EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
320
EUR
E U I
W O R K I N G
P A P E R No. 19
PARTY GOVERNMENT: A RATIONALISTIC
CONCEPTION.
by
RICHARD S. KATZ
SEPTEMBER 1982
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This paper is distributed for discussion
and critical comment and should not be
quoted or cited without prior
permission of the author
©
Richard S. Katz
Printed in Italy in September 1982
European University Institute
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Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception
Richard S. Katz
Department of Poli ti cal Science The Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland 21218
That po li ti cal parties have been the central institutions of demo c r a t i c governments at l e a s t since the enfranchisement o f the working
c l a s s is w e ll known. D i s r a e l i wrote, " I b e l i e v e that without party
p a r l i a m e n t a r y g o v e r n m e n t i s i m p o s s i b l e " ( R os e, 197**: 1).
Schattschneider (19**2: 1) t e l l s us that "modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms o f party," whil e to S a r t o r i (1976: i x ) , " P a r t i e s are the central intermediate and intermediary s t ru c tu r es between soci ety and
government." Although as Rose ( 1969) points out, "operational control
of government" by parties i s often assumed rather than demonstrated, the li t er a ry theory (as Bagehot would have i t) or the dominant ideal-type or myth of democratic government in Western Europe has been the model of
party government. While party government has not been accepted quite so
readily as a description of government in the United States, i t has been
widely accepted as an i de a l there as w e ll ( K i r k pa t ri c k, 1950). With
varying degrees of sophistication and with more or fewer caveats, elabo rations, and qualifications, this has been true of p o li ti c al scientists,
j o u r n a l i s t s , and the general publi c. The character, as w e ll as the
success or failure of governments both in solving particular problems
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and in providing effective long term s t a bi li ty and leadership, is most commonly a tt r ib ut ed to the state o f the p a r t i e s and party system (Briggs, 1965; Allum, 1973).
Like other i d e a l i s a t i o n s of government — for example f i r s t that \ the king and then that the l e g i s l a t u r e ruled — the party government model is both descriptive and just if icat or y.1 At the descriptive level, the party government model assigns to poli ti cal parties a number of key
functions in the governing process, including m o bi li s at io n and
channeling o f support, formulation of a l t e r n a t i v e s , recruitment and replacement of leadership, and, when in power, implementation of policy
and control over its administration. At the normative level, the party
government model implies a particular view of democracy, in which the system i s made democratic by the e l e c t o r a l r o l e o f the p a r t i e s . Structures or i nd iv i du al s other than p a r t i e s and t he i r leaders could perform the functions attributed to parties and could contribute to the governing of society, but only parties offer the whole public a choice
among comprehensive and comprehensible a l t e r n a t i v e s . An e l e c t o r a l l y
v i c t o r i o u s party or c o a l i t i o n of p a r t i e s i s e n t i t l e d to control the decision making and implementing functions of government because i t has been authorised by the whole people to do so (Ranney, 1962).
The preceding paragraph ignores many thorny problems. Like other
idealisations, the party government model is oversimplified, and is not intended to be taken as a complete description of any particular govern
ment. Its English origins are quite obvious, and both its descriptive
and i t s normative elements require modif icat ion before they can be
adapted to other political systems. Nonetheless, until recently i t was
generally accepted as a desirable ideal and also as a reasonably accu
\
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r at e d e s c r i p t i o n o f the operation of European, i f not n e ce ss ar il y of American, democracy.
In recent years, however, widespread concern has been expressed g e n e r a l l y about the g o v e r n a b i l i t y o f i n d u s t r i a l or p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y about the a b i l i t y o f pa r t i e s and party
governments to cope with contemporary problems ( C ro z i e r , 1975). A
variety of events, social changes, and results of academic research have called the party government model into question, both normatively and
e m p i r i c a l l y . Heightened awareness o f the independence of bureaucrats
and o f t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p s with organised i n t e r e s t s has raised the question of whether parties have been, or can be, in effective control
of policy. The broadening of government functions and the proliferation
o f governmental and quasi-governmental agencies indeed has raised the question of whether anyone can exercise comprehensive control. The rise o f social groupings and issues not reflected in existing party systems has introduced new s t r a i n s that threaten the s t a b i l i t y o f e x is t i n g institutions and raised doubts regarding the adequacy of representation by p a r t i e s ( I n g l e h a r t , 1977), while the e f f e c t i v e penetration o f organised groups into the governmental apparatus has challenged the
assumption that parties are necessary for representation. Moreover, the
suspicion that partisan bickering is responsible, at least in part, for the apparent incapacity of western governments to deal effectively with contemporary problems has raised doubts about the very desi rabi li ty of party government (Finer, 1975).
