E U I W O R K I N G P A P E R No. 8 UNILATERALISM OR THE SHADOW OF CONFUSION
by A T H A N A S I O S M O U L A K I S FEBRUARY 1982
svu «
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
permission of the author Athanasios Moulakis Printed in I t a l y in February 1982 European U n iv e r s it y I n s t it u t e Badia Fiesolana © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
Woe to the rebellious children, saith the Lord that take counsel, but not of me;
and that cover with a covering, but not of my spirit, that they may add sin to sin ...
Therefore shall the strength of Pharaoh be your shame and the trust in the shadow of Egypt
your confusion. (Isaiah 30,1;3.) © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
At the end of January of this year Mr. Vadim Zagladin,
first deputy secretary of the Soviet Communist Party's
foreign affairs department, told a group of visiting
West German Young Socialists that the Soviet Union has
stopped deploying SS-20 milliles targeted on Western
Europe. This is the same Mr. Zagladin who a few days
earlier went on Hungarian radio to say :
"Those in the West who think we will show compliance on the issue of Euromissiles or any other question, because we have to support Poland, make a great mistake. The Soviet Union has never showed compliance over principal issues and will not do so now"
(The Times, Jan. 25 1982)
So this deployment stop is a pure gesture of good will.
Except, of course, that about 280 of these rockets with
three nuclear warheads each, are already in place. To
these one may add about the same number of the older and
less sophisticated SS-4s as well as about 25 SS-5s.
According to Western estimates this represents about
85% of the entire projected programme. Perhaps not a
bad time to stop, especially since the other side hasn't
even started its own deployment of "Euromissiles".
Mr. Zagladin would not say for how long the Soviet Union
would hold out this olive branch. It would depend on
what NATO would do.
At the beginning of February Leonid Brezhnev himself
pointed out the importance of keeping things apart,
human rights (not his term) on the one hand and
armaments on the other, and called for "denouements"
rather than "linkages".
In this realistic vein he made a number of proposals,
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
2
of nuclear arms from European soil. A most attractive
proposition, it would seem. Except upon second thought
it isn't much of a concession. Eastern European coun
tries, other than the Soviet Union itself, have no
nuclear weapons, nor will they be allowed to have any.
A nuclear-free zone in Europe involves therefore no
sacrifices by Russia's allies and whereas Western
Europe would remain without nuclear cover, the Soviet
Union would just have to remove its missiles somewhat
further inland. The missiles are perfectly capable
of reaching targets in Western Europe if fired from
behind the Urals. Seeing that the West is not yet
quite prepared for a radical solution of this sort
Brezhnev proposed a mutual reduction of medium range
weapons down to 1/3 of their present strength by 1990.
The diminution of the stockpile of nuclear arms is
doubtlessly desirable. But, as the arithmetic clearly
suggests, the Brezhnev proposal leaves the present
imbalance of nuclear armament intact. In terms of
Western medium range missiles, one third of nothing
is still nothing. Brezhnev can pretend he is suggesting
a balanced reduction by counting American aeroplanes
against Soviet missiles and leaving Soviet planes out of
the account. He also proposed a Moratorium which once
again would freeze the status quo. The Secretary General
of the Soviet Communist Party was speaking at a reception
in the Kremlin for the Consultative Council of Disarmament
of the Socialist International, or rather to what there
was of it, because the British, French, West German and
Dutch representatives had refused to go to Moscow in
view of the situation in Poland. Mr. Brezhnev spoke
of the folly, presumably of others, "to build a policy
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
with an eye to nuclear war" (I.H.T. 4.2.82) and
emphasized that the Soviet Union placed peace
ahead of all other objectives.
The same disarmament council of the Socialist
International was told very similar things about
the pacific goals of Soviet policy or its previous
visit to Moscow in October 1979. It was told
in particular that it was ludicrous even to
suggest the possibility of Soviet military inter
vention in a foreign country. That was three
months before the invasion of Afghanistan.
A day after the Brezhnev anouncement President
Reagan repeated his earlier offer to cancel
the plans for the production and deployment
of Western "Euromissiles" if the Soviet Union
would stop putting up theirs and scrap the ones
that are already in place. The "zero option" was
once again rejected out of hand by the Soviet
Union as a mere figleaf to cover ominous military
plans.
To most people one nuclear weapon is much like
another. They are all terrible instruments of
intimidation and destruction. There are however
different levels of nuclear weapons. It is
important to keep such distinctions in mind if
one wants to understand the moves and counter
moves of the Superpowers, and in order to form
a reasoned opinion of what is involved in doing
without this or that weapons system or what it
means to have as much or more than the other side.
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
Strategic nuclear arms are the "traditional" powerful
weapons that can be carried over long distances by long
range missiles or bombers. Their capacity for destruction
is so great, that their use would cause a universal confla
gration. They are therefore limited as instruments of policy
to balancing each other out in the expectation that one
threat cancells out the other. It is these weapons that are
the object of the SALT negotiations and of the partial limi
tations agreements that were reached at these talks. Different
from these are tactical nuclear weapons, of much more
limited destructive power which can be thought of
as extensions of conventional military equipment and,
so the theory goes, could conceivably be used in a
limited "battlefield" role without necessarily unleashing
a massive response with strategic weapons. Finally,
there are intermediate nuclear weapons, of medium range,
such as the Soviet SS 20 missiles and the American
Pershing and Cruise missiles of a wider scope than "battle
field" arms; they are nevertheless limited to a relatively
restricted potential "theatre" of war, such as Europe.
