EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT O F HISTORY AND CIVILIZATION
%
R K I N G PAPER No. 87/317
iMBERG’S EXPORTERS AND
PROTECTIONISM, 1931-36.
by
Eamonn
NOONAN
BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (F I)
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in part without prior permission of the author
(C) Eamonn Noonan
Printed in Italy in December 1987
European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico (Fi)
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Württemberg 1s exporters and German protectionism, 1931-36
I
The debate on the relationship between business and the successive governments in Germany in the Great Depression continues. There is a clear divergence of views between those seeing the NSDAP's accession as a result of industry's intrigues and those who hold that industry in general were reserved or unenthusiastic about Hitler.1 Neebe's comprehensive account concludes that "the assaults against democracy, parliamentarianism and the Weimar state by large sections of business and finance certainly contributed to the triumph of National Socialism, but does not explain fundamentally the 'German catastrophe' in the transition phase to a modern industrial society". After 1933, "the limitation of the freedoms of entrepreneurs and the new orientation, especially of trade policy, could however be compensated for almost without friction by the announcement of forced armament programmes, in combination with a pay and social
For a list of abbreviations used, see the appendix. 1. For the former viewpoint see Lotte Zumpe, Wirtschaft und Staat in Deutschland 1933 bis 1945 Berlin 1980. David Abraham, The Collapse of the Weimar Republic. Political Economy and Crisis. Princeton, N.J. 1981, stresses the common interests of industry and NSDAP. The book is flawed by serious errors in the annotations; see Ulrich Nocken "Weimarer Geschichte(n)", in; VSWG, 71 (1984), pp.505-27, and Abraham, "Business Wars: on contributions to Weimar scholarship" in VSWG, 72 (1985), pp.329- 52. Reinhard Opitz (ed) Europastrategien des deutschen Kapitals, 1900-1945 Cologne 1977, gives some hairraising documents from the period.
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policy closely attuned to the interests of industrialists". It is agreed that there was a degree of political and financial backing for the Nazis and that industry encouraged and profited from rearmament. But 'traditionalists' object that the 'neo- marxist' model reduces Hitler to the role of a mere puppet, and understates the regime's ability to control business.^ Mason suggests the argument should be moved to a higher plane, at which the choices of individuals are secondary, being highly determined
4 by economic and institutional pressures.
The following attempts to outline some of the economic pressures of those troubled times, which used to seem a lot more remote from us than they do now. Some opening assumptions, to be
2
2. Re inhold Neebe, GroBindustrie, Staat und NSDAP 1930-1933. Paul Silverberg und der Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie in der Krise der Weimarer Republik Gottingen 1981, p.202. (All translations from the German in the following are by the author). See also U. Wengst, "Der Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie in den ersten Monaten des Dritten Reiches. Ein Beitrag zum Verhàltnis von GroBindustrie un Nationalsozialismus". in: VfZ 28 (1980) p.94ff; F. Blaich, Staat und Verbànde in Deutschland zwischen 1871 und 1945 Wiesbaden 1979, p.98ff. H.A. Turner, German big business and the rise of Hitler Oxford 1985; John R. Gillingham, Industry and politics in the Third Reich. Ruhr Coal, Hitler and Europe New York 1985; and Harold James The German Slump. Politics and Economics 1924-1936 Oxford 1986, reach similar conclusions to Neebe.
3. For a confrontation of the two views, see H.A. Turner, "GroBunternehmertum und Nationalsozialismus 1930-1933" in: HZ 221 (1975), pp.l8ff; and Dirk Stegmann, "Antiquierte Personalisierung Oder sozialokonomische Faschismus-Analyse?" in: AfS 17 (1977), pp.275-96.
4. AmHR 88, 4 (Oct 1983), p.1144. T.W. Mason, "Der Primat der Politik. Politik und Wirtschaft im Nationalsozialismus" in: Das Argument 41 (1966), long set the tone for the debate on the situation after 1933. Lotte Zumpe, "T.W. Mason, Arbeiterklasse and Volksgemeinschaft" in: JWG (1979) rejects the primacy of politics in decision making. Joachim Radkau, "Entscheidungsprozesse und Entscheidungsdefizite in der deutschen AuBenwirtschaftspolitik 1933-1940" in: GG 2 (1976), suggests that Hitler left trade policy decisions to the bureaucracy.
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tested below, can be outlined. Producers did not bring Hitler to power single-handedly. Neither did they act concertedly to stop him. Their chief priority was (and is) profit, though there are many roads to that goal. At the time, political stability, even through the repression of opposition, appeared desireable. Reflation of the domestic economy also seemed a good idea. But not to all. Home-oriented producers, especially the heavy industries, stood to gain, though even here one must discriminate; coal was exported in large quantities.^ Potential arms makers and armaments-related industries would gain. Exporters, on the face of it, would lose out, which is a good reason to concentrate on their attitudes.
Trade policy was but one of many economic issues, but it was crucially affected by reflation efforts. There is a plethora of previous studies. Stegmann portrays industry as eager for closer links with Central and Southeast Europe, not so much to help the 6 area out of depression as to forge an extended home market. They saw this as a modification to the Most Favoured Nation system rather than as an alternative. Gessner suggests that industry accepted aid programmes for agriculture in the hope that the latter would go along with cooperation with the mainly agricultural Southeast.^ Industry opposed agricultural protection, but gave in to some new quotas and tariff increases in
5. Coal exports rose from 20 to 39 million tonnes from 1932 to 1937. Gillingham, op.cit., p.34.
6. Dirk Stegmann, "'Mitteleuropa' 1925-1934. Zum Problem der Kontinuitat deutscher Auflenhandelspolitik von Streseman bis Hitler" in: D.Stegmann, B.J.Wendt, P.C.Witt (eds), Industrielle Gesellschaft und politisches System. Festschrift fiir Fritz Fischer Bonn 1978. 7*
7. Dieter Gessner Agrardepression und Pràsidialregierungen in Deutschland 1930-1933 Düsseldorf 1977. p.213f.
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1932 in order to prevent more drastic steps.