These doubts have contributed to a f e e l i n g that there i s a c r i s i s brought about by a lack of capacity on the part of the parties which is
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threatening the survival of party government and of democracy. This
suggestion r a i s e s questions c l u s t e r i n g in three main ca te gor ie s. Firstly, to what extent, and under what circumstances, do governments
conform to the party government model? Put somewhat infelicitously,
what i s the level of "party governmentness" of contemporary regimes, how is i t to be explained, and, projecting into the future, what changes in party governmentness should be expected on the basis of other poli ti cal ,
social, economic, and cultural developments? Secondly, how and under
what circumstances i s the l e v e l or organi sati on of party government r e l a t e d to a p o l i t i c a l system's capacity and potential for survival? Thirdly, is party government necessary for democracy or, less demand- ingly, is party government the only alternative to authoritarian, auto
cratic, or di ctat or ial government? How much party government is there;
can i t survive; should one care?
These questions could be approached as historical descriptive prob
lems to be addressed rel ati vely atheoretically. There is much s t i l l to
be said about the r o l e o f p a r t i e s in the governing of past and present
s o c i e t i e s at a purely d e s c r i p t i v e l e v e l . I f v a li d c ro s s- na t io na l
comparisons are to be made, i f events are to be explained, and especially i f an assessment of the consequences of potential or future events rather than only those that, have already occurred i s to be attempted, however, a more developed t h e o r e t i c a l framework w i l l be
necessary. In t hi s paper, I want to explore one possi ble such
framework. The remainder o f the paper i s divided into three main
sections. The f i r s t section is concerned with the choice of an overall
theoretical approach, or paradigm. The second section then addresses
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underlined in the l a s t paragraph. F i n a l l y , the purpose o f the third section is to relate these concepts to one another, drawing theoretical connections among them and suggesting hypotheses and a framework for
interpretation. Although examples w i l l be given when possible, since
this is primarily a theoretical paper rigorous tests of hypotheses w i l l be l e f t to future research.
Choice of Paradigm
Before any d e f i n i t i o n a l problems can be resolved or t h e o r e t i c a l p r op o si ti o ns advanced, one must choose the paradigm within which the
work w i l l take place. This involves deciding on the nature o f the
universe to be explained or studied — the "units" or "things" out o f which i t is made, the kinds of relationships that are important, and the
forces that might produce or modify those relationships. In effect, a
paradigm is a framework for the construction of an empirical theory and the choice o f a paradigm i s the choice o f the language in which the
theory w i l l be b u i l t and the research c ar ri ed out. Although research
based on one paradigm may be useful to work in another, a l l but the barest f a ct s (and sometimes those as w e l l , depending on op er ati onal
d e f i n i t i o n s o f concepts) r equi re t r a n s l a t i o n . For example, Fiorina
(1981) can make frequent use of the party identification variable from the Michigan surveys in his basically rati onal isti c account of American e l e c t o r a l choice, even c i t i n g f i g u r e s computed by those using other
approaches. His t h e o r e t i c a l d e f i n i t i o n of party identification, how
ever, is quite different from theirs and so too is his interpretation of those figures.
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Paradigms are not f a l s i f i a b l e . They provide structures within which f a l s i f i a b l e empirical hypotheses may be formulated but have no
empi ri cal content themselves. Rather, a paradigm is judged by i t s
usefulness, that is by whether the theor ies advanced within i t are
verified and whether i t contributes to understanding. Ultimately, the
t es t o f a theory, and thus i n d i r e c t l y the measure of i t s parent para
digm's usefulness, i s the " o b j e c t i v e " standard of accuracy. To date,
however, no social science theory has achieved a level of accuracy such
that it can stand on that ground alone. Thus, "generality, pl ausi bi li ty
and auxilliary implications" must remain important bases for judging theories and choosing paradigms (Fiorina, 1981: 190).
Unfortunately, one implication of this is that the choice of para digms i s l a r g e l y a matter o f t aste based on i nt u it io n. Moreover, the
paradigm that appears most useful for studying one class of phenomena may be d i f f e r e n t from that which appears most useful for another
(Kaplan, 1964: 258-326). I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , then, that there has
been no consensus reached within po li ti cal science, or even within its
subfields. I f cumulative progress is to be made, however, this problem
must be resolved.
This paper i s not the place to debate the r e l a t i v e merits o f a l l the competing paradigms in p o l i t i c a l science, a task which has been
undertaken elsewhere (Barry, 1970; Holt and Richardson, 1970). Instead,
in t hi s section I only want to l ay out the basic elements o f the para digm I propose to adopt, that i s the r a t i o n a l i s t i c (in Barry's terms, the economic) paradigm.
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The basic unit for the rati onal isti c approach is the goal-oriented
rational actor. Goal-oriented actors are individuals who perceive that
they have goals and whose actions are motivated by a desire to achieve
those goals. People do not j u s t act, they act so as to bring about a
situation that they value more rather than one that they value less; i f there is behavior that cannot be regarded as purposive, it is inexplica
bl e within the r a t i o n a l i s t i c framework. R a ti o n a l i t y i mpli es that in
attempting to further their goals, actors always try to maximise their
attainment with the minimum expenditure of resources. As Locke (1975,
section 131) put i t, "no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse."
