Generalized political exchange : preliminary considerations

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(1)DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES. 320. EUR. E U I. W O R K I N G. P A P E R. No.. 85/190. GENERALIZED POLITICAL EXCHANGE Preliminary Considerations. B e r n d. M a r i n. Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico di Flesole (Firenze). © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE.

(2) in whole or in part without the prior permission of the author. (c). BERND MARIN. Printed in Italy in July 1985 Badia Fiesolana 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI). ITALY. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. This paper should not be reproduced.

(3) 1. -. "Exchange" Notions as Media of Social Scientific Exchange A. Cautionary. Analogy, Yet Another Attempt at Conceptual Currency. Reform. "Exchange" precarious with. an. conceptual. systems. universally within. is. old,. widely. currency. theoretical. circulated,. yet. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -. highly. in social science discourses. As. notions,. "exchange" language is almost. accepted if not used as a medium of exchange of ideas. and. across. circulation,. disciplinary. widespread. communications. and. ever. usage new. boundaries. within. emissions. a. But. extensive. multiplicity. of. by ever new theoretical. issuing offices does, by itself, not insure the declared value. On the. contrary, the oversupply of "exchange" notions inflates their. exchange value: It became an intellectual currency which is always around. in. some. way. or. the. other. without. buying and that is. explaining too much.. This the. very. analogy. "Exchange" probably. devaluation process can be understood in pursuing. between conceptual currency and money a bit further. notions. never. guaranteed. have. will).. not. become. Unlike. theoretical notes yet (and. treasury. notes. or legal tender,. by a single, respected, monopolist authority - such as. a government guaranteeing a currency or a bank guaranteeing checks or bank deposits - "exchange" theory is no promise to explain yet, backed. by. an. uncontested. intellectual. authority. and. to. be. transfered as transferable cognitive tool to pay one's explanatory obligations..

(4) Rather, modern. it. resembles. "private. boundaries. money",. 2. -. primitive which. chains. would. of. constantly. obligations or overstep. the. of their domain proper. Premodern and private bills of. exchange,. in. principle,. are. of highly restricted use: They are. fully accepted in some cosmopolitan villages called "disciplines", in. certain. small,. closely-knit. theoretical. communities called. "paradigms", or within theoretical shops named "schools" only.. Consequently, their dependence on mutual trust and confidence among. adherents. explanatory tribe. obligations. only.. territory. of the same creed allows for a cancelling out of. Other tribes within or even outside the disciplinary. simply. regulating. ignore the presumably worthless pieces of paper. exchange. transaction-chains just of. one. in short cycles, within the paradigmatic. within are. in. the. tribe. But even here, primitive. permanent danger of being blown up by. important "outsider" in the chain; hence, the obsession. scientific tribes with thought control and "treason", doxa and. heresy.. If we compare the manifold "exchange" notions in contemporary social. science. discourses. with. monies. guaranteed. by. private. parties only - such as credit accounts of a stores' customers or a credit certain. card company - the result is similar: Each can be spent in theoretical. areas. and. even. magazines only; it will be. accepted. exclusively as illiquid assets; transfers to outside its. original. theoretical. domain. are. strictly. limited. or costly -. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(5) "exchange". 3. -. concepts can be transferee! to other theoretical realms. at expensive discount only.. This the. situation reminds of an historical constellation before. development. of. modern. money.. Like early notes,. "exchange". notions are restricted to given circles of social acquaintanceship and. intellectual. are. competing. within. each. as. local. areas, should they actually pay. There. "exchange". notions. of different paradigms. disciplinary terrain, usually preferred over general. theoretical such. trading. notes. issued. "economics". by. often. a central intellectual authority claims. within. the human and social. sciences.. Thus, single. there. is an ongoing struggle over the imposition of a. theoretical. tender. greatest. reputation. respected. intellectual. choice". this. discipline,. confidence,. "schools".. As. and. other. "economist". enjoying. the. trusted. and. or "rational. notions are not universally as acceptable to intellectual. creditors. as. circulate. other. and. paradigmatic Their. and. by. debtor's. accumulate. leaders,. whose. notes,. in. the own. they hands. recurrently of. "exchange". most. fail to. trustworthy. notions circulate.. acceptability depends on the reputation and known resources. of the conceptual issuer and guarantor.. This theoretical. would. not. special. constitute purpose. any. monies. problem, were. not. as long as these overdrafted. and. increasingly used outside their limited domain proper. But as with. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(6) credit. cards. towards. an. obligations currency. shop. 4. -. in contemporary Western societies, there is a trend ever-widening covered. by. range. of. theoretical,. explanatory. some kind of "exchange" concept as valid. Though a non-universal theoretical money,. it invites to. around intellectually in ever new areas. Yet, how to prevent. to use another conceptual "exchange" card than the one adequate in a given situation? What generally used private monies actually buy in. other fields in terms of explanatory power is quite uncertain:. Exchange. rates. with. other. fluctuating and instable; holding. is. highly. conceptual. monies. are. extremely. speculations are the rule while constant. risky;. inflationary. use is hard to prevent;. "black" and other secondary currencies to fall back on emerge etc. But. why, then, is some "exchange" currency still used and trusted. at all, even more, why is it time and again issued anew instead of switching to another, more solid medium of scientific exchange?. One. possible. reason. conceptual. medium. securities.. For. most. might. be. the. silent. presumption. of. high. all that, it is still a main currency of the one. important disciplinary empire within the humanities, that is. economics,. which. conceptual. resource.. the. for this loyalty to such a problematic. expectation,. which,. finally,. founded. that. Being. its. intellectual. production. on this. of such powerful heritage might feed. "exchange". notions. are part of a medium. will pay its way to explain the world in all its. complexities out of a few, simple principles.. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(7) Acting. upon. this. idle. 5. -. hopes,. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -. a number of prominent social. scientists continually attempted, over the last decades, either to smuggle. in. "exchange". or. "imperialistically" impose economistic notions of. to. replace. or. reconvert. other. anthropological,. political. science,. theoretical. currencies of "exchange". In this respect, endeavours. to. redefine. international. sociological,. -. everything warfare. as. from. social. psychological. interpersonal. relations. to. "exchanges" are equally telling as the. efforts. to reinterpret all kind of social and political exchanges. by. economic. the. model of perfect market competition - political. exchange being market relations between political actors.. This. levelling. out. of intellectual domains by overdrafting. one special, economic "exchange" concept, and. stabilize. contrary, currency theory been. the. conceptual. further reform. "exchange". inflate it. Instead, on. "exchange". I hold, will not restore currency. but, at the. a fundamental theoretical. concepts in political and social. seems necessary, basic prerequisites of which have already laid. ground. anthropology,. in as different areas as economic and cultural. functional. systems. theory,. and. sciences,. economy and political sociology, corporatist. neo-institutionalism come. up. "political. with. a. etc.. single. exchange",. decision. analysis,. interorganizational political. collective. network. theory,. policy. While none of these approaches has yet and. definite. convincing. framework of. each of them could contribute to raise the. explanatory power of such a notion..

