Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in Greece

ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STUDIES

Anna Triandafyllidou, Ifigeneia Kokkali

European University Institute

Tolerance and Cultural Diversity

Discourses in Greece

2010/08

1. Overview National Discourses

Background Country Reports

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

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Tolerance and Cultural Diversity Discourses in

Greece

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Work Package 1 – Overview of National Discourses

on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity

D1.1 Country Reports on Tolerance and Cultural

Diversity Discourses

© 2010 Anna Triandafyllidou and Ifigeneia Kokkali

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50014 San Domenico di Fiesole - Italy ACCEPT PLURALISM Research Project, Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion:

Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe European Commission, DG Research

Seventh Framework Programme Social Sciences and Humanities

grant agreement no. 243837

www.accept-pluralism.eu www.eui.eu/RSCAS/

Available from the EUI institutional repository CADMUS cadmus.eui.eu

Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe (ACCEPT PLURALISM)

ACCEPT PLURALISM is a Research Project, funded by the European Commission under the Seventh Framework Program. The project investigates whether European societies have become more or less tolerant during the past 20 years. In particular, the project aims to clarify: (a) how is tolerance defined conceptually, (b) how it is codified in norms, institutional arrangements, public policies and social practices, (c) how tolerance can be measured (whose tolerance, who is tolerated, and what if degrees of tolerance vary with reference to different minority groups). The ACCEPT PLURALISM consortium conducts original empirical research on key issues in school life and in politics that thematise different understandings and practices of tolerance. Bringing together empirical and theoretical findings, ACCEPT PLURALISM generates a State of the Art Report on Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Handbook on Ideas of Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Europe, a Tolerance Indicators’ Toolkit where qualitative and quantitative indicators may be used to score each country’s performance on tolerating cultural diversity, and several academic publications (books, journal articles) on Tolerance, Pluralism and Cultural Diversity in Europe. The ACCEPT PLULARISM consortium is formed by 18 partner institutions covering 15 EU countries. The project is hosted by the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and co-ordinated by Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou.

The EUI, the RSCAS and the European Commission are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).

The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) at the European University Institute (EUI), directed by Stefano Bartolini from September 2006, was set up in 1992 as a complementary initiative to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. The Centre hosts research programmes and projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives.

Anna Triandafyllidou is the Director of the ACCEPT PLURALISM research project. She is part time Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute and Senior Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), for more see www.annatriandafyllidou.com

Ifigeneia Kokkali is Research Assistant at the ACCEPT PLURALISM research project. She has been a lecturer in the Institut Français d’Urbanisme, as well as in the Department of Planning & Development of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki/School of Engineering.

Contact details:

Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou, Dr. Ifigeneia Kokkali

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Via delle Fontanelle, 19

50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI), Italy Tel: +39 055 4658 Fax: + 39 055 4685 770

E-mail: anna.triandafyllidou@eui.eu, ifigeneia.kokkali@eui.eu, accept-pluralism@eui.eu

For more information on the Socio Economic Sciences and Humanities Programme in FP7 see: http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/index_en.htm

Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ... 2

KEYWORDS ... 4

1. INTRODUCTION ... 5

DEFINITIONS ... 6

2. GREECE AND EUROPE ... 7

2.1NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STATE FORMATION ... 7

2.2CITIZENSHIP IN GREECE... 8

2.2THE ROLE OF EUROPE AND THE “WEST” ... 9

3. CULTURAL DIVERSITY CHALLENGES DURING THE LAST 30 YEARS ... 10

OMOGENEIS/CO-ETHNICS ... 3

PONTIC GREEKS ... 3

ETHNIC GREEK ALBANIANS ... 4

NATIVE MINORITIES... 5

MUSLIMS OF WESTERN THRACE ... 6

MEMBERS OF THE SLAVIC-SPEAKING MACEDONIAN MINORITY ... 7

ROMA OF GREECE ... 8

IMMIGRANTS ... 12

ALBANIANS ... 12

GEORGIANS AND UKRAINIANS ... 14

SOUTHEAST ASIANS (BANGLADESHI,PAKISTANI,AFGHANI) ... 15

4. DEFINITIONS OF TOLERANCE IN GREECE ... 16

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS ... 19

Executive Summary

Until 20 years ago, Greece was considered largely a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural and mono-religious country, a true ‘nation-state’ where the dominant nation, notably people of ethnic Greek descent and Christian Orthodox religion accounted for approx. 98% of the total population. The dominant definition of the nation was ethno-cultural and religious, while civic and territorial elements were of secondary importance in defining who is Greek. This view of the nation as a community of descent and culture was reflected in the Greek citizenship law which until recently was based almost exclusively on the jus sanguinis principle.

The Greek state formally recognises only the existence of a religious Muslim minority in western Thrace that accounts for less than 0.2% of the total population of Greece. It also recognises numerically even smaller and relatively invisible religious minorities of Greek Jews, Catholics and Protestants. During the 1990s and following the dismantling of Yugoslavia, a Slavic speaking Macedonian minority has mobilised ethnically in northern Greece but its claims have been ignored (and to a certain extent suppressed) by the Greek state and the local Greek speaking majority. Part of Greece’s native minorities is also a relatively large Roma population (300-350,000 people) that is often subject to racist and discriminatory behaviours.

During the last two decades Greece has become the host of more than a million returning co-ethnics, co-ethnic immigrants and foreigners – these groups accounting now for more than 10% of the total resident population. In particular Greece received in the late 1980s and during the 1990s approx. 150,000 Pontic Greeks (co-ethnic returnees from the former Soviet Union) and nearly 240,000 ethnic Greek Albanians from southern Albania (the so-called Voreioipirotes). In addition during the 1990s and 2000s Greece has experienced significant inflows of economic migrants from eastern European, Asian and African countries. The total legal immigrant population is currently estimated at just under 700,000, the largest groups being Albanians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Georgians, Ukrainians, Pakistani, and Bangladeshis.

In order to understand better the kind of diversity challenges that the country has to deal with it is important to divide these groups into three categories: native minorities, co-ethnic migrants, and ‘other’ migrants.