Stopping here, one would not have said much, for i t seems apparent
that a l l behavior is rational. Indeed, i f a psychotic's withdrawal from
r e a l i t y lessens his pain, even that would be r a t i o n a l (Ke ll ey , 1957). Unless the goals being pursued are known or assumed, the rationalist can do l i t t l e beyond vacuous or jex post explanations o f the form "He did
what he did because he wanted to." Rationalistic work advances beyond
t hi s by sp ec if yi ng the ends to be pursued, but at t hi s point one
advances from the level of paradigm to that of specific theories. The
problem of what goals to consider with specific reference to a theory of party government is discussed below.
I t i s important to be c l e a r as to what this notion o f a g o a l -
oriented rational actor does not imply. Firstly, i t does not imply that
an individual's goals w i l l be mutually compatible in the sense of being
achievable simultaneously. There may be t r a d e - o f f s necessary in any
p a r t i c u l a r choice of action; one can with pe rf ec t r a t i o n a l i t y d es i r e ,
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both low taxes and a high l e v e l o f public expenditure for education. Indeed, the basi c assumption o f the most r a t i o n a l i s t i c o f th,e s oc i al sciences, economics, is that people simultaneously desire both guns and
butter in incompatible quantities. (See, however, Converse, 196M: 209.)
Secondly, it does not imply that an individual's goals are sensible as
seen by an outside observer. Some goals are simply matters o f t as t e;
that I consider something to be o b j e c t i o n a b l e , immoral, or s e l f
destructive does not preclude its pursuit by someone else. Other goals
are instrumental and thus based on real it y judgments. In this case, an
objective observer might decide that they were foolish or mistaken, but
t hi s r a i s e s the third point. Rational actors are not assumed to be
omniscient; indeed the costs of obtaining r el ia bl e information may be such that a rational individual would consider a blind guess to be more cost e f f e c t i v e than an informed judgment. Fourthly, r a t i o n a l actors need not make involved cost-benefit analyses before taking every action. Rules o f thumb and standard operating procedures are r a t i o n a l i f they have been proven satisfactory by experience, either real or vicarious. The search for an optimal st ra te gy may prove suboptimal i f excessive
search and decision costs are incurred. What is assumed is that indi
viduals behave as _if they made cost-benefit analyses based on the goals they choose to pursue, with the resources available to them, and in the circumstances in which they find themselves.2
The r a t i o n a l i s t i c paradigm i s s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c . Neither groups nor or gani sati ons e x i s t as primary units within i t s
framework. Instead, they are viewed fundamentally as c o l l e c t i o n s of
i nd iv i d u a l s whose cooperation or cohesion must be explained (Olson,
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phenomena rather than individual actors; organisation is a strategy that may be pursued by some sets of individuals.
This does not mean that or g a n i s a ti o n s or s o c i a l groups may not
enter rationalistic theories for analytic simplicity. Theory building
and t es ti ng within the r a t i o n a l i s t i c paradigm proceeds by successive approximations. Simplifying assumptions regarding the nature o f the actors, the goals they pursue, the environment in which they operate, or the s t r a t e g i e s open to them are posit ed, and, on the b a s i s o f the consequent model, hypotheses are deduced concerning thei r behavior. These are tested and to the extent that predictions f a i l to f i t real ity
the model i s m o d i f i e d . In c o n s i d e r i n g the i n t e ra c t i on s among
organisations, i t may be productive i n i t i a l l y to regard them as unitary
actors. Downs' (1957) treatment o f p a r t i e s i s a c l a s s i c example o f
this. Although many suggestive conclusions could be derived from this
simplification, many anomolies remained. Others (e.g., Robertson, 1976)
later relaxed this assumption, obtaining a closer f i t with reality.
Organisations and i n s t i t u t i o n s may also play a r o l e in r a t i o n a l
theories as exogenous or situational variables. From the point o f view
of the individual(s) whose behavior is to be explained, an organisation
may appear to be a fixed structure like any other institution. Behavior
is decided on and takes place within an institutional structure. Since
t hi s p a r t i a l l y determines the r e s u l t s o f any p a r t i c u l a r pattern o f behavior, i t influences the l i k e l i h o o d that such behavior w i l l occur. For example, behavior on the part of a candidate that would be rewarded in a proportional representation system might be counterproductive, and
so less likely, in a plurality system. Cultural expectations similarly
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condition the expected responses from others and anticipation of those
responses w i l l influence the actor's i n i t i a l choice of behavior. Social
and economic variables may be considered in the same way.
Social structure may al so be rel evant to a r a t i o n a l i s t i c theory
through i t s i n f l u e n c e on the g o a l s o f i n d i v i d u a l s . Wh il e the
r a t i o n a l i s t i c paradigm does not recognise soc ia l c la s s e s as e n t i t i e s distinct from the individuals who comprise them, commonality of soc ia li
zing experiences and similarity of objective situations may lead members
of a social class to have similar interests and goals. Moreover, among
the values inculcated by these experiences may be a sub je c ti v e identification and consequent desire for group solidarity and conformity to perceived group norms. Again, however, c la ss s o l i d a r i t y and c la ss consciousness are seen not as natural but as needing explanation. S i m i l a r l y , while "working c l a s s Tories" may be exceptional in some countries, the r a t i o n a l i s t i c paradigm does not r e g a r d them as theoretical anomolies.
