E U I W O R K I N G P A P E R N o . 38 NEW PROTEST ELITES IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF WEST-BERLIN: THE ECLIPSE OF CONSENSUS?
Prepared for the W o r kshop on Empirical Elite Research European University Institute, Florence, Italy
O c tober 4-9th, 1982.
b y
Dietrich Herzog Freie Universitat Berlin
320
EUI 020650 BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)
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T h i s p a p e r is d i s t r i b u t e d for d i s c u s s i o n and c r i t i c a l c o m m e n t and s h ould not be
q u o t e d or c i t e d w i t h o u t p r i o r p e r m i s s i o n of the a u t h o r © Dietrich Herzoq P r i n t e d in I t a l y in December 1982 E u r o p e a n U n i v e r s i t y I n s t i t u t e B a d i a F i e s o l a n a I - 50016 S a n D o m e n i c o (FI) I t a l y © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
Introduction
It is one of the established assumptions in modern elite theory that a mixture of both consent and dissent between strategic elites is one of the basic prerequisites to the stability of political regimes and to the
efficiency of policy-making. In this theoretical context, consent refers to procedural norms and institutional structures of the polity, whereas dissent refers to divisions on substantive matters of political decision making. To be sure, in empirical research it may not be easy to define clearly which norms or substantive issues are to be investigated, and some times even the differentiation between norms and issues may cause conceptua. hazards, - particularly if controversial definitions of the political
actors themselves come into play. Also, a particular issue may grow so salient for an elite that the controversy about it becomes fierce, thus disturbing the consent about the "rules of the game".
Yet, as a general working device the consent-cum-dissent assumption has proved to be a powerful stimulus for theoretical and empirical studies on the functions of elites in many countries such as Norway (Highley 1976), the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1968), Canada (Presthus, 1974), Austria (Stief- bold, 1974), England (Putnam, 1973), the USA (McCl^ky, 1960) and others.
In the case of Germany, a variety of writers have used the consent-cum- dissent hypothesis in order to assess the viability and performance of a liberal democratic system, with reference to the Weimar Republic and to the Federal Republic. Authors in the sixties, like Ralf Dahrendorf (1968), have emphasized a peculiar lack of inter-elite conflict which - in com bination with a considerable degree of mutual distrust between the leading
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-cause not only for a general conservatism and decisional stalemate during
ihat
the mid-sixties but also as a factor/may jeopardize the stability of the system.
This picture contrasts sharply with results of elite studies in the
seventies. As Rudolf Wildenmann and his associates (Wildenmann, 1971, 1975; Hoffmann-Lange, 1980) could demonstrate on the evidence of successive elite surveys, a broad consensus about fundamental norms of the system exist among political (and also societal) elites in the Federal Republic, while on the other hand there is a considerable amount of inter-elite conflict about major issues, - a mixture which allows a dynamic political process whit' i a stable, i.e. generally accepted institutional context. Elites are thus being able to form variable coalitions and to communicate cooperatively.
While these results may - grosso modo - still hold true in the eighties, we observe recently certain new developments within the political elite
formation which causes questions about the prospects for efficient inter- elite cooperation.
Firstly, a new generation with other values and priorities enters into the political arena and gradually also into the political leadership stratum.
(Inglehart, 1981) Secondly, members of the steadily growing class of professional academics (which Gouldner has called "Bildungsklasse") with new interests and behaviour oatterns are increasingly intruding party and parliamentary elites. (Feist/Liepelt, 1982; Herzog, 1982) Both developments seem to change the structure of political decision-making. Among the political parties particulary the Social Democratic Party is gradually being transformed from a "stratarchic" Volkspartei into a type
of with declining party loyalty of the activists and the emergence
of intra-party counter-elites.
