Speculations about the prospective demise of authoritarian regimes and its possible consequences

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(1)F L O RENCE. DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES. r. E U I. W O R K I N G. P A P E R. No. 85/165. SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE PROSPECTIVE DEMISE OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES by Philippe C. Schmitter. BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI). © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. EUROPEAN UNIV E R S I T Y INSTITUTE,.

(2) in whole or in part without the prior permission of the author. (c). Philippe C. SCHMITTER. Printed in Italy in May 1985 European University Institute Badia Fiesolana 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) ITALY. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. This paper should not be reproduced.

(3) This is a revised version of a paper first presented as "Authoritarian Expériences and the Prospects for Democracy", at the workshop on "Prospects for Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarian Rule", sponsored by the Latin American program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 1980. A subsequent draft with the same title as the present one was initially circulated as Working Paper No. 60 (1980) of the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., but has been out of print now for several years. In any case, this version has been substantially revised. Some of its themes and concepts will appear in essays contained in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions From Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols. (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming in 1985), especially in the fourth volume written by Guillermo O'Donnell and myself entitled Political Life After Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Transitions. Despite repeated urgings by critics to divorce my speculations from those of Machiavelli, I have refused to do I apologize to the reader for so m this revised edition. seem an excessive preoccupation with this what may Florentine. Incidentally, this intellectual illustrious antedates my coming to the European University f ascination in Florence and, therefore, should not be Institute as a case of "ecological determinism" or interpreted nativism". My rediscovery of Machiavelli I owe in "adoptive large part to Elissa B. Weaver of the Department of Romance Languages of the University of Chicago. She has gently, but firmly, sought to keep me faithful to the original works and is, therefore, in no way responsible for the distortion and extensions I have no doubt forced upon them.. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. PREFACE.

(4) © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository..

(5) How. and why do authoritarian regimes break down? Who are the. agents, and what are the motives involved in the deterioration and eventual. transformation of this mode of political domination? How. do. past. experience with authoritarian rule and the circumstances. of. its. demise affect future democratic performance? What are the. processes of democratization which ensue from such a liberation of political forces? Which possible combination of actors and actions will of. best. ensure a viable democratic outcome? What configuration. institutions and pattern of benefits are likely to emerge from. such a transformation in regime type?. Not context have. very of. the. posing. considered pura fantasia — science. thinking. with. ago,. of. such questions in the. contemporary Latin American and Southern Europe would. been. political. long. To. fiction. or. a. an imaginative exercise in. naive. expression. of. wishful. the extent that scholars were explicitly concerned. regime-level. questions at all, their attention was directed. elsewhere.. Most. interrelated. (and presumably viable) properties of "bureaucratic-. authoritarian imperatives in. the. were. rule" for. and/or. preoccupied. with. demonstrating. delineating. the. the ineluctable. its emergence (and, putatively, its persistence). context of the regions'. semi-peripheral,. with. delayed, dependent, peripheral or. capitalist development.. explaining away the survival. A few were keeping busy. of rare democratic exceptions due to. mitigating circumstances and/or extraordinary conditions.. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 1.

(6) Rather about. suddenly. regime. elite. and. Scholars, the. transformation moved up on the agenda of public and. attention. relevancia. as. demand. and quite unexpectedly, the above questions. from. pura. even,. in. a. for. Of. to. their. there. services,. were. authoritarian. rule. dilemmas. eventual. and. enough. to. least, gran. possible. actualidad.. their recently acquired. ill-fitting,. if. not. ill-. about. account. for. democracy. scattered. possible. in the explanations of. inconsistencies,. contradictions,. unresolved. and a case could be made. if unexplained and unexpected, changes. especially in the structure of the world economy—. transformation. of. found. garments. hints. significant,. had occurred — to. places,. at. the task of explaining such an unanticipated outcome.. course,. that. few. to,. usual responding belatedly and opportunistically to. conceptual-cum-theoretical suited,. fantasia. the. possibility. Nevertheless, in. of. "necessary". regime. the mere prospect of a resurgence. Latin America and Southern Europe was enough to. provoke an "agonizing reappraisal" of assumptions about the nature of. the. fit. development. between. regime. type,. class. structure,. economic. and international context in those parts of the world. ( 1 ).. This. intriging. theoretical group the. of. combination. embarassment scholars. no. of. doubt. practical. motivated. urgency. and. the decision of a. associated with the Latin American Program of. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars to convoke a. working. group. Transitions. from. on. the. topic. of. "Prospects. for. Democracy:. Authoritarian Rule". Several of its members had. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 2.

(7) contributed. significantly. "bureaucratic point. out,. that. to. authoritarian. the. previous. regimes". —. discussion. on. and, it is only fair to. to the criticism of that paradigm (2). As a member of. group, I think it accurate to say that all of us felt that a. re-examination forces. these themes required detailed analyses of the. and factors involved in specific —. cases. (past. democracy, processes the. of. and as. well. and. one. present) as. generic. of. regime. speculative. hopefully analogous — transformation. exploration. toward. of the general. issues raised by such transformations. On. hand, we recognized that we needed much more information. and insight about what had happened and was actually happening; on the other hand, we considered it necessary to attempt, even before the. necessary. such. empirical material was available, to identify what. instances. and. examples might have in common, and why their. outcomes might be expected to differ.. Guillermo O'Donnell and I first drafted a loose problématique outlining attract about to. attention its. the Adam. issues t;o. and. our. themes. joint. (3).. It was intended to. venture and to elicit comments. scope, content and approach. The statement also served. establish. assigned “. relevant. a. tentative. division. of. labor under which I was. the less savory, but more tractable, job of dealing with. "Demise of Authoritarian Rule", while Guillermo O'Donnell and Przeworski. would. engage. in. the. more. appetizing task of. speculating about the generic causes and consequences of the "Rise of Democracy". (4). *. *. ★. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 3.