The rationalistic paradigm is a way of looking at the world and a
s t yl e o f explanation. In t hi s view, whatever the ultimate influence
exercised by social forces or institutional/organisational arrangements, the immediate cause of a poli ti cal event is always the conscious choice
of individual human beings. While social, economic, cultural, or poli
t i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s may lead i n d i v i d u a l s who are otherwise s i m i l a r l y placed and pursuing the same goals to make different choices, i t is only through those choices that the influence of impersonal forces can be manifested.
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Conceptual Problems
Party
The consequences o f adopting a r a t i o n a l i s t i c approach begin to appear as soon as we think about p a r t i e s . In general terms, there are
two different ways in which parties may be viewed. The one most common
among adherents o f the various " s o c i o l o g i c a l " approaches, and the one often implicit in analyses of the functions of p o li ti c al parties or in a s s e r ti o ns that p a r t i e s do, or ought to do, c ert ain things, as w e l l as in comparisons o f the behavior or " g e s t a l t " o f d i f f e r e n t types o f
p a r t i e s , i s to see each party as an organic en ti ty . In t h i s view,
parties seek to control the government and, in this attempt, may either conflict or cooperate with other organisations or structures in society such as mass media, bureaucracy, i n t e r e s t groups, business f i r ms , and the military.
From the rati onal isti c perspective, however, party must be seen as
a "they" rather than as an " i t . " Moreover, once one t r i e s to develop a
rigorous theory or to o p e r a t i o n a l i s e the concepts necessary for empi rical research, the corporate view of party leads to great d i f f i c u l t i e s .
Two may be mentioned here. The f i r s t concerns the coherence of party.
I f party i s to be regarded as a whole, i t ought to be p o s s i b l e , for
example, to identify i ts goals. As constant conflict and debate within
the British Labour party makes clear, however, i t is not always a simple task to i d e n t i f y a party's a u t h o r i t a t i v e voice so as to i d e n t i f y i t s
goals. Similarly, in f actional ised p a r t i e s the deci sion of c o n st it u
t i o n a l l y authorised party organs may not bind the party's constituent
parts.3 Far from rescuing the corporate view, attempts to regard each
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party as a microcosmic political system simply underline the inadequacy of the original conceptualisation.
This i s underscored by the second problem which i s in many ways
even more d i f f i c u l t . The corporate view must assume p a r t i e s to have
d i s t i n c t b o u n d a r i e s t hat se t them a p a r t from other structures
( E l d er s ve ld , 1964: 1). In f act , there i s obviously a deep interpene
tration of these supposedly rival and autonomous power sources. What,
for example, is one to make of the situation in which a church or trade union controls policy by creating a "captive" po li ti cal party to do its
bidding? Although the British Labour party has grown more autonomous
than i t was originally, the trade unions s t i l l dominate i ts conference.
Is it a separate institution or an arm of the trade union movement? I f
the bishops d i c ta t e po li cy to a Christi an democratic party, i s the church simply a successful pressure group, or is the party an arm of the
church? And what of the converse case, when a party creates ancillary
organisations that behave like other interest groups? Is the Italian
CGIL the Communist party in another form or an autonomous and
p o t e n t i a l l y r i v a l group? In either case, t o t a l autonomy and t o ta l
subservience are both overstatements; there are both connections and differences. This reality is easily lost in viewing party as a distinct organism.
The alternative view is to deny the independent existential basis
o f party, as well as o f other groups. Instead, party i s seen as an
or gani sa ti on o f , or structured pattern of interactions among, indivi
duals in pursuit of their own goals. Rather than being an independent
actor, party is an instrument or conduit or basis of influence used by
i n d i v i d u a l s . In this case, one properly speaks o f functions being
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performed within or through p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s rather than by them. E s p e c i a l l y , one is alerted to the p o s s i b i l i t y that "party functions" might be performed elsewhere or not at a l l , even while or g an is a ti o ns calling themselves parties exist.
This h i gh li g ht s a c l e a r problem with f unctional d e f i n i t i o n s o f
parties. I f parties are defined by their functions, party nonfeasance
becomes a logical impossibility. Likewise, i t becomes impossible for
the defining functions of parties to be performed by any other institu
tion since i t would thereby become a party. One may, of course, s t i l l
refer to the functions of p ol it ic al parties in the sense of "things done by individuals through the mechanism of party" and be concerned with the importance o f those things and o f having them done by p a r t i e s for the
po li ti cal system.1* As Smith (1982) observes, however, " I t is one thing
to provide a functional 'check-list,' but quite another to imply that a party, a party system or an arrangement o f party government e x i s t s in
order to 'perform' certain functions. The approach readily lends i t s e l f
to distortion. It implies some kind of over-arching system rationality
without ever being c alle d upon to demonstrate i t s presence....Without n e c e s s a r i l y committing i t s e l f , the f unct ional ordering a d d i t i o n a l l y takes on a s t a t i c emphasis, tending to look for a fixed r e l a t i o n s h i p
between structure and function." While the r a t i o n a l i s t i c approach
assumes that indivi dual actors are r a t i o n a l , i t makes no assumptions about the " r a t i o n a l i t y of the system," and indeed research has shown that i nd iv idu al r a t i o n a l i t y may lead to c o l l e c t i v e i r r a t i o n a l i t y (Hardin, 1968).
