The European Response to the Yugoslav Crises: Story of a Two-Level Constraint

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Story of a Two-Level Constraint

Sonia Lucarelli jp 321 0 2 0 9 4 UR

EUI Working Paper RSC No. 95/37

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Corrections

1. Missing sentence

At page^&f immediately before §1.4. "What" and "How" in the Management of the Yugoslav Crisis: Summing up, the following sentence is missing:

On February 28, NATO aircraft enforcing the no-fly-zone over Bosnia- Herzegovina took the first aggressive military action not only in Western management of the Yugoslav crisis, but also in NATO's history. Unfortunately, however, this did not sign a turning point in the Westeners' unconsistent behaviour in ex-Yugoslavia.

2. Mis-written title

Both in the table of content and at page/4^ in the title of paraghaph 1.3, "April 1993" has to be replaced with "February 1994”, the correct title being: 1.3. "EC/U-UN burden sharing" (January 1992-February 1994)

I apologize for the inconvenience,

Sonia Lucarelli _©The

Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE

ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE

The European Response to the Yugoslav Crisis

Story of a Two-Level Constraint

SONIA LUCARELLI European University Institute, Department of Social and Political Sciences

3 8 1 -0 8 0 9

EUI Working Paper RSC No. 95/37 BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN D O M EN ICO (FI)

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No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form without permission of the author.

Printed in Italy in December 1995 European University Institute

Badia Fiesolana I - 50016 San Domenico (FI)

Italy © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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Table of Content

Introduction

Section One : "What" and "How" the European Management of the Yugoslav Crisis: a Chronological Account

Prelude

1.1. "The hour of Europe". EC efforts to broker a political settlement under the CSCE (June - September, 1991)

1.2. EC management with UN legitimation (September 1991 - January 1992)

1.3. "EC/U-UN burden sharing" (January 1992-April 1993) 1.4. "What" and "How" in the Management of the Yugoslav Crisis: Summing up

Section Two : The European Response to the Yugoslav Crisis: an alleged failure in search of a scholarly explanation

2.1. The decision to manage the Yugoslav crisis 2.2. The diplomatic and collective type of action The debate over military intervention

The recognition o f Slovenia and Croatia

Conclusions Achronyms Table of References © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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Introduction1

The European response to the Yugoslav crisis has been widely recognised as a failure as it has been unable to bring the fighting to a rapid end. This has created scepticism about the possibility for the European Union (EU) to play an international role and about the functioning of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP). I will argue that judging the EU international capacity only on the basis of its poor record in securing peace in ex-Yugoslavia is unfair and misleading.

Unfair, because the European Community was neither an agency legally authorised for the binding enforcement of international law, nor a Superpower with a particular political interest for a certain evolution of the crisis. It was simply a peculiar international actor, involved in a delicate phase of internal as well as external definition. A common foreign policy was not even in the treaties when the Yugoslav war/s began, and far less was there an EC/U international duty to function as "crisis manager". In spite of this, the EC member states (MSs) undertook a common action, and searched to maintain the co-ordination throughout the entire management.

Misleading, because it assumes that the EC/U had the sole objective of bringing peace when dealing with the Yugoslav conflicts. On the contrary, I will argue that the Community’s MSs had three main objectives in ex-Yugoslavia: a) promoting peace on the ground, b) preventing unilateral involvement of major European actors, and c) satisfying domestic public opinion in individual EU member states. These three objectives, always present in the decision-makers’ minds, were frequently in conflict. In particular, there is enough evidence to suggest that the Union succeeded in maintaining a high level of internal cohesion, but this was probably at the expense of adopting an efficient peace making policy. As a matter of fact, internal divergencies over preferred courses of action led the Union to assume a minimalist approach. Furthermore, some of the internal debates over the use of force and the recognition policy overlapped with internal debates over the construction of EU; therefore, the position assumed by individual member states responded more to its interests in the European construction than in bringing peace in ex-Yugoslavia.

1 I would like to thank Julie Lindley-French, Tonny Brems Knudsen, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Knud Erik Jorgensen, Hanna Ojanen and Neil Winn, for valuable comments on earlier drafts. My thanks also to the other participants to the Workshop: European Approaches

to Crisis Management, EUI, May 1995, and to the Robert Schuman Centre of the EUI which

made the workshop possible. I am also indebt to Jeames Welsh for useful linguistic corrections. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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The paper is organised in two sections. In Section One, I describe the European management of the Yugoslav crisis. In Section Two, offer an understanding of the crisis management based on the unrecognised factor that EC membership shaped the MSs’ preferences and, thereby, the actual EC reaction. In other words, the EC/U co-ordination/cohesion was a value in itself which needed to be safeguarded. My theoretical reference will be the "rationalistic research project" (so-labelled by Keohane, 1988) or "neo-neo-synthesis" (so-called by Waever, 1994). Finally, I will draw more general conclusions over possible European approaches to crisis management.

Section One :

"What" and "How" the European Management of the Yugoslav crisis : a chronological account

In this section I describe the European reaction to the Yugoslav crisis and its main characteristics in terms of2:

1. arena of crisis management (EC, UN); 2. source of legitimation (CSCE, UN);

3. tools used or threatened (diplomatic/coercive3); 4. the timing of the actions (anticipatory/reactive4);

5. the aim of the actions (preventive/proactive/punitive/awarding5) 6. degree of "collectivity'Y'individuality" of the action6.

2 This framework was developed for use in the project European Approaches to Crisis

Management of which this paper is a part.

3 A diplomatic action uses verbal declarations or economic sanctions in order to obtain a certain aim, while a coercive action uses force or the threat of force.

4 An anticipatory action is performed as an initial step to obtain/avoid a certain behaviour from the counterpart. A reactive action is performed as a response to a certain course of events once they have already appeared.

5 Both preventive and proactive actions are anticipatory. The former are undertaken in order to avoid a certain course of events, the latter in order to stimulate it. Both punitive and

awarding actions are reactive, the former punish while the latter awards the counterpart’s

behaviour.

6 A collective action is performed by a group of states who agree to undertake a common position regarding a certain step in the crisis management. An individual action is undertaken by one of the members of the so-called "crisis management coalition", as a sort of defection from common action.