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Thirdly, a variety of new social movements - ecological, peace, women emancipation and others, are increasingly putting pressure on the politi cal process. They also constitute an apparently stable, although still diffuse, electoral basic for new political parties; under different
labels like "Grune" or "Alternative Listen", they already succeeded in en tering several local councils and Lander parliaments (Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin, Lower-Saxonia). On the evidence of recent opinion polls, it may be expected that a party of that kind will gather up to 9 ?o of the vote in general elections and will thus be represented in the next Bundestag. At the moment, these new parties not only advocate particular issues, most of them of a protest or anti-form (anti-nuclear energy, anti-economic growth, anti-military defence etc), but they also call into question the conventional party and parliamentary decision making procedures. Outside parliament, a kind of rousseauist direct- democracy is being practized, whereas within parliament heavy pressure is exerted on governments while deliberately abstaining from taking over governmental responsibilities. As one of their activists has put ist, they are living on two feet, one outside parliament for "standing", the other inside parliament for "playing".
These new developments in the German party system cause a number of questions for empirical elite research:
- How many and of which kind are the areas of inter-elite consent resp. dissent?
- How do major cleavages run, - between the established parties on the one hand and the new political groups on the other, and/or within the parties?
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-- Are the areas of dissent of such kind that inter--elite cooperation and coalition-building is severely hampered, with the possible effect of blocking political decision-making or even destabilizing the political system?
- What are the social bases of new intra- and inter-elite cleavages, i.e. how durable will they be in the future?
Whereas the last question cannot be answered at the moment, because the rele vant data have not been analyzed so far, this paper will try to give an answer to the first three, - however tentatively. The data stem from a
research project, directed by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and myself. Its subject is the crisis in the sociopolitical system of West-Berlin, concentrating on several, yet integrated, research dimensions like voting behaviour, parti cipation, attitudes and values, mass-elite linkages and inter-elite conflict The data bases are, among others, an aggregate analysis of voting behaviour in West-Berlin since 1946, an elite network analysis, a representative population survey and a mail survey among all candidates for the Berlin parliament (Abgeordnetenhaus) and the 12 district assemblies (Bezirksver- ordnetenversammlung), the two surveys having been conducted shortly before the last Berlin elections on May 10, 1981.
Among the 1911 candidates, 45.8 percent returned the questionnaire, which is a comparatively good response ratio, although it should be added, that the very top politicians have participated less frequently and the response rates from the parties differing a lot. The communist SEW (Sozialistische Einheitspartei West-Berlin) has rejected any cooperation. (Table 1)
In the candidate questionaire a number of questions about social status, attitudes and values have been taken in, which were also used in the population survey, thus allowing elite-mass comparisons. Similarly, some
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questions have been introduced which were used in the recent national elite survey, conducted by Rudolf Wildenmann, Max Kaase andtheir associates; so a comparative analysis between Berlin and the Federal Republic will be possible.
In this paper, only some of the results will be presented. (Extract from the questionnaire see Appendix A) It is a preliminary analysis, based on a prima facie inspection of some data. Teetotal research project will - hope fully - be finished mid-1983.
Certainly, the situation in Berlin cannot be equated with that in the Federal Republic in general. On the other hand, social and political de velopments in the metropolitan centres may be considered as being typical or at least indicative for major changes in the national context. In addition, Berlin is particularly interesting because here changes of the party system are apparent and the new social movements are specifically virulent. On their basis, the new political group "Alternative liste" (AL) succeded in gathering 7.2 percent of the vote in the last elections, thus being now representend in the Berlin parliament. (Table 2) This election has also made a notable impact on the political regime in so far as the long-standing coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Liberals (FDP), that formed the government since 1963 (with the interruption of a one-party SPD government
from 1971 to 1975) lost its majority, giving way for the first time to a (minority) government of the Christian Democrats (CDU).
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6
Government and Pluralism
Starting with an analysis of attitudes towards basic principles of the political order, we find a general consensus between the leadership strata, of all Berlin parties. The principle of "alternating government" is common ly approved. (Table 3) Even within those parties which have been in power since several legislative periods in Berlin and also in the Federal Republic (SPD and FDP), a clear majority agrees with the necessity of changing govern mental responsibilities from time to time.