What kind of an organisation i s a party and how is i t distinguished
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from other structured patterns of interaction? The answer l i e s in the functions o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , not for the p o l i t i c a l system as in a
functional a na ly si s , but for those who use them. P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s
developed in the nineteenth century with the rise of mass suffrage and
regularised political participation. They were created to support and
assist their organisers who were already in government (in the case of p a r t i e s o f i ntraparl iamentary o r i g i n ) or who wished to get into
government ( p a r t i e s o f extr apar li ament ar y o r i g i n ) . 5 They replaced
combinations o f members o f parliament who supported or opposed the government o f the day on the b a s i s o f t he i r personal i n t e r e s t s or preferences, the i n t e r e s t s or preferences of t he ir sponsors, or in
return for p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c rewards. Party represents a s t ra t e g y by
which support in the mass publi c may be curried and converted into
p o li ti c al power in an electorally oriented democratic society. The key
change was ultimate dependence on popular e l e c t i o n , and the ce nt ral d i s t i n c t i o n between pa r t i e s and other groups i s that they contest e l e c t i o n s and r e l y on t he i r success in e le c ti o ns for t he i r claim to legitimate participation in government.
Left at t h i s , personal campaign or gan isa ti on s would q u a l i f y as p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and to a l i m i t e d e x t e n t and e s p e c i a l l y in
p r e s i d e n t i a l systems they do. P r e s i d e n t i a l systems requi re s pe c i a l
treatment because personal and party victory in a presidential election are synonymous; whichever person/party wins that one e le c ti o n wins
control o f the executive branch o f government.^ In parliamentary
systems — and in the le gi s la t iv e branch of presidential systems — the r e a l prize comes not from a s i n g l e candidate's v ic to r y, but from the
formation of a l e g i s l a t i v e majori ty. P o l i t i c a l pa r ti e s are further
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di st ing uishe d by t h e i r cooperative seeking of m a j o r i t i e s , and the_ concomitant right and obligation collectively to govern and to be held responsible for governing.
Fundamentally, parties represent to the voters alternative teams of rulers and to the members of those teams a device for mobilising support
to compete with the members of other teams. The basis o f this competi
tion may be programmatic or i d e o l o g i c a l , but i t need not be. In par
ticular, conservative parties may have no concrete program, only a broad philosophy and a b e l i e f in t he ir own a b i l i t y to r ul e in the national
interest (Beer, 1969: 99; Amery, 1953: 4-31). Other parties may have no
a r t i c u l a t e d goal beyond supporting a p a r t i c u l a r leader. The party
politician is committed, or acts as i f he were committed, to a coopera t i v e quest for power, not j u s t a personal quest for o f f i c e , while the party voter is voting for a team in addition to a particular candidate.
This conception o f party has obvious roots in the r es ponsi ble
p a r t i e s doct rine. In that notion, p a r t i e s are the l i n k between the
publi c as a whole and the government as a whole. For pa r t i e s to serve this function, voters must be able to treat them as collective entities. Only i f parties behave cohesively in the discharge of public of fice, and only i f their candidates are prepared to stand or f a l l as a team on the basis of the party's collective record in of f ic e and proposals for the future can vo t er s, whose e l e c t o r a l vocabulary is necessarily limited, have a chance to speak e f f e c t i v e l y ( L o w e ll , 1913: 67-69; Schatt-
schneider, 1942: 52). Party is defined here with at least an eye toward
this theory.
In admitting this, i t becomes necessary to consider three further
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questions. The f i r s t concerns the nature of party unity and indirectly the question of internal party "democracy" in the case of parties with
mass memberships. The "party democrats" have seen p a r t i e s as "huge
a s s oc i at io n s o f partisan vot ers, " and have i nsisted that they be internally democratic (Schattschneider, 1942: 54; Kirkpatrick, 1950: 22-
23). This has n a t u r a l l y raised some complaints that i n t e rn a l party
competition is incompatible with collective action in government. While
t h i s point may be v a l i d e m p i r i c a l l y , i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e to argue that int ernal party democracy requi res not only that there be competition within the party but also that a l l party people, including the losers of this internal competition, behave cohesively v i s - a - v i s the
external world in support of the victorious position. It is only this
point that is required by partyness. Whatever the internal organisation
or rules of the party, and whatever the level of consensus or dissensus among party people, in thei r r e l a t i o n s with nonparty i n d i v i d u a l s and groups, those following a party strategy of poli ti cal action must behave as a team.