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The account is limited to a period June 1991 - February 19947. The European reaction in this period can be devised into three phases according to the first two criteria:

—> Phase 1: June-September 1991, "The hour of Europe";

—> Phase 2: September 1991- January 1992, "EC management with UN legitimation";

—> Phase 3: January 1992 - February 1994 , "EC/U-UN burden sharing".

Prelude

In Winter 1991, the tension within the SFRY reached its climax. Slovenia and Croatia threatened to secede if the Yugoslav federation did not agree to decentralise power by June 268.

Having failed to reach agreement, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on June 25, and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) intervened in Slovenia on June 26. Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution had started9.

1.1. "The hour of Europe". EC efforts to broker a political settlement under the CSCE (June - September, 1991)

From the onset of the Yugoslav war, both the UN and the US assumed a low profile, while "Europe" took on a leading role10. Within one week the EC had

7 The period had been chosen rather arbitrarily. The final delimitation indicates the first NATO military action in ex-Yugoslavia.

8 For an analysis of the "break up" period 1980-1991 see: Garde, 1992; Magas, 1993, Ramet, 1992b; Bianchini, 1993, and their bibliographies. For a valuable survey of the Balkan history see: Castellan, 1991.

9 There is a growing literature on the Yugoslav crisis and its international management. Amongst them, Borden et al., 1992 ; Defarges, 1992; Garde, 1992 and 1992-3; Gow & Smith, 1992; Heuven & Siccama, 1992; Jakobsen, 1993b; Jorgensen, 1993; Ramet, 1992; Remade, 1992 and 1993; Riva & Ventura, 1992; Salomon, 1992; Samary, 1994; Thomson, 1992; Zametica, 1992. Specifically on the analysis of the JNA’s role in the Yugoslav wars see: Gow, 1992. This presentation of events is primarily based on some of the above quoted works, on the Eastern European Report, the European Report, Keesing’s Record of World Events, and major European newspapers. A more detailed description of the international reaction to the Yugoslav war/s by the same author is Lucarelli, 1995.

10 UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, stated that “Slovenia is not an independent UN member [...], the UN has no role in Yugoslavia [unless the EC and CSCE efforts fail]” (Steinberg, 1993). A US official summarised his country’s position saying “After all, it’s not

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established two Troika bons officies missions, an observatory mission, and an embargo on military goods - soon joined by the US. All decisions were endorsed by the CSCE.

The truce which followed created a wide sense of euphoria, especially since it allowed the negotiation of the Brioni Agreement. According to this agreement, the declarations of independence were suspended for three months (Le Monde, 7/10/1991), and the JNA withdrew from Slovenia (July 18): Belgrade had de facto recognised the independence of the country.

However, hostilities worsened in Croatia, where no EC observers were deployed until one week later. French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas’s proposal for a WEU peace-keeping force was debated various times but opposed by the United Kingdom (UK), Spain, Greece and Germany - but only as far as German troops were concerned.

On the diplomatic side, the Twelve agreed on an EC-sponsored Peace Conference and an "Arbitration Committee", and threatened Serbs with sanctions. Germany and Italy threatened to recognise Slovenia and Croatia if a cease-fire was not reached by September 1 (Financial Time, 4/9/1991). These "sticks" were accompanied by the "carrot" of 1 million ECUs in emergency aid in case dialogue was resumed (EC Commission, 5/9/91).

In spite of the initial diplomatic successes, countless broken cease-fires followed, and further local conflicts begun in Bosnia, Kosovo, Vajvodine and Macedonia. Moreover, the particular case of Macedonia threatened the direct involvement of Greece. The latter claimed its historical rights on the name and some of the symbols chosen by the former Yugoslav republic, and denounced Macedonia’s constitution to represent a direct threat to Greece’s territory.

Various European countries with Austria on top reiterated their call for a UN intervention. France proposed an arms embargo and the creation of a UN emergency force on the model of that sent to the Gulf under Resolution 688 (Le Monde, 24/9/91), but Britain vetoed the idea.

1.2. EC management with UN legitimation (September 1991 - January 1992) With UN Security Council resolution 713 (25/9/91) the actual involvement of the UN began. The resolution endorsed the EC’s peace-building efforts, and imposed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia, as requested by the EC. For the first time the EC acted as a "regional agency" of the UN and established its agenda.

By early October, after the clear failure of the Brioni Agreement, the EC Foreign Ministers opted for a "stick and carrot" approach, threatening economic

our problem, it’s a European problem” (Financial Times, 29-30/6/1991).

5 © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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sanctions if hostilities were not over by October 7, but granting recognition if a solution was reached. The strategy failed and the plan for a “free association of sovereign and independent republics” suggested by the EC mediator at the Peace Conference, Lord Carrington, was opposed by Serbian leaders. Consequently, the EC implemented trade sanctions, and called for a UN-imposed oil embargo and a UN peace-keeping mission.

Despite the West’s emphasis on the principle of unity of Yugoslavia, the separation of the country and the Serb responsibilities for the conflict became increasingly obvious11. On December 16, the EC Foreign Ministers adopted guidelines for the recognition of new states, and affirmed they would decide by January 15 on any request for recognition arrived before December 23, on the basis of the Arbitration Committee’s advice. However, Germany began its informal recognition of Slovenia and Croatia immediately afterwards ('Washington Post, 20/12/1991) and a formal one on December 23. This action was extensively criticised by the other Eleven, who, however, followed.

1.3. "EC/U-UN burden sharing" (January 1992-April 1993)

Endorsing new calls for peace-keeping involvement, the UN deployed of a small group of military personnel (Resolution 724 and 727), and eventually the "UN Protection Force" (UNPROFOR, Resolution 743, 2/21/92) - the second largest UN peace-keeping force ever authorised. However, when in March the war started in BH also (WEU doc. 1337), the full deployment of UNPROFOR was not yet authorised (Resolution 749, 7/4/92) and could not be completed before the end of June.

A separate Peace Conference on BH opened in Brussels on March 30. On April 6, the EC recognised the independence of BH12, and on April 27 Serbia and Montenegro constituted the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Yugoslavia had ceased to exist.