There were differences between sectors. Heavy industry was more geared to the domestic market, and hence more conciliatory
8
towards agriculture.'' The chemical industry was an eager exponent of a European trading block, but there were differences as to its configuration.1^ The replacement of Duisberg by Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach as president of the Federation of German Industry in 1932 is seen as an indication of a shift towards a more protectionist stance. Yet a number of large concerns were clearly out of step with protectionism.91011 *
This essay has two main aims. It reconstructs the course of trade policy between mid 1931 and mid 1933, to clarify the motives for the adoption of increasingly protectionist measures. Secondly, it seeks to gauge the reactions of small and medium sized industry, neglected in the historiography to date. Private reports, Chamber of Commerce publications and economic newspapers are used. I concentrate on a particularly export-oriented part of Germany, Württemberg, and on two sectors especially dependent on
8. See Harm Schroter AuQenpolitik und Wirtschaftsinteresse. Skandinavien im aussenwirtschaftlichen Kalkiil Deutschlands and Grossbritaniens 1918-1939 Frankfurt/Main 1983. pp.50-74.
9. Ibid, p.71.
10. Ibid, p.71, n.99. See also Verena Schroter, "The IG Farbenindustrie AG in Central and South-East Europe 1926-1938", in: Alice Teichova, P.L. Cottrell (eds), International Business and Central Europe 1918-1939 Leicester 1983. Helmuth Tammen Die IG Farben Aktiengesellschaft 1925-1933 Berlin 1978, p.242 and p.253f, stresses that their plans were in no way linked to autarky ideas or to a departure from the world economy.
11. See A.Teichova, "The Mannesmann concern in East Central Europe in the interwar period", in Teichova/Cottrell, op.cit., p.126; H.Schroter, "Siemens and Central and South-East Europe between the two world wars", ibid, p.186.
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exports, engineering and textiles. The conclusions reached by Verena Schroter's study of larger concerns serve as a point of departure. In the Depression, exports by the chemical and electrotechnical sectors fell less than their domestic sales, but for different reasons. The chemical industry had a clear technological edge, and concentrated on restricting cooperation on research and preventing competition, through cartel agreements. The E-T and the optics industries, faced with strong American rivals, had to concentrate on market-oriented and cost-conscious innovation. Organisational changes, the restructuring of sales networks and product diversification also helped offset the effects of the depression.13 14
The position of smaller producers was different in many respects. Without strong Manufacturers' Associations, they could not arrange private international deals to restrict competition.
14
Without access to large capital resources, they could not invest directly abroad to evade trade barriers. They were more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of government trade policy. As long as they were competitive, they of necessity had to favour a liberal line.
12. In 1929 the proportion of total production exported for textiles was 17%; for machinery and vehicles, 14%. See Volker Hentschel, "Osservazioni sulle dimensioni del commercio estero tedesco tra la Grande guerra e la crisi", in; Peter Hertner, Giorgio Mori (eds), La transizione dell'economia di guerra all'economia di pace in Italia e in Germania dopo la prima guerra mondiale Bologna 1983, p.642.
13. Verena Schròter Die deutsche Industrie auf dem Weltmarkt 1929 bis 1933. AuBenwirtschaftliche Strategien unter dem Druck der Weltwirtschaftskrise Frankfurt/Main 1984, esp. pp.140-90, 233-67, 290-346, 448-55.
14. Larger firms could raise capital through their international connections, even if their own resources were limited. V. Schròter, Die deutsche Industrie, p.192.
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II
Germany was then as now one of the world's leading economies and leading exporters. Its share of world exports in 1929 was 9.73%. Britain's, by comparison, was 10.75%.1^ Germany's economy was less open than Britain's, but more open than the United States'. “^Exports corresponded to 14.9% of Net National Product between 1925 and 1929, although this was down from the prewar
17
level of 17.5%. Imports and exports each corresponded to about 10% of net domestic product even after the crash of 1931.15161718 1920 A key feature of Germany's trade relations was their multilateral nature. It had high export surpluses with other industrial countries, and high deficits with producers of primary commodities; high surpluses in Europe, high deficits elsewhere. Germany was singularly unsuited to the bilateralisation of trade
19
which came about in the 1930s. The leading exporting sectors were metals, accounting.for 18.1% of exports in 1928, and textiles
20 (16.8%). Chemicals (12.2%) and machinery (9.5%) followed.
15. W. Arthur Lewis Economic Survey 1919-1939 London 1978 (1st edn, 1949), p.94.
16. In 1929 the proportion of manufacturing production exported was 37% in the UK, 27% in Germany and 6% in the US. Alfred Maizels Industrial growth and world trade Cambridge 1971, p.223. 17. H. James, op.cit., p.13.
18. F.W. Henning, "Die zeitliche Einordnung der Uberwindung der Weltwirtschaftskrise in Deutschland" in: H. Winkel (ed), Finanz- und wirtscaftspolitische Fragen der Zwischenkriegszeit Berlin 1973, p.149. There was a keen debate at the time on how important exports were for the job market. One estimate thought one third of the industrial labour force was directly or indirectly dependent on the export trade. ("Wieviel Deutsche leben vom Export?" in: Die Chemische Industrie Feb 2, 1933, p.117).
19. See Wilhelm Grotkopp Die Zolle Nieder! Berlin 1931.
20. Jurgen Wulf Der deutsche AuBenhandel seit 1850 Stuttgart 1968, p .88.
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The Great Depression shook everything. Exports fell in value from 13.5 milliard RM in 1929 to 9.6md RM in 1931 and 5.7md RM in
21
1932. Overseas markets and especially raw materials producers were particularly weak. All sectors suffered, but investment goods proved more resistant than consumer goods. By 1936, textiles made up only 10.7% of exports. Leather and hides slipped from 7% in 1928 to 2.8%. The shares of metals and chemicals increased to 20.9% and 16.4% respectively. Machinery overtook textiles in importance, accounting for 12.7% of exports. The electrotechnical sector also gained relatively, from 4.1% to 5.4%. Exports of cars and lorries increased even in absolute terms; by volume the 1936
22
figure was nearly double that of 1928. Overall, Germany's share of world exports fell to 6.8% by 1936, though it recovered to 9.1%
23
the following year. The direction of trade also shifted. Southeast Europe took an increasing share of German exports: 3.5% in 1932, 5.9% in 1935 and 10.3% in 1938. The corresponding figures for imports from the region were 5%, 7.7% and 9.8%. Trade with Latin America also rose in relative terms. By contrast, only 70.2%
21. Avraham Barkai Das Wirtschaftssystem des Nationalsozialismus Cologne 1977, p.182.
22. J. Wulf, op.cit., p.88,89.
23. Lewis, p .94 gives 9.1% for 1937. Dorte Doering Deutsche AuQenwirtschaftspolitik 1933-1935. Die Gleichschaltung der AuBsenwirtschaft in der Friihphase des nationalsozialistisches Regimes Berlin 1970, p.359, gives 6.8% for 1936. The manipulation of the exchange rate made it difficult to give a true picture (see Maizels, op.cit., p.542). Harold James remarked that German trade declined less relatively to Britain or France in the Thirties ("The German reaction to the collapse of the international monetary system, 1931-1932" in Gustav Schmidt(ed), Konstellationen Internationaler Politik 1924-1932 Bochum 1983, p.316). But Guillebaud wrote in 1938 that Germany was probably a less serious rival than in 1931, though the situation would change if she were to diminish home investment in order to expand the export industries. C.W.Guillebaud The Economic Recovery of Germany 1933-1938 London 1939 (reprinted New York 1972), p.72.