Remarkably here, as in others of the following tables, we find a rather large section of around one fourth to one third of the candidates from the "established" parties, who are in a middle position, i.e. neither fully agreeing nor fully disagreeing. This may cause some theoretical reflections. Leaving aside the possibility that these people are actually undecided
about the matter (an interpretation which does not seem to be very
sensible with respect to political activists standing for election), two different interpretations might be offered: Firstly, that there are more party leaders, particularly within the SPD, who are at least sceptical about the democratic principle of "alternating government" than it would appear under a strict dichotomy between the "yeas" and the "noes". Seco, .y under a different theoretical perspective, one may propose that the middle position on an attitude scale, like that under scrutiny, is a specific one; these people may hold a mixture of governmental stability (e.g. for long term planning) and the existence of a strong opposition (that is able to
control government effectively and to take over governmental responsibilities) is desirable. With this last mentioned interpretation - which has a long
philosophical tradition since Aristotle -, we can understand the groups in the middle position, that are comparatively big in all established parties, as indicative for a well-reflected and consensual option in favour of a stable, although not inflexible, governmental system.
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In the same way, attitudes towards public control of government may be interpreted. (Table 4) Clearly, the CDU elite is more authoritatively oriented than those of the other parties. Yet, underst ding the interview question strictly as it is formulated, one can argue that the existence of a strong, i.e. effectively working, government is not incompatible with efficient public control of governmental actions, but that in stable demo cratic polities both are functionally interdependent. Thus, elites of the two major parties are conspicuously consensual in this regard.
With respect to both items, the AL candidates differ a lot. Nearly un animously they emphasise the necessity of changing government and of the superiority of public control vs. strong government. This reflects their more radical stand towards democratic principles as well as their present situation as a kind of "out-group" in the established power hierarchy.
A similar picture emerges when we look at attitudes towards principles of pluralism. All party elites are overwhelmingly against a political system in which government overrides group interests, - although it should be noted that in this respect the Christian Democratic (CDU and CSU) leader ship in the Federal Republic is distinctively more authoritarian than other parties and also than their Berlin branch. (Table 4a)
By contrast, there is less consent befceen the Christian Democrats and all other parties with respect to the question, whether the "general good" might be decreased by the pressure of interest groups. (Table 5) A majority of CDU leaders are supporting this statement. But again, a rather big
group in the middle position of this attitudinal dimension (42. percent
in Berlin, and nearly 50 percent at the Federal level), is indicative for the fact that there is no strict opposition against the principle of
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8
Liberalism and Participation
More diffuse are attitudes of the Berlin leadership strata towards prin ciples of Liberalism. Some issues suggest a very strong inter-elite consent. This refers, for instance, to the issues of "death penalty", which is
clearly opposed by all (66 percent in the CDU, and more than 90 percent in the other parties). Any pressure for re-introducing the death penalty
into West-German criminal law would have no chance of realization by political leaders. (Table 6)
Consent also exists between all parties about the legitimacy of "comprorr a" in political decision-making. More than 80 percent among candidates of the established parties, and even a majority of 53 percent among the AL activists, are in favor of politics by compromise.
Noteworthy, a further consent area is found with respect to participation in industry. A majority of all party elites accept the proposition that the chance for individual participation in the regulation of their jobs (Mit- bestimmung am Arbeitsplatz) is one of the prerequisites of political demo cracy, - with a rather strong, at the Federal level even majoritarian, sceptical middle group in the CDU. (Table 7)
But on other items of Liberalism, inter elite consensus is rather fragile. Here the divisions are mostly between the Christian Democrats and all other parties. One of these items is "freedom of opinion and discussion". To be sure, we have to consider the fact, that the interview question ist not \"limits" to the freedan of opinion may be understood either individually/
formulated unequivocaliyyCin the sense that people are not willing to discuss or modify their personal basic moral conviction) or collectively
(i.e. that the freedom of others has to be curbed authoritatively).
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Holding this epistomological vagueness in mind, we can cautiously deduce from the data that only among the Christian Democrats there is a substan tial group who have a rather restrictive understanding of that liberal principle, while SPD, FDP and AL candidates - in this rank order - are supporting an unlimited freedom of opinion and discussion. (Table 8)
More rigidly drawn are the attitudinal divisions on items of specific forms through wihich public opinion may by voiced. Asked how strongly they feel about "more say of citizens in political decisions", only about 15 percent of the Christian Democrats, and 19 percent of the Social
Democrats, are answering "very important". In contrast, nearly half of the Liberals and all of the "Alternatives" are strongly in favor of more
plebiscitarian democracy. (Table 9) Only if we combine those who answer "very important" and "important", a clear majority emerges in all parties supporting the strengthening of citizens’ participation in politics. While this principle is generally accepted, the emphasis laid on its promotion varies a lot between the parties, seperating particularly the Christian Democrats on the conservative side.
