to presen t oneself as a m em ber of a socially recognized group, w heth er religious, cultu ral, national or political. It is often seen as an essential aspect of the social being. Having a consistent identity, a knowledge of who you are and where you stan d in relation to different social groups has been seen on the one hand as a positive attribute, essential for facilitating socialization

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-and integration w ithin through the internalization of 'the other' -and the in te rn al represen tation of 'the self as seen by th e o th er [Mead 1934]. M oreover, the belief th a t others th in k and act like you, sharing your beliefs and attitu d es also has a positive role to play in prom oting self-confidence, self-aw areness and self-fulfilm ent. A person w ithout such a clear identity is often p resen ted in m odern W estern culture as l'étranger, the outsider, lacking any clear sense of 'self, u n a tta ch e d to any social group, alienated from everyone and everything in the social world where he or she exists.

However, th is is an im portant aspect of the modern notion of identity which contrasts m arkedly w ith traditional societies w here identities were and are largely acquired through b irth (family, n atio nal and regional) and m ay be changed only in exceptional circum stances. In the m odern world not only may they be selected by a d u lts during th e ir lifetim e, b ut changing fundam ental aspects of th e self one presents to th e external worlds is quite common place. A person may, for exam ple, change th e ir nam e, chose to become th e citizen of a n o th er country, u n d ertak e a religious conversion or a sex-change operation. A lthough there may be questions as to how 'real' such changes are, for all official purposes a person may in sist upon his or h e r a cq u ired id e n tity by, for exam ple, d e m a n d in g rig h ts of citizenship or insisting th a t his/her children attend a religious school. Increasingly, a 'h ealth y society' is seen as one w here individual rights are respected, including the right to make choices concerning th e th ey w a n t to be described by others, a t le a s t in term s of natio n ality , religion and gender. In Anglo-Saxon countries th is freedom is even being extended to children, who m ay now, in certain circum stances, choose to change th e ir fam ily identity, th a t is the family with whom they identify.

2. Conversely, identities which are imposed upon a person w ithout his/her consent and form the basis for differentiation betw een people and for distrib uting resources are seen, as a denial of h u m an rights. An 'unhealthy society’, such as existed in South Africa, therefore, is one w hich uses a ttrib u te d id en tity as a m eans of denying to individual the freedom to choose th eir self-identity. W here, those features of th e individual which are im m utable or extrem ely difficult to change, such as skin colour, certain physical featu res associated w ith ethn ic or racial groups or gender are, selected for special a tte n tio n by governm ents as defining th e person, lib eral and e g alitarian political m ovem ents are likely to emerge dem anding an end to such discrim ination and stratification along racial or ethnic lines and the forced imposition of identities

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-3. In th e m odern world an individual m ay sim ultaneously have more th a n one identity, provided th a t these identities are compatible and provide th a t person w ith both a coherent notion of a unified self and an a tta c h m e n t to one or more e x te rn al group w hich a re also compatible. Problems arise when the 'self is fractured into different belonging identities to the point where the individual does not know w here he or she really belongs or who he or she really is. This is described as an ’identity conflict' or 'an identity crisis'. There are also d a n g e rs lu rk in g w here an p erso n belongs to two or m ore incom patible groups giving rise to 'conflicts of loyalty'. Som etimes these two forms of conflict are seen as afflicting one heroic individual who is 'a t w ar w ith him or herself and a t the same tim e being forced to b e tra y one of th e groups to which he or she belongs. These conflicts ten d to excite considerable interest. T.E. Lawrence is an example of archetypal modern hero in conflict with himself, or ra th e r w ith his two identities. After leading th e Arab Revolt a g ain st th e T urks in N orth Africa, while dressed as a Bedouin and for several years enduring a nomadic existence in th e desert, Lawrence returned to E ngland. T here, he endured th e b etray al of his Arab allies abando ned by th e B ritish G overnm ent for reasons of political expediency. He also experienced a profound crisis of identity, when he discovered the Bedouin identity th a t he had chosen to adopt, had soured his belief in E nglish society and its values. W hat m akes Lawrence in terestin g from our perspective is not so m uch the way th a t his heroic exploits and su b seq u en t r e tre a t from public life succeeded in capturing the im agination of m any millions of people in the W estern world, b u t the fact th a t Lawrence saw him self and was portrayed by his several biographers as a m an caught betw een two worlds.

... th e effort for th ese years to live in the dress of A rabs and im itate th e ir m ental foundation, quitted me of my English self, and let me look a t th e W est and its conventions w ith new eyes: they destroyed it all for me. At the sam e tim e I could not sincerely take on th e Arab skin: it was an affectation only. Easily was a m an made an infidel, b u t hardly m ight he be converted to another faith. I had dropped one form and not ta k en the other ... (Lawrence, p.31-2)

Lawrence w as seen as an individual caught in th e 'no m an's lan d ’ between two incompatible identities, two perm anent insurm ountable barriers, which denied any possibility of movement eith er forward or backward. His subsequent attem p t to bury him self and his p a st by becoming Air craftsm an Shaw and Private Ross were seen th e only escape route open to him. Yet th ere is also a sense in which the Lawrence story can be seen as a modern parable dem onstrating the price to be paid when an individual steps beyond boundary of those identities th a t were acceptable by his society. In B ritish society of the

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-7-1920s the identity of an Englishm an in an 'Arab skin' clearly was not acceptable, even as a tran sitio n al identity. It w as only valid as a disguise, a false identity, taken on with the sole purpose of outw itting an enemy.