(8) When. the. above mentioned problématique was circulated among. potential. participants. responses. particularly. accused not at. it. other. intrigued. interested me:. one. scholars,. perceptive. of being insufficiently Machiavellian —. having the. and. two. critic. perhaps. for. put theoretical speculation squarely and aggressively. service. of. improving the prospect for a republican-cum-. democratic. outcome;. a second, equally perceptive, critic charged. that. was. it. assumption or. —. perhaps. for. its. that political regimes are not merely given by culture. the. paradoxical master,. merit of either or both of these accusations, their message. sent. me. scurring. back. to. the Florentine. first out of curiosity and, then, for edification.. For. there. substantive carefully. also. Machiavellian. imposed by circumstance, but are willed and chosen into being.. Whatever. (5). excessively. I. not. matters,. only but. found. also. considerable. a. inspiration in. sober injunction "to consider. how human affairs proceed". (Discourses, II, 29, p. 342). and, therefore, not to flinch from unpleasant conclusions. He gave. me. definite. rule. particular similar details,. the. methodological. concerning. details. decision". of. these. those. and,. tip. matters. states. therefore,. that. without. wherein if. one. "one cannot give a knowing. the. one had to take a did. not know those. the only way to proceed was by abstraction and deduction. "in as general a manner as the subject matter will allow". (Prince,. XX, 146). Finally, I received optimistic support for my implicitly comparative. approach. in his argument that "in all cities and all. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 4.

(9) peoples. there. desires. and. still. and. exist. passions.. always. it. is. an. events. to. foresee. Thus. past. have. existed, the same. easy matter for him who future events in a. carefully. examines. republic,. or, if old remedies cannot be found, to devise new ones. based upon the similarity of the events". Within subject new. the. limits. matter. ways. of. imposed. (Discourses, I, 39, 252).. by my lesser talents and by the. itself (alas, new desires and passions, or better satisfying. and. frustrating. ancient. desires. and. passions, seem to have further complicated political life since he wrote. in. the. properly initial. early. 1500s),. Machiavellian. critics.. obsessive.. In. I. I will attempt in this essay to be. doubt this would satisfy either of my. I. know. my. reliance on Machiavelli has become. only. hope. it. will. provide. a fruitful point of. departure, although I fear it exposes me to an awesome standard of comparison (6).. I. DUBIOUS. "...THERE OF. SUCCESS,.. IS NOTHING MORE DIFFICULT TO EXECUTE, NOR MORE. NOR. MORE. DANGEROUS. TO ADMINISTER THAN TO. INTRODUCE A NEW SYSTEM OF THINGS: FOR HE WHO INTRODUCES IT HAS ALL THOSE ONLY. WHO. PROFIT. LUKEWARM. SYSTEM". THE OLD SYSTEM AS HIS ENEMIES AND HE HAS IN ALL THOSE WHO MIGHT PROFIT FROM THE NEW. (PRINCE, VI. 94.). Regime considerable lesser,. FROM. ALLIES. risk. transformation risk to. to those. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 5. those. —. in whatever direction — involves a promoting. it and a substantial, if. defending against it. Not only are "many.

(10) conspiracies (Prince few "a. VI,. new. system. content power. therefore,. of. changing. very. Of all the acts of political courage. efforts. authority. the of. Machiavelli suggests, will manage to institute. of things".. knavery,. structure. are. 94), but even once successful in seizing power, very. conspirators,. and. in. ... attempted but very few reach their desired goal",. likely. to. be. altering. the basic at. choice and not just the. at affecting the established distribution of. resources and not just words,. at. and not just the occupants of office,. calculus of public. policy,. other. aimed. the pattern of political benefits. —. attacks on the persistence of a given regime — among. the. rationally. spontaneous. the. behavior. rebels may appear and even become in the course of a. change,. violent. under. seizure. that. of. behavior. power lies. a. or. and. and. willful.. mobilized,. passionate. calculated. deliberately of. However. most. other. calculus. form of regime of dissent —. a. weighing of costs and benefits to be probabilistically gained from different. investments in political action and vdifferent resultant. configurations and. import. cannot. unconscious reactions. of. authority (7). Political action of this nature be. responses. explained to. exclusively in terms of either. functional. to cultural norms —. imperatives or instinctual. no matter how much "necessity", as. Machiavelli liked to call it, establishes the conditions of choice or "love" determines what actors would prefer to see happen. It is the. calculus. of dissent with respect to regime type that we will. attempt to expose below.. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 6.

(11) So. uncertain,. however,. is the calculus and so momentous may. be the consequences for any given individual that most will prefer to. make. it. This rational indifference to regime questions,. coupled. with. the. not. when. quasi-instinctual nature of political behavior. transformation.. If,. way never changes" would. personal they. incur. low. and. strongest. the. constitutes. he. are. stakes. the. indeed,. the. actions. barrier. to. are. repetitive,. possible. regime. "a man who is used to acting in one. (Discourses, III, 9, 382), and if, by changing, a high risk of political failure (not to mention. injury), why would regime forms change at all? Why would. not. marginal. merely. perpetuate. adjustments. in. themselves. policy. and. indefinitely. through. occasional circulations in. elites?. This. question. of. why. regime. transformation occurs I will. address later. What is of concern here is the implication that the demise. of. political compared. one. form. domination to. the. possible. rise of another form of. is a relatively rare event, especially when. most instances of political behavior which have been. "scientifically" of. and. observed. and analyzed. There can be no question. using. effectively the powers of statistical inference or even. empirical. induction based on a large number of observations. Each. case. will. not. to. be. too uniquely specified in time, space and content,. mention. the. exemplification,. past. the. and. present. —. fact cases. the. that,. through. diffusion. and. will contaminate those occurring in. future.. Purely inductive theory risks. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 7.

(12) a. "one. to. one". mapping. of. reality. with. as. many. explanations as cases, as many variables as events (8).. We. must,. subject. matter. processes, logic. therefore,. of. motives their. specifications, case. whose. future. will. past. outcome. proceed "in as general a manner as the. allow", and. identify a set of generic outcomes,. actors. and seek to expose the politico-. interrelation, knowing full well that the types, and. Gestalten may not fit well with any specific. behavior one. is. one is attempting to explain or whose. attempting. work backward —. to. predict. In this vein, I. propose. to. from a typology of how authoritarian. regimes. are overthrown, to why this might happen, to who might be. involved and, finally, to what might be the consequences of such a demise for the possible rise of a democratic replacement.. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. becoming.