Similarly, attitudes differ with respect to specific legislative actions. Among all interviewees, only within the ranks of the Christian Democrats we find a substantial number of candidates who are strongly in favor of restricting the right of political demonstrations. (Table 10) Vet, from a different perspective, even if we add those who just answer "important", there is no majority (but only 37 percent) in the total CDU elite stratum opting for more restrictive measures. This finding may ring a bell in the heads of some self-confident "strong men" in the upper circles of the Berlin CDU leadership.
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-More pronounced are Christian Democrats when the issue of the police force is at stake. One quarter strongly favors the threngthening of the police, and a clear majority of about 66 percent (answering "very important" or "important") would back governmental actions for that purpose. It is in this field where the Christian Democrats may be understood as the party of "law and order", - they are very consensual inside and very much separated from the other parties. (Table 11)
Looking at attitude towards "citizen action groups" (Burgerinitiativen), a different cleavage comes to the fore. Here only the "Alternatives" are (nearly unanimously) approving more influence by these groups, while th. established parties are strongly against it. However, this must not mean a general opposition to action groups; since the interview question com bines "more influence by action groups" with a reciprocal "less influence by political parties", there is no reason to assume that leaders of
established parties voluntarily renounce their power (and responsibili
ties to their voters) to particular societal interests, - however positively or negatively they may be evaluated as forms of participation in general.
(Table 12)
A third type of inter-elite division is exemplified by attitudes concerning the influence of trade unions. Understandably, we find here the "bourgeois" parties (CDU and FDP) on the negative side, while Social Democrats and also AL are fostering more influence by organized labour. Yet, both are by no means unanimous. Even within the over hundred years old "workers party", there is a substantial group of leading activists (about one third) who are at least sceptical about the power of trade unions, - a group that would deserve closer sociological analysis. (Table 13)
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Environment, Economy, and Foreign Relations
While we have been finding certain distinct inter-elite cleavages
concerning matters of Liberalism and participation, although with different patters of crisscrossing latent coalitions, there is another picture if we look at areas of economic, environmental and foreign politics.
Being asked whether the system of social welfare (Sozialstaat) should be enhanced, remain as it is now, or be reduced, only the "Alternatives" are strongly in favor of strengthening the "welfare net", whereas even within the Social Democratic leadership cadres no more than about 41 per cent would argue in this direction. (Table 14) There is a sufficient basis of consent, however, in all three established parties agreeing to preserve the present state of the "welfare system". (It may be added that this attitudinal pattern may be very different among party elite at the Federal level, although at the moment there are no comparable data at hand.)
Whether the "protection of the environment" is a consensual issue or not may be a matter of argument. As table 15 shows, only a small majority among the Liberals and the Social Democrats, and of course nearly all
"Alternatives", are very strongly environmentally motivated. But summing up those who feel that environmental politics is either "very important" or at least "improtant", we find a clear majority of 90 percent and more in all parties. Thus, the importance of environmental considerations in politics seems to be generally accepted by all politicans, - the diffe rences between them being more a matter of degree than of kind.
Conversely, the Berlin political class is rather sharply divided between the CDU on the one hand, and SPD, FDP and AL on the other, when we look
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-at certain crucial problems of economic and foreign politics. (Tables 16,17) Asked about their stand towards "economic growth" and "nuclear energy", we find a positive majority only in the CDU, with all other party elites being sceptical or adversary. Vet the "hard core" of strong opponents is much smaller in the SPD and FDP than among the "Alternative" candidates.
On both issues, therefore, the main division is clearly separating the £
Christian Democrats from all other parties, but there seems to exist a second, minor cleavage between the two established parties (SPD, FDP) and the "Alternatives", who hold a particularly strong position in both
policy areas.
