Luhmann Conservative, Luhmann Progressive

(1)

EUI

WORKING

PAPERS IN

LAW

EUI Working Paper LAW No. 90/7

Luhmann Conservative, Luhmann Progressive Reiner Grundmann © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(2)

(3)

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE

WP F a 9

EUI Working Paper LAW No. 90/7

EUR

Luhmann Conservative, Luhmann Progressive

Reiner Grundmann

BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)

(4)

No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form without permission of the author

European University Institute Badia Fiesolana 1-50016 San Domenico (FI)

Italy © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(5)

EUI

WORKING

PAPERS IN

LAW

Luhmann Conservative, Luhmann Progressive Reiner Grundmann © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(6)

3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9 2 9 4 9 9

Please note

As from January 1990 the EUI Working Paper Series is divided into six sub-series, each sub-series will be numbered

individually (e.g. EUI Working Paper ECO No. 90/1). ©

The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(7)

DEPARTMENT OF LAW

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE

WP Fa9

EUR

Luhmann Conservative, Luhmann Progressive

Reiner Grundmann

BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)

(8)

No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form without permission of the author

European University Institute Badia Fiesolana 1-50016 San Domenico (FI)

Italy © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(9)

Luhmann conservative, Luhmann progressive

by R einer G ru n d m a n n E u ro p e an U niversity In stitu te Florence S ep tem b er 1990 © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research

(10)

(11)

of th e s u b je c t a n d to th e idea th a t individuals a re th e basic u n its of social action. B u t I sh all n o t a tte m p t to give a com prehen siv e exposition of th e th eo ry of au to p o ie sis a s developed b y L u h m a n n 2. Instead, som e a s p e c ts of L u h m a n n ’s am b itio u s a n d com plex theory shall be picked o u t a n d tre a te d in a r a th e r n o n -sy ste m a tic way, draw ing on h is c o n trib u tio n s to legal th eo ry a n d th e critiqu e of ideology. T his sh a ll b e done so a s to ju x ta p o s e h is theo retical o u tlin e w ith th o se of

Anglo-2 From L u h m a n n ’s w ritings on th e topic th e re a re now availbale Ecological Communication. Cam bridge: Polity P ress (1989); E s s a y s on Self-Reference. New York: C olum bia U niversity P ress (1990, forthcom ing). S tan fo rd U niversity P ress p re p a re s a tra n s la tio n of Soziale S y stè m e . For o th er c o n trib u tio n s, see th e a rticles in H u m b erto M a tu ra n a a n d F ran cisco V arela (eds.) Autopoietic S y ste m s. A Characterization

o f the Living Organization, U rb an a (111.) (1975); H. M a tu ra n a

a n d F. V araela (eds.) A utopoiesis a n d Cognition. The

R ealization o f the Living. D ordrecht: Reidei (1980); M ilan

Zeleny (ed.) Autopoiesis: A Theory o f Living Organization, New York: Elsevier (1981); G u n th e r T eu b n er (ed.) Autopoietic Law:

A N ew Approach to L a w a n d Society, Berlin: de G ruyter

(1988); G u n th e r T e u b n e r (ed.) State, Law, Econom y a s

Autopoietic S y ste m s, Milano: Giuffré (1990, forthcom ing). For

a len gh ty review article, see A rth u r J . J a c o b s o n ’A utopoietic Law: T he New Science of Niklas L u h m a n n ’ in 87 M ichigan

L a w R eview (1989), pp. 1647-1689. For a general re p re s e n ta tio n of L u h m a n n ’s w ork in E nglish, see h is Trust

a n d Power. C h ichester: Wiley (1979); D ifferentiation o f Society.

New York: C olum bia U niversity P ress (1982); A Sociological

Theory o f Law . London: R outedge (1985); Love a s Passion.

C am bridge: Polity P ress (1986); Political Theory in the W elfare

State. Berlin: de G ru y ter (1990).

(12)

R einer G ra n d m a m i

Luhmann conservative, Luhmann progressive'

The lawyer has to legitimate the world as it is.

Jacob Taubes If we presuppose society as it is the only thing we can do is to conserve it.

Niklas Luhmann

Writing on L u h m an n for a n Anglo-am erican readership, one could be tem pted to adopt a h a b it of explaining autopoiesis in a way rem iniscent of Lyotard’s well-known booktitle* 1. This is not m eant to be p resu m p tu o u s or provocative. The theoretical traditions of G erm an an d Anglo-am erican th o u g h t are quite distinct, a fact w hich m akes com m unication across the board ers difficult. The m ost single im p ortan t difference is perh ap s L u h m an n ’s abolition of any appeal to th e philosophy

I w ish to th a n k Niklas L u h m an n , S e a n S m ith a n d G u n th e r T e u b n e r for valu able com m en ts.

1 See J.F . Lyotard, Le postm odem e expliqué a u x enfants. Paris: Galilée (1986). © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(13)

a m e ric a n th e o rists, s u c h a s R aw ls’. B u t som e a tte n tio n is also paid to H a b e rm a s ’ com peting project. In fact, m an y of th e A nglo-am erican a u d ie n c e kn ow L u h m a n n ’s sy stem th eo ry only from a F ra n k fu rtia n reading . T his read in g n u r tu r e d a long s ta n d in g av ersion to w ard s sy stem s th eo iy w hich is reg ard ed a s te c h n o c ra tic 3. T he p re s e n t article trie s to rec o n sid er s u c h a ju d g em e n t.

T he two ep ig ram s4 a t th e beginning of th e te x t seem to su g g e st th a t L u h m a n n is prim arily in te re ste d in ju stify ing existing order, n o t to criticise o r to c h an g e it. However, th is im p re ssio n is co n trad icted by sta te m e n ts w h ere L u h m a n n

3 Cf. R obert Lilienfeld, ’S y stem s T heory a s a n Ideology’ in 42 Social R esea rch pp. 6 37 -6 6 0 (1975); P eter Ludz, ’M arxism a n d S y stem s T heory in a B u re a u cra tic Society’ in 42 Social

R esea rch pp. 6 6 1 -6 7 4 (1975).

4 In th e original th ey re a d a s follows; ’D er J u r i s t muJ3 die Welt, wie sie ist, legitim ieren. Solange a u c h n u r eine ju ris tis c h e Form g efun d en w erden k a n n , m it w elcher Spitzfindigkeit a u c h im m er, ist es u n b e d in g t zu tu n , d e n n s o n s t reg iert d a s C h ao s.’ (Jacob T au b es, A d Carl Schm itt.

G egenstrebige Fügung. Berlin: Merve (1987), p.72) a n d ’If

society is su p p o s e d to be w h a t it is, th e n th e problem c a n be only to con serve society, to co n tin u e solving its p ro b lem s, a n d possibly to im prove problem solving a n d to overcom e u n ex p ecetd difficulties.' Niklas L u h m an n , T auto log y an d P arad o x in th e self-D escriptions of M odem Society’ in 6

Sociological Theory (1988), p.28. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(14)

defends him self a g a in st exactly s u c h ch arges. For exam ple, h e sa y s th a t h e does n o t w a n t to ju stify existing sy ste m s an d th e ir fu n ctio n s, th a t h e does n o t in a n o rm ative way reco m m en d th e fu n ctio n s h e d e scrib es5. How a re we to resolve th is p arad o x ? Or, if it is no p arad ox , how a re we to reconcile th e two s ta te m e n ts ? One way to view th is q u e stio n is to draw a d istin ctio n betw een law yers a n d sociologists. T his w ould be a move w h ich follows T a u b e s’ d ictu m . A ccording to this, L u h m a n n th e law yer w ould be th e conservative, and L u h m a n n th e sociologist w ould b e th e progressive. However app ealing th is suggestion m ay be, it is p u t into q u e stio n by th e fact th a t L u h m a n n ’s th eo ry really does n o t lend itself to s u c h a n e a t se p aratio n . The ’progressive’ sociologist h a s to face th e sa m e problem a s th e ’conservative’ lawyer.