Monitoring missions were extablised in the waters of ex-Yugoslavia. A- WEU-NATO co-ordinated mission was set in the Adriatic in Spring 1992 (The

11 On December 2, 1992 the EC abolished economic sanctions against all Yugoslav republics except Serbia and Montenegro (WEU doc. 1337). Further economic sanctions on the FRY were established by UN Resolution 757 (30/5/92).

For an interesting evaluation on the effects of the embargo and sanctions-policy in the Yugoslav case see: Ciliberto, 1994; Dimitrijevic & Pejic, 1995.

12 Pressures for recognition came both from the outside - the US (The Guardian, 10/3/92; German Foreign Ministry, "Recognition of the Yugoslav Successor States", March 1993) - and inside - the EP.

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Times, 11/7/92; WEU doc. 1337, 1366), and a another one was deployed on the Danube in late Spring 1993 WEU. The latter was a WEU "civilian operation" in co-ordination with the EC, the CSCE, and the Sanctions Assistance Mission (WEU doc. 1367).

Since new revelations on internment camps (New York Newsday , 2/8/92; first Matzowieki’s report), the UN passed Resolution 771 - which called for opening the camps to the Red Cross - and Resolution 770 - which called explicitly, for the first time, “upon all states, or regional organisations, to take all measures necessary to facilitate [••■] humanitarian assistance [...in] BH”. Consequatly, NATO offerred protection to UN humanitarian convoys (WEU doc. 1337), and eventually the EC and the US agreed the French proposal for a "no-fly" zone on BH (UNSC Resolution 781) - although the military enforcement of the ban was opposed by France’s and BritainOs concerns for their troops on the field (EER, November-December, 1992).

Meanwhile, a new EC/UN co-sponsored Peace Conference - proposed by France - had begun (August 28). Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance - appointed respectively EC and UN mediators - proposed a peace plan for the creation of seven/ten autonomous provinces within a single, decentralised, Bosnian state. The plan met strong criticism from Western observers, dissatisfied Bosnian Serbs and concerned the Bosnian Muslims. Only the Croats endorsed it. However, most of the following diplomatic efforts were directed towards reaching an agreement on the plan.

By January 1994, the EC gained the support of the FYR’s leadership, who offered its mediation with Bosnian Serbs with the view of re-gaining international legitimacy and having the sanctions against it withdrawn. However, the Bosnian Serbs constantly opposed the map part of the plan. The Bosnian Muslims also changed positions. Military stronger than before (Ciliberto, 1994: 59-60) and faithfull in the support of the newly-assertive US Administration - which expressed major reservations on the Vance-Owen plan (Herald Tribune, 10/2/93), President Izetbegovic reinforced his opposition. In reality, in spite of repeated threats of military intervention (Clinton, April 23; EC Foreign Ministers, April 24), when facing a further refusal of the Vance/Owen plan by the Bosnian-Serbs, neither the US nor the EC did intervene (ER 1854).

As the air-ban continued to be violated, eventually the UN Security Council allowed NATO to enforce the ban (Resolution 816; Keesing’s: 39375). At 2.00 PM of April 12, the "deny flight" - the first war operation of NATO history - started.

By April, the international diplomacy was reinforced by a more assertive Russia, which functioned as mediator between Serbia and the West. On May 22,

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France, the US, Russia, Spain and the UK de facto agreed on a tripartite division of BH (Keesing’s: 39469/70/71)13.

On the military front, on June 4, the UN allowed UNPROFOR to use force in response to the attacks to the "safe areas" and humanitarian convoys (Resolution 836; Keesing’s: 39471). In response, NATO agreed on an extensive interpretation of UN resolution 836: air strikes also could be used - as proposed by the US - to attack Serb artillery positions around Sarajevo (Keesing’s: 39603). Although the decision was withdrawn in a week - due to acknowledged “lack of political will” (The Guardian 10/8/93) - the Serb troops withdrew from around Sarajevo.

In the aftermath of this agreement, Owen and Stoltenberg (the new UN mediator) proposed a tripartite division of BH into ethnically-based communities (Keesing’s: 39604); eventually the aims of the Bosnian Serb leader, Karadzic, had been satisfied! (Keesing’s: 39605). In order to gain Serbs’ agreement over the territorial concessions previewed by the plan, the EU Foreign Ministers tried the Franco-German idea of a conditional lifting of sanctions on Serbia in exchange for territorial concessions (3%-4% more territory to the Muslims) and confidence-building measures in Krajina (ER 1904: V, 9-10). But it was too late. When, on December 21, Milosevic and Tudjman agreed to assign more territory to the Muslims, Izetbegovic refused the deal (Keesing’s: 39785).

Serb troops continued to bomb Sarajevo from the surrounding mountains but the international reaction came only after the umpteenth attack on civilian targets on February 3 (Keesing’s: 39870). NATO threatened air strikes if Bosnian Serbs did not withdraw or to put under UN control, all heavy weapons in the 20 Km around Sarajevo by midnight February 20. Russia’s representative to the UN, Churkin, mediated, and by February 20 most of the Serb armament had been removed. Despite the incompleteness of the withdrawal, the UN special envoy, Akashi, declared it sufficient (Keesing’s: 39871). Unfortunately, this successful "tactical model" was not extended to other areas as requested by many EC MSs, but opposed by the US and Russia (Financial Times, 23/2/1994; Keesing’s: 39871).

1.4. "What" and "How" in the Management of the Yugoslav Crisis: Summing up

A survey of the management of the Yugoslav crisis in the period June 1991-February 1994 shows characteristics which did not change substantially in

13 Following the agreement, the UN established an International War Tribunal for War Crimes in former Yugoslavia (Resolution 827).

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spite of the shift in main arena of management and/or source of legitimation. Uneven/inconsistent courses of action and lack of preventive measures were present in all the phases analysed. Therefore, the accuses generally delivered to the EC for its inefficiente performance could be extended to all the other actors who attempted at managing the crisis. Looking at the crisis management in terms of the criteria adopted in Section One, the following characteristics can be summarised:

Firstly, most of the actions undertaken were of a diplomatic nature. From the beginning, the EC presented its efforts under the form of "mediation", and used coercive tools only to obtain agreement over its mediating role. In performing this role, the EC showed a clear inconsistency between stated principles and actual action. This was the case in the threat to recognise Slovenia and Croatia although the conference was based on the principle of unity for Yugoslavia, and of the attribution of responsibility in the Bosnian conflict (formally no party was considered more guilty than the others, but in reality the sanctions ware maintained only against Serbia).

