Sebastiano Gino Book Review
Eric Schliesser (ed.), Sympathy: A History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 434.
The book Sympathy belongs to a series of Oxford University Press volumes, i.e. “Oxford Philosophical Concepts”, each of which is devoted to the history of a specific concept. Thus, Sympathy tries to chart the history of this notion from the first occurrences of the Greek word sympatheia, to the usage of its correlatives in contemporary philosophy. Contributions from experts of different orientation shape the volume in a highly interdisciplinary fashion. If some chapters focus on theories of sympathy in the history of philosophy, others show how the concept was deployed in other fields, such as literature, politics and economics. Interestingly, longer chapters are followed by shorter “reflections” which explore the implications of the philosophical concept of sympathy in disciplines other than philosophy.
In the introduction, Eric Schliesser remarks how the concept of sympathy is semantically rich, as it has been used to describe a wide range of phenomena. Attempting to encapsulate some defining features of the concept, Schliesser claims that sympathy most frequently refers to the so-called action at distance between elements which are somehow similar. Its cause is normally invisible to the eye, while its effects are instantaneous. This characterization of the concept is in itself neutral with regard to specific cosmological, physical or psychological theories. Explanations based on the concept of sympathy are often vague, since it may happen that sympathy is treated like the explanans of a phenomenon, for example when one says that two things are in a sympathetic relationship because they are alike. This shows the heuristic potential of the notion of sympathy in the sense that it can be considered the best explanation available at some point, which leaves open the possibility of carrying out further inquiries into the phenomenon in question. Schliesser also calls attention to the fact that sympathy implies a mutual action or a kind of “coaffectability” of things within a system. The introduction ends with some remarks about how early modern philosophers drew on the notion of sympathy in order to make sense of philosophical puzzles, for instance the body-mind union, or groundbreaking scientific discoveries. Notably, Newton’s gravitational attraction to a form of sympathetic connection of all physical things has been compared by important philosophers, such as Leibniz. In the end, Schliesser stresses that it is most likely that correlative notions will not be altogether erased from the philosophical vocabulary in an era in which our understanding of the mind is shaped by the recent discovery of mirror neurons.
The first three papers of the volume are devoted to a clarification of the Greek notion of sympatheia. René Brouwer argues that sympathy played only a marginal role in the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, while the Stoics and the Epicureans used it in a more systematic way. Both traditions relied on a materialistic conception of the universe, but with striking differences: for Epicurus, the atomic structure of the human soul explained its sympathy with the body and the external world, while the Stoics considered sympathy a feature of the world itself, since everything is pervaded by the divine breath (pneuma), which makes all parts of the cosmos relate with each other in the same way the organs do in an animal. Eyjólfur K. Emilsson’s chapter deals with sympathy in the writings of Plotinus and argues that the doctrine of sympatheia that we find in the Enneades is indebted to Plato’s Timaeus, but also takes into account the influence of the Stoic doctrine of pneuma. Nevertheless, Plotinus’s sympathy is not the result of the material structure of the universe, but rather is based on the World-Soul, namely, the hypostasis located between the material world and the higher principles of reality. As the World-Soul is what informs inert matter, all the instances of sympathetic relationships depend on its activity. In the end, Emilsson contends that Plotinus’s theory of vision is akin to Galen’s. This topic is further elaborated in a short reflection on the medical notion of sympathy by Brooke Holmes.