I sh a ll a d re s s b o th a sp e c ts in w h a t follows. First, I focus on som e a sp e c ts of L u h m a n n ’s legal th eo iy (I.) a n d th e n tu r n to th e problem of self-description of m o d ern society — a

5 N iklas L u h m an n , Legitimation durch Verfahren (3rd ed. 1978), p. 6. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(15)

problem w h ich com m only is dealt w ith in te rm s of 'critique of ideology’ (II.).

I.

L u h m a n n ’s w riting on legal theory h a s b e e n extensive from th e m id 1960s onw ards. Here, however, I sh a ll focus m ainly o n tw o w riting s from th e 1980s, viz. A usdifferenzierung d e s

R e c h ts a n d Soziale S ystem e. In w h a t follows I w ish to direct

th e a tte n tio n to th e q u e stio n s of ju stice , law, n o rm s, values, a n d conflict.

C onfronting L u h m a n n w ith a u th o rs like H a b e rm a s or Raw ls, one w ould n o te th a t th e co ncept of legitim acy, w hich p lay s a m o st im p o rta n t role in th eir th eories, is tre a te d by him in a com pletely different way.

Legitim acy © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research

(16)

For L u h m an n , m o d ern positive law provides its own legitim acy6, it is n o t d e p e n d en t on a n 'overlapping c o n s e n s u s ’7, n o r on a n eth ics of u n iv ersa l p rag m a tic s8. L u h m a n n , therefore, is m u c h n e a re r to A nglo-am erican w ays of ad d re ssin g th is problem 9. The tra d itio n of positive law from K elsen to H art to Dw orkin is s h a re d by L u h m a n n . According to L u h m an n , th ere is a decisive difference betw een a n c ie n t a n d m o d ern law. W h ereas th e form er derived its validity from its enviro n m ent, i.e. from a 'divine' or 'n a tu ra l' order, th e la tte r derives its validity from its own o p eratio ns. M odern law itse lf e sta b lish e s w h a t is legal w h ich is to say, it itself e s ta b lish e s its ow n validity. T here is no place in m o d ern societies w here a n objective an d ratio n al in sta n c e w ould

6 Significantly, h e avoids speak in g a b o u t legitim acy an d u s e s th e term of validity.

7 J o h n Raw ls A Theory o f Justice. Oxford: Oxford U niversity P ress (1971).

8 H ab erm as, Theory o f Com m unicative Action, Vol 1 a n d 2, B oston: B eacon P ress (1984) a n d C am bridge: Polity Press (1987).

9 O u r initial s ta te m e n t th a t L u h m a n n is q u ite d istin c t from A nglo-am erican th o u g h t h a s therefore to be a tte n u a te d , a t le a s t w ith re sp e c t to law. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(17)

re s id e 10 a n d w hich could provide a rig h t answ er. T he re a so n therefo re is, a s sh a ll becom e clearer in sectio n II., th a t society h a s n o p ossibility of perceiving itself a s society. Only social s u b s y ste m s a re c a p ab le of self-observation a n d self re p re s e n ta tio n 11.

Given th is prem ise, how c a n we, for exam ple, m ak e se n se of m o ral conflict? How is one to ev aluate th e p e rsiste n c e of radically divergent conceptio ns of th e good in m o d ern society? T he gen eral a n sw e r w ould be th a t L u h m a n n exam in es s u c h q u e stio n s n o t from th e view point of m oral p h ilo sophy b u t from a perspective of th e sociology of law. T his is to sa y th a t m oral q u e stio n s a re n o t looked a t by a m oral th eory w hich w ould only lead to parad o x es o r infinite reg re sse s sin ce a

10 See also L u h m a n n A usdijferenzierung d e s Rechts. B eitrâge zu r Rechtssoziologie u n d R echtstheorie. F ra n k fu rt

am M ain: S u h rk a m p (1981); Soziale S y stè m e . F ra n k fu rt am M ain: S u h rk a m p (1984); T ra n sla tio n Social S y ste m s.

S tanford: S tan fo rd U niversity P ress (forthcoming).

11 Cf. th e opposing ap p ro a c h of H ab erm as, ’K ônnen konp lex e G esellsch aften ein e v e m ü n ftig e Id e n titâ t a u s b ild e n ? ’ in Zur R eko nstruktion d e s historischen M aterialism us. F ran k fu rt: S u h rk a m p (1976). H a b erm as does

n o t a c c e p t L u h m a n n ’s concequences; h e trie s to keep open th e p o ssibility for a ’fu tu re , ratio n al collective id en tity ’.

(18)

m oral th eory alw ays w a n ts to b e ’good’ a n d n o t ’b a d ’. Sociological inquiry, on th e o th e r h a n d , c a n afford to look a t rea l m ec h a n ism s in a d isin te re ste d way. T he cool an d an aly tical view m ay be of g re a te r h elp th a n a m oral w ay of looking a t th ing s. We sh all follow L u h m a n n in th is o rientation.

P e rh ap s th e m o st im p o rta n t a p p ro a c h in th is resp e c t is L u h m a n n ’s elab oratio n of th e theory of double contingency a n d its corollaries. D eparting from th e p rem ise of double con ting ency in social life12, th e q u estio n of how social o rd er becom es p o ssib le is resolved by a n a n a ly sis of th e m e c h a n ism s w hich lead to a positive so lu tio n of th is double in d eterm in acy . E x p ectatio n s w hich c a n be fulfilled or fru s tra te d (disappointed) becom e m o st cru cial h ere. Basically th e re a re two types of expectations: ex p ectatio n s w hich are open to lea rn in g a n d ex p ectatio n s w hich a re no t. T he first

12 T alcott P arso n s, E dw ard Shils et al. (1951) Tow ard a

General Theory o f Action. Theoretical F oundations f o r the Social Sciences. New York: H arp er & Row, p. 16,

(19)

type is cognitive, th e seco n d norm ative'3. T he cognitive type is d ifferen tiated a n d in stitu tio n a lise d by science, th e n o rm ativ e type by law.

Values a n d Norm s

For L u h m a n n , v a lu e s a re n o t generalized n o rm s. V alues a re sim ply ru le s of preference, th ey do n o t c o n ta in claim s a b o u t th e rig h tn ess of social action. T his w ould be possible only if a lexical o rdering of v alu es w ere a t o u r d isposal, for exam ple, only if w e could ra n k liberty, peace, c u ltu re , a n d profit o n a scale, m ak in g s u re th a t profit does n o t figure h ig h e r th a n lib erty 13 14. B u t it is com m only accepted th a t s u c h a sc ale is n o t available to u s 15. On th e contrary, we h ave in n u m e ra b le v alu es a n d th e ir ra n k in g is ch anging all th e tim e. V alues a re u s e d in co m m u n icatio n to te s t if specific ex p ectatio n s a re

13 Cf. L u h m a n n , Soziale S y stè m e , p. 437; Rechtssoziologie. Reinbek: Rowohlt (1972), pp. 40 ff. T ra n sla te d a s A

Sociological Theory o f Law , London: R outledge (1985).

