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E U I W O R K I N G P A P E R No. 8 UNILATERALISM OR THE SHADOW OF CONFUSION

by A T H A N A S I O S M O U L A K I S FEBRUARY 1982

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© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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permission of the author Athanasios Moulakis Printed in I t a l y in February 1982 European U n iv e r s it y I n s t it u t e Badia Fiesolana © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research

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© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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Woe to the rebellious children, saith the Lord that take counsel, but not of me;

and that cover with a covering, but not of my spirit, that they may add sin to sin ...

Therefore shall the strength of Pharaoh be your shame and the trust in the shadow of Egypt

your confusion. (Isaiah 30,1;3.) © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research

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© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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At the end of January of this year Mr. Vadim Zagladin,

first deputy secretary of the Soviet Communist Party's

foreign affairs department, told a group of visiting

West German Young Socialists that the Soviet Union has

stopped deploying SS-20 milliles targeted on Western

Europe. This is the same Mr. Zagladin who a few days

earlier went on Hungarian radio to say :

"Those in the West who think we will show compliance on the issue of Euromissiles or any other question, because we have to support Poland, make a great mistake. The Soviet Union has never showed compliance over principal issues and will not do so now"

(The Times, Jan. 25 1982)

So this deployment stop is a pure gesture of good will.

Except, of course, that about 280 of these rockets with

three nuclear warheads each, are already in place. To

these one may add about the same number of the older and

less sophisticated SS-4s as well as about 25 SS-5s.

According to Western estimates this represents about

85% of the entire projected programme. Perhaps not a

bad time to stop, especially since the other side hasn't

even started its own deployment of "Euromissiles".

Mr. Zagladin would not say for how long the Soviet Union

would hold out this olive branch. It would depend on

what NATO would do.

At the beginning of February Leonid Brezhnev himself

pointed out the importance of keeping things apart,

human rights (not his term) on the one hand and

armaments on the other, and called for "denouements"

rather than "linkages".

In this realistic vein he made a number of proposals,

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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2

of nuclear arms from European soil. A most attractive

proposition, it would seem. Except upon second thought

it isn't much of a concession. Eastern European coun­

tries, other than the Soviet Union itself, have no

nuclear weapons, nor will they be allowed to have any.

A nuclear-free zone in Europe involves therefore no

sacrifices by Russia's allies and whereas Western

Europe would remain without nuclear cover, the Soviet

Union would just have to remove its missiles somewhat

further inland. The missiles are perfectly capable

of reaching targets in Western Europe if fired from

behind the Urals. Seeing that the West is not yet

quite prepared for a radical solution of this sort

Brezhnev proposed a mutual reduction of medium range

weapons down to 1/3 of their present strength by 1990.

The diminution of the stockpile of nuclear arms is

doubtlessly desirable. But, as the arithmetic clearly

suggests, the Brezhnev proposal leaves the present

imbalance of nuclear armament intact. In terms of

Western medium range missiles, one third of nothing

is still nothing. Brezhnev can pretend he is suggesting

a balanced reduction by counting American aeroplanes

against Soviet missiles and leaving Soviet planes out of

the account. He also proposed a Moratorium which once

again would freeze the status quo. The Secretary General

of the Soviet Communist Party was speaking at a reception

in the Kremlin for the Consultative Council of Disarmament

of the Socialist International, or rather to what there

was of it, because the British, French, West German and

Dutch representatives had refused to go to Moscow in

view of the situation in Poland. Mr. Brezhnev spoke

of the folly, presumably of others, "to build a policy

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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with an eye to nuclear war" (I.H.T. 4.2.82) and

emphasized that the Soviet Union placed peace

ahead of all other objectives.

The same disarmament council of the Socialist

International was told very similar things about

the pacific goals of Soviet policy or its previous

visit to Moscow in October 1979. It was told

in particular that it was ludicrous even to

suggest the possibility of Soviet military inter­

vention in a foreign country. That was three

months before the invasion of Afghanistan.

A day after the Brezhnev anouncement President

Reagan repeated his earlier offer to cancel

the plans for the production and deployment

of Western "Euromissiles" if the Soviet Union

would stop putting up theirs and scrap the ones

that are already in place. The "zero option" was

once again rejected out of hand by the Soviet

Union as a mere figleaf to cover ominous military

plans.

To most people one nuclear weapon is much like

another. They are all terrible instruments of

intimidation and destruction. There are however

different levels of nuclear weapons. It is

important to keep such distinctions in mind if

one wants to understand the moves and counter­

moves of the Superpowers, and in order to form

a reasoned opinion of what is involved in doing

without this or that weapons system or what it

means to have as much or more than the other side.