Furthermore, not only did the use of coercive diplomacy come late and - worst of all - without a real willingness to use force, but it was mainly used to obtain the parties’ agreement over a peace plan proposed by the international "mediators" (clearly the word was rather misused). Even more confusing was the term "Arbitration" to refer to the function of the Badinter Committee: Its task was actually to provide consulting facilities for the Chairman of the Peace Conference. These terminological mistakes reflected the MSs’ confusion as to what role the EC/U should play in the conflict. However, they also stemmed from the fact that the EC/U attempted something it had never been tried before: to conduct a truly collective management of a complex international crisis.

As far as the tools of crisis management are concerned, "humanitarian aid" not only was frequently the primary goal of the management14 - and, in this less ambitious perspective, a relative success - but it was also used as a tool of crisis management: it was used (a) in place of other types of action/intervention, (b) as a "carrot" in a coercive action, but also (c) as a "stick", when relief operations were suspended as a form of reprisal against the continuation of fighting or the violation of agreements15. Significantly, the head of the humanitarian aid desk

14 In the first two years the EC provided the largest aid to ex-Yugoslavia, nearly 50% of the entire UNHCR’s budget (ER 1840: V, 14; 1850).

15 An example of this "use" of humanitarian aid as a form of crisis management was the decision of the UN High Commissioner for Refugee, Ogata, to suspend relief operations in all Serb-controlled areas of BH and Sarajevo as a protest against the failure of all fighting parties to respect humanitarian principles (Keasing’s: 39327)

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at the Quay d 'Orsay, René Roudault, said "L’humanitaire est un des instruments de la diplomatie" (Floquet & Coq, 1993: 247).

However, what had initially appeared as a low-cost/high-image policy soon showed its unavoidable linkage with other types of action such as the necessary military protection of humanitarian convoys. Furthermore, humanitarian action has been frequently criticised for its actual result. If on the one side food and medical aid has helped "humanise the conflict", on the other side it has longthened the war on feeding soldiers and their families. Thus when "save areas" were created as a means of humanitarian action, the result was an implicit help to the "ethnic cleansing policy" of the fighting parties.

Furthermore, the unclear strategy adopted by the international community constantly put UNPROFOR troops into danger. If on the one side the UN was present on the field with supposedly "neutral" troops, on the other it passed coercive resolutions, mainly directed to the Serb camp. In the same way, the EC mediating role was severely undermined by its bullying the Serbian camp so to make progresses in the negotiations. These two levels of action were not kept at a proper distance, if ever they could be. In reality, the crisis management coalition was unprepared for this type of management and learned while performing it.

Secondly, the management of the crisis was nearly entirely reactive- punitive. There was no prevention whatsoever of the violent break up of the SFRY. During the war/s, there were few preventive actions - as testified by the distrous delay of the EC observatory missions’ and UNPROFOR’s deployments. Furthermore, even when observator missions or peace-keeping troops were sent to crucial areas with a preventive aim, they were not allowed to use force. However, the Yugoslav case saw the first-ever UN preventive peace-keeping action: the UNPROFOR deployment in Macedonia. In this context, a further precedent was represented by US troops in a UN peace-keeping operation (Gow, 1994: 19). The proactive side of the management was limited to the blackmails to have the parties agreement on the proposed peace-plans.

These initial considerations show features of the reaction to the Yugoslav crisis identified by J. Gow (1994) as reasons for its inefficacy: inconsistency, unwillingness to use force and poor timing. The alleged lack of co-ordination, frequently accused as the main cause of an inefficient management, on the contrary does not emerge from my study as one of the main features of the crisis management.

Thirdly, the European management of the Yugoslav crisis was, thirdly, mainly collective, sometimes even "collective at any cost". The "collectivity" of action was saved also in cases of "defection", as shown in the table below. The "collectivity at any cost" led to inaction in case of disagreement - as in the case if the debate NATO vs. WEU (see 2.2) and in the one on the recognition of

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Macedonia - and re-alineation in case of defection - as in the case of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (see 2.2).

Actually, the stress on the collectivity of action by the main EC/U MSs provides an interesting key to all crisis management. The very fact that the members of the EC decided to act together, to perform a task which was not specifically attachable to the EC/U, and the fact that in most cases they tried to save the "collectivity" of action in spite of the consequences on the crisis itself, suggest that, in broad terms, "the EC membership did matter". In which terms it did are explored in the next section.

Tab. 1. Collective and individual actions in the management o f the Yugoslav crisis

Phase 1. "EC-team"

x debate over type of military tool (NATO vs. WEU)—> inaction Phase 2. "EC-team"

x debate over type of military tool (NATO vs. WEU)—> inaction x Greece’s disagreement over the recognition of Macedonia—> inaction x debate over the recognition, of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s independence. —> Germany’s defection —> EC’s recognition

Phase 3. "EC+UN Security Council team"

x Mitterrand’s trip to Sarajevo as a "free rider" —> EC endorsement of Mitterrand’s results

x Greece’s disagreement over the recognition of Macedonia —> initial inaction of the EU. Later: UN implicit recognition of the FYROM —> the EC extablishes diplomatic relations with FYROM but refuses to accept its flag and symbols. Greece’s de facto embargo on Macedonia is persecuted by the EC in terms of art. 113 ( not as a defection from collective foreign policy (Greece defends its action on the basis of art. 224 - threat to fundamental national values).

x debate over type of military tool (NATO vs. WEU) —> long time of inaction and eventual use of both for the monitoring mission on the Adriatic, and of NATO for the no-fly zone mission (later empowered by the UNSC to use force). 11 © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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Section Two

The European Response to the Yugoslav Crisis: an alleged failure in search of a scholarly explanation

"theory without empirical work is, in long run, as empty as facts without theory" (Keohane,- 1989: 12)

In this section, I interpret the European management by a combined structure (international system Factor (state) approach.

