Corso di Laurea magistrale (ordinamento ex D.M.
270/2004)
in Lingue e Istituzioni Economiche e Giuridiche
dell’Asia e dell’Africa Mediterranea
Tesi di Laurea
Shifting dynamics of power inside
Ḥamās in the aftermath of the Arab
Spring.
Between moderation and militarization.
Relatore
Ch. Prof. Barbara De Poli
Laureando
Mabel Grossi
Matricola 987053
Anno Accademico
2012 / 2013
Sommario
Introduction ... 4
Transliteration table ... 9
I.Roots of Political Islam in Palestine ... 10
The Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and the Nakba ... 10
The Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip after 1948 ... 14
The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank after 1948 ... 18
The Six Day War and its aftermath. ... 21
1980s: From Daʿwa to Ğihād. Domestic, regional and international determinants. ... 27
1987 and the First Intifāḍah: Ḥamās is born ... 32
II: Ḥamās from Resistance to Government: Between Opposition and co-existence 34 Ideology, structure and strategies ... 35
Ḥamās Charter ... 35
Historical development of Ḥamās’s organizational structure ... 37
The External Leadership and foreign relations ... 41
The internal leadership ... 44
Between violence and co-existence. Oslo and its aftermath ... 47
Ḥamās and the PLO ... 48
The Oslo Accords and signs of internal divisions ... 51
Failed peace, Islamic social welfare and the al-Aqṣā Intifāḍah. ... 56
Towards political pragmatism ... 61
Ḥamās’s electoral campaign ... 63
III. After Fitna. The Growing power of the Gaza Leadership (2007-2010) ... 67
Ḥamās state building in Gaza: A one-party state. ... 67
Fitna ... 67
Gaining security, political and judicial control ... 72
Facing internal opposition: Ḥamās and the Salafists in Gaza ... 76
Internal economy ... 80
The authoritarian Ḥamās ... 84
Ḥamās in the West Bank ... 86
Shifting internal dynamics ... 90
Conclusive remarks ... 92
IV. What will the Arab Spring deliver for Ḥamās? ... 93
The Arab Revolts and Palestine. Repercussions and Implications ... 93
Geopolitical reorientation: Challenges and Opportunities ... 98
Ḥamās-Mursī relation ... 104
Reconciliation Process: managing the challenges of the Arab Spring ... 112
Internal divisions: Between moderation and militarization ... 117
Conclusions ... 127
References ... 134
BOOKS ... 134
ARTICLES ... 137
REPORTS and WEBSITE SOURCES ... 140
POLLS & DOCUMENTS ... 143
ḤAMĀS STATEMENTS & PRESS: ... 144
Introduction
This study aims to shed light on the repercussions of the Arab Spring on Ḥamās’s internal structure of power, by providing an in-depth historical analysis of Ḥamās’ political thought since its establishment, with major focus on the 2011-2013 framework of time. Specifically, the thesis aims at answering the following questions: What has been the impact of the Arab Spring on the Islamic Resistance Movement (Ḥamās)? Are internal divisions between the internal and external leaderships new and unprecedented, or do they belong to a long-standing historical tension along the politico-military lines? Will the Arab Spring finally force Ḥamās to engage in non-violent/popular resistance, or will it highlight the militarization of the Gaza Strip?
The study makes an important contribution into the existing academic literature about the history of Ḥamās’s political thought, as it provides a careful attempt to read regional events between 2011 and July 2013 from a historical perspective, so as to analyze Ḥamās decisional mechanisms in the framework of a punctual historical heritage and new geopolitical dynamics. In fact, after the Arab Spring, academic literature has been focused on the geo-political repercussions of the Arab Spring at a regional level, focusing on countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya – where the Arab Spring had its most profound consequences, but also on new “emerging” regional powers such as Qatar. For this reason, we believe that this study proves to be extremely useful in assessing the impact of the revolts on “secondary” actors, as it focuses on the analysis of the political behavior of a Muslim Brotherhood’s offspring, Ḥamās, under the direct impact of regional events. Also, the study proves highly relevant for it provides political and historical analysis of contemporary Palestinian politics, and represents a useful tool for the understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Palestinian reconciliation.
Methodology used during the research combined primary and secondary sources, and draw its major bulk of information from newspapers and Ḥamās’s official statements. We relied on interviews with Ḥamās PLC speakers and Palestinian political analysts that were carried out between November 2012 and April 2013 throughout the West Bank. Importantly, because Ḥamās is a grassroots organization with a hierarchical structure, statements and official documents often provide only a partial picture of the complexity of the movement. In fact, during our fieldwork, we assessed the constant discrepancies between Ḥamās official statements in the press, and allegations provided during behind-doors interviews. As a matter of fact, we have widely used Ḥamās’s official webpages,
such as its Facebook and Twitter accounts, however we contend that less official media outlets, such as Ḥamās-controlled in Gaza Filasṭīn and Risālah- but also Filasṭīn Al-Muslima published in Britain- have often provided more reliable information regarding Ḥamās true political position.
Regarding the interviews, we spoke with Ḥamās PLC speakers in Ramallah and Nablus, as well as one ex Ḥamās member in the 2007 government, and the Kutla al-Islāmīyyah in the Birzeit, Bethlehem and Al-Quds Universities. Also, our interviewees had direct access to key institutions in the West Bank, such as Ministry of Awqāf in Ramallah and Bethelem, Ministry of Detainees, as well as local NGOs and social welfare institutions. Moreover, we relied our analysis on interviews with Palestinian and international political analysts experts in Palestinian politics, and people directly involved in political negotiations.