4. A lthough th e psychological lite ra tu re on social id e n tity h a s tradition ally been concerned w ith the way th a t in d iv id u a ls come to see them selves as belonging to specific social groups, more recently, both psychologists and sociologists have w ritten about th e way in which people construct th eir own social worlds and them selves, th eir perso n al id en tity , w ith in th a t world. Y et th is id e n tity is not constructed from th in air. There m ust be a sense in which it was its ex isten ce p re -d a te s any ind iv id u al c o n s tru c tio n 1. As Thom as Luckm ann, one of th e early exponents w ith P e te r B erger of th e co n stru c tiv ist school of th e sociology of knowledge [B erger and Luckm ann, 1967] explains,

Except for bodily functions, lusts, and pains, the individual does not experience him self directly; w hat he does experience directly is a structured and changing environment...

P e rso n a l id e n tity is in te r subjective and h a s a s itu a tio n a l biographical dimension. [Luckmann, 1987 p.374]

Yet he th en goes on to tell us how

...One of th e m ost im p o rtan t characteristics in m odern societies is th e segm enting of th e to ta l stru c tu re into in stitu tio n a l dom ains which a re organized to m eet th e m ain req u irem en ts of se p a ra te functions... This m eans th a t th e norm s of behaviour in h e re n t in one system a t an y one tim e are not d irectly tra n sfe ra b le to o th e r com ponent system s. The s tru c tu re s of m ean in g belonging to different com ponent system s are not related to personal id en tities b u t to institutions (p.376)

In m odern societies social institutions are, according to Luckm ann somehow failing in th eir responsibility of producing th e conditions for the individual to construct a concept o f'self th a t serves to situ ate him or h e r in th e general social structure. As a result, people are seen as experiencing 'no common reality' and 'no socially produced stable social stru ctu re of personal identity', but are presented instead with several com peting, incom patible m eaning system s w ith no bridge betw een them and no arch to fram e them . According to Luckm ann, w hat th is m eans is th a t each person has to face up, in his or h e r own subjective an d p riv ate way (p.379), to th e ta s k of achieving for

1 Berger and Luckmann (1967) lell us that 'Identity is a phenomenon that emerges from the dialectic between individual and society', but that 'identity types ... are social products tout court', (p. 174)

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h im self an d h erself a 'stable, personal identity'. How we do th is, according to Luckm ann, is th en a m a tte r of personal choice. The individual will receive little help in th a t choice from the social world which he or she lives and works, because modern institutions produce role-perform ers valid only w ithin these system s of m eaning ra th e r th a n th e cohesive and com prehensive notion of 's e lf th a t w ere produced by traditional societies. On the other hand, it would appear th a t, according to th is account, in d iv id uals are free to choose w h atever id en tity pleases them and, in doing so, are presum ably allowed to fulfil th e ir own personal desires and am bitions and yet, th e absence of a 'total social stru ctu re' m akes th e exercise of this freedom em pty and m eaningless exercise.1

5. How are we to reconcile these different versions of th e identity problem ? Is it really the case th a t m odern society provides fixed points, beyond which individual identity cannot w ithout being forced beyond th e lim its of w hat is socially acceptable? If this is so, how is it possible th a t new id entities are constantly being produced in the m o dern w orld. F a r from being solid and fixed, th e b a rrie rs surrounding individual choices of identity appear to be in continual sta te of flux. A lternatively, are we to be left w ith L uckm ann's paradox of individuals who are free to 'be them selves' only to find th a t th e selves th a t they construct have no general social validity and only serve- them in narrow social situations. However, while Luckm ann's paradoxical state m ight tak e us closer to the subjective experience of life as lived, is it really the case th a t modern societies provide no generalized id entities leaving th e confused individual w ith no solution b u t to find a good psychoanalyst to help him to find out who he/she really is or can become? For th e purposes of this article I would not w ant to offer any definition of identity' other th an th a t of self-image. Instead, I would suggest th a t we can speak of the existence of an individual iden tity w herever th ere is conceptual notion available which allows a person to place him or herself w ithin the prevailing environm ent and to differentiate him or h erself from th a t environm ent. A social identity for our purposes will exist when such a notion is generally recognized within a specific society.

Identity and Religious Experience

In my discussion of religion I s ta rt from the assum ption th a t there exists a t bo th th e sociological and psychological levels some experience which is essentially religious. This does not m ean th a t the experience h as necessarily to be associated with the existence of a

* I would lake issue with Luckmann's denial of any 'stable structure ol personal identity' by arguing that the social production of the notion of 'the individual' provides just such a structure.

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-9-su perio r being, b u t ra th e r th a t it tran scen d s ra tio n a lity and the 'norm al' range of feelings and provides individuals and groups of people w ith th e sensation th a t they are engaged in a com m union eith er w ith th e ir own 'inner selves' or w ith some sp irit or existence beyond th e m aterial world in which they live out th e ir everyday lives. I am not saying th a t this experience is always interpreted socially in a conventionally religious way. As Aldous Huxley, Tim othy Leary, Ronald Laing and m any others have shown, it m ay be ta k e n as evidence of some sp irit or force quite rem ote from m onotheistic religion. Nor does the experience have to be accessible only through such form ally religious activities, as p raying, fastin g , c h a stity , w itnessing m iracles or, m artyrdom . However, it h a s u sually been religion w hich h a s been called upon to m ake sense of th e se tra n sc e n d e n ta l or sp iritu a l events and to give guidance on how experiences of 'oneness' and comm union w ith th e in n e r self or external being m ay be achieved by th e individual. It h as also been formal religious institutions which are called upon to decide w hether contingent experiences of this n atu re are or are not 'genuine'1. The acceptance by societies of the existence of religious experience is absolutely central to the development of religious dogmatics as is the notion th a t th is experience can only be achieved by following certain accepted paths. If this were not the case, th en religion would have no sep arate social identity; it would not be able to differentiate itself from law, m orality, politics, economics etc. For religious individuals and organizations, which inevitably engage in legal, m oral, political and economic activities, it is only the unquestioning acceptance of religious experience, the use of fa ith as th e u ltim a te legitim ator, which allows them to claim th a t th eir involvement in these activities is indeed ’religious'.