The second question concerns the nature of the competition among
those teams. The responsible parties theory of democracy generally is
associated with the requirement that pa r t i e s present c l e a r and d i s t i n c t i v e pl atforms, s p e l l i n g out the p o l i c i e s they w i l l f o l l o w in
o f f i c e . Because the party that wins an el ec ti on (assuming a s i n g l e
party does achieve a majority) can be trusted to put its manifesto into p r a c t i c e , t hi s a l l o w s voters to exercise prospective control over
policy. Parties might, however, compete on the basis of their records
in o f f i c e , in which case the control exercised by voters would be r e t r o s p e c t i v e , and might be based either on p o l i c i e s or on outcomes
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( F i o r i n a , 1981: chap. 1). Indeed in the l a s t case, the choice of the voters — and correspondingly the competition among the parties — may be based on confidence in a particular team of leaders without necessary regard for the policies they have pursued in the past or would pursue in
the future. While these differences are important, they do not bear on
a party's claim to that name. A l l that i s required i s c o l l e c t i v e
accountability, made possible by the expectation of collective action in o f f i c e .
The third question concerns party membership. Who i s the party?
Most broadly, one could argue that a party con si s ts o f everyone who
votes for or sympathises with it. Demands for internal democracy based
on an i n s t i t u t i o n l i k e the American d i r e c t primary i m p l i c i t l y assume
t hi s view. Except for reaching an e l e c t o r a l de c is io n, i t i s hard to
imagine such an " o r g a ni s at i on ” taking any sort o f c o l l e c t i v e action; "members" make no promises of l o y a l t y and may not have even to admit their membership publicly; there can be no regular communication among members, only from le ade rs to f o l l o w e r s ; no sanctions can be imposed
agai nst deviants. A more r e s t r i c t e d view would be to look only at
formal members in the European card-carrying sense, but this implies a
mass membership party. Even t h i s , however, confuses supporters with
p a r t i c i p a n t s . Although the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c o r ie n t a t i o n renders the
whole problem of only marginal concern, the view taken here is that the leadership is the party, and when party is discussed as an actor, it is
to the collective leadership that reference is meant. This is the only
group small enough and in s u f f i c i e n t l y constant communication that consciously concerted action i s po ssi bl e. This i s not to deny the
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importance of mass membership in some parties, and of the decisions of
supporters for a l l parties. Members may take many policy decisions —
although always subject to the i n t e rp r et a ti o n o f party l eader s. They
may also choose the leaders. Nonetheless, they are no more "the party"
than c i t i z e n s are "the government" in repre se nt ati ve democracies. F i n a l l y , as suggested above, mass membership i s not necessary f or a party at a l l .
The three requirements or defining characteristics of "partyness" thus are: Dcohesive team behavior; 2)orientation toward winning control over the t otal it y of political power exercised by elected o f f i c i a l s and
those appointed by elected o f f i c i a l s ; and 3) claiming legitimacy on the
basis of electoral success. Organisations with many different structural
forms could satisfy these criteria and properly be called parties. On
the other hand, organi sati ons that c a l l themselves p a r t i e s might not. For example, clandestine groups that do not contest elections — even i f only because they are l eg all y barred from doing so — would not qualify
as p o l i t i c a l parties as the term is meant here.? More generally, since
organisations can vary in the degree to which they satisfy each of these requirements, t hi s implies t h a t " p ar ty n es s " ought to be regarded as a v a r i a b l e with a range o f values, i f not n e ce s s a r i l y as a continuum,
rather than as a dichotomy. In these terms, the B r i t i s h Conservative
party i s more p a r t y - l i k e than the I t a l i a n Christian Democracy, whil e both are more party-like than the American Republicans, who are in turn more party-like than the American Prohibition party.
Party Government
In defining party governmemt, one is again confronted with a choice
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between a dichotomy and a range. There has been some tendency to regard party government as a category into which a system either does or does not f i t . For example, Mintzel and Schmitt (1981a; see also 1982b) say "Party government is that form of societal conflict regulation in which a p l u r a l i t y o f d emoc ra ti cal l y organised p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s play a r e l a t i v e l y dominant r o l e both in the socio-political mediation sphere and in the actual process o f p o l i t i c a l decision-making (government
sphere)." Similarly, Sjttblom (1981) suggests with a Venn diagram that
party government is a class, although he also proposes nested subclasses that might be taken as successively closer approximations of an ideal type.
I f one i s i nterested in the causes, consequences, and future o f
party government, however, t hi s approach i s of l i t t l e help. Leaving
aside Mintzel and Schmitt's questionable insistence on democratically organised parties, presumably a reference to their internal arrangements rather than to their commitment to democracy in the wider governmental sphere, i f party government i s a category, i t e vi de nt ly includes a l l modern Western democracies with the p o s si b le exception o f the United
States. I f this is so, then the concept is of no empirical value, since
the corresponding operational variable w i l l have no variance. Moreover,
i f party government means government through parties and partyness can vary, then party governmentness must be able to take on a range o f values as well.