(13) II. AUTHORITARIAN TRANSFORMED. REGIMES IN. ONE. COMMONLY OF. TRANSFORM. THEMSELVES OR ARE. FOUR WAYS DEPENDING ON WHO LEADS THE. STRUGGLE AND WHETHER ACTUAL VIOLENCE IS USED.. No. regime. overthrown. No. of. ruling,. authoritarian. unless. violence. circle. —. it. matter. and how. beneficiaries. those. procedures. in. not. its. other. supporters. poor. the. —. collapses or is. are. threatened. by. performance, how narrow the. or how weak the moral justification for. power. (but. or. (PCS). will. persist. necessarily. in. in. their. their. practices and. policies). until. sufficiently and plausibly threatened by physical harm or forceful loss. of. resources (9). When compelled to act, they may do so out. of imperative necessity or anticipated reaction.. For rulers do not always wait to act until forced to do so on the. terrain. Political their. at. actors. are. actions. "theory" have. and. their opponents' choosing.. of projecting the consequences of. predicting. analogous and. Machiavelli *. capable. of. those. of others. With the aid of. (usually bashed on examples from cases elsewhere judged to. been. outcomes. and. the moment. act put. in. so it,. nature),. as to. they. forestall. "in order. not to. may. anticipate. unwanted. future. outcomes.. lose everything,. As. (actors. were). forced to concede to (others) their own share" (Prince, II,. 181).. Therefore,. material. benefits. mobilization physical. regimes. of. force. or. may. symbolic. change in nature (and not just in trappings). without. an. actual. their opponents and/or without the actual use of —. although its presence is always lurking in the. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 9.

(14) background.. In. other. words,. power. may. be. given. over. (Machtuebergabe) and not just seized (Machtergreifung).. Where. actors. remaining of. in. power. calculate. that. the. benefits. to. in power clearly exceed the costs (direct and indirect). repressing. their. opponents,. they. will. resist to threat of. violence. with actual violence. In fact in such circumstances they. have. incentive. an. to. act. pre-emptively. violence by their opponents —. and. even. to provoke. thereby, achieving what Machiavelli. constantly strives for, i.e. "an economy of violence".. Where actors in power miscalculate their own resources and/or those. of. option. their. of. intact, Quite. exiting. they the. becomes. threatening opponents, or where they perceive no. will. from. the. situation. also. act. violently, but without efficiency.. contrary,. such. counterproductive:. weaker. (their. population. regime). as. their. with. miscalculated "the. and desperate violence. more cruelty (they) employ, the. becomes" enemy. crucial resources. when. rulers. (Discourses. I,. have 16,. the general 220).. Also. Machiavelli sagely warns that once regime proponents and opponents are other. forced. to. with insults,. conflict. and. dangerously them. mobilize themselves and actually to confront each. to. go. opportunity. the. :. expectations. lodged. in. its. outcome. rise. "When (false) hope enters men's breasts, it causes. beyond of. insolence and violence both the stakes in the. their. possessing. work a. better one that is less certain". and, in most cases, to lose the. certain good by hoping to obtain a (Discourses, II, 27, 339).. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 10.

(15) Regimes reactions Actors of. may. to. also. violent. change. from. mobilization. a sequential combination of and peaceful transformation.. who have been successful in the past at meeting the threat. violence. with the use of violence against their opponents may. 9. choose <-. over. to. react. to. the prospect of renewed violence by handing. power (or a portion of it) because their former actions have. temporarily. eliminated. their most dangerous opponents or because. they are beginning to suffer the weakness brought on by their past cruelties. the. In this case, regime transformations coincide not with. high point of violent mobilization, but with its aftermath —. even with periods of considerable quiescence.. The. presence. authoritarian policies). regime. a. threat. (and. differentially. calculation groups:. of. not. of just. affects. the. violence. against. a. given. against one or more of its political. necessity. and. of two (not always initially clearly distinguishable). (1) those who have benefitted from and/or been included in. the. regime; and (2) those who have suffered or been excluded from. it.. As. we. shall. differential reactions,. see infra, a great deal hinges on whether this. impact or. produces. two. exclusive. and. polarized. whether it has a centripetal influence through its. %. differential '. effect. within. the. two. "camps". of supporters and. opponents.. Among deprivations to. choose. regime. opponents,. (antagonists,. those. who. have. suffered. direct. let us call them) will be most likely. increased mobilization and advocate violent overthrow,. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 11.

(16) but. they will probably lack the necessary resources for effective. collective. action. "prince",. e.g.. movements.. unless. exiles. Those. they. or. who. are. assisted. members have. of. been. by. some external. transnational politically. political. excluded. by. authoritarian. rulers, but have not suffered specific deprivations. (subjects. my terminology) may possess the aggregate resources. in. necessary; intense. however,. their. sheer. numbers,. dispersion. and less. motivation normally mitigate against collective action on. their part.. Among from. it. respond. regime. supporters those included with it, benefitting. and responsible for it (protagonists) are most likely to violently in its defense, so much so that they may resort. to violence even against fellow benefactors who show a willingness to compromise with real or emergent threats.. but. Finally,. actors. are. directly. policies. not. benefit from the authoritarian regime,. dependent. on. it. or responsible for its. (supporters) . present a real but ambiguous threat to its. persistence. negative). who. They are likely to possess significant (positive and. resources, to be small enough in number, concentrated in. location, and astute enough in calculation to act collectively out of. choice. retaining. and. not. already. necessity acquired. —. if sufficiently assured about. resources. some different form of governance.. and future benefits under. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 12.

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(18) Those politico-logical distinctions can be juxtaposed to each other. to produce a matrix with four modal types or strategies for. the demise of authoritarian rule.. 11.1. in. a seizure of power, some segment or faction of those who. have. participated. react. with. eject, from. and. benefitted. from authoritarian rule. concerted violence, normally by coup d'Etat, to. even. to eliminate physically, the present occupants. executive. office.. They are most likely to attempt to. institute a purified, more repressive and exclusive, type of regime,. although their sheer vulnerability may lead them to. broaden their basis of support by appealing to some subjects of the previous regime.. 11.2. In. a transfer of power, the principal actors guiding regime. transformation. consist. directly. compromised. policies. and. without. a. who. of by. ex-beneficiaries or. acquire. substantial. deeply. involved. who. were not. with regime. their reins of power and office. mobilization. for violence on their. part.. II.3. In. a. surrender. of. power,. previous authoritarian rulers,. faced with a greater credible threat from antagonists and/or more aggressive protagonists, prudentially agree to withdraw from actors. formal not. positions. of. authority. in favor of a set of. compromised with the now defunct regime but not. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 14.