With regard to native minority groups, the only oficially recognised minority of Greece is a religious one: the Muslims of western Thrace (in the north-western border with Turkey), who are protected by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. In line with this treaty the Muslims of western Thrace enjoy a special set of cultural, religious and educational rights including the possibility to be judged under shari’a law, bilingual schools, and bilingualism in public administration. Comprising individuals of Turkish origin, Roma and Slav-speaking Pomaks, prior to World War II, the Muslims of Thrace coexisted largely as a religious community. Since the 1970s, the minority has mobilized to assert a common Turkish identity, thus stirring anxieties among Greek elites and the public opinion. Although an initially repressive state policy in the 1970s and 1980s has been replaced since 1991 with a series of measures ensuring the non-discrimination of minority members by the state and the full respect of their individual rights, the Greek state tenaciously refuses to recognise their existence as an ethnic (Turkish) community and is particularly sensitive to any assertions of collective ethnic rights on the part of the minority.

Apart from the above officially recognised minority, there is a Slav-speaking population of northwestern Greece, widely known along Greece as Slav-Macedonians. These latter had mobilised politically in the 1990s, raising claims of cultural and linguistic recognition. During the last decade however the issue has largely disappeared from the public debate. In any case, the Greek state has so far refused to recognise officially this group as a minority and to satisfy any of the claims of the Slav-speaking activists molilised.

A native minority group that is worth special attention is the Roma population of Greece, i.e. the Roma that are not part of the Muslim minority of Thrace and thus are neither officially recognised nor protected in any specific way. The Roma live scattered throughout mainland Greece and make a living through metal and other garbage recycling, petty trade and farm work. Their phenotypical features

and their particular life style (often nomadic and tent-dwelling, under age marriages, patriarchal extended families) set them apart from the majority population. Roma children are not welcome in mainstream schools and although segregated schooling is forbidden often local authorities and parent’s associations try to separate Roma children from their children at schools. Having dwelled in Greece for several centuries, the Roma challenge from within the dominant view of a Christian Orthodox Greek-speaking white and modern nation that Greeks have of themselves.

Contrary to the native minorities, co-ethnic migrant populations are considered as integral part of the nation and are seen as relatively easy to integrate into the mainstream national culture. Co-ethnic

migrants include Pontic Greeks and ethnic Greek Albanians who have arrived in Greece largely in

the 1990s as a result of the 1989 debacle of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The former used to live in the Southern Republics of the former URSS (mainly along the Black Sea), while the latter were members of the recognised Greek minority in Southern Albania. Both the above groups do not pose any ethnic diversity challenges to the dominant Greek majority, since they are considered as co-ethnic or omogeneis in Greek (meaning of the same the same genos, i.e. of the same descent). Still, they certainly pose cultural and linguistic challenges even if overall they are well-accepted by and in the Greek society mainly thanks to their Greek origin.

‘Other’ immigrant populations in Greece include Albanians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians and

Georgians, who actually form the oldest and largest immigrant groups in Greece and who challenge Greek society with their cultural or linguistic otherness but not really religiously as they are largely Christian (or non practicing Muslims). Romanians and Bulgarians technically are not considered migrants any longer as they have become EU citizens. Some of the more recently arrived groups, notably Pakistani and Bangladeshi citizens pose a great challenge to Greek society because of their different phenotype and Muslim religion even if numerically these communities are still relativley small.

At the face of a 10% immigrant population Greece is slowly and to a certain extent reluctantly adapting its education and citizenship policies. A first step in this direction has been the reform of the citizenship law which took place only one year ago (in March 2010). This reform has provided for the nearly automatic naturalisation of children born in Greece of foreign parents provided their parents live legally in Greece. It has included provisions also for the naturalisation of children who have arrived in Greece at an early age and have attended for six years or more a Greek school. Last but not least the law has also facilitated the naturalisation of foreigners who live for 7 years or more in Greece. In education there have been efforts to train teachers in intercultural pedagogy and receptions classes are provided for non Greek speaking pupils but overall there is no concerted effort to accommodate cultural and religious diversity in school life. Difference is mainly seen as a ‘problem’ of the foreign children. The ideal outcome is their assimilation into the rest of the school population.

Indeed overall there is as yet no re-consideration of what it means to be Greek in the 21st century. The still dominant definition of national identity does not embrace minority and immigrant groups, who are largely considered to be (and at a certain extend remain indeed) outside the Greek society. The recent citizenship law reform is actually seen with suspicion by many majority Greeks who disagree with the opening up of citizenship to people of non Greek descent.

In the public and political discourses on minorities and immigrants, the tolerance of their cultural diversity is understood in Greece as liberal tolerance, meaning that one refrains from interfering with practices, individuals or groups that one does not approve of. Unlike the on-going discourses in Northern and Western Europe, concepts and norms such as liberalism or pluralism are not used in Greece. Besides, while multiculturality is gradually being accepted as a fact, multiculturalism is seen as a normative approach that predicates the co-existence of different communities. It is thus understood as a descriptive state of affairs signalling the parallel existence of several ethnic and cultural groups that are not integrated with one another into one whole. By contrast, Greek policy makers and scholars tend to favour intercultural dialogue meant as the integration of individuals – and certainly not communities – into Greek society. Interculturalism is thus understood as a normative

approach that allows for individuals of different cultures to enter into mutually respectful dialogue. In the public debate, the intercultural approach is seen as favourable to societal cohesion. In practice, however, there is little change in education, anti-discrimination or political participation policies towards this direction.

All in all, the main concept and perspective adopted in Greece to deal with cultural, ethnic and religious diversity is that of integration, while notions such as tolerance, acceptatnce, respect or recognition are more or less absent from the relevant debates. Yet, integration is used rather loosely to refer more often than not to assimilation and much more rarely to a mutual engagement of the different groups to form a cohesive society. Interestingly, the long-existing native minorities of the country are not seen as relevant to this debate as if the two types of diversity – the native and the immigrant – cannot be addressed with the same type of policies. The report questions this artificial division between native and incoming diversity and proposes how notions of liberal or egalitarian tolerance could provide answers to the diversity challenges that Greece is facing in the 21st century.

Keywords

National identity, cultural diversity, ethnic diversity, religion, tolerance, integration, Muslims, Greece, Europe, minority, migration

1. Introduction

Geographically, Greece is located at the southeastern corner of the European continent, indeed closer to the Middle East, Turkey and the Balkans rather than to what is today defined as the ‘core’ of the Europe, notably countries like France or Germany. This geographic position of Greece at the fringes of the European continent is to a large extent matched by a geopolitically and economically peripheral character of the country within the European Union, despite the fact that the successive enlargements of the EU to the East in 2004 and 2007 have made Greece more central both culturally and politically. The position of Greece however may also be seen as a pivotal one, between East and West. Dominant discourses on Greek national identity reflect a geopolitical and cultural ambivalence between being ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ (Roudometof, 1999; Tsoukalas, 1993).