Additionally, because of the present salience of the nuclear issue,
a brief look at the opinions of the electorate may be of interest. As table 18 shows, the voters of the Christian Democrats are conspicuously more reluctant in supporting nuclear energy than their party. Conversely, there are more proponents of nuclear energy among the Social-Democratic and also "Alternative" voters than among their parties* leaders. Thus, dissent on this issue is more accentuated by the elites than it is in the
I electorates.
On foreign policy issues, the Anti-Communist consens, which was characte ristic for Berlin in the fifties and sixties, seems to be broken up, - at least at the political elite level. Looking at the attitudes towards "World Communism" (Table 19), we find only the Christian Democratic can didates understanding "World Communism" as the most important threat to Western democracies, and their leadership stratum is nearly unanimous on
this issue. Among all items analyzed so far, "Anti-Communism" ist that issue where Christian Democraticinter-elite consensus is most pronounced, being
L. !' © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
also roughly the same in West-Berlin and at the Federal level.
All other parties are on an adversary stand, with the Social Democrats and the Liberals internally rather divided and the "Alternatives" very un animous and on the extreme position.
This corresponds to attitudes towards foreign policy strategies. Only a majority of CDU candidates advocate a "policy of military strength",
i.e. a "strong NATO", while this is strongly opposed by all other parties. (Table 20)
It should bejbdded, however, that under the premise of an East-West arms reduction, more than 80 percent of CDU, SPD, and FDP candidates are pro- NATO, while only about a quarter of the Social Democrats and of the Liberals are favoring the dissolution of NATO (and the Warshaw Treaty Organization). So we find two cleavages in the total political elite stratum in Berlin: One that separates sharply the CDU from all other parties, refering to a "policy of military strength"; the other dividing the established parties from the AL, with respect to the preservation/dissolution of the Western military alliance.
Again, an elite-mass comparison reveals distinctively different patterns. Whereas on the Christian Democratic side, candidates and their voters have roughly similar preferences, notable incongruencies are apparent on the side of the other parties; in contrast to their candidates, about one third of
A
the SPD and of the FDP voters are supporting a "strong NATO", while con versely there are less AL voters favoring a dissolution of the Western and Eastern military alliances than AL candidates. In this crucial area, politic dissent is more marked at the elite level than among the population at large
(Table 21) © The Author(s). European University Institute. produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
14
-Inter-Elite Consent and Dissent Areas; A Summary
Summarizing the foregoing analysis, the following table gives a rough overview about inter-elite consent and dissent.
AREAS OF INTER-ELITE CONSENT AND DISSENT (1) Inter-elite consent
Alternating government
Public control of government Legitimacy of interest groups Compromise in politics
Individual participation at thetark place (as a prerequisite for democracy)
Death penalty
Protection of the environment
(2) Dissent between established parties (CPU, SPD, FDP) vs. AL
More influence by action groups, less by political parties Welfare state
Dissolution of NATO (and Warshaw Treaty Organization) ^ (3) Dissent between "bourgeois" parties (CPU, FDP) vs. "left-wing"
parties (SPD, AL)
More influence by labour unions
(4) Dissent between CPU vs. all others (SPD, FDP, AL) Interests as threat to "common good"
Limits to freedom of opinion
More say for people in political decisions Limits to the right for demonstrations Strengthening of policy force
Politics of economic growth Nuclear energy
Anti-Communism
Politics of military strength ^
1) Combined in one interview question
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By inspecting the issues, three things emerge: Firstly, there is a wide spread consensus between all Berlin parties about fundamentals of govern ment. This includes also the acceptance of compromise in political decision making, the opposition against re-introducing the death penalty, the value of ecological considerations, and a participatory non-authoritative employer- employee relationship. On the other hand, there are many inter-elite conflict areas not only on substantive - and indeed salient - issues but also on
matters of Liberalism and political participation.
Secondly, the traditional antagonism between the "bourgeois" parties and the "Socialists" does not seem to constitute a major cleavage any longer. Nor do we find most conflicts as separating the established parties from the emerging new party of the "Alternative movement", - although the differences between them may be rather distinct in some issue areas. Instead, the
dividing line of dissent on a variety of issues concerning substantive policy matters and procedural norms of Liberalism runs between the Christian
Democrats on the one hand and the three other parties (SPD, FDP, AL) on the other. These conflict areas would need thorough sociological analysis.