(19) themselves. capable of mobilized violence. A special case of. this type consists of situations in which the transformation occurs. the context of impending or actual defeat in war )' and may be presided over by an occupying foreign power.. II.4. In. in. an overthrow of power, the previous authoritarian rulers. resist. violently,. but. unsuccessfully,. and. are forceably. ousted by the mobilized efforts of their formerly conformist subjects. and. victimized. antagonists.. Here, they lose not. only formal control over the offices of public authority and the. transition. resources —. process,. up to and including both property and life.. *. Needless calculus. of. to. say,. regime. even. these. of. instances". are. successful. seizures. spectre. of. personal are. not. an. may. of. impending. *. concrete results. historical instance of the in. the downfall of a given. involve some combination of several or. modal only. *. types.. One. could. argue. that "pure. rare, but likely to fail. For example, power. usually. overthrow. depend. on. at least the. by radical antagonists. The. sacrifice and mass mobilization involved in an overthrow. unlikely. prudential. any. dissent, which. authoritarian all. but also their informal political. to. prevail where either a preemptive transfer or a. surrender. of. power. offers. a. much. easier and more. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 15.

(20) attractive. resolution. to. the. regime. crisis. —. unless. such. temptations are ruled out by hard-time protagonists.. A. recent. (implicitly). volume that. simultaneously, the. problem. introductory from. such. but. of. on. previously. breakdown. strategies. as. of. should. democracies argues be. regarded. not as. sequentially available modes for solving. regime. essay. the. transformation. (10).. Juan. Linz in his. argues that the rise of authoritarian regimes. democratic. ones. involved either an inadvertent. overthrow. through civil war or, more often, a surrender of power,. but. eventual outcome followed upon a prior seizure of power. by. this a. narrowly-based group within the previous democratic regime.. Such prior transformations within the factional structure of power also seem characteristic of the demise of authoritarian rule.. For (he. Machiavelli,. cites. bloodless scorn. on. those to. Discourses III, 6, 360). He repeatedly poured. who . sought. such. a. transformation,. conspiratorial normative viable. approval Juvenal's maxim that "few tyrants die a. death" —. compromise regime. with. mobilized violence was a virtual necessity. bias. seizure. negotiated,. middle-of-the-road. issue. Certainly the literature on. scanty. as. and/or. mass. against. democracies. "second-best". vital. a. it is, emphasizes the role of overthrow. Perhaps it is my. violence or my empirical conviction that. have. emerged. more. often. compromises. between. stalemated. historically political. as. forces. incapable of imposing their preferred mode of governance by regime seizure. or. overthrow (11), but I intend to pay special attention. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 16.

(21) to. strategies. beneficiaries eject of. of transfer and surrender in which previous regime and. forceably. passive. opponents —. unable and. unwilling to. authoritarian rulers from power —. are incapable ) ruling without each other's resources of power and legitimacy.. Hence, they reach a compromise and agree to establish some form of democracy. which. excludes. protagonists. and. The. property. central. declining. revanchiste. regime. is. leading. the. we. have. transfer. I. extremes. stressed. vulnerability. extremists.. moderates.. the. of. die-hard. antagonists of the defunct regime.. usually. centrifugal to. only. will. or. to be. in. the. context. overthrow. of. a. or seizure by. looking for dispensability. surrender. of power to centripetal. We are by no means assured of finding the latter, but reason. to. suspect. that. such an outcome may provide a. better and more viable basis for political democracy.. III.. (BECAUSE POWER LACK. OF OF. RESULT. MEN'S). DESIRE. IS. ALWAYS GREATER THAN THEIR. ACQUISITION, DISCONTENT WITH WHAT THEY POSSESS AND SATISFACTION (13).. FORTUNES,. (12). FOR LOSE. FROM SINCE WHAT. (WITH THIS. HOW. ARISE. THEY OBTAINED IT) ARE THE THE. VARIATIONS. IN. THEIR. SOME DESIRE TO POSSESS MORE AND OTHERS. FEAR. TO. THEY HAVE ACQUIRED,. (POLITICAL ENMITIES. WILL. CONSTANTLY ARISE AND LEAD TO THE RUIN OF ONE REGIME AND. THE EXHALTATION OF ANOTHER - PCS) Discourses, I, 37, 247.. Given that "human affairs are always in motion, either rising or. declining". (Discourses, II, Intro., 288) and, hence, that "all. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 17.

(22) things of this world have a limit to their existence" 111,1,. 351),. regimes. perhaps. collapse. patterned,. consensual. prudence. in. existing. order,. ways. doing. of. or. the. one. should. are. transformed,. domination. (Discourses,. wonder, not why authoritarian. can. but long. why. any. form. of. endure. Presumably,. face of the high risks involved in changing the combined. with. a general inability to learn new. things (14), prevent political life from becoming. completely chaotic in form and random in behavior.. Moreover, requires is. to. whatever. the. type. of regime, its internal order. some degree of self-limitation and self-abnegation if it survive:. "Just as the states of princes have endured for a. long time so too have the states of republics; both have needed to be. regulated. wishes. laws,. for. a. prince who is able to do what he. is mad, and a people that can do what it wishes is unwise". (Discourses, of. by. I, 58, 285). This "legality" is far from the element. "legitimacy". stressed. by. so. many. Neo-Weberian students of. regime persistence in that it refers to self-regulated, prudential behavior. by. those. in.. power,. not to the belief by those out of. power that their rulers are rightfully entitled to their positions of domination.. Purely arbitrary, unself-restrained, i.e. "tyrannical", forms of. authoritarian. encourage. rule. "madness". are. among. intrinsically their. leaders. unstable because they and. cannot inculcate. predictable and prudential ways of acting in their subjects — because. not. their "princes" are disliked by the people or their forms. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 18.

(23) illegitimate or. highly. in. the eyes of the citizenry. Hence,. personalistic,. different. problems. (especially. and. physical. their. demise,. the. longer-term. correspondingly. "sultanistic",. authoritarian regimes (15) face rather. must. rely on rather different resources. coercion. and fear) to survive. The mode of. the motivation and identity of their opponents and consequences. likely. to. of. their. replacement. are. be different from those of their more. established, impersonal, predictable,. "bureaucratic-authoritarian". relatives.. III.l.. "Since. human. remain. fixed,. it. things. you are not compelled to do by reason, you are impelled to. do. necessity". by. (or,. better,. affairs. is. are. necessary. (Prince,. diminish. constantly changing and never that they rise or fall and many. VI, 192). Authoritarian regimes fall. in their viability) from two intersecting. and. overlapping sets of motives. By necessity, people may have to. act. (be. compelled. already. to. act) out of fear of losing what they have. acquired or out of need for acquiring what they feel they. must. have.. act). out. By. reaspn,. people may choose to act (be impelled to. of calculation of what may happen in the future, unless. changes. intervene, or out of admiration for what they regard as a. better,. more. just,. socio-political. order.. Machiavelli, while. acknowledging the force of reasonable anticipation and admiration, was. skeptical. predictability unless never. about. the. constancy. of its outcome:. good. except. out. its. effect. and. the. "men always turn out badly for you. some necessity makes them good" do. of. (Prince, XXIII, 137); "men. of necessity, but when they have the. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 19.