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of exports went to Western Europe and the United States in 1935, 24
falling from 81.7% in 1932. Ill
Two views emerged as to what was happening. Some saw the Depression as a watershed in economic history, marking a transition to a phase in which international trade would have a
25
diminishing role in economic growth. Others believed the storm would not have long-term implications for the importance of trade.^ The government's course of action from 1931 was influenced alternately by both views, but ultimately the former prevailed. Clearly trade policy was subordinate to general economic policy. Under Briining, all effort was concentrated on creating the conditions for the economy to heal itself via deflation. Wage and price cuts implied stronger German competitiveness abroad; a liberal trade policy, allowing exporters take advantage of this, suited Briining well. The change to protectionism was gradual, and was partly a consequence of changes in other economic policies. The process was completed, not initiated, by the Hitler administration. It began in 1931, in the wake of the bank crisis.
24. Wolfram Fischer Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik 1918-1945 Opladen 1968 (3rd edn.) p.110.
25. See among others Edgar Salin, "Zum Wandel der Weltwirtschaft in der Nachkriegszeit" in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 35, 1 (1932 I), pp.1-43; R. Friedlànder-Precht1 Wirtschaftswende Leipzig 1931? Ferdinand Fried Die Zukunft des AuBenhandels Jena 1934. 26. This was the thrust of the Kiel Enquete committee's report. Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft und Seeverkehr an der Universitat Kiel Der deutsche AuBenhandel und die Nachwirkung weltwirtschaftlicher Strukturwandlungen Berlin 1932. Institut fiir Weltwirtschaft, "Die Welthandelsentwicklung und das Problem der deutschen Ausfuhrpolitik" in; Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 36, 1 (1932, II), pp.24-56 is a summary of the findings.
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The bank disaster led to state regulation of the use of foreign exchange, which had been provided for in a presidential decree of December 1930. The measure was primarily intended to bring order to a chaotic financial situation, but circumstances led to its progressive tightening. Currency control eventually became a means of centrally directing the composition of German imports. The thin edge of the wedge was driven home before the Nazi accession.
Twenty-three states, including sixteen in Europe, adopted 27
currency controls before the end of 1931. They were not a uniquely German remedy. The restrictions further handicapped trade and gave an impulse to bilateral trade treaties, making it more practical to buy from a land to which one exported than from the cheapest supplier.
The sizeable trade balance surplus was of no avail in the face of the withdrawal of foreign capital. The Foreign Office calculated the trade surplus from June to September to be 916m RM? around lmd RM was withdrawn by creditors not covered by a debt
28
moratorium. The extent of Germany's external indebtedness was overwhelming. Short-term and long-term debts together amounted to 20.6md RM; if all short-term obligations were successfully rescheduled, 1.5 or 1.6md RM per annum would be needed towards repayment over the next few years. For this to be possible, the export surplus would have to reach 1.8 to 2md RM, and this was reckoned to be inattainable. The surplus of 1931 was seen as
29 artificial and vulnerable to increasing restrictions abroad .272829
27. Lutz Kollner, Chronik der deutschen Wahrungspolitik 1871-1971 Frankfurt/Main 1972, p.73. Lewis, p.65, names just twenty states, twelve European.
28. Memo by Gerhard Kroll, Apr 1, 1932 (PA/AA, Handakten Ritter, Donau-Foderation, Vol. 2). 29. Ibid.
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The operation of the foreign exchange regulations suggests that they were also aimed at increasing the trade surplus by restricting imports, at least in the initial stages. Exchange was readily allocated for debt repayment, but was harder to acquire for the purchase of foreign goods. Only a fixed proportion of the amount spent on the corresponding purchase in the foregoing twelve months would be allotted; the proportion was especially low for luxury items.3<^ The priority for debt reflected the wish to maintain creditworthiness.31 * Even in early August, however, the Cabinet heard complaints about the strict application of the provisions. The Reichsbank's representative, in reply to banking specialist Bernhard Dernburg, insisted that the bank could only
32
supply exchange for absolutely unforegoable imports. Secretary of State Trendelenburg backed him, albeit reluctantly. The July decrees were revised once the initial panic had subsided, on August 6. Trendelenburg concluded that the original limitations had been excessive, and that the Reichsbank's protestations had been exaggerated. Hermann Dietrich agreed. The Agriculture Minister, Schiele, still hoped for a restriction of luxury imports, and another advisor, Hermann Schmitz, regretted the relaxation.33 Schiele evidently hoped to turn the currency regulations into a substitute for the higher tariff levels agriculture had been seeking throughout the year.
30. Karl Erich Born Die deutsche Bankenkrise 1931 Munich 1967, p.121.
31. Ibid.
32. Chefbesprechung, Aug 3,1931 in: Tilman P. Koops (ed), Akten der Reichskanzlei. Weimarer Republik. Die Kabinette Brüning I und II, Marz 1930-Marz 1931; Màrz 1931 - Oktober 1931 Boppard 1982. p.1502.
33. Chefbesprechungen, Aug 6 and 7, 1931, in: Koops (ed), op.cit., p.1530-4.
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The monthly import figures over the following year declined, 34
but not too severely. Domestic demand had been so hit by the Depression that import restrictions seemed superfluous. A leading figure in the Economics Ministry, Hans Posse, made this point in explaining to the Federation of German Industry that the government would not use exchange control as an instrument of trade policy.^ But the proportionate allocation of exchange for imports was gradually reduced. The government pleaded necessity, particularly after the devaluation of Sterling in late September.36 The head of the Economic Policy section of the 37
Foreign Office, Karl Ritter, also stressed that deliberate 3 8
restrictions could not save very much on imports.
