Dottorato di ricerca in Scienze Politiche
Political Science Faculty, Geopolitics and International Relations Section
The New Patterns of War in the 21st Century: The War in Syria
as a Case Study
Candidato
Supervisore
Ringraziamenti
To all my family, friends and professors يتذتاسا و يقافرو يلهأ لك ىلا
Perla mia famiglia, amici e professori
Index
Introduction
Chapter One
Wars and New Wars in International Relations and Security Studies
Introduction 1-Definition of war
1.1
Realism and the Definition of War 1.1.1-Historical Realism1.1.2-Carl von Clausewitz Definition of War 1.1.3-New realism
1.1.4-Structural anarchy self-help
1.2
Liberalism and War1.3
Neoliberalism and war1.4
Constructivism and War1.5
The Lockean Culture of Anarchy and Predominance of Rivalry1.6
Marxist Definition of War1.7
Geopolitics and War1.8
Schmidt and war1.9
Geopolitical and Geostrategic in War science changes after the Cold War 2-War and Power in the 21th Century3-New wars Definition 3.1-Asymmetric Warfare
3.3-Future of the new patterns of war, From 4th Generation to Hybrid1 3.4-Hybrid Warfare
3.5-Islamic State Organization as a Prototype 3.6-Cyber Warfare
3.7-New Wars: Into the Sixth Generation?
4-Debate about new wars in IR
4.1 New Wars or Civil Wars Between Constructivism and Neorealism
4.2 The ideology of cosmopolitanism in old wars and the absence of this trend in new wars Conclusion
Chapter Two
International Relations Theories applied to the Middle East Introduction
1-Complex Realism 1.1 Axis Policy
1.2 Reworking the relationship between regional and international politics 1.3 The United States of America equation in the Middle East
1.4 Rebalancing the regional level, Israel and GCC 1.5 Regional Crisis Management
1.6 Competing for regional security issues.
2-International Relations in the Arabic Region
2.1 The Arab Regional System: The Characteristics of Common Formation 2.2 The state in the Arab regional system of sovereignty
2.2.1-The problem of moving from "old royal" to the "modern state."
2.2.2-The modern state phenomenon in the historical and political awareness of the Arab world 2.3 The Colonial shape of the Arab State Economy
2.4 Chronic Problems in Arab State Building
2.5 The problem of accepting the state in its political terms 2.6 Complex Identities
2.7 Maps Drawing
2.8 The problem of leadership 2.9 Triangle of crises
2.9.1-First: the crisis of the regime 2.9.2-Second: the crisis of society 2.9.3-Third: the state crisis
3-International Relations in Syria 3.1-The French Occupation
3.2-The Transitional period 3.3-The United Arab Republic 3.4-Syria 's Baath Rule 1963 3.5- New Syria: Regional power 3.6 Bashar Al Assad
3.6.1-Easy Power Transition
3.6.2-Al Dardary Neo-liberalism: 2006-2010
3.6.3-That Economic liberalization with no Political Reform
Chapter Three
War in Syria 2011-2017
Introduction 2010-2011 1- Chronology of the War in Syria 1.1 Early phase
1.2-Military Phases 1.3-Political phases
2-Actors on the Ground
2.1 Pro-Syrian Government –State and non-state actors Definition 2.1.1 Goals
2.1.2 Strategy
2.2 Opposition Forces -State and non-state actors Definition 2.2.1 Goals
2.2.2 Strategy
3- Conclusion Conclusions
Introduction
The research focuses on the current war in Syria, from the early months of 2011 up to the events of late 2017, and assess if and how the conflict does fit within the categories of armed conflicts elaborated so far by the main theories of international relations and strategic studies, in particular those concerning the so called “New Wars”. Moreover, the research would assess if the conflict in Syria has introduced new elements to the scientific debate.
The relevance of the topic stems from the strategic impact that the war in Syria has had so far to the international and Middle East security as well as on the scientific debate about the effectiveness of categories like “hybrid wars”, “asymmetric wars”, “proxy wars”, or more traditional inter-state wars to describe the current conflict. As a matter of fact, the analytical challenge is that the conflict in Syria is featuring all the elements of these categories at the very same time and space.
However, so far any comprehensive study has brought all these elements into a cohesive analysis whereas, while events are still unfolding, they mostly focused on single issues and topics, like jihadi groups and warfare, state and non-state armed groups, international military interventions or diplomacy. Moreover, most of these studies suffer from dramatic shortage of local sources on the events and, more troubling, Arab-authored analysis, arguably, those that are the most concerned by the conflict in Syria. As such, the research will try to fill two interrelated gaps in the literature: the gap between theoretical studies on war and those focused on the conflict in Syria; the gap between those scientific and policy-oriented studies elaborated in Europe and North America and those elaborated in the Arab world.
As for the methodology, the research is firmly set within the scientific debate about the “New Wars”, which has developed after the end of the Cold War mainly within the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies. By reviewing the main trends and theories, and comparing them with the literature on Middle East security, the research
will highlight the points of convergence and divergence between the more generalist studies and the peculiarities of “area studies”. Hence, the research reviews the features of the conflict in Syria from early 2011 to late 2017 by collecting and assessing the goals, strategies and results achieved by the main actors involved. As for this point, the research collects and analyses the works by Arab analysts and researchers in order to compare them and integrate with the studies by Europeans and North American scholars. Finally, it compares the literature on New Wars and Middle East Security with the case-study of the conflict in Syria in order to assess if and how scientific literature has proved suitable to analyze it and, in turn, how the Syrian case-study might provide new elements to update and improve the understanding of current, and likely future, warfare practices.
The body of the thesis contains three main chapters, the first chapter provides an analysis of the scientific literature regarding the different approaches and schools in the theory of international relations. More specifically, the different explanations for the phenomenon of war, which has been a major issue for international relations: what is war and what is not; and if it is war when is it legitimate and when it is not; what is the role of the international order in the process of war, One of the major reasons for the transformation of the Syrian war is the new world order.
The second chapter reviews the scientific literature on foreign policy and war within the Middle East region: decision-making processes, alliances, regrouping and axis. Then, it moves to studying the creation of the modern Syrian state, focusing on its structures and their development in the XXth century up to 2011.