14 L u h m a n n , Soziale S ystèm e, pp. 433-4.

15 Cf. also L u h m a n n T auto log y a n d P arad o x ’, op. cit., p. 33.

(20)

realistic. In L u h m a n n ’s w ords, v alu es a re u s e d in ’pro bin g’ specific e x p e cta tio n s16

T u rn in g to th e u s e of th e te rm ’n o rm ’ th e following should be noted. L u h m a n n tries to find a m iddle w ay betw een n a tu r a l rig h ts th eo ries a n d classical sociology. The form er is co n cern ed w ith finding or justify in g j u s t norms, th e la tte r ex plains th e existing social o rd er in a ssu m in g a com m only s h a re d n o rm ativ e o rie n ta tio n 17. Take, for exam ple, th e following s ta te m e n t by Parso ns:

’F u rth e rm o re , th e double contin gen cy im plies th e n o rm ativ e o rien tatio n of action, sin ce a lte r’s reactio n of p u n is h m e n t or rew ard is su p e ra d d e d to a lte r’s ’in trin sic ’ o r d ire c t b ehavioral reactio n to ego’s original selection. If p u n is h m e n t or rew ard by a lte r is rep eated ly m anifested u n d e r c e rtain conditions, th is rea c tio n a c q u ires for ego th e m ean in g of a n a p p ro p riate co n seq u en ce of ego’s conform ity

16 Cf. L u h m a n n , Soziale S y s tè m e ; for th e difference betw een v alu es a n d p rogram m s, see ibid., pp. 432 ff.

17 ’In c o n tra s t to th e old E u ro p e an theory of society, we do n o t begin from norm ative p resu p p o sitio n s. Nor like D u rkh eim or P a rso n s do we view th e concept of n o rm s as th e u ltim a te ex p lan atio n of th e fact or possibility of social o rd er p u re a n d sim ple.’ L u h m an n , Soziale S y stè m e , p. 444.

(21)

w ith o r deviation from th e n o rm s of a sh a red sym bolic

s y s te m .''8.

In com m en tin g o n th is p assag e, L u h m a n n p o in ts o u t th a t P a rso n s sh o u ld have em phasized ’rep e a te d ly ’ in ste a d of ’s h a re d sym bolic sy ste m ’18 19. T his is to say, th a t only u n d e r th e co nd ition of rep e a te d experiences a ’s h a re d sym bolic sy ste m ’ c a n arise: th e dim en sio n of tim e is co n stitu tiv e of all social order. And it is precisely h e re th a t th e ’n o rm s ’ a re located (cf.

ibid., p. 429). T he ta s k for social th eo ry , therefore, is m u c h

m ore difficult.

T he d a n g e r of th e n o rm ative ap p ro a c h to n o rm s lies in its naive id ealism a s is ex p ressed in its b asic a s s u m p tio n s of a social c o n tra c t a n d th e s u p p o se d situ a tio n of free choice a t th e p o in t of its em ergence. T he d a n g e r of th e classical

18 P a rso n s e t al.. General Theory, p. 16, orig. e m p h a sis. The p a s sa g e c o n tin u e s: 'A sh a re d symbolic sy ste m is a sy stem of ’w ays of o rien tin g ’, p lu s th o se ’external sym bols' w h ich control th e s e w ays of orienting, th e sy stem being so geared in to th e ac tio n sy ste m s of b o th ego a n d a lte r th a t th e e x te rn al sym bol b rin g fo rth th e sa m e or a co m p lem entary p a tte rn of o rie n tatio n in b o th of them . S u c h a sy stem , w ith its m u tu a lity of norm ative o rien tatio n , is logically th e m o st e le m en ta ry form of c u ltu re ... c u ltu re provides th e s ta n d a rd s (value-orientations) w h ich a re applied in evaluative p ro ce sse s.’

19 Soziale Systèm e, p. 175. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(22)

sociological a p p ro a c h (which ta k e s existing n o rm s a s ex p lan ato ry of social order) evades th e q u e stio n of how social o rd er is possible in th e first place. It begs th e q u e stio n since it refers th e problem to th e p a s t su p p o sin g th a t it h a s alread y b e e n solved. In o th e r w ords, w h e re as th e n o rm ativ e a p p ro a c h trie s to find legitim ate so lu tio n s for society, th e sociological a p p ro a c h trie s to explain social cohesion by a n axiom atic se ttin g of generally accepted n o rm s. W hich escap e ro u te does L u h m a n n p ropose?

A ccording to L u h m an n , holding o neself b o u n d to n o rm s is in effect a pervasive fact of social life w hich c a n b e explained by th e n ecessity of m eaningful a n d self-referential rep ro d u c tio n of th e s e n o rm s. T his a p p ro a c h is m ore am b itio u s in th a t it trie s to show m ec h a n ism s of rep ro d u c tio n of n o rm s in tim e. N orm s a n d th e ir rep ro d u ctio n a re seen a s a n ongoing p ro cess. They em erge w henever m eaningful generalization s are n e c e s s a iy w hich c a n be claim ed in a c o u n te rfa c tu a l way. E x p ectatio n s w h ich a re valid w ith o u t resp e c t to fac tu al events a re called generalized expectations. They leave open w h a t exactly is expected sin ce th ey h av e th re e d im ensions: a

(23)

tem p o ral, a m ate ria l a n d a social d im en sion20. N orm s are located in th e tem p oral dim en sio n w h e re as p e rso n s, roles, v a lu e s a n d p ro g ram m es a re located in th e ’S a c h d im e n sio n ’ (of.

ibid., pp. 4 2 9 ff.).

L a w

T hose n o rm ativ e exp ectatio n s w hich a re n o t open to learn in g p ro ce sse s a re obviously crucial. N orm ative ex p ectatio n s a re conditioned by a so rt of 'safety n e t’, by th e social in stitu tio n of law. They c a n be fu rth e r d istin g u ish e d into c o n fo rm an t a n d dev ian t b ehaviour, viz. to lerated a n d p ro h ibited behaviour. However, n o t all norm ative ex p ectatio n s a re law. As L u h m a n n p o in ts out.

'Additionally, c o n s e n s u s m u s t be p resu p p o se d n o t only for th e n o rm ativ e style of expectatio n b u t also for the re a d in e s s to im pose sa n c tio n s an d for th e carry in g o u t of conflicts w here th e se ex p ectatio n s a re th w a rte d . In th is resp ect, law is n o t only a m e a n s of solving social conflicts, b u t, in th e first place, a n d m o st im p o rta n t, a m e a n s of creatin g social conflict: a pro p for p re su m p tio n s, d e m a n d s

20 'Zeit- S ach - u n d Sozialdim ension’, cf. Soziale S y ste m e , p. 445. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(24)

a n d rejection s even in c a se s w here re sista n c e is ex p ected .’21.