References to the ‘East’ in the Greek national narrative reflect a notion of ‘eastern danger’ (Heraklides, 2001; Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou, 2002; Triandafyllidou 2002) that is generally projected to modern Turkey, reflecting both past experiences of subjugation to the Ottoman Empire and current tense relations with this country. References to the West and Europe are also ambivalent. Modern Greece carries the ‘honourable burden’ of being the heir of ancient Greece, identified by modern European intellectual and political elites as the craddle of European modernity. This glorious past is both a source of national pride and inspiration and a heavy symbolic burden to the extent that modern Greeks cannot stand up to the level of cultural, political or scientific excellence of their ancestors.

Even though the national narrative managed to incorporate classical Greece with the Byzantine tradition creating a unified national history from the 6th century b.c. to this day, the tension between Greece’s western and eastern cultural and geopolitical influences remains an important feature of Greek identity today (Tsoukalas 2002). Indeed, Greeks have found themselves trapped between Hellenism (the western prototype of classical Greece) and Romiosyne (the historical experiences of Greece in the last five centuries under the Ottoman Empire) (see also Tziovas, 1994).

Although politically Greece has been firmly anchored in western Europe in the post World War II period, the cultural positioning of Greece remains ambivalent, modern Greek-ness being of but not in Europe (Triandafyllidou, 2002a). While the European-ness of modern Greece has been officially confirmed by its accession to the European Communities (later European Union) in 1981, the geopolitical, cultural and economic relations between Greece and its fellow member states are often fraught with misunderstandings. During the 1990s, the confrontation between Greece and its fellow partners in the EU on the Macedonian question1 as well as Greece’s unpleasant position as the only country who had striven but could not make it to the first phase of the European Monetary Union have been two obvious expressions of these tensions.

The 21st century has brought new developments and new challenges for Greece and its national self-understanding. The inclusion of Greece in the first phase of the Euro zone implementation, on 1 January 2002 has confirmed the Europeanness of the country at the monetary but also at the symbolic level (Psimmenos, 2004). Moreover, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements to Central and Eastern Europe and the shifting of the EU geopolitical, cultural and religious borders farther East has made Greece inevitably more central geographically and religiously (since other Christian Orthodox countries have joined the EU) even though geopolitically it remains quite peripheral (Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 2003). The economic crisis though that Greece is undergoing at the time of writing (spring and fall 2010), the risk of a national bankruptcy and of quitting the Euro zone have on one hand emphasised the firm anchoring of political elites and citizens to the EU but also greatly shown the weakness of Greece as an actor in the European economic and political system.

1 i.e. the question of recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent Republic, the name that this last would take, as well as its nationalist claims to what the Greeks deemed as ‘their’ national heritage (Triandafyllidou et al. 1997; Roudometof 1996).

The expansion of the EU to the east which continues, even if with a slower pace, with a view to incorporating Croatia, the western Balkans and Turkey poses new identity and geopolitical challenges. Enlargement is desired as a factor of stability, democracy and peace in the region, but also for economic reasons, since many Greek firms are highly oriented towards the Balkan markets. Greek public opinion has marked an interresting shift between 2006 and 2008 regarding EU enlargement to southeast Europe and especially to Turkey. In 2008, 47% of Greeks declared in favour of the entry of Turkey in the EU (Eurobarometre, 2008: 30), contrary to the respective 33% registered in 2006 (Eurobarometre, 2006). The possible future accession of Turkey to the EU certainly keeps stiring unsolved identity and geopolitical issues, not least the Cyprus question.

In light of these considerations, this paper first offers a brief excursus on the main factors that have conditioned the development of the modern Greek state and the dominant conception of Greek national identity. The second part of the paper concentrates on the internal Significant Others (Triandafyllidou 1998) of Greek society over the past 30 years with a view to identifying which have been the important minority groups that have challenged with their diversity the cohesion and homogeneity of Greek society during the last three decades. We cover three distinct time periods: the 1980s and the end of the Cold War, the 1990s and the rise of multiculturalism in Western Europe but also the debacle of Communist regimes and the rise of nationalism in central Eastern Europe, and the last decade with the expansion of the EU to the east, the rise of international terrorism and the financial and economic crisis of the last couple of years.

In the second part we shall seek to highlight the aspects of ‘difference’ of specific groups that have been particularly contested. Those aspects that the groups advocate as important for their identity and that the state or the majority group consider ‘intolerable’ or at least difficult to accommodate. Pointing to such challenging differences will help locate different instances in which ‘tolerance’ has been an important concept or practice with a view to allowing for diversity to exist. Naturally we shall also take note of the competing concepts in favour of a more active accommodation and respect for diversity or concepts and behaviours that call for the rejection of diversity and the imposition of not only unity but also homogeneity within Greek society.

Definitions

In order to clarify the focus of this paper we propose here a set of working definitions of the terms nation, national heritage, national identity, nationalism and also integration and assimilation. Even though in the scholarly literature there is considerable polyphony regarding when a group qualifies to be a nation, we consider here a nationa as a named and self-defining human community whose member cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or “homelands”, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws (Smith 2002: 15). A nation presupposes the notion of ‘national identity’ of a ‘feeling of belonging’ to the nation. The notion of national heritage is defined as a set of cultural forms that characterise a specific nation and which provide for the framework within which the members of the nation are socialised.

In sociology and political science the term integration is considered a fuzzy term and for this reason quite problematic. A minimal working definition adopted in this work for integration is the following: integration is a social, economic and political process that regards the insertion of immigrants into their country of destination. Integration requires both the effort of migrants to adapt to the new reality and the effort of the host population to adapt to the presence of migrants and the changing character of the host society. In common parlance, integration is often confused with assimilation. Assimilation is a social process by which the immigrants completely adapt to the traditions, culture and mores of the host country, and eventually become part of the host nation gradually abandoning their own ethnicity, culture, and traditions. Assimilation is indeed a one-way process that involves the effort of immigrants to ‘assimilate’ in the destination country and its dominant culture and is in this sense a distinct concept and term from integration

This report focuses on cultural (customs, mores, life style, language), religious, and ethnic (cultural as before or phenotype, related to a specific ethnic descent of a group of people) diversity of

minority groups that have lived in Greece since the creation of the modern Greek state in 1831 and of immigrant populations that have arrived in the country during the last twenty years. Terms like tolerance, acceptance, respect and recognition as well as multiculturalism and interculturalism are discussed in the paper as their definitions in the Greek context are one of the objectives of this study.