The third, final chapter represents the core of the thesis, namely a theoretical analysis of the most important actors (state and non-state): their goals, strategies and policies, by reviewing the related scientific studies, social media pages, official, governmental statements, as well as by making use of data collected during the several research missions on the field, and especially from research centers in Damascus.
Here, personal interviews have also been made with Syrian policy makers or figures that have direct contact with the decision making process in Syria. These data have provided the thesis with an extra advantage in understanding and assessing the fast-changing and fragmented situation on the ground.
Chapter One
Wars and New Wars in International Relations and Security Studies
Introduction
War has been a continuous pattern of interaction between and within nations and other political units for thousands of years. It is the most disastrous human behavior that has caused millions of causalities, economic destruction, resources lost and social and cultural devastation. War has been one of the major reasons for creating or ending states and vice versa. From times of ancient empires to the near modern states, war has always played a key role in economic, military and social levels.
A study based on information from the Correlates of War Project database1 (which the authors of "Resort to War 2" David Singer, Meredith Sarkis and Frank Wayman based their analysis - the complementary part of the classic work of policy-makers Melvin Small and David Singer3 Resort to Arms, both books analyzed war data during the 19th and 20th century), data showed that there were 655 wars in the world, including 335 Intra-State wars, 62 Non-State wars, 163 Extra-State wars and 95 Inter-State wars. The rate of outbreak of wars was 3.4 wars per year and there were only 12 years where wars totally disappeared.
Much of the academic debate between schools of thought in the field of international relations throughout the 20th century (and perhaps throughout history) revolves around this phenomenon, about the increased probability of its occurrence, and about its decline and scarcity. Beginning
1 COW War Data, 1816 - 2007 (v4.0), http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war, Sarkees, Meredith Reid and
Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press.
2 Meredith Sarkees and Frank Wayman (eds.): "Resort to War 1816-2007". (Washington D. C.: CQ Press, 2010), pp.
451-477, 562
3 Small, Melvin and J. David Singer. Resort to Arms: International and Civil War,1816–1980. Beverly Hills, CA:
with British Edward Hallet Carr and his book Twenty Years Crisis4 and around his arguments from the Marxist to Morgenthau and his book Politics Among Nations5, discussing international world order after the second world war. Kenneth Waltz in his "Man, State and War" tried to propone an explanation to War phenomena, in the context of IR.
The aim of this chapter is a profound analysis of war and new war definitions in the International Relations arena, with diverse political scientists from all points of view with different schools of orientation, the world is now witnessing a new international order with Russia and China breaking the unipolarity the world witnessed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Cold War is over and new types of war (or at least they seem new) are now emerging from Proxy to Cyber War.
Definition of War
Definition of war is a very complicated scientific debate if we take differences between scholars and their priorities, maybe not only in the process of defining war, but the study of war in general. In international relations, the three main theories have some details in common about how and what is the definition of war. We must focus on the influence of war in international relations for us to understand how to have a clear war definition or to be more accurate to understand war.
The need to study war is not the result of this age, nor the one that preceded it, but as old as the age of war itself. It dates back "at least" to the 4th century BC, when the first cities began to form and with it, their armies in Mesopotamia. Since then, many have written about the war and been in it, east and west, starting with the Chinese writer Sun Tzu (544-496 BC), who in 13 chapters of his book "The Art of War" presented the issue of indirect military strategy, deception and circumvention of the enemy.
4 E. H. Carr: “The Twenty Years Crisis: An Introduction to International Relations”.(London: Palgrave, 2001). 5 Hans Morgenthau: Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973).
On the contrary, war is a matter of life and death, and it is the road to safety, or destruction, and therefore it is a subject worthy of investigation and investigation, and cannot be ignored by any means "(Sun Tzu: The Art of War)6
These first acts of war can be seen as the first group writings, most of which are characterized by the analyzing of historical war models, rather than the analysis and planning of these wars. The writings of the second regiment, as we have seen, reached us with the formation of comprehensive armies and the emergence of classical military strategy theorists in the war field of study.
Arab literature about war has contributed to this field of war. Perhaps Omar bin Ibrahim al-Ansari author of the book "Resolving Problems in the Management of Wars", written during the reign of the Mamluk Sultan Faraj ibn Barqouq7 (1399-1411), as a manual in preparation for war and how to win it, Jacques Hippolyte (1743-1790), wrote about the great national armies and the idea of the "citizen-soldier" in an essay on military tactics and the definition of war8.
Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) was the "god of war," as Carl von Clausewitz called him9; he worked so hard to develop the art of maneuvering in war to win a stronger enemy by focusing on his weaknesses10. Also, Antoine de Jomini (1779-1869), who insisted on the importance of focusing forces on crucial points and logistics in the context of his view in his book, "Summary in the Art of War" of "Rational War.11"
In fact, there is no limit to those who wrote about war, but we are not basing our analysis on these writers, but rather we will be setting a historical background for war science, and more
6 GILES,LIONEL The Art of War by Sun Tzu – Special Edition. Special Edition Books. 2007. p. 61
7 Umar Ibn Ibrahim al-Awsi Al-Ansari,Tafrij Al Korob Fi Tadbeer Al Horob, Edited and translated by George T.
Scanlon, First published in 1961 by the American University in Cairo Press, This work contains 20 Books about the art of War.
8 Beatrice Heuser: "Guibert (1744-1790): Prophet of Total War?", in Stig Förster & Roger Chickering (eds.): War in
an Age of Revolution: The Wars of American Independence and French Revolution, 1775-1815 (Cambridge
University Press, 2010), pp. 49–67.
9 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Book 1, Chapter 3 10 Idem
11 Jomini, Le Baron de. Précis de l'Art de la Guerre: Des Principales Combinaisons de la Stratégie, de la Grande
specifically for military strategy, not for studies of war. However, until the moment when the issue of war began in many fields, these names could not be ignored when talking about and within the war, especially since they are authentic in this matter, and that they are today a reference to military science is only a retroactive classification.
Until the 19th century, all we knew about war was a series of stories, ideas and partial explanations, which included general points or operational points directly. The first methodological basis in the study of war was only mentioned in the book published by Prussian Clausewitz (1880-1871) under the title "On War". In this book, Clausewitz presents several definitions of war based on his recognition that war intersects with many other sectors, mainly with politics; yet, trade, the military sect, the social dimension and psychological factors also play a role.
