a cura di
P
aolo
F
ederighi
,
V
anna
B
oFFo
Firenze University Press
2014
Pensare l’esperienza. Itinerari nella scuola primaria
Parte prima
Sullo sfondo teorico
1
Cap. 1 – La scuola in una società complessa: formare
la professione docente
3
Cap. 2 – La formazione degli insegnanti
1.1 La scuola e la formazione di base dei giovani
Paolo Federighi
1.1.1 La scuola ‘non-insegnante’
parte degli studenti e delle famiglie e sulla capacità della scuola di attrarre
1.1.2 Scuola e mobilità sociale
4
LA SCUOLA IN UNA SOCIETÀ COMPLESSA the world.Roots of corruption in education
Despite its fundamental values of fairness and impartiality, education is seen by some as especially vulnerable to corruption.4 Corruption risks are elevated by two main factors: the
high stakes of educational opportunity and the large sums allocated to fund it.
The fi rst cause of corruption risks in education is the high stakes involved. Education is universally valued as a formative condition of human and national development. Parents and governments recognise that the outcomes of schooling determine the futures of individuals and nations alike. Formal education is a widely accepted mechanism for selecting people for appropriate roles in society, and its absence or inadequacy deprives young people of the basic tools needed to achieve prosperity, prestige and authority.5 Because of the perceived
high stakes of education, it is an attractive target for political manipulation.6
Multiple international bodies have recognised education as a moral imperative and an inalienable human right, but in some parts of the world it remains a scarce and limited good. Even when access to education is guaranteed, its quality varies signifi cantly, and it can be bought and sold in ways both legitimate and illegitimate. The high stakes of educational opportunity give those who provide educational services a strong position to extort favours or funds. At each educational level there are multiple ‘gatekeepers’, who make decisions with long-lasting consequences for people’s lives.7
At the same time, the risk of corruption in education also stems from an inevitable tension between the general notion that merit should be the basis of educational success and the particular desire of parents to ensure the advantage of their own children.8 Those
who possess power and resources will strive to capture the benefi ts of education for themselves and their families. Elites tend to reproduce existing power relations through schooling, often resorting if necessary to corrupt practices. Corruption becomes endemic when people engage in corrupt behaviours because they see such behaviours as widespread, and feel that they cannot afford to be honest.9 When schooling
accu-stoms youth to corruption as a social norm, its cycle begins anew in each generation. Corruption thus represents the failure of a society to manage the competing interests of different groups in a fair and meritocratic way.
The risk of corruption in educa-tion is magnifi ed by the sheer scale of educational expenditures, both
Figure 1.1 Basic government expenditures: Global averages in 2009 Source: World Bank DataBank, World Development Indicators, 2009–2010.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Education Public Health Defence High income
countries Middle income countries Low income countries
% o
f G
DP
the world.
Roots of corruption in education
Despite its fundamental values of fairness and impartiality, education is seen by some as especially vulnerable to corruption.4 Corruption risks are elevated by two main factors: the
high stakes of educational opportunity and the large sums allocated to fund it.
The fi rst cause of corruption risks in education is the high stakes involved. Education is universally valued as a formative condition of human and national development. Parents and governments recognise that the outcomes of schooling determine the futures of individuals and nations alike. Formal education is a widely accepted mechanism for selecting people for appropriate roles in society, and its absence or inadequacy deprives young people of the basic tools needed to achieve prosperity, prestige and authority.5 Because of the perceived
high stakes of education, it is an attractive target for political manipulation.6
Multiple international bodies have recognised education as a moral imperative and an inalienable human right, but in some parts of the world it remains a scarce and limited good. Even when access to education is guaranteed, its quality varies signifi cantly, and it can be bought and sold in ways both legitimate and illegitimate. The high stakes of educational opportunity give those who provide educational services a strong position to extort favours or funds. At each educational level there are multiple ‘gatekeepers’, who make decisions with long-lasting consequences for people’s lives.7
At the same time, the risk of corruption in education also stems from an inevitable tension between the general notion that merit should be the basis of educational success and the particular desire of parents to ensure the advantage of their own children.8 Those
who possess power and resources will strive to capture the benefi ts of education for themselves and their families. Elites tend to reproduce existing power relations through schooling, often resorting if necessary to corrupt practices. Corruption becomes endemic when people engage in corrupt behaviours because they see such behaviours as widespread, and feel that they cannot afford to be honest.9 When schooling
accu-stoms youth to corruption as a social norm, its cycle begins anew in each generation. Corruption thus represents the failure of a society to manage the competing interests of different groups in a fair and meritocratic way.