Ann E. Moyer tackles the issue of sympathy in the Renaissance and argues that the Latin translation of the Greek word sympatheia features prominently in the studies of natural philosophy during the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, while the meaning that associates sympathy with the feelings of our fellow creatures comes forward when the term begins to be used in vernacular languages. Moyer explains how it became common currency in natural philosophy after Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa published De occulta philosophia in 1533. The development of theories of universal sympathy is linked to a growing interest into the work of Pliny and to new editions of Galenic and Hippocratic corpora. Gerolamo Fracastoro’s De sympathia et antipathia rerum (1546) is an important Renaissance medical tract which drew on the concept of sympathy in order to provide a materialistic explanation of contagion. Even new medical paths pursued by Paracelsus and his followers did not exclude the theorization of sympathetic affinities between elements. Moyer concludes by stressing the fact that we fail to trace linear advancements of the notion of sympathy from the late Middle Ages to early modern times. After a brief reflection on sympathy and music by Giuseppe Gerbino, next is Christia Mercer’s chapter on seventeenth-century universal sympathy. She contends that philosophers of the seventeenth century generally distinguished between a “natural” and a “supernatural”, or demonic, form of sympathy, thereby defending themselves from the charges of heresy associated with magical thinking by both Catholic and Protestant authorities. She also argues that the discussion on Stoic philosophy generated by the
publication of Justus Lipsius’s collection of fragments in 1604 set the stage for further developments of the notion of universal sympathy. In particular, some assumptions derived from a blend of Platonic and Stoic ideas can be found in the metaphysics of Leibniz and Anne Conway. Among these assumptions, Mercer lists the idea of a hierarchy of substances, emanative causation, the principle of plenitude (the theory that Gods fills the world with as many beings as possible), universal sympathy, and enhanced sympathy (the idea that created substances increase the goodness and the beauty of the universe by mirroring each other). She claims that these assumptions are recast by Leibniz in his doctrine of pre-established harmony, which she interprets as «universal sympathetic harmony pushed to its limits» (p. 128). Anne Conway also endorsed similar premises in Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (1690), but reached conclusions which are partly at odds with Leibniz. For Conway, every substance can virtually attain a degree of moral perfection analogous to God’s. The discussion of theories of sympathy in early modern philosophy concludes with a short reflection by Sarah Skwire on the philosophical underpinnings of Shakespeare’s King Lear and Karolina Hübner’s chapter on Spinoza. Hübner shows how Spinoza’s doctrine of the fundamental unity of all things in one single substance rehabilitates the concept of sympathy, although Spinoza normally rejected all theories of sympathy between things based on an erroneous conception of nature. Hübner refers to the scholium of the seventh proposition in the second book of Ethics in order to argue that Spinoza’s doctrine of the unity of body and mind must not be interpreted in terms of a numerical unity.
The section of the volume engaging with the eighteenth century is opened by Ryan P. Hanley’s paper, which provides a detailed and learned account of the reasons why this century has been considered the age of sympathy. Hanley resolves this query by pointing out that the manifold theorizations of sympathy during the Enlightenment constituted a response to some pressing concerns related to new forms of socio-political organization and a new conception of man. Sympathy was conceived as the process through which we substitute ourselves with others and experience their feelings, and this was seen as a potential barrier to self-interest. Moral theories built on this idea can be linked to phenomena such the rise of commercial societies, colonialism and imperialism, namely, social constructions that could threaten the value of Christian caritas. Self-interest, self-love, amour-propre and related notions – often traced back to the systems of Hobbes and Spinoza – might conceivably be checked by an invisible force such as sympathy, which was capable of strengthening social bonds. Hanley correctly highlights that such an account was normally grounded on a secular conception of man and had eudaimonistic implications: sympathizing with others’ feelings and showing benevolence to them can, in turn, make the subject happy. These aspects are also considered by Julie C. Hayes in a reflection on eighteenth-century
French theatre; she stresses how the genre of tearful (larmoyantes) comedies brought to the stage new forms of affectivity and infused the subjects of dramas with a new kind of sensibility. She also notes how the theorization of sympathy in French eighteenth-century culture was theatrical in nature, as in the case of Sophie de Grouchy, the translator of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.