All these aspects of war are explained by Clausewitz, emphasizing the idea that war is ultimately a "conflict of will based primarily on violence" or that "war is one of the acts of force to force the enemy to carry out our will."12. In fact, this is very important. The war, he says, is a "form of social existence" that has many dimensions or aspects, in which war can be defined collectively or separately, but without canceling the essence of this phenomenon: "Violence", "conflict of will" or "adversity". In other words, we can talk about "war as an extension of politics" or "war as strategy and tactics: defense and attack"13, "economic", "social" and "psychological". One of these aspects may be withdrawn or added when a definition of war is given, but in the midst of that, the spirit of war cannot be abolished as a violent force to defeat the enemy.
In the same way as the old writings, the attempts continued, after Clausewitz, in the form of scattered efforts in different fields that were not combined by one common methodology in dealing with the subject of war. We had to wait for the 1940s to see the studies or science of war as a specialized and independent field that combined all these curricula under one roof by the French "sociologist" Gaston Bouthoul (1896-1980). This work is a scientific attempt to analyze
12 Cormier, Youri. War As Paradox: Clausewitz & Hegel on Fighting Doctrines and Ethics, (Montreal & Kingston:
McGill Queen's University Press, 2016) pp. 184-214
and study the problems related to war conflicts, capable of analyzing and "thinking" about the war without demonizing it14.
By studying war's definition there emerges two problems: the first about the concentration on classical war (state vs state war), then the scholarly view of the incapability of finding difference between organized violence and war. Basically, the major difference between international relations major schools is how and why war is waged. Realism school, which we will study further in this chapter, would see the war with necessary means to achieve good political goals. We should pay attention so that the differences between these three schools are not about the ethical engagement as a fundamental part of why we should not go to war. We would also study Marxism and its definition of war as an additional argument to the three schools. For these reasons, it is better to study the authors first, then put it in the right theoretical order by schools of IR.
Hegel's view of the cause of war and peace is part of the realistic school and needs some reflection. He sees the necessity and importance of wars among people. If the 18th century philosophers had defended the need for peace among people, Hegel does not find it absurd to say that war is necessary for the continuation of humanity and must play a large role in the history of creating societies. War moves the lives of people and should not stop because this would make people lazy and restrained. In his eyes, it is evidence of health and integrity of morality and without wars, gradually people would lose the meaning of freedom, and adhere to the material life alone if they would live along without war15.
The definition of war passed a lot of stages in history from Carl van Clausewitz to our recent time, from classical war schools to the new generation ones. From classical inter-state to modern intra-state (also classical according to some scholars). In the traditional definition of war, we can find that it is: an organized conflict which usually lasts for a long time between states or non-governmental entities. Wars are generally characterized by extreme violence, social chaos and an attempt to inflict economic damage between the conflicting parties. War should be understood as a "deliberate, widespread armed conflict between political communities", and thus we can define
14 Gaton Boutoul, La guerra, a Cura di Renato Aimo, con tre Appendici, Guerriglia, Guerra Urbana, Terrorismo,
Armando, Roma, 1975.
15 H. G. Ten Bruggencate. "Hegel's Views on War." The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) 1, no. 1 (1950): 58-60.
war as a "form of violence or political interference". The range of techniques used by warring groups is known as combat. The state of non-war is called peace.
In order to understand war better, we must ask three questions to help us reach our destination: what war is, how can we differentiate it from the non-war (peace state) and what are the conditions for war. War is a "set of negative social processes characterized by the destructive nature of violent conflict". It is an "armed conflict based on the use of armed force by the use of organized armed groups called regular armies and sometimes semi-paramilitary groups". Armed forces use all means to harm the other side in war; military or civilian capabilities. This is done through systematic and planned destruction using military information from the other party collected by the "military intelligence and reconnaissance services16.
If our aim is to explain the causes of war, we must begin with a brief definition of the subject of our inquiry. We define war broadly as sustained, coordinated violence between political organizations. Such a definition includes great power wars like World War I, colonial wars like those fought by the European great powers in Africa and Asia from the eighteenth century to early twentieth century, civil wars like those in the United States in the nineteenth century or in the Congo or in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, 3 organized insurgencies like the one against American forces in the Iraq War, tribal wars among pre - modern societies, and a wide variety of other forms of violence. This definition has several component parts, and it would be useful to examine each of them individually17.
Realism and the Definition of War Historical Realism
In a historical-analytical survey of international conflicts since the Peloponnesian Wars in 400 BC to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Donald Kagan (2003) concludes that war has always been a product of international competition for power, and moreover, sovereign states not only are
16 .فسوي دمحأ ،دلاجلا ديلو دمحم " ".. Retrieved 2014-11-16.
looking for power to enhance their security or for economic gain, but also to strengthen their international prestige. He concludes that the fear of threats, whether near or far, from which it may not be possible to remain safe, is what explains the persistence of the phenomenon of war as a part that does not appear to change from human nature.18
The importance of examining War from a realistic perspective, in terms of what war is or explaining the reasons why countries go to war or even in terms of solutions to mitigate this phenomenon in international relations, stems from the realist paradigm to provide us with a clear and coherent interpretation of the development of the international system, the behavior of states and their possible tendencies towards the use of force to maximize their interests19. On the other hand, in exchange for the capacity to interpret, it appears that realism does not have the same capacity to propose and formulate mechanisms to resolve conflicts and limit the spread of war in the existing international order.20
Thucydides is considered to be of the first writer in the realist tradition with also the title of: founding father of the field of international relations21. Thucydides is the historian of the Peloponnesian wars that took place between the two superpowers of the ancient Greek world (Athens and Sparta). His assumption from studying these wars was that "the strong always do what power can do and the weak accept what must be accepted."22 He is thus the first to draw attention to the element of force as an engine of State behavior in war." What made the war inevitable is the growth of Athenian power and the fear it caused in Sparta:23" Thucydides commenting the reasons for the Peloponnesian wars between Athens and Sparta. Sparta was afraid of losing its role in the Hellenic world as a result of the imbalance of power in favor of Athens, thereby strengthening its military power and recruiting what it could from support by its allies. In turn, Athens responded similarly. Thucydides analyses were not far from conventional
18 Kagan, Donald. (2003). The Peloponnesian War. New York: Viking Press.pp 16-48 19 Idem. p12
20 Of course, here we are trying to put Realism as a school of IR with all its divisions in the same line of thinking,
which is almost impossible due to the great differences between its subdivisions, see
21 Dewald, Carolyn. Thucydides' War Narrative: A Structural Study. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
2006
22 Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. "Political Realism in International Relations". The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
concepts such as armament, deterrence, balance of power, alliances, perception of power and weakness24.