The risk of corruption in educa-tion is magnifi ed by the sheer scale of educational expenditures, both
Figure 1.1 Basic government expenditures: Global averages in 2009 Source: World Bank DataBank, World Development Indicators, 2009–2010.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Education Public Health Defence High income
countries Middle income countries Low income countries
% o
f G
DP
4 FRAMING CORRUPTION IN EDUCATION
institutions also have the potential to play a critical role in promoting integrity and teaching an anti-corruption stance. This report brings together the expertise of the anti-corruption movement to examine the underlying factors affecting corruption in the education sector, and showcases signifi cant work to improve governance and educational outcomes around the world.
Roots of corruption in education
Despite its fundamental values of fairness and impartiality, education is seen by some as especially vulnerable to corruption.4 Corruption risks are elevated by two main factors: the high stakes of educational opportunity and the large sums allocated to fund it.
The fi rst cause of corruption risks in education is the high stakes involved. Education is universally valued as a formative condition of human and national development. Parents and governments recognise that the outcomes of schooling determine the futures of individuals and nations alike. Formal education is a widely accepted mechanism for selecting people for appropriate roles in society, and its absence or inadequacy deprives young people of the basic tools needed to achieve prosperity, prestige and authority.5 Because of the perceived high stakes of education, it is an attractive target for political manipulation.6
Multiple international bodies have recognised education as a moral imperative and an inalienable human right, but in some parts of the world it remains a scarce and limited good. Even when access to education is guaranteed, its quality varies signifi cantly, and it can be bought and sold in ways both legitimate and illegitimate. The high stakes of educational opportunity give those who provide educational services a strong position to extort favours or funds. At each educational level there are multiple ‘gatekeepers’, who make decisions with long-lasting consequences for people’s lives.7
At the same time, the risk of corruption in education also stems from an inevitable tension between the general notion that merit should be the basis of educational success and the particular desire of parents to ensure the advantage of their own children.8 Those who possess power and resources will strive to capture the benefi ts of education for themselves and their families. Elites tend to reproduce existing power relations through schooling, often resorting if necessary to corrupt practices. Corruption becomes endemic when people engage in corrupt behaviours because they see such behaviours as widespread, and feel that they cannot afford to be honest.9 When schooling accu-stoms youth to corruption as a social norm, its cycle begins anew in each generation. Corruption thus represents the failure of a society to manage the competing interests of different groups in a fair and meritocratic way.
The risk of corruption in educa-tion is magnifi ed by the sheer scale of educational expenditures, both
Figure 1.1 Basic government expenditures: Global averages in 2009
Source: World Bank DataBank, World Development Indicators, 2009–2010.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Education Public Health Defence High income
countries Middle income countries Low income countries
% o
f G
D
P
LOOKING TO 2060: LONG-TERM GLOBAL GROWTH PROSPECTS
OECD ECONOMIC POLICY PAPERS, NO. 3 OECD 2012 19
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932718307
Capital intensity is assumed to gradually stabilise
In most, but not all, developed economies, the ratio of (non-residential) productive capital (defined here to exclude housing) to trend output has been relatively stable (Figure 7). In these countries, this stability in capital intensity is expected to continue over the next decades. However, there are a number of countries where capital intensity has shown a definite recent trend. Where this is the case, the trend is expected to gradually disappear so that the underlying capital-output ratio stabilises. Australia and Canada are examples among OECD countries where recent capital deepening is probably related to the commodities boom in mining, and China and India are important examples among emerging countries.
Future capital-output ratios are however influenced by the real cost of capital with changes in such costs translating into opposite changes in capital intensity.6
The main reason for changes in the cost of capital are changes in real interest rates, which vary for a number of reasons, including the cyclical position of the economy, fiscal risk premia equalising saving and investment at the global level. For instance, higher interest rates on rising government debt put upward pressure on long-term interest rates throughout the economy, thereby reducing capital intensity. A generalised increase in global interest rates related to a fall in the global saving rate (discussed in later sections) accounts for the slight tendency for capital intensity to decline in most countries towards the end of the baseline projection.