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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Strategic nuclear arms are the "traditional" powerful

weapons that can be carried over long distances by long

range missiles or bombers. Their capacity for destruction

is so great, that their use would cause a universal confla­

gration. They are therefore limited as instruments of policy

to balancing each other out in the expectation that one

threat cancells out the other. It is these weapons that are

the object of the SALT negotiations and of the partial limi­

tations agreements that were reached at these talks. Different

from these are tactical nuclear weapons, of much more

limited destructive power which can be thought of

as extensions of conventional military equipment and,

so the theory goes, could conceivably be used in a

limited "battlefield" role without necessarily unleashing

a massive response with strategic weapons. Finally,

there are intermediate nuclear weapons, of medium range,

such as the Soviet SS 20 missiles and the American

Pershing and Cruise missiles of a wider scope than "battle­

field" arms; they are nevertheless limited to a relatively

restricted potential "theatre" of war, such as Europe.

It is difficult to discuss nuclear arms dispassionately.

Their use would lead to such nightmarish results that it

would be simply inhuman not to be filled with great fear

and horror of what they can do to our world whichever

"side" may ultimately be thought to be at fault assuming

that "we" and "they" can be kept apart in the case of

nuclear conflict. It is all the more important, therefore,

to keep a cool head, which is very different from having

a cold heart. One possible response to the threat of

nuclear catastrophv is to refuse for one's own part, to

contribute towards or even to tolerate the deployment of

nuclear weapons. This position reflects a morality which

cannot be rejected out of hand.

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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It does however raise new moral problems for

leaving the field free for villains means de­

livering not only oneself, to which one perhaps

has the right, but also one's fellow men into

the villains' hands. Once the technology is

there, someone will be tempted to use it if

he thinks he can get away with it. Short of

general nuclear disarmament the only plausible

way of deterring an adversary from throwing

the Bomb at you is to have one of your own he

knows you can throw back at him. It may be a

sad reflexion on human nature, but it is a bold

man who would say that the absence of war in

Europe for now close to fourty years is unre­

lated to the "Balance of Terror".

It is a different matter that anyone in his

senses would like to see a negotiated, properly

monitored and enforced limitation of horrible

and costly arms. Achieving such an agreement

is something else again. Wanting it alone will

not do. Also, by definition, agreements cannot

be unilateral. Apart from all other difficulties,

it is not easy to determine what exactly constitutes

a balance of asymétrie weapons systems, so that

reasonable people, even when extremely well

informed and technically competent may well

disagree on particulars. The concept of

deterrence also involves psychological consi­

derations that are difficult to evaluate.

It is hardly wise policy to take the logically

easy way out of the complexities of strategic

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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balance or imbalance by simply rushing ahead

to make sure one has "more" that the other

side. It is true that one cannot afford to

be weak, but one must beware of oversimpli­

fications in wanting to argue "from strength".

Such a policy is no better if catering to a

populist desire to be "number one". In demo­

cracies, effective policies need popular support.

It is the task of leadership to clarify, but

not to falsify the meaning of policies in order

to persuade rather than mislead public opinion.

A large section of American public opinion was

misled by successive administrations who pre­

sented the valuable, but limited achievements

of detente as leading to a "stable structure

for peace". It was not, and could not be any­

thing of the kind. Having fallen out of that

cloud with a bump, Americans feel they have

been duped and they demand a policy of "though-

ness". The sentiment is understandable, but

it is once again up to the administration to

lead, and not to allow its policy to become

prisoner to jingoism and illusions of endless

resources and impregnable American primacy in

all fields.

No matter what the difficulties - conceptual,

emotional, political and economic - of formu­

lating and implementing sensible policies

regarding nuclear arms, it is necessary to have

and be known to have the capacity for nuclear

deterrence. It is not a matter of choice.

Once made,-the, invention of nuclear weapons

cannot be unmade. Even the dismantling

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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of all existing nuclear arms would not put us

back in a state of nuclear innocence. Even so,

universal nuclear disarmament would undoubtedly

be a blessing. Such disarmament would of course

have to be accompanied by appropriate and effective

controls. The agreements limiting strategic

nuclear arms that have been concluded so far are

certainly valuable, but strictly circumscribed.

There seems to be little hope of global nuclear

disarmament. It is partly a matter of perceptions.

The Soviet Union, for instance, does not differ­

entiate between conventional and nuclear forces

in its military planning as presented in its

own publications. Under such circumstances

the high-minded morality of refusing to have

anything to do with nuclear weapons under any

circumstances must be weighed against the heard-

headed and, I believe in effect more humane

morality that seeks ways to prevent everyone

from using such weapons.