Thirdly, from the inspection of the data so far presented here, it does not appear that the eclipse of inter-elite consensus in Berlin may destabilize the political system. Fundamental norms for democratic government are shared by all party elites. Yet, there are certain salient policy issues, like economic growth, nuclear energy, and international politics (e.g. military strength, NATO), where inter-elite dissent has obviously deepened in recent years. This may put severe strains on the political process. Inter-elite cooperation and coalition building in parliament may bee severely hampered. On certain basic policy issues, the Christian Democrats (with their relative
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-majority in parliament) and the new party of the "Alternatives" (with around 7 percent of the vote) are both internally quite consensual and externally extremely far apart, - with the Social Democrats and the Liberals drifting away from the former consensus of the established
parties. Thus, in spatial terms, the middle position in the total political spectrum has become weakened, with the chances of stable majority formation in parliament being reduced.
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Table 1: The Berlin Elite Sample Candidates for Election 1981 CandidatesN Interviewed 0' .0 Total 1911 875 45.8 CDU 653 262 40.1 SPD 652 384 58.9 FDP 210 120 58.0 AL 199 86 43.2 others 197 22 12.0 Abgeordneten-haus 718 314 43.7 Bezirksver- ordnetenver-sammlung 1193 561 47.0
Table 2: Election Results for Berlin Parliament (Abqeordnetenhaus)
1979 1981 (3.March) (10.May) Voting Turnout (?ó) 85.4 85.3 Voters (°ó) CDU 44.4 47.9 SPD 42.7 38. 8 FDP 8.1 5.6 AL 3.7 7.2 SEW 1.1 0.7 others 0. 1 0.3 Seats (N) CDU 63 65 SPD 61 51 FDP 11 7
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-Table 3 : Stability of government more important than chance for
changing governmental majorities (?o)
CDU SPD FDP AL Agree 18 27 23 1 Middle 29 35 26 14 Disagree 53 38 51 85 Positive all (agreeing) 33 45 37 6 Negative all (disagreeing) 67 55 63 94 N 256 378 117 81 X -.96 -.30 -.71 - 2.4 StD 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.1
Table 4 : Strong government more important than public control
of government (?o) CDU SPD FDP AL Agree 33 18 14 2 Middle 35 37 23 1 Disagree 32 45 63 97 Positive all (agreeing) 57 39 24 2 Negative all (disagreeing) 43 61 76 98 N 253 378 116 84 X .18 -.69 - 1.13 -2.73 StD 2.2 2.1 2.0 1 . 0 II II II II II II II II II II II II II !! II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II
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Table 4a: Strong political leadership necessary for overriding group interests (%) CDU Berlin FRG SPD Berlin FRG FDP Berlin FRG AL Berlin Agree 23 35 7 11 5 16 Middle 27 33 14 34 13 32 1 Disagree 50 32 79 55 82 52 99 Positive all (agreeing) 39 55 15 28 11 24 1 Negative all (disagreeing) 61 45 85 72 89 76 99 N 256 121 380 122 118 25 83 X -.71 .03 -2.1 - 1 . 0 -2.3 -.86 -2.9 StD 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 .46
Table 5 : Demands by interest groups decrease "general good" (
CDU SPD FDP AL Agree 30 14 12 2 Middle 42 25 32 5 Disagree 28 61 56 93 Positive all (agreeing) 60 27 25 2 Negative all (disagreeing) 40 73 75 98 N 256 380 119 82 X lACsl -1.3 -1.3 -2.7 StD 2.1 2.0 1.9 0.9
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-Table 6 : Re-■introduction of death penalty (%)
CDU SPD FDP AL Agree 19 6 4 -Middle 24 7 8 1 Disagree 57 87 88 99 Positive all (agreeing) 34 11 8 -Negative all (disagreeing) 66 89 92 100 N 256 382 119 84 X -1.1 -2.4 -2.5 -3.0 StD 2.3 1.5 1.4 0.2