For M uslim s th e very m eaning of th e word, 'Islam ', s u b m is s io n rem inds them of th e fundam ental importance of faith. The verses of the K oran abound w ith references to the necessity of acceptance of God and God's word w ithout doubts and w ithout questioning and to th e fate th a t aw aits those who tu rn th e ir back on an unw avering belief in

God2-From th e perspective of th e sociology of social id entity production w h a t is p articu la rly in te restin g is th e guidance given in Islam ic

1 Bernard Shaw's play St. Joan offers an interesting debate on the legitimation of religious experience. Ultimately it is the Catholic Church, and not the pragmatic English army, which has formally to declare Joan's voices to be false.

2 See e.g. Koran, 6:137 10:17, 10:39. 15:2.

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-scriptures and com m entaries for M uslims to achieve a sta te of self- knowledge an d p u rity of h e a rt which denotes religious perfection th a t brings th e individual to sim ultaneous com m union w ith the inner-self and th e universe. As th e quotation a t the s ta r t of th is article indicates, w hat th is requires is a total denial of oneself as an individual, a m erging of oneself w ith th e universe, a d e a th before biological d eath, th e absence of any differentiation betw een th e self and th e environm ent.

T H E S O C IA L ID E N T IT Y O F R E L IG IO N

According to anthropological studies, in trad ition al societies it was religion w hich both provided th e individual w ith a generalized id entity and also lim ited severely the identities which anyone could le g itim a te ly ad o p t [M ol,1976]!. As one m ig h t expect social psychologists have tended to tu rn this round by presen ting religion as answ ering certain h um an needs relatin g to peoples fears and uncertainties and th e need to account for inexplicable events (See e.g. B atson, 1982). A num ber of sociologists, also influenced by both these lines of enquiry have tran sferred th is notion of need from the in d iv id u al to society by exam ining th e functions religion plays th ro u g h ritu a l, p ra y e r etc. in s tru c tu rin g people's lives and in legitim ating certain forms of behaviour, usually associated w ith the exercise of power [W eber,1963; Beckford,1982]. O thers, such as D u rk heim , have em phasised th e cohesive force of religion for individuals as well as for societies (See Pickering, 1984) or th e fit or non-fit between different religions and the needs of capitalist societies [W eber,1963]. Yet none of these approaches has been able to arrive a t a concept of religious identity which reconciles in a satisfactory m an n e r any notion of the evolution of religion in different social environm ents or any description of the ways in which the m eaning of religious identity may be transform ed by th e social system and social subsystem s which it encounters.

One way to deal w ith this problem of religious identity is to change the orientation of th e problematic away from the predicam ent of the individual. This is precisely w hat N iklas L uhm ann did when in his book, F u n k tio n der Religion [Luhm ann, 1984], he exam ined the issue of religious identity. Luhm ann refuses to accept the concept of the individual, th a t tran scend en tal subject of post-E nlightenm ent Europe, as th e s ta rtin g point for sociological enquiry. He sees identity as a problem not so much for the individual as for evolving 1 Hans Mol goes so far as to describe religion as the 'sacrilization of identity' (Moi, 1985] © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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-societies and social sub-systems. The identity problem for religion as a social subsystem concerns, for example, how to differentiate itself from other social subsystem s and a social environm ent which is in a continual sta te of change, while a t the sam e tim e influencing the environm ent in ways th a t will ensure its own survival and continued influence. The processes which evolve w ithin religious organizations to solve these problem will decide w hat form religions and religious identities take in different societies. This in tu rn will determ ine w hat possibilities are open for people living in th a t society to situ a te 'the self and in te rp re t th eir own behaviour and the behaviour of others. In th e rem ain d er of th is piece I shall a tte m p t to trace L uhm ann's ideas and to apply them to Islam and the identity problems it faces as a social subsystem in the modern world. By approaching the issue in th is w ay it should be possible to th ro w some lig h t on th e contradictions th a t seem to be implicit in th e notion of a E uropean Islam and more generally in the concept of a secularized religious identity.

Religion as a Social System of Communications

1. In order to understand Luhm ann's ideas on religious identity, it is necessary to exam ine briefly some of the concepts essen tial to his general theoretical approach to the social evolution of systems. In the first place Luhm ann sees society, not as a collection of h um an beings, b u t as comm unicative acts and social systems. They are, therefore, system s consisting, not of people, but of communications. Individuals have th e ir separate existence as psychic or personal system s, b u t for social system s they are p a rt of th e environm ent in which th e system operates and which it attem pts to influence by its comm unications. Since system s can consist only of com m unications th ro u g h which m eaning is generated, people affect system s only to th e ex ten t th a t th e ir com m unications (u tteran ces, acts, w ritings etc.) ta k e place w ithin and are th u s interpreted by these diverse m eaning system s. E ach of th e se system s is involved in a continuous process of in te rp re tin g or reconstructing th e social environm ent (including society and all its subsystem s) in ways which m ake sense on its own terms.