What will not do, is the kind of lopsided

special pleading which has lately become so

common in Western Europe and particularly in

Western Germany. West Germany's geographic

position, its split national identity, the

sectarian tradition of some of its churches,

the long term "antimilitarizing" effects of

a "reeducation" programme designed to correct

past excesses are no doubt among the factors

affecting the increasingly prevalent one-eyed

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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8

view of nuclear armament. What is true of

Western Germany is true a fortiori of West

Berlin.

A group of prominent West Berliners, headed

by the former Governing-Mayor Heinrich Albertz

and including authors, academics, actors,

physicians and clergymen issued in September

of 1981 an "Appeal from Berlin to the People

of the USA".

This text is well worth discussing in some

detail because of the intellectual distinction

of those who sign it and because it is an

excellent summary of the "unilateralist" argu­

ments being advanced in Germany today. It is,

needless to say no less significant for what it

passes over in silence than for what it spells

out:

"We, a group of West Berlin citizens, want to express our deepening sense of apprehension and alarm at the military policy of the Reagan administration."

This is an ably constructed sentence, which without

doing violence to the language, personalizes the

source of apprehension and appeals over the head

of the "nasty man" and his associates to the

"American People". It would never have done to

speak of "U.S. defense policy". That would

have rung all the wrong bells : it would take

away the aggressive edge of the word "military"

and suggest that the President is, for better

or for worse, the properly elected representative

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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of the United States. So far we have no more

than quite admissible rhetorical emphasis.

"The construction of a new generation of American nuclear weapons is raising political and social tensions through­ out the world and promises to drasti­ cally increase the risk of nuclear war".

This states the thesis advanced in the Appeal.

It has to be seen in the light of what follows

in its support. It does however already raise

some important questions : why would the construe

tion of new nuclear weapons increase the danger

of war ? Weapons are not as such the causes of

war any more than money is the cause of greed.

On the other hand, if a new weapon being intro­

duced is seen to unsettle a balance in armaments

thought to be crucial in discouraging hostilities

then indeed, the new weapon has a destabilizing

effect. The only weapon that could really do

this, would be one capable of such a swift,

precise and extensive preemptive strike as to

make retaliation impossible. But this is not

what the fuss is about. In fact the so-called

strategic nuclear weapons, the "Big-Bombs" are

not referred to anywhere in the Berlin Appeal.

"The proposed stationing of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Western Europe has catalyzed an unprecedented opposition movement. In the Federal Republic alone over 1 1/2 million people have signed petitions against the stationing of Pershing II and Cruise missiles on European soil. In Hamburg more than

100.000 Protestant Christians recently demonstrated against these new weapons.

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This Fall hundreds of demonstrations and teach-ins will take place in the Federal Republic to protest the present United States military build-up."

The big fuss is about medium-range nuclear missiles.

It is certainly true that, whatever its histo­

rical and ideological origins, the large wave

of pacifist/unilateralist protest got rolling

in response to the NATO decision in December

of 1979 to deploy Pershing II and Ground Laun­

ched Cruise Missiles on Western European soil.

A large and vociferous protest movement pre­

sumably indicates that there is a prima facie

reason for concern. It does not of course tell

us much about the merits of the case. The

number of people marching or attending rallies

is a poor indicator of the worth of their cause.

In evaluating the protest it would be useful

to know for instance what proportion of the

petitions were signed in the spirit of "down

with nukes" rather than "down with new American

nukes only". It is, no doubt, psychologically

easier and perhaps politically more effective

to protest about things not yet introduced

than about things that are already there.

It is again a neat rhetorical device to

underscore the fact that one of the most

important demonstrations against the installation

of Western medium range missiles was staged by

"Protestant Christians".

The appeal is addressed to the American people,

which is imbued with Protestant values. A large

number of Americans are bound to view the protest

with different eyes than if it had been staged

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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by "atheist fellow-travellers". On the other

hand the large majority of the American public

is not likely to be aware of some of the more

disturbing aspects of German Protestantism.

There is a virulent millenarist-sectarian strand

among the German Protestant churches. Neutralist

sentiment in the interest of German unity is no

novelty. It has always played an important

role in Protestant "Kirchentage" or great national

church meets. It has also been remarkable that

many protestant clergymen who have been protagonists

in the condemnation of nuclear energy -for peaceful

as well as for military purposes- never seem

to extend their -possibly perfectly justified-

censure beyond the Elbe.1 So much, as it were,

ad hominem.

But what of the substance of the argument ?

