Feminism
Introduc/on
We can dis9nguish between three concerns of feminism:
1. Feminism tracks the domina9on of women in a male-‐dominated
society.
2. Feminism engages cri9cally with the liberal public-‐private dis9nc9on.
3. Feminism, as a theory of difference and not equality, proposes an
alterna9ve concep9on of jus9ce.
Let's have a look at these three different, though complementary,
outlooks in feminism.
1. The difference approach
• Un9l well into this century, restric9ons on women's civil and poli9cal rights were said to be jus9fied by nature: Women are naturally unsuited for
poli9cal and economic ac9vi9es outside the home.
• Contemporary theorists view women as 'free and equal beings' and liberal democracies have progressively adopted an9-‐discrimina9on statutes that guarantee the equality of rights in the poli9cal sphere and the equality of opportunity in the economic sphere. Women have equal access to
educa9on, employment, poli9cal office, etc..
• The extension of rights and a sex-‐blind or gender-‐neutral society is supposed to solve the problems women face.
• MacKinnon calls this the 'difference approach' to sexual discrimina9on, for it views as discriminatory unequal treatment that cannot be jus9fied by reference to some sexual difference (p. 379).
1. The dominance approach
• Yet, the difference approach is problema9c. MacKinnon writes that "sex equality law has been u%erly ineffec9ve at geZng women what we need and are socially prevented from having on the basis of a condi9on of birth: a chance at produc9ve lives of reasonable
physical security, self-‐expression, individua9on, and minimal respect and dignity" (p. 378). Sex equality does not prevent women from the 'second shi]' or 'double day', with women being dispropor9onately represented in low-‐paying, part-‐9me work, which
makes them economically dependent.
• The problem isn't any longer old-‐fashioned chauvinism. The problem is that jobs are
designed for people who are not primary caretaker of children and can afford compe9ng and working 10h a day. Women need not be discriminated against. The fact that they have to and perhaps also want to take care of children, auto-‐excludes them from most a%rac9ve and well-‐paid posi9ons and relegates women to the low-‐paid sector.
• The problem is that society is sexist in its very founda9ons. McKinnon therefore
proposes the 'dominance approach' to sex equality that seeks to ensure not only the absence of discrimina9on, but equal power of women and men in defining society.
1. The dominance approach and theories of
jus/ce
• Many feminists argue that theories of jus9ce interpret equality in ways that are incapable of recognizing women's subordina9on. Therefore we should give up interpre9ng jus9ce in terms of equality. Yet, the dominance approach is also an interpreta9on of equality, though more complex than formal equality.
• Is the dominance approach consistent with mainstream theories of jus9ce? Communitarianism and libertarianism could reject its premises. First claims that social roles are given, second insists on the employers' freedom to design jobs however they see fit.
• Can liberal theories adopt the dominance approach? MacKinnon argues that the dominance
approach goes beyond liberalism, but Kymlicka believes that liberalism can accommodate much, if not all feminist concerns. Formal equality is not enough and the different, mostly hidden ways women are discriminated against and dominated in poli9cs, society and the market can be
countered, if, as Moller Okin argues, "Rawls's contractors would insist on a more complete a%ack on the system of gender differen9a9on, elimina9ng both the unequal domes9c division of labor and sexual objec9fica9on" (p. 385).
• Yet, the dominance approach might require liberals to revise the private-‐public dis9nc9on and the rela9onship between jus9ce and care.
2. Liberalism and the public-‐private
dis/nc/on
•
According to liberalism, jus9ce refers to the 'public' realm, whereas
familial rela9onships are private and lie outside of the state's
competences. Therefore theories of jus9ce con9nue to ignore
rela9ons within the family.
•
Yet, as Carole Pateman writes, the "dichotomy between the public
and the private is, ul9mately, what feminism is all about" (p. 387).
•
There are two concep9ons of the public-‐private dis9nc9on in
liberalism: (1) the dis9nc9on between the poli9cal and the social and
(2) the dis9nc9on between the social and the personal. Neither
2. (1.) State and civil society
• This dis9nc9on equates the public with the state, and the private with civil society. And liberalism valorizes civil society, since it is the best expression of our freedom.