As a general rule, the success or failure of system s in differentiating them selves from th eir environm ent is crucial to the system s survival. This is achieved th rough th e process of reduction of com plexity by selectivity. The environm ent is always more complex th a t the system, giving rise to infinite possibilities for interpretation. Any particu lar subsystem , in o rder to produce and reproduce its own world of m eaning, m u st select from the environm ent those in p u ts which it will reconstruct on its own term s. As society becomes more (or less)

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-complex, so each sub-system is obliged to respond by producing more (or less) complex reconstructions of th a t society

This im position of selective m eanings of society w ithin different subsystem s occurs through a process of binary coding, for example, law ful/unlaw ful for law, power/no power for politics, profit/loss for economics, sick/healthy for h e a lth system s, true/false for science. M ean in g is produced th ro u g h th e affirm ation or n eg a tio n of s ta te m e n ts u sin g th is b in ary code. The fac t t h a t in any comm unicative exchange is accepted as offering th e possibility of an affirm atio n or a negation of a proposition as a basis for fu rth e r in te ra c tio n binds fu tu re exchanges to a p a rtic u la r system of interpretation . By producing m eaning for them selves and for th eir environm ent social system s are able sim ultaneously to evolve an autonom ous existence and to g u aran tee th e ir fu tu re w ithin th e ir social environm ent. For Luhm ann, therefore, it does not m ake any sociological sense to exam ine a religion except in the context of the social environm ent in which it exists. 'One cannot select an identity for a sy stem w ith o u t a t th e sam e tim e selecting a re le v a n t environm ent and vice versa' [Luhmann, 1984, p.48].

The in tro d u c tio n of w ritin g, and la te r p rin tin g , expanded th e possibilities for comm unication beyond face to face interaction and resu lted in th e developm ent of additional code m echanism s which L uhm ann calls sym bolically generalized com m unications m edia. These allow the transm ission of system s-generated m eanings across a wide variety of situations and for m any different communications. They include love, tru th , power, and faith.

An im portant aspect of social meaning systems is th eir self-referential n a tu re . B ecause th e code used by each system reco n stru cts the environm ent is unique, relatin g as it does to the system 's social function, all com m unications taking place w ithin the system m ust refer back to previous com m unications of th a t system . System s, therefore, reproduce them selves from th eir own elem ents. Moreover com m unications cannot pass directly from one system to another. System s m ay of course in terp ret (reconstruct) th e sam e social event in th e ir own p articu lar ways, but any communications between them concerning th is event m ust take the form of an interference, th a t is, of one system reconstructing the other's communications in its own terms.

2. Applying this general theory specifically to religion as a social system , th e ta s k of religion is th e n to c o n stru c t th e social environm ent in religious term s, providing its own in terp retatio n of the social environ m ent in which it exists. As P e te r Beyer, th e

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-tra n s la to r of one of th e ch a p te rs of L u h m an n 's F u n k tio n der Religion, - Religiose Dogmatik und gesellschaft Evolution - w rites in his explanatory introduction,

It is not sim ply a question of accommodation by religion to m odern society; i t is also a q u estio n of re fo rm u la tin g th e com plete system /environm ent relation from the perspective of religion [Beyer, 1984, p.xix]

Religion, therefore, cannot produce an yth ing oth er th a n religious com m unications, and is program m ed to reconstruct legal, political, scientific etc. communications in religious term s. This does not mean, of course, th a t every tim e a religious cleric speaks, he or she is u tte rin g a religious com m unication or th a t religious lea d e rs or organizations never become involved in political or economic m atters. Indeed, religious organizations and leaders m ay apply th e linguistic codes of other social system s to them selves and th e ir own operations. This, as we shall see, is one aspect of secularization.

3. Social theorists who wish to understand religion as a social system m u st not simply reduce it to the state of a superstition or a collection of rituals; they need to examine it on its own term s, i.e. as religion. In th e sam e way, they should not proceed by im posing sociological, psychological or political definitions upon it, since to do so is to deny th e existence of religion as having m eaning for itself. M uch of L uhm ann's account, then , is concerned w ith the problem s faced by religious system s, notably C hristianity, in differentiating itself from th e enviro nm ent of m odern societies and in reco n stru ctin g th is environm ent in term s which sim ultaneously m ake sense for religion and allow religion to influence th a t environm ent in ways t h a t will ensure its own reproduction. Indeed, much of L uhm ann's analysis is alm ost theological in its concern to u n d e rsta n d such controversial issu es as th e evidence for God's existence and th e v a lid ity of revelationary claims.

4. At th e sam e tim e, it is not sufficient for social theo rists to confine th e ir analysis to the theological level. They m ust be sim ultaneously aw are of th e system ic n a tu re of religion and of th e functions it perform s for society. A lthough L u h m an n is unw illing to lim it relig io n ’s fun ction s by describing th em in any com prehensive m anner, he deals specifically w ith one p articu lar function; th is is to relieve society of its contingency problem s caused in p a rtic u la r by disap p o in tm en ts and unfulfilled expectations by ’m anaging th e inevitability of contingency' [Beyer, 1984, p.xxxxiv]1. Contingencies

1 A recent example would be Sadam Hussein’s use of the idea that Iraq was engaged in a jihad or holy war against the West during the Gulf War, which