"We are told that the Pershing II and Cruise missiles will deter the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe by providing the United States and NATO with means to "win" an atomic war. "

This is both inaccurate and wrong-headed.

Medium range nuclear missiles do not constitute

an American or Western technological break­

through which might be thought capable of

"outsmarting" the Soviet weapons systems thus

making "victory" in a nuclear conflict possible.

They are rather meant to counterbalance a

Soviet breakthrough on comparable terms in

order to make even "limited" nuclear war un­

thinkable. Unlike NATO's medium range weapons

that have yet to be deployed, the Soviet Union

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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already has close to 300 of them in place,

targeted on Western Europe, and their number

is apparently still increasing, despite the

statements of Mr. Zagladin (Times, Feb.6,1982).

This presumably strikes the signatories of the

"Appeal" as a perfectly pacific pursuit.

The point about these weapons is that their

range and their accuracy, which permits them,

for instance, to concentrate on strictly military

targets, could conceivably allow them to be used

within the confines of one "theater" of war, say

in Western Europe, without automatically provoking

the massive retaliation with "strategic" weapons

by the Superpower allied to the attacked countries.

The protective Superpower might well be reluctant

to use its strategic arms, for fear of a strategic

counterretaliation. Following this logic, the

European allies get nervous about "decoupling",

and about the American atomic umbrella folding

over their heads. They recognize that the days

when an American President could warm people's

hearts and carry conviction by saying "Ich bin

ein Berliner" are long gone. It is easy to

imagine that America, post-Vietnam, self-concerned

America, might well hesitate to bring down an

atomic war upon its head just for the likes of us.

President Reagan caused an uproar, by saying

something very much like that. It is to reassure

the Europeans, and under the persistent pressure

of the West German Chancellor himself that the

much disputed NATO decision to produce and deploy

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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Pershings and Cruise Missiles was taken. It

certainly doesn't stem from the desire of the

U.S. to start any European wars they might hope

to "win". The deployment of NATO medium range

missiles can only be conceived as a threat to

peace, if it is assumed that the Soviet Union,

not the U.S., might be willing to unleash a

preemptive attack before the missiles are in

place, in order to preserve its present enormous

advantage. But if this is so, the "Appeal" is

knocking on the wrong door.

The concept of "limited" nuclear war is certainly

open to many questions. The Soviet SS20s and their

Western counterparts are still very destructive

things, despite their accuracy. The dynamic

character of all wars suggests it may be very

difficult to prevent escalations. The intermediate

range missiles deployed by the Soviet Union and to

be deployed by NATO are still under the direct

control of the respective Superpowers. One wonders

therefore, why the Soviet Union, for instance,

would shoot back at the Western European launching

pad rather than at the missile's mother country.

This brings us back to global strategic deterrence,

which means that producing and installing the new

weaponry could be a waste. On the other hand these

weapons may, for all I know, be worth every penny

spent on them if, everything considered, they

provide a "credible deterrent"; credible not

primarily to you and me but to the strategists

in the Kremlin. © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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The NATO plan to counterbalance the Soviet armoury

at a certain level does not increase the risk

of war. One may argue that it is superfluous,

but not that it is damaging to a balance which

it is in fact intended to reestablish. The other

wrong impression conveyed by the tone of the

"Appeal" is that the new weapons, by being techno­

logically more advanced must also be even more

inhuman than their cruder forerunners. It is

hard to see why more accurate, and therefore

less wantonly destructive weapons should be

humanly more repulsive and morally more objectionable

than technically less sophisticated arms which are

only capable of indiscriminate destruction on a vast

scale.

"The recent decision of the Reagan admini­ stration to build the neutron bomb has only unleashed additional revulsion and opposition".

The fact is undoubtedly true. The question to ask

is whether the reaction was justified. what

was said about the relative 'moral' merits of the

technologically more advanced against the more

indiscriminate weapons also applies to the neutron

Bomb. It must be because people are accustommed

to exponential growth in all fields that they

automatically assume that a new Bomb must be

even more horrible than an old Bomb. In fact

the neutron Bomb is much more precise in its

scope and much less destructive in its effects

than the older devices. While capable of killing

people by direct radiation, the heat and blast

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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it produces and the radioactive fallout it leaves

behind is greatly reduced by comparison to nuclear

warheads as we have had them so far. Used against

a massive tank formation, for instance, it would

stop the advance by killing the crews without

ravaging and poisoning vast stretches of possibly

densely populated country. This is surely less

rather than more sinister than letting everything

go up in one great mushroom. The revulsion would

have been justified if the choice were not between

one Bomb and another but between a Bomb and no

Bomb. Neatly separated by four paragraphs from

this first evocation of (largely misunderstood)

nuclear horror, the "Appeal" takes a more so­

phisticated approach to the neutron Bomb.