There is extensive academic secondary literature about Ḥamās’s early years, with a peak in publications dealing with the 2006-2009 years. In this regard, we have combined and compared information between Ḥamās-close publications (Al-Zaytūna Center for Studies and Consultations) and Western-associated authors that use different methods of analysis. In this regard, authors such as Milton-Edwards, Šadīd, Ḥammāmi and Cohen tend to address Palestine’s westernized elite, while others such as Levitt only consider Ḥamās’s use of violence and base its work primarily on Israeli’s intelligence sources. Therefore, we gave priority to authors that made extensive use of primary sources and combined theoretical discourse and practice such as ‘Abū ʿAmr, Mishaul and Sela, Sara Roy and Geroen Gunning, as well as Ḫālid Ḥrūb and ‘Azzām Tamīmī. Arabic academic secondary sources tend to privilege theoretical discourse (Al-‘Asʿāl, ʿAdwān, Al-Hoūt and ‘Abū Al-Namal), therefore we used them as a general theoretical framework of reference to explain Ḥamās’s historical political thought.
For the 2007-2013 years, we made wide use of interviews-based policy-oriented reports such as those produced by the International Crisis Group, and other think tanks such as Crown Center for Middle East Studies, the Center on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding in Geneva and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, to quote a few. Moreover, we made extensive use of primary Arabic sources from Arabic press, as well as official texts of agreements and public speeches of Ḥamās and Egyptian leaders.
This thesis is structured in four chapters covering the whole historical life of Ḥamās, until July 2013. The first chapter provides an introductory historical background of the roots of political Islam in Palestine, addressing the coupling of national, regional and international determinants in triggering the revival of political Islam in Palestine and the
reasons behind the establishment of Ḥamās: the Nakba, the 1967 war and the development of political Islam through the 1970s and 1980s until the first Intifāḍah. Importantly, in this section we set the historical basis for the institutional development of Ḥamās in the Gaza Strip, with a careful eye to its relation with the Egyptian government and the Egyptian Brotherhood, alongside the origins of the geographical and institutional division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The second chapter aims at providing an in-depth analysis of the development of Ḥamās’s internal structure of power, highlighting the growing moderation and pragmatism of Ḥamās’s leadership from the 1990s stemming from its early relation with the PLO. In this context, this section highlights Ḥamās’s “dual policy” vis-à-vis the PLO in negotiating pragmatic co-existence and rejectionism. Moreover, in this chapter we assess the dialectical tension along the politico-military line triggered by such “dual policy”, as well as between the “hardliner” external leadership and “pragmatic” Gaza leadership.
The third chapter addresses the framework of time between the 2006 electoral victory and 2010, providing a complete analysis of Ḥamās state-building in Gaza. In this context, we crucially analyze Ḥamās’s growing resemblance with the post-Oslo PA during the state-building phase and its growing authoritarian institutional grip. In fact, this section contends that international boycott and the siege have strengthened the Gaza’s leadership rule over the Strip and has switched the Ḥamās’s internal balance of power from the “outside” towards the “inside”.
The last chapter aims at providing an assessment of the impact of the Arab Spring over Ḥamās’ internal structure of power. Here we analyze the reconciliation process as one of the major effects of the Arab Spring on Ḥamās, and the factors hindering its actual and effective implementation stemming from internal polarization within Ḥamās. In fact, the major observation of this chapter is the growing militarization of Gaza and of Ḥamās politburo after the 2012 Šūrā elections, and the attitude of the Gaza leadership to resist any change brought about by the Arab Spring, both at the regional and national level. Moreover, the chapter analyzes Miš’al’s approach to the Arab Spring, and reconciliation proposal in the light of a strategic effort to undermine the growing power of the Gaza leadership.
Finally, in fact, the thesis concludes that the Arab Spring has highlighted long-standing historical trends that had characterized Ḥamās internal structure of power since its establishment. If it is premature to experience internal splits within Ḥamās, the Arab Spring has definitely increased the political weight of the military wing in the Gaza Strip. Moreover, we conclude that between 2011 and 2013 the Gaza and external leaderships
have progressively engaged in internal competition that resulted in the common attitude to preserve the status quo: the Gaza leadership has resisted reconciliation processes fearing that this might undermine its political and security control over the Gaza Strip, on the other hand, Miš’al has engaged in regional negotiations and reconciliation with the primary purpose of upgrading its political power within Ḥamās’ internal structure of power.
ﺔﻣﺪﻘﻤﻟاﺍ
لﻝﻼﺧ نﻥﻣ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ لﻝﺧاﺍدﺩ ﺔطﻁﻠﺳﻟاﺍ لﻝﻛﯾﻳھﮪﮬﻫ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻟاﺍ تﺕﺎﯾﻳﻋاﺍدﺩﺗ ﻰﻠﻋ ءوﻭﺿﻟاﺍ ءﺎﻘﻟإﺇ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺔﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ هﻩذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ فﻑدﺩﮭﻬﺗ
ةﺓرﺭﺗﻔﻟاﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻲﺳﯾﻳﺋرﺭ لﻝﻛﺷﺑ زﺯﯾﻳﻛرﺭﺗﻟاﺍ ﻊﻣ ،٬ ﺎﮭﻬﺋﺎﺷﻧإﺇ ذﺫﻧﻣ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ﺔﻛرﺭﺣﻟ ﻲﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ رﺭﻛﻔﻠﻟ ﻲﺧﯾﻳرﺭﺎﺗﻟاﺍ لﻝﯾﻳﻠﺣﺗ رﺭﯾﻳﻓوﻭﺗ
2011
ـ
-
ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻟاﺍ رﺭﯾﻳﺛﺄﺗ نﻥﺎﻛ اﺍذﺫﺎﻣ :ﺔﯾﻳﻟﺎﺗﻟاﺍ ﺔﻠﺋﺳﻷاﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ
بﺏﯾﻳﺟﺗ
نﻥأﺃ
ﻰﻟإﺇ
ﺔﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ فﻑدﺩﮭﻬﺗ
،٬دﺩﯾﻳدﺩﺣﺗﻟاﺍ
ﮫﻪﺟوﻭ ﻰﻠﻋ.