The concentration of Thucydides on fear as a reason for the outbreak of the war between Athens and Sparta makes it easy for us to fall upon other historical cases over the centuries: France and Britain during the 17th and 18th centuries, Napoleonic France and the rest of Europe at the beginning of the 19th century, Germany and Britain after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and the Soviet Union and the United States during the four decades following the end of World War II. In all of these historical examples, fear was the dominant characteristic and the driving factor of arms races and wars in themselves, according to realists25.
Timothy Dunne provided an insightful commentary on the implications of the dialogue between the Athenian invaders and the Spartan Island called Milos in an attempt to ward off the occupation by appealing to the invaders to observe the principles of justice26. He noted that the various realists fully agree with Thucydides in the view that a characteristic of the logic of power is applicable at all times and places. Instead of the Athenians and Milesians, we can simply replace them, for example, by the German Nazis and the citizens of Czechoslovakia in 1939, and the Soviet Union and Hungary in 1956 or Indonesia and East Timor in 1975. In each case, the weaker country had to yield to the stronger state27.
Machiavelli wrote about power, the balance of power, the formation of alliances and anti-alliances, and the causes of wars between various Italian cities. His famous book, The Prince is a practical guide to gaining strength, preserving and expanding it. The reality of the Machiavellian contribution can be inferred through:
- His interest in force.
- His assumption that politics is characterized primarily by the conflict of interests.
24 Dewald, Carolyn. Thucydides' War Narrative: A Structural Study. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
2006
25 Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, by Routledge, Axon,
First Edition 2007.
26 Tim Dunne, Michael Cox, Ken Booth: Empires, Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics, Cambridge University press, 2001, Introduction, PP5-8
- His pessimistic view of human nature: a primary characteristic of war as a part of human natural behavior.
You ought never to suffer your designs to be crossed in order to avoid war, since war is not so to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage.28
This can be inferred by emphasizing the importance of seeing the war as it is, not as it should be, and then calling for a separation of politics and morality. This call is justified in the responsibility of the ruler to ensure the security of his state, and thus become the goal - the security of the state - a justification for any means that can achieve that end, even if it is unethical.
Hobbes has followed Machiavelli's view of power as a decisive factor in human behavior in general, and in states' behavior in particular. In his book, Leviathan, he says: "Man has a permanent desire to possess power, and it vanishes only in his death."29 He also looks pessimistically at human nature; his focus on internal politics based on the need for a strong central authority. The people of the former era of the existence of this power were living "state of nature"30, a situation in which everyone is fighting against everyone. The absence of such central authority, or being too weak to protect individuals, makes each individual self-reliant thus, having enmity against all other individuals.
Hobbes' influence is reflected in the realistic perspective of international relations through this dark vision of individuals in the chaotic state of affairs. This vision can be dropped on relations between states, because states also exist in an anarchic state, where “Leviathan” or the supreme power of order in contemporary realism31, Leviathan is the hegemonic power. In this uncertain void of mistrust and conflict, war becomes inevitable, as there is no trace of morality in the management of relations between states32.
28 Machiavelli Niccolò, The Prince, The Macmillan CO 1913, chapter 3, p.14
29 Leviathan. Revised Edition, eds. A.P. Martinich and Brian Battiste. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2010 30 Idem
31 Harrison, Ross. Hobbes, Locke, and Confusion's Empire: an Examination of Seventeenth-Century Political
Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Carl von Clausewitz’s Definition of War
For the first time in the history of what was written about the war, he was the first to study it as a "phenomenon" from more than one side while emphasizing the centrality of the core of the war in state relation field. Hence, the theoretical status of Clausewitz surpassed all of his predecessors in the study of war, and to a certain extent, also outweighed many of those who followed him in this area33. He created a new approach to the study of war without realizing it at the time, and to this day Clausewitz is misunderstood by placing it on the shelves of the military library only. In practice, however, many war scholars argue that war studies as a specialized and independent knowledge field began with Clausewitz34.
War is a manifestation of politics, or, as the Prussian philosopher would put: a continuation of politics by other means, and "a violent act intended to force the opponent to submit to our will." War on this basis is a tool of policy, which is intended to protect the interests of the belligerent or expand its sphere of influence35.
War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the enemy–to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations... war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started which must lead, in theory, to extremes. This is the first case of interaction and the first ‘extreme’ we meet with.36
33 Christopher Basford in his introduction to the Principles of War, by Clausewitz Translated and edited by Hans W.
Gartzke
34 Idem P4
35 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, On War, MICHAEL HOWARD And PETER PARET, Introduction and Notes by
BEATRICE HEUSER, Oxford New York, Oxford Press University, 2007.P8 Quote: "It is in Clausewitz’s
discussion of the human and social factors of war, not the tactical or technological ones, that one can find the greatest lasting wisdom of Clausewitz’s observations and analysis." Notes b
36 John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic
The political conception of war for Clausewitz represents a revolution on the prevailing perception of war as a satisfactory phenomenon in international relations and that it reflects the collapse of the international order. In contrast, Clausewitz argued that war is a natural feature of international relations and a fundamental mechanism of the functioning of the international system because of its role in the system of balance of power. Clausewitz argues that war is (or must be) a restrictive political act37. The idea is that war is a real political instrument, a continuation of political action by other means. War is not the end of political action, it is for political purposes. Although a military officer, he has always stressed the importance of political control over the armed forces38.