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-give rise to a wide range of possible explanations including those th a t m ay be dam aging to the continuance of the social system. Although re lig io n m ay n o t alw ays be able to reliev e a n x ie ty and disappointm ent and explain the unexpected, it should a t least be able to in te rp re t th em in ways which m ake them appear determ inable or a t lea st provide some way of u nd erstanding th eir indeterm inability. As Luhm ann states,

This functional w ay of conceiving religion goes beyond th e fam iliar controversy as to w hether religion relieves anxiety and un certain ty or w h eth er it generates them to begin with. Both are in a certain sense correct. Religion reformulates the conditions for insecurity. It thereby m akes an increase in acceptable insecurity possible. ( 1984, p.8 italics added)

The problem of indeterm inacy is th u s sacrilized. Exam ples of this process are th e creation of taboos of 'weak points in th e social order, of transitions, ... of anomalies.' (p.9) The issue of how th is function of transform ing indeterm inate complexity into d eterm inate complexity is to be perform ed, L uhm ann adm its, is too ab stract and general a concept to tell, us m uch about the variety of religions or the lim its to the variatio n s th a t can exist. As we have seen, L uhm ann does not subscribe to the view th a t one can characterize religion by reference to a single social function. In stead he proposes a system s-theory analysis which adm its th e possibility th a t religion, like every other social system , including society, has more th a n one problem to solve and m u st therefore fulfil more th a n one function. Any theory of functional system s, he argues, 'm ust go beyond th e mere cataloguing of functions and dysfunctions' (p.12) to look, for example, a t problems of processing information, problems of representing the world and the im m ediate social environm ent, problems of differentiation of itself from other system s and from the environment, problems w ith the use of th e m edium of faith. All these need to be considered in any analysis of religious dogmatics and the evolution of religious identity w ithin different social environments.

Th e e v o l u t i o n o f t h e r e l i g i o u s i d e n t i t y o f Is l a m In th is section we shall look briefly a t some of th e dogmas, beliefs and practices of Islam , not as cultural curiosities, b ut as illustration s of the way th a t Islam as a religious m eaning system has throughout history developed w ithin changing social environm ents. Approaching allowed him, at least rhetorically, to turn a crushins defeat into a moral victory by claiming that God’s will would prevail and His enemies would ultimately be defeated. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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-Islam in th is way should allow us to understan d w ith g rea ter clarity both th e general relationship of religion to society and th e specific n atu re of M uslim identity. It should th en be possible to throw some light on th e problem s currently faced by Islam in Europe, uprooted as it has been from those countries where it is th e official religion and h avin g to confront th e secular societal env ironm ents of m odern W estern states.

1. Revelation: Islam may be described as a revelationary religion. Belief in the Koran, the sacred book is one of the five Articles of F aith for M uslim s. According to Islam ic dogma, the com m unication of revelatory 'Books' to Moses, David Jesu s and M oham m ed are the sum m ation of the intervention of divine grace in favour of h um an ity [Jomier, 1988, p.54]. For religious dogmatics this notion of revelation has distinct advantages. It allows the religion to deal w ith th e issue of tim e in a non-linear form. The Books were not w ritte n by th e Prophets. They were dictated by God. They do not belong to any particu lar epoch or culture, as they have been tra n sm itte d by God to th e Prophets. Only the date of th eir transm ission, not th e date of th e ir authorship are interpreted as historical events. They are of no time, b u t are for all times.

According to Luhm ann, the dogma of revelation serves to co-ordinate generalization of th e religion.

It com bines ( D a universally available authorship (God) w ith (2) w idely applicable an d interpretable contents whose ratio n ality and in te rp re tab ility are guaranteed, and (3) w ith th e actual appearance of a possibility in the form (4) of a particular historical event w hich is (5) im m ediately clear and which cannot be changed by any given society, because it is historically unique. Instead it is subject only to a theological a d m in istra tio n of dogmas [L uhm ann, 1984, p.90] (emphasis in original)

This discovery of a body of religious dogm atics w hich have both universal relevance and specific jurisdiction. The fact th a t they are rev e latio n s from a su p er-h u m an being m akes n eg ation w ith in Islam ic dogm atics impossible. The only way in w hich Islam can respond to pressure from the environm ent is by re-interpretation. In this respect the m eaning system is entirely closed and self-referential. Moreover th e fact th a t th is rein terp retatio n is placed firm ly in the hands of theological jurisdiction ensures continuity and perpetuation. In th e case of Islam th e revelation of th e K oran to M oham m ed provides additional scope for generalization. Previous revelations, according to Islam ic dogm atics, had been m ade by God w ith the intention th a t the Envoys/Prophets would be dispatched to specific

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-people th a t were m ade to a specific -people, th e C hildren of Israel. M ohammed was unique in th a t he was sent on a world mission. For the purposes of conversion, therefore, the boundaries betw een Islam and society are easily crossed. It requires only a public declaration of belief, 7 confirm th a t there is no god other than God (Allah) and, that M oham m ed is the Messenger o f God'. This allows for conversion of non-believers which involves no initiation rites or ex am inations1. At the sam e tim e it is essential for the preservation of the identity of Islam th a t th e notion of revelation - th a t th e Koran was dictated to M oham m ed by the Angel Gabriel to whom it had be given by God, H im self - is k ep t constantly in th e forefront of belief. This accounts for th e need for c o n sta n t rep etitio n of th e u n iq u en e ss of th e revelation. Hence the five daily prayers.