(24) freedom. to. choose. and. can. do. they. please,. becomes. 182).. Love. for a particularly just leader or admiration for good. moral. principles, in. "since. and disorderly". everything. immediately. occasion. confused. as. (Discourses, I, 3,. men are a sorry lot is broken on every. which their own self-interest is concerned; but fear. is held together by a dread of punishment which will never abandon you". (Prince,. XVII,. necessary. fear,. those. power,. in. depriving might. 131).. not. just. but. actions. If the. also. by. one. in. the notion of. possibility of punishing acts by. the. those. includes. more "capitalistic" response of. in control of the economy, then one. agree with Machiavelli that satisfaction of immediate self-. interest. provides. a. opposing. or. remote). calculation. more. supporting. prominent. and predictable motive for. a given regime than reasonable (but more. and/or. reasonable. (but. possibly. fickle). admiration (16).. Nevertheless, rational. the. subsequent. development of instruments of. calculation in political life (e.g. professional staffs,. statistical. data. analysis. and. inference,. planning techniques,. social science theory, etc.) and the growing role of international standards. of admirable behavior in political life (e.g. Universal. Declaration. of. Human. constitutional. prologues,. have. enhanced. the. type.. Levels. punishments the. of for. Rights,. international. importance living. U.N.. above. violations. of. Charter, pressure. innumerable groups, etc.). choice with respect to regime. mere subsistence and more humane. of authority have perhaps diminished. centrality of sheer necessity and survival in the calculus of. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 20.

(25) political. action.. authoritarian and. Opponents. rule. and. renegade. supporters. of. may feel sufficiently freed from those narrow. predictable. constraints to indulge in their preference for a. more. legitimate. and just type of regime, or to take a calculated. risk. on. the. longer-term. benefits. to. be. gleaned. rational and better structured form of governance — enticed. to. do. so. by. from a more even when not. the opportunity for immediate benefits or. forced to do so by the prospect of unbearable costs.. For these motivational categories of necessity and choice, we can. deduce. four. authoritarian. modal. regime. answers. may. be. to. the question of why a given. seized. or. overthrown,. forced to. transfer or surrender power:. III.l.. Success:. If. modern. authoritarian. regimes. are. the. contemporary functional equivalents of classic dictatorship, their demise would be easy to understand, Machiavelli. defined. circumscribed problem power. for to. the. if still difficult to predict.. dictator. as. "(one). created. for. a. period, of time, and only in order to deal with the which. decide. he was chosen. for. danger,. punish. anyone without appeal, but he could do nothing which would the. them. historial. everything. without. consultation, and to. form of government ..." (Prince, XXXIV, 244). Once the. authoritarian placed. do. himself the way in which to deal with this. urgent. alter. to. His authority encompassed the. rulers in. power. parenthesis". had. satisfied the necessities of those who. (including. their. own), the "unfortunate. would come to an end and the polity would. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 21.

(26) return. to. rulers,. the. form. of. government it had known previously. The. finding that "those who were at first trusted" had become. increasingly. hostile. to. the. ruler's. perpetration in power and. being unable to obtain "more loyalty and more utility in those men who,. at. the. beginning. (Prince,. XX,. 148). aside.. Most. rule. problem-solving. the. imperatives.. inventing their. new. irreversibly return. to. to. better, should) prudentially step. of. dictators. to. alter. for. on such a functionalist,. apologists tend to discount or ignore. promoters, them. based. justifications. the relation between regime type and. These. that. "liberal" be. "necessities". initial brought. (or. seem. "logic". possibility. that. would. their rule, were considered suspect". contemporary. authoritarian. system. of. in. will. succeed. order. in. creating. or. to retain the support of. or that they will resolve the problems. power so slowly or in a manner that would. the. pre-existing. from of government, making. it virtually impossible. In Machiavelli's terms, there. is an ever-present danger that they will "corrupt the society".. III.2.. Failure:. If. the. authoritarian. regime. persistently and. manifestly fails to resolve the problems which occasioned its rise (or. which. expectant. were. occasioned. beneficiaries. transformation. as. will. necessary.. by. its come. rise), to. fear. its benefactors and it. and regard its. Its initial enemies and subsequent. victims. will, consequently, be reinforced in their opposition. An. extreme. instance of regime failure —. indeed, the most common and. probable cause of the demise of such regimes —. has been defeat in. war. Machiavelli notes that unsuccessful republics/democracies are. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 22.

(27) more. threatened. the. expression. their. own. by of. making. unsuccessful vulnerable. dissent. in. (Prince,. reaction to failures not even of. XXXIII, 241). By inverted reasoning,. principalities/authoritarian to. themselves. "internal emergencies" because they tolerate. "external. provoke. emergencies",. failure. by. regimes if. only. may. be. more. because. they. engaging in more adventurous and. aggressive foreign policies.. In. the. failure it. of. simplest,. but. least. likely,. of circumstances the. authoritarian rule is so complete and convincing that. provokes. what. Machiavelli. called "universal hatred" uniting. both the common people and the notables against it. Only defeat in war. seems. capable. consensus. diffuse,. More. of. likely. assessment. of. bringing. about. such. a. "catastrophic". the. situation in which a broad, but. failure. pervades "the general populace". is. while a small, privileged set of supporters continues to judge the regime. successful. failures either "the. yet. still indispensible). Such relative. in authoritarian governance may persist for some time -because. the .extent of malperformance has not yet reached. realm of necessity" where vital interests are threatened, or. because to. (and. the. "free. sheer diffuseness of its impact encourages opponents. ride", hoping that someone else will take the risks and. pay the costs of seizing or overthrowing the regime.. In. discussing. (Discourses general. "the. causes. of. conspiracy against Princes". III, 6, 358), Machiavelli downplays the importance of. unpopularity-cum-hatred.. It becomes crucial, he suggests. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 23.