Clausewitz advocates suggest their political conception of war - as a mechanism to reduce conflicts - through two main points: First, as part of the balance of power, they argue that along with the balance of power is a mechanism for preventing wars; the latter is also a good mechanism for maintaining the stability and balance of the international order. Second, as a mechanism for conflict resolution, it can achieve what the balance of power cannot achieve. In this scenario, a combination of the two mechanisms can be realized. Without wars, the balance of power couldn't be maintained in the international system. Also, without the balance of power, the widespread wars would cause chaos. In other words, alliances and arms races may be mechanisms for maintaining the balance of power peacefully (without war), but the failure of these mechanisms makes war a necessary option. The war does not reflect the failure to resolve the conflict and push for change. It may be an unavoidable mechanism for achieving this. This is the essence of the political conception of war in the classic realists (primarily Clausewitz).39 Morgenthau has overshadowed the theory of realism both classical and new. Morgenthau's work remains the main reference to the criticisms that other scholars in Liberalism and even Neorealism make. For the Morgenthau theory of realism, there are six basic principles: Political relations are governed by objective rules deeply embedded in human nature, political actors or leaders think and act according to the concept of national interest corresponding to power, so that
37 W. B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Angles and Tolstoy, Cambridge University
Press, 1978
38 Ken Booth, Realism and World Politics, First Edition Routledge, 2011, PP 26-27 39 Idem 50-80
interest becomes the core of politics, and thus war can be defined as "the struggle for power". In a world in which nations compete for power, each country is driven to protect its physical, political and cultural survival against other nations, mainly by war40.
Nation-states, in pursuit of their national interest, are not governed by the same moral principles that govern the personal relations of individuals. Political realism does not match the moral aspirations of a country with the moral laws that are supposed to be governing the world41. Emphasizing the independence of the political field from the other fields, and therefore the need to resort to war acts to basically achieve political criteria, Morgenthau says: "The economist asks: How does a policy affect the well-being of society?" The lawyer asks: "To what extent does a war agree with the rules of law?"42. Morgenthau asserts that politics of war is a realistic perspective that seeks either to collect, preserve, increase or memorize power, depending on the nature of that policy: the policy-quo policy, imperialistic policy, or prestige policy. He also believes that the balance of power policy is the most effective technique for managing war in a chaotic international system based on competitive and adversarial relations between international units.43
Morgenthau traces the cause of states' "perverse" behavior in waging war to the dark human nature governed by the instinct of power, the love of domination and hegemony, where this aggressive nature increases when it moves from one individual to the state level, as a result of its ability to mobilize and use its material resources to harm other states. Morgenthau, to support his position, namely that the evil of man [and hence the state] is "an insurmountable tendency", Morgenthau believes that the [evil] forces inherent in human nature are the cause of international conflicts, and that the conflicting interests of individuals or nations make the world an inappropriate place to embody ethical principles. Thus, the most effective means of avoiding wars and acts of aggression is to shape the balance of power, which discourages countries from resorting to fighting each other and thus maintaining the stability of the international system44.
40 Hans Morgenthau: "Politics among Nations". (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 11-35 41 Idem
42 Ahmad Abu Zaid, War in International Relations: Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, Al Naqed, First
Edition V1, 2017, P1-27
43 Idem P35-37
New realism
Neorealism is a new extension of classical realism. It remains conservative on the assumption that power is a major variable in international politics, although it exists as an inevitable and necessary component of a political relationship, rather than as an end. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Theory of International Politics" 197945 and "Man, the State and War" 1959 is the pioneer of new realists46.
While classical realism focuses on the human nature of the interpretation of international relations (and the phenomenon of international wars in particular), the new realism focuses more on the structure of the international system as a form of political relations between its various units47. According to Waltz, the term “structure” refers to the way in which various parts of the system are organized. If the structure of the national system is essentially a hierarchical structure where the internal units are placed in an official differentiation according to their degree of authority or function48.
The structure of the international system in turn is anarchical. Where the international units are placed according to a vertical relationship, and thanks to the nature of this structure, international units find themselves, in a self-help situation, in need of self-reliance and arrangements to ensure their survival and improve their security situation49.
Waltz's war can be seen in three levels: first is that war happens because of human nature, second it occurs because of the nature of the state, whether democratic or not, and the third level or image is concerned about war and international politics as separate political spheres positioned
45 Kenneth Waltz: “The Theory of International Politics”. (Reading: Mass; Addison-Wesley, 1979).
46 Kenneth Waltz: “Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis”. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1959).
47 Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein, and Jay Shafritz: Classic Readings of International Relations, Fort Worth;
Texas: Harcourt Brace College, 1999,p 217
48 David Singer, The Level of Analysis Problem in World Politics, World Politics, Vol. 14, No.1 1961, PP 76-93 and
Review International Conflict, Three Levels of Analysis, World Politics, Vol. 12, no. 3, 1960, PP. 452-462
by pressure and constraints exercised by the international construction of the system, and the differences in power between states.50
Kenneth Waltz's neo-realistic introduction to the debate has dominated the theoretical field of international relations since the early 1980s. Much of this discussion has gone to the boundary between the level of analysis of the structure and the nature of the international system and the level of analysis of the system's subdivision [international unit].51 For Waltz, he focused his theoretical efforts on the level of analysis of the international system, as opposed to neglecting the role of international units and the influence of international unit structures themselves on international behavior models.52
Waltz enriched Morgenthau's realist theory by trying to respond to criticism that accused realism of neglecting positive international interactions and cooperative gains among nations53, as well as neglecting the growing interdependence of the international system. Waltz made a serious attempt to refine classical realism, but he still recognized the metaphysical outlook of the international system, where the normal state of relations between states is assumed to be the state of war54. The structure of the international system leads to the creation of what he calls the insecurity dilemma and drives states to worry about their security. This formulation indicates an interactive bi-directional relationship between the chaotic structure of the international system and the fact that international units are self-help units to protect their security from the threats of other units; in other words, the anarchic structure of the international system increases the self-reliance of states; the latter exacerbates the first55.
Structural anarchy self-help
50 Idem PP 5-9
51 Kenneth Waltz: “The Theory of International Politics”. (Reading: Mass; Addison-Wesley, 1979). PP. 15-17 52 Idem 20
53 Idem p.23
54 Waltz, Theory of International Relations, p. 105; Joseph Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, Cornell University
Press, 1990, pp. 39-51; and Robert O. Keohane, Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, , 1992, pp. 9-18.
55 Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,
This is the essence of the new realism theory, or more precisely the structural realism. It should be emphasized that Waltz's theory was a qualitative response - essentially - to the requirements of the behavioral revolution that accompanied most of the fields of social knowledge, including the field of international relations as a branch of political science. Waltz, along with other neo-realists, worked on the theory of realism on the social-empirical path of social studies by shifting the real attention from dark human nature (as an interpretation of international conflicts) to the chaotic structure of the international system in putting nations in the dilemma of insecurity: a state of constant readiness to fight wars in order to preserve its security.56
The realistic/neo realistic assumption is that war is a ceaseless and permanent feature of international relations, based on the approach of the security dilemma presented in war that countries face constantly57: a structural concept of the anarchic formula of the international order, as well as states' reliance on themselves to preserve their national security. States, because of the chaos in the international system and therefore tending more on self-reliance, are taking measures to enhance their security which results eventually in wars.