In claim ing th a t m o d ern law alw ays p lays th e d ouble role of creatin g a n d solving social conflict, L u h m a n n show s th a t he directly opposes N eo-K antian th eo ries s u c h a s R aw ls’ an d H a b e rm a s’. To recall, R aw ls’ in te re s t lies in th e conditions for a ’j u s t ’ society, H a b e rm a s’ in te re s t lies in a ratio n al society in w hich c o n se n su s, founded solely on th e force of th e b e tte r a rg u m e n t, plays the con stitu tiv e role. For L uh m an n , th ese c o n sid e ratio n s belong to a d isco u rse w hose p re su p p o stio n s have b e e n su p e rse d e d by th e con d itio n s of m odernity, i.e. by th e cond itio n of a highly differentiated society. For him , law s u p p o rts b e h av io u r w hich otherw ise could n o t be su sta in e d , for exam ple in c a se s w here one is th e w eaker or liable to be a tta c k e d on m oral g ro u n d s. In th is sen se, law se cu re s freedom , including freedom of conflict a n d freedom of socially u n d e sira b le behaviour. N either eth ics n o r re a so n c a n achieve th is fu n d a m e n ta l function of law sin ce b o th of th e m have to align th em selv es too strongly w ith desired or desirab le

21 L u h m an n , Soziale S y stè m e , p. 451, m y tra n si.; see also L u h m an n , Ausdifferenzierung, pp. 104-5. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(25)

r e s u lts 22. T his in d ic a te s n o t only t h a t L u h m a n n refu ses H a b e rm a s ’ m o ral p hilosophy b u t also t h a t h e o u ts trip s R aw ls’ lib eralism .

C o n trad ictio n s in society have th e fu n ctio n of a la rm signals, th ey serve a s a so rt of im m u n e-sy ste m w ith in th e social system . L u h m a n n co n sid ers two com plem entary im m u n e sy stem s; law a n d conflicts. Law a n tic ip a te s p ossible conflicts in selecting from th e m an y everyday exp ectatio n s th o se w h ich m ig ht prove to be relevant. Law o p e ra te s w ith th e d istin ctio n legal/illegal a n d w ith th e se co n d ary coding of p e rm itte d /p ro h ib ite d 23. T his lead s to a n in cre ase in possible conflicts b u t also to a precise resp o n se from th e legal system . It conceives conflicts a s d istu rb a n c e s w h ich m u s t be overcom e. Law c a n fulfil th is function b e c a u s e it is d etach ed from m orals. It is therefore able to p ro h ib it som eth in g p e rm issib le a n d to p e rm it so m ethin g pro h ib ited.

22 Cf. A usdijjerenzierung, p. 105. 23 Cf. S oziale S y stè m e , p. 511. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research

(26)

Conflict

Conflict m e a n s th e co m m u n icatio n of a rejected expectation. W here ’No' is co m m unicated , conflict g ain s social existence24. T his is im p o rta n t to u n d e rs ta n d L u h m a n n ’s co n cep tu alization of stab ility a n d instab ility in society. R e tu rn in g to th e above m en tio ned crucial role w hich exp ectatio ns play in social life, th e q u e stio n of instabilities in social sy stem s a rise s quite n a tu ra lly . It is p ossible th a t a n escalatio n of instab ilities w ith in social sy ste m s could lead to th eir self-destruction. We have se en above th a t v alu es are u se d in testin g th e gro u n d for behaviour. H ere L u h m an n , in a co u n te r-in tu itiv e m ann er, a ssig n s also to conflicts th e fu nction of stabilizing sy stem s since conflicts red u c e th e in secu rity reg arding expectations. C o n trary to com m on usage, L u h m a n n a ttrib u te s to conflicts th e fu n ctio n th a t th ey fa cilita te social action. For exam ple, in su p p o sin g th a t alter is th e enem y (Gegner), ego g ain s certain ty for fu rth e r expectations. Conflicts en ab le ego to derive ce rtain ty in situ a tio n s of u n c e rtain ty , precisely by m e a n s of

24 A usdifferenzierung, p. 100. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(27)

conflict25. A conflict is th e o p eratio n al au to n o m iz a tio n of a c o n tra d ic tio n by m e a n s of co m m u n icatio n 26. It is therefore m isconceived to explain conflicts by a failu re of co m m u n icatio n — a n ex p lan atio n w h ich p re s u p p o s e s th a t co m m u n icatio n a s s u c h w as so m eth in g good w h ich could fail. In L u h m a n n ’s version, conflict is s e p a ra te d from p u rely observed a n ta g o n ism s of in te re sts, from general co n tra d ic tio n s, even from m u tu a l d am age27. C onflicts therefo re ex ist w ithin o th e r sy ste m s w ith o u t becom ing su b s y ste m s them selves. T h eir m ode of existence is p u rely p arasitic. N evertheless, conflict itself c a n be se e n a s a social system w hich o p e ra tes according to its own logic, w hich s p re a d s out, m oblilises reso u rc es, d e m a n d s tim e a n d eventually occupies th e sy ste m in w hich th e conflict w as g e n e ra te d .28 To rela te

25 A usdifferenzierung, p. 98. 26 Soziale S y stè m e , p. 530.

27 See Soziale S y stè m e , p. 531, n o te 62 for som e references. 28 It sh o u ld b e n o te d t h a t n o t every social sy ste m is a t th e sa m e tim e a fu n ctio n al s u b sy ste m of society. G enerally, L u h m a n n co n sid e rs th e following a s fu n ctio n al su b sy ste m s: econom y, politics, science, law, religion, ed u catio n , see, for exam ple, N iklas L u h m an n , Ôkologische K om m unikation.

O pladen: W e std e u tsc h e r Verlag (1986). T ra n sla te d a s

Ecological Communication. C am bridge: Polity P ress (1989).

(28)

th is p roblem atic to th e legal system , it sh o u ld be recalled (cf.

supra) th a t law plays a double role here: conflicts a re solved

th ro u g h law, a n d conflicts a re g en erated th ro u g h law. To p rev en t conflicts from sp re a d in g o u t too far a n d unfolding th e ir d estru c tiv e force, th ird p a rties play a n im p o rta n t role in providing se cu rity on th e b a sis of instability29. T hird p a rties help to tra n sfo rm th e conflict into ’is s u e s ’ a n d to fu rth e r decom pose th e th em e of th e conflict into sm aller, m anag eable q u e stio n s. It is significant th a t L u h m a n n does n o t sp e a k of th ird p a rte is a s 'a rb ite rs ’ w hich w ould p rob ab aly su g g e st too stro n g a sim ilarity to a n objective overlooker. For L uhm ann , th e th ird p a rty is n e u tra l essen tially in th e beginning.

T he im p o rta n t q u e stio n w hich arise s on th e b a sis of th is definition is th e q u estio n of th e conditions w hich d eterm ine th e selection from th e v a st a n d pervasive existence of conflicts. In o th e r w ords, w hich o u t of th e in n u m e rab le conflicts w hich em erge every day g ain significance beyond th e level of in te rac tio n ? W hich conflicts g ain general social

29 A usdijferenzierung, pp. 107 ff., a n d th e cited literatu re.

(29)

significance? It is th e fu n ctio n of law a n d m o rals to ch eck th e su ita b ility of special conflicts for g eneral social co m m u n icatio n . Conflicts a re th ereb y co nd itioned e ith e r by re stric tin g a d m issib le m e a n s (e.g. violence), o r by in cre asin g in se c u rity (e.g. ap p eal to th ird parties)30.