Party government i s an a b st ra cti on of European parliamentary
democracy in the era of mass suffrage. Although most clearly based on
academic interpretations of British practice, the party government model i s an i n t e l l e c t u a l construct whose l o g i c i s f ar more coherent than i s
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the actual operation of any r ea l party governments. In h i s t o r i c a l terms, the party government model represents the adaptation o f the i n s t i t u t i o n s o f bourgeois p a r l i a m e n t a r y democracy ( w h i ch were adaptations of the institutions of royal government) to democracies with e l e c t o r a t e s numbering in the m i l l i o n s rather than the thousands. For democratic theory, the party government model makes government accountable to the general public by entrusting i t to i n d i v i d u a l s o r g a n i s e d i n t o p a r t i e s t hat owe t h e i r p o s i t i o n s to e l e c t o r a l
approbation. More concretely, party government involves at least four
conditions.
Firstly, a l l major governmental decisions must be taken by people chosen in e le c t i o n s conducted along party l i n e s , or by i n d i v i d u a l s
appointed by and responsible to such people. It is not necessary that
p a r t i e s compete on the b asi s o f a l t e r n a t i v e poli cy proposals, but whatever p o l i c i e s are made must be made by i n d i v i d u a l s who owe t he i r a ut hor it y e it he r d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y to the e l e c t o r a l success o f
their parties. Recognising that a permanent bureaucracy is an essential
f eat ure o f a l l modern governments, t hi s condition i s v i o l at ed to the extent that bureaucrats exercise independent policy making authority. It is similarly violated whenever rule making power is turned over to individuals who cannot be removed by elected of ficials® or to functional boards whose members owe their positi ons to t he ir r o l e s in i n t e r e s t groups or the like rather than to party appointment or election.
Secondly, policy must be decided within the governing party, when there is a "monocolor" government, or by negotiation among parties when
there i s a c o a l i t i o n . Not only must po li cy be made by elected
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o f f i c i a l s , a condition met for example by the American Congress, i t must also be made-along party l i n e s , 'so that each party may be held
collectively accountable for "its" position. This condition is not met
by the Congress. Similarly, cross-party negotiations among factions, as
occurs in Italy, also violates this condition.
Thirdly, the highest o f f i c i a l s (e.g., cabinet mi ni st ers and
especially the prime minister) must be selected within their parties and
be r es ponsi ble to the people through t he i r p a r t i e s . P osi ti ons in
government must f low from support within the party rather than party
positi ons f lowi ng from e l e c t o r a l success. For example, the B r i t i s h
practice whereby the l e a d e r o f the ma jor ity party in the House o f Commons becomes prime minister is consistent with the party government model while the American usage of declaring the winner of enough primary elections to be nominated for president, or of enough popular votes to be elected president, t he re fo re to be the l eader o f his party i s not. That B r i t i s h party l e a d e r s often remain as l e a de r s even a f t e r t he ir p a r ti e s are defeated but are u n l i k e l y to survive a s u b s t an t ia l intraparty defection even i f they formally win the "vote of confidence," while a presidential candidate's "party leadership" can withstand major int ernal de fe cti ons but not e l e c t o r a l d e f e at , i s i n d i c a t i v e o f t hi s
d i s t i n c t i o n . The French case i s more complicated, but c los er to the
party government model than to the American model. Mitterand became the
presidential candidate of the Socialist party because he was the party's leader (although clearly his presidential appeal was a condition for his
r i s e to party l e a d e r s h i p ) ; he remained party l eader even a f t e r his
defeat in the 197M election. Giscard was si mil arly party leader f i r s t
and president second. His leadership of the larger French right while
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he was president, however, was more in the American mold.
Fourthly, party-based leaders must be able ef fectively to control
the bureaucracy and other public or semi -publ ic agencies. Party
domination o f the elected branches o f government must carry with i t
control over the entire governmental apparatus. Although bureaucrats
are never p o l i ti c al l y irrelevant, the party must be able to coordinate and direct their work effectively.
A number of observations must be made regarding this definition of
party government. Firstly, it represents an ideal type, rather like but
in contrast to Dahl's (1971) i deal type o f polyarchy. As such, i t
represents an extreme that may be approximated but is neither realised
nor r e a l i s a b l e in the ultimate sense. It i s also a multidimensional
concept. Thus a p a r t i c u l a r system may c l o s e l y approximate the i d e a l
type in one respect but not in another. For example, while the
partyness of American congressional-presidential relations is extremely low in comparison to its British parliamentary-cabinet counterpart, the partyness of the American bureaucracy i s higher than that o f the
British. Similarly, even within a single po li ti cal system the degree to
which many dimensions of the ideal are approximated may vary from one policy area, time, or set of circumstances to another.