The Briining administration regarded currency control as temporary. Neither bureaucrats nor theorists realised that it made an expansion of domestic credit feasible. The Reichsmark's exchange rate could now be maintained despite an increase in the
39
domestic supply of credit and notes. The government hoped to help exports; but in practice currency controls harmed imports. To
34. Rolf Llike Von der Stabilisierung Krise Zürich 1958, p.346 , gives the following figures for imports;
1931 mRM 1932 mRM Jul 607 Jan 451 Aug 464 Feb 458 Sep 460 Mar 394 Oct 519 Apr 463 Nov 497 May 406
Dec 507 Total, July 1931-May 1932; 5,226m RM. Exports for the period amounted to 8,228m RM.
35. Minutes of the meeting of the RDI's Trade Policy Committee, Oct 9 , 1931 ( BA Silverberg Papers, 366. RDI, Trade Policy, 1931-2, ff 74-83).
36. This led to further offloading of German securities on foreign financial markets. Luke, op.cit., p.324.
37.
38. Meeting on currency controls and the trade balance, Dec 1, 1931 ( BA R43/I, 1175, ff 233-8 ).
39. Born, op.cit., p.123; Rolf Lüke, op.cit., p.344f.
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the satisfaction of the protectionist faction in the cabinet, the measures further isolated Germany from the international economy.
With the backing of industry, the government resisted calls 40
to increase agricultural tariffs throughout 1931. New British and Italian tariffs, new Swiss quotas against German goods and widespread devaluations strengthened the protectionist case towards the end of the year. At the start of December 1931 a decree provided for tariff increases beyond the existing statutory limits, and on January 19, 1932, a butter tariff was imposed. The decree was presented as defensive: "further campaigns against the increasing threats from abroad are needed in Germany's trade
, . , „ 41
policy struggle". It was intended to inhibit future protectionist steps, and to cause countries such as Poland and
42
Canada to withdraw existing barriers. The supplementary tariff levied on Canadian produce was dropped once Canada agreed to trade
43
talks. Posse defended the butter tariff as a reaction to import embargoes by Sweden and stringent exchange regulations by
44
Denmark. The attitude had become tougher, and drew violent ... . - . 45
criticism from exporters.
Cabinet discussions towards the end of Briining's term registered greater concern about foreign exchange resources, but 404142434445
40. See Gessner, op.cit., pp.151-68.
41. Press release, Mar 9, 1932 ( BA R43/I, 1142, f 6 ).
42. Foreign Office Trade Policy Committee, Jan 25, 1932 ( AA Sonderref. W . , Handel 13, Handakten, Trade Policy Committee, Vol. 4).
43. Note of Jul 5, 1932 (PA/AA Sonderref. W , , Wirtschaft 1, Allgemeine Wirtschaftslage, Vol 13).
44. Memo by Posse, Feb 3, 1932, in: ADAP, Series B, xix, p. 538. 45. cf HK Heidelberg Jahresbericht 1932, p.12. "The changeover in economic policy in favour of home market interests in the last year has made it more difficult to take care of foreign trade matters". Other annual reports, including those of HK Ulm and HK Mannheim, were in the same vein.
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always with reference to the possible foreign reaction to import restrictions. The resignation of Curtius in October removed one minister who was especially unpopular with agriculture, and the resultant reshuffle reflected the influence of Hindenburg and the right. The balance of opinion on trade policy, however, was not
46 greatly affected.
Briining could not win the support of Hindenburg or of agriculture despite modifications in trade policy. They considered the aid provided for the conversion of rural indebtedness was inadequate, and eventually had him removed from office. Von Papen's cabinet of barons was more inclined to listen to them. Nevertheless, the Papen administration was more concerned with the question of credit expansion. The Papen plan of September 1932 finally authorised a limited expansion by means of tax certificates. The plan also entailed greater use of import quotas, notwithstanding the precarious state of negotiations with the Netherlands and Denmark on the butter tariff.
Representatives of the liberal line were not absent from Papen's cabinet. Hermann Warmbold welcomed credit expansion, but opposed quotas. The government's programme fell short of the wishes of the new Agriculture Minister, von Braun, who prophesied
47
imminent rural catastrophe. The political capital being made by the NSDAP out of rural discontent was also cited as an argument for import restrictions. The administration claimed quotas would only be used when they did not contravene existing trade treaties. When the butter tariff negotiations reached a standstill in July, Warmbold urged settlement on the Dutch terms, pointing out the 4647*
46. See the diary entries of Hans Schaffer for Oct 10, 1931 and Mar 4, 1932 in: Politik und Wirtschaft, Vol. 4, Part ii, p.1032 and p.1314.
47. Cabinet meetings, Aug 27, Sep 3, and Sep 23, 1932 (BA R43/I, 1457, ff 339-47, 447-57 and 676-9).
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risk of a boycott of German exports. Von Braun called for industry to make its fair share of sacrifices. Papen noted that purchasing
48
power did not come from the export sector alone. In late September Warmbold publically criticised the government's line. The Frankfurter Zeitung thought this indicated his isolation within the cabinet, but hoped his speech forestalled stronger
. . 49
protectionist measures.
IV
The need to protect domestic firms - or farms - balanced against the need for foreign markets determines tariff levels. But 50 international trade as a whole is regulated by trade treaties. The cornerstone of the post-Versailles years was the Most Favoured Nation system. The Papen administration yielded more to agricultural lobbying than Briining, but both were ambivalent on the MFN principle. Germany's goal from 1919 had been to achieve full MFN status. The peace treaty obliged it to concede any tariff reduction to all sides, but it was not entitled to reciprocal treatment. A treaty with Britain in December 1924 was a first step, but German energies were deflected by the desire for a customs union with Austria. The defeat of Curtius's prosposals in
51 mid 1931 made a rethink necessary.
48. Cabinet meeting of Aug 4, 1932 (BA R43/I, 1447, ff 238-42). 49. F Z , Sep 29, 1932, p.l.
50. So Hans Posse Aus der Werkstatt der Handelspolitik Stuttgart 1950, p.40. See also Posse Der gegenwartige Stand der deutschen Handelspolitik Leipzig 1930, p.8ff. This was a talk given to the *51 RDI in October 1929.