T raditionally, law w as th e m o st im p o rta n t m e a n s of selecting am ong conflicts, to ad m it o r to tra n s p o rt sm all conflicts in to th e social a re n a . In th e tra n s itio n to m odernity, th is legal fu n ctio n did n o t get lo st b u t w as b a se d on different g ro u n d s. The se m a n tic s of n a tu re w ere s u b s titu te d by a se m a n tic s of freedom . R ights w ere a ttrib u te d to individuals. T his individ ualizatio n lead s to a decoupling of n a tu r a l b o n d s w h ich are, in tu rn , rep laced by b o n d s w h ich a re freely ch o sen . People sh ift th e ir a ttitu d e s a n d e n g ag em en ts, they follow fash io n s a n d m oods. T his leads to a n aggregation a n d a c c u m u la tio n on th e level of collective id entities. T h e m o st im p o rta n t exam ple is th a t of social m o vem ents. Social m ovem ents, like law, a re selecting conflicts w h ich a re to have

30 Cf. L u h m a n n , S oziale S y ste m e , pp. 539 ff. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(30)

significance on a legal or political level. For exam ple, race d isc rim in a tio n co n ncected to im m igration is ta k e n u p by a u n io n or social m ovem ent a n d m ad e into a political issu e. T his is th e m ec h a n ism by w hich co m m u n icatio n s on th e level of in te ra c tio n get ’re so n a n c e ’ on th e level of social system s.

J u stic e

We a re no longer able to describe single legal decisions a s j u s t or u n ju s t. T his is only possible w ith re sp e c t to th e legal sy stem a s a whole. T raditionally, ju stic e h a s b een d isc u sse d in te rm s of perfection a n d perfectability31 32. However, w ithin th is n o tio n of perfection th e re is also co n tain ed a w eak er notion of developm ent, since perfection is th e e n d -s ta te of a

developm ent32. In ca se th e p ro cess of perfection does n o t exist

31 A usdifferenzierung, pp. 378 ff. for som e historical so u rces.

32 S ee Philippe v a n Parijs Evolutionary Explanation in the

Social Sciences. A n Emerging Paradigm. London a n d New

York: Tavistock (1981), p. 51 for a d istin ctio n betw een a stro n g (’ev olutionist’) a n d a w eak (’evolutionary’) form of evolutionary ex planation. See, also, Karl E. W eick The

Socia l P sy c h o lo g y o f O rganizing. R e a d in g /M a s s .: Addison-W esley. Second edition (1979) p. 119 a n d D onald T. C am pbell V ariatio n a n d Selective R etentio n in S ocio -C u ltu ral E volution’ in 14 General S y s te m s (1969), pp.

(31)

or does n o t lead to its cu lm in atio n (i.e. th e realizatio n of th e idea), n ev erth eless, th e p ro cess a s s u c h rem a in s. T h is is to sa y th a t th e n o tio n of developm ent s u b s titu te s th e n o tio n of perfection 33. A re a so n w hy ju s tic e m ight n o t be perceived in perfectio n ist te rm s h a s to do w ith th e s tr u c tu r e of th e legal sy ste m itself. The idea of perfect ju s tic e w as rela te d to a specific con cep t of th e unity of th e legal order, t h a t is, to a n o rd er w h ich c o n sisted only of legal a c ts (Recht) b u t n o t of illegal a c ts (Unrecht). Only on th is condition, i.e. t h a t th e illegal w a s excluded from th e legal order, could a perfectio n ist persp ective b e derived. Conversely, if th e legal sy ste m is co n cep tu alized a s co n tain in g b o th R echt a n d Unrecht, th e perfectio n ist perspectiv e becom es u n fea sib le sin c e an y developm ent of th e legal system develops b o th , R echt a n d U n rech t34. B u t how c a n we, on th is b a sis, conceive of ju stic e ?

69-85.

33 See L u h m a n n ’s in stru ctiv e, albeit ten tativ e d isc u ssio n of ad ap tio n , m o rp h o genesis a n d teleology in Soziale S y ste m e , pp. 4 7 7 ff. 34 A u sdifferenzierung, pp. 3 84 ff. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(32)

L u h m a n n provides th e following solution: ju s tic e is

a d e q u a te com plexity of th e legal system . T he com plexity of th e

legal sy stem is a d e q u ate if a n d in so far it is com patible w ith concrete decisions w ithin th e sy stem 35. The criterion of ju stic e is th e e x te n t to w hich th e legal system c a n ad e q u ate ly deal w ith com plexity. T here m ay arise serio u s problem s w here th e legal sy stem in cre ase s its com plexity u p to a po in t w here it c a n n o longer come to decisions. In s u c h c a se s th e legal sy stem w ould n o t have a d e q u a te com plexity b u t sim ply would be blocked. The overbu rd en in g of th e legal system c a n lead to a situ a tio n of indeterm inacy. T his w ould be th e c a se w hen righ ts, n o rm s a n d ru le s a re m ad e w hich a re contradictory. For exam ple, a rig h t to a so u n d en v iro n m en t m ay be inco m p atib le w ith a rig h t to p ro p erty a n d free en te rp rise, a n d m ay lead to in d eterm in acy in th e c a se of a n e n tre p re n e u r w ho p o llu tes th e environm ent. As L u h m a n n m a in ta in s, th is problem is a real d a n g e r for th e legal sy stem b e c a u se th e d e m a n d s of society p re ss th e legal sy stem ever m ore in th e direction of in cre ase d complexity. However, th e com plexity

35 ibid., p. 390. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(33)

d e m a n d e d by society is alw ays h igher th a n th e com plexity w h ich c a n b e realized w ithin th e legal system ; only a sm all ra n g e of social a c tio n s c a n becom e legally rele v an t fac ts36.

T he co n seq u e n c e s of th is a p p ro a c h a re sta rtlin g , even frightening, a s L u h m a n n h im self adm its. L u h m a n n concedes t h a t H a b e rm a s a n d o th ers have a ju stified c o n c e rn in critizising a c tu a l legal practices. However, L u h m a n n arg u es, s u c h criticism s a re b o u n d to rem a in on th e level of ’exp erience’ (erleben), th ey c a n n o t be tra n sfo rm e d in to m odes of ac tio n a t th e level of th e system . The s p h e re s of a c tio n an d of experience a re divided sh a rp ly in m o d ern so cieties37. More generally sp eak in g , th is criticism is d irected a g a in s t th e illusio n th a t a su b s ta n tiv e co ncept of ju s tic e m ight be available to u s w hich in t u r n could be applied to single cases. T he only criterio n w hich rem a in s seem s to be th e ru le to tre a t eq u al c a se s equally a n d u n e q u a l cases u n eq u a lly . T h is device se em s to se c u re th e com patibility req u ired w ithin th e legal

36 Cf. ibid.., p. 3 92 a n d generally, Soziale S y stè m e , pp. 249 f. 37 ibid., p. 3 8 9 note 33. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(34)

sy stem a n d to m ake decisions easier. In a way, th is ru le also h elp s to reduce com plexity38.