It is difficult to discuss nuclear arms dispassionately.
Their use would lead to such nightmarish results that it
would be simply inhuman not to be filled with great fear
and horror of what they can do to our world whichever
"side" may ultimately be thought to be at fault assuming
that "we" and "they" can be kept apart in the case of
nuclear conflict. It is all the more important, therefore,
to keep a cool head, which is very different from having
a cold heart. One possible response to the threat of
nuclear catastrophv is to refuse for one's own part, to
contribute towards or even to tolerate the deployment of
nuclear weapons. This position reflects a morality which
cannot be rejected out of hand.
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
It does however raise new moral problems for
leaving the field free for villains means de
livering not only oneself, to which one perhaps
has the right, but also one's fellow men into
the villains' hands. Once the technology is
there, someone will be tempted to use it if
he thinks he can get away with it. Short of
general nuclear disarmament the only plausible
way of deterring an adversary from throwing
the Bomb at you is to have one of your own he
knows you can throw back at him. It may be a
sad reflexion on human nature, but it is a bold
man who would say that the absence of war in
Europe for now close to fourty years is unre
lated to the "Balance of Terror".
It is a different matter that anyone in his
senses would like to see a negotiated, properly
monitored and enforced limitation of horrible
and costly arms. Achieving such an agreement
is something else again. Wanting it alone will
not do. Also, by definition, agreements cannot
be unilateral. Apart from all other difficulties,
it is not easy to determine what exactly constitutes
a balance of asymétrie weapons systems, so that
reasonable people, even when extremely well
informed and technically competent may well
disagree on particulars. The concept of
deterrence also involves psychological consi
derations that are difficult to evaluate.
It is hardly wise policy to take the logically
easy way out of the complexities of strategic
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
6
balance or imbalance by simply rushing ahead
to make sure one has "more" that the other
side. It is true that one cannot afford to
be weak, but one must beware of oversimpli
fications in wanting to argue "from strength".
Such a policy is no better if catering to a
populist desire to be "number one". In demo
cracies, effective policies need popular support.
It is the task of leadership to clarify, but
not to falsify the meaning of policies in order
to persuade rather than mislead public opinion.
A large section of American public opinion was
misled by successive administrations who pre
sented the valuable, but limited achievements
of detente as leading to a "stable structure
for peace". It was not, and could not be any
thing of the kind. Having fallen out of that
cloud with a bump, Americans feel they have
been duped and they demand a policy of "though-
ness". The sentiment is understandable, but
it is once again up to the administration to
lead, and not to allow its policy to become
prisoner to jingoism and illusions of endless
resources and impregnable American primacy in
all fields.
No matter what the difficulties - conceptual,
emotional, political and economic - of formu
lating and implementing sensible policies
regarding nuclear arms, it is necessary to have
and be known to have the capacity for nuclear
deterrence. It is not a matter of choice.
Once made,-the, invention of nuclear weapons
cannot be unmade. Even the dismantling
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
of all existing nuclear arms would not put us
back in a state of nuclear innocence. Even so,
universal nuclear disarmament would undoubtedly
be a blessing. Such disarmament would of course
have to be accompanied by appropriate and effective
controls. The agreements limiting strategic
nuclear arms that have been concluded so far are
certainly valuable, but strictly circumscribed.
There seems to be little hope of global nuclear
disarmament. It is partly a matter of perceptions.
The Soviet Union, for instance, does not differ
entiate between conventional and nuclear forces
in its military planning as presented in its
own publications. Under such circumstances
the high-minded morality of refusing to have
anything to do with nuclear weapons under any
circumstances must be weighed against the heard-
headed and, I believe in effect more humane
morality that seeks ways to prevent everyone
from using such weapons.
What will not do, is the kind of lopsided
special pleading which has lately become so
common in Western Europe and particularly in
Western Germany. West Germany's geographic
position, its split national identity, the
sectarian tradition of some of its churches,
the long term "antimilitarizing" effects of
a "reeducation" programme designed to correct
past excesses are no doubt among the factors
affecting the increasingly prevalent one-eyed
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
8
view of nuclear armament. What is true of
Western Germany is true a fortiori of West
Berlin.
A group of prominent West Berliners, headed
by the former Governing-Mayor Heinrich Albertz
and including authors, academics, actors,
physicians and clergymen issued in September
of 1981 an "Appeal from Berlin to the People
of the USA".
This text is well worth discussing in some
detail because of the intellectual distinction
of those who sign it and because it is an
excellent summary of the "unilateralist" argu
ments being advanced in Germany today. It is,
needless to say no less significant for what it
passes over in silence than for what it spells
out:
"We, a group of West Berlin citizens, want to express our deepening sense of apprehension and alarm at the military policy of the Reagan administration."
This is an ably constructed sentence, which without
doing violence to the language, personalizes the
source of apprehension and appeals over the head
of the "nasty man" and his associates to the
"American People". It would never have done to
speak of "U.S. defense policy". That would
have rung all the wrong bells : it would take
away the aggressive edge of the word "military"
and suggest that the President is, for better
or for worse, the properly elected representative
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
of the United States. So far we have no more
than quite admissible rhetorical emphasis.