In the projections, it is assumed that the elasticity of capital intensity to the user cost of capital is consistent with a Cobb-Douglas production function.
COMPLESSITÀ E PROFESSIONALITÀ DOCENTE
5
high stakes of educational opportunity and the large sums allocated to fund it.
The fi rst cause of corruption risks in education is the high stakes involved. Education is
universally valued as a formative condition of human and national development. Parents and
governments recognise that the outcomes of schooling determine the futures of individuals
and nations alike. Formal education is a widely accepted mechanism for selecting people for
appropriate roles in society, and its absence or inadequacy deprives young people of the
basic tools needed to achieve prosperity, prestige and authority.
5Because of the perceived
high stakes of education, it is an attractive target for political manipulation.
6Multiple international bodies have recognised education as a moral imperative and an
inalienable human right, but in some parts of the world it remains a scarce and limited good.
Even when access to education is guaranteed, its quality varies signifi cantly, and it can be
bought and sold in ways both legitimate and illegitimate. The high stakes of educational
opportunity give those who provide educational services a strong position to extort favours or
funds. At each educational level there are multiple ‘gatekeepers’, who make decisions with
long-lasting consequences for people’s lives.
7At the same time, the risk of corruption in education also stems from an inevitable
tension between the general notion that merit should be the basis of educational success
and the particular desire of parents to ensure the advantage of their own children.
8Those
who possess power and resources will strive to capture the benefi ts of education for
themselves and their families. Elites
tend to reproduce existing power
relations through schooling, often
resorting if necessary to corrupt
practices. Corruption becomes
endemic when people engage in
corrupt behaviours because they
see such behaviours as widespread,
and feel that they cannot afford to
be honest.
9When schooling
accu-stoms youth to corruption as a
social norm, its cycle begins anew
in each generation. Corruption thus
represents the failure of a society
to manage the competing interests
of different groups in a fair and
meritocratic way.
The risk of corruption in
educa-tion is magnifi ed by the sheer scale
of educational expenditures, both
Figure 1.1 Basic government expenditures: Global averages in 2009Source: World Bank DataBank, World Development Indicators, 2009–2010.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Education
Public Health
Defence
4 FRAMING CORRUPTION IN EDUCATION
institutions also have the potential to play a critical role in promoting integrity and teaching an anti-corruption stance. This report brings together the expertise of the anti-corruption movement to examine the underlying factors affecting corruption in the education sector, and showcases signifi cant work to improve governance and educational outcomes around the world.
Roots of corruption in education
Despite its fundamental values of fairness and impartiality, education is seen by some as
especially vulnerable to corruption.4 Corruption risks are elevated by two main factors: the
high stakes of educational opportunity and the large sums allocated to fund it. The fi rst cause of corruption risks in education is the high stakes involved. Education is universally valued as a formative condition of human and national development. Parents and governments recognise that the outcomes of schooling determine the futures of individuals and nations alike. Formal education is a widely accepted mechanism for selecting people for appropriate roles in society, and its absence or inadequacy deprives young people of the
basic tools needed to achieve prosperity, prestige and authority.5 Because of the perceived
high stakes of education, it is an attractive target for political manipulation.6
Multiple international bodies have recognised education as a moral imperative and an inalienable human right, but in some parts of the world it remains a scarce and limited good. Even when access to education is guaranteed, its quality varies signifi cantly, and it can be bought and sold in ways both legitimate and illegitimate. The high stakes of educational opportunity give those who provide educational services a strong position to extort favours or funds. At each educational level there are multiple ‘gatekeepers’, who make decisions with
long-lasting consequences for people’s lives.7
At the same time, the risk of corruption in education also stems from an inevitable tension between the general notion that merit should be the basis of educational success
and the particular desire of parents to ensure the advantage of their own children.8 Those
who possess power and resources will strive to capture the benefi ts of education for themselves and their families. Elites tend to reproduce existing power relations through schooling, often resorting if necessary to corrupt practices. Corruption becomes endemic when people engage in corrupt behaviours because they see such behaviours as widespread, and feel that they cannot afford to
be honest.9 When schooling
accu-stoms youth to corruption as a social norm, its cycle begins anew in each generation. Corruption thus represents the failure of a society to manage the competing interests of different groups in a fair and meritocratic way.