For L u h m an n , th en , th e re c a n be no u ltim a te c riteria of ju s tic e (or: of legitim ation) behind th e legal system . It is th e legal sy stem itself th a t c re a te s law a n d it is a featu re of positive law th a t it provides th e validity (Geltungsgrund) of its own. A gainst Raw ls’ idea of a n ’overlapping c o n s e n s u s ’ an d a g a in st H a b e rm a s’ claim th a t legality h a s be s u s ta in e d from o u tsid e th e legal system by legitimacy, L u h m a n n holds th a t positive law is nev er su p p o rte d by a rea l c o n s e n s u s 39. More generally, legitim ation is g en erated w ith in th e political system , th a t is, o u tsid e th e legal system . Conversely, H a b erm as seem s to claim th a t law c a n n o t b e conceived a s a s u b sy ste m of society since it h a s n o t lost its in h e re n t lin k s to politics and m o ra ls40. T his is to say th a t law h a s to cope w ith q u e stio n s

38 ibid., pp. 391, 406. 39 ibid., p. 1981: 132.

40 Cf. J u rg e n H ab erm as, ’Law a n d M orality’, The Tanner

Lectures on H um an V alues vol. VIII, ed. M. M cM urrin.

Cam bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press, (1988); T o w ard s a C om m un ication -C oncept of R ational Collective W ill-Form ation. A T h o u g h t E x p erim en t’ in Ratio Ju ris 2 (1989), pp. 144-154.

(35)

of legitim ation a s well a s w ith q u estio n s of m oral ju stic e . To be s u re , H a b erm as ta k e s g rea t p a in s to prove th is p o in t w ith h isto ric a l a n d theo retical arg um en ts; however, in m y view, his p o sitio n often c a n n o t avoid giving th e im p re ssio n t h a t it does n o t a d m it w h a t w ould n o t be d esirab le from a n o rm ative view point.

R aw ls a n d H a b e rm a s a re sim ilar to n a tu r a l law th e o rists in a d o p tin g a sc h e m a acco rd ing to w h ich conform ity an d deviance select am ong social behaviour. However, accordin g to L u h m a n n , u n d e r th e conditions of m o d ern ity we w itn ess a fu rth e r differentiation. According to his an aly sis, it is a b asic tra it o f function ally differentiated societies t h a t social lin k s get loosened. As a re s u lt of th e pro cess of in d ividualization41 we have to reck o n w ith th e possibility th a t th e n o rm -s c h e m a a s s u c h gets challenged. T his possibility ste m s from th e fact th a t people a re socialized a n d governed by codes, n o t by p e rs o n s 42.

41 See also S te p h e n Holm es ’A ristip p u s in a n d o u t of A th e n s’ 73 The A m erican Political Science R eview (1979), pp. 113-127. 42 In a sim ilar way, M arx claim ed th a t people in m o d e m c a p ita list societies a re d o m in ated by abstractions, cf. Karl M arx G m nd risse. Berlin: Dietz (1953), pp. 81f.

(36)

’C odes’ a re differences, like p o w e r/w e ak n e ss, legal/illegal, tru e /fa ls e , good/evil etc. Therefore real d a n g e rs a rise if whole p o p u latio n s a re governed a n d socialized by s u c h codes over several g e n e ra tio n s43. U sing th e co ncep t of th e re -in tro d u ctio n of th e excluded third?4, re s u lts in m o d ern societies, a s a c o n seq u en ce of th e ir own operatio ns, pro d u cin g a ’quiet reservoir for p ro te st m ovem ents of all k in d s ’45. Insofar a s social m ovem ents engage in a rejection of th is n o rm -sch em a, th ey a re n o t likely to be su c ce ssfu l since th ey lim it them selves to a b s tra c t negation. They a re also d a n g e ro u s in so far a s they w a n t to reverse functio nal differentiation. W ith regard to a u th o rs w ho tiy to com bine th e view point of th e legal system w ith t h a t of social m ovem ents u n d e r th e h ea d in g of ’civil

43 Cf. Soziale S ystèm e, pp. 44-5. It seem s ironic th a t L u h m an n , w ho eschew s an y reference to th e h u m a n is t tra d itio n of th o u g h t a t th e level of h is th eo retical design, seem s to be in sp ired exactly by ’h u m a n is m ’ w h e n — however c a u tio u sly — criticising th e p re s e n t s ta te of affairs.

44 D raw ing on Michel S erres, Le Parasite. Paris: G ra sse t et F rasq u elle (1980) a n d George S p en cer Brown, L a w s o f Form. 2nd. ed. London: Allen & Unwin (1971).

45 Cf. Soziale S y stè m e , p. 313. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(37)

diso b ed ien ce’, L u h m a n n holds th a t they te n d to forget th a t society’s stab ility calls for a clear Yes for society’...46

B u t let u s now see in w hich way L u h m a n n an alyzes th e problem of m o d ern society’s self-description a n d in w hich way h is v ersio n of sy ste m s th eo ry h a s affinities to conservative or progressive ideologies.

II.

L u h m a n n d raw s a rad ic al conclusion from th e wiedely accep ted sociological view th a t m o d ern societies a re functionally d ifferentiated. T he co n clu sion is th a t th e re is no c e n tre or top w hich w ould allow for a privileged p o in t of o b serv ation o r descrip tio n of th e w hole of society. Or, m ore precisely, th ey have no m ea n s to re-in tro d u ce th e u n ity of the social sy ste m in to th e social system via self-ob servation or self-description. M odern societies, in ste a d , in v en t

self-46 ibid., p. 550. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(38)

d escrip tio n s in th e form of ideologies. Ideologies are sim plifying a n d focus alw ays on p a rtic u la r fe a tu re s of th e sy stem in q u estion . L u h m a n n d istin g u ish e s betw een conservative a n d progressive (revolutionaiy) ideologies. At th e b a s is o f th e s e ideologies th e re is a c u rio u s type of self- reflexion of society. W henever societies reflect o n th e ir unity, they have two basic form s of self-description a n d self reflexion: tauto logy a n d parad o x . In th e tautological version, society is w h a t it is. In th e parad o xical version, society is w h a t it is n o t47.

T h ese two versions corresp o n d to th e conservative- /p ro g re ssiv e d istin ctio n a n d it is easy to see how. W hereas conservative ideologies affirm th e existing social o rd er (i.e. fu n ctio n al su b sy ste m s in L u h m a n n ’s term s), progressive or rev o lutionary ideologies see society a s w h a t it is not. T hey try to b rin g a b o u t a society w hich does ’n o t y et’ exist. C onservative ideologies have it th a t society’s p o ten tial is realized, therefore all th a t rem a in s to be done is to im prove

47 Cf. for th e following, L u h m an n , T au tology a n d P aradox’,

op. cit. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research

(39)

on its problem -solving. Conversely, revolu tionary ideologies have it th a t society’s p o ten tia l h a s still to b e realized, th erefo re society is w h a t it is n o t (yet).

T his lead s to a self-blocking of b o th th e observed system a n d th e o b server since we do n o t get o u t of th e problem in analyzing it. W hat we have to do, L u h m a n n reco m m en d s, is to look a t how th e system itself u n -b lo ck s th e situ a tio n . And it does th is th ro u g h th e ’u nfolding’ of its self-referentiality in b rea k in g it u p a n d in te rp re tin g it in one w ay or a n o th e r. The choice itself c a n n o t be ju stified . S u c h a n o p eration of de- tautologizing a n d de-paradoxizing d e m a n d s th a t b o th th e o p e ra tio n a n d th e u n d erlyin g problem b e concealed.