(28) elsewhere unable. only. to. call. overcome. a. (Prince,. IX,. likely. 109).. individuals". —. small. survival.. or. type of failure which is most lies. deprivation,. specifically. in "offenses against. interpreted as unjust or. designated. persons. (or,. by. Since. the. (or. certain. the. fact of losing what one has. eminent prospect of such a loss) is a. and more predictable basis for action than the uncertain. opportunity some. to his authority and office. challenges. of. of the common people" to. groups) who, as a consequence, come to fear for. acquired. stronger. specific. these. acts. friendship challenge. The. against. extension,. already. "the. focused. provoke. arbitrary,. times of adversity", when the prince will be. upon. more. to. their. "in. for obtaining what one does not yet have (or has lost. time ago), and since those who lose some property, privilege honor. are. resources since. at. likely hand. still. than. to. those. have. more disposable political. who have never had them (or long. been deprived of them), it is the failures of authoritarian. rulers which affect discrete groups or individuals among their own supporters "causing. a. implication its. and. past. beneficiaries. conspiracy" is. that. against. that. are. most conducive to. perpetuation. in. power.. if a failed regime can manage to distribute. deprivations in a diffuse and proportional manner —. across. the. survive. population,. periods. of. The. very. but. among. poor. its own supporters —. performance,. even. not only it can. if it is not. admired or loved on other grounds.. Most. authoritarian. regimes are neither marked successes nor. manifest failures (17). Their mixed performance, confounded by the. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 24.

(29) emergence into. existence. them), if. of new problems in addition to those which brought them (some. sustains. regime. of. their. own. creation; some thrust upon. them in power much longer than would be expected. change were a mere instrumental-functionalist response. to what liberals call "the problems of modernization" and Marxists call. "the. imperative. capitalist. development".. "Salvationist" managing which. a. populace. particular. and. from. doubt, which. threats. of. of. delayed-dependent. instances withdraw. can. be found of. after successfully. crisis, and of "catastrophic" autocracies. strategic. transformations. of. No. dictatorships. collapse. strictly. contradictions. to. the. supporters,. authoritarian. survival but. regimes. of. most are. the general contemporary. not. motivated. by necessity. They involve complex elements of choice —. willful. political action based on reasonable anticipation and. admiration.. III.3. Decay (18): Authoritarian rulers "used to acting in one way never. change;. (they). must. come. to. ruin. when. the. changing, no longer ai;e in harmony with (their) ways" III, to. 9,. to. a. whatever. their. shifting. panoply reckoned. unforeseeable. and. the. remove. success. or. failure in meeting these. those who rule for any length of time will have to adjust. (Machiavelli. are. (Discourses,. 382). Whatever the causes-cum-motives of their accession. power,. causes,. times, in. new. about. circumstances; one. half). are. some. of. which. occasioned. by. unavoidable events of fortune; others of which. unintentional one. of. product. inconvenience. of. without. past actions: "one can never causing. another. to. arise". © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 25.

(30) (Discourses, calculation: that. I, 6, 190), or the unavoidable consequence of faulty "shortsightedness in human nature will begin a policy. seems. good. underneath.". All. but. not. notice. the. poison. that. is. (Prince, XXX, 123).. regimes,. restructured. interval. does. therefore,. Machiavelli. must. thought. be. periodically revived and. that. ten years was a maximum. "because after that amount of time has elapsed men begin. to change their habits and to break the laws ... if nothing arises that. recalls. their. the. hearts". rulers. are. authority must. draw. on. (Discourses, will. capable. revision a. of. such. acts. of re-establishment of. of policies because by their nature they. narrower variety of experience than democracies. III,. restrict. to their minds and renews the fear in. (Discourses, III, 1, 353). Princes or authoritarian. less and. penalty. 9, 382), and because their internal procedures. (through. strict. rules of cooptation) or prohibit. (through lifetime perpetuation) the succession to higher office of those. capable. and. issues. out. of. or. to. shifts. a. understanding and responding to new challenges. in novel ways. Whether by rotation of parties in-and-. power. response possess. of. by. realignment in. functional. electoral substitute. of parliamentary alliances in fortune, for. democratic. overcoming. regimes. the fixity of. individual human natures and the sclerosis induced in institutions by. previously. authoritarian as. an. policy. successful policies (19). The inability of a given regime to use predictably the dilemma of succession. opportunity and. order —. to. re-establish. the. foundations of public. more than any other factor —. contributes to. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 26.

(31) strategically disruptive behavior on the part of its supporters as well. as. its opponents. Moreover,. changes. in. the. modifications compulsion and. not. that. to. in. its. the. policies.. regime Even. itself actors. and freed. not from. just the. fearful of losing what they have, may begin to calculate best,. longer-term,. alternatively, the. of. of sheer necessity, benefitting from the regime itself. their. or,. nature. it orients this behavior toward. interest lies with another prince. in a republic "ready to turn itself according. way the winds of fortune and the changeability of affairs. require*.. (Prince, XVIII, 135).. This. strategic. domination growing. on. "indifference". the. to. the. form. of. political. part of those near to power, coupled with the. expectation. that those in office will prove incapable of. coping with the "crooked and unknown roads" of fortune or with the perverse. and. unexpected. outcomes. of. previous. policies,. is. particularly subversive of the viability of authoritarian regimes. Not only is this shift in support difficult to spot beforehand, it is. difficult. to. attribute to any specific, immediately present,. material factor and, hence, virtually impossible to buy off in any reliable. fashion.. renewing. fears". necessity. have. important. opponents. clear. What. Efforts. to. are. only. is. worse,. react by "recalling penalties and. likely. to. precipitate action out of. those most inclined to react to decay. resources to deny the regime and/or to supply its. Authoritarian. regimes. in. such a dilemma are neither. functional successes nor failures according to their stated. objectives or objective states. They have sown the "seeds of their. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 27.

(32) own. destruction". cultivated. - all right, but these have come up, not in the. plots. of fearful necessity, but in the fallow soil of. anticipated reaction.. III.4.. Delegitimation;. might. lead. citizens. Of all the motives Machiavelli considered. to. least. likely and. part. those in power or the "desire to free one's city" on the. of. those. judiciously —. excluded. "love" —. the. he. part. was. rulers,. reliable of. thought. change. by. either the loss of it on the. princely. power.. Doses. of. and economically applied, would suffice —. fear,. he thought. to overcome such momentary losses of popularity and to disperse. such. higher. moral. purpose.. Contemporary. students. of politics. attribute a good deal more significance to the normative basis for political. action,. political. obligation and consent in order for regimes to persist.. Presumably,. this. inculcation and. of. to. be. a. the. joint. need for legitimate grounds of. product. of. the. diffusion. and. in. voluntary. the. content. of. state actions which demand. compliance on the part of citizens if they are. efficiently and effectively implemented. Fear of sanctions. alone. is. prevent more. is. to. of standards of proper behavior within cultural areas. changes. greater. i.e.,. no. longer. sufficient to induce people to serve (or to. them from disserving) the interests of the state. New and. complex. linkages. community. and. imperative. that. an. between. expanded. rulers. a. mobilized,. providential. literate, popular. state. be loved and respected —. make. it. more. even when they. are not being held accountable through the mechanisms of electoral. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 28.