Finally, th e existence of a revelatory Book m akes possible the kind of b inary decision of th e acceptability/non-acceptability, of different form s of behaviour and validity/invalidity of different Koranic and S h a ri'a in te rp re ta tio n s , th a t L uhm ann m ain ta in s is of 'c e n tra l significance' for th e organization of the religious system as a church or social in s titu tio n (p .90). How ever, d esp ite th e claim of fu n d am e n ta lists th a t the Koran rep resents a 'constitution for the u n iv erse' [Jom ier, 1988, p.61], in re a lity th e com m andm ents contained in th e K oran are few and often im precise. For Islam , therefore, th e revelatory Book is the ultim ate legitim ator of w hat has subsequently become known as Islamic law ra th e r th a n being the source of all legal knowledge. This has enabled religion to keep a close control over the developm ent of law by ensuring th a t Islam ic law cannot go beyond certain lim its and so cannot itse lf become a closed m eaning system. Although historically th is has ensured the su rvival of Islam ic law, it h a s also m ean t th a t even in Islam ic countries it has increasingly been forced to accept the im position of secular law alongside its own jurisdiction. Moreover, this jurisdiction has itself been increasingly restricted to family, private law m atters. This area of law, relating to the personal sta tu s of m en and women and th e ir relationships with one another w ithin and outside m arriage and the control each respectively organizes over th e ir children has come to rep resen t for several 'Islamic states' the essence of Islamic law. Indeed, recently th e symbolic dem arcation of M uslim /non- M uslim h as tended to be organized around these rules of personal s ta tu s derived from Koranic exegesis. While w ithin the political and econom ic sy ste m s of M uslim c o u n trie s th e K o ran and its interpretatio n is seen as having little relevance to daily decisions, it is of th e highest im portance to the way in which fam ilies are organized 1 According to Manazir Ahsan, Ihe Director General of the Islamic Foundation. U.K. several thousand native Brilains have converted lo Islam.

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-and especially th e roles for men -and women -and th eir power relations within families.

2. The C reation a n d D estruction o f the W orld: According to a system s functional analysis, religions were able to deal w ith society's problem of causality, only after they had constructed a concept of time as

'a m eaningful relationship between tem porally d ista n t events of the p a s t an d fu tu re . It m u st also be seen as th e space in w hich com m unication develops. T h a t is, it m u st be seen historically. For th is way of thinking, history is the history of decisions to w hich God responds accordingly. It is reflected as dialogue with God.' [Luhm ann, 1984, p.86]

In C h ristianity, Judaism and Islam, therefore, tim e came to be seen both as an e te rn a l presen t, th e continuing act of giving life to individuals, between two fixed points, the creation and destruction of the world. A causal schema could th u s be seen to exist for all events in th e social world. At a second level, th e changing of p a s t into future implicit in The Judgem ent Day allowed for the existence of a notion of progression (p.67)

Islam accepts th e version of creation set out in G enesis, and the K oran places m uch em phasis on the fact th a t hum ankind is God’s creation. 'It is he who has created you from clay. He h a s decreed a term for you in th is world and ano ther in th e next'. (K oran 6:2). Creation is the one external proof of God’s existence and His powers. The K oran challenges any of the false idolatrous gods to recreate the world as proof th a t they are really divine. The fact th a t none of them of done so is evidence of God's divinity.

Elsew here in Islamic dogmatics the creation is evoked to rem ind m an of th e mercy of God who nourishes and brings to him those whom he needs. It shows also the power of God, capable of giving life and th u s of renew ing it on the day when he revives th e dead. In th e face of God, m an is th e servant before his m aster th is tru th is w ritten in the very dep th s of h u m an n a tu re th e m an who denies it can n o t be forgiven [Jomier, 1984, p.50]

A im p o rta n t p a r t of M uslim dogm atics concerns c a u sa lity , in particu lar where they describe the catastrophic events th a t will occur w hen th e world ends. As in th e C h ristian version of th e Day of Ju d g m en t there is th e image of bodies climbing out th e ir graves a t the sound of tru m p et for the last judgm ent, th en the jud gm ent itself w ith its balancing of deeds, the books which will be opened, the verdict of paradise for some and hell for the others. Hell, however,

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-Will not be eternal for believers. The intercession of M ohammed will ensure th e release of those who are a t h e a rt believers in whom where one can still find an atom of faith, even if only after tho u san d s of years of punishm ent.

There is, of course, a contradiction implicit in Islamic dogm atics (as th e re is in J u d a ism and C h ristian ity ) concerning th e issu e of determ inism and responsibility. This is the theological debate which concerning w hether God, as all-powerful and all-seeing supposes is capable, not only of knowing in advance how m en and women will behave, b u t also of determ ining th a t behaviour. If God does indeed determ ine behaviour, then how is this compatible w ith the concept of free-will and responsibility and, indeed, w ith th e very concept th a t m en and women should be judged and subjected to rew ards and punishm ents. This contradiction is resolved in p a rt by the existence in the K oran of th a t other sup ernatu ral figure, the Devil, (who is also God's creation) which m akes it possibility for m ankind to m ake choices betw een good and evil, two p ath s which lead in opposite directions.