"The construction of a new generation of American nuclear weapons is raising political and social tensions through out the world and promises to drasti cally increase the risk of nuclear war".
This states the thesis advanced in the Appeal.
It has to be seen in the light of what follows
in its support. It does however already raise
some important questions : why would the construe
tion of new nuclear weapons increase the danger
of war ? Weapons are not as such the causes of
war any more than money is the cause of greed.
On the other hand, if a new weapon being intro
duced is seen to unsettle a balance in armaments
thought to be crucial in discouraging hostilities
then indeed, the new weapon has a destabilizing
effect. The only weapon that could really do
this, would be one capable of such a swift,
precise and extensive preemptive strike as to
make retaliation impossible. But this is not
what the fuss is about. In fact the so-called
strategic nuclear weapons, the "Big-Bombs" are
not referred to anywhere in the Berlin Appeal.
"The proposed stationing of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Western Europe has catalyzed an unprecedented opposition movement. In the Federal Republic alone over 1 1/2 million people have signed petitions against the stationing of Pershing II and Cruise missiles on European soil. In Hamburg more than
100.000 Protestant Christians recently demonstrated against these new weapons.
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
10
This Fall hundreds of demonstrations and teach-ins will take place in the Federal Republic to protest the present United States military build-up."
The big fuss is about medium-range nuclear missiles.
It is certainly true that, whatever its histo
rical and ideological origins, the large wave
of pacifist/unilateralist protest got rolling
in response to the NATO decision in December
of 1979 to deploy Pershing II and Ground Laun
ched Cruise Missiles on Western European soil.
A large and vociferous protest movement pre
sumably indicates that there is a prima facie
reason for concern. It does not of course tell
us much about the merits of the case. The
number of people marching or attending rallies
is a poor indicator of the worth of their cause.
In evaluating the protest it would be useful
to know for instance what proportion of the
petitions were signed in the spirit of "down
with nukes" rather than "down with new American
nukes only". It is, no doubt, psychologically
easier and perhaps politically more effective
to protest about things not yet introduced
than about things that are already there.
It is again a neat rhetorical device to
underscore the fact that one of the most
important demonstrations against the installation
of Western medium range missiles was staged by
"Protestant Christians".
The appeal is addressed to the American people,
which is imbued with Protestant values. A large
number of Americans are bound to view the protest
with different eyes than if it had been staged
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
by "atheist fellow-travellers". On the other
hand the large majority of the American public
is not likely to be aware of some of the more
disturbing aspects of German Protestantism.
There is a virulent millenarist-sectarian strand
among the German Protestant churches. Neutralist
sentiment in the interest of German unity is no
novelty. It has always played an important
role in Protestant "Kirchentage" or great national
church meets. It has also been remarkable that
many protestant clergymen who have been protagonists
in the condemnation of nuclear energy -for peaceful
as well as for military purposes- never seem
to extend their -possibly perfectly justified-
censure beyond the Elbe.1 So much, as it were,
ad hominem.
But what of the substance of the argument ?
"We are told that the Pershing II and Cruise missiles will deter the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe by providing the United States and NATO with means to "win" an atomic war. "
This is both inaccurate and wrong-headed.
Medium range nuclear missiles do not constitute
an American or Western technological break
through which might be thought capable of
"outsmarting" the Soviet weapons systems thus
making "victory" in a nuclear conflict possible.
They are rather meant to counterbalance a
Soviet breakthrough on comparable terms in
order to make even "limited" nuclear war un
thinkable. Unlike NATO's medium range weapons
that have yet to be deployed, the Soviet Union
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
12
already has close to 300 of them in place,
targeted on Western Europe, and their number
is apparently still increasing, despite the
statements of Mr. Zagladin (Times, Feb.6,1982).
This presumably strikes the signatories of the
"Appeal" as a perfectly pacific pursuit.
The point about these weapons is that their
range and their accuracy, which permits them,
for instance, to concentrate on strictly military
targets, could conceivably allow them to be used
within the confines of one "theater" of war, say
in Western Europe, without automatically provoking
the massive retaliation with "strategic" weapons
by the Superpower allied to the attacked countries.
The protective Superpower might well be reluctant
to use its strategic arms, for fear of a strategic
counterretaliation. Following this logic, the
European allies get nervous about "decoupling",
and about the American atomic umbrella folding
over their heads. They recognize that the days
when an American President could warm people's
hearts and carry conviction by saying "Ich bin
ein Berliner" are long gone. It is easy to
imagine that America, post-Vietnam, self-concerned
America, might well hesitate to bring down an
atomic war upon its head just for the likes of us.
President Reagan caused an uproar, by saying
something very much like that. It is to reassure
the Europeans, and under the persistent pressure
of the West German Chancellor himself that the
much disputed NATO decision to produce and deploy
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
Pershings and Cruise Missiles was taken. It
certainly doesn't stem from the desire of the
U.S. to start any European wars they might hope
to "win". The deployment of NATO medium range
missiles can only be conceived as a threat to
peace, if it is assumed that the Soviet Union,
not the U.S., might be willing to unleash a
preemptive attack before the missiles are in
place, in order to preserve its present enormous
advantage. But if this is so, the "Appeal" is
knocking on the wrong door.