2. Greece and Europe

2.1 National identity and state formation

While the foundations of Greek nationalism in the late eighteenth century were based on European Enlightenment and its civic ideals (Veremis, 1983: 59-60; Kitromilides, 1990: 25-33), the Greek nation has eventually been defined in strongly ethno-cultural terms. Common ancestry, culture and language have been the main tenets of the development of the modern Greek national identity (Veremis, 1983; 1990; Kitromilides, 1983; 1990: 30), together with Christianity – a heritage of the Byzantine Empire (constructed essentially as Greek and related linearly to the Greek classical past.) The dominant national narrative concluded with Greece’s subjugation to the Ottoman Empire, the national resurrection in 1821 and the creation of a small independent Greek state in 1831. A unified national consciousness was successfully instilled in Greek society through state policies in military conscription, education and cultlure throughout the ninetienth and twentieth century.

The state and the political and intellectual elites propagated however for several decades an irredentist view of the Greek nation that extended further north to Macedonia and Thrace and further east to Minor Asia. This ‘Great Idea’ – to unite all the territories where people who were of Greek ethnicity or who spoke the Greek language and shared the Greek culture – dominated Greek politics and the successive enlargements of the Greek nation state until the early 20th century. It was only in 1923 and after the debacle of the Greek forces in Minor Asia by the Turks that irredentism was largely abandoned. Nonetheless the modern Greek state took its present territorial form after World War II when the Dodecanese islands were incorporated into Greece in 1948 (Divani 1997). It is this difficult and gradual path to the territorial integration of modern Greece that has marked Greek nationalism making the conception of Greek citizenship predominantly ethnic, religious and cultural (much less civic and territorial) (Christopoulos 2006; see also for a review Triandafyllidou 2001, Chapter 3).

Although territorial and civic features have gained importance through the expansion and consolidation of the national territory, the essence of Greekness is still often defined as a transcendental notion in Greek public discourses (Tsoukalas, 1993). The link between the modern institutions of the Greek state and the traditional Greek society remains even nowadays puzzling (Diamandouros 1983: 47-50). The late and limited industrial development of Greece in conjunction with the early introduction of parliamentarism resulted in the distorted functioning of the political system through the preservation of traditional power structures under the cover of Western-type institutions (Diamandouros 1983; Mouzelis 1986; 1995).

Modern Greek identity thus developed in a web of complicated relationships that evolved around two main contradictions or dilemmas. These contradictions have been articulated in the following characteristics of modern Greek identity: a national pride for a unique past; a frustration of grandeur ‘lost’ as the modern Greek state emerged into independence as a poor, agricultural economy and an incomplete and fragile democracy; an ongoing attempt to bridge the competing universalisms and fundamental antagonisms between the secular and rational interpretations of Hellenism advocated by Western Enlightenment on the one hand, and by the Byzantine Empire legacy and the conservative religious conformism of a strong and very present Eastern Orthodox Church on the other (see Tsoukalas 2002, Tziovas 1994); and last but not least a perpetual need to ‘catch up’ with the rest of Europe as there was much ground to cover in terms of Greece’s industrialization, modernization, and democratic consolidation.

The intertwining of such contradictory elements has resulted in an ideologically confusing notion of ‘Helleno-christianity’ and an underlying East–West tension in Greek identity and politics. Greece’s Ottoman past is presented as responsible for the country’s personalized, clientelistic political

culture and a mentality of state patronage; while Great Power politics that were played out across the Balkan peninsula throughout the 19th and 20th centuries have engrained perceptions of threat of foreign intervention as regards national independence, territorial integrity and the cohesion of national identity.

2.2 Citizenship in Greece

These features of Greek national identity have marked the definition of Greek citizenship which has been based (until 6 months ago) almost exclusively on the jus sanguinis principle2.The previews to the 3838/24.3.2010 laws (voted on March 2010) provided for a separate procedure for acquiring Greek nationality (the so called procedure of nationality definition) that has been reserved for people who could prove that they were of Greek descent and ‘behave as Greeks’. The terms used for this procedure imply that Greek descent and national consciousness exist prior to the acquisition of Greek nationality (Christopoulos 2006: 254). This rule refers to people of Greek ethnic origin, the omogeneis (meaning those of the same genos, i.e. of the same descent).

There are two broad categories of omogeneis in Greece currently: the Pontic Greeks

(numbering a little over 150,000), notably people of Greek descent that resided in the former

Soviet Republics. The Greek state has adopted a generous naturalisation policy allowing the

large majority among them to naturalise through a simplified citizenship definition procedure

called ‘specific naturalisation’ (Christopoulos 2006: 273). The second group of omogeneis

(co-ethnics) are ethnic Greek Albanians or else known as Voreioipirotes

. These held until

recently Special Identity Cards for Omogeneis (EDTO)

issued by the Greek police which

gave them full socio economic but no political rights in Greece. As of November 2006, a joint

decision by the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs facilitated the naturalization

procedure for them, waiving the fee and the discretionary character of the judgment,

encouraging thus ethnic Greek Albanians thus to naturalise. Indeed this change of policy has

led to an exponential increase of naturalisations from two-digit numbers each year to several

thousands. While in the period 1998-2006 only a handful of people had naturalised, in the

period between 2007 and 2009 approximately 45,000 foreigners, in their vast majority of

Albanian nationality, have acquired Greek citizenship.

2

Until March 2010 when law 3838/24.3.2010 was voted, second, or even third-generation immigrant children were not entitled to Greek citizenship at birth unless their parents had been naturalised. Law 2130/1993 foresaw that immigrants who wished to become Greek citizens had to be residents in Greece for more than ten years in the last twelve calendar years. This was one of the longest residence requirements for naturalisation in Europe. Law 2910/2001 (articles 58-64) had made the conditions and procedure even more cumbersome, introducing an application fee of 1,500 Euro. In addition to that, authorities were not required to reply within a specified period of time and need not justify a negative decision to the applicant. A special circular of the Home Affairs Ministry (Circular 32089/10641/26.5.1993) stated that such obligations of fair administration are not valid when the matters treated refer to the acquisition, recognition, loss or re-acquisition of the Greek nationality, rendering thus the whole issue truly exceptional and outside the normal work proceedings of state administration.