51. See H.J. Schroder, "Die deutsche Siidosteuropapolitik und die Reaktion der angelsachsischen Machte 1929-1933/4" in: J. Becker, K. Hildebrand (eds), Internationale Beziehungen in der Weltwirtschaftskrise 1929-1933 Munich 1980, pp.343-60.
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Policy makers worried about the formation of trading blocks abroad. In early 1932 Posse expected the Ottawa conference to create an "economic Empire", and thought a British block would have even wider dimensions. He foresaw tariff negotiations between Belgium, the Netherlands and Britain, and feared closer
52
cooperation with Scandinavia and possibly Argentina. Germany resisted a suggestion that it devalue and join a British free trade front. Briining opposed taking a common approach before a final settlement of the Reparations issue.5253 545556 Agriculture also
54
disapproved of a conciliatory line. Germany believed Britain was too friendly towards France, an impression strengthened by the signing of a trade agreement between the two in July 1932.555
Relations with France were still overshadowed by Versailles. Differences persisted over the eastern frontiers, the Saarland,
56 the former colonies, rearmament and unity with Austria. The Depression brought conficts on trade between the two. France had conceded Germany Most Favoured Nation status in 1928. The trade surplus with France then grew to nearly 500m RM in 1931, its third
52. Posse memo, Feb 2, 1932, in: ADAP, B, xix, p.538.
53. Sch{ffer diary, Mar 21, 1932, in Politik und Wirtschaft 4,ii, p.1348. See also Luke, op.cit., p.334.
54. Posse memo, Feb 2, 1932, in: ADAP B, xix, p.541.
55. Report by Ritter, July 22, 1932 (PA/AA Sonderref. W . , Wirtschaft 1, Allgemeine Wirtschaftslage, Vol. 13). Britain considered Gerrmany's fixation on reparations as exaggerated, and was concerned about its aggressive trade policy in the Southeast. See Holm Sundhaussen, "Die Weltwirtschaftskrise im Donau-Balkan-Raum und ihre Bedeutung fur den Wandel der deutschen AuBenpolitik unter Briining" in: W. Benz, H. Graml (eds) Aspekte deutscher Auflenpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert Stuttgart 1976, p.145. 56. The ambassador to Paris saw little prospect of resolution of any of the issues. Hoesch to Ritter, Aug 21, 1931 (PA/AA Sonderref. W., Wirtschaft 1, Paneuropaische Bewegungen, Vol.11).
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largest in Europe.5^ France introduced a series of quotas in the crisis, provoking strong criticism. Talks between German and French industrialists brought some concessions, but the renewal of the MFN agreement in 1932 was without substance. Plans for the economic integration of western Europe and a common exploitation of the potential of Southeast Europe as a market, advanced by such as François Delaise, failed in the face of lasting political hostility.^
Rivalry over southeastern Europe exercised policy-makers more than problems in direct trade relations. The Tardieu Plan was the basis of French policy at the end of 1931. It proposed a series of preference tariffs between Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, to be extended later to include Rumania and Yugoslavia. The major European powers were then to offer these states tariff relief. Germany steadfastly opposed the plan. It criticised the emphasis on the internal trade of the region with reference to the inadequacy of its internal demand. Germany presented itself as a necessary adjunct to any regional confederation. The Tardieu Plan was seen as politically motivated, as an attempt to rope Austria ans Hungary into the Little Entente and to counter Italian courtship of Hungary and Yugoslavia. The plan was blocked at a four-power economic conference in April 1932; Germany and Italy made common cause against France and Britain. France unavailingly challenged Germany to drop its assumption of pre-eminence in the region. The hint that reparations might be reduced did not soften 5758**
57. German exports to France in 1931 amounted to 834m RM; imports were 342m RM. Foreign Trade Society memo, June 14, 1932 (BA Gothein Papers, 48, f 156).
58. On plans for a European Union, see Reinhard Frommelt Paneuropa Oder Mitteleuropa? Einigungsbestrebungen im Kalkiil deutscher Wirtschaft und Politik 1925-1933 Stuttgart 1977.
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German opposition.
Germany interpreted the Tardieu Plan as a change in French policy. It jettisoned the conciliatory approach of Briand's common market proposals of 1930 and the plan constructif of 1931. These 60 both rejected the division of Europe into regional blocks. France like Germany was now seeking an alternative to the Most Favoured Nation system. A common approach did not emerge; the memory of the French veto of the customs union with Austria was too recent. For her part, France objected to the preference treaties Germany was negotiating with Rumania and Hungary.61 Cooperation was occasionally broached. A few weeks before losing office, Briining assured the French ambassador that he hoped for an eventual return to the MFN system after the temporary adoption of preference treaties, and for a revival of the economic sections of
6 2
Briand's programme. At the Lausanne conference, Ritter sounded his counterparts on the use of preferences to raise European agricultural prices. To his amazement he was asked his opinions on a German-French customs union, which the French linked to the settlement of differences over the Polish corridor and armaments. He did not take the offer seriously.63
59. Sundhaussen, p.149; Note by von Biilow, Mar 4, 1932 (PA/AA Handakten Ritter, Donau Foderation, Vol. 2); Note of March 8, 1932 (PA/AA Sonderref. W . , Wirtschaft 1, Paneuropàische Bewegungen, Vol. 14). Nevertheless Posse acknowledged that France's capital resources meant French patronage was essential in any long-term restructuring of the Southeast's economy; Memo, Feb 2, in ADAP B, xix, p.541.
60. Memo by Gerhard Kroll, Apr 1, 1932 (PA/AA Handakten Ritter, Donau Foderation, Vol. 2).
61. See Frommelt Paneuropa, p.73-8, 85-96.
62. Note by von Biilow on a meeting between Briining and French ambassador François-Poncet, May 13, 1932 in: Politik und Wirtschaft 4, ii, p.1450.
63. Memo by Ritter, June 18, 1932 (PA/AA Wirtschaft 1, Paneuropaische Bewegungen, Vol 15).
Sonderref. W . ,
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Germany's drift from the MFN principle dates from 1931. Preference agreements with Rumania and Hungary were signed in mid 1931, though ratification was delayed pending the consent of the Most Favoured Nation partners. In early 1932 it pressed ahead without the approval of the USA, Canada, Argentina and the Soviet Union, hoping they would later acquiesce. A strongly worded US
65
protest in May caused a further delay in ratification. Rumania criticised this faithfulness to MFN obligations, regarding preferences as a matter of necessity. The Southeast saw the proposed concessions as inadequate.^
Ritter presented the treaties as a first attempt to help agriculture in the Danube states and denied that they signalled a systematic use of preferences. Posse did likewise, stressing that they would only apply to a limited range of products, only for a short period, and only with the approval of third parties. The suspicion of a major change in policy remained. Posse supposedly told a Rumanian negotiator that Germany was prepared to give up the MFN system; the Ministry the denied this in response to a
67 protest from the Association of German Chambers of Commerce.