The concept of "limited" nuclear war is certainly
open to many questions. The Soviet SS20s and their
Western counterparts are still very destructive
things, despite their accuracy. The dynamic
character of all wars suggests it may be very
difficult to prevent escalations. The intermediate
range missiles deployed by the Soviet Union and to
be deployed by NATO are still under the direct
control of the respective Superpowers. One wonders
therefore, why the Soviet Union, for instance,
would shoot back at the Western European launching
pad rather than at the missile's mother country.
This brings us back to global strategic deterrence,
which means that producing and installing the new
weaponry could be a waste. On the other hand these
weapons may, for all I know, be worth every penny
spent on them if, everything considered, they
provide a "credible deterrent"; credible not
primarily to you and me but to the strategists
in the Kremlin. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
14
The NATO plan to counterbalance the Soviet armoury
at a certain level does not increase the risk
of war. One may argue that it is superfluous,
but not that it is damaging to a balance which
it is in fact intended to reestablish. The other
wrong impression conveyed by the tone of the
"Appeal" is that the new weapons, by being techno
logically more advanced must also be even more
inhuman than their cruder forerunners. It is
hard to see why more accurate, and therefore
less wantonly destructive weapons should be
humanly more repulsive and morally more objectionable
than technically less sophisticated arms which are
only capable of indiscriminate destruction on a vast
scale.
"The recent decision of the Reagan admini stration to build the neutron bomb has only unleashed additional revulsion and opposition".
The fact is undoubtedly true. The question to ask
is whether the reaction was justified. what
was said about the relative 'moral' merits of the
technologically more advanced against the more
indiscriminate weapons also applies to the neutron
Bomb. It must be because people are accustommed
to exponential growth in all fields that they
automatically assume that a new Bomb must be
even more horrible than an old Bomb. In fact
the neutron Bomb is much more precise in its
scope and much less destructive in its effects
than the older devices. While capable of killing
people by direct radiation, the heat and blast
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
it produces and the radioactive fallout it leaves
behind is greatly reduced by comparison to nuclear
warheads as we have had them so far. Used against
a massive tank formation, for instance, it would
stop the advance by killing the crews without
ravaging and poisoning vast stretches of possibly
densely populated country. This is surely less
rather than more sinister than letting everything
go up in one great mushroom. The revulsion would
have been justified if the choice were not between
one Bomb and another but between a Bomb and no
Bomb. Neatly separated by four paragraphs from
this first evocation of (largely misunderstood)
nuclear horror, the "Appeal" takes a more so
phisticated approach to the neutron Bomb.
"... the neutron bomb (is) a weapon which is supposed to make atomic war "thinkable"."
This is presumably just because it is less
destructive. But what does "making atomic war
' thinkable mean ? The implication seems to
be that the introduction of the neutron Bomb
is evidence of an intention to conduct a limited
nuclear war, suddenly made possible by technology.
This is not at all the same as the fact that
a deterrent can only do its job, to deterr and
prevent a war, if the adversary knows that one
is able and if driven to it willing to use it.
The "Appeal" is unfair if it suggests, however
indirectly, that those responsible for introducing
the neutron Bomb are actually eager to use it. It
does however raise the legitimate question : what is
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
16
The problem is posed by the great imbalance of
conventional forces in Europe. Warsaw Pact
Divisions outnumber NATO Divisions in Northern
and Central Europe by more than 2 to 1 and the
Warsaw Pact has almost three times as many tanks
in this area as the Western Alliance. This
strength is enhanced by geography -the lack of
depth of Western Europe, poor communication lines,
etc.1 The Soviet Union has consistently maintained
and increased the strength of its (nuclear and
conventional) forces since World War II, through
cold war, detente and after. One wonders why.
It is true that these armies came in handy when
people who didn't know their own good started
trouble in places like Budapest, or Prague.
But surely a military apparatus of such magnitude,
maintained at enormous expense, can hardly be
justified by police duties alone.
The moment American monopoly and then even
American superiority in nuclear arms was gone,
the moment that is that the Soviet Union was
capable of retaliatory strikes against the United
States itself, the strategic nuclear deterrent
was seen to offer insufficient protection against
the conventional military strength of the Soviet
Union. This has led to attempts since the 1950's
to develop "tactical" or "battlefield" nuclear
weapons able to make up for the relative weak
ness of NATO's conventional forces. The neutron
Bomb is the first such device which can be plausibly
expected not to have such disastrous side effects
1. See T h e M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 1 , The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1980
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
on the countryside and the civilian population
as to make it usable at all. In this sense,
the authors of the "Appeal" are right when they
say that the neutron Bomb is "supposed to make
nuclear war thinkable". The asymetry of the
means, "nuclear" versus "conventional" power,
makes it hard to determine the real worth of
"tactical" nuclear weapons. Nuclear is nuclear,
however qualified.
"If the neutron bomb were ever to be used in Europe or anywhere else in the world, it could open up an age of
unlimited atomic wars. Pershing II's, Cruise missiles and neutron bombs on European soil could not only unleash an
atomic war here. We believe that such a conflict would quickly escalate and turn the entire northern hemisphere into a nuclear wasteland."
Well, it could. The question is, do these arms provide a
plausible enough disincentive to discourage actions which
-might necessitate their use. What are the alternatives ?