Apart from being defensive or offensive, other states interpret such actions as a potential threat to their internal security. The constant state of doubt and distrust about the military preparations of other states would lead to a cycle of action and reaction in international units, that is, a feeling of insecurity generates more insecurity, making the possibility of war always possible58. Even when there is a belief that a state is harboring good intentions, there is a constant fear that these intentions will change. This is what Butterfield calls the "terrible tragedy in international relations"59. Realists see that there is no indication that states can overcome this predicament60. Mearsheimer, one of the theorists of offensive realism, argues that even if countries are involved in agreements to limit the proliferation of weapons, they will always fear that the other parties will veto them and carry out an earlier investigation; in this case, to carry out their national security on their own. This explains - to a certain extent - the continued goal of nuclear powers to
56 Charles L. Glaser, Realist as Optimists: Cooperation as Self Help, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3. (Winter,
1994-1995), pp. 50-90.
57 Idem 58 Idem
59 Herbert Butterfield, The Review of Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 147-164 60 Idem
retain their nuclear capabilities despite signing strategic arms reduction agreements and nonproliferation agreements.
The security dilemma is particularly intense when two conditions hold: first when offensive and defensive military forces are identical. States cannot signal their defensive intent – that is their limited objective – by the kind of military forces they choose to deploy.61
It should be noted that neo-realistic understanding of the security dilemma is divided into two basic stages: the interpretation stage, and the response phases. The approach of the security predicament assumes that the chaotic structure of the international system and the self-reliance system always prompt states to assume the worst-case scenario in war. Even when they realize the consequences of their actions (reducing the level of security of other states), the nature of their status in the international system prompts them to take the steps they are taking. In this way, it turns out that neo-realistic argues that the security dilemma is, as a structural state intractable, because it is linked to the chaotic structure of the system on the international level, which leads automatically to continuous war62.
There is also the veracity of the neo-realistic interpretation of interstate wars or civil wars proposed by Barry Posen63, because historical evidence in Yugoslavia which is near to our case study of the Syrian war,64 suggests that the rupture of multi-ethnic states can put ethnic groups in a chaotic situation. The fears of each party toward the other, lead both to try to use force to improve its relative position and this situation becomes more complicated when the territory, occupied by a group, contains pockets inhabited by other ethnicities. Each party attempts to implement an ethnic (pre-emptive) liquidation to end the existence of any extraneous minorities, allowing expansion to include all members of their group who are outside the current borders of their territory.
Liberalism and War
61 Barry R. Posen, Survival. Vol.35 No.1, Spring 1993, P 28
62 2009 ةعابطلا ةداعا مدقتلا راد ,ةيلودلا تاعازنلا ريسفت يف ةديدجلا ةيعقاولا ,يحور بنيز,Zeinab Rouhi, The New Realism in the
Interpretation of International Conflicts, Dar al-Tahadat Reprint 2009,
63 Barry R. Posen, Survival. Vol.35 No.1, Spring 1993, PP.27-47
64 it was intended for Syria to become the next Yugoslavia multiethnic and religious minorities in this contest the
In contrast to the focus of realism on the study of nation states and their external behavior, the state-society relation of Liberalism emphasizes the study of the relationship between state and society and the overlap between local and external contexts surrounding states; the extent to which social ideas, interests and institutions influence the behavior of the state, as it is the performance of the state, which means the basic social purpose that determines the strategic calculations of governments65."Whilst many liberals attributed World War I as much, if not more to a systemic failure than to willful design66"
The liberals' view of domestic politics reflects their view of international politics. They recognize that war is an essential feature of international relations, but not a permanent one, where it can be changed because of the possibility of changing human ideas. Kant in his “Perpetual Peace (1795) wrote about the harm of war and that it would not be an acceptable means even for defense, so from a liberal political perspective, Kant denounced war, admitting it’s a human nature instinct, that needed to be governed by rules and that rules should come from what he called “league of nations”. We must look on his figure of war in his pamphlet by three main points. Firstly, while Kant approached war from the ethical angle in resolving disputes:
Purposeless savagery held back the development of the capacities of our race; but finally, through the evil into which it plunged mankind, it forced our race to renounce this condition and to enter into a civic order in which those capacities could be developed. Through wasting the powers of the commonwealths in armaments to be used against each other, through devastation brought on by war, and even more by the necessity of holding themselves in constant readiness for war, they stunt the full development of human nature. But because of the evils which thus arise. it is forced to institute a cosmopolitan condition to secure the external safety of each state.67
65 Ahmad Abu Zaid, War in International Relations: Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, Al Naqed, First
Edition V1, 2017, P1-27
66 John MacMillan, International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century Edited by Martin Griffiths, First
published 2007 by Routledge
67 Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784). Translation by Lewis White Beck. From
Kant gave great importance to the role of common values among people in preventing war. The democratic states are more peaceful because they guarantee the rights and freedoms of individuals by establishing a political system based on separation of powers, the rules of law and representative government and that the citizens of the liberal system believe in the legitimacy of other democratic systems because they represent their society.68 At the internal level, a just republic, based on public consensus, views other elected republics as just as worthy of respect and good treatment69.
Habermas, by addressing Kant's concept of war, shows that this concept has been limited to only his experience of certain conflicts witnessed between states and alliances without thinking about current patterns of confrontation such as world wars, civil wars, current wars of terror, wars of cleansing and genocide70. Kant was not aware of how military techniques turned war into a cosmic arena, and how it eliminated the criterion of distinction between belligerent armies and defenseless civilians71.
According to John Locke, the state of war is a vehicle for aggression and destruction72. Human beings often resort to eliminating all those who enter with him in a state of war as they threaten his security and life. The writer makes a comparison between the state of nature which is like the state of peace and the state of war. The situation of theft is a type of war, so if there is no law that guarantees the right of man, it is the right of man according to the law of nature to restore his right by his own hands and to apply this right in the form of individuality away from the law, which made the world more applicable to wars.