The risk of corruption in educa-tion is magnifi ed by the sheer scale of educational expenditures, both
Figure 1.1 Basic government expenditures: Global averages in 2009
Source: World Bank DataBank, World Development Indicators, 2009–2010. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Education Public Health Defence High income
countries Middle income countries Low income countries
% o
f G
D
P
LOOKING TO 2060: LONG-TERM GLOBAL GROWTH PROSPECTS
OECD ECONOMIC POLICY PAPERS, NO. 3 OECD 2012 19
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932718307
Capital intensity is assumed to gradually stabilise
In most, but not all, developed economies, the ratio of (non-residential) productive capital (defined here to exclude housing) to trend output has been relatively stable (Figure 7). In these countries, this stability in capital intensity is expected to continue over the next decades. However, there are a number of countries where capital intensity has shown a definite recent trend. Where this is the case, the trend is expected to gradually disappear so that the underlying capital-output ratio stabilises. Australia and Canada are examples among OECD countries where recent capital deepening is probably related to the commodities boom in mining, and China and India are important examples among emerging countries.
Future capital-output ratios are however influenced by the real cost of capital with changes in such costs translating into opposite changes in capital intensity.6
The main reason for changes in the cost of capital are changes in real interest rates, which vary for a number of reasons, including the cyclical position of the economy, fiscal risk premia equalising saving and investment at the global level. For instance, higher interest rates on rising government debt put upward pressure on long-term interest rates throughout the economy, thereby reducing capital intensity. A generalised increase in global interest rates related to a fall in the global saving rate (discussed in later sections) accounts for the slight tendency for capital intensity to decline in most countries towards the end of the baseline projection.
In the projections, it is assumed that the elasticity of capital intensity to the user cost of capital is consistent with a Cobb-Douglas production function.
LOOKING TO 2060: LONG-TERM GLOBAL GROWTH PROSPECTS
22 OECD ECONOMIC POLICY PAPERS, NO. 3 OECD 2012
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932718364
The relative size of economies will change dramatically over the next half century
The next 50 years will see major changes in country shares in global GDP (Figure 10). On the basis of 2005 purchasing power parities (PPPs), China is projected to surpass the Euro Area in 2012 and the United States in a few more years, to become the largest economy in the world, and India is about now surpassing Japan and is expected to surpass the Euro area in about 20 years. The faster growth rates of China and India imply that their combined GDP will exceed that of the major seven (G7) OECD economies by around 2025 and by 2060 it will be more than 1½ times larger, whereas in 2010 China and India accounted for less than one half of G7 GDP. Strikingly in 2060, the combined GDP of these two countries will be larger than that of the entire OECD area (based on today’s membership), while it currently amounts to only one-third of it.
II.5. A FAMILY AFFAIR: INTERGENERATIONAL SOCIAL MOBILITY ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES
ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS: GOING FOR GROWTH © OECD 2010 185
low in the Nordic countries, Australia and Canada, with less than 20% of the wage advantage being passed on from fathers to their sons.
New OECD evidence on intergenerational persistence in wages is obtained by estimating the percentage increase or decrease in individuals’ gross hourly wages for different levels of their fathers’ educational attainment in selected European countries.4 Across these countries, individuals whose fathers had achieved tertiary education are found to earn substantially more than those whose fathers had achieved upper secondary education, after taking into account the impact of a number of individual characteristics (e.g. migrant and marital status and urbanisation of the area of residence).5 For instance, in
southern European countries, the United Kingdom and Finland, having a father with tertiary education raises a son’s wages by at least 20% or more, compared with a son whose father had upper secondary education. At the same time, individuals whose fathers had achieved below upper secondary education tend to earn considerably less than those whose fathers had achieved upper secondary education.6
One way to summarise intergenerational wage persistence is through the overall estimated gap between the wage for individuals whose fathers had achieved tertiary education and the wage of individuals whose father had achieved below upper secondary education. According to this measure, intergenerational persistence is particularly strong in some southern European countries and in the United Kingdom, while it is lower in some Nordic countries, Austria, France and Greece (Figure 5.2).7 In general, according to this
metric, wage persistence across generations is also slightly stronger for sons than for daughters. The magnitude of wage persistence changes moderately, but country rankings are barely affected – although the cross-country spread is flatter – when adjustments are made for cross-country differences in inequalities today and in past generations. Such
Figure 5.1. The strength of the link between individual and parental earnings varies across OECD countries1
Intergenerational earnings elasticity: estimates from various studies
1. The height of each bar measures the extent to which sons’ earnings levels reflect those of their fathers. The estimates are the best point estimate of the intergenerational earnings elasticity resulting from an extensive meta-analysis carried out by Corak (2006) and supplemented with additional countries from d’Addio (2007). The choice of empirical estimates in this meta-analysis is motivated by the fact that they are based on studies that are similar in their estimation technique, sample and variable definitions. The higher the value, the greater is the persistence of earnings across generations, thus the lower is the intergenerational earnings mobility.