(8) But. restoring. concepts. the. renders. fashionable. -. theoretical exchange value of "exchange". necessary. rational. 6. specializing. choice. exchange. them:. notion,. Instead which. of. might. a be. universally interchangeable, but values and buys little in certain world areas to be explained by social science, a less convertible, more as. domain-specific "political. or special purpose conceptual currency such. exchange". might. do. and. do better than a flimsy. flimsy, catching all and nothing in particular.. This. is. introducing kind. of. the. to. allow. notions bit. what. am proposing to do in this paper,. voucher in social science. While its use is. explain. a. specific. class. of phenomena only, it. to understand them more fully than those "exchange". which. only.. I. concept of "generalized political exchange" as a. theoretical. restricted should. exactly. claim. What. the. political. exchange". prevalent. market. understanding:. to explain absolutely everything - a little new. currency. of. "generalized. is claimed to explain is just what the still. models. The. conceptual. logic. of. exchange. of. define. out. of. possible. ongoing risky transactions between. organized, collective actors with functionally interdependent, yet competing. or even antagonistic interests, and not to be regulated. (sufficiently) by legal-contractual devices.. This on. paper is part of a series of preliminary considerations. "generalized. specific. and. transactions. political. most can. exchange". It sets out to argue how a. precarious. class. of macropolitical-economic. be better unerstood by the new concept and what. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(9) distinguishes within. an. extended. economic state. exchange. constellation. (Parri. 1985).. concentrates. and. A. -. networks. policy. between. 7. of. interdependent transactions. community from simple, dyadic barter. interest. associations. -. the. prototypical. in what could be called the Italian model. second,. closely. related. paper (Marin 1985 a). on the logic of "generalized political exchange" and. on. problems of analysis: How is it possible at all and what makes. it. so. difficult. (Marin/Wagner hierarchies" single. industrial claiming various. promising). 1985) and. most. (yet. develops. reconstructs. important. to the. study key. macroeconomic. dimension. of. as. "generalized. provide. a. non-institutionalist. political. corporatist). of. "market. management. governance. -. (pluralist,. A third paper. notion. societies to. it.. in. -. the. advanced. exchange" -. alternative to the. paradigms. of. neo. institutionalism.. The. new. concept. can. macroeconomic-political. be. clarified. transactions. by. to. analyzing be. typical. understood. as. "exchange"; but what exactly constitutes a case in point cannot be determined arbitrary requires,. without way-out. some of. theoretical this. preconceptions.. inevitable. hermeneutical. A. noncircle. as will be seen, recourse to economic models as well as. to everyday political experience and common sense.. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(10) 8. -. POLITICAL EXCHANGE: WHAT IS A CASE IN POINT?. Defining. political. macropolitical organized,. and. does. but. of. as. mutually. transactions. actors. with. functionally. character. not. least,. -economic. collective. antagonistic, binding. exchange. contingent,. between. autonomous,. divergent/competitive/. interdependent. interests,. the. which cannot be based on law and contract,. lead very far in specifying the notion. But it does, at. cut. out ab initio a wide range of phenomena often loosely. associated. with. political. exchange,. which. actually. might. be. understood more precisely by other concepts.. Clientelistic patronage for instance, and corresponding deals between. a. tutelary. citizens;. interactions. legislators between and. party. and. their. machine between. and individuals or groups of elected. constituencies;. representatives negotiated. as. agreements. political parties and, more generally, coalition behavior. alliances between territorially-based interest organizations;. lobbying. in. public. oligopolist. firms;. leadership. and. ministerial. and. offices;. bargaining work. arrangements. between. between management/organizational. force/rank. subordinate. decision-making; mergers,. cartel. and. service. file;. haggling. agencies;. between. governmental. interlocking directorates or other forms. of vertical integration between companies; strategic intermarriage to. underpin. "buying". interorganizational. relations by kinship ties; vote. (as different from vote trading) are just a few examples. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(11) 9. -. of exchange-related and politically relevant patterns which do not constitute political exchange according to the initial definition.. But, a. then, what is it what is to be covered and explained by. specified. political. and. theoretically. exchange,. phenomena. and,. what. at. the. elaborated notion of generalized. cuts same. out. so. time,. many. has. not. most. interesting. been. understood. sufficiently by existing conceptualizations yet? Let us start with a. meanwhile. "classical". paradigmatic. case. example,. which. has become a downright. of political exchange,. in order to see to what. an extent the transaction analysed and the analytical tool derived from this analysis hold generally.. Scambio Politico Pizzorno ongoing. (1978),. theoretical. in. his. debate. seminal. in. social. essay. which. science,. started an. focuses on the. following most elementary constellation.. "A. factory. workers. affected. demand which. decides. for. decision.. is. their. obtains How. some is. to. close.. then. services, total. by. Although the market power of the definition nil, since there is no. they. or their union take an action. or partial revision of the management. this possible? The answer is often in terms of. political pressure or political power exercised by the union. Some gain has been obtained in exchange for something 'political'. What kind. of. exchange. is then taking place here? What kinds of goods. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(12) are. 10. -. being traded in this political market? While in the atomistic. market. more. gains were obtained in exchange for more effort, and. in. the. collective bargaining in exchange for continuity of work,. in. the. political. called. consensus. which. has. social. goods. consensus. consensus unless. market. the. resource given in exchange may be. or support. An actor (generally the government) to. give is ready to trade them in exchange for. with an actor who can threaten to withdraw that. (or, which is more or less the same, to endanger order). he. receives. collective. the. goods. he needs. In a situation of pure. bargaining, industrial action means threat to withdraw. continuity of work. The exchange becomes political when the threat is. withdrawal. resource is. of the wider social consensus or social order. The. in the hand of workers in the case of political exchange. regulated. case. of. collective. depends. on. resource (279),. according to completely different criteria from the. the. depends and. function. he. of. the. bargaining.. demand. for. instead. Market power in the latter case. labour.. The value of the consensus. on completely, different circumstances". summarizes that this political "market power is a need. for. consensus". (280). which. bears. "no. necessary relation to the demand for the product of these workers, and. (is). thus. external. to. the. market. on. which. collective. bargaining takes place" (279).. But. this. very. gap. exchange,. "the. fact. exercise production. is. not. a. between that. collective bargaining and political the amount of power which a group may. function. of. the. contribution. it makes to. .... might be seen as the main cause of destabilisation. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(13) in. an. industrial. pressures (based. in. on. relations. particular.. -. system". (280), and of inflationary. Equilibrium. macroeconomic. calculated. 11. stability). under-exploitation. of. in can. the. political market. be regained by a well-. short-term. market. power. in. exchange for some kind of guarantee of future repayment. The power of. a. union. to. obtain future benefits in exchange for immediate. moderation. depends. interpret. short-run. interest,. and. in. charge. state. the. on. its. capacity. demands. in. for. the. strategy,. light. of. more. that is to long-term. "the state increasingly becomes the main structure. of the guarantee of long-term goals obvious. 'other. side'. in. the. ... This makes the. bargain through which. present restraint is traded for future security" (286).. There. is a further mechanism bringing about the same result.. Such as exchange on the political market is external to collective bargaining. exchanges,. so. does. industrial. action. generate. "secondary effects analogous to the external economies" of marketdecisions.. The. potentially in. private. actors. activities structure. itself. which for. 286. ). .. of these increasingly frequent and. secondary. effects. of. industrial. action. a main resource of political exchange between. like. order,. interdependences (. control. damaging. becomes. political. very. and. unions, the. produce. political which. capable. of endangering the socio. state, held responsible for it. State the. political. exchanges exist. among. are the. market. as opportunity. related. to "systematic. units. of the economy". © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(14) This. is. subtleties. not. of. process. leeway. should and. ... in. be. where. the. rank. representatives. Secondly,. premises. of. union. file. traditional. exchanged. politically, of. and. single. of. "power. Wade. First,. disruptive. of. obtaining. future. (284), but the. the. emergence of new. with. the. individualistic. Consensus. as. the. resource. is not aggregated individual. expressed by vote, as the "economic. following Schumpeter, would have it. In consumers. entrepreneurs. in. or. exchange theories, applied to. 1968).. citizens. democracy.. breaks. for instance,. political. organizations. unrest. economic. democracy",. model,. liberal. immediately.. political exchange are located in the. Pizzorno. (Curry. political. the elaborations and. collective identities outside the exchanging. politics. this. into. power over its own members". and. and. actors.. theories. go. interoganizational intermediation is limited by intra-. organizational. support. made. of. becomes. to. model of political exchange, but a few. limits. itself,. benefits. place. Pizzorno's. observations potentials. the. -. buy. preferred. policies. from. who freely compete on the marketplace of. The. consensus. contrast,. is. rather. exchanged a. by. interest. collective support of. public policies by compliance to rules or negotiated agreements, a restraint. of. any. collective action capable of damaging economic. stability and socio-political order.. Thus "Oxford's bargaining Such. Pizzorno,. without. ever. saying. so,. radicalizes. the. school" criticism of the "classical" view of collective of. the. Webbs. as expressed by Allan Flanders (1968).. as collective bargaining is not just a collective equivalent. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 12. -.

(15) of. individual. mutual. insurance. against so. exchanges. their. does. and. 13. (and. legal. -. for. the unions an alternative to. enactment,. forced. upon. employers. will) but a joint regulation of the terms of work,. political exchange not replace collective bargaining but. regulate it. Such as collective bargaining is not just an economic process. in. which. institution power. an. state. to. actor. joint. diplomatic. use of organizational. power-relationship, so is political exchange not of. rather,. bargaining. it. as a market activity to the. involves different power resources and. actors. as. well. -. political exchange,. in. collective bargaining, does not require the union as. constituted. (278),. by. political. regulation. the. and. intermediating. is. market". rules. collective. contrast. market. as a labor cartel but a political. extension. different. to. a. realm;. main. act. making. within. simply. unions. consensus. the. And. while. the political. "political aspects of the labour. exchanges cannot be reduced neither to. or political bargaining on the labor market nor. pressure. group. activities. to. make the state enforcing. negotiated rules agreed upon in the collective bargaining process.. Whereas supposedly not on but. just the. a. recognized exchange. the. political. character of a. in collective bargaining, which is. individual exchange for many, Pizzorno not longer looks political. organized. for. economic. focuses. market,. Flanders. on. dimensions of exchanges between private actors the. very. collectivities constituted. genuine. logic of transactions between private and public authorities in the political. by the latter. Hence,. social. science. theory,. all the basic elements which. does. not shrink. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(16) political hand:. 14. -. exchange to market behavior of political actors,. are at. Functional interdependence and mutual interest contingency,. corresponding exchange. strategic complexity and political indeterminacy of. rates as well as the crucial role of time and history of. political in contrast to market exchange patterns.. Why types do. then,. does one need to elaborate the concept? Are there. of political transactions it does not cover sufficiently or the. same. exchanges. within. different,. more. general. explanatory. power. of. somewhat. more. modelling?. the. complex. different. analytical. and. that. is. contexts. In. order. tool,. we. "real". to. require test. a the. will look at a. configuration. of. political exchange. As Pizzorno claims "that the difference in the extent. to. which the political market impinges upon the positions. of the workers, the unions and the employers, in. distinguishing. (287),. a. general. among. national. theoretical. is the main variable. industrial relations systems". framework. should. also cover the. following constellation (more fully analysed in Wagner 1985).-. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(17) A Simple Transaction -Chain. Think of this union wage strategy as an under-exploitation of short-term unions. market. and. power. employers. considerations,. to. within. basically. uniformous,. average. the. increase growth. in. exchange for future benefits. Trade. associations. keep. increases. relative. in. agree,. collective. following that. for. macroeconomic. bargaining ana nominal wage. framework:. wage. increases are. is all categories get about the same. of gross income; they are oriented at the real labor. productivity. throughout. the national. economy; and in calculating nominal wage increases, the collective bargaining. parties. rely. on. a. common. forecasting. of. future. inflation rates.. Such between. a. wage. gross. policy. national. guarantees product. a. certain synchronisation. and mass incomes; generally,. it. sets neither restrictive nor inflationary impulses. But persistent sectoral. differentials. constant. pressure. generate. some. anticipated. to. domestic. in productivity increases not only induce innovate. and. structural. rationalize firms, but also inflation,. which. has to be. at the negotiation table, when interest organizations. bargain over nominal wage increases.. In increasing term. a. short-term. perspective,. expansionary. demand for consumer goods are maintained;. perspective,. entrepreneurs. effects. of. in a middle-. are under effective pressure to. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -15.