The alternative to "tactical" nuclear arms is an extensive
European conventional rearmament, despite the heavy economic
and political burden it would place on the countries
of Western Europe or a major reduction of Soviet
conventional forces, which does not look very
likely.
In any case, neither possibility is envisaged in
the "Appeal".
"As West Berliners living in the West but surrounded by the East we have
had the privilege of experiencing first hand the benefits of détente. We believe from the results of this experience that only a policy of deepening East-West
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
18
dialogue and understanding -not weapons superiority- can provide a working framework for peace"
This is one of the strangest paragraphs in the
whole document. No doubt West Berlin was parti
cularly sensitive to whatever advantages détente
had to offer, in terms of economic, cultural
and human exchanges. Trade is a good thing and
if both sides profit it doesn't necessarily matter
who gets the better deal. The possibility of
visiting tante Hannah in what used to be called
Chemnitz might even in itself be worth the vast
transfers of technology and credit from wTest to
East. But having established links of this nature,
who has the greatest interest in maintaining them,
who can least afford to pick a fight, the lender
or the borrower ? Who was it then who killed
détente ? Again we find our "Appeal" knocking
on the wrong door.
Was it the American people who made a spitoon
out of the third basket (human rights, rather
than guns or butter) of the Helsinki Accord ?
Was it the American government that subjected
to psychiatric treatment people who checked
whether the stipulations of this crowning Act
of détente were observed ? Every face has only
two cheeks to offer to the bully, no more.
Never mind the Horn of Africa, Angola, etc.,
which may plausibly be put down as "power struggles",
indirect confrontations between Superpowers,
where the lines of demarcation were not hard
and fast. It is nevertheless worth noting that
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
in the period of détente any advance of American
influence, such as the turning around of Egypt,
was obtained by peaceful means, whereas the gains
of Soviet interest were obtained by military
violence. But what possible overarching conflict
can be cited as an explanation for the invasion
of Afghanistan ?
"West Berliners living in the West but surrounded by the East"
also seem to have short memories. Who was it
who blocaded them, and who by contrast set up
airbridges to keep them alive and in the West ?
Unless they do not care to be in the West, but
that is not what they say.
A recipe for détente : first build a wall, than
open a tiny opening, provide it with a pay gate,
make a point of making the gate work capriciously
and call it progress. If someone bangs his fist
in frustration, call him a bloodthirsty fascist.
Yes, indeed let us deepen East-West dialogue and
understanding. But the authors of the "Appeal"
seem to have taken as a model the later dialogues
of Plato in which one of the interlocutors says
nothing other than "Yes, Socrates", "Quite so,
Socrates", "It would be hard to quarel with what
you say, Socrates".
Of course discussion is invaluable to peace.
It is undoubtedly a necessary condition. But
hardly a sufficient one. Or do we have a case
of "tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner" ?.
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
20
The next paragraph is indeed one of deep though
selective empathy.
"The people of the Soviet Union have never forgotten the invasion of their country by Germany during the Second World War. More than 20 million Russians died as a result of the war. Like all of us in the West the Soviet people are deeply afraid of a coming nuclear war. And now intermediate range missiles, able to reach Moscow in less than five minutes, are to be deployed in the Federal Republic!"
Here is the contrast to "the Reagan Administration" :
"the people of the Soviet Union". People good,
Government bad. The list of peoples who have
never forgotten the invasion of their country
by Germany would be long indeed. Most of them,
unlike the Soviet Union never even dreamt of
signing a pact with Hitler in order to gobble up
their smaller neighbours undisturbed.1 If, indeed,
one can find fault with these countries, it is
that they let the bully get away with bloody
murder, literally, in order to secure "peace in
their time". We know how well they succeeded.
The memory of German occupation has not prevented
these other countries from creating close bonds
of cooperation and friendship with post-war Germany.
What is it that puts the Soviet People in a class
apart ? Apparently the size of their sufferings.
No one denies the enormous sacrifices made by
the Soviet Union in the War. But what is this
l.The Hitler— Stalin pact was concluded on Aug.23,1939. Poland was partitioned in September of that year. The present Eastern border of Poland is little different frpm the Molotov-von Ribentropp line resulting from that pièce of European Cooperation. Letonia Estonia and Lithuania lost the last vestiges of independence.in 1940. Finland, because of it valorous resistance had to surrender only parts of its territory to the Soviet Union, in the same year. It was also the year of the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia a n d “the Bukovina at the expense of Romania. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
gruesome body count ? Above a certain number
of war victims a people cannot but be mistrustful
of the Germans, below that level it is likely
to be its friend and ally ? It is of course
nothing but the adoption of the propagandistic
Soviet view of World War II as of the "Great
Patriotic War". It involves no disrespect to
the great Soviet contribution to that World War
to say that it is grossly insensitive for German
intellectuals to adopt that view in an Appeal
to a people that has lost thousands of good men
fighting for the liberation of Europe from the
Nazis. Furthermore, the breastbeating and concern
about the presumed Soviet sensibility towards
"l'éternelle Allemagne" might perhaps pass, if
one were speaking of German defence alone. But
it is Western European defense we are talking
about. It is simply callous to associate other
peoples with a historical burden which weighs
on Germany alone. It is also useful to remember
that whatever the Soviet people may remember
or may not be allowed to forget about German
agression, the Soviet leadership did not hesitate
for a moment to send in German troops, Saxon
and Prussian goosestepping troops, to crush the
Spring of Prague, thus redoubling the horror
of the Checoslovaks.