My theoretical references are to neoliberal/rational institutionalism in the version proposed by Keohane (1989, 1990a, 1993a) and, even more, Keohane, Nye, Hoffmann eds., (1993), and to Moravcsik’s neoliberal intergovemmentalism (1991, 1992, 1993). The latter represents a further development of the rationalistic research project16. For all these approaches, therefore, the state is the main actor in world politics and "it" decides according to its interests and preferences. The way state decision-makers construct their preferences, however, differ across the perspectives17.

This set of theories seems well-equipped to allow for a plausible understanding of the EC/U management of the Yugoslav crisis. I will argue that the systemic changes brought by the so-called end of the Cold War had a substantial impact on the EC MSs’ perceptions and interests regarding the EC and its role in Yugoslavia. The post-Cold War opened to the EC new opportunities and incentives to operate in the international scenario. However, the new EC/U assertiveness demonstrated in Yugoslavia cannot be understood without a direct reference to the major EC MSs, their interests and perceptions.

Although its sovereignty might be partially transferred (James, 1991), or changed in nature (Christiansen, 1994; MacCormik, 1993; Keohane, 1993b) the MS continues to be a key variable to understand EC/U performance in foreign policy. What is interesting from an institutional perspective is the fact that the MSs’ interest and perceptions are frequently not understandable without a reference to the EC membership.

This was the case in the management of the Yugoslav crisis. The decision to handle the crisis as well as the main characteristics of its management cannot

16 On the "rationalistic research project" see Keohane, 1988; on the debate between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (also labelled "the relative vs. absolute gains debate") see Baldwin ed., 1993. An alternative analysis of rational institutionalism in terms of synthesis between neorealism and neoliberalism (the "neo-neo-synthesis") in Waever, 1994; on theory synthesis in IR, Alexopoulos & McCarthy, 1995; Kauppi & Viotti (eds.), 1992.

17 For a review of the different perspectives I remand to the above quoted literature, as the length of the paper does not allow for a wider presentation.

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be understood without an explicit reference to the EC position in the so-called international system at the time, and to the impact of the EC/U internal debate on the MSs’ decisions towards the Yugoslav crisis.

2.1. The decision to manage the Yugoslav crisis

In a neorealist perspective states are ultimately concerned about maintaining their existence and autonomy and engage in military affairs when this ultimate aim is in danger. International collaboration in military matters is possible when there is a “regional security complex” (Buzan et al., 1990) at work. Such collaboration “is shaped primarily by acceptability and availability of means not by the desirability of ends” (Waltz, 1979: 62).

This image of security might have fit well with the Cold War international system18, where a high polarisation around two main security complexes (the US-led one and the USSR-led one) and a constant threat of an atomic war gave a particular shape to security concerns. However, already by the second half of the ’80s, Gorbachev’s reforms indicated that a progressive but inarrestable change was developing. At present, the result of this change is an unclear security structure. Still ambiguous are the number of important actors in world politics and their definition of interests and concerns. In this context, a new and unfamiliar threat - the “breakdown of order” (Mortimer, 1992) - emerged, and for the first time since WWII, Western Europe faced the problem of defining its security interests.

In this context, existing international institutions, rather than disappear as expected by hard-core realists (Mearsheimer, 1990), played a crucial role. They not only provided to Western Europe the peace and stability that Eastern Europe lacked (Keohane, Nye, Hoffmann, eds., 1992), but also represented the element around which foreign policy and security interests and perceptions were redefined. In a certain sense the EC/U become a value in itself, and saving its existence and international role was a major concern for its MSs - even the less

18 It is worth admitting that the notions of "Cold War" and "Post-Cold War" are not as- clear-cut as they are presented here. The degree of polarisation around the two main security complexes was not constant during the so-called Cold War. Furthermore, it is difficult to indicate a particular event or date which represents the "end" of the Cold War. However, we cannot deny that since 1989 the world has seen a steady weakening of the previous two security complexes, to the disappearance of some security organisations (such as the Warsaw Pact) and the extension of others (such as NATO). This huge change, which coincides with the fragmentation of the former USSR and its "bloc" is usually referred to as "the end of the Cold War". 13 © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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"Europhoric" among them. The management of the Yugoslav crisis is a particularly telling point in question.

As a matter of fact, the June 1991 war in Slovenia cannot be considered a direct threat to all the EC MSs. There was not a security complex at work: some states, such as Germany, Italy and Greece, might have had a stronger perception of threat19, but most of the others had more incentives not to intervene than to intervene in the crisis management. In the case of the UK and Spain, for instance, there was a domestic incentive to abstain from intervening as it would create an unwelcome precedent of intermission in a state’s internal affairs.

Rather than resulting from the perception of a direct threat to the entire community, the Yugoslav crisis was conceived as a way to re-define the EC’s role in the changing international and European security system.

This is perfectly in line with the general atmosphere at the time which was of euphoria about the future shape of international relations. The European states, with France on top, had repeatedly shown their willingness to develop European institutions. The debate over a CFSP was going on and the post-Gulf war US seemed unwilling to continue paying for the Europeans’ security. The Yugoslav crisis offered the possibility to overcome the lack of cohesion Europe had shown in the Gulf and create a precedent for a future European role in international relations20. Therefore, the EC membership shaped the interests and preferences of its MSs: as Tsakaloyannis has written (1994: 48), “Had it not been for the Twelve’s Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on Political Union,

19 In the case of Germany, geopolitical analyses mainly refer to Germany’s historical aims in the area (Korinman, 1993). Domestic analyses focus on the Slovenian/Croat and industrial lobbies working in the country (Stark, 1992: 341) and to the social consequences of a-mass- immigration. In the case of Italy, geopolitical explanations refer to Italy’s interests in-re- gaining Istria or at least re-negotiating the Osimo agreement, and to the recent cooperation established both regionally - Alpe Adria - and nationally - Pentagonal/Hexagonal (Nuti, 1993: 3). Domestic explanations emphasis the threat perceived by the Italian population living near the border with Yugoslavia, the existence of Croat/Slovenian minorities in Italy and Italian minorities in Istria (Zametica, 1992: 48), and, again, the social consequences of a mass- immigration. In the case of Greece, geopolitical analyses read Greece’s interests at intervening as dictated by ancient aims over a greater Greece and on the historical friendship with Serbia (Pettifer, 1992), while domestic researches tend to enlighten the generally-perceived threat of an extension of the conflict to the entire Balkans.