"... the neutron bomb (is) a weapon which is supposed to make atomic war "thinkable"."

This is presumably just because it is less

destructive. But what does "making atomic war

' thinkable mean ? The implication seems to

be that the introduction of the neutron Bomb

is evidence of an intention to conduct a limited

nuclear war, suddenly made possible by technology.

This is not at all the same as the fact that

a deterrent can only do its job, to deterr and

prevent a war, if the adversary knows that one

is able and if driven to it willing to use it.

The "Appeal" is unfair if it suggests, however

indirectly, that those responsible for introducing

the neutron Bomb are actually eager to use it. It

does however raise the legitimate question : what is

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The problem is posed by the great imbalance of

conventional forces in Europe. Warsaw Pact

Divisions outnumber NATO Divisions in Northern

and Central Europe by more than 2 to 1 and the

Warsaw Pact has almost three times as many tanks

in this area as the Western Alliance. This

strength is enhanced by geography -the lack of

depth of Western Europe, poor communication lines,

etc.1 The Soviet Union has consistently maintained

and increased the strength of its (nuclear and

conventional) forces since World War II, through

cold war, detente and after. One wonders why.

It is true that these armies came in handy when

people who didn't know their own good started

trouble in places like Budapest, or Prague.

But surely a military apparatus of such magnitude,

maintained at enormous expense, can hardly be

justified by police duties alone.

The moment American monopoly and then even

American superiority in nuclear arms was gone,

the moment that is that the Soviet Union was

capable of retaliatory strikes against the United

States itself, the strategic nuclear deterrent

was seen to offer insufficient protection against

the conventional military strength of the Soviet

Union. This has led to attempts since the 1950's

to develop "tactical" or "battlefield" nuclear

weapons able to make up for the relative weak­

ness of NATO's conventional forces. The neutron

Bomb is the first such device which can be plausibly

expected not to have such disastrous side effects

1. See T h e M i l i t a r y B a l a n c e 1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 1 , The I n t e r n a t i o n a l Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1980

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on the countryside and the civilian population

as to make it usable at all. In this sense,

the authors of the "Appeal" are right when they

say that the neutron Bomb is "supposed to make

nuclear war thinkable". The asymetry of the

means, "nuclear" versus "conventional" power,

makes it hard to determine the real worth of

"tactical" nuclear weapons. Nuclear is nuclear,

however qualified.

"If the neutron bomb were ever to be used in Europe or anywhere else in the world, it could open up an age of

unlimited atomic wars. Pershing II's, Cruise missiles and neutron bombs on European soil could not only unleash an

atomic war here. We believe that such a conflict would quickly escalate and turn the entire northern hemisphere into a nuclear wasteland."

Well, it could. The question is, do these arms provide a

plausible enough disincentive to discourage actions which

-might necessitate their use. What are the alternatives ?

The alternative to "tactical" nuclear arms is an extensive

European conventional rearmament, despite the heavy economic

and political burden it would place on the countries

of Western Europe or a major reduction of Soviet

conventional forces, which does not look very

likely.

In any case, neither possibility is envisaged in

the "Appeal".

"As West Berliners living in the West but surrounded by the East we have

had the privilege of experiencing first hand the benefits of détente. We believe from the results of this experience that only a policy of deepening East-West

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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dialogue and understanding -not weapons superiority- can provide a working framework for peace"

This is one of the strangest paragraphs in the

whole document. No doubt West Berlin was parti­

cularly sensitive to whatever advantages détente

had to offer, in terms of economic, cultural

and human exchanges. Trade is a good thing and

if both sides profit it doesn't necessarily matter

who gets the better deal. The possibility of

visiting tante Hannah in what used to be called

Chemnitz might even in itself be worth the vast

transfers of technology and credit from wTest to

East. But having established links of this nature,

who has the greatest interest in maintaining them,

who can least afford to pick a fight, the lender

or the borrower ? Who was it then who killed

détente ? Again we find our "Appeal" knocking

on the wrong door.

Was it the American people who made a spitoon

out of the third basket (human rights, rather

than guns or butter) of the Helsinki Accord ?

Was it the American government that subjected

to psychiatric treatment people who checked

whether the stipulations of this crowning Act

of détente were observed ? Every face has only

two cheeks to offer to the bully, no more.