(18) raise. productivity;. distribution. can. categories. be. of. distribution. of. redistribution. in. a. 16. long-term. kept. up;. are. income. between by. view,. consensus on income. given wage differentials between. labor. caused. -. kept. as labor. much and. as. the. functional. capital.. The. only. a uniformous and productivity oriented. wage. policy is between company profits in different branches, and. that. seems acceptable to unions as long as employers associations. are. capable of disciplining their most profitable member firms or. sectoral representatives.. But. how. is. implicit. and. unwritten. contract. for. formal. and. such. simple but strange, highly unprobable,. a. "social. contract", setting the terms of. collective agreements, possible at all? Why. how do the parties agree on these terms of incomes policy and. make. their. constituencies. have. these. meta-rules for regulating collective bargaining to do. with. political. exchange. comply. ,. or,. to these agreements? And what. more. precisely:. what. kind of. political exchange is the negotiated incomes policy sketched above a part of?. Here,. the. enough,. unions. reason. to. picture and. gets. employers. voluntarily. share. a. bit mpre complicated. Obviously associations must have some sound governmental. responsibility. for. inflation, the control of which in other contexts resorts with the central assume. bank. and. not. with the parties of incomes policy. If we. that all collective actors involved display a limited, but. nevertheless. well. calculated. strategic rationality, what is the. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(19) overall. game. meaningful the. they. or. spaces. -. play which makes such incomes political moves. feasible. of. 17. at all, what are its rules, and what are. manoeuvre it leaves for collective bargaining and. the opportunity structures for political exchanges proper?. For, in order to produce the collective good of macroeconomic stability trade. by. imposing collective discipline on wages and prices,. unions. larger. and. employers. framework. of. associations. macroeconomic. must operate within a. management. and. political. division of labor. All such efforts would be shallow would not the central. bank. inflation trade,. take. through. which,. labor. an. on. competitiveness. responsibility exchange. the. for. rate. average,. controlling. policy. does. "imported". neutral to foreign. not affect national price. on world markets; nor would they be acceptable to. organizations, would the government not take responsibility. for maintaining high levels of employment by filling the deflatory gap. between. Though. a. policy. tasks. residual. be. taken,,. in. case. integral. demand. of. and. supply through public deficit spending.. function. in. the. hierarchy of macroeconomic. and the corresponding time sequence of decisions to governmental fiscal "insurance" to compensate ex post losses based on false equilibrium expectations is an. and. indispensable. entrepreneurial. element. expectations. as. in. well. stabilizing as. optimistic. the risky advances of. "responsible" unions.. Within policy,. this. unions. division free. the. of. political. central. bank. labor in stabilization from. the. necessity of. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(20) 18. -. restrictive interventions, which they fear a lot, and thereby they free. themselves. responsibility an. this. fear:. In exchange for internalizing. domestic inflation control, unions neutralize. unpredictable. and. threatening environment. But as. arrangement rests on a concerted exchange rate policy of the. central. bank,. addition. to. trade having. moderation: in. for. otherwise. this. from. unions pay another, more important price in to. oblige. their. series of political exchanges, a. and. file. to. wage. In order to secure the possibility of adquate returns. terms of employment guarantees,. for. rank. corresponding. loss. of. they have to engage in another. including government, to compensate monetary. steering. resources. in. macroeconomic management.. The. importance. as. well. as the political exchange rates of. this other transaction-chain result from the technicalities of the logic. of. a. preference and. Keynesian for. (Unions. tend to have a strong. Keynesianism, as it is the only economic paradigm. political. their. strategy.. meta-game which gives them some saying and defines. constituent. interests. as. universal. and of macroeconomic. relevance,. see Lindberg 1983). Within this super-game, the central. bank. has. to. once. it. accommodate. to foreign interest rate developments,. has chosen to pursue a determinate exchange rate policy.. Thus,. it. rates. by a policy of "cheap money" if it will not run the risk of. massive. cannot. capital. interest segmenting. rate. counteract. outflow. oriented. credit. an international hausse in interest. This dilemma between exchange rate and monetary. markets. into. policy an. can be circumvented by. internationally. oriented. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(21) "financial oriented. circulation" money. circulation". 19. -. and a domestic and productive investment. market;. but to establish a protected "production. through. a. network. of. subsidized. credits. for. investments and exports, government must support this transactionchain. and. actually. regulating for. a. and. short-term. financial. this. crucial. capital markets,. link.. Without. it has to make. protected capital market segment for productive investment to. stabilize. expectations. amount and. contribute. The. middle-term central. bank,. and. optimistic. in. turn,. entrepreneurial. must agree that the. of "cheap money" circulating is regulated by fiscal policy. that. is. by. public. households. and not by its own monetary. policy.. Let. us, at this point, break off the description of the game. sketched,. without. technicalities. of. feedback. looking. into. the. more. complicated economic. Its economic consequences - such as a de-coupling mechanisms. for. price-dynamics,. realizing. the. "classical dichothomy" - as well as its coherence and viability as a. macroeconomic. program. have been analysed more fully elsewhere. (Wagner 1985, Marin/Wagner 1985). There is an ongoing debate among economists. of. how. to. interpret. this. most. unconventional but. successful policy-mix theoretically ( e.g.Tichy 1984, Wagner 1985) or. how. looked policies. to identify its success (Scharpf 1981, 1983). Others have into. the. with. D./Maurer/Wagner. actual fit of empirically identifiable economic the 1983).. underlying Instead,. macroeconomic I. would. model. (Marin,. like to point to the. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(22) implications. of. the. above. 20. -. sketch. for an analysis of political. exchange, to be elaborated a bit in the next section.. Quite can. obviously,. what was called a simple transaction-chain. be analysed as a pattern of political exchange as much as the. elementary. barter. prototype. of. the Italian paradigm. It starts. with. the. very same case of union wage moderation, but allows for. some. more. contextual elements to be taken into consideration: At. least for the series of other, related games than the one of which the. political. of.. This leads, as will be seen, to the conception of networks of. generalized economic. exchange. of collective bargaining outcome is part. political exchange and met a (super)games or political-. regimes.. It. builds. on. the significant difference and. greater generality of this type of political exchange than the one originally. introduced. by. Pizzorno. and. other Italian scholars,. following his conceptualization.. From Barter to Exchange-Networks. What. are. exchange. the differences between the two cases of political. presented. differences. in. above. terms. of. and a. what is the significance of these general. theoretical. framework. to. interpret such precarious transaction patterns?. In. order. underlying at. a. to. clarify. the. divergent. exchange perspectives. the different examples chosen to analyse, we will look. series. of. most. simple and obvious questions to which any. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(23) conceptualization does:. collective. the. relationship they. do. otherwise? the. -. will have to come up with answers, and actually. What is the terrain or field of political exchange? Who are. the. do. 21. actors. between them? What resources do they trade? How. it? What. participating in the transaction? What is. Why. do. they. do it the way they do it and not. for do they exchange at all? What is at stake in. transaction?. How long will they go on playing the game? When. do what kind of political exchange pattern arise at all?. W. A. first,. political all. most. exchange. followers. market. in. e. r. obvious. e. ?. difference. concerns where the. actually takes place. Pizzorno (and virtually the. Italian. debate) concentrate on the labor. and its political aspects, not "stemming directly from the. relationship but. and. h. from. employers and employees ... at work". governmental. frameworks system.. between. or. interventions,. long-term. The. field. union. they. collective. focus. public. strategies on,. thus,. policies,. (277), legal. within the political is. the. political. implications. of. bargaining or of extra-institutional. action:. The. domain of the political market created by government. through. its. very dealings with the parties of the labor market -. as. far. as labor organizations in particular are able and willing. to. control. and trade the political externalities of labor market. exchanges in exchange with state agencies.. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(24) Against terrain. of. markets,. in. exchange. occasionally. and. -. the simple transaction-chain example, the. political. and. parties are. that,. 22. parliament. comprises. a. multitude of other. even the political arena of political. proper. While collective wage agreements. to be found in the labor market, corresponding price controls the. (whatever. mechanism. chosen. from. outright state control to. autonomous. voluntary self-regulation by the social parties or the. industries. themselves). incomes. affect. operation in product markets. The. policy resulting from exercising collective discipline on. wage developments in labor markets and pricing in product markets, again,. has. to be mediated to collective action on domestic money. and credit markets as well as on international financial markets.. These exchanges, are. markets,. constituting an economic arena for political. are. only many, but also interdependent; and they. not only interdependent, but also hierarchically ordered. The. ordering. itself and. processes, respective. is. induced. the. fields. boundaries., not,. not. resulting. and. Whether. politically,. games. fully. market of. hierarchies. political. intended,. through. exchange. exchange. define. the. and their. recognized and accepted or. some kind of market hierarchy always exists and determines a. corresponding transaction inevitably structured. set. of. and part. political. related of. a. much. interdependence. games. Any kind of labor market. political larger of. exchange, terrain. markets. and. of. therefore, a. simply. understood adquately when looked upon in isolation.. is. politically cannot. be. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(25) W. This the. leads. two. Italian. h. -. o. ?. immediately to a second,. cases. participating. 23. in. point:. Who. are. important difference of the. collective. actors. in political exchange? In what might be called 'The. Model'. the. main. protagonists are two, sometimes three:. Trade unions and the federal government or the central state, with occasional. taking. respective. counterpart. centers their. into. account in. of. labor. (organized). capital as the. markets. As the model strongly. on labor organizations, workers sometimes come in to play role. governance. market. a. of. organized market'. as. which. labor is. demanding constituency, the representation and remains. leadership.. just. the. a. permanently precarious task for. In terms of numbers, the 'political. opposite. of. a heavily populated economic. and resembles much more how textbook economics exemplifies. exchange processes: with Robinson Crusoe and Friday.. Transaction-chains, that one. is. neither. sketched,. participating instance, competing) also. by. is. in. trade shop. the contrary, are composed of a few,. just two nor too many actors. In cases like the. there. not. at. is a series of additional collective actors political. only. exchanges:. represented. by. Organized (a. unitary. labor,. for. or several. unions (sometimes helped by labor parties), but. floor. or. company representatives. (shop stewards,. Betriebsraete, works councillors, comités d'entreprise or délégués de. personnel,. consigli. di. fabbrica,. etc.), chambers of labor,. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(26) etc.;. with. the. confederations. degree. 24. -. of. integration. between. central. and affiliated unions or between peak associations. and other working class representatives as a crucial variable.. Correspondingly,. organized capital cannot be thought of as a. unitary, coherent collective actor, which is far from true even at the. level of employers associations. In some fields, other inter-. organizational. clusters. dominant. conglomerates. often. firm. leading. capital games. but. or. as. trade. associations,. cartels,. in strategically important sectors,. public enterprises or banks controlling industrial. public debtors play a decisive role in some political. Similarly,. regional. governmental a. such. "the. state" is not simply central government,. or local governments. (and their coordinated,. inter. exchange-relations) might be even more important for. counter-cyclical. budget. policy within a federal structure, as. much as this holds for various "parafisci" like social security or pension funds.. This. reminds. of. macropolitical-economic model'. both. of. the. organized. crucial. actors. in. any. exchange-network, ignored in the 'Italian. play. labor. and. organized. capital. do,. in. many. an independent and important if not guiding role. formation of political exchanges underlying macroeconomic. decisions. Netherlands, Planraad. more. Autonomous cooperative bodies composed of representatives. countries, in. two. Here,. the Social-Economische Raad (Estor 1965) in the. the. Swedish Harpsund-Conferences and the succeeding. (Elvander. 1972),. the. Norwegian. Oekonomiske. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(27) Samordningsraad 1983). or. the. 25. -. and later the Kontaktutvalget. (Rokkan 1966, Olsen. Austrian Paritaetische Kommission (Marin 1982) are. just the most prominent cases in point of these cooperative, decision-making. bodies,. joint. participating in and often substantially. shaping the transaction-chains.. Even. more. so. does. the. central. bank. in any one country.. Whereas the significance of cooperative collective actors varies a lot. between. simply in. do. different. not exist), the federal reserve bank is always crucial. ordering. opportunity model actor. the. market. structure. outlined to. national contexts (in some countries they. which. then. serves. as. an. for ongoing political transactions. In the. above,. keep. hierarchy. for. the. instance,. overall. it is the one most central. system. in. balance. and. other. collectivities including central government have to flexibly adapt their. strategies. authorities. conclusion at. the. Thinking. of. parameters. set. empirical. cases. first by the monetary leads. to. the. same. as the model: The Deutsche Bundesbank counteracting an. least moderately expansionary fiscal policy of the West German. government policy; supply up. to. in. the. late. 1970s. by. a. most restrictive monetary. after 1979, the Bank of England tightly controlling money or the American Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker keeping. real interest rates at levels which also affected the terms of. political. trade. between. capital. and. labor. in. all. European. economies,. all these examples confirm the absolutely crucial role. of central banks in any one economic policy community. The Italian model,. not. taking. into account the systemic impact of this most. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(28) powerful an. actor. adequate. on. 26. -. the overall political economy, cannot provide. assessment. of. specific. exchanges. even within the. terrain of labor markets and their relationship to the state only: How could the unions be expected to forego immediate opportunities for. gains. if even the most labor-friendly government. is not able. to guarantee that its commitments to future repayments will not be upset by a counteracting strategy of the central bank?. H. In. what. sense,. more. o. w. systematically,. does. the. exchange-. relationship differ in the two cases presented above? The ‘Italian model'. clearly. occasionally. implies. extended. a. dyadic. or. bilateral. relation,. to a tri-partite constellation, which very. often reduces to a two-step-bilateralism: Unions offer controlling their. very behavior with the counter-party on the labor market in. an anticipatory manner or ex post in exchange with government. The collective. actors. involved. in. the. transactions. are. in. a. structurally. asymmetric relationship with regard to the nature as. well. the. as. to. power. of. the power resources exchanged: While. private. interest. organizations. may. have. resources. at. their. disposal. which are potentially obstructive enough to force public. authorities to enter in an exchange relationship at all, the state is. always held to be in command of more powerful resources due to. the legitimate use of coercion, force and legislation. Futhermore,. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(29) imbalance. in. interest of. -. the exchange-relation between the state and private. organizations is seen in the central structural position. the. market. 27. former: and. It. is the state which constitutes the political. which,. therefore,. is. essential and dominant in any. exchange transaction.. Political exchanges are fundamentally different structured in a. more extended economic policy community. First of all, economic. policy. communities. legitimate. are. public. not. constituted. authorities,. but. by by. the state or other the. contingency. of. historical processes making some collective actors more and others less as. powerful and indispensable in governing the economy; as well by. the. brought. very. about. constrained trade any. by. by. unions. same. market. the. very. them.. of. countries imposed. by. historical. to. actors. latter on. the 'Italian model', neither. In. countries. such. as the United States,. or Switzerland, unions are at best a most marginal. the we. which themselves are. nor the state are necessarily part of every or even. France. element. same. Contrary. exchange-network:. Japan,. hierarchies. economic. policy. community;. and. in. many more. find economic policy games played which are neither governments. nor do they leave any place for even the. most powerful labor organizations.. If. any. respective with. other. ordering political. of. actors. -. that. is. their. "weight" as well as their exchange-linkages. collective. transaction-chain. collective. actors. further. "up". or. "down". the. - is neither an ahistorical invariant, nor just. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(30) a. historical. hierarchy, fixed. then. once. meta-games. the. but. -. actually. created. exchange-relations. for. ever,. played.. importance, and. given. 28. by a specific market. and power structures are not. but changing with the political games and. Unions. and. the. state are of widely varying. and in some games they do not play a role whatsoever;. state,. if. present,. is not always stronger than other,. private collective actors.. Additionally, a. fundamentally. 'Italian. In. the. nature dyadic. than the ones analysed in the structure. (which. is not only. for the "political exchange" literature but implicit also. theconceptual tools developed in most of the "social exchange". models. of. the. necessarily sometimes. mutually for. 1961 or Blau 1964 type), transactions are contingent:. tat.. But. tit. is. given. for. tit. and. while the repayment is not always. hie et nunc, it is expected to come from the other party. from. time. Homans. tit. possible and. different. model'.. typical in. exchange-relations in an extended field are of. that. span.. contingent. party only, within a controllable and agreed upon. Any. continuation. upon. of. political. exchange,. thus, is. sufficient returns from the one chosen (private). or fixed (state) other side - and that is highly precarious.. Patterned community,. at. linkages. within. a. broader. economic. policy. the contrary, are not only multi-lateral, but also. no. simple extension of bilateral transactions. Continued exchange. is. not. party,. contingent but. upon. upon valued. a. specific. returns. quid pro quo by a specific. from out of the network or the. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(31) network. alltogether.. whether. they. have. 29. Exchange the. form. -. within of. complex. long. configurations -. cylces, rings, chains or. extended trees - is not just a linked aggregation of two party/two way. political barter. Bilateral barter might actually be excluded. if. expected to be at the expense of (all the) other actors in the. network. or. incompatible. directs. the. flow. of. with. the exchange system itself, which. certain. valued resources in one direction. only.. This. distinction. is strictly analogous to what Lévi-Strauss. (1947/1973),. in. cross-cousin. marriage,. exchange.. the completely different context of matrilateral analysed. as. restricted. and generalized. In generalized exchange, a lineage cannot receive women. from a lineage it gives women to (the opposite would be the simple rule. of. except women. restricted it. to. a. from. analogous. to. political barter),. fullfils its primary obligation to give its own. another. Benefits makes. first. exchange,. lineage. than. the. one it married women from.. one party must be returned to a third party, which. for reciprocity between a great number of partners. Through. complicated set of rules, exchange-relations are organized in a. specific, irreversible direction.. Similarly, certain cannot (though. political. valuables be. subsidized. they. conditions. will. in. can case. exchange flow. and. be of. form. cycles where. in one direction only. Governments. they. granted. networks. cannot more. or. be given tax exemptions less. favorable. credit. public debts); central banks do not need. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(32) organizational file. securities. mobilization;. offered. -. for membership recruitment or rank and. employers. legislative. 30. or. trade associations will not be. powers; and trade unions might not be easily. threatened by announcements to regulate capital flows - while each of. these. resources. exchanged is highly valued a return by other. actors in the transaction-chain.. Furthermore, primarily but. by. most. those. actors. are. not reciprocated. parties they offer concession or support to,. by strategically placed third parties. If unions hold back on. wages,. to. take. a. on. the. counterpart. much. firms. which. without. being. able. Governments with. profit to. Italian example, it is their. bargaining from. repay. it. table. and even more. by higher profitability,. directly. or. even. adequately.. might be supported if committed to an incomes policy, respect. popularity. preferred. collective. specific. but. collective. to. other. games. -. not to speak of electoral. - wage restraint might turn out to be a danaer's gift,. undermining popular consensus and cabinet support.. This. even. more. so. providing. valued. returns. organized. labor,. are. control:. Employment. investment. decisions;. are,. above. rate. (neutral. regimes,. the. all,. to. to. the. for. extent. the. risky. that. system. advances. payoffs,. offered. by. outside the domain of effective government levels and. depend inflation. mainly. on. private. capital. rates (in our second case). be controlled by the central banks exchange. or "hard currency") policy. In other meta-games or central bank, through its monetary policy, strongly. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(33) 31. -. influences labor market developments, which are of central concern to. working. eventually. class. union. members. asked. for. wage. moderation,. by a government which itself has no power to guarantee. future repayments in terms of new jobs to be created.. But. as. far. as. central. government cannot guarantee future. security in exchange for short-term restraint, it ceases to be the focal. and. essential. 'other. 'Italian. model'. network. of. generalized. monopoly. of. coercive. played. -. or. government. would. could,. have. side' it.. in. for. transaction, as the. No single actor in an extended. political. ressources. the. exchange and. instance,. is. has. an. effective. dominant in all games. anyone imagine a democratic. in a capitalist market society effectively controlling. capital flows in and out the country?. W. But. h. a. t. ?. what do the collective actors actually exchange in terms. of ressources, rewarding constituted. if transactions are not simply mutually contingent,. returns by. to each other? What flows through the networks specific. market. hierarchies,. if. the. overall. structure cannot be conceived of as composed of a series of dyadic barter by. arrangements. private. "goodies"?. interest. where diffuse consensus or support organized associations. is. traded for specific state. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(34) While. within. the. conceptualizations. 32. 