In Islam , as in some forms of C hristianity, th is distinction betw een good an d evil, God and the Devil, serves to not only to rem ind believers w hat will happen to them if they disobey God's word, but also to differentiate Muslims from non-Muslims, since it is impossible for th e faithless to be on the side of Good or to be rew arded in the world to come. Indeed, there is some considerable debate among M uslim theologians as to w hether infidels of good faith m ay also be saved. Several of them (e.g. al-Ghazali, 1058-1111) accept th a t those infidels who are of good faith could be saved, if they were not m orally responsible for th e ir lack of belief [Jomier, 1988 p.58]. As L uhm ann points out, religious system s, like C hristianity, Jud aism and Islam , which trad itio n ally have made sharp distinctions betw een m em bers and non-m em bers, increasingly discover th a t th eir own m em bers do not m eet the expectations of the religion and th a t non-believers may be following th e ir own religious faith . I t therefo re becomes increasingly difficult to reconstruct the world as being divided along sim ple lines betw een believers, who are necessarily good and non believers, who are necessarily bad. The sim ilarities between members and non-m em bers were impossible to ignore. In Islam fu rth e r d istin c tio n s w ere developed betw een n on-believers who w ere nevertheless 'brothers of th e Book' (Jews and C hristians) and other non-M uslim s, such as H indus and B uddhists. The S h ari'a rules, which evolved around m arriages between M uslims and B rothers of the Book, were fu rth e r evidence of recognition th a t simple good/evil re c o n stru c tio n of th e e x te rn a l world could not be su sta in e d . Nevertheless, as we shall see, it was always possible to resurrect such

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-reconstructions in different forms in response to perceived th re a ts to Muslim identity from the external environment.

3. Self-reference and Authenticity

An im p o rta n t questio n for Islam to answ er concerned its own au th en ticity and, in particu lar the au thenticity of th e Koran and of M ohammed as a P rophet and God's last envoy to m ankind. W here was th e proof of th is authenticity? C riteria and evidence of proof clearly change over tim e and according to the p articular belief system of those dem anding proof. It was, therefore, necessary for Islam to protect itself again st the scepticism not ju s t of one historical epoch, b u t for all tim e. This was achieved by the production of a closed system, not so much of knowledge, but of belief.

In the Koran the objectors recalled the fact th a t the ancient prophets had performed m iracles to confirm the divine origin of th e ir m ission and th ey sum m oned M ohamm ed to do th e sam e. The K oran, how ever, p ro te ste d a g a in st th is dem and and in r e ite ra tin g its confirmation of the divine origin of the Koran, it presents itself as the g rea t m iracle proving the authenticity of th e revelation received by Muslims. The professions of faith affirm th a t th e K oran is of divine origin and possesses qualities such th a t no creature could have or will be able to compose its like. The Koran defies anyone to produce a single ch ap ter which can equal those of the K oran (10:37-8, 52:25- 42, 69:42-3,) Since nobody has been able to m eet this challenge, th e divine origin of th e K oran h as been definitively proved. [Jom ier, 1988, p.56]. As w ith creation, therefore, the proof of th e K oran's authen ticity , therefore lies in itself. The evidence of th e te x t is all th a t tru e believers need or are entitled to in order to validate the claim for authenticity. If they doubt the text by requiring fu rth e r or different evidence, th en they cannot claim to be tru e believers. According to the sam e logic, Mohammed m u st be God's M essenger, because the Koran was transm itted to him.

The circular n a tu re of th e argum ent is obvious, but it has served, not only to convince M uslims of the divine authorship of the K oran and th u s of M ohamm ed s ta tu s as th e last Prophet/Envoy, b u t also to differentiate a religious Islamic system of m eaning based on faith and faith alone from all oth er m eaning system s both inside and outside th e Muslim world. The tru th in Islam can be discovered only by referring to th e K oran and th e evidence of th e tru th of the Koran is th e Koran. Believers may th en refer all issues concerning the rig h tn e ss, w rongness, good or evil of events selected from th e external social environm ent as well as the causes and consequences of such events for religious interpretation by reconstructing them in term s which m ake sense exclusively for Islamic dogmatics. The fact

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-th a t o -ther m eaning system s, w he-ther rationalistic, scientific, political or w hatev er produce different answ ers or in te rp re t these events in different ways or even th a t they find the issues concerned triv ial or in sig n ifica n t is of no consequence for religious dogm a of Islam (although, as we shall see, it may have consequences for Muslims). 5. The M edium o f Faith: As we have seen, simply to refer back to its e lf provides Islam (and oth er religions) w ith th e necessity of having to prove th e authenticity problem on any b u t its own term s. On its own, it does not p resent any reasons why Islam 's solution to the problem should be more acceptable th an any other. An essential ele m en t is m issing. T his is th e com m unication m edium , th e language which m akes it possible for religion to m anage contingency issues in the social environm ent by transform ing into w h at it claims are exclusively religious term s. For other system s love, money, and tru th are communication media. For Islam, and other highly evolved religious systems, it is faith.

L uhm ann's account of th e evolution of religious dogmatics describes how, as religion takes on a specific, but universally relevant function in society, it's internal basis m ust also switch from ritual to faith.

The am plitude- of m yths and explanations which w as norm al and h arm less in older religions based on ritu a l and cult is no longer tolerable if religion is based on more highly generalised symbols. The correct u n d e rsta n d in g of faith can and indeed m u st become th e subject of controversy, th e se ttlin g of w hich sp u rs th e fu rth e r developm ent of dogma. [Luhm ann, 1984, p.34]

The developm ent of dogm atic theology presupposes th a t faith has become reflexive (p.62) th a t ’[T]he faith process can, ... "formulate" th e condition of its own possibility’, using faith, for exam ple, to determ ine th e correctness or fallibility of its own concepts which are them selves based on the m edium of faith. In Islam the use of the form ula of th e sh a h ad a - a negative p h rase (there is no divinity outside God), which removes everything th a t is not God, but reserves th e question of the m ystery of God to Himself, a m ystery into which th e believer him self is forbidden from unravelling - is seen as the only correct way of conceptualizing God. In th e sam e way th a t positive legal system s presuppose th a t the establishm ent of norm s can itself be m ade subject to norms, so religion achieves reflexivity th rou gh th e faith m edium by assum ing the rig h t to determ ine the conditions estab lish in g th e existence or non-existence of faith , of im plem enting a b inary code th a t sep arates th e faithful from the faithless, th e believer from the infidel. 'The reflexive process applies itself to itself and changes itself [Luhmann, 1984, p.94 em phasis in original]. From L u h m an n 's evolutionary perspective, it is the

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-achievem ent of reflexivity th a t m akes possible th e tra n s itio n of religion to modern societies.