• One might think that the family is part of the civil society, yet liberalism conceptualizes civil society in abstrac9on of the family, as a realm that contains only adult men.
• Why do liberals not ensure that domes9c life is organized along principles of equality and consent? One reason is that liberals inherited the
tradi9onal assump9ons concerning the women's natural role.
• Yet, the liberal state-‐society dis9nc9on is in any sense based upon tradi9onal gender roles.
2. (1.) State and civil society ( cont.)
Are there feminist grounds for rejec9ng the liberal state-‐society dis9nc9on, once it is no longer based upon the dis9nc9on between female domes9c sphere and the male public sphere? There are some points of dispute:
• Feminists might endorse stronger policies of interven9on in civil society in order to encourage the maintenance of certain social 9es, including familial ones.
• Feminists may not share the liberal faith that freedom of speech and the press will counteract prejudice and stereotypes and so may endorse stronger
government policies to fight demeaning cultural images of women.
• Feminists believe that ac9ve state policies are needed to challenge the problem of 'adap9ve preferences' (the contented housewife), while liberals tend to think that individual rights and distribu9ve jus9ce are going to do away with the
2. (2.) The personal and the social: the right
to privacy -‐ the problem
• This second dis9nc9on, going back to Roman9cism, separates the personal from the public, whereas the 'public' includes both state and civil society. Individuality is threatened not only by coercion, but also by the pressure of social expecta9ons and conformism. This second dis9nc9on is discussed under the heading of a 'right to privacy'.
• Yet, the right to privacy is interpreted by the US Supreme Court in terms of the privacy of the family. As a result, it has immunized the family from
reforms designed to protect women's interests -‐ for example, state
interven9on that would protect women against domes9c violence and marital rape, or empower women to sue for non-‐support, or officially recognize the value of domes9c labor. This way, the right to privacy reinforces the division between public and private.
2. (2.) The personal and the social: the right
to privacy -‐ the solu/on
•
In order to protect women's interests, the right to privacy must be
extended to individuals and not to families. This becomes possible
through the detachment of privacy from patriarchal ideas of family
autonomy. Accordingly, "state ac9on may be needed within the
domes9c sphere to protect privacy and prevent abuse" and
"guarantee women (or children) a sphere for personal retreat from
the presence of others, or from the pressure to conform to others'
expecta9ons" (p. 398).
•
In conclusion, the "feminist cri9ques of privacy leave the liberal
concep9ons of privacy of private choice very much alive" (p. 398).
3. The ethic of care
• Women are since always supposed to have different modes of thought and feeling -‐ more intui9ve, emo9onal, par9cularis9c disposi9ons. And in fact, women's supposed different nature is one reason for their discrimina9on.
• There is a strand in contemporary feminism, however, that argues that we should take seriously women's different morality. It is a mode of moral reasoning and a source of moral insight that is ra9onal and public in scope.
• These feminist theories go back to Carol Gilligan (In a Different Voice, 1982) who discovers that women reason in terms of interpersonal rela9onships and context, whereas men tend to impersonal, abstract and universal reasoning in terms of principles. She labels women's morality as 'ethic of care' and men's morality as 'ethic of jus9ce'.
• There is some controversy if this different voice really exists and, if it does,
whether it is significantly correlated with gender. Another ques9on is if a care-‐ based approach to poli9cal ques9ons competes with jus9ce.
3. Ethic of jus/ce vs. Ethic of care
The debate concerns the following issues:
1. moral capaci9es: learning moral principles (jus9ce) versus
developing moral disposi9ons (care)
2. moral reasoning: solving problems by seeking principles that have
universal applicability (jus9ce) versus seeking responses that are
appropriate to the par9cular case (care)
3. moral concepts: a%ending to rights and fairness (jus9ce) versus
a%ending to responsibili9es and rela9onships (care).
3. (1.) Moral capaci/es
• Also for theories of jus9ce moral disposi9ons are important. Even if jus9ce involves applying abstract principles, people do develop a 'sense of jus9ce' only if they learn a broad range of moral capaci9es.
• Most jus9ce theorists neglect the development of the affec9ve capaci9es, since they suppose that the sense of jus9ce and the sense of care is
learned within the family.