Never mind the Horn of Africa, Angola, etc.,

which may plausibly be put down as "power struggles",

indirect confrontations between Superpowers,

where the lines of demarcation were not hard

and fast. It is nevertheless worth noting that

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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in the period of détente any advance of American

influence, such as the turning around of Egypt,

was obtained by peaceful means, whereas the gains

of Soviet interest were obtained by military

violence. But what possible overarching conflict

can be cited as an explanation for the invasion

of Afghanistan ?

"West Berliners living in the West but surrounded by the East"

also seem to have short memories. Who was it

who blocaded them, and who by contrast set up

airbridges to keep them alive and in the West ?

Unless they do not care to be in the West, but

that is not what they say.

A recipe for détente : first build a wall, than

open a tiny opening, provide it with a pay gate,

make a point of making the gate work capriciously

and call it progress. If someone bangs his fist

in frustration, call him a bloodthirsty fascist.

Yes, indeed let us deepen East-West dialogue and

understanding. But the authors of the "Appeal"

seem to have taken as a model the later dialogues

of Plato in which one of the interlocutors says

nothing other than "Yes, Socrates", "Quite so,

Socrates", "It would be hard to quarel with what

you say, Socrates".

Of course discussion is invaluable to peace.

It is undoubtedly a necessary condition. But

hardly a sufficient one. Or do we have a case

of "tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner" ?.

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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20

The next paragraph is indeed one of deep though

selective empathy.

"The people of the Soviet Union have never forgotten the invasion of their country by Germany during the Second World War. More than 20 million Russians died as a result of the war. Like all of us in the West the Soviet people are deeply afraid of a coming nuclear war. And now intermediate range missiles, able to reach Moscow in less than five minutes, are to be deployed in the Federal Republic!"

Here is the contrast to "the Reagan Administration" :

"the people of the Soviet Union". People good,

Government bad. The list of peoples who have

never forgotten the invasion of their country

by Germany would be long indeed. Most of them,

unlike the Soviet Union never even dreamt of

signing a pact with Hitler in order to gobble up

their smaller neighbours undisturbed.1 If, indeed,

one can find fault with these countries, it is

that they let the bully get away with bloody

murder, literally, in order to secure "peace in

their time". We know how well they succeeded.

The memory of German occupation has not prevented

these other countries from creating close bonds

of cooperation and friendship with post-war Germany.

What is it that puts the Soviet People in a class

apart ? Apparently the size of their sufferings.

No one denies the enormous sacrifices made by

the Soviet Union in the War. But what is this

l.The Hitler— Stalin pact was concluded on Aug.23,1939. Poland was partitioned in September of that year. The present Eastern border of Poland is little different frpm the Molotov-von Ribentropp line resulting from that pièce of European Cooperation. Letonia Estonia and Lithuania lost the last vestiges of independence.in 1940. Finland, because of it valorous resistance had to surrender only parts of its territory to the Soviet Union, in the same year. It was also the year of the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia a n d “the Bukovina at the expense of Romania. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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gruesome body count ? Above a certain number

of war victims a people cannot but be mistrustful

of the Germans, below that level it is likely

to be its friend and ally ? It is of course

nothing but the adoption of the propagandistic

Soviet view of World War II as of the "Great

Patriotic War". It involves no disrespect to

the great Soviet contribution to that World War

to say that it is grossly insensitive for German

intellectuals to adopt that view in an Appeal

to a people that has lost thousands of good men

fighting for the liberation of Europe from the

Nazis. Furthermore, the breastbeating and concern

about the presumed Soviet sensibility towards

"l'éternelle Allemagne" might perhaps pass, if

one were speaking of German defence alone. But

it is Western European defense we are talking

about. It is simply callous to associate other

peoples with a historical burden which weighs

on Germany alone. It is also useful to remember

that whatever the Soviet people may remember

or may not be allowed to forget about German

agression, the Soviet leadership did not hesitate

for a moment to send in German troops, Saxon

and Prussian goosestepping troops, to crush the

Spring of Prague, thus redoubling the horror

of the Checoslovaks.

We are indeed all deeply afraid of a coming nuclear

war. Which is why we want to make sure that all

of us are sufficiently afraid not to start one.

The medium range missiles to be deployed in Western

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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22

Europe will be able to reach Moscow in five minutes.

The Soviet Union already has such missiles, capable

of reaching London in about the same time, give

or take a minute, and that might not go down too

well with those who remember the Blitz, whether

the rocket is fired in Mecklenburg or in Minsk,

or for that matter in Kant's native city of

Kaliningrad.

The implied concommittant of a presumed Soviet

fear of medium range nuclear weapons based in

Germany is that by the same token Germany would

be primary target of Soviet nuclear attack.