2013
نﻥﯾﻳﺑ تﺕﺎﻣﺎﺳﻘﻧﻻاﺍ لﻝھﮪﮬﻫ ؟(سﺱﺎﻣﺣ) ﺔﯾﻳﻣﻼﺳﻹاﺍ ﺔﻣوﻭﺎﻘﻣﻟاﺍ ﺔﻛرﺭﺣ ﻰﻠﻋ
ﻟاﺍ
ﻲھﮪﮬﻫ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ﺔﻛرﺭﺣﻟ ﺔﯾﻳﺟرﺭﺎﺧﻟاﺍوﻭ ﺔﯾﻳﻠﺧاﺍدﺩﻟاﺍ تﺕاﺍدﺩﺎﯾﻳﻘ
ﺎﮭﻬﻧأﺃ مﻡأﺃ ،٬ﺔﻗوﻭﺑﺳﻣ رﺭﯾﻳﻏوﻭ ةﺓدﺩﯾﻳدﺩﺟ تﺕﺎﻓﻼﺧ
ﺔﺟﯾﻳﺗﻧ
ﺳﻟاﺍ نﻥﯾﻳﯾﻳوﻭﺗﺳﻣﻟاﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻲﺧﯾﻳرﺭﺎﺗﻟاﺍ رﺭﺗوﻭﺗ نﻥﻣ
ﻲﺳﺎﯾﻳ
وﻭ
ﻟاﺍ
لﻝھﮪﮬﻫ ؟يﻱرﺭﻛﺳﻌ
ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻟاﺍ رﺭﺑﺟﯾﻳﺳ
نﻥأﺃ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ
ﻰﺗﺑﺗﺗ
ﺔﻣوﻭﺎﻘﻣﻟاﺍ
ﺔﯾﻳﻣﻠﺳ
ةﺓرﺭﻛﺳﻌﻟاﺍ ﻰﻟأﺃ يﻱدﺩؤﺅﯾﻳﺳ ﮫﻪﻧأﺃ مﻡأﺃ
ةﺓدﺩﯾﻳاﺍزﺯﺗﻣﻟاﺍ
ةﺓزﺯﻏ عﻉﺎطﻁﻗ ﻲﻓ
ﻲﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ رﺭﻛﻔﻟاﺍ ﺦﯾﻳرﺭﺎﺗﻟاﺍ لﻝوﻭﺣ ةﺓدﺩوﻭﺟوﻭﻣﻟاﺍ ﺔﯾﻳﻣﯾﻳدﺩﺎﻛﻷاﺍ تﺕﺎﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ نﻥاﺍدﺩﯾﻳﻣﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻣﺎھﮪﮬﻫ ﺔﻣھﮪﮬﻫﺎﺳﻣ ﺔﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ هﻩذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ لﻝﺛﻣﺗ
،٬سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ﺔﻛرﺭﺣﻟ
نﻥﺈﻓ
دﺩﮭﻬﺟ ﺔﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ رﺭﻓوﻭﺗ
اﺍ
ﺗ ﻲﻓ ﺎﻘﯾﻳﻘﺣ
نﻥﯾﻳﺑ ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻟاﺍ ﺎھﮪﮬﻫرﺭﺎﺛأﺃ ﻲﺗﻟاﺍ ﺔﯾﻳﻣﯾﻳﻠﻗﻹاﺍ تﺕاﺍرﺭﯾﻳﯾﻳﻐﺗﻟاﺍ لﻝﯾﻳﻠﺣ
2011
-
ﺔﯾﻳﺧﯾﻳرﺭﺎﺗﻟاﺍ ﺎﮭﻬﺗرﺭﺑﺧ رﺭظﻅﻧﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﺟوﻭ نﻥﻣ سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ ﺔﯾﻳﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ تﺕاﺍرﺭاﺍرﺭﻘﻟاﺍ لﻝﻠﺣﻧ نﻥأﺃ ﻊﯾﻳطﻁﺗﺳﻧ ،٬ﺔﻘﯾﻳرﺭطﻁﻟاﺍ هﻩذﺫﮭﻬﻟ وﻭ
2013
زﺯﻛرﺭﺗ دﺩﻗ ،٬ﺔﻘﯾﻳﻘﺣﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ .ةﺓرﺭﯾﻳﻐﺗﻣﻟاﺍ ﺔﯾﻳﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳوﻭﯾﻳﺟﻟاﺍ تﺕﺎﯾﻳﻣﺎﻧﯾﻳدﺩﻟاﺍوﻭ
مﻡظﻅﻌﻣ
تﺕﺎﺳﺎﻛﻌﻧﻹاﺍ لﻝوﻭﺣ ﺔﯾﻳﻣﯾﻳدﺩﺎﻛﻷاﺍ تﺕﺎﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ
ﺔﯾﻳﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳوﻭﯾﻳﺟﻟاﺍ