M odern society u s e s th is form of resolving its p a ra d o x e s b u t it c a n n o t a d m it th a t it does. N either c a n it a d m it th a t its a tte m p t a t self-description a m o u n ts to tautologies a n d p a rad o x es in th e first place. It conceals its id en tity a n d is by th is m e a n s (and only by th is m eans) ab le to form a reflective theory. A nd only a n o b server c a n see th is. Only h e c a n see w h a t th e sy stem itself c a n n o t see. A nd L u h m a n n , a s th e

(40)

theo retical m o u thp iece of th is problem atic, is c a u g h t u p in exactly th e sa m e s itu a tio n 48. Here one could a s k th e following qu estio n s: W here does L u h m a n n s ta n d ? Is L u h m an n L u h m a n n or is L u h m a n n n o t L u h m a n n ? L u h m a n n w ould n o t have b e e n L u h m a n n h a d h e n o t ta k e n p a in s to avoid a sim ple answ er. One m ight object h e re (and L u h m a n n did so) th a t I am focussin g too strongly on p e rso n a l fea tu re s, th ereb y neglecting th e m ore general problem w h ich sy stem s th eory a s

su c h faces. However, I th in k it is legitim ate to d isc u ss

L u h m a n n ’s th o u g h t in a p ro m in e n t way since it is h e who gave sy stem s th eo ry a specific b ra n d . Certainly, th e ideological im plications of th e H a b e rm a s /L u h m a n n d e b a te a t th e beginning of th e 7 0 s sta m p e d him a s a ’conservative’49, an d , 48 T here m ight be som e controversy on th e p o in t of w h e th e r L u h m a n n ’s th eo ry is sim p ler or m ore com plex th a n social reality. For th e sa k e of th e a rg u m e n t let u s a s s u m e th a t th e theory a n d its object have m ore or less th e sa m e complexity. 49 Cf., for exam ple, H a b e rm a s’ verdict th a t systems theory a m o u n ts to a ’negative u to p ia of tech n ical control over h isto ry ’ in w hich h u m a n , no longer occupied th e p o sitio n of homo

fa b e r b u t of homo fa b ric a tu s (H aberm as, T echnology an d

Science a s ’Ideology” in Tow ard a Rational Society. Boston: Beacock (1970), p. 106; see also T hom as M cCarthy, ’Com plexity a n d Dem ocracy, or T he S e d u c e m e n ts of S ystem s T heory’ in N ew German Critique 35 (1985), p. 28. B u t H a b erm as him self m ad e co n sid erab le u s e of th a t th eory after th e d e b a te w ith L u h m an n . As T h o m as M cC arthy rem ark ed, H a b erm as in Theory o f Com muicatiue Action seem s to adm ire

(41)

a t tim es, it seem s a s if h e w ould h ap p ily a c ce p t th is label know ing t h a t th e a s se rtio n of good in te n tio n s gives rise to c o n tra ry su sp ic io n s. B u t a p a rt from th e s e p a rtly idiosyn cratic fe a tu re s of th e d e b a te s u c h a c h a ra c te riz a tio n w ould n o t do ju s tic e to h is theoiy.

In o th e r w ords, if L u h m a n n proceeds in th e sa m e w ay as m o d ern societies do, m ight it n o t be, th en , t h a t L u h m a n n h im se lf h id es aw ay b e h in d p arad o xes a n d tau to lo g ies? He h a s to decide w h e th e r to tak e th e side of tauto lo gy (conservatism ) or th e sid e of p a ra d o x (progressivism ), a n d if h e does, h e h a s to h id e th e o p eratio n 50. From M erleau-Ponty, B ateso n, a n d

’L u h m a n n ’s co n cep tu al a n d theo retical v irtu o sity ’ (ibidem, p.47) — b u t for M cC arthy ’it is n o t clear j u s t w here th e need for sy ste m s th eo iy a ris e s ’ (id., 51). T ru e en o u g h , H a b e rm a s ’ left-w ing a u d ie n c e alw ays w atch ed w ith su sp ic io n th e fac t th a t th e m a s te r took u p theo retical tools from sy ste m s th e o iy . In th e ir view, H a b erm as w as com prom izing w ith th e devil. 50 Cf. also Ricoeur: ’B ecause th e a b so lu te overlooker is im possible, th e n it is som eone w ithin th e p ro ce ss itse lf w ho ta k e s th e resp o n sib lity for ju d g e m e n t.' However, R icoeur claim s t h a t th is tak in g of a view point a m o u n ts to a d v an cin g a utopian m odel on th e b a sis of w hich one envisages ’a b e tte r fu tu re for h u m a n ity ’. In consequence, h e rep la ce s th e d is tin c tio n id e o lo g y /s c ie n c e w ith th e d is tin c tio n id eo lo g y /u to p ia, cf. P aul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology a n d

Utopia. George H. Taylor ed. New York: C olum bia U niversity

P ress (1986), pp. 172 f. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(42)

S p e n c e r Brown, L u h m a n n ta k e s u p th e m essa g e ’D raw a d istin ctio n !’ M aking a d istin ctio n e sta b lish e s a universe, se ts u p system ic b o u n d a rie s, s tru c tu re s a d isc o u rse. O nce th e d istin ctio n is m ade, we a re talkin g a b o u t th is, a n d n o t a b o u t th a t. In a often rep e a te d a n d so m ew h at cryptic p h ra s e we a re told th a t it is a difference w hich m ak es th e difference51. Here we c a n d istin g u ish betw een two levels, th e level of reality (where rea l events create differences a n d rea l sy stem s e s ta b lis h th e ir unity) a n d a level of observing th e s e system s. T he la tte r activity, u su a lly called seco n d -o rd er observation, exposes itself in tu r n to observation. Or, in th e w ords of Heinz von F oerster: ’I su b m it th a t th e cy b ern etics of observed

s y s te m s we m ay co n sid er to b e first-o rd er cybernetics; while

seco n d -o rd er cyb ernetics is th e cyb ern etics of observing

s y s te m s .’52. From th is sta n d p o in t it m ay b e claim ed th a t th e

d istin ctio n s w h ich a re d raw n by a n observer only ex p ress his

51 See, for exam ple, Gregory B ateson, S te p s to a n Ecology o f

Mind. S a n F rancisco: C h an d ler (1972), p. 315.

52 Heinz von F oerster, ’C ybernetics of C ybernetics’ in K, K rippendorff (ed.) Com munication a n d Control in Society. New York: G ordon & B reach (1979), p. 7, e m p h a sis added.

(43)

bias53. It w ould follow th a t th e observer is n o t able to exem pt

h im s e lf/h e rs e lf from th e stric tu re s of th e observed objects since h e d raw s j u s t som e o th e r differences w ith o u t ever being able to re a c h th e ’view from now here', i.e. a b so lu te tru th . Every ob serv atio n is m ad e on th e b a sis of a blind sp o t. The o b serv er c a n n o t see w h a t he c a n n o t see. T h is is p o ssib le only for o th e r observers. L u h m a n n re s o rts to seco n d o rd er cy b ern etics to avoid precisely th e 'p arad o x of th e s u b je c t’, i.e. th a t th e re is som e u ltim a te in sta n c e w hich does n o t fail54.