20 Immediately after the EC Troika’s efforts led to a first truce, a sense of euphoria about the EC’s future international role appeared. Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jacques Poos (who held the EC Presidency until July 1, 1991) enthusiastically affirmed: “this is the hour of Europe” (New York Times, June 29, 1991), while for the Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis: “it is a good sign for the future of the political union” (Steinberg, 1993).

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it is likely that they might have reacted more guardedly”. Furthermore, even if we assume that the “reason for intervening [..was the ] sense of responsibility felt by most decision-makers [for the maintenance of order in Europe]” (Schmidt, 1994: 20), this sense of responsibility was that of "EC Members" and not of "national officials" because the reaction was constantly collective.

2.2. The diplomatic and collective type of action

Section One has shown three major characteristics of the EC/U reaction to the Yugoslav crisis: it was mostly-diplomatic, reactive and collective. Here I will account for these characteristics with the assumption that they were the result of the main EC/U MSs’ interests and perceptions.

In particular, I will analyse the UK, France and Germany’s position on: the debate over military intervention; and the debates over the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.

Around these two debates a set of beliefs developed.

On the first issue - military intervention - it is frequently said that a strong decision was long impeded by the lack of agreement among "Western powers". It is also said that the EC/U institutional weakness in terms of military power was a major impediment to an efficient crisis management. The second issue - Germany’s early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia - is often reported as an example of how the lack of intra-EC co-ordination leads to an inefficient reaction. This statement rests on two assumptions: a) Germany’s recognition policy can be regarded only as a defection from its membership duties; b) the recognition has a major responsibility for the war in BH. In the following I will evaluate the empirical support to these widespread beliefs.

The debate over military intervention. The debate over military intervention in June 1991-February 1994 had at least two phases: a first one until early 1992 and a second one from there on. During the first year of the crisis management, France assumed a far more assertive role as compared to its EC partners, proposing to send a lightly armed WEU peace-keeping force to Yugoslavia as early as August 1991. The idea, in the form of a UN emergency force, was reiterated by France and Austria shortly afterwards. Both times France’s idea was boycotted by the other EC MSs - except Germany - particularly by the UK. The main point under debate was the institution through which send the forces, not the action in itself. The UK led the pro-NATO party, while France led the pro-WEU party.

The debate assumed a very different nature from the beginning of 1992. The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia had already attributed an inter-national

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nature to the conflict and most decisions were debated within the UN Security Council. However, neither in this forum nor within the EC Council of Ministers was the debate over through which institution to act, but rather with the type of military action to perform. There was an unprecedented general consensus over "risking the least". Symptomatic of this, the indecision over, and delays of, the enforcement of UN resolutions over the use of force on the field. The deployment of blue helmets, established on February 21, 1992 (Resolution 743) had full authorisation only on April 7 (Resolution 749) and was not accomplished until May-June 1992. The no-fly zone was established on October 9, 1992 (Resolution 781), and was militarily enforced only on February 1994, after an endless number of empty threats.

Since 1992 most important military measures were performed through the WEU (monitoring of sanctions on the Danube), NATO (operation deny-flight) or the two of them together (monitoring of the arms embargo in the Adriatic Sea). That is to say that the debate on military intervention did not coincide anymore with the NATO vs. WEU dispute. Furthermore, disagreement was now particularly high between US-Americans (who had no troops in BH) and Western Europeans (who had troops on the field): West Europeans were not disposed to risk their troops with an air-strikes campaign as proposed by the US.

The fact that the "military intervention debate" changed nature by the beginning of 1992 shows what an impact the EC internal "institution-building debate" had on the European management of the Yugoslav crisis. It does not seem to be by chance that such a shift in the states’ position occurred in coincidence with the signature of the Maastricht Treaty; the WEU vs. NATO debate was but a reflection of the discussion within the Intergovernmental Conference on CFSP. Once the Maastricht process was concluded, the main preoccupation both for France and Britain become: a) containing the conflict to BH (interviews, September 1995); and b) dealing with the domestic demands over the crisis management.

The UK is the European country with the strongest tradition of military intervention abroad. Furthermore, it is also a country with a public opinion strongly in favour of intervention (Towle, 1994: 97). If it is true that "both the general British public opinion and the political establishment have less resistance to [...] becom[ing] involved in foreign crises" (Towle, 1994: 94), why did not the UK take the lead in a more decisive military action in the Bosnian case? Public opinion, most of the press (The Times, the Guardian, the Independent, etc.), and one part of all political parties took a pro-peace enforcement position. So why was the line of the British government so hesitant?

The British government was to face general elections in the following spring, whose result was highly uncertain. Therefore, "the last thing that the

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government must have wanted [was] to have British soldiers killed" (Jakobsen, 1993b: 41), especially in a far-away quarrel which did not represent a direct threat for the country. Although public opinion was pressing for tougher action, the government feared the eventual change of attitude of its electorate once British blue helmets were killed and/or the TV showed British heavily armed helicopters firing highly-populated areas. For this reason the UK opposed the US proposal of air strikes and expressed strong scepticism about deploying ground troops whose task went beyond humanitarian aid21. The government scepticism might have been influenced also by the military’s opposition to become heavily involved in a too complicated local war, for which British troops were not equipped, lacking the necessary infantry and artillery (Towle,

1994; interviews at the FCO).

It is also true that in the British tradition, experience in external intervention and national pride of being a Great Power could not be dismissed solely by the government concerns over a possible ’U turn’ in public opinion and the opposition of the military. However, these elements became of great importance when compared to the actual interests in the military intervention.

The same can be said about France, which, however, maintained a more asserive attitude, as compared to the other European states. Most of the international community’s initiatives - such as the lightly-armed peace-keeping force, the arms embargo, the opening of a co-sponsored Peace Conference, the establishment of a no-fly-zone over BH - were French. They were initially opposed by a group of countries lead by the UK but eventually adopted. In spite of a substantial opposition of the French militaries to military intervention (Howorth, 1994), France not only was the promoter of most initiatives in ex- Yugoslavia, but was also one of the countries which supplied the greatest number of troops to UNPROFOR. How can this behaviour be exlained?