ثﺙﯾﻳﺣ ـ ﺎﯾﻳﺑﯾﻳﻟ وﻭ سﺱﻧوﻭﺗ ،٬رﺭﺻﻣ لﻝﺛﻣ لﻝوﻭدﺩ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎﺻوﻭﺻﺧ وﻭ ،٬ﻲﻣﯾﻳﻠﻗﻹاﺍ ىﻯوﻭﺗﺳﻣﻟاﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻠﻟ
ﺛﺄﺗﻟاﺍ نﻥﺎﻛ
ﯾﻳ
ةﺓدﺩﯾﻳدﺩﺟﻟاﺍ ﺔﯾﻳﻣﯾﻳﻠﻗﻹاﺍ ىﻯوﻭﻗ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺎﺿﯾﻳأﺃ وﻭ ـ ﺎﻘﻣﻋ رﺭﺛﻛﻷاﺍ ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻟاﺍ رﺭ
“
ﺔﺋﺷﺎﻧﻟاﺍ
”
لﻝﺛﻣ
،٬بﺏﺑﺳﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫﮭﻬﻟ .رﺭطﻁﻗ
دﺩﻘﺗﻌﻧ
ﺑ
ةﺓدﺩﯾﻳﻔﻣ ﺔﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ هﻩذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ نﻥﺄ
اﺍدﺩﺟ
تﺕاﺍرﺭوﻭﺛﻟاﺍ رﺭﺛأﺃ مﻡﯾﻳﯾﻳﻘﺗﻠﻟ
ﺔﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ
نﻥﯾﻳﻠﻋﺎﻔﻟاﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ
“
ﺔﯾﻳوﻭﻧﺎﺛﻟاﺍ
”
ﺎﻣﻛ ،٬سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻛ
نﻥﺄﺑ
زﺯﻛرﺭﺗ
ﺔﻌﺑﺎﺗ ﺔﺳﺳؤﺅﻣﻛ سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ ﺔﯾﻳﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ كﻙوﻭﻠﺳﻟاﺍ لﻝﯾﻳﻠﺣﺗ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ
ثﺙاﺍدﺩﺣﻷاﺍ رﺭﺷﺎﺑﻣﻟاﺍ رﺭﯾﻳﺛﺄﺗﻟاﺍ تﺕﺣﺗ نﻥﯾﻳﻣﻠﺳﻣﻟاﺍ نﻥاﺍوﻭﺧﻹﺎﺑ
ﺔﯾﻳﻣﯾﻳﻠﻗﻹاﺍ
.
رﺭﺎطﻁإﺇ ﻲﻓ
بﺏﯾﻳﻟﺎﺳأﺃ
تﺕﺎﺣﯾﻳرﺭﺻﺗ وﻭ فﻑﺣﺻﻟاﺍ نﻥﻣ تﺕﺎﻣوﻭﻠﻌﻣ ﺎﺿﯾﻳأﺃ وﻭ ﺔﯾﻳوﻭﻧﺎﺛ وﻭ ﺔﯾﻳﻟوﻭأﺃ رﺭدﺩﺎﺻﻣ ﺎﻧﻣدﺩﺧﺗﺳاﺍ ،٬ثﺙﺣﺑﻟاﺍ
ﯾﻳﻣﺳرﺭﻟاﺍ
ﺔ
.سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ﺔﻛرﺭﺣﻟ
ﺗﻌﺗ
دﺩﻣ
ﺔﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ
سﺱﺎﺳﻷﺎﺑ
ةﺓدﺩدﺩﻌﺗﻣ تﺕﻼﺑﺎﻘﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ
ﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺎﻧﯾﻳرﺭﺟأﺃ
ﻊﻣ
أﺃ
ﻲﻓ سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ ءﺎﺿﻋ
ﻟاﺍ
ﻧاﺍدﺩﯾﻳﻣ لﻝﻣﻋ لﻝﻼﺧ نﻥﯾﻳﯾﻳﻧﯾﻳطﻁﺳﻠﻓ نﻥﯾﻳﻠﻠﺣﻣ ﻊﻣ ﺎﺿﯾﻳأﺃ وﻭ ﺔﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻐﻟاﺍ ﺔﻔﺿﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ ﻲﻌﯾﻳرﺭﺷﺗﻟاﺍ سﺱﻠﺟﻣ
ﮫﻪﺑ ﺎﻧﻣﻗ ﻲ
نﻥﯾﻳﺑ
نﻥﯾﻳرﺭﺷﺗ
ﻲﻟﺎﺛﻟاﺍ
2012
وﻭ
نﻥﺎﺳﯾﻳﻧ
2013
.