3 According to Dodos (1994: 119-121), the term “Vorios Epiros” (Northern Epirus) is a diplomatic and political designation that appears after 1913. It has come out of the opposition of the Greek inhabitants of Greece’s border regions to the international agreements that determined the borders of the country together with those people’s national fate decided against their will, since the areas where they were living in were granted to the new Albanian state. As a geographical term, it does not cover anything specific, because the limits of the northern borders of the "Northern Epirus" have never been clearly established. In addition, since 1919, even by the most favourable to the Greek positions tracing of borders, the importance of the Greek population is not so obvious (Kokkali, 2010).

4 There were 197,000 EDTO holders on 31 December 2009, according to data released by the Ministry of Interior in December 2010.

The distinction between co ethnics and ‘other’ migrants that Greek law had introduced

as early as 1997 had been subject to severe criticism by NGOs, the liberal press

and

international organisations (ECRI 2004) for being discriminatory and unfair

. ECRI in

particular had raised concerns regarding the preferential path to citizenship available to

individuals of Greek origin, noting that there are subjective elements in the assessment of

such origin, making the applicants liable to discrimination.

It was only in March 2010 that the Greek Parliament voted a new law (law n. 3838/2010) on citizenship and naturalisation which introduced provisions for the second generation of migrants, notably children born in Greece of foreign parents or children born abroad of foreign parents but who have completed at least 6 years of schooling in Greece and live in Greece. In either case, these children can naturalise by a simple declaration by their parents when they are born or when they complete their sixth year of attending a Greek school. The new law also lowers the requirement for naturalisation from 10 to 7 years of residence, provided the foreigner has already received the EU long term resident status which can be acquired after 5 years of legal residence. The new law also introduces local political rights (both passive and active) for foreign residents (living in Greece for 5 years or more). The new law has made a breakthrough by Greek standards introducing a substantial element of jus soli in the concept of Greek citizenship. Nonetheless, it remains clear to this day that Greek citizenship (like Greek national identity) remains strongly defined by ethnic, cultural and religious elements rather than by civic or territorial ones.

2.2 The role of Europe and the “West”

In the pre-World War II period, Europe played an indirect role in national self-understandings of Greekness: it was part of the classical Greek heritage but also perceived as alien and threatening. Culturally speaking, Greece and Europe were constructed by Greek historiography as part of the same classical Greek/European civilization. From a political viewpoint however, other European countries were seen as – and indeed were actually – ‘foreign powers’ which imposed their interests on Greece and interfered wigth domestic affairs. While European foreign powers were perceived also as economically and culturally more advanced than Greece, they were also despised because they could not ‘compete’ with Greece’s glorious classical heritage.

Since the end of World War II Greece has been politicalggly and ideologically part of Western Europe. This largely determined the outcome of the Greek civil war (1944-1948) as well as its post WWII political history. Western military, trade and energy interests held Greece firmly within the Western part of Europe and pulled the country out of its isolation and away from Communist and left-wing tendencies. Greece joined NATO in 1952 and in 1962 signed a pre-accession agreement with the European Communities (EC).

During the post war period the stance of Greek social and political actors towards Europe has alternated between ‘Europhilia’ and ‘Europhobia’ given the role that various western actors have played in Greece’s political history (particularly the UK and the USA), and the way this has translated in a deep polarization of domestic politics – between the pro-western right and centre-right and the communist and left political forces. The foreign influence over the outcome of the civil war; the 1960s political instability and the Colonels’ military coup (1967-1974); the importance of the Marshall Plan for the country’s economic recovery; the importance of participating in NATO’s southern flank in the context of the Cold War confrontation; Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish dispute, are all factors and events that determined Greece’s relationship with the rest of Europe and the West.

5 See, Ios tis Kyriakis, Athens daily, Kyriakatiki Eleftherotipia, 4 January 2004, www.enet.gr/ and Athens Anglophone daily Athens News, 7 January 2004, Citizenship backlog, by Kathy Tzilivakis, www.athensnews.gr . Also Greek Helsinki Monitor at www.greekhelsinki.gr/bhr/english/index.html.

6 Greek authorities are generally required to respond within specified time limits to applicants addressed to them and to provide justification for their decisions.

At the level of public attitudes, Kokosalakis and Psimmenos (2002: 24-26) show (on the basis of Eurobarometer survey data) that Greeks have been overall positive as regards their country’s participation in the EC and later EU, saw no conflict between their national and their European identity, and were overall supportive of European unification which they perceived as economically and politically advantageous for the country. However, qualitative studies have shown that Greeks tend to look at other Europeans as ‘others’ and as ‘different’ to the foundations of Greek tradition and collective identity (Anagnostou 2005; Kokosalakis 2004). Indeed, legacies of the past, territorial insecurities and antagonistic identities in Greece’s immediate neighbourhood the Balkans, have not been easily understood by Western and Northern EU member-states, and have at times been exaggerated in Greek politics, largely for domestic political reasons. Indeed, during the 1990s, the feeling of alienation that Greeks at times expressed towards the West (Tsoukalas, 1993; 1995) was further accentuated by the controversy between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the failure of resolving the Cyprus question, and the inability of other EU countries to appreciate Greece’s sensibility on these issues (Roudometof, 1996; Triandafyllidou et al., 1997, Triandafyllidou 2007).

In the early 21st century a more flexible understanding of Greek national identity seems to emerge, mainly due to the increasing salience of European policies and symbols, such as the European currency. Besides, the actual experiences of belonging to the European Union reinforce a civic and political value component in Greek national identity (Triandafyllidou et al. 1997; Kokosalakis 2004; Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou 2007).

3. Cultural diversity challenges during the last 30 years

The new European context at the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first century has raised new challenges to Greek national self-understandings and the country’s geopolitical positioning within its immediate neighbourhood and of course within the EU and Europe writ large. These challenges are related to the continuing (even if slower) expansion of the EU to the Balkans and Turkey.

Moreover, during the last two decades, Greece has had to make room – even if hesitantly and only to a limited extent – for cultural, ethnic and religious diversity within the nation. These developments have had to do with two different population groups: native, historic minorities and immigrants. Regarding minorities first, regional legal and institutional frameworks—such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—have furthered progress in promoting the recognition and protection of minorities (linguistic, ethnic, religious, racial) across Europe (Psychogiopoulou 2009). This progress has also increasingly influenced debates and policies on the position and rights of minorities in Greece, which for long has been a sensitive matter in Greek political life and society. Nikiforos Diamantouros (1983: 55) had described this ‘sensitivity’ as an indication that the process of national integration is incomplete.