Secondly, party government i s not a complete d e s cr ip t io n o f government or i n s t i t u t i o n s . While perhaps more c l e a r l y derived from consideration of adversarial or majoritarian systems in which elections choose between rival and alternating sets of leaders and policies, the basi c l o g i c o f the model i s equally a p p l i c a b l e to c on soci ati onal or
c o a l i t i o n a l systems.9 while perhaps more d i f f i c u l t to achieve in
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p r e s i d e n t i a l and/or federal systems, party government i s l o g i c a l l y compatible with these i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements as w e ll as with parliamentary and unitary systems.
Together, these two observations imply that many d i f f e r e n t
approximations o f the party government model are po s si b le . Assuming
that a single quantitative measure of party government were devised, it would combine several dimensions with the result that two systems could achieve the same "party government score" while standing quite
di ff er entl y on the individual dimensions. Whether the dimensions that
comprise the o v e r a l l concept o f party government are s u f f i c i e n t l y coherent that this does not occur, or whether the dimensions o f the o v e r a l l concept must be considered s e pa r at el y , i s a question for empirical research.
In the same way, s i m i l a r "par ty government scores" might be
achieved by countries with very d i f f e r e n t party systems. Two party
competitive systems, systems with a l t e r n a t i n g c o a l i t i o n s , systems dominated by a single party or coalition with a semipermanent opposition (so long as i t i s permitted to contest e l e c t i o n s f r e e l y ) , and systems
with grand c o a l i t i o n s a l l are po t en ti a l party governments. Whether
similar levels of party government are produced by similar conditions and whether they lead to similar consequences in these di ff er ing systems also must be resolved empirically.
Finally, this definition of party government is intended to distin
guish party government from other forms o f government. I t speaks,
t h e r e f o r e , to the "partyness o f government" as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f formal institutions and indicates the proportion of formal governmental
power exercised in accordance with the party government model. To the
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extent that its conditions are met, what formal government there is w i l l
be party government. There is no guarantee, however, that there w i l l be
any effective formal government at a ll . While the "authoritative all o
cation of values" goes on in a l l societies — even those with no " p o li t ical" institutions — the government of the party government model may be more or less relevant to this process.
This observation has two consequences for the definition of party government. F i r s t l y , i t means that those conditions which de fi ne or promote government in general must be appended to those s p e c i f i c a l l y
relating to party government. Secondly, adding these considerations to
the d e f i n i t i o n o f party government underlines a d i s t i n c t i o n between partyness as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the formal government apparatus and
party governmentness as a s oc i al c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . For example, in a
l a i s s e z - f a i r e economy, high partyness of government would s t i l l leave p a r t i e s in a r e l a t i v e l y marginal position in the a u t h o r i t a t i v e
a l l o c a t i o n o f economic values. Correspondingly, i f the power of
government grew while the party politicians' relative a b i l i t y to control it shrank, parties might become absolutely more important in the overall a l l o c a t i o n o f values even while the l e v e l of partyness o f government
decli ned. Party governmentness i s then a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the
" he rr s c h a ft s o r g a n i s a t i o n" of the wider s oci ety, and i nd ic at es the proportion of a l l social power exercised by parties within the framework of the party government model.
Capacity
Looking at the chronic economic problems of many western countries, or s t i l l more at the collapse of democratic regimes in the interwar era,
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there is a strong temptation of attribute these d i f f i c u l t i e s to a lack
o f capacity on the part o f the government or p a r t i e s . There i s an
element o f truth to thi s. Assuming that the governments o f the
contemporary west want to "solve” their economic problems, and assuming that the democratic regimes o f Germany, I t a l y , and Spain "wanted" to survive, their failure to do so certainly indicates a lack of capacity. This, however, i s a tautology, not an explanation; i f f a i l u r e i s the d e f i n e r o f low capacity, low capacity cannot be the explanation of
f a i l u r e .
Moreover, in many cases i t is not c l e a r that f a i l u r e as defined
from outside real ly is an indicator of low capacity. To listen to the
r h e t or i c o f some l e f t wing p o l i t i c i a n s , one might wonder whether bourgeois parties real ly do want to reduce unemployment; after a l l , i t
keeps wages low and workers docile. Similarly, inflation is beneficial
to some groups, at l e a s t in the short run. Beyond the d e b a t a b i l i t y o f
what a solution to many problems is, the cost of a solution in terms of personal or organisational goals may be so high that politicians choose
not to solve the problem. In Thurow's ( 1980: 44) view, for example,
Richard Nixon could have stemmed American i n f l a t i o n in 1972 had he pe rs i st ed with recessi onary p o l i c i e s ; he believed that to do so, however, would cost him the 1972 election and so he chose to change his
po li cy . Objective f a i l u r e thus may be the r e s u l t o f lack o f w i l l or
lack of foresight rather than lack of ability. Finally, some problems
may have no sol ut ions. I f poverty i s r e l a t i v e rather than a bsol ut e,
then the poor w i l l always be with us.
This suggests that "problem solution capacity" actually consists of
four d i s t i n c t , or s e m i d i s t i n c t , elements. The f i r s t element i s the