مﻡﮭﻬﻣﻟاﺍ نﻥﻣ
ﻹاﺍ
ﻧ
ﺎﺑﺗ
ىﻯدﺩﻟ نﻥأﺃ ،٬هﻩ
سﺱﺎﻣﺣ
ﺔﻣظﻅﻧﻣ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺔﻓﺎﺿﻹﺎﺑ ﺔطﻁﻠﺳﻠﻟ ﻲﻠﻛﯾﻳھﮪﮬﻫ جﺝرﺭدﺩﺗ
ﻌﺷ
ﺔﯾﻳوﻭﻗ ﺔﯾﻳﺑ
ﺔﯾﻳﻣﺳرﺭﻟاﺍ قﻕﺋﺎﺛوﻭﻟاﺍ وﻭ تﺕﺎﻧﺎﯾﻳﺑﻟاﺍ نﻥﺈﻓ بﺏﺑﺳﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫﮭﻬﻟ وﻭ
نﻥﻛﻣوﻭﯾﻳ ﻻ
نﻥأﺃ
لﻝﺛﻣﺗ
فﻑﺎﯾﻳطﻁﻷاﺍ
ﺔﻛرﺭﺣﻠﻟ ﺔﻔﻠﺗﺧﻣﻟاﺍ
وﻭأﺃ
نﻥأﺃ
سﺱﻛﻌﺗ
،٬ﻊﻗاﺍوﻭﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ .ﺎﮭﻬﻠﺧاﺍدﺩ ﻎﻟﺎﺑﻟاﺍ دﺩﯾﻳﻘﻌﺗﻟاﺍ
ﺎﻧﻣﻗ دﺩﻘﻟ
لﻝﻼﺧ
ﻟاﺍ
لﻝﻣﻌ
ﻟاﺍ
تﺕﺎﺣﯾﻳرﺭﺻﺗﻟاﺍ نﻥﯾﻳﺑ تﺕﺎﺿﻗﺎﻧﺗﻟاﺍ مﻡﯾﻳﯾﻳﻘﺗﺑ ﺎﻧﻣﻗ ،٬ﻲﻧاﺍدﺩﯾﻳﻣ
ﻼﺑﺎﻘﻣﻟاﺍ لﻝﻼﺧ ىﻯرﺭﺧأﺃ تﺕاﺍءﺎﻋدﺩاﺍوﻭ ﺔﻓﺎﺣﺻﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ ﺔﯾﻳﻣﺳرﺭﻟاﺍ
،٬ﺔﻘﯾﻳﻘﺣﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ .تﺕ
ﻟ
ﺎﻧﻣدﺩﺧﺗﺳاﺍ دﺩﻘ
نﻥﻣ تﺕﺎﻣوﻭﻠﻌﻣ
ﻟاﺍ
تﺕﺎﺣﻔﺻ
ﻹاﺍ
سﺱﯾﻳﻔﻟاﺍ لﻝﺛﻣ ،٬سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ ﺔﯾﻳﻣﺳرﺭﻟاﺍ ﺔﯾﻳﻧوﻭرﺭﺗﻛﻟ
) كﻙوﻭﺑ
) رﺭﺗﯾﻳوﻭﺗﻟاﺍ وﻭ (
ﺎﺿﯾﻳأﺃ نﻥﻛﻟ وﻭ ،٬(
ﺎھﮪﮬﻫرﺭﺷﻧﺗ ﻲﺗﻟاﺍ "ﺔﻣﻠﺳﻣﻟاﺍ نﻥﯾﻳطﻁﺳﻠﻓ" ﺔﻔﯾﻳﺣﺻﻟاﺍ وﻭ ،٬"ﺔﻟﺎﺳرﺭﻟاﺍ" وﻭ "نﻥﯾﻳطﻁﺳﻠﻓ" لﻝﺛﻣ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ﺎﮭﻬﯾﻳﻠﻋ رﺭطﻁﯾﻳﺳﺗ ﻲﺗﻟاﺍ دﺩﺋاﺍرﺭﺟﻟاﺍ
ﺔﻔﯾﻳﺣﺻﻟاﺍ ﻲھﮪﮬﻫ وﻭ ﺎﯾﻳﻧﺎطﻁﯾﻳرﺭﺑ ﻲﻓ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ
ﺗ ﻲﺗﻟاﺍ
ﺗ
دﺩﻘ
مﻡ
رﺭﺛﻛﻷاﺍ تﺕﺎﻣوﻭﻠﻌﻣﻟاﺍ
ﺔﯾﻳﻗاﺍدﺩﺻﻣ
فﻑﻗوﻭﻣﻟاﺍ نﻥﺄﺷﺑ
ﺔﯾﻳﺣﺎﻧ نﻥﻣ ﺔﻛرﺭﺣﻟاﺍ
ﺎھﮪﮬﻫرﺭﻛﻓ
ﻲﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ
.
ﻊﻣ ﺎﻧﺛدﺩﺣﺗ ،٬تﺕﻼﺑﺎﻘﻣﻟاﺍ لﻝﺎﺟﻣ ﻲﻓ
أﺃ
ﻲﻓ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ﺔﻛرﺭﺣﻟ ءﺎﺿﻋ
ﻟاﺍ
ﻊﻣ ﺎﺿﯾﻳأﺃ وﻭ سﺱﻠﺑﺎﻧوﻭ ﷲ مﻡاﺍرﺭ ﻲﻓ ﻲﻌﯾﻳرﺭﺷﺗﻟاﺍ سﺱﻠﺟﻣ
قﻕﺑﺎﺳ وﻭﺿﻋ
ﻲﻓ
ﺔﻣوﻭﻛﺣ
مﻡﺎﻋ ﻲﻓ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ
2007
،٬
وﻭ
ﻊﻣ كﻙﻟذﺫﻛ
تﺕﯾﻳﺑ تﺕﺎﻌﻣﺎﺟ ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾﻳﻣﻼﺳﻹاﺍ ﺔﻠﺗﻛﻟاﺍ بﺏﻼطﻁ
مﻡاﺍرﺭ ،٬مﻡﺣﻟ
ﷲ
وﻭ
ﻼﺑﺎﻘﻣ ﺎﻧﯾﻳرﺭﺟ ،٬كﻙﻟاﺍذﺫ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺔﻓﺎﺿﻹﺎﺑ .سﺱدﺩﻘﻟاﺍ
تﺕ
تﺕﺎﺳﺳؤﺅﻣ لﻝﺧاﺍدﺩ صﺹﺎﺧﺷاﺍ ﻊﻣ
ﺔﯾﻳﻣوﻭﻛﺣ
لﻝﺛﻣ ،٬ﺔﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻐﻟاﺍ ﺔﻔﺿ ﻲﻓ