We are indeed all deeply afraid of a coming nuclear
war. Which is why we want to make sure that all
of us are sufficiently afraid not to start one.
The medium range missiles to be deployed in Western
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
22
Europe will be able to reach Moscow in five minutes.
The Soviet Union already has such missiles, capable
of reaching London in about the same time, give
or take a minute, and that might not go down too
well with those who remember the Blitz, whether
the rocket is fired in Mecklenburg or in Minsk,
or for that matter in Kant's native city of
Kaliningrad.
The implied concommittant of a presumed Soviet
fear of medium range nuclear weapons based in
Germany is that by the same token Germany would
be primary target of Soviet nuclear attack.
This may well be true, but it is a great illusion
to think that only countries equipped with nuclear
arms will be subject to nuclear attack. Witness
the angry letter of a Swedish woman to Leonid
Brezhnev, which was in the papers not long ago,
in which she expresses the most bitter disillusionment,
that despite all the statements to the contrary, the
Soviet Union did train nuclear weapons on non
nuclear, neutral Sweden as evidenced in the cargo
of the "whisky" class submarine that got stranded
on the Swedish shore.
"Euroshima no I" is a slogan seen on the walls
of many European cities and expresses an under
standable fear, but it misses a central point
of its own allusion : That the U.S. could only
afford to drop the Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
because the Japanese had nothing of the sort
to throw back at them.
Germany's geographic position and its importance
as an industrial power expose it to particular
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
dangers. If, as the authors of the "Appeal"
suggest we also consider a "sale Boshe" view
of Germans as prevailing in the Soviet Union,
it is difficult to see that Germany would be
spared in the case of armed conflict, whether
American missiles are stationed on its soil or
not.
"WHO CAN SERIOUSLY BELIEVE THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES IN EUROPE WILL STRENGTHEN THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE ?"
In view of what was said before, the answer to
the rhetorical question is : a lot of thoughtful,
informed and peaceloving people. Given the
problematic nature of the concept of deterrence
I am not myself certain that the production and
deployment of these missiles is in fact necessary.
I would much prefer to be certain in a matter
involving enormous amounts of money and giving
rise to great political risks. But I am not.
What is certain is that the Western medium range
missiles do not bring any additional threats to
peace, if it isn't through the emotional and
unreasoned reactions to them in the West.
"West Germany already has the highest density of atomic weapons per square mile of any country in the world. Within this powder-keg environment which is our home, the Reagan admi nistration is taking steps to place the neutron bomb, ...
All this sounds very dramatic, as in many ways
it is. Increasing the possibility of accidents
is a matter for concern. But one can easily
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
24
the same kind of absurdity as the endless race
for quantitative nuclear superiority. Here we
have the bizzare case of "overkill" in reverse.
Germans, like other people, can only die once.
"WE ALONG WITH MILLIONS OF OTHER EUROPEAN CITIZENS, WILL NEVER ACCEPT ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE."
Why just "additional" nuclear weapons ? Is it
so important for the maintenance of peace that
the enormous Soviet advantage be maintained ?
This partisan view becomes cynical in the next
paragraph.
"The present American arms build-up is creating fear. Fear leads to hate and not to respect. The United States will be respected, if it respects the
integrity and independence 'of its Allies and it treats all peoples of
the world as having equal rights. It will be respected, if it shows genuine willingness to negotiate."
The American build-up creates fear. The Soviet
build-up, which it is meant to answer, relent
lessly and coldbloodedly pursued all through
détente presumably confers a feeling of
security and repose. There is no need to treat
the Macchiavellian point about whether a Prince
should seek to be loved or to be feared. The
important thing is to see that the authors of
the "Appeal" invariably construe American
strength as a menace, Soviet strength, by
implication, as necessary for the defence of
a much abused people whereas the only proper
Western European posture for assuring peace is
in their view that of the dog lying on its
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
back hoping that the canine nature of its adversary
will then prevent him from tearing out its throat.
But how bigotted does one have to be to lecture
the American people on the respect of the integrity
and independence of its Allies in the midst of
the Polish crisis ? Certainly the American
presence in Europe is not alien to American in
terests. But it does not seem to have occured
to the signatories of the "Appeal" that the
American people and the U.S. Government would
only be too glad if the Europeans themselves
were able and willing to take up the slack of
their own defence. Independence is all very
well. But Sweden and France for instance or
even Switzerland are armed to the teeth.
The flagrant disrespect of the Soviet Union for
the integrity and independence of its Allies,
of which the direct interventions in Hungary,
Checoslovakia, etc. are but the most explicit
manifestations, have not endangered peace in
Europe. The Soviet Union has been able to get
its way with impunity because of the pragmatic
understanding which mistakenly goes under the
name of Yalta. As a formula for the avoidance
of war, though not for the advancement of justice
or the respect for equal rights of the peoples
in the world, the understanding has worked.
But I do not think that this is the kind of
East-West understanding the authors of the
"Appeal" had in mind.