(33) competition. and representative government to the wishes and whims. of the public.. Demonstrating plausible (or. of. that. delegitimation. (or. illegitimacy). is a. motive for the demise of any given authoritarian regime such. regimes. empirically,. more. dissatisfaction. in. general). difficult. of. immediate. than. may be logically, as well as attributing. its. downfall to. needs, threat to acquired goods or. frustration of eventual opportunities.. First,. actors. antithetic. to. intensity. how. be. authoritarian. shown. not. only. to possess values. rule with sufficient conviction and. (20), but these preferences about the form of political. domination expected. must. must. be proven independent of the content of policies. from a regime change. Citizens should demonstrably value. politics. political. is. conducted. action.. separately. from. who. If they feel it is illegitimate,. benefits from regardless of. whether. it. is perceived as a success or a failure, regardless of. whether. it. seems. the. regime. opponent their. will be opposed —. even when its demise may leave the. in a less favorable, objective circumstance.. ethical. motives. capable of coping’or not with emergent issues,. for. objections. If not, if. are hedged, such "normatively" phrased. opposition can safely be reduced to the more mundane. (and. predictable). more. ethereal. They. become. category of self-regarding necessity or to the. (but reliable) category of calculated anticipation. merely. a language in which political struggle takes. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 29.

(34) place. and. through. which. actors. with. calculations can ally for a convergent,. Second,. the. legitimation. existing. for. its. regime. divergent. needs. and. if fleeting, purpose.. must. be. shown. to. "need". survival. The values must not only clearly. identify existing authorities as unworthy of respect and voluntary compliance. —. disguising. themselves. promising must. be. resources. the. get. to. hearts. resources deeply. actors. may. make. difficult. or. to. for. but they. depriving authorities of key strategic the. perpetuation. of governance.. If the. the compliance it needs by merely "recalling the. the of. by. behind democratic façades or by themselves. linked. acquired. can. penalty". these. eventual conformity to democratic practices —. also. regime. something. mind of its subjects and "renewing the fear" in its. citizenry without seriously diverting scarce. upsetting. future. calculations,. then no matter how. enculcated and sharply focused they are, dissenting values. about the form of domination may. be of little consequence.. One serious problem affecting the legitimacy of regimes which persist the. for. some time in power is the inherent decay involved in. transmission. respect. for. compounding. of political values across generations. Just as. authority rates. and. identity. with party may increase at. once a new regime is founded, so has a secular. process of decline and disillusionment set in "once the generation that organized it (passes) away".. (Discourses, I, 2, 179).. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 30.

(35) Inversely, regimes. persist. support. —. because. some. protractedness with which some authoritarian. —. despite intergenerational decay in normative. suggests. societies. another problem. Machiavelli observes that,. polities. had. self-government could. the. isolate. become. Zeitgeist. information. or. of. office. (21),. it. and. by. long. suffered. princely rule, their. corrupted that no manner of republican. be expected to take hold. If such a regime. citizenry. democratic. culture",. so. could its. had. from. either. the contrary influences of a. by. convincing. it. censoring of. its. its. peculiar. sources. of. "political. if it could inculcate such a respect for hierarchy. and privilege and inequality of access and acquisition could confine questions of legitimacy to the holders of. specific positions without jeopardizing the survival of the regime itself.. ★. Our. discussion. of. *. the demise of a given authoritarian. regime. might. terms.. Success, Failure, Decay, and Delegitimation are categories. obviously specific precisely to. occur. why. *. capable interests,. has been expressed in quite generic abstract. of. encompassing fears,. a. 'projections. vast variety of much more and. aspirations. It is. because contemporary instances of efforts to remove and. defend entrenched authoritarian rulers are likely to involve a. varied menu of specific motives that I have sought to structure my. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 31.

(36) speculations enough. at. a. general. descriptive. experiences,. level.. material. Once analysts. have obtained. and identified groups of analogous. then they can pass to more discriminating statements. about the kinds of interests affected by regime success, the types of. fear generated by failure, the ranger of anticipated reactions. inspired trigger. by. and. the sorts of normative aspirations which. delegitimation.. anecdotal. At. illustrations. ethnies, came. decay. regions,. present, there are only fragmentary, of. why. generations,. classes,. sectors,. statuses,. institutions or even individuals. to oppose, became indifferent to, or stayed to support given. authoritarian. regimes. under. specific. (often. a. hint,. perhaps. of. the. quite. unique). circumstances.. is. There. that. suspicion, regimes. also. sketched. of. than. instances. few. correspond. category. more. exclusively. and. a. persistent. demise of authoritarian. exhaustively. to. a. single. the already quite simplified motivational set I have. out. above.. Such. regimes. are. often. simultaneously. perceived as successful, and, therefore, dispensible in the eyes of their the. initial. proponents;. realization. of. supporters. and. therefore,. probably. the. almost. failed and, therefore, obstructive to interests. all. of. unfavorable. of. their to. some of their frustrated opponents;. decadent and,. the future opportunities of. many of their present supporters; and illegitimate and, therefore, offensive rarer most. to. the values of various publics. If consensus is even. at the demise of a regime that at its founding, what may be important. is. some. optimal. mix. of. motives. for support,. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 32.