ةﺓرﺭاﺍزﺯوﻭ ،٬مﻡﺣﻟ تﺕﯾﻳﺑ وﻭ ﷲ مﻡاﺍرﺭ ﻲﻓ فﻑﺎﻗوﻭﻷاﺍ ةﺓرﺭاﺍزﺯوﻭ
ىﻯرﺭﺳﻷاﺍ
ﺔﯾﻳﺎﻋرﺭﻟاﺍ تﺕﺎﺳﺳؤﺅﻣ وﻭ ﺔﯾﻳﻣوﻭﻛﺣ رﺭﯾﻳﻏ تﺕﺎﻣظﻅﻧﻣﻟاﺍ ﺎﺿﯾﻳأﺃوﻭ
ﺑﺧ وﻭ ،٬نﻥﯾﻳﯾﻳﻟوﻭدﺩ وﻭ نﻥﯾﻳﯾﻳﻧﯾﻳطﻁﺳﻠﻓ نﻥﯾﻳﻠﻠﺣﻣ ﺎﻧرﺭﺎﺷﺗﺳاﺍ ﺎﺿﯾﻳأﺃ وﻭ .ﺔﯾﻳﻋﺎﻣﺗﺟﻻاﺍ
ﺔﯾﻳﻧﯾﻳطﻁﺳﻠﻔﻟاﺍ ﺔﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ قﻕﺎﯾﻳﺳ ﻲﻓ ءاﺍرﺭ
تﺕﺎﯾﻳﺻﺧﺷ
تﺕﻛرﺭﺎﺷ دﺩﻗ
.ﺔﯾﻳﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ تﺕﺎﺿوﻭﺎﻔﻣﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ رﺭﺷﺎﺑﻣ لﻝﻛﺷﺑ
ﻦﻣ ﺪﯾﻳﺪﻌﻟاﺍ كﻙﺎﻨھﮪﮬﻫ
رﺭدﺩﺎﺼﻤﻟاﺍ
تﺕاﺍﻮﻨﺳ لﻝﻮﺣ ﺔﯾﻳﻮﻧﺎﺜﻟاﺍ ﺔﯿﻴﻤﯾﻳدﺩﺎﻛﻷاﺍ
ﻰﻟوﻭﻷاﺍ
ﻟ
سﺱﺎﻤﺤ
ﺔﯿﻴﺳﺎﯿﻴﺳ ﺔﻛﺮﺤﻛ
وﻭ .
لﻝوﻭﺎﻧﺗﺗ دﺩﯾﻳدﺩﺣﺗﻟﺎﺑ
نﻥﯾﻳﺑ ﺎﻣ ةﺓرﺭﺗﻓ تﺕاﺍرﺭوﻭﺷﻧﻣﻟاﺍ هﻩذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ بﺏﻠﻏأﺃ
2006
-
سﺱﺎﻣﺣﺑ ﺔطﻁﺑﺗرﺭﻣﻟاﺍرﺭدﺩﺎﺻ
ﻣﻟاﺍ ﺔﻧرﺭﺎﻘﻣﺑ ﺎﻧﻣﻗ ﺔﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ هﻩذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ ﻲﻓ .
2009
.ﺔﻔﻠﺗﺧﻣﻟاﺍ لﻝﯾﻳﻠﺣﺗﻟاﺍ قﻕرﺭطﻁ مﻡدﺩﺧﺗﺳﺗ ﻲﺗﻟاﺍ ﺔﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻐﻟاﺍ رﺭدﺩﺎﺻﻣﻟاﺍ ﻊﻣ (تﺕاﺍرﺭﺎﺷﺗﺳﻹاﺍ وﻭ تﺕﺎﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻠﻟ ﺔﻧوﻭﺗﯾﻳزﺯﻟاﺍ زﺯﻛرﺭﻣ لﻝﺛﻣ)
وﻭ
لﻝﺛﻣ نﻥﯾﻳﻠﻠﺣﻣﻟاﺍ ضﺽﻌﺑ مﻡﺎﻗ ،٬دﺩدﺩﺻﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫﻋ ﻲﻓ
Milton
-
ﻊﻣ لﻝﻣﺎﻌﺗﻟﺎﺑ
Šadīd, Cohen, Hamīmī
,
Edwards
لﻝﺛﻣ رﺭﺧﻵاﺍ ضﺽﻌﺑﻟاﺍ ﺎﻣﯾﻳﺑ .ﺔﯾﻳﻧﯾﻳطﻁﺳﻠﻔﻟاﺍ ﺔﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻐﻟاﺍ ﺔﺑﺧﻧﻟاﺍ
Levitt
اﺍ
ﺔﯾﻳﻠﯾﻳﺋاﺍرﺭﺳﻹاﺍ تﺕاﺍرﺭﺑﺎﺧﻣﻟاﺍ رﺭدﺩﺎﺻﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ دﺩﻣﺗﻌﺗ ﻲﺗﻟ
ﺟوﻭ نﻥﻣ ﺎﮭﻬﻌﻣ نﻥوﻭﻠﻣﺎﻌﺗﯾﻳ وﻭ ﻲﻧﻣأﺃ دﺩﯾﻳدﺩﮭﻬﺗﻛ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ نﻥوﻭرﺭﺑﺗﻌﯾﻳ نﻥﯾﻳذﺫﻟاﺍ
ﺎﻧﯾﻳطﻁﻋأﺃ ،٬بﺏﺑﺳﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫﮭﻬﻟ .طﻁﻘﻓ فﻑﻧﻌﻟاﺍ وﻭ ةﺓوﻭﻘﻟاﺍ رﺭظﻅﻧ ﺔﮭﻬ
لﻝﺛﻣ ﺔﯾﻳﻠﻣﻋ وﻭ ﺔﯾﻳرﺭظﻅﻧ دﺩرﺭاﺍوﻭﻣ وﻭ ﺔﯾﻳﻟوﻭأﺃ رﺭدﺩﺎﺻﻣ اﺍوﻭﻣدﺩﺧﺗﺳاﺍ نﻥﯾﻳذﺫﻟاﺍ نﻥﯾﻳﻠﻠﺣﻣﻠﻟ ﺔﯾﻳوﻭﻟوﻭأﺃ
Roy, Tamimi, Mishaul,
Sela, Gunning, Abu Amr
.