This may well be true, but it is a great illusion

to think that only countries equipped with nuclear

arms will be subject to nuclear attack. Witness

the angry letter of a Swedish woman to Leonid

Brezhnev, which was in the papers not long ago,

in which she expresses the most bitter disillusionment,

that despite all the statements to the contrary, the

Soviet Union did train nuclear weapons on non­

nuclear, neutral Sweden as evidenced in the cargo

of the "whisky" class submarine that got stranded

on the Swedish shore.

"Euroshima no I" is a slogan seen on the walls

of many European cities and expresses an under­

standable fear, but it misses a central point

of its own allusion : That the U.S. could only

afford to drop the Bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki

because the Japanese had nothing of the sort

to throw back at them.

Germany's geographic position and its importance

as an industrial power expose it to particular

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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dangers. If, as the authors of the "Appeal"

suggest we also consider a "sale Boshe" view

of Germans as prevailing in the Soviet Union,

it is difficult to see that Germany would be

spared in the case of armed conflict, whether

American missiles are stationed on its soil or

not.

"WHO CAN SERIOUSLY BELIEVE THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES IN EUROPE WILL STRENGTHEN THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE ?"

In view of what was said before, the answer to

the rhetorical question is : a lot of thoughtful,

informed and peaceloving people. Given the

problematic nature of the concept of deterrence

I am not myself certain that the production and

deployment of these missiles is in fact necessary.

I would much prefer to be certain in a matter

involving enormous amounts of money and giving

rise to great political risks. But I am not.

What is certain is that the Western medium range

missiles do not bring any additional threats to

peace, if it isn't through the emotional and

unreasoned reactions to them in the West.

"West Germany already has the highest density of atomic weapons per square mile of any country in the world. Within this powder-keg environment which is our home, the Reagan admi­ nistration is taking steps to place the neutron bomb, ...

All this sounds very dramatic, as in many ways

it is. Increasing the possibility of accidents

is a matter for concern. But one can easily

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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24

the same kind of absurdity as the endless race

for quantitative nuclear superiority. Here we

have the bizzare case of "overkill" in reverse.

Germans, like other people, can only die once.

"WE ALONG WITH MILLIONS OF OTHER EUROPEAN CITIZENS, WILL NEVER ACCEPT ADDITIONAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE."

Why just "additional" nuclear weapons ? Is it

so important for the maintenance of peace that

the enormous Soviet advantage be maintained ?

This partisan view becomes cynical in the next

paragraph.

"The present American arms build-up is creating fear. Fear leads to hate and not to respect. The United States will be respected, if it respects the

integrity and independence 'of its Allies and it treats all peoples of

the world as having equal rights. It will be respected, if it shows genuine willingness to negotiate."

The American build-up creates fear. The Soviet

build-up, which it is meant to answer, relent­

lessly and coldbloodedly pursued all through

détente presumably confers a feeling of

security and repose. There is no need to treat

the Macchiavellian point about whether a Prince

should seek to be loved or to be feared. The

important thing is to see that the authors of

the "Appeal" invariably construe American

strength as a menace, Soviet strength, by

implication, as necessary for the defence of

a much abused people whereas the only proper

Western European posture for assuring peace is

in their view that of the dog lying on its

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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back hoping that the canine nature of its adversary

will then prevent him from tearing out its throat.

But how bigotted does one have to be to lecture

the American people on the respect of the integrity

and independence of its Allies in the midst of

the Polish crisis ? Certainly the American

presence in Europe is not alien to American in­

terests. But it does not seem to have occured

to the signatories of the "Appeal" that the

American people and the U.S. Government would

only be too glad if the Europeans themselves

were able and willing to take up the slack of

their own defence. Independence is all very

well. But Sweden and France for instance or

even Switzerland are armed to the teeth.

The flagrant disrespect of the Soviet Union for

the integrity and independence of its Allies,

of which the direct interventions in Hungary,

Checoslovakia, etc. are but the most explicit

manifestations, have not endangered peace in

Europe. The Soviet Union has been able to get

its way with impunity because of the pragmatic

understanding which mistakenly goes under the

name of Yalta. As a formula for the avoidance

of war, though not for the advancement of justice

or the respect for equal rights of the peoples

in the world, the understanding has worked.

But I do not think that this is the kind of

East-West understanding the authors of the

"Appeal" had in mind.

Willingness to negotiate "must entail readiness

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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26

December 1979 decision of NATO was a double

decision : to ask the Soviet Union to dismantle

medium range weapons, targeted on Europe or,

in the case of refusal, to produce and deploy

their counterparts. Again later, and now again

President Reagan proposed what is known as the

"zero option".