Source: D’Addio (2007). http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/784787325068 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
DNK AUS NOR FIN CAN SWE DEU ESP FRA USA ITA GBR
fortemente compromesso e i compiti di crescita delle competenze delle
2010
2011
2012
2013
considerato dalle stesse istituzioni governative indispensabile per vivere
21
sia
accrescimento delle conoscenze di base svolte dalla scuola si limitano
di preservare i guadagni e il prestigio di alcuni gruppi professionali
1.1.4 Il punto di vista degli studenti e degli insegnanti
Per riportare alcune delle opinioni degli studenti facciamo riferimento
ai risultati di una recente rilevazione svolta dallo
del
monianza o nelle scuole parallele e non contribuire a rinnovare il sistema
in
disponibilità di giovani pronti a entrare nel mercato del lavoro con le
stagnazione del sistema educativo e il perdurare della sua riluttanza al
aperto il problema oggettivo della domanda di competenze del sistema
miglie a ulteriori costi di adeguamento delle competenze e impone alla
•
•
•
dei contenuti costituiscono la spina dorsale della metodologia
•
•
•
le diverse sembianze sotto cui si cela la legittimazione della distinzione
i giovani alla accettazione del futuro cui vengono destinati operando sia
-viene attribuito il compito di assumere il ruolo di attore del cambiamento
sociale e di creazione di condizioni di eguaglianza tanto al suo interno
formativo in generale saprà mettere a disposizione della società e del
e
funzione selettiva formando persone per un futuro prescritto dalle dina
mai messo in discussione il modello originario di una scuola creato per
elementi di conoscenza la ricerca individua i
sta cambiando la natura
tenza degli elaboratori di dati accresce la possibilità di guardare al
partecipare ai processi di continua creazione di nuove conoscenze
valoriali di gruppi dominanti e da interessi occupazionali di gruppi
tenti del mondo economico e sociale e trarre da loro ispirazione per
dobbiamo compiere ulteriori passi in avanti rispetto a ciascuno degli indi
se la formazione primaria dei bambini del futuro possa fondarsi su loro
implicita nei curricola degli attuali Corsi universitari dedicati alla loro
in parallelo con le diverse fasi attraverso cui si sono evolute le attese rivolte
st
pone una sua tassonomia dei punti distintivi della professionalità docente
• possesso di un corpo distintivo di conoscenze e abilità di esercitarle
•
•
• periodo di
•
•
mento del 2012 dedicato al tema
propone una declinazione delle competenze necessarie per raggiungere un
1.1.12. Competences Required for Effective Teaching
in the 21
stCentury
•
•
terials
policies
issues
ves and processes
practices
sercizio della professione e molte di loro possono essere apprese attra
le
e le
stituire la tesi di laurea conclusiva con la valutazione delle competenze
-1.2 Il ruolo del CdS in Scienze della Formazione Primaria nella
recente storia fiorentina
1.2.1 La fase aurorale
precedente corso di laurea ma
1
era il frutto di un
il varo di tali
mativa
2poi lungo il tragitto e non facevano certo buona pubblicità al corso di laurea
3
la trasformazione dei moduli in esami singoli di pari crediti per ridurre il
2
risolversi in un unico corso tenuto dai docenti interessati e concludersi con un unico
1.2.2 La fase di espansione
una piega diversa e le iscrizioni al test di ingresso a conoscere una crescita
4