ﺔﻣﺎﻋ ﺔﻔﺻﺑ
،٬
ﻟاﺍ نﻥﺈﻓ
ﺑ زﺯﺎﺗﻣﺗ ﺔﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍرﺭدﺩﺎﺻﻣ
ﺔﻌﯾﻳﺑطﻁ
ﯾﻳرﺭظﻅﻧ
ﺔ
لﻝﺛﻣ
Al-‘Ash’al, Adwan, Al-Hout and
Abu Al-Namal
قﻕﻠﻌﺗﯾﻳ ﺎﻣﯾﻳﻓ .سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ ﻲﺧﯾﻳرﺭﺎﺗﻟاﺍ ﻲﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ رﺭﻛﻔﻟاﺍ حﺡرﺭﺷ لﻝﺟأﺃ نﻥﻣ ﺎھﮪﮬﻫﺎﻧﻣدﺩﺧﺗﺳاﺍ ﺎﻧﻧﺈﻓ كﻙﻟذﺫﻟ ,
نﻥﯾﻳﺑ ةﺓرﺭﺗﻔﻟاﺍ
2007
-
Crown
,
International Crisis Group
لﻝﺛﻣ ﺔﺻﺎﺧﻟاﺍ رﺭﯾﻳرﺭﺎﻘﺗ ﺎﻧﻣدﺩﺧﺗﺳاﺍ ،٬
2013
ـ
Center for Middle East Studies, Center on Conflict, Development and
Peacebuilding
وﻭ
Washington Institute for Near East Policy
،٬كﻙﻟاﺍذﺫ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺔﻓﺎﺿﻹﺎﺑ وﻭ
دﺩﻣﺗﻌﺗ
دﺩﺎﺻﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ
رﺭ
وﻭ سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ ﺔﯾﻳﻣﺳرﺭﻟاﺍ تﺕﺎﺣﯾﻳرﺭﺻﺗوﻭ ،٬ﺔﻓﺎﺣﺻﻟاﺍ نﻥﻣ ﺔﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﺔﻐﻠﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﯾﻳﻟوﻭأﺃ
صﺹوﻭﺻﻧ
تﺕﺎﯾﻳﻗﺎﻔﺗﻹاﺍ
ةﺓدﺩدﺩﻌﺗﻣﻟاﺍ
.
مﻡﻼﺳﻹاﺍ ةﺓدﺩﻻوﻭ لﻝوﻭﺎﻧﺗﯾﻳ ثﺙﯾﻳﺣ ،٬ﺔﯾﻳﺧﯾﻳرﺭﺎﺗ ةﺓذﺫﺑﻧﺑ ﺎﮭﻬﻓ لﻝوﻭﻷاﺍ لﻝﺻﻔﻟاﺍ أﺃدﺩﺑﯾﻳ .لﻝوﻭﺻﻓ ﺔﻌﺑرﺭأﺃ ﻲﻓ ﺔﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ هﻩذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ مﻡوﻭﻛﺗﺗ وﻭ
بﺏرﺭﺣﻟاﺍ ،٬ﺔﺑﻛﻧﻟاﺍ لﻝﺛﻣ ﺔﯾﻳﻟوﻭدﺩ وﻭ ﺔﯾﻳﻣﯾﻳﻠﻗإﺇ ،٬ﺔﯾﻳﻧطﻁوﻭ ثﺙاﺍدﺩﺣأﺃ بﺏﺑﺳﺑ نﻥﯾﻳطﻁﺳﻠﻓ ﻲﻓ ﻲﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ
1967
وﻭ
مﻡﺛ نﻥﻣ
مﻡﻼﺳﻹاﺍ رﺭوﻭطﻁﺗ
ﻲﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ
ﻲﻓ
ﺑﺳﻟاﺍ
ﻲﺿﺎﻣﻟاﺍ نﻥرﺭﻘﻟاﺍ نﻥﻣ تﺕﺎﯾﻳﻧﯾﻳﻧﺎﻣﺛﻟاﺍ وﻭ تﺕﺎﯾﻳﻧﯾﻳﺑﻌ
وﻭ
ﻻوﻭﺻ
ﻼﻟ
.ﻰﻟوﻭﻷاﺍ ﺔﺿﺎﻔﺗﻧ
مﻡﺳﻘﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ ﻲﻓ لﻝوﻭﺎﻧﺗﻧﺳوﻭ ﺎﻣﻛ
ﯾﻳﺧﯾﻳرﺭﺎﺗﻟاﺍ سﺱﺎﺳﻷاﺍ