Regarding migrants, even since the early 1980s, Greece can no longer be described as an emigration country. The country’s population has increased by 10-12%, with large numbers of migrants mainly from the Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria and Romania), ex-Soviet Republics (Georgia, Russia and Ukraine) and, increasingly, Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China). Immigration poses a challenge to dominant Greek nationalist discourses; there has been a gradual recognition on behalf of state institutions and public opinion that Greek society has become de facto multi-cultural and multi-ethnic (Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2009). Tables 1, 2 and 3 below present an overview of the size and composition of the immigrant and native minority population in Greece.

Table 1 Immigrant Stock in Greece, on 31 December 2009

Source: Triandafyllidou and Maroufof (2010) SOPEMI report for Greece, December 2010.

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The estimate of the illegally staying aliens offered by Maroukis (2008) is the most recent scientific estimate of its kind. For more information see: http://clandestino.eliamep.gr .

Size of immigrant stock

% of total resident

population Source of data

Legal immigrant

population 636,258 5.86%

Stay permits valid at least for 1 day during 2009, Ministry of Interior Co ethnics from

Albania 197,814 1.82%

Data from Ministry of Interior, for 31 December 2009

Estimate of irregular

immigrants 280,000 2.58% Maroukis (2008), CLANDESTINO

project7 Total stock of foreigners 1,114,072 10.26% Total population of Greece 10,856,041 100% LFS, 4th trimester 2009 Co-ethnics from the

Soviet Union 154,000 1.42%

Secretariat of Greeks abroad, Special Census, 2000

Total stock of

immigrants and

Table 2. National Composition of the Migrant Stock in Greece, 31.12.2009

LFS 4th Tri. 2009

Third Country Nationals (TCN) Valid Permits December 2009 EU Citizens Valid Permits December 2009 All foreigners (EU and non-EU)

Country of

Origin Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage

Albania 501,691 59.74% 414,445 70.65% 414,4458 56.64% Bulgaria 54,492 6.48% 51,006 37.46% 55,909 7.64% Georgia 33,870 4.03% 17,655 3.00% 17,655 2.41% Romania 33,773 4.02% 38,388 28.19% 41,954 5.73% Pakistan 22,965 2.73% 17,097 2.91% 17,097 2.33% Russia 19,522 2.32% 13,512 2.30% 13,512 1.84% Ukraine 13,748 1.63% 21,644 3.68% 21,644 2.95% Bangladesh 12,533 1.49% 5,910 1.00% 5,910 0.80% Syria 12,401 1.47% 7,962 1.35% 7,962 1.08% Armenia 12,339 1.46% 6,277 1.07% 6,277 0.85% Cyprus 11,773 1.40% 5,972 4.38% 5,972 0.81% Poland 11,204 1.33% 10,876 7.98% 11,258 1.53% Egypt 10,289 1.22% 14,732 2.51% 14,732 2.01% Iraq 7,849 0.93% 1,183 0.20% 1,183 0.16% India 7,654 0.91% 13,127 2.23% 13,127 1.79% UK 7,539 0.89% 7,811 5,73% 7,811 1.06% Germany 7,270 0.86% 5,914 4.34% 5,914 0.80% Moldova 4,682 0.55% 12,217 2.08% 12,217 1.66% Netherlands 3,548 0.42% 2,201 1.61% 2,201 0.30% Philippines 3,302 0.39% 9,668 1.64% 9,668 1.32% OTHER 47,262 5.62% 31,161 5.31% 13,983 10.27% 45,144 6.17% TOTAL 839,706 100.00% 586,590 100.00% 136,151 100% 731,592 100%

Source: Triandafyllidou and Maroufof, 2010, SOPEMI report for Greece. Based on data from National Statistical Service of Greece, Labour Force Survey 4th trimester; Ministry of Interior Affairs, Valid Stay Permits on

December 31st 2009; Ministry of Citizen Protection. Registered EU citizens on December 31st 2009.

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Table 3. Native Minorities in Greece

1961-1991* * 1999/today 1999/today Native Minorities

Absolute numbers % of the total population of

Greece Catholics, Protestants, Jews and new

religious movements 150,000 1-1,5 Jews 5,000 Catholics 50,000 Protestants 25,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses 70,000

Muslims of Western Thrace*: 80,000-120,000 0,5

Turkish-speaking 36,000-54,000***

Pomaks 28,800-43,200***

Roma 14,400-21,600***

Roma (all over Greece)

300,000-350,000**** 2-3

Arvanites/Arberor 200,000**** 2

Macedonians (Slav-speaking Greeks) 10,000-30,000**** 2

Vlachs/Aromanians 200,000**** 2

Source: Compilation and treatment of data from different sources/estimations (see notes below).

* The Muslims of Western Thrace according to the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations (Treaty of Lausanne), in 1923, counted for 106,000 individuals. According to the Greek census of 1928, 1940 and 1951, there were registered respectively 126,000 individuals, 140,090 individuals and 112,665 individuals (Human Rights Watch, ‘Greece: The Turks of Western Thrace’, Vol.11, No.1, 1999/January; available at

http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/index.htm#TopOfPage [consulted on the 02/11/2010]. It is to note that the report on Muslims of Thrace does not distinguish between the sub-populations that are included in this category (that is to say Roma and Pomaks), referring thus to all as ‘Turks of Western Thrace’.

** Unlike the 1951 census, more recent censuses have not addressed issues of national/ethnic origin, language and religion (GHM, Report about Compliance with the Principles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1999, available at http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/Minorities_of_Greece.html [consulted on the 02/11/2010]). Therefore, no official data is available and we can only rely on estimations.

*** Estimation of Alexandris (1988) for the numbers in 1981, according to which from about 120,000 individuals 45% are Turkish-speaking, 36% are Pomaks and 18% Roma. According to an estimation of GHM (at

http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/pomaks.html [consulted on the 02/11/2010]), the Pomaks nowadays count for 30,000 (i.e. the minimum estimated by Alexandris above mentioned).

**** Estimation of GHM, Report about Compliance with the Principles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1999, available at http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/Minorities_of_Greece.html [consulted on the

02/11/2010].

In this section we shall briefly outline the main native and immigrant minority groups of Greece. We shall discuss their history, size, main features and investigate the nature of their diversity. We shall thus identify the main diversity challenges that they pose to Greek society and seek for challenging events that have taken place in recent years. We shall discuss such events and the ways in which Greek institutions and society have dealt with them with a view to identifying the relevant practices, norms, institutions and the use, if relevant, of concepts such as tolerance, acceptance, respect, pluralism, national identity and national heritage.

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In table 2 below we present schematically the main native and immigrant minority groups and identify the diversity dimensions on which they challenge the dominant conception of Greek citizenship and national identity.