Posse played a central role. He maintained good contacts with different sections of the economy, frequently outlining the government's position to meetings of representative 64656667**
64
64. For more detail on these negotiations see H.-J. Schroder, "Deutsche Siidosteuropapolitik, 1929-1936", in: GG, 2 (1976), pp. 1-32? H. Sundhaussen, op.cit., pp.121-164, and D. Gessner, op.cit, pp.80-102.
65. Note by Ritter, July 8, 1931; report of May 28, 1932. Both in PA/AA Handakten Wiehl, Pràferenzvertrage, Vol. 1.
66. Notes of June 6 and Oct 22, 1932 (by Franges) (PA/AA Handakten Ritter, Donau Fòderation, Voi. 2).
67. Note by Ritter, July 8, 1931? note by Posse on the Stresa conference, Sep 8, 1932; note of Dec 12, 1931 (PA/AA Handakten Wiehl, Praferenzvertràge, Vols 1/2).
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organisations. He was a Ministerial Director in the Economics Ministry in 1931, became a member of the League of Nations' Economic Committee in late 1932 and was appointed Secretary of the Department in July 1933.^ Initially he supported the MFN system, citing the diversity of Germany's production and the wide distribution of its m a r k e t s . I n 1929 he argued that Germany could not afford isolation from outside, even if this meant sacrifices on the part of agriculture. The remedy to the excessive postwar protectionism was not bilateral trade agreements, but the removal of trade barriers. His turnaround was apparently due to events internationally rather than to a protectionist ideology. But the subsequent condemnation of multilateralism was vehement. The MFN system had been "bled to death".7i He saw a new phase in postwar German trade policy, characterised by the consolidation of regional groups into economic blocks. "What had the Most Favoured Nation system produced but the necessity to seek reorientation on
72
the lines of 'Raumwirtschaft'?". He constantly referred to attempts by rival powers to form trading blocks, although even after the failure of the London World Economic Conference he admitted that this was not the only possible solution to the
68. Posse had been considered for appointment as the RDI's permanent manager in 1925. See Harold James The German Slump. Politics and Economics 1924-1936 Oxford 1986, p.l75f.
69. See ADAP B, xxi, p.643; Edgar Bissinger, Per deutsche Handel, Aufgabe und Zukunft Berlin 1936, p.470.
70. Posse Per gegenwartige Stand, p.22.
71. Hans Posse, "Die Belebung der Weltwirtschaft durch Starkung der Nationalwirtschaft" in: Nauticus. Jahrbuch fur Deutschlands Seeinteressen, 22nd year, 1939, p.377. 72
72. Posse Die deutsche Wirtschaft, n.p., 1937, p.30.
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world's problems.
Throughout 1932 Posse's energies were concentrated on relations with Southeast Europe. In 1933 he began to stress another element of economic policy, the restoration of the domestic market. Sound national economies were the precondition
74
for the recovery of international trade. The London Conference's predictable failure at least served to drive this home, he remarked.737475 He saw no reason to return to his earlier convictions in the later course of events, but repeated his twin hobby-horses monotonously: the world economy could only thrive if based on solid national economies; Germany's long-term aim was not isolation from outside but a return to international trade after a necessary period of convalescence.76 Even the Four Year Plan of 1936 was presented in this light; the intention was to further develop the emphasis on self-sufficiency found in the New Plan, and to encourage industrial innovations to regain ground lost to
73. Posse, "Grundlagen und Moglichkeiten unserer AuBenhandelspolitik" in: Bissinger, op.cit., p. 237. "After the failure of the London conference, the formation of regional trading blocks between healthy national economies is without doubt the happiest, if not the only, solution to the existing international economic difficulties".
74. Posse in DV August 1933. Cited in "Die Stunde der deutschen Handelspolitik", WI Sep 2, 1933 (nr.35), p.274f. In this he was of one mind with Hugenberg: "the point of departure for all deliberations was the improvement of the economic conditions in the individual countries themselves, for international commerce was basically an appendage of the national economy". Hugenberg at an Economic Policy Committee meeting, Apr 24, 1933. DGFP 1919-1945 C, i, p.336.
75. See the Economics Ministry's account of trade policy relations in 1933, cited in WI Jan 6, 1934, p.1/2.
76. Posse, "Die Belebung der Weltwirtschaft", p.372.
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foreign firms.
Already in 1931 policy makers were favourably disposed to bilateral treaties with the Southeast. These would be forestalled if economic relations in the area were reorganised without reference to Germany. A triangular agreement between Italy, Austria and Hungary was viewed with equinamity. An interim agreement between the three in mid 1931 further breached the MFN system. Germany issued a protest, but assured Austria privately that this was a matter of form. Germany gauged the international
7 8 response with a view to adopting a similar approach.
By contrast, a possible federation of the Danube states 79 . . inspired an unease bordering on anxiety. Economic crisis at last seemed to overshadow the region's territorial disputes. The succession states together with Poland and Estonia called for a system of preference treaties in 1930. A conference at Budapest in
8 0
February 1932 oulined the demands. There were obstacles. The minorities problem persisted. Public opinion was unenthusiastic. States developing an industrial base feared the competition of Czechoslovakian industry. Czechoslovakia was torn between its economic and political interests. Two-thirds of its trade was with Austria and Germany, but a narrow Central European Union would end 77787980
77
77. See von Mickwitz (ed), AuBenhandel unter Zwang unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung des Vierjahresplans Hamburg 1937, p . 32ff; also Otto Sarnow, "Das System der deutschen Handels- und Clearingvertràge" in : Bissinger, p.247.
78. Account of a talk with Ritter, Jun 5, 1931 (BA Gothein Papers, Vol. 52, ff 98-100); Report by Schubert from Italy, Apr 1932 (AA Handakten Ritter, Donau Fôderation, Vol. 2); see Jens Petersen, "Italien und Siidosteuropa, 1929-1932" in; Josef Becker, Klaus Hildebrand (eds), op.cit., pp.393-412.