Table 7 : Participation at work necessary for democracy (?o)
CDU
Berlin FRG Berlin FRGSPD Berlin FRGFDP BerlinAL
Agree 2 21 83 91 70 48 93 Middle 49 64 16 7 26 36 7 Disagree 19 15 1 2 4 16 -Positive all (agreeing) 66 61 96 97 87 76 99 Negative all (disagreeing) 34 39 4 3 13 24 1 N 256 122 381 123 118 25 84 X .57 .15 2.4 2.0 1.7 .66 2.7 StD 1.9 1.2 1.1 .89 1.4 1.5 .68
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Table 8 : Limits to freedom of opinion (*) CDU SPD FDP AL Agree 53 24 20 4 Middle 28 26 21 18 Disagree 19 50 59 78 Positive all (agreeing) 74 44 29 12 Negative all (disagreeing) 26 56 71 68 N 255 376 118 83 X 1 . 0 -.79 -1.1 -2.1 StD 2.1 2.2 2.3 1.4
Table 9 : More say of citizens in political decisions (?e)
CDU SPD FDP AL Very important Important 49 '
15> “
29 \ 80 514> 3
4 6 ^ 94-^ Not so important 30 16 6 — Unimportant 2 2 - 1 Against 4 2 1 -N 248 372 116 83©
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-Table 10 : Restriction for right of demonstration (%)
CDU SPD FDP AL Very important 15\ / 38 23'
>
_ _ Important 2 -Not so important 27 10 11 -Unimportant 8 8 8 -Against 27 75 79 100 N 246 369 114 82Table 11 : Strenqtheninq police
CDU («) SPD FDP AL Very important 25\ Important 4 1 / 66 ! 7 / 23 9/ 15 -Not so important 26 38 30 2 Unimportant 3 10 13 5 Against 5 29 42 93 N 246 363 110 83
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Table 12 : More influence by action groups (?ò) CDU SPD FDP AL Very important 0 1 4 55 Important 4 9 14 36 Not so important 22 31 34 8 Unimportant 13 10 11 1 Against 61 49 37 -N 248 363 111 84
Table 13 : More influence by labour unions (%)
CDU SPD FDP AL Very important 1-^ 12^_ 1 . 19\ Important 4 / * 47x/ 59 3/ 4 3 6 > 55 Not so important 27 32 34 35 Unimportant 10 1 11 5 Against 58 8 51 5 N 247 361 114 80
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-Table 14: Social welfare system (»)
CDU SPD FDP AL ( Strengthening 7 41 17 75 Keeping as it is 57 53 6Ü 21 More individual self-care 36 6 23 4 N 259 379 120 79
Table 15: Environmental considerations necessary (?o)
CDU SPD FDP AL Very important Important 30 > B 9 59 ' 43X 5 5 \ > 9 6 41' 9 1 \> 1 0 0 9 ^ Not so important 10 6 3 -Unimportant - 0 - -Against 1 — 1 -N 249 377 117 85
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Table 16 : Economie growth (%) CDU 5PD FDP AL Very important Important Not so important Unimportant Against 26 48 22
>
10 35 41 9X 9 28 41 1 4 ^ 1 6 1918> 7*
5 6 ^ N 242 370 115 80Table 17 : Nuclear energy (attitudes of candidates) (?o)
CDU SPD FDP AL Very important 47 12 12 -Important 44 29 27 14 Not so important 7 22 26 14 Unimportant 0 6 ^ J, 37 3 ^J>35 -Against 2 3 1 ^ 3 2 ^ 72 N 249 366 113 83
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-Table 18 : Nuclear enerqy (attitudes of voters) (?o)
V o t e r s o f : CDU SPD FDP AL Very important 29 16 13 3 Important 48 37 32 11 Not so important 15 31 29 23 Unimportant 2 6 10 17 Against 6 10 16 46 N 348 261 49 81
Table 19: World Communism as threat to Western democracies (?i)
CDU SPD FDP AL Agree 81 22 21 __ Middle 15 34 33 5 Disagree 4 44 46 95 Positive all (agreeing) 93 38 40 1 Negative all (disagreeing) 7 62 60 99 N 256 381 119 82 X 2.2 -.64 -.62 -2.7 StD 1.3 2.2 2.2 .7 IIII IIII IIII IIII IIII IIII IIII IIII
II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II II IIII IIII 11II IIII IIII IIIt II IIII IIII IIII IIII IIII IIII IIII
\
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Table 20: Attitudes toward NATO (candidates) (%)
CDU SPD FDP AL
Strong NATO 58 6 6
-Arms reduction (by NATO and Warshaw Treaty Org.)