Willingness to negotiate "must entail readiness
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
26
December 1979 decision of NATO was a double
decision : to ask the Soviet Union to dismantle
medium range weapons, targeted on Europe or,
in the case of refusal, to produce and deploy
their counterparts. Again later, and now again
President Reagan proposed what is known as the
"zero option".
To say that the proposal was made as a propaganda
gesture in the knowledge that the Soviet Union
would reject it, is to beg the question of the
Soviet readiness to disarm. The "Appeal" having
been issued in September 1981 could not have
considered the offers of the zero option. I
doubt that it would have made much difference.
We have to complete the sentence. In the view
of the writers of the "Appeal" willingness to
negotiate must entail readiness to disarm uni-
lateraly.
Qui desiderat pacem praeparat bellum. It has
become quite fashionable to play on this maxim
of ancient prudence and to say instead that if
you desire peace, prepare peace. It is a catchy
phrase which has the sound of common sense.
But what does it mean ? Peace can be maintained
when it exists and it can be established after
a war. But how can it be prepared ? Peace,
like liberty, is not a thing that can be obtained
once and for all, a harbour that can be reached
if only one steers in the right direction and
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
and overcomes the seamonsters. Maintaining peace
is more like keeping the ship on an even keel
under changing circumstances. It requires constant
and repeated efforts, difficult adjustments,
laborious and mostly tedious negotiations occasionally
leavened by acts of imaginative statesmanship.
But none of these is incompatible with being
prepared for war. On the contrary.
There is no system of international relations
that can exclude the possibility of armed conflict.
Isaiah is often quoted to the contrary, but the
relevant passage is rarely quoted in full. It is
not just that such things as beating swords into
plowshares will come to pass "in the last days"
and not before. Such things, shall only be possible
because the Lord "shall judge the nations and
shall rebuke many people". I doubt that Isaiah
was prophesying the coming of Dr. Waldheim.
Therefore, providing for the common defence remains
a necessary task of government. Determining
exactly what constitutes adequate provision for
the common defence is a different matter.
Obviously, decisions about armaments, troops,
supplies etc. like all political decisions, are
not taken in a disinterested vacuum, dans le
silence des passions. What is often erroneously
concluded from this fact is that such decisions
are nothing but a reflection of particular
interests. But firstly, though interests influence,
they do not determine courses of action and
secondly the interests of even very small groups
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
2 8
the same direction. Furthermore any identifiable
interest competes against other countervailing
interests as it seeks to influence public policy.
Finally, in some countries, though not in others,
those who take the decisions are answerable to
the public that put them in and which can vote
them out.
Such considerations notwithstanding, conspiracy
theories abound. Wars are not seen to result
from irréconciliable differences between countries,
from conflicting interests, widely differing
views of the world and poor defences against
the desires for domination.'and agrandizement,
but from the perfidious machinations
of sinister men who can manipulate their people
into "using their creative potential for war".
Such theories channel frustration about the
complexity of an imperfect world into a
psychologically more manageable hatred of the
alleged culprits. They also hold out the illusory
but attractive prospect of a concommitant "if only"
theory. The maintenance of peace need not be the
sisyphian task it is, "if only" one got rid of
whoever is always kicking the stone back down
the hill. The "Appeal", in fairness, does not
go that far. But it raises the question why
the American people alone is admonished to wield
the hammer while the Soviet Union is busily beating its
sickle into a scythe of death.
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
-r.r :■.'■ $ % '. cûiand. Finland or way? !' - ■ É f c tSiSs s Poland '*sbS‘- /Hung, Yugo..Romania^, M o n a c A ndo rra Turkey
their striking range in of SS-20 medium-range missiles
A schematic representation of Soviet deployment Europe and beyond.
and
Gre enland
(Den.)
—US Department of Defense.
o © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
Newly I n d u s t r i a l i z e d Countries No. 2: Joseph H.H. WEILER : Supranational!'sm R e v is it e d -
Retrospe ctive and Prospective The European Communities A fte r T h i r t y Years
No. 3: Aldo RUSH CHINI : S e a s o n a lit y in E u ro d o lla r I n t e r e s t Rates
No. 4: Mauro CAPPELLETTI/
David GOLAY : J u d ic ia l Review, T ransnational and Federal: I t s Impact on In t e g r a t io n
No. 5 : Leonard GLESKE : The European Monetary System - Present S it u a t io n and Future Prospects
No. 6: Manfred HINZ : Massenkult und Todessymbolik in der n a t i o n a l s o z i a l i s t i s c h e n A r c h it e k t u r
No. 7: Wilhelm BORKLIN ; The "Greens" and the New P o l i t i c s Goodbye to the Three-Party System No. 8: Athanasios MOULAKIS : U n ila t e r a lis m or the Shadow of
Confusion © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research
© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.
© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research
C ' A , La V , ta • • • V 7 7 7 7 7 7 ! : ' f ( \< ’ 7 I -, A , , 7 7 ; 7 7 7 Y• 7 v ^ i Y ’1 Y' Xvj f 7-hV A A f L f' Y 7 < , ... .1. ■■' 0, Voi n .. ,N A - 7 7 v,4„, 7 . 7 & v r - A ' 7 7 , 7
YYiiiAv#
,
■
i.
( 7 x V v i ' , i v ' 1
.
7
: 'i ■
i - 1 ' ' V V 1 - v V ' V ' V - ■ V
, ' 1 è,i v ; , ■ ■ ; ■%
.