In a lengthy chapter by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, the doctrines of sympathy of Hume and Smith are considered. Sayre-McCord concentrates on their theories of approbation and moral judgement. The chapter highlights especially the differences between the two Scotsmen, who nonetheless shared some general assumptions. Significantly, both Hume and Smith distinguished between a fact as an approved action, and the approvability of some actions. However, the second element requires the theorization of a normative standard for moral evaluations. According to Hume, sympathy has a specific etiology: I sympathize with someone when I have an idea of what he feels and the idea of myself transfers some vivacity to the corresponding impression. On the contrary, Smith’s account is more simple: I imagine myself in someone else’s situation and sympathize with her by considering the circumstances that generated her feelings. Hume thinks that moral approbation is obtained when we consider the effects of a person’s action on others and overlook our personal interest. This requires two distinct elements to be in place: a sympathetic relationship between the agent and the person who judges her, and the consideration of her character traits in general. Considering these two elements together, Hume claims that moral approbation is based on a sense of sympathy with the pains and pleasures of those on whom the agent’s actions have an effect. For Smith, an action is approved when we realize that we sympathize with the agent and think that we would share her motives. This brings us to the issue of moral judgement, which depends on what Hume terms the “general point of view” and for Smith the “impartial spectator”. The former is a condition in which we consider the general effects of someone’s action, while the latter represents a hypothetical observer who knows every action, motive and circumstance relating to a person’s action and evaluates it without regard to her private interest. Sayre-McCord concludes by stressing that the identification of a standard for moral evaluation cannot discover an independent foundation for the standard itself.
In a brief discussion of Goethe’s Elective Affinities, Elizabeth Millán elucidates the common root of chemical affinities and the attachments of the heart that are the subject of the novel. Goethe exploited this analogy in order to join poetry and science. Bernard Reginster addresses Nietzsche’s critique of Schopenhauer’s morality of compassion. In the sense that the compassionate agent must somehow identify herself with the person who suffers, Schopenhauer argued that selflessness is a requisite for actual compassion. Attacking this view, Nietzsche elaborated a reductionist account of compassion, which he interpreted as a manifestation of “will to power”. Reginster describes the
Nietzschean critique and sketches possible answers to address it through Schopenhauer. In the end, he claims that the problem raised by Nietzsche can serve to highlight a limitation of Schopenauer’s account of compassion, specifically, a too strong devaluation of the personal interests of the compassionate agent. Remy Debes shifts the reader’s attention to the history of psychology and describes how sympathy was treated by American psychologists and early phenomenologists. He explains the terminological transformation which occurred as a consequence of the translation of the German word Einfühlung to the English term “empathy”, and explains how the history of empathy is closely intertwined with “sympathy”. His essay dwells at length on the figure of Theodore Lipps and then turns to his legacy as interpreted by American psychologists. The issue of empathy is tied to the recognition of others “as others”, which has great import for the elaboration of a theory of egalitarian societies. In another chapter, David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart provide a complex picture of how eugenic debates generated by Darwinian theories related to the issue of sympathy between human beings. Alfred R. Wallace argued in an important paper of 1864 that natural selection is countered by sympathetic bonds created by civilization. The chapter explains how the necessity of elaborating methods of artificial selection within human societies gave rise to debates in Britain concerning the political control over marriages and contraceptives. In the final chapter of the book, Vernon L. Smith and Bart J. Wilson focus on the connection between experimental economics and Smith’s doctrine of the “impartial spectator”: they assume that some insights found in Theory of Moral Sentiments can be useful to contemporary scientists of economics in order to clarify the results of experimental “exchange games”, namely, artificial situations in which people are asked to accept or reject a monetary offer under particular conditions.
Undoubtedly, Sympathy is a remarkable accomplishment. It helps the reader to deepen her understanding of how a multifaceted concept is rooted in different philosophical traditions, whose transformation and interpretation throughout the centuries has shaped the way we conceive “sympathy” both in philosophy and in common ways of speaking. As Eric Schliesser remarks correctly in the introduction, the interdisciplinary outlook of the volume helps us to understand that the notion of sympathy is too equivocal to be attributed to a single philosophical tradition, for example, British Empiricism. Given the importance of interdisciplinarity for philosophical scholarship in general, it is a pity that the medical concept of sympathy is relegated to a brief reflection, since medicine and philosophy were so tightly linked in the past. A better understanding of “medical sympathy” would surely be useful for the historians of philosophy.