• Yet, as Okin points out, if the family is itself gendered and children learn within the family about despo9sm and exploita9on rather than equality and reciprocity, then the whole structure of moral development is built upon uncertain grounds.
• Therefore, jus9ce theorists have to accept the care theorists emphasis on moral disposi9ons and pay more a%en9on to the jus9ce of the family.
3. (2.) Moral Reasoning
Jus9ce theorists are right in being universalist (insis9ng on principles) rather than situa9onist (responding to the complexity of a given situa9on). Why? • Not all contextual features are relevant to moral decisions. We need to
dis9nguish salient and irrelevant features of moral situa9ons.
• Moral demands may conflict and we need principles to solve this conflict. • It is not clear that we always should try to accommodate conflic9ng
demands.
• We have limited resources for caring. We need moral guidelines for ordering our priori9es.
3. (3.) Moral concepts
The dis9nc9on between 'rights and fairness' and 'responsibili9es and
rela9onships' can be construed in at least three ways:
1. universally versus concern for par9cular rela9onships
2. respect for common humanity versus respect for dis9nct
individuality
3. (3.1.) Universality versus preserving
rela/onships
For care theorists, morality requires responding to percep9on of need within the context of rela9onships and not the categorical impera9ve.
This is problema9c, since the care ethics risks to exclude the most needy, since they are most likely outside the exis9ng web of rela9onships.
Therefore, some care theorists expand the web of rela9onships to include all human beings. This is problema9c:
• We lose the dis9nc9on between the par9cularity of rela9onship and the generality of principle.
• Moreover, imposing impar9ality, a%achment loses its moral relevance. • The ethics of care leaves also unclear how conflicts of interests between
3. (3.2.) Respect for humanity and respect for
individuality
Jus9ce neglects people's dis9nct individuality. It is concerned with the 'generalized other' rather than the 'concrete other'. Care responds to concrete differences rather than our abstract humanity.
This contrast seems overdrawn in both direc9ons:
• The ethic of care, once universalized, also appeals to common humanity. • Theories of jus9ce are not limited to respect for the generalized
other.According to Okin, Rawls' theory of jus9ce does not depend upon a disembedded and disembodied being but requires that "as moral subjects, we consider the iden99es, aims and a%achments of every other person (...) as of equal concern with our own. We must develop considerable
capaci9es for empathy and powers of communica9ng with others about what different human lives are like" (p. 408).
3. (3.3.) Accep/ng responsibility and claiming
rights
•
Jus9ce is concerned with rights, whereas care with accep9ng
responsibili9es. For Gilligan, care requires concern for welfare,
whereas rights are essen9ally self-‐protec9ve and selfish.
Yet, except for libertarians, theories of jus9ce recognize posi9ve du9es
concerning the welfare of others.
•
Is there a difference in the kind of responsibility each ethic insists
upon?
For care ethics whatever subjec9vely-‐felt hurt is immoral whether or
not it is fair.
3. (3.3.) Jus/ce as fairness: the challenge
Why do jus9ce theorists limit our responsibility for others to the claims
of fairness?
•
Some interests remain my own responsibility, otherwise we reward
irresponsibility. We are responsible agents.
•
Taking into account subjec9ve hurts can hide oppression (see
exploita9ve and oppressive rela9ons). Oppressors' subjec9ve hurts
have no moral weight, since they arise from unfair and selfish
expecta9ons.
•
Using subjec9ve hurt as the basis of moral claims imposes too great a
responsibility for others. There seems to be no limits to our
3. (3.3.) The place for an ethic of care
Care theorists counter that we need to dis9nguish a 'self-‐less' concep9on of caring from a 'self-‐inclusive' concep9on of caring. This is what dis9nguishes a 'feminist' ethic of care from a 'feminine' ethic of self-‐sacrifice.
Yet, how much autonomy can we claim for ourselves and how much
reciprocity can we demand from others, without neglec9ng the subjec9ve hurt of others?
Care theorists do not resolve this ques9on by developing a system of
abstract rules. Yet, autonomy requires that responsibili9es are predictable and codified in advance.
However, the assump9on that subjec9ve hurts give rise to moral claims is plausible if applied to our rela9ons with dependants (children). A baby is not responsible for its needs and cannot be expected to a%end its parent's