To say that the proposal was made as a propaganda

gesture in the knowledge that the Soviet Union

would reject it, is to beg the question of the

Soviet readiness to disarm. The "Appeal" having

been issued in September 1981 could not have

considered the offers of the zero option. I

doubt that it would have made much difference.

We have to complete the sentence. In the view

of the writers of the "Appeal" willingness to

negotiate must entail readiness to disarm uni-

lateraly.

Qui desiderat pacem praeparat bellum. It has

become quite fashionable to play on this maxim

of ancient prudence and to say instead that if

you desire peace, prepare peace. It is a catchy

phrase which has the sound of common sense.

But what does it mean ? Peace can be maintained

when it exists and it can be established after

a war. But how can it be prepared ? Peace,

like liberty, is not a thing that can be obtained

once and for all, a harbour that can be reached

if only one steers in the right direction and

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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and overcomes the seamonsters. Maintaining peace

is more like keeping the ship on an even keel

under changing circumstances. It requires constant

and repeated efforts, difficult adjustments,

laborious and mostly tedious negotiations occasionally

leavened by acts of imaginative statesmanship.

But none of these is incompatible with being

prepared for war. On the contrary.

There is no system of international relations

that can exclude the possibility of armed conflict.

Isaiah is often quoted to the contrary, but the

relevant passage is rarely quoted in full. It is

not just that such things as beating swords into

plowshares will come to pass "in the last days"

and not before. Such things, shall only be possible

because the Lord "shall judge the nations and

shall rebuke many people". I doubt that Isaiah

was prophesying the coming of Dr. Waldheim.

Therefore, providing for the common defence remains

a necessary task of government. Determining

exactly what constitutes adequate provision for

the common defence is a different matter.

Obviously, decisions about armaments, troops,

supplies etc. like all political decisions, are

not taken in a disinterested vacuum, dans le

silence des passions. What is often erroneously

concluded from this fact is that such decisions

are nothing but a reflection of particular

interests. But firstly, though interests influence,

they do not determine courses of action and

secondly the interests of even very small groups

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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2 8

the same direction. Furthermore any identifiable

interest competes against other countervailing

interests as it seeks to influence public policy.

Finally, in some countries, though not in others,

those who take the decisions are answerable to

the public that put them in and which can vote

them out.

Such considerations notwithstanding, conspiracy

theories abound. Wars are not seen to result

from irréconciliable differences between countries,

from conflicting interests, widely differing

views of the world and poor defences against

the desires for domination.'and agrandizement,

but from the perfidious machinations

of sinister men who can manipulate their people

into "using their creative potential for war".

Such theories channel frustration about the

complexity of an imperfect world into a

psychologically more manageable hatred of the

alleged culprits. They also hold out the illusory

but attractive prospect of a concommitant "if only"

theory. The maintenance of peace need not be the

sisyphian task it is, "if only" one got rid of

whoever is always kicking the stone back down

the hill. The "Appeal", in fairness, does not

go that far. But it raises the question why

the American people alone is admonished to wield

the hammer while the Soviet Union is busily beating its

sickle into a scythe of death.

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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-r.r :■.'■ $ % '. cûiand. Finland or way? !' - ■ É f c tSiSs s Poland '*sbS‘- /Hung, Yugo..Romania^, M o n a c A ndo rra Turkey

their striking range in of SS-20 medium-range missiles

A schematic representation of Soviet deployment Europe and beyond.

and

Gre enland

(Den.)

—US Department of Defense.

o © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research

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© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(37)

Newly I n d u s t r i a l i z e d Countries No. 2: Joseph H.H. WEILER : Supranational!'sm R e v is it e d -

Retrospe ctive and Prospective The European Communities A fte r T h i r t y Years

No. 3: Aldo RUSH CHINI : S e a s o n a lit y in E u ro d o lla r I n t e r e s t Rates

No. 4: Mauro CAPPELLETTI/

David GOLAY : J u d ic ia l Review, T ransnational and Federal: I t s Impact on In t e g r a t io n

No. 5 : Leonard GLESKE : The European Monetary System - Present S it u a t io n and Future Prospects

No. 6: Manfred HINZ : Massenkult und Todessymbolik in der n a t i o n a l s o z i a l i s t i s c h e n A r c h it e k t u r

No. 7: Wilhelm BORKLIN ; The "Greens" and the New P o l i t i c s Goodbye to the Three-Party System No. 8: Athanasios MOULAKIS : U n ila t e r a lis m or the Shadow of

Confusion © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research

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© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

(39)

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research

(40)

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