Table 4: Main Minority and Immigrant Groups in Greece and their Dimensions of Difference

Dimensions of difference

Citizenship Racial Ethnic Religious Cultural Lingu

istic Co-ethnics Pontic Greeks X X Ethnic Greek Albanians X X Native minorities Turks/Muslims of Western Thrace X X X X Slav-speaking Macedonians X X Immigrants Albanians X X X X X Georgians X X X X Ukrainians X X X X X Asian Muslim migrants* X X X X X X Sub Saharan Africans X X X X X

Source: Author’s compilation.

* Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Afghani citizens mainly.

Minority groups in Greece can actually be classified into three broad categories in terms of their closeness to the majority group. The term ‘national majority’ is here to identify Greek citizens born of Greek parents, in Greece, who are Christian Orthodox (at least via a familial affiliation). In terms of the national identity and citizenship conception, omogeneis, that is co-ethnics, are the minority groups that differ less from the national majority. There are two populations within the larger category of co-ethnics: Pontic Greeks and ethnic Greek Albanians.

The second category of minority groups are native minorities, that is people who are ethnically, culturally, religiously different from the national majority but which have formed part of the modern Greek state since its creation. These include the Muslims of western Thrace (which may be further sub-divided into Pomaks, Muslim Roma and ethnic Turks) who are Turkish-speaking, Muslims and largely self-identifying as ethnic Turks. There are also however three more native minority groups that may be relevant for the ACCEPT PLURALISM study, and these are the Macedonians of Greece, Greek Jews and Greek Roma who are Christians.

The third category of minority groups in Greece are migrant populations. We identify here five different populations: Albanians, as the largest group; Georgians and Ukrainians as the second and third largest nationalities among immigrants; Asian immigrants and asylum seekers (Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Filipinos and Afghanis) who are Muslims from southeast Asia; and last but not least

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Sub-Saharan Africans who come from many different countries and are Christians in their large majority.

Omogeneis/Co-ethnics

The Greek national identity and citizenship definition asserts not only the distinction between citizens and foreigners but also between omogeneis (co-ethnics) and allogeneis. Omogeneis are the co-ethnics who are of Greek ethnic origin – belong to the Greek Christian Orthodox ‘genos’– and allogeneis are those who are of another ‘genos’ (Christopoulos 2006: 253). Thus there are ‘allogeneis’ who are Greek citizens, e.g. members of the native minorities or naturalised foreigners. And there are ‘omogeneis’ who are not Greek citizens, e.g. members of the Greek diaspora abroad or emigrants. The first category of minority groups that we shall discuss in this report are the ‘omogeneis’, the co-ethnics.

According to the decision of the State Council9 no. 2756/1983, the legitimate criterion for one to be characterized as a co-ethnic is ‘to belong to the Greek Ethnos’. That is ‘to have Greek national consciousness’, which is ‘deduced from characteristics of personality which refer to common descent, language, religion, national traditions and extensive knowledge of the historical events of the nation’. It may thus seem that having a Greek national consciousness suffices to be a co-ethnic although in practice this is not the case. The two criteria: that of ethnic ancestry and that of national consciousness are used cumulatively and in the absence of one, it is the ethnic descent criterion that prevails (see also Christopoulos 2006).

Pontic Greeks

Pontic Greeks are ethnic Greeks who either emigrated from areas of the Ottoman empire (the southern coast of the Black Sea in particular) to the former Soviet Union in the beginning of this century or left Greece in the 1930s and 1940s for political reasons (Glytsos, 1995). The right of Pontic Greeks to return to their ‘homeland’ (Greece) has been conceded by presidential decree in 1983. Pontic Greeks are defined by the Greek state as members of the diaspora community10 who ‘return’ – even though most of them had never lived in Greece before – to their ‘homeland’ and are, therefore, given full citizen status and benefits aiming to facilitate their integration into Greek society. Pontic Greeks naturalised under the ‘definition of nationality’ procedure foreseen by the Greek legislation for people of ethnic Greek origin (Christopoulos 2006: 254).

The peak of their flow was in the early 1990s. Pontic Greeks were citizens of the former republics of the Soviet Union who declared an ethnic Greek origin, and on that base were given Greek citizenship. In 2000 there were 155,319 Pontic Greeks in the country. More than half of them (about 80,000) came from Georgia, 31,000 came from Kazakhstan, 23,000 from Russia, and about 9,000 from Armenia (General Secreteriat of Repatriated Co-Ethnics, 2000).

Despite the fact that Pontic Greeks acquired Greek citizenship literally upon arrival and, also, that their education level is higher than that of native Greeks11, they faced serious problems in finding jobs, mainly because they did not speak Greek at a good level, but also because the state did not recognise their educational diplomas. The highest percentage of returnees worked as unskilled workers. Other common occupations were those of constructors, cleaners and – especially for women – housekeeping (General Secretariat of Repatriated Co-Ethnics, 2000). In December 1990, the

9 State Council is the Supreme Administrative Court of Justice in Greece.

10 With regard to Pontic Greeks see also Journal of Refugee Studies, 1991, Special Issue, 4, 4.

11 This becomes apparent by comparing the educational level of the Greek population according to the data of the national census of 2001 for people over six years old with the data from the census of the General Secretariat of Repatriated Co Ethnics, conducted in 2000 (p. 64). For example 10% of the repatriated co-ethnics have graduated from a Technological Educational Institute while the correspondent percentage for Greeks is 3%. Also 12% are University graduates while the correspondent percentage for Greeks is 8%.

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government set up the National Institute for the Reception and Rehabilitation of Emigrant and Repatriate Co-Ethnic Greeks (Ε.Ι.Υ.Α.Π.Ο.Ε.) (on the basis of art. 8, law 1893/1990) to manage the conditions of entrance, residence and work of Pontic Greek returnees. Accommodation, food, education for children and for adults, specialized courses of Greek language and professional training have been provided within the context of this Institute’s (Kassimati, 1993). EIYAPOE has been dissolved in March 2003 and Pontic Greeks have largely ‘disappeared’ sociologically to the extent that there is no special monitoring of their socio-economic situation any more.