In a rationalistic perspective, two possible explanations exist. The first focuses on French leaders’ attention to public opinion. French public opinion, part of the media and intellectuals brought good reasons for a decisive military intervention (Howorth, 1994) and a clear identification of the main responsibles. In this perspective, Mitterrand’s surprise visit to Sarajevo in June 1992 can be interpreted as a message to domestic public opinion.

In support to the "domestic concerns explanation", it can be observed that France’s assertiveness functioned as a "barometer of the public opinion" (Howorth, 1994: 113): it was characterised by periods of intense pressure for intervention followed by periods of lower attentiveness. Usually the periods of

21 Evidence for the importance of public opinion in shaping Britain’s position towards humanitarian aid an minimal usage of military tools was widely provided by diplomats I interviewed at the Foreign Office and British Ministry of Defence, September 1995.

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greater pressure followed exceptional news of the events on the battle-field, therefore the proposals for action were reactive and never preventive, nor did they follow a strategic plan. During the referendum on the ratification of Maastricht Treaty, then, the debate on intervention had a sensible impact on the positions adopted in the intervention dispute (Howorth, 1994: 113; on the various positions in the debate Le Figaro, 13/1/93). In particular, Bernard Kouchner - the French State Secretary for Humanitarian Action - gave a substantial help to the "oui" party by reminding the French public opinion that "more Europe [was] needed in order to protect the inhabitants of Sarajevo" (in Floquet & Coq, 1993: 17)“ .

A second explanation of France’s assertiveness depicts France in neorealist terms: its support to the UN is seen as a way to signalling that France is a Great Power, and a way of protecting its permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

I will argue that both factors - public opinion and power-politics - played a role in the UK’s and France’s attitudes in phase 2 of the military intervention debate. In the Post-Cold War, neither France nor the UK wanted to loose their privileged position within the UN Security Council. Moreover, the low perception of a direct threat forced state-leaders to justify their foreign policy actions before a newly-assertive public opinion (which required to "do something" but not to risk too much).

The country under the highest pressure by public opinion was Germany. Strong pressure in favour of helping Slovenia and Croatia appeared in June 1991. In spite of the initial divergence of opinion between the CDU and the SPD regarding the institutional form of action (the CDU being in favour of a WEU intervention, while the SPD favoured a UN action), the German government eventually supported not only peace-keeping efforts but also peace making initiatives, provided that no German troops would be deployed out of the NATO area.

The entire debate over military intervention in ex-Yugoslavia was a non debate in Germany: all political sides agreed on the inadmissibility of the deployment of German troops in the scene of Hitler’s crimes (Muller, 1994). However, the debate over the legitimate use of force in the Yugoslav case was fuel to the German domestic debate on out-of-NATO-area actions. Germany’s basic law allows the use of the Bunderswehr only for self-defence, with the exceptions of national emergencies and participation in systems of collective security (Art. 24, 2). The CDU, on the one hand, and SPD and FDP, on the other, disagreed over the interpretation of the latter exception. For the CDU 22

22 On the importance of the "factor Kouchner" in France’s humanitarisme d ’Etat see Floquet & Coq, 1993.

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Germany’s participation in a NATO’s operation were included in the exception, for SPD and FDP it did not as NATO was to be considered a system of collective defence. The discussion went on with no formal revision of the Constitution but with a flexible interpretation of it by the government22 23.

The consensus over CDU’s "flexible interpretation" of Art. 24, could not continue long. When German destroyers were to help supervise the embargo against Serbia and, again, when the Cabinet decided to participate in the no-fly- zone operation, the opposition went to the Constitutional Court. In the first case, the Court found that the NATO/WEU operation in the Adriatic surpassing the limits of the founding Treaties, and judged that the WEU’s St. Petersburg declaration implied a change in the Treaty which should be subject to Parliamentary ratification (Muller, 1994: 129). On the second case, the Court was much more unclear. It was requested to respond by ’urgent ruling’ rather than by ’main case jurisdiction’, for this reason the ratio of the judgement was to compare the eventual costs of non-involvement versus those of involvement. Interesting enough, the Court decided that Germany’s abstention to participate would weaken its reputation before the Allies, and that the Bunderswelt could take part into the operation as far as it was a low-risk one (Muller, 1994: 130). A short note can be added on Germany’s position in the WEU vs. NATO dispute. Germany did not assume any radical position but, as traditionally, had a double-track strategy. It was the co-author of the French proposal about WEU peace-keeping troops, but at the same time it was one of the main architect of the NACC. According to a neorealist interpretation, “supporting both sides [was] the optimal security strategy Germany [could] pursue” (Jakobsen, 1993a: 60): it enabled Germany to co-operate and reassure France, while keeping French and British nuclear arms under a broader - and safer - security umbrella. At the same time, it allowed Germany to maintain “a very long-established” relation with Washington (Morgan, 1992).

Summing up, the initial part of the military intervention debate was shaped by the EC internal debate over institutional development of a European security structure. The time of particular euphoria around the possible EC/U future role in Western security shaped the attitude of both the Europhorics (France) and the Eurosceptics (the UK). In the continuation of the crisis management, when the Maastricht process was concluded and the EC failure to end the war was already clear, France and the UK tended to agree over doing

22 The post-Cold War re-opened the debate over art. 24. Although no solution was in sight, the conservative government progressively extended Germany’s participation in UN military actions staring with the deployment of mine sweepers in the Gulf after the war. It proceeded providing air support to the UNSCOM and IAEA missions in Iraq (following UN Resolution 687), and continued with a medical unit to Cambodia - the first German unit to assist in a UN peace-keeping action (MYller, 1994).

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something (as both their international role and their domestic public opinion demanded), but not risking too much (as domestic concerns and the lack of a direct interests suggested). On the entire issue Germany’s attitude seemed to influenced by a) the internal debate over constitutional limitations to Germany’s troops, and b) Germany’s the concern over not putting its privileged relationship with the US, on the one hand, and France, on the other, in danger.

Confronting the findings of this paragraph with two "beliefs" around the military intervention in ex-Yugoslavia, we can say that the lack of a substantial military intervention in the first phases of the crisis management can rather plausibly be attributed to the lack of agreement within the European coalition and to the lack of a common rapid reaction force. The existence of such a force would have also reduced the disagreement occurred until January 1992. The euphoric climate around the EC management of the Yugoslav crisis - which continued until the failure of the Brioni Agreement - would have probably lead the Twelve to use such a rapid reaction force to monitor the cease-fire and prevent further escalation of the conflict. This argument has been used for the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force in former Yugoslavia, Euroforce and Euromarforce.