79. See the reports of Dec 10, 15 and 28, 1931 (PA/AA Sonderref. W . , Wirtschaft 1, Paneuropaische Bewegungen, Vol. 13).
80. Report on the Budapest conference on economic cooperation in Southeast Europe (Feb 12/13, 1932 ) (PA/AA Sonderref. W. , Wirtschaft 1, Paneuropaische Bewegungen, Vol. 14).
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the Little Entente. The Stresa conference in September 1932 revealed the differences; Posse expressed relief at its indecisive
i •
81
conclusion.
One problem of a confederation was whether to rely on French or German support. France could supply investment capital, but imported little from the area. Germany had a greater capacity to take the region's produce. Germany's intentions were mistrusted, but France's refusal to give credits at favourable rates increased dependence on exports. They had a poor bargaining position with Germany. The six Danube states had a trade deficit with Germany of 370.1m RM in 1931. Their exports to Germany were proportionately more important than Germany's to the Southeast.^2 The developments of 1932, particularly the failure at Stresa, strengthened Germany's hand.
The government which succeeded von Schleicher was a coalition of the conservative right. Its participants had varying political goals, but as a whole it was more friendly to farming interests than its immediate predecessors. The first months saw no drastic redirection of economic policy. The new Chancellor warned against alienating any section of the electorate before the new elections of March 1933; controversial economic measures could jeopardise
8 3
the NSDAP's target of 18 or 19 million votes. In his Reichstag speech of March 23, Hitler glossed over largely irreconcilable differences. He assured exporting industry that the government was 818283*
81. Sundhaussen, p.l58ff.
82. Ibid, p.l58ff and p.l31f. German exports to the six Danube states (Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Rumania), amounted to 992m RM, about 10% of total exports. 83. "Any specific descriptions of the government's economic programme are to be avoided in the election propaganda". Hitler to the cabinet, Feb 8, 1933 (BA R43/I, 1459). The target was duly achieved, by fair means or foul.
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not hostile to exports, and that Germany's geographical situation did not allow for economic self-sufficiency. But he also repeated the standard protectionist argument: "The restoration of agriculture may be hard on the consumer, but the fate of the whole nation, should agriculture go to the ground, would be incomparably worse... its health is the main precondition for the flourishing and the expansion of our industry, for Germany's domestic trade
84 and for Germany's exports'.
Tariffs on agricultural imports were doubled in February. Immediately after the election, regulations were introduced to limit the production of margerine and to ensure greater
8 5
consumption of home-produced butter. Other actions contributed to the worsening climate of protectionism. A trade treaty with Switzerland was called off. Trade talks with Czechoslovakia were downgraded. The minimum tariff between France and Germany was increased on both sides. The persecution of the Communist Party soured relations with the Soviet Union; the persecution of Jews led to boycotts of German goods.^
The departure of the dollar from the Gold Standard further troubled the run-up the World Economic Conference. Increased protection of the trade balance surplus was necessary. The Economics Ministry presented devaluation or a blanket tariff on imports as the only alternatives. Devaluation was not seriously
84. E. Klòss (ed), Reden des Fiihrers. Politik und Propaganda Adolf Hitlers 1922-1945 Munich 1967, p.lOlf. 8586
85. Barkai, op.cit, p.113; see the minutes of the Foreign Office Trade Policy Committee, March 10, 1933 (PA/AA Sonderref. W., Handel 13, Voi. 5).
86. UP report, May 5, 1933 (PA/AA Sonderref. W . , Wirtschaft 1, Allgemeine Wirtschaftslage, Voi. 16).
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Domestic discussed; harmful psychological effects were feared,
and international prices drew steadily apart, increasing Germany's isolation from world markets.
In the cabinet's infrequent discussions of trade, pessimism prevailed. Posse thought the London conference would strengthen the tendency towards regional blocks. Von Papen hoped for progress at last towards tariff agreements in Central Europe. There were differences over the nature of a German-led trading block. Hitler opposed industrial development in non-industrial states. European industry was based on imported raw materials, and to export investment goods would undermine its position. Schacht contradicted him: industrialisation raised demand for consumer
,
88goods.
The Reinhardt programme of June 1933 boosted domestic purchasing power. This again endangered the trade balance surplus. Papen's cabinet had seen the consequences of credit expansion for
87. Meeting of the economic policy committee, Apr 24, 1933, in ADAP C, i, pp.332-9. Knut Borchardt, "Could and should Germany have followed Great Britain in leaving the Gold Standard?" in: JEurEcH 1984 3, pp.471-97, argues that devaluation in 1932 was hardly possible. H. James, op.cit. (1986), p.396f, points out that support for devaluation among business people was still scarce in in 1934 and 1936. Barkai, op.cit., pp.138-42, and Doering, op.cit., pp.219-22, consider it was a feasible alternative to currency controls. Italy's refusal to devalue also had political rather than strictly economic grounds; see Gianni Toniolo L'economia dell'Italia fascista Rome 1980, p.186. *7
88. Ibid., p.335f. Hitler's ideal was an economy which imported only raw materials and (until domestic production could be broadened) foodstuffs. This pleased agrarian interests. Most economists held that the export of investment goods and the import of consumer products foster world trade growth. Hitler assumed world trade would not grow, and sought to maximise Germany's share of the existing amount. See A. Barkai, "Wirtschaftliche Grundanschauungen und Ziele der NSDAP" in: JIG 7 (1978), pp.355-87; and Harold James, op.cit., pp.346-54. For a general discussion of trade and growth, see Alfred Maizels, op.cit.
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trade. Concern for the trade balance had delayed the adoption of
def icit spending. In August 1931 Warmbold had argued: "foreign trade has not contracted as much as the domestic market. Accordingly attention must be directed at the latter, but without switching to a purely domestically oriented policy. The drop in domestic turnover has also led to the fall in government revenue,
89 and this is another reason to revive the home market". After Britain left the Gold Standard, Hermann Dietrich pondered on the substitution of domestic for foreign markets: "only one course is possible. Squeeze imports to a minimum, and then pursue an 90 exclusively home-oriented policy until the uproar is over". Trendeleburg thought the state of the business cycle and of the trade balance determined the advisability of job creation programmes. The prospect of success was better if the nadir of the depression had been reached. He wondered "whether a revival was 91 possible without a hitch due to a worsening trade balance." Reinhardt's plan expanded greatly on Papen's; by mid 1933, confidence that a recovery was underway was far stronger.