Diversity challenges: Pontic Greeks are considered to be similar to native Greeks as regards

their national consciousness, culture, and religion. They only differ from natives in terms of their language (as at least the first generation of returnees spoke Russian and/or Ποντιακά (Pontian language) as a mother tongue) and at least the first generation in terms of the socio-economic system that they had been brought up in. Representatives of EIYAPOE interviewed by the author in the mid 1990s considered that the main problem for Pontic Greeks’ socio-economic integration was their excessive reliance on the state to provide for anything and their inability to adapt to a free market economy. There are unfortunately not enough recent studies to assess this claim however it is clear that the cultural and linguistic difference of the Pontic Greeks is still present in Greek society even if on the whole it is not perceived as challenging the national unity. Indeed, Pontic Greeks (together with other ex-Soviet nationals, such as Georgians, Russians, and in a lesser extent Armenians) dispose a non-negligible ‘ethnic infrastructure’, this is to say their own shops, mini-markets, cafés, festivity halls, dentists, churches, at least in the city of Thessaloniki where they have mainly settled in the 1990s (Kokkali 2010).

Ethnic Greek Albanians

The second large group of co-ethnics that has recently ‘returned’ to Greece are ethnic Greek Albanians, widely known as “Vorioepirotes” (Βορειoηπειρώτες). The State Council (judgement no. 2207/1992) attempted to provide a description of their status: co-ethnics from Albania are the people that descend from Greek parents and their place of birth (theirs or their parents) is “Vorios Epirus” (Βόρειος Ηπειρος)12.

As regards Greek Albanians, law 1975/1991, on the basis of article 108 of the Greek Constitution, provided them with a preferable legal status as people without the Greek citizenship but with the Greek nationality (article 17). Because of their ethnic minority status in southern Albania, they were perceived as refugees who suffered persecution and discrimination because of their Greek nationality and Christian Orthodox religion. The legal provisions in issues of stay, social security, retirement coverage and medical care were of a discretionary positive character as opposed to those concerning other categories of foreign immigrants (article 24).

Even though the law provided for the preferential treatment of Greek Albanians, in practice they have not been as privileged as the Pontic Greeks. The Greek government did absolutely not want the evacuation of the minority in Albania, and, thus, was very reluctant to the settlement of ethnic Greeks from Albania to Greece (Tsoukala, 1997; Dodos, 1994: 142). And that is the reason why the Greek state has adopted a different approach towards co-ethnic repatriated Pontic Greeks and co-ethnics from the Greek minority in Albania. While the former are accepted as refugees, the latter are instrumentalized by the Greek foreign policy: their presence in southern Albania is considered as vital for the promotion of the Greek interests there (Pavlou, 2003; Kokkali, 2008: 78, 173 and 2010).

The legal status of ethnic Greek Albanians has been clarified in detail with the Presidential Decree 395/1998. Following from this decree, Greek co-ethnics who are Albanian citizens (Voreioepirotes) hold Special Identity Cards for Omogeneis (EDTO) issued by the Greek police. On 31 December 2009 there were 197,814 Special Identity Cards for Co-Ethnics issued, of which over 150,000 were of 10-year duration. As of November 2006, holders of these Identity Cards were encouraged to apply for citizenship. They were exempted from the high citizenship fee and were

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generally grated citizenship if they satisfied the requirements (in other words, no negative discretion was exerted). Indeed during the past 3 years more than 40,000 Albanian citizens of ethnic Greek origin have acquired Greek citizenship.

Diversity Challenges: Ethnic Greek Albanians differ from native Greeks mainly in their

citizenship and to a lesser extent in their language. Contrary to Pontic Greeks, the use of Greek language, especially among the older generation, was more widespread13 in southern Albania. Also the geographical and cultural proximity was higher – native Greeks of Hepirus in northern Greece and ethnic Greeks born in southern Albania had many cultural similarities. Overall ethnic Greek Albanians’ public image has also been constructed as ‘positive’, contrasted to that of ‘other’ Albanians whose image was negative (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002), at least during the 1990s. The ethnic, religious and cultural proximity of ethnic Greek Albanians with native Greeks makes them a minority group that is gradually assimilating into Greek society and poses no strong cultural diversity challenge to the country. At the same time their presence forces to clarify how national and cultural unity and homogeneity is pretty much constructed rather than given depending often on beliefs of common genealogical descent more than actual cultural proximity. It is interesting how the cultural diversity of Voreioipirotes has been treated during the 2000s by contrasting to how the cultural diversity of ‘other’ Albanians has been perceived at the same time. Actually, however, such distinctions seem to have faded, since Albanian citizens (either omogeneis or allogeneis) are largely considered as very well integrated to the Greek society, while other – more recently arrived – foreigners (such as Afghani, Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants or asylum seekers) monopolise the public discourse.

Native minorities

There are a number of native minorities in Greece whose population however is rather small (Clogg 2002). According to the data provided by international and Greek NGOs the following national, ethno-linguistic and religious minorities are present in Greece (percentages refer to the total resident population): Roma 3.3%; Arvanites 2%; members of the Macedonian minority 2%; Vlachs 2%; Turks 0.5%; Pomaks 0.314 (Lenkova, 1997; Minority Rights Group (MRG), 1994). Religious minorities, which include Catholics, Protestants and new religious movements, make up nearly 1% of the citizens of Greece. Among these minorities, the Greek State only recognises the existence of the Muslims of western Thrace, the Roma population and Greek Catholics and Protestants.

Since official recognition of other minorities of any kind is withheld, these groups are subjected to discriminatory treatment, whether at the collective and individual level. The recent mobilisation of the Macedonian minority (during the 1990s) has been dealt with by refuting its existence and persecuting its activists (Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM), 1998: Kostopoulos 2000). In this report we shall only discuss the two numerically important native minorities in the country: the Muslims of western Thrace and the Macedonians in northwestern Greece.

13 Even though the use of Greek language was mainly confined to private homes and only in southern Albania in the Greek inhabited villages. Often ethnic Greek Albanians were moved to Tirana and other areas for work where they could not speak the Greek language and hence many of them were no longer fluent in it.

14 Arvanites are a Christian Orthodox minority that originates from northern Albania and migrated to continental Greece in the late middle ages. Vlachs are a Christian Orthodox minority native of Greece. There are however important Vlach populations across the Balkans and even in Central Europe. Vlachs are sub-divided in several ethnic sub-groups and are preodominantly Christian Orthodox. Both populations (the Arvanites and the Vlachs) are considered today to be totally assimilated to the dominant Greek national identity and culture even if Vlachs in particular may have their group-specific cultural festivities. Pomaks are a local Muslim population that lives in the Rhodope mountains on both sides of the Greek Bulgarian border. In Bulgaria they are considered Bulgarian Muslims while in Greece they are seen as part of the larger Muslim population of Western Thrace (see also Clogg 2002 and Rozakis 1996; 2000).