38 67 71 2
Dissolution of NATO and Warshaw Treaty Org.
4 27 23 98
N 258 380 119 86
Table 21: Attitudes toward NATO (voters) (?ó)
V o t e r s o f
CDU SPD FDP AL
Strong NATO 60 33 34 5
Arms reduction 27 42 42 23
Dissolution of NATO and Warshaw Treaty Org. 11 23 24 71 Don’t know 2 2 0 1 N 348 261 49 81
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-References
Dahrendorf, Ralf (1968):Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutsch land. Piper Verlag, München.
Feist, Ursula, and K.Liepelt (1982, in print) : Neue Eliten in alten Parteien. Anmerkunqen zu einer Nebenfolge der Bil- dunqsreform. In: M.Kaase and H.-D.Klingemann, eds.: Wahlen und Politische Kultur. Studien zur Bundestagswahl 198o.West- deutscher Verlag, Opladen.
Herzog, Dietrich (1982, in print): Elitensoziologische Aspekte der Bundestagswahl 198o. In: M.Kaase and H.-D.Klingemann, eds.(see above).
Higley, John, G.L.Field, K.Groholt (1976): Elite Structure ^ 1 Ideology. Universitetsforlaget, Oslo / Columbia Univ.Press, New York.
Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula,H.Neumann, B.Steinkamper (198o): Konsens und Konflikt zwischen Fuhrungsgruppen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Peter D.Lang, Frankfurt a.M.
Inglehart, Ronald (1981): Post-Materialism in an Environment of Insecurity. In: Am.Pol.Rev., vol.75.
Lijphart , Arend (1968): The Politics of Acoanodationt) Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands.University of California Press, Berkeley.
McClosky, Herbert, P.J.Hoffmann, R.O'Hara (196o): Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers. In: Ar °ol. Sc.Rev., vol.54.
Presthus, Robert (1974) : Elites in the Policy Process.
Putnam, Robert D. (1973): The Beliefs of Politicians:Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy.Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, Conn.
Stiefbold, Rodnay P. (1974): Segmented Pluralism and Consociatio- nal Democracy in Austria: Problems of Political Stability and Change. In: M.O.Heisler, ed.: Politics in Europe: Structures and Prpresses in Seme Post-Industrial Democra cies. David McKay, New York.
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
Wildenmann, Rudolf (1971):Germany 193o/197o: The Empirical Findings. In: Sozialwiss.Jahrb.f.Politik, vol.2.G.01zog, Miinchen.
Wildenmann, Rudolf (1975): Towards a Socio-Political Model of the German Federal Republic.In: Sozialwiss.Jahrb.f. Politik, vol.4. G.Olzog, München.
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EUI No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. N o . 1 N o . 1 N o . 1 No. No. WOR K I N G PAPERS : 1 : Jacques PELKMANS : 2 : J o s e p h H. H. W E I L E R : 3 : A l d o RUSTICHINI : 4 : M a u r o CAPPELLETTI / D avid GOLAY : 5 : Leonard GLESKE : 6 : M a n f r ed HINZ : 7 : W i l h e l m BURKLIN : 8 : Athana s i o s M O U LA K I S : 9 : Man f re d E. STREIT : 0 : K u m a r a sw a m y V EL U P I L L A I : 1 : Kumara s w a my V E L U P I L L A I : 2 : K u m a ra s wa m y V E L U P I L L A I / : Gu g li e l m o CHIODI 3 : Gunther T E U B N E R : 4 : Gunther TEU BN E R :
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L ett -Righ t Political : scales: Some Expert
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*A ■ • © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
