(Accepted on 2011.03.09)
Trade Discount Policies in the Differential Games Framework
Igor BYKADOROV ∗ , Andrea ELLERO † , and Elena MORETTI †
∗ Sobolev Institute of Mathematics, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Novosibirsk, Russia
† Department of Management, Universit`a Ca’ Foscari, Venice, Italy
Abstract: We consider a vertical control distribution channel in which a manufacturer sells a single kind of good to a retailer. We assume that a wholesale price discount increases the retailer’s sale motivation thus improving sales. The optimal control of manufacturer’s profit via trade discounts is embedded in a differential game framework; in the special case of constant controls we compare the Stackelberg equilibria obtained considering manufacturer and retailer respectively as leaders of the game with Nash equilibrium points.
Keywords: Optimal control, differential games, motivation, trade discounts
1 Introduction
To earn a reasonable profit the members of a distribu- tion channel often adopt rather simple pricing tech- niques. For example, manufacturers may use cost- plus pricing, simply defining the price adding a de- sired profit margin to (variable) production costs; in a similar fashion, retailers very often use to determine shelf prices adding a fixed percentage markup to the wholesale price.
The main advantage of simple policies is that they are...easy to be applied. But this blind approach to pricing does not provide tools to manufacturers in or- der to encourage retailers to sell and retailers, in turn, cannot adequately stimulate consumer to buy.
Differential games are used to represent problems of conflict and cooperation when decisions are made in real time. Their use in marketing, e.g. in advertising, pricing, promotion policies optimization, has a long tradition dating over 30 years ago (see e.g. [4],[7] and also [8],[5],[6]).
In this paper we will focus on the effects of trade promotions, a widely used dynamic pricing strategy that manufacturers can exploit to raise sales. With trade promotions an incentive mechanism is used to drive other channel members’ behaviors.
In particular we investigate the relationships be- tween the members of a distribution channel by means
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