Wilson Woodrow (1856-1924), an advocate of liberalism at the international level, spoke of the state of war as a natural consequence of the undemocratic state of international relations, and that collective democratic action must be taken to address external conflicts and achieve collective security73. In contrast to realism, liberalism sees that there is supreme value for the establishment
68 Idem 69 Idem
70 Ahmad Abu Zaid, War in International Relations: Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, Al Naqed, First
Edition V1, 2017, P15
71 Delahunty, Robert J. and Yoo, John (2010) "Kant, Habermas and Democratic Peace," Chicago Journal of
International Law: Vol. 10: No. 2, Article 5.
72 Second Treatise of Civil Government John Locke (1690) CHAP. III. Of the State of War.
73 Pestritto Ronald, Woodrow Wilson and the Roots of Modern Liberalism. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &
of rules for a global government that puts an end to wars and establishes peace, comprehensive and lasting. Cooperation is also essential for free trade, human rights and freedom, the consolidation of equality, the rule of law and moral values on the international level.
Classical liberalism found that the establishment of an international federation would be a determining factor in controlling the behavior of the parties and achieving a degree of harmony of interests and thereby reducing the number of wars between countries. However, power struggles among the great powers at the turn of the 20th century once again cast doubt on the liberal ideas on the first two levels, and the second within the state itself74.
Consequently, the great complexity and diversity of economic ties between liberal, republican states prevents any conflict of interest between them from dominating and souring the overall relationship. In relations with non-liberal states, however, their very paucity of relations with economically powerful liberal-republican states invites just this sort of problem. Such relationships are likely to be ruptured and may lead to war when a conflict of interest develops, and no other profitable relations are able to counterbalance the resulting tension.75
Within liberal explanation of stability and war comes the term "civilized societies," which are pacified and civilized. This is a very dangerous concept as Mary Kaldor shows in her definition of new war and her solution to resolve civil war is the creation of these civilized islands. Fukuyama interpretation of Kantian theory of no war between liberal democracies as they share the same values and ideology comes in the same context of Kaldor's civilized islands that we will study in the next section of this chapter76.
74 Jack S. Levy, William R. Thompson, Causes of War, Wiley-Blackwell (first Ed. published January 1st, 2009), PP.
62-70
75 Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2." Philosophy and Public Affairs 12. no. 4
Ü983Í: 326.
76 Colin M. Fleming (2009) New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future, Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:2,
Neoliberalism and war
The new amendments to the classical liberal methodological rules have been in force since the early 1990s, and are clearly based on the interaction between the new actors in the international system, which is the beginning of the Western European countries plan to conclude the Treaty of the European Union and the collapse of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe and its direction, its tendency to adopt Western capitalist values, and the emergence of China as a country that attracted very large capital investments in light of the growing commercial and financial capacity of multinational corporations77.
These structural changes in the international system represent a strong support for the structural liberalist ideas, declaring their recognition of the new actors in international relations, and overcoming the traditional liberal ideas of the establishment of the world government, considering the diversity of sources of power and their diversity among these new actors. As a result of the great influence of multinational companies and international institutions such as the United Nations, which has worked to create international consensus since the second Gulf War in 1991, which promoted the idea of collective security78.
In their book, Power and Interdependence (Nye and Keohane 1977)79, Nye Joseph 80 referred to the influence of diverse actors on transnationalism and the creation of the concept of interdependence in solving war issues. Joseph Nye finds that the state of interdependence between its parties as a result of the division of labor and specialization has created more peaceful cooperation and integration. New liberalists such as Lamour Charles find that there are opportunities for collective security in the shadow of chaos, but in a framework of balance of international institutions (Bills, 2004). By expanding the framework of the national interest to the collective interest and accepting a settlement that creates an institutional framework for security
77 15 ةحفص 2015 ملاسلا تاسارد ,دماح روق ,ريمح دومحم نيدلا يحم , ملاسلا و برحلا تاسايس مهفل لخدمك ةيلودلا تاقلاعلا
Mohi Mahmood, International Relations as an Approach to Understanding Dynamics of War and Peace, Peace Studies Kartom 2015, p15
78 ردصملا سفن idem p22
79 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye: "Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition". (New York:
Addison Wesley Longman, 1976).
80 Joseph Nye: “Independence and Interdependence”. Foreign Policy, No. 11 (Spring 1976), pp. 131-132. Joseph
that can achieve peaceful conflict resolutions, this is what neo-liberalism has added to its interest in international institution-building rather than traditional or institutional liberalism itself81. "Recognition" was an important role in liberalism's recognition of international pluralism and its acceptance of levels of analysis:
Which is not recognized by traditional or institutional liberalism. In its positive sense, the rationality of the state will push it to solve its problems in international cooperation with its partners, which interact with them in a complex and varied network of levels from both countries and non-states because it will maximize absolute gains for all82.
There is an international report in the possibility of international cooperation and integration and an exclusion of the idea of striving for war and maximizing power, which was revealed in the transitional period, with the recognition of the existence of international regimes and absolute gains83. Keohane Robert pointed to the importance of the role of international institutions in controlling the behavior of states and thus mitigating their rush to war (Keohane, 1991), which created a new vision for liberal theses84. The idea of democratic peace was also expressed by Doyle W. Michael and Fukuyama F. They spoke of the commitment to democracy and the protection of human rights and the interdependence and interaction between and across nations in their innovative phase; key factors in the tendency of states toward peace and security, while non-democratic states tend to war and aggression85. Doyle believes that democratic states tend not to fight each other (Doyle, 1999). Thus, neoliberalism has overtaken traditional theses of liberalism whether classical or institutional, from which they focused on ethical values in international politics, to the suggestion that wars do not arise if international cooperation is well
81دحاو ةخسن 2016 ةقراشلا , بقارع ةلجم ,بورحلا ريسفت و ةيلودلا تاقلاعلا سرادم ,ديز وبا دمحم
82 -2 1 ص . 1998 ،عيزوتلاو رشنلاو تاساردلل ةينطولا رادلا :نانبل .1 ط ،)تاعازنلا ملع يف ةيلود ةينوناق ةسارد(ةيلودلا تاعازنلا ،لامك دامح
Hammad Kamal, Global Disputes (Legal Study in Conflict Science), I. Lebanon: National Institute of Studies, Publishing and Distribution, 1998
83 ,23ص ردصملا سفن Idem p.23 84 ,50ص ردصملا سفن Idem p.50 85 ,55ص ردصملا سفن Idem p.55
promoted towards the universalization and peaceful dissemination of liberal democracy in the world. The changes in the international system in the third millennium have led to the emergence of new relations in it. The most important of these is the state of penetration between countries and through them in terms of ideas and means of communication86.