ﻲﻓ تﺕﻣھﮪﮬﻫﺎﺳ ﻲﺗﻟاﺍ ﺔ
رﺭوﻭطﻁﺗ
تﺕﺎﺳﺳؤﺅﻣ
ﻊﻣ ،٬ةﺓزﺯﻏ عﻉﺎطﻁﻗ ﻲﻓ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ﺔﻛرﺭﺣ
ﻟاﺍ
ﺔﯾﻳرﺭﺻﻣﻟاﺍ ﺔﻣوﻭﻛﺣﻟاﺍ ﻊﻣ ﺎﮭﻬﺗﻗﻼﻋ ﻰﻠﻋ زﺯﯾﻳﻛرﺭﺗ
وﻭ
مﻡﯾﻳظﻅﻧﺗ
نﻥاﺍوﻭﺧﻹاﺍ
،٬رﺭﺻﻣ ﻲﻓ
ﻰﻟإﺇ
بﺏﻧﺎﺟ
بﺏﺎﺑﺳﻷاﺍ
ﻲﻓاﺍرﺭﻐﺟﻟاﺍ مﻡﯾﻳﺳﻘﺗﻠﻟ
.ةﺓزﺯﻏوﻭ ﺔﻔﺿﻟاﺍ نﻥﯾﻳﺑ
ﻰﻟإﺇ ﻲﻧﺎﺛﻟاﺍ لﻝﺻﻔﻟاﺍ فﻑدﺩﮭﻬﯾﻳوﻭ
مﻡﯾﻳدﺩﻘﺗ
ﺗ
رﺭوﻭطﻁﺗﻟ قﻕﻣﻌﻣ لﻝﯾﻳﻠﺣ
ﻟاﺍ
ﻲﻠﺧاﺍدﺩﻟاﺍ لﻝﻛﯾﻳﮭﻬ
يﻱرﺭاﺍدﺩﻻاﺍ
,سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ
وﻭ
ﻰﻠﻋ ءوﻭﺿﻟاﺍ ﻰﻘﻠﯾﻳ
ﻲﻣﺎﻧﺗﻣﻟاﺍ ﻲﺗﺎﻣﻏاﺍرﺭﺑﻟاﺍ لﻝاﺍدﺩﺗﻋﻻاﺍ
ﻲﻓ
سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ةﺓدﺩﺎﯾﻳﻗ
لﻝﻼﺧ
تﺕﺎﯾﻳﻧﯾﻳﻌﺳﺗﻟاﺍ
رﺭﯾﻳرﺭﺣﺗﻟاﺍ ﺔﻣظﻅﻧﻣ ﻊﻣ ﺎﮭﻬﺗﻗﻼﻋ نﻥﻋ ﺔﻣﺟﺎﻧﻟاﺍ
ﺔﯾﻳﻧﯾﻳطﻁﺳﻠﻔﻟاﺍ
.ﺔﯾﻳﺋاﺍدﺩﺗﺑﻻاﺍ ةﺓرﺭﺗﻓ لﻝﻼﺧ
مﻡﺳﻘﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ زﺯرﺭﺑﯾﻳ ،٬قﻕﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ ﻲﻓ
ﻟاﺍ
ﺔﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳ
ﻟاﺍ
ﺔﺟوﻭدﺩزﺯﻣ
ﺔﻣظﻅﻧﻣ هﻩﺎﺟﺗ سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ
اﺍ
قﻕﻠﻌﺗﯾﻳ ﺎﻣﯾﻳﻓ ﺔﯾﻳﻧﯾﻳطﻁﺳﻠﻔﻟاﺍ رﺭﯾﻳرﺭﺣﺗﻟ
شﺵﯾﻳﺎﻌﺗﻟاﺍ
نﻥﯾﻳﺑ
ﺔﯾﻳﻌﻗاﺍوﻭﻟاﺍ
ضﺽﻓرﺭﻟاﺍوﻭ
.
مﻡﯾﻳﯾﻳﻘﻧ لﻝﺻﻔﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ ﻲﻓ ،٬كﻙﻟذﺫ ﻰﻟإﺇ ﺔﻓﺎﺿﻹﺎﺑ وﻭ
هﻩذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ نﻥﻋ مﻡﺟﺎﻧﻟاﺍ يﻱرﺭﻛﺳﻌﻟاﺍ وﻭ ﻲﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ نﻥﯾﻳﯾﻳوﻭﺗﺳﻣﻟاﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ رﺭﺗوﻭﺗﻟاﺍ
ﻟاﺍ
ﺔﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳ
ﻟاﺍ
كﻙﻟذﺫﻛوﻭ ،٬ﺔﺟوﻭدﺩزﺯﻣ
رﺭﺗوﻭﺗﻟاﺍ
ةﺓدﺩﺎﯾﻳﻘﻟاﺍ نﻥﯾﻳﺑ
ﺔﯾﻳﺟرﺭﺎﺧﻟاﺍ
.ﺔﯾﻳﻌﻗاﺍوﻭﻟاﺍ ةﺓزﺯﻏ ﻲﻓ ةﺓدﺩﺎﯾﻳﻘﻟاﺍوﻭ ةﺓدﺩدﺩﺷﺗﻣﻟاﺍ
ﺛﻟاﺍ لﻝﺻﻔﻟاﺍ لﻝوﻭﺎﻧﺗﯾﻳوﻭ
نﻥﯾﻳﺑ ةﺓرﺭﺗﻔﻟاﺍ نﻥﻋ ثﺙﻟﺎ
2006
وﻭ
2010
لﻝﻣﺎﻛ لﻝﯾﻳﻠﺣﺗ مﻡدﺩﻘﯾﻳ وﻭ ،٬
ةﺓرﺭﺗﻓ نﻥﻋ
ءﺎﻧﺑ
"