If th e language of faith is to be available for a v ariety of social situations, it m ust be generalized beyond those acts which in specific religions are th e evidence of the existence of faith [Luhm ann, p.58]. Yet, once the m edium of faith becomes universalized beyond actual m anifestations of faith to witnesses and testim onies of faith th a t one finds in religious ritu als there is a danger th a t 'faith inflation' may occur. This de-ritualization of religions m eans th a t religious motives, r a th e r th a n ritu a ls , become a ll-im p o rta n t in deciding w h a t is a p p ro p ria te to select from th e e x te rn a l e n v iro n m e n t for com m unication and coding by th e language of faith. T here is no guarantee th a t religion will be able to control th e scope and direction of these transform ations. F aith, like 'love' or 'tru th ', m ay be tak e n to a level of a b stract generalization where it loses all ability to serve society's contingency-m anaging req u irem en ts. F a ith , in th ese circum stances, risk s becoming a form ula for justifying everything and anything. Like the superstitious concept of 'fate', it's absence or presence m ay be p rese n ted as th e cause of all unexpected or scientifically inexplicable events.

RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY

1. W hile L u h m an n , following D u rk h eim 's d istin c tio n betw een m ech an ical and organic so lid a rity , sees m odern societies as fu n d am en tally different in th e ir organization from tra d itio n a l or 'archaic' societies he b reak s w ith D urkheim and th e d u alistic sociological trad itio n th a t works with only two distinct types of social organization. For Luhm ann, as we have m entioned, modern societies are characterized above all by th eir complexity and above all by the diversity and self-reflexive n a tu re of th e ir functional subsystem s [Luhm ann, 1984, p.74-5] which m akes it impossible for th em to be regulated as a cohesive organization, as was th e case in tra d itio n al societies. This fun dam en tal difference avoids th e kind of rigid segm entation of power and wealth th a t occurs in traditional societies. It also m eans th a t these subsystem s are continually involved in a tte m p ts to in flu e n ce th e e x te rn a l e n v iro n m e n t by th e ir com m unications and in responding to 'interference' from oth er sub system s by im posing th e ir own m eanings on com m unications from other subsystems.

2 . W hat difficulties th en have to be faced by religious system s as th ey confront th is frag m en tatio n of m eaning system s and th e ir functional differentiation as occurs in modern societies? For a sta rt,

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-religion can no longer rely upon th e u niqueness or u tility of its function of contingency m anagem ent. A p art from specific ritu a ls denoting s ta tu s changes, in, for exam ple, baptism , confirm ation, m arriage, or th e crowning of a m onarch, it can expect to be called upon only in certain specific situations, of p articular u n certainty and anxiety, such as unexpected d eath or incurable illness. Indeed religion ten ds to restrict its role of in modern societies largely to th a t of a 'h elp in g h a n d ’ [L uhm ann, 1984, p.41]. I t is no longer functionally necessary a t the level of society as a whole, since other system s, such as science and law, compete w ith it, and have by and large become more successful th a n it, in th e ta s k of m anaging disappointm ents and stabilizing congruent expectations.

Any a tte m p t by religion to pursue in modern societies the functions th a t it served in traditional societies will continually be th w arted by th e fact th a t, the notion of faith, while still existing w ithin religious dogmatics, 'has largely ceased to function as a code for general social processes' [Luhm ann, 1984, p.64] In order fulfil its trad itio n al roles, therefore, religion increasingly has to form ulate its com m unications in th e codes of oth er social m eaning system s, such as law, politics, m edicine, education or social science. M oreover, as a price for influence over society and other system s it has progressively been obliged to couch its message in term s of a general m orality which is not d e p e n d e n t upon th e existence of a tra n s c e n d e n ta l force determ ining events in the world. It is not at all surprising, therefore, to find religious leaders m aking claims for religions as providing 'the stru c tu re s of our common life' [Sacks, 1991, p.93] or portraying other social in stitu tio n s as breeding grounds for selfishness, m aterialism and intolerance. Increasingly 'tru th ', 'love', 'self-discipline' and 'cohesiveness' come to tak e th e place of faith as th e m edia for religious communications. Shabbir A khtar, a t th e Florence workshop w ent so far as to claim th a t th e moral h ealth of society is dependent upon adherence to a religious code in his claim th at,

th e relatio n betw een religion and th e stric t regulation of the sexual im pulse is a necessary one; sexual cultures are bound to assum e the view th a t sexual activity is largely a technique for recreation and enjoym ent. In o th e r w ords successful sanctions a g a in st sexual indulgence are exclusively religious in motivation.

Discipline in sexual m atters cannot, according to this construction of society, exist w ithout religion.

3. The p o st-E n lig h ten m en t ratio n ality , which can be said to c h a ra c te riz e m odern societies' reco nstructio n of th e social and physical enviro nm en t th re a te n e d to leave religious organizations increasingly isolated and m arginalized. Those which continued to