7. ,*
■
,■> Y l-i
r J ! 1
i
7! vi A ■
t ■
‘ t
r -■
*
à
i
1
v' '■1
1
\ v a \ n y m r ' ;, • I, - ]'7 I IV - , A11 ■' .1 'Vi4.é 3 VV' /V7 '■lì'' H W h 17 , 7-
v7 7VV
7 7 7t
y
7 > 7V V V f
7 » 7 7 P 7 ; m ' '
7 7 7 7 .7 77 i r m ■.}'■ Y A v a ■ i/. Vi '* ' V 1!7 , 7 7 " ' 7 , A \i /{V 1 '■1 7 : fi i ; .7 7 7 7 ' ■ : s V' >, 1 ■ -% 7 7 .r V. ■.7 . 7 • :1 r - 7 , ■4 f < v a- v > • J-* ■ ■ - M .-7? 7' V'W'I </ ! Vi ifU•*% i ,'V ' 7 , -* 7 vi \ù ri > .v| irli : 1 ' V ? ; V ih V ^ 1 ■7\ ^ ' 1r' , ï i • ,A W i Y
'v; ■ '7'!'../'ìZy'ÀÌ ' 'V ■ / '7' ’V" i'-ìy / \\' '%ì '7 V1V . 7 ' ' M S 1 f; . 7 f : V 4 v | . 7 : 7 r 7 . 7 /■,*. t v y v ì w y v a i A i i v i i t A ■'* 1 .. , 4 ■ ;. ■■:m : ■ , i ■ ■. ' - r Si 1 7 IM 'u ) 3 »\ iu r %
^ 7Vn< »■’
i'7'i . l,VV'; 7;
/ '■ i 7 7 r'fi-J' -f: / K f
... I
> l i , f i 7 I ■ /: / / ' 7 ' ,, : ,, V ' ' 7 7 7 7 t'._f 1 - V ’ : : , ’ V ( I ' ' , ' 1 : • ".P >•) ... 1 /ri ;. ! ■(v T '. V ■I - V ! 1 » \ • 0 1 ’ ' ,. M v i. ‘ '3)'\ iw J J \, - ;»1-VW jSi-'i"
; , 1 1 ' I \ » > " ,/ / • ''7 7 , ; V I : ,7 V M V ■ ; .1 . .. . W v-a N / 9 11 7 ; vn i v 7 ' i ' : !i 1 •, r . ' ^ 7 ^ ’V ' ^ 1 ,y ; ^ / ' 7 ^ ;\ !
i : \\i ''7 71 (-^.v V'
¥ ]
,7.
‘7
ïï V tt % i 1 f ' 1 . ft ; , ■. ■ w Ï 1 ; * M » V i ■ - i ■ ' g « M' • . 7-V i» ; • : 7-|fft v - M :y V VkiP'l 37^.b k P i i , 'i:Ì ÌÆ k , y s k, i ì’VÌ ■. (i;.7 'f ■ f A ,i; ■ ' 1/• -i V 'k y 1')}', 1 : v vf'--'"
c)
\ t
■
1
V i
vi
i
i i
ll,7 -Yf-I v i i.V^ I ^ .H- i.l ■'*. ' ï - 7 :v . ‘ /.' 7r VA\, K1 1/1 |P ' f ™ ' M * ' iSV 7
VV “Y V 1^ lho’ ,r ìifh Ik r-Ì7; x 7 VV' iv7; '^v^s ':."fv / r i .
i
^V
7I
..7 j'dV-l'
Y'P ,
.vi'i\ 7, ^Vìii,7 /■
L X /!■
;V) 71,'Y; ^Vìv. fi IVYfi /‘I’Y V Ìp
1 , i » ■/ i rf ' ■ *t(ì ' i;v i ''i >a v i 1/ fvw-' ‘ V CIMXl I1 f. V' / 7 7 . : 7 , , 7
/ / '
7
•
!
'
Si'ì yI j* , i v i-,, i v ■ / .in / / ‘- n / ' P /
.
V■ ■ V v
/ A 7 ; 7\f
» : f it,
I
.
■
A ■
■
7 _
( i er
•-
.U,
' . \Y 7 V'i7 Y 1 Ì 7 x i .7 -'' 'v •')l ..it fh'l-> i- 1 il '7 4- / A. : h V " ' p/ m'à Y : I ' W ' V 7 ■wr ■■j7 ‘v i!5 . 1 .. 7 ) , v . ; - 7 ' ^ H , m " $ : ì I a ' i,. ' V ’ •• ! ' 'tt, « ' :/ ) , fili ’ ,W1.. . .- v ' # ■ te a 1 ■' & fM ,7 Ji r . r . )- y 7| 7 / * . i;: f , ì'|.|ì ' ■' .'. 7 ' f '7Y: - - 1 r 1 i - y', ' vli'v ■■ i Y ‘V v ' 'y ; v'ì 1 ^ v y r ^ Z / ì r ' y .■'■ >,.? i v ( r 7 Sifrìi 7 li 7ì ì !y A iì77iÌ 7,7 .vi t e , „ y 77fc- 'Ayf*y- siik''- %i vY " 1 .ìi ® ,'J i • v " 'f ■ ' ( ' f '- ' "\7 ■Nf 1i,1*/ 7 1 © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.