Constructivism and War
While the question "when does war happen?" is best left to realists, the question "why does war happen" is the focus of constructivism. Constructivists and critics focus on studying and analyzing aspects of values, beliefs, and ethical standards of individuals, groups, and nations. The constructivism school in international relations says that the natural pattern of relations between states is not full conflict or lasting peace, but the peaceful rivalry of the philosopher John Locke. The war for them occurs when there is a difference between the international units around the rules and values governing the bilateral and collective relations between them, which makes the Hobbesian style dominant in the international system87.
According to AL Jandali88, the real lack of understanding of the war environment during the Cold War is reflected in its approach to the power distribution when interpreting the end of this war; in the sense that the realistic claim for the fall of Soviet Union from the power of the United States, while the theory of constructivism lies in the new security policies that Gorbachev devoted to his adoption of the idea of international collective security with his economic and social reforms.
86 Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, Norton 1997, pp 319-340 87 ،ةيجيتارتسإ تاسارد ةلسلس ةيجيتارتسلاا ثوحبلاو تاساردلل تاراملاا زكرم ،ةيطمنلاو ةيملعلا نيب "يلودلا ماظنلا" مويفم ،حودمم ىفطصم دومحم ددعلا 17 ط، 1 ، 1998
.م Mahmoud Mustafa Mamdouh, "The International System" between Scientific and Modeling, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, Series of Strategic Studies, No. 17, I, 1998.
88 115 ةحفص , 2004 , رئازجلا ةعماج , ةيلودلا تاقلاعلا ىلع ةدرابلا برحلا دعب ام ةمظنا يف تلاوحتلا راثا, يلدنجلا نيدلا رصانلادبعAbdul
Nasser al-Din Jandali, The implications of the transformations of the international post-cold-war regime to the major theoretical trends in international relations, University of Algiers, 2004 p.115: War has passed many important
stages and it evolved along with the evolvement of the Sovereign State and the shape of the international system, It reflected and continue to reflect the World Order, shape and power differs. Cold War Dominated the international Scene for almost five decades and almost every Intra-State and inter-State Wars evolved in the Cold War Scenario between USSR and the U.S, direct and indirect interference.
The Lockean Culture of Anarchy and Predominance of Rivalry
On the contrary to neorealism with a domination of the Hobbesian theory in the international history of war explanation and the concentration of its continuation rather than its change, which means "wars continue and will continue" and "power is important and will be important"89, instead Wendt prefers a qualitative profound modification of war in international relations, based on Westphalian countries, in other words "no war on you no war on me" would substitute "kill or be killed". Lockean anarchism of no war prevails over Hobbesian naturism of war90.
Wendt tried to put difference in international politics between rival and enemy. In the international system if the nature of enmity is not applicable, the applicable one is rival vs rival; enemy is where you don’t give the right for itself to exist. Classical realists such as Hobbes, Niebuhr and Morgenthau defined war as a human natural act of power; interests always come in the first place, while neorealist scholars lead by Kenneth Waltz find war in the international context of anarchism, which leads to war. Anarchy is a permissive cause of war91: the exact opposite of Wendt’s suggestion about the "peaceful" end of the Cold War.
Also, the nature of the post-Cold-War era was the appropriate environment for the test of constructivist theory, which many see as providing an appropriate input, from Richard Little92 to Buzan93 to understand and study war and conflict in international relations at a stage in which the role of identity and social factors increased under the system of globalization and civil wars. This theory, therefore, finds great acceptance among academics and politicians alike.
Marxist Definition of War
89 Badawi, Muhammad, Introduction to International Relations, The Egyptian Modern Office for Printing and
Publishing, Cairo, 3, pp. 55-120, 1977.
90 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),p. 277.
Also see Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,”
International Organization 46, no 2 (1992): 391-92.
91 Also see Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State, and War ( New York: Colombia University Press(1959) p.230 92 Richard Little, (1989) `Deconstructing the Balance of Power: Two Traditions of Thought', Review of International
Studies 150/2 86-101.
Lenin was the first with a structural view that the structural division between the center of the capitalist system and its extremities determines the nature of the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Here, a significant observation can be made in the identification of the ontological premises of international Marxism, concerning the fact that states are not the only actors in international relations. Realism and liberalism have been more rigid regarding war definition. There are social classes and positions within the overall structure of the global capitalist system, (sites) that identify patterns of interaction between international units and their dominant patterns of control and their importance in war creating mechanisms94.
While both liberal and the realistic perspective focused on the evil nature of man and the chaotic structure of the international system, he argued that imperialism was the product of the continued tendency of capitalism to expand in search of new foreign markets and for broader and more fertile spaces to exploit the surplus of value resulting from the exploitation of the center by the parties95.
It remains to be noted that the theoreticians of the war-world system emphasized the relationship between the states of the center with hegemony and military power. The central role of the state is to establish a leading role in a conflict within the inter-state system. Here, the dominant power may impose certain practices or institutions that provide the appropriate environment for capital accumulation to proceed successfully and throughout the system. (The Bretton Woods system as a model); the second function is the use of military force to correct imbalances and discipline elements that refuse to submit to the rules of the free trade and multinational companies within the system. The contemporary intervention of the United States is no less, according to Amin, imperial than the colonial invasion of the 19th century. The goal behind the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example, was to establish a (non-democratic) dictatorship, serving the American capital by plundering the country's resources. A liberal, globalized economic system requires "permanent war" (or successive military interventions96).
94 ,2006 ,ليدنق راد ,ةيسكرام تاسارك ,بيصغ ماشه Hisham Ghasib, Marxist Booklets, Qandeel, 2006 95 Idem pp.44-64
96 , 2004 :توريب -يبارافلا راد,ليوطلا دعس :مجرتملا نيمأ ريمس :فلؤملا, ملاعلا ةكرمأو ةمئادلا برحلا, يلاربيللا سوريفلا :باتكلا مسا Samir
Amin, The Liberal Virus: Permanent War and the Americanization of the World, trans. James Members (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004).