However, the eventual existence of an EU armed force would not imply an automatic use of it in future external conflict management. It could avoid disagreements concerning the institutional forum/national troops to use, but it could not overcome the intrinsic constrains represented by unanimity or even majority voting. The agreement over a collective military action is a conditio sine qua non of any EU action in foreign policy.

The recognition o f Slovenia and Croatia. It is no exaggeration to affirm that this is the most debated question of the whole European reaction to the Yugoslav crisis. Germany’s early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia represented the first great breach to the collective management within the European coalition. By then the Yugoslav conflict/s become legally "international" and the UN assumed a more relevant role.

Germany occupied a pivotal position in the early EC response. If at the beginning it shared the common EC "wait and see" attitude (Zametica, 1993), it assumed a different position as soon as fighting began in Slovenia. By late June 1991, various German Parliamentarians demanded the recognition of the two ex-Yugoslav republics and the isolation of Serbia. Both Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher appealed to the right to self-determination and denounced the JNA’s behaviour. During July, the German Government pressed its EC partners restlessly for a quick recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, supporting it as the only way of stopping the shootings.

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In early December, Germany, supported by Italy and Denmark, reiterated its intention to recognise Slovenia and Croatia by Christmas unless an agreement was reached by December 10.

At the EC Council of Ministers meeting on December 16, two compromise declarations were adopted: one regarding Yugoslavia, and the other the criteria of recognition of new states in Eastern Europe24. The general agreement was to wait for the Badinter Commission’s advice on the candidates’ fulfilment of the criteria indicated. All this notwithstanding, and contrary to the opinion of the American Administration (Simic, 1992: 76), on December 20 Germany recognised the two republics without even consulting its Community partners. Kohl described it as “a great triumph of German foreign policy” (Zametica, 1993: 65), but it caused enormous problems to the EPC, and has been frequently - although wrongly - interpreted as the main cause of the break out of war in BH. The German decision was immediately followed by the EC partners, in an extreme attempt at eventually saving the EC cohesion, even if they strongly denounced the German defection.

What was the reason for Germany’s shift in preference by June 1991? Why did it undertake an unilateral recognition exactly when the whole EC had accepted the disruption of Yugoslavia as a fait accompli ?

Most of the explanations offered for Germany’s preference over recognition and its eventual unilateral act refer to the historical German territorial aims in that region25, or to the modem economic interests in expanding its influence in the developed Slovenia and Croatia26. A further

neo-24 Valuable juridical perspectives on the recognition issue are in Rich, 1993, and TYrk, 1993.

25 An old-fashioned "balance of power” explanation of the eventual recognition by Germany’s EC partners was offered by the former Italian FM, Gianni De Michelis. In an interview to L ’Espresso (4/7/1993), De Michelis accused Germany of having "forced” its allies to go along with recognition by threatening to re-open the question of the border with Poland. “The EC fell back to Germany’s pressures - he said - in favour of the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in order to put the [German] revanscist aims towards East in a secondary position. In a certain sense, we let the Germans ’run’ in Yugoslavia not to have other problems” (translation of the author).

26 Le Monde Diplomatique, in September 1991, reported that more than 150 German firms had invested in Slovenia alone. However, Germany’s trade interests in the East are not even comparable with its interests in maintain good economic relations with the West. In 1991, approximately one-half of Germany’s investment abroad was in EC Member, and one-quarter in the US. In 1992, about 78% of all export was directed to the Western market. Compared with this the level of export and investment in the East was very low. Therefore, although there might have been some economic interest in opening new markets in the East, the greatest economic interest was to maintain the wide Western market (Schwarz, 1994: 100).

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imperialistic/espansionistic explanation focuses on Germany’s interest in stabilising the East as the US did with the West after WWII (Schwarz, 1994). These explanations tend to dismiss Germany’s strong preference for multilateral co-ordination. Indeed, Germany’s behaviour since its reunification seems to confirm that it “has a strong, specifically national interest in the stabilisation of the East [...but that] it is determined to co-ordinate its Eastern European policy with its partners in the West” (Schwarz, 1994: 102). In spite of what has been widely written, Germany’s recognition of Slovenia and Croatia is a case in

point. /

Until June 1991, although the around 470.000 Croat workers immigrants were already lobbying for the recognition of Croatia, Germany supported the collective EC line: keep Yugoslavia united. When the conflict started, the internal pressure for the recognition of the break-up republics rose, but no unilateral action was undertaken. German representatives at the EC began pressing for the identification of the Serbs as the main responsible party and for the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, with the aim of reaching a collective agreement on the issue. The reason for this shift in preference cannot be attributed to ancestral German aims on that area, which could not fit with Germany’s attempts within the IGCs to deepen EC integration. Rather, the reasons for Germany’s preferences over the Yugoslav case are to be found in the domestic concerns of Germany’s policy makers.

As the conflict started, the pro-intervention, pro-recognition party rose its voice. It was led by the popular newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung which was able to mobilise a large part of public opinion. The themes of the Slovenians’ and Croats’ right of independence in the name of the principle of self-determination - recently adopted by the German population in the DDR - were proposed on a daily basis. As Beverly Crawford (1993) observes, this type of political propaganda eventually reached the main political parties and reminded them how the "principle of self-determination" had been crucial in the post unification elections (in which the CDU’s use of the self-determination principle paid off). For this reason the CDU started to use this type of propaganda also in the case of Slovenia and Croatia, and the SPD and FDP could do anything but follow the same strategy. Crawford (1993) refers to this as "bandwagoning effect" on domestic political elites. The effect was reinforced by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung which "cultivated" the pro-recognition issue by an "almost daily bombardment" (Crawford, 1993: 38). In a short time political parties’ elites were pressing Kohl and Gensher to oppose the EC course.

Already by the beginning of July, Germany’s position diverged for the EC line, but both Kohl and Gensher agreed to maintain the multilateral co ordination. The strategy adopted seemed to be that of gaining the EC partners’