By mid 1933, a protectionist system had been built up. Despite three changes of government, trade policy did not swing widely. The redirection came in stages: the acceptance of bilateral treaties, the adoption of currency controls, the increased protection of agriculture and finally the reflation of the domestic economy.
89. Cabinet protocol, Aug 3, 1931 (BA R43/I, 1451).
90. Deutsche Staatspartei executive meeting, Sep 26, 1931, in Politik und Wirtschaft, 4/ ii/ p.1001. See also Schaffer's diary 91 entries for Oct 10, 1931 and Mar 4, 1932, ibid., pp.1032-5 and p.1316. Dietrich and Schaffer both thought that compensation business, though undesireable, had become necessary.
91. Economic Ministry meeting, Feb 12, 1932 (PA/AA Sonderref. W., Wirtschaft 1, Paneuropaische Bewegungen, Vol. 14).
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Bilateral treaties were sought in 1931, as a response to protectionism abroad. Britain devalued and imposed a new tariff. Italy increased tariffs by 15%. Switzerland and Czechoslovakia took steps to cut their deficits with Germany. South American countries imposed higher tariffs and quotas. A League of Nations report approved preference treaties and suggested theat a unified European market could only be reached via interim regional
92
agreements. The US criticised these trends, and censured Britain's attempts at Imperial economic cooperation. But it
93 undertook no major initiative.
The move to protectionism internationally came towards the 94
end of 1931, but Germany sought preferences even earlier. Its avowed intention was to help the Southeast recover, but there was also a political consideration. The successful formation of a block of agricultural states would have hindered revision of Versailles. Precisely for this reason France hoped for a system of preferences centred on themselves.
Currency controls were a legitimate response to the bank crisis of July 1931. Their potential as a tool of trade policy was however seen from the start. Other policy decisions, in favour of reflation and against devaluation, dictated their progressive t ightening.
The successive administrations' stances on agricultural 929394
92. The League of Nations Commission of Inquiry for European Union endorsed preferences at its conference in May, 1931. See Sundhaussen, p.l39f: see also a note on the Commission's report of August 1931, (Dec 24,1931), (PA/AA Sonderref. W . , Wirtschaft 1, Paneuropaische Bewegungen, Vol. 13).
93. See report by Ulrich on US attitudes, May 20, 1932 (PA/AA Handakten Wiehl, Praferenzvertrage, Vol. 1).
94. Thus a memo by Kroll, June 14, 1932 (PA/AA Sonderref. W . , V/irtschaft 1, Allgemeine Wirtschaftslage, Vol. 12).
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tarriffs varied, though not as much as has been suggested. Papen's cabinet was more favourable to agriculture than Briining's or Schleicher's, but in each case there were clashes between the Ministers of Economics and of Agriculture. The accession of the NSDAP to the cabinet strengthened the protectionist faction.
Agricultural protection fitted easily into the idea of a domestically-based recovery. The limited expansion of credit under Papen marked the beginning of reflation. The difficulties this would pose for exports were unmistakeable. Thus reflation in turn fitted well with the attempt to form a German-led trading block.
The continuity evident despite frequent changes of government suggests the bureaucracy, dominated by Posse and Ritter, played a key role. Their memos in 1932 prefigured both the emphasis on the home market and on bilateral trade negotiations which were central
96
to the Hitler administration's approach. Did the bureaucrats initiate policy spontaneously or merely reflect the shifting 9596
95
95. "During the first third of the year (1932), Bruning continued his fruitless attempt to reconcile the two opposing perspectives (export and domestic orientations); in the middle third Papen tried to implement the radical protectionist programme based on import quotas; in the abbreviated final third, Schleicher sought to resurrect the liberal bloc's policy under the exclusion of the rural elite. In each case the "unity of state policy" was noteworthy for its absense: the economics minister and the agriculture minister, for example, did constant open battle". David Abraham, op.cit., p.216f (see note 1 above). 96. On reflation: "each country which makes an effective effort to get its own economy going again is simultaneously doing the international economy a most useful service" in: Guidelines for the German delegation to the Preparatory Committee (for the World Economic Conference), Jan 3, 1933. ADAP B, xxi, p.539f. On a trading block: Germany's aims at Stresa included "preparing the way for preference agreements, for a limited geographic area and a limited number of commodities. Prevention of a restoration (Sanierung) of the Danube region at the expense of Germany and Italy and allowing the payment of existing debts to England and France". Posse to Wiehl, Sep 23, 1932 in: ibid, p.149; see also Stresa delegation to AA, Sep 12, 1932, ibid, p.108-10.
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political concensus? The Depression cast doubts on the course followed in the late Twenties, and at the end of 1932 there was little prospect of joint international action. The failure of the World Economic Conference was already probable. Keynes wrote: "the Conference will agree in its collective capacity that tariffs and quotas have reached a pitch of absurdity and are a menace to international trade, but there will be no offers by individual
97
countries to reduce them". International monetary problems diverted attention from the structure of trade. Yet the protectionist case was accepted by only a minority of German
9 8
economists. This suggests the bureaucrats' pragmatism was fortified by a strong dose of nationalism. The prime aim was still to loosen the fetters of Versailles.
V
What did small and medium sized enterprises think of these steps, and of the course of events to 1936? One forum for their views was the Association of German Chambers of Commerce, the DIHT. At their 1930 General Meeting a leading member of the presidium, Eduard Hamm, addressed the question of preferences for southeastern Europe. He affirmed that the MFN system must remain
99
the basis of German trade policy . The key to the problem was 979899
97. J.M.Keynes in Wirtschaftsdienst, Dec 23, 1932.
98. See Fritz Boese (ed), Deutschland in der Weltkrise Berlin 1932, an account of the Verein fur Sozialpolitik's 1932 debate on trade policy; E.M. Noonan, "Aspects of German Trade Policy, 1931-1933" (M.A. Thesis, National University of Ireland, 1984), pp.17-41.
99. Verhandlungen des DIHT Heft 12, 1930 (HauptausschuBsitzung, Oct 10, 1930), p.41. Michael Griibler Die Spitzenverbande der Wirtschaft und das erste Kabinet Briinings Düsseldorf 1982, p.293, argues that the DIHT was more ready to accept bilateral treaties with the Southeast than were the RDI at that stage.