'Italian. -. model'. there. is. a variety of. to understand the support mobilized by private. actors, it ultimately always boils down to an exchange of (social, political) public of. power. resources. authorities.. between. private. organizations. and. In contrast to this one-dimensional exchange. power resources (of different nature and origin), transactions. within. comprehensive. comprise. the. fields. simple. passing. collaborative. efforts. communication. of. power. are on. multi-dimensional: of. technical. They. also. information. in. as well as the transfer of services or the. normative expectations, with varying degrees of. implications.. When. it. comes. to. power,. it. is less the. resources at the disposal of the collective actors or the capacity to. use. them,. which. is traded, but the actual exercise of these. "possibilities. for. includes,. course,. of. possibilities, exchange,. action". withdrawl. blocking. (Crozier/Friedberg. threats of. as. action,. the. 1979). formulation. -. which. of. these. non-decisions, suspense of. of the possibilities for action, self-binding. commitments not to exercise them etc.. If these variety of valuables exchanged - consensus,. support,. concessions, guarantees, mutual respect of political status rights and. duties,. symbolic attributions of responsibilities,. authoritative commitment. one. membership. control,. power and withholding of power - has to be reduced. underlying. compliance. effective. to compromised rules, renouncing of strategic exit and. voice-options, to. decision-making,. access to. dimension,. the common minimal denominator is. with specific rules. It is this generalized compliance. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(35) 33. -. with quite specific and highly differential rules of the games and regimes. (meta-games). constitutes compliance of. the. of. valued. any. one. return. participating. on. which. actor. which. all the other actors'. is. contingent upon. This reciprocally contingent flow. compliance. with a system of rules asking different actors for. rather. different. obligations. rewarding. two. exchanges. together:. "reinforcing". party/two. a. way. No. return. -. and. not. a linking of mutually. transactions. direct. -. holds. repayments. political. might. be. more. than immediate returns, considered to be. side payments threatening to blow up the whole transaction-chain.. H o w. In. order. unregulated. to. control. c o m e. these. political. rents. generated by. barter, which is the core transaction of the 'Italian. model',. generalized. exchange. networks. rest on a hierarchically. ordered. set of rules of game and meta-games,. inducing "calculated. rigidities ". of collective action: Not every power resource can be. traded. longer. any. in. the. political. market.. But. in order to. represent acceptable constraints on possible courses of collective action,. political. exchange. rules. must. fulfill. following,. interdependent. requirements:. They. allow. a. opportunistic. behavior,. for. sufficient. control procedural. of. benefits. to. at. least. must. compensate. the. a) actually b). for. generate foregoing. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(36) strategic. opportunitites. 34. -. and c) produce a cooperative surplus to. be shared among the participants in the game.. Minimizing to for. exchange. as. rules is of crucial importance, as the opportunities. opportunism are quite unequally distributed within the market. hierarchy the. opportunistic behavior and controlling compliance. constituting a network. Decision-makers in markets down. chain do have to accept interventions in markets up the chain given. have. data; in turn, actors deciding first. to. intervene. collectivities illustrates. in. coming. the. trust. later,. problem. with. exchange rate and wage policy, to. the. central. bank. to down. (and up the chain). corresponding the. regard. chain.. to. a. behavior Wagner. of. (1985). synchronisation of. giving a double strategic advantage. over collective bargaining parties through. control of time parameters.. Within. the. hierarchy, the. constituted. by. a. certain. market. the determination of effective exchange rates precedes. negotiation. parties. meta-game. have. of nominal wage levels and collective bargaining. to. flexibly adapt to the space of manoeuvre set by. currency policy. Moreover, the central bank can continually adjust post. festum. markets, unions. whereas. daily. employers,. interventions employers. in. foreign. associations. exchange and. trade. are bound in their reactions to the (yearly) rythm of wage. negotiations. and. through. Only. a complicated network of mutually stabilizing. trust generating expectations that each collective actor acts. according. to. rules. agreed. upon without using opportunities for. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(37) 35. -. opportunism allows for ongoing, undisruptive transactions. But the emergence if. the. are. of. trust and effective mutual control is only probable. participating actors are few enough while their exchanges. frequent. and. interdependent enough as to - through the very. comprehensiveness all. exchanges. of. the. taking. network and the inter-connectedness of. place. within it - make cheating simply to. costly.. But. inflicting. others. within. enough. a. the. Similarly, to. network. motivation. circumventing. due. costs upon oneself by inflicting it unto the. to. might,. forego. established. rules. in itself, not be sufficient. immediate or. little. gains through either barter deals aside.. the rather vague expectation of overall system payoffs. collective. future might,. discipline and cooperation in an undetermined. in itself, be too weak an incenttive to abstain from. exploiting opportunities for tangential benefits to grab. Instead, the promise of a cooperative surplus to be shared later on must be made. plausible. daily,. so. to. speak,. in. the. very. process of. producing these systemic gains by immediate process benefits along the way.. Systemic achievement continual final becomes. outcomes, to. and. rewarding in. in. fact,. become. less. precarious. an. the extent that they can be perceived in terms of uncontestable process payoffs and not just as one, result;. to. the extent that easing transactions. itself a valuable to be exchanged; to the extent that. the way and how to get along it becomes part of the goals, and the. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(38) means to. and. community,. them. -. modes of exchange become part of its ends. With regard. political. certain. 36. exchange. the. of. produces. interaction. the one. extended. economic. policy. -. the and. game and by controlling the compliance to overall. making. environments. an. inducement of "calculated rigidities" by imposing. rules. participants,. within. up. permanent. for. creation. advantage. for. all. loosing opportunities of strategic of. "concerted", highly predictable. of stabilized expectations in an otherwise most. turbulent political and economic world.. As. the. main. and. political-economic contingent,. most. arena. strategic. threatening. stem. uncertainties. in. the. from the complexities of mutually. interaction,. "concerted" environments for. any one actor require political exchanges with other organizations in. the field; but these exchanges must themselves be regulated by. rules. in. order. to. reduce and not to further increase strategic. interactional complexities. Absorption of uncertainty gives power, and. to. and. coordinating. exchange. the extent uncertainty can be reduced through coordinated. assumes. participating each. other. available as. the. behavior a. the. power-generating. actors are. only,. in. very process of regulated capacity.. While powers of. the economic policy community vis-à-vis. constrained. by exchange rules, power potentials. within the chain through cooperative strategies as well power. Generalized. of. the. overall. network. increase. tremendously.. political exchange is an inherently power-generating,. value-adding and mutually insuring process.. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(39) W h a t. This. leads. elementary, their. to. 37. -. f o r. ?. another, most significant difference between. restricted barter and generalized political exchange,. enjeux, what is at stakes in the transaction and what it is. done for. In the 'Italian model', exchange is carried out in order to. optimize. governing. the. capacities.. calculation, exclusive in. the. return in terms of one's own power resources or. single. focus field. Even. if. "enlightened". organizational. self-interest. by. long-term. remains. the. at concern. Reference to other collective actors or to the exchange partner reduces to increase the. own strategic rationality. Both sides seek to maximize their total payoff,. at. the. corresponding exchange. other's. terms. where. expense. as. far as power relations and. of political trade allow. They will meet for. the. respective. balance. of. forces. -. and. the. strategic capacities to skillfully use power resources at disposal will point. lead which. expense. of. them would. to. exchange. Consequently, transactions at a. maximize. overall. systemic gains, but at the. the stronger party only, are inconceivable. Political. barter has the limited purpose of bargaining over the distribution and. redistribution of public "goodies". peace". under. control. of. private. (sometimes as with "social. organizations);. it deals with. deals of appropriation of categoric goods only.. Generalized exchange, in contrast, does not confine itself to the. (r e )distribution. transfer. of. valued. and items.. consumption Rather,. of public goods by direct it. involves. an additional. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(40) production. of. transaction. surplus- value. process. as. 38. -. through the very regulation of the. well. as a provision of mutual insurance. against the inevitable risks and systemic instabilities of complex exchange. networks. While organizational self-interest remains the. driving to. force. be. and the core focus of consideration,. matched. rules. of. with the systemic imperatives as emboddied in the. the. organizational. games. productivity. "vital". interests. interdependent. as. and. of. super-games.. mediated mutual. optimizing. by investments into overall. consideration. self-reproduction All. Thus,. participants. of. elementary,. of other, opposing, but seek. (or. are made to. take into account) above all overall systemic output, organizational. primarily. on. total. run,. on. the. Exchange. is. actors.. individual. and. and. returns. systems. effectively. it has always. rules. payoffs. are. seen. as. depending. surplus value to be appropriated in the long stability of exchange processes in short term.. codify. this. primacy of collective systemic over. particularistic interest pursuit. Actual exchange rates, therefore are. no. simple reflection of existing power dependence-relations,. or only inasfar as they are compatible with the rules of the game. Time. and. again. differentials, down. this. for. implies. instance. rebalancing. of. given. power. by strengthening the weaker parties. the transaction-chain, in order to keep a precarious network. equilibrium of the extended economic policy community. Generalized political exchange is a comprehensive set of games to regulate the appropriat ion_____ a n d accordingly,. it. always. the production/supply of public goods; refers. to. nothing. less. but. societal. reproduction and development and that is governance of the system,. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(41) the. collective. -. actors exchanging resources are constituent parts. of - as well as constituted and functionalized components.. H o w. Bilateral obviously. political. moving. fundamentally Though term. it. l o n g. barter. exchanges. restricted. not. ?. of. the. beyond only. a. in. Italian spot. scope. type, base,. while remains. but also in time.. stresses linkages between short-term demands and long. interests. through. strategic capacities, these calculations. themselves remain singular or sporadically recurrent events and no stable,. long-term,. model,. quite. rightly,. contract-like, future. and. reducing. institutionalized. orientations.. The Italian. conceptualizes political exchanges not as. discrete single transactions but as relations with. in the. order. to. control. exchange-relation. future while at the same time over. time. to. a. temporary,. of. elementary. transitory phenomenon.. The political. occasional. or. time-limited. character. exchanges is all too understandable, as continuation is. seen dependent not only on specifically advantageous cost/benefit calculations. for. 1983,. and that is contingent upon preceding exchanges, but. also. 362),. any. single. on highly precarious,. or. series of transactions (Regini. "permanently temporary" resources such. as market power or militancy - or governments/cabinet stability on. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 39.

(42) 40. -. the. other side. How could political exchange ever go on if unions. (in. recessions). under-exploit,. have no market power of organized labor force to no. rank. extra-institutional temporarily,. be. and. file. collective. tired. or. to. mobilize in industrial or. action. scared),. or. (as. people. another. might,. government. to. confront than the one committed to fair returns?. Whereas, political. at. this. barter. point,. will. a. dyadic,. actually. come. restricted. to. an. end,. type. of. political. transactions in the overall network of an extended economic policy community. will,. of. course,. continue. -. and. go on "open-end”.. Generalized political exchange can be of widely varying degrees of network-interconnectedness. or. interrelational. density. and also. allows for dis-connectedness or breakdown of even central linkages such. as. collective. pattern. is. structure,. conceptualized of. structural. enduring. an. enduring,. quasi. permanent. permanently changing shape. Specific can. games. change do. or. always. dissolve, go. yet. some. on. This is a less. point as it seems to be at first sight, as it shifts time. horizons not. and. or arbitration. But some overall. as. or. configurations. exchange-relations trivial. bargaining. and. sharpens. the criteria for identifying games: It is. exchange in general which breaks down from time to time but a. specific structural constellation, a specific game or meta-game.. Still, the time horizon for any such game or meta-game varies itself. with. political. the. exchange. nature. of. implies. the political exchange. Whereas all recurrent. transaction and that is a. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(43) 41. -. longitudinal. character. of. fundamentally. finite. political. in. the. emerging barter. relation, while. it. is. envisaged. in. principle. infinite in extended networks. This open-time has to do. with. relative. but. the. relatively. that. is. but. other. horizon. fixed number of participants, with structural and. "endless". varying, each. social closure of exchange-networks: A small,. as. interest. interdependence, with multiplex and. basically non-interchangeable valuables to offer to and. therefore capable of developing an infinite time. the. most. important of all self-generated sources of. networks. of generalized political exchange actually. reproduct ion.. Whether persist matter. longer of. priori.. over. time. empirical. What. than elementary barter relations is a. investigation. counts,. however,. is. only and cannot be decided a the general expectation - of. constituent collective actors, not of outside scientific observers only. -. that. they. do; and that if not, a specific game finished. will be followed by another exchange-relationship of at least some continuity. with. difference, of. thus,. different. counterfactual collective. the. preceding. one. terminated.. What makes the. is not so much differential objective duration. forms of political exchange but a generalized, even expectation. of. this. sort;. not. real. time, but. time horizons and the capacity to extend them in a way. as to project a determinate exchange-network into an indeterminate future.. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.

(44) W h a t. The only. two. types. 42. -. k i n d. w h e n. of political exchange outlined so far do not. imply different temporal frames of reference (time horizons,. operating. time. durations. to. historical. time. order,. yet. structures develop, and. not. etc.); they. they. they. appear. display. do at. also need different different. points. of. a specific evolutionary time. irreversible. While the time-theoretical aspects. are more fully elaborated in a related paper (Marin 1985a), I will point. to. just. one. implication. of. the. time dimension for the. different scope of the models building on the cases presented.. For argued. in both cases, the conceptual framework derived could be as. being. overgeneralization) Pizzorno. and. his. an. inductive. generalization. (and. even. of quite particualr historical circumstances. followers in the Italian debate had a specific. Latin-European problem constellation of industrial labor relations in. mind. and. at. -. the height of union power, in the transitional phase from. pluralist actually other. Italy in the period of the latent compromesso storico. or. pre-corporatist. to. a neo-corporatist stage, which. never came about. Generalized political exchange, on the. hand. could. be. seen. Middle-European-Scandinavian,. as a theoretical generalization of a more. corporatist. mode of interest. intermediation. Consequently, both concpetualizations would addrss different. realities. and. would. be appropriate for distinct, but. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. -.