53 T his is a corollary of th e fact th a t a n o b serv er u s e s d istin ctio n s w h ich h e c a n n o t th em atize w hile applying th em . 54 In a b rillia n t d isc u ssio n of M an n h eim ’s sociology of know ledge, R icoeur com es to a sim ilar co n clu sio n . He ad v a n ce s a 'p o st-m arx ist concept of ideology' w hich becom es inevitable once ’we acknow ledge th a t th e objective ontological u n ity of th e w orld h a s collapsed. We live sp iritu a lly in a polem ical s itu a tio n of conflicting world views w hich are, for one a n o th e r, ideologies. We face a p ro cess of m u tu a l labelling; a n ideology is alw ays th e ideology of th e o th e r.’ (Ricoeur,

Lectures, p. 163). The re a so n w hy th e m a rx ist co n cep t of

ideology no longer w orks, is spelled o u t in th e following way: ’For M an n h eim ... th e p ro cess of d isin teg ratio n h a s proceeded so fa r th a t all c la ss c o n scio u sn e sse s a re c a u g h t in th e d e stru c tiv e p ro ce ss of collapse. T here is a lack o f a center in th e evolution of h u m a n society. B ecause th e re is no tru e u n iv ersa lity anyw here, no g ro u p m ay claim to b e th e b e a re r of u n iv ersa lity .’ (ibidem , e m p h a sis added).

(44)

Society a s s u c h is n o t able to p ro d u ce tru e self descrip tio n s, th erefo re it re so rts to ideologies. T hese ideologies a re e ssen tially b a se d on tautologies a n d p arad o x es. However, acco rdin g to L u h m an n , tautologies a n d p arad o x es a re of little help. B oth a re essen tially sterile. An o bserver c a n n o t p redict w hich of th e two possibilities will be ch o sen , n o r c a n h e reco m m en d w h ich to chose, n o r c a n h e p red ic t w h a t co n seq u e n c e s will follow in a d o p tin g one o r th e other.

Let u s now engage in observ atio n of observation a n d look a t L u h m a n n ’s th eo ry w ith th e sam e c o n c ep tu a l tools. We ask: w h ich side does L u h m a n n tak e ? W here is h is blin d sp o t? One could say th a t a s far a s th e p u rely th eo retical a p p a ra tu s is concerned , s u c h q u e stio n s do n o t arise. B ut th ey certainly do a rise a s so o n a s p ractical im plications com e to th e fore an d h e re h e seem s to have a conservative b ia s 55. For exam ple, he

55 Cf. C esare L uporini 'G overnare il m o ndo o cam b iarlo ’ in 22 Problemi del Socialism o (1981), pp. 57-70; D anilo Zolo 'A utopoiesis. U n P aradigm a C onservatore’ 1 MicroMega (1986), pp. 129 ff. ; U lrich Ròdel, G ü n th e r F ra n k en b e rg a n d H elm ut D ubiel (1989) Die dem okratische Frage. F ra n k fu rt: S u h rk am p ; G ü n th e r F ra n k en b e rg ’U n o rd n u n g k a n n sein. V e rsu ch ü b e r Systèm e, R echt u n d U n g eho rsam ’ in A. H onneth, T. M cC arthy, C. Offe & A. W ellm er (eds.) Z w ischenbetrachtungen

im Prozeji d er A ujklàrung. F ran k fu rt: S u h rk a m p (1989) for

som e re c e n t s ta te m e n ts . © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(45)

clearly favo urs society’s stab ility 56 a n d ’R e c h tssic h e rh e it’ w hich in th e view of m an y leftists w ould be a conservative H o b b esian s ta n d p o in t57. B u t th e m ean in g o f th e te rm s conservative a n d progressive a re shifting a s a re s u lt of th e

tem poralization of ideologies. L u h m a n n d raw s on R ein h ard

K oselleck’s w ork58 w ho show ed how m an y co n cep ts, am ong th e m ’ideology’, in th e m iddle of the 18th c e n tu iy ch an g ed th e ir m ean ing . They w ere no longer linked to nature b u t to histo rical tim e a n d th e p re s e n t s itu a tio n of society. A ccelerated social ch an g e u n d e rm in e s th e opposition co n serv ativ e/p ro g ressiv e a n d lead s partly to a n in te rc h a n g e of

56 N iklas L u h m a n n , W id e rsta n d sre c h t u n d politisch e G ew alt’ 5 Zeitschrift f ü r Rechtssoziologie (1984), p. 36.

57 W ith slig h t irony h e re m a rk s th a t people in G erm any rea c te d in a n allergical way even to a p la n n e d c e n su s , see L u h m a n n W e r sa g t d a s ? ’ Delfin 12 (1989), p. 90. In an Interview h e said: W eil m ir g ar keine a n d e re G esellschaft v orschw eb t a ls die, die w ir h a b e n , will ich a u c h die vielen positiven S eiten u n s e re s S ystem s aufzeigen. E s g e h t also n ic h t u m A b leh n u n g oder Z u stim m u n g zu d iese r G esellschaft, s o n d e m u m ein b e sse re s V erstân d n is ih re r s tru k tu re lle n R isiken, ih re r S elbstgefàh rd u ng en, ih re r ev o lu tio n âren U n w ah rsc h e in lic h k e it.’ ’Biographie, A ttitü d en, Z e tte lk a ste n ’ in D. B aecker a n d G. S tan izek (eds.) N iklas Luhm ann. A rchim edes u n d wir. Interview s. Berlin: M erve (1987), p. 155.

58 Cf. R e in h a rt Koselleck, F utures Past. On th e S em a n tics o f

Historical Time. C am bridge, M ass./L o n d o n : T he MIT P ress

(1985). © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(46)

th em e s a n d iss u e s betw een th e sides. For exam ple, m an y on th e political left are dealing today w ith th em e s like c u ltu ra l p essim ism , critique of technology a n d call u p o n th e s ta te (e.g. to p rev e n t ecological crises) — clearly old iss u e s of th e political rig h t59. T his in sig h t is all th e m ore sign ificant in a situ a tio n w hich lac k s cle a r an sw e rs to th e q u e stio n W h a t is left?’

B u t even on th e th eo retical level th e q u e stio n is n o t so easy to decide. C o n traiy to m an y criticism s w hich have it th a t L u h m a n n ’s p ractisin g of th e fun ctio n al m eth o d h a s conservative im plications, one could claim th a t th is m ethod, conversely, lea d s to a critical a p p ro a c h . T he p o ten tial for criticism lies in th e fact th a t existing a rra n g e m e n ts a re in te rp re te d in a w ay w h ich s tre s s e s th e ir contingency. T h a t w hich is c o n tin g en t is n e ith e r n e c e ssa ry n o r im possible. ’K ontingent ist etw as, w as w eder notw endig is t noch unm oglich ist; w as also so, wie es is t ... se in k a n n , a b e r a u c h a n d e rs m oglich is t.’60. To show b o th th a t th in g s are possible

59 Cf. th e cu rio u s self-description of th e G erm an G reen Party W e a re n e ith e r left n o r right, b u t far a h e a d ’.

60 Soziale S ystèm e, p. 152. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.