(37) indifference both. for. and. opposition.. identifying. overthrow,. transfer. That. mix of "whys" may be crucial. the "whos" responsible for regime seizure, or. surrender,. and. for. specifying. "what. consequences" such as transformation might eventually have for the viability of any ensuing democratic regime.. IV. BECAUSE. MEN ARE CAPABLE OF COLLIDING AND COALIGNING WITH EACH. OTHER FOR A WIDE RANGE OF PURPOSES AND ISSUES AND BECAUSE THEY EXHIBIT. DIFFERING. DISCOUNTING GROUPS. TIME,. WILL. NO. SINGLE. PREDICTABLY. AUTHORITARIAN ACTION,. PROPENSITIES. ANY. AND. FOR GROUP. TAKING OF. RELIABLY. RISKS. I. Florentine were. CAUSE. THE DEMISE OF. RULE. AT SOME POINT IN TIME, IN SOME CONTEXT OF GROUP. OR. INDIVIDUAL. MAY. SUPPORT, TOLERATE OR (PCS). part company rather dramatically with my illustrious. predecessor.. divided. "nobles". FOR. THEM OR ALLIANCE OF. OPPOSE THE PERSISTENCE OF AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME.. Here. AND. into. As. two. he. mutually. saw it, the polities of his time exclusive. social. groups: the. and the "people", each composed of different persons and. interests,. each. Since. former. the. with. clear and incompatible regime preferences.. wished. only. "to. be free to command" and the. latter "to be free from command", the identity of those supporting princely. rule. establish time. with. This. and. those. supporting republican rule was easy to. within the social structure and relatively fixed across tradition of associating dichotomously defined groups. distinctive. regime. preferences. has,. of course, prevailed. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 33.

(38) (Lord-Peasant,. Bourgeois-Proletarian,. Master-Slave,. Creditor-. Debtor, Producer-Consumer, Center-Periphery and so forth) without, however,. producing a convincing explanation or description of who. provokes either the rise or the demise of authoritarian rule. Some of. those. who. enslavement, command" more. have. risk. have. chosen. etc.. by. struggling. for "freedom from. to remain indifferent until others had taken. paid. the. often. resisted oppression, exploitation,. turned up on the wrong side of the barricades (or,. and. Inversely,. have. dependency,. often,. the. "should". the. ranks. been. cost. of. of a "beneficial" regime change).. those assaulting authoritarian regimes. swelled (if not lead) by those who had formerly. been "free to command". More often than not, regime preference and tolerance. have. divided. categories of actors and rarely. brought. together groups of economic or social homogeneity. One could go so far. as. to. viability. claim. that. involves. economic. and. part. the. social. of. the process undermining regime. fragmentation. interests. and. of their. previously. coherent. recombination. into. unprecedented alliances oriented around alternative strategies for regime. defense. identify of. and empirically isolate two warring coalitions (22): one. privileged,. aspiring, clear. and demise. Hence, even if one could analytically. defensive,. aggressive,. that. the. two. mutually. exclusive. locuses,. productive. to. mention. loyalties.. the. commanding. "nobles". and. another of. freedom-loving "plebes", it is by no means camps. would be composed of distinctive and. economic classes, social statuses, geographic sectors or institutional situses —. thorny. issue. not even. of ethnic identities and national. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 34.

(39) Given both. this social heterogeneity in the contemporary basis of. support. one. for. and opposition to authoritarian rule, the best. can expect is to specify the generically relevant features of. actors at. with respect to such regimes —. explaining. distinctive. transformation, sectoral,. to. fill. locational. and then, in efforts aimed. historical. in. these. and. instances. categories. generational. with. units. of. their. the class, specifically. appropriate to the case and time period at hand.. The actors. most obvious and elementary categorization of positional with respect to existing regimes involves whether they are. in or out of power. Those "in power" can be further subdivided, as we. have. argued. responsible. above,. into. those. directly. involved. in. and. for the acts of the regime (protagonists), i.e, those. whose office or status is primarily dependent upon the regime, and those. whose. support is courted, whose opinions are solicited and. whose. actions. whose. position. are. encouraged. and. and subsidized by the regime, but. property are independent of it (supporters).. Actors "out of power" *can also be usefully dichotomised into those who are ignored, acted upon or controlled by the regime but existence thwart. its. those. who. is. tolerated purposes are. or. proved. they. whose. do not act collectively to. challenge its existence (subjects), and. deliberately. deprived. or. persecuted. by. it. (antagonists). The latter two categories constitute the great bulk of. the population under authoritarian rule, except for "populist". varieties and. which. subject.. seek to fuse the passive categories of supporter. Nevertheless,. policies of paternalistic concession. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 35.

(40) and. benign. within. neglect. may. be. sufficient. to contain most persons. the realm of passive obedience and to isolate successfully. most potential antagonists.. These most intransigeant opponents, in turn,. are likely to be subdivided into those driven into exile by. persecution. (23). and. those. who continue to reside precariously. without the country.. The nature. second generic factor of differentiation is strategic in and. responded they. is furnished by Machiavelli. He suggested that actors to. could. already. political seek. acquired;. to or. choice with one of two dispositions:. minimize (2). losses. (1). and protect what they had. they could be driven by the desire to. expand their resources and benefits further, thereby, exhibiting a much. greater. propensity. for. taking. risks. in. the prospect of. maximizing gains.. (PLACE FIGURE II HERE). Figure. II. displays. these. two. dimensions. of. political. position/disposition in a matrix which generates six generic types of. actors —. each with a presumed different propensity for acting. with respect to the authoritarian regime in power. The examples of social, are. political. and economic groups at the bottom of each cell. merely illustrative since, as I noted above, the mix of those. supporting or opposing authoritarian rule varies considerably from one case to another and over time with a single case.. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 36.

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(42) IV.1.. In. rather may. one. of. his most apposite passages, Machiavelli argues. counter-intuitively. be. more. that defensive or conservative actors. dangerous to regime persistence than acquisitive or. aggressive ones for "in most cases. ... disturbances are caused by those who possess for the fear of losing generates in them the same desires that those who desire to acquire possess Furthermore, those who possess more can with greater force and speed effect changes. And what is more serious, their unchecked and ambitious behavior kindles the desire for possession in the minds of those who do not possess. (Discourses I, 5, 187-8). Actors benefices Their. they. chosen. (honor, and. oriented. not. goals. freedom. present. substantial are. do. toward. acquiring. presently. resources, positions and. have are easier to deal with.. are less certain and, perhaps, less tangible. and future property instead of security, command property).. and,. perhaps,. Their. available. resources. are. less. less concentrated. Their disturbances. less likely to becdme contagious. Most important, defensively. motivated actions against regime persistence can be more difficult to. predict. represent. and rapid. recognize. than. acquisitive ones since they may. reversals of position and/or since they may come. disguised as supportive in intent.. IV.2. Machiavelli also warns authoritarian rulers-cum-princes that they. can rarely rule by themselves, but must rule through or with. others.. They. should, therefore, be more wary of those in or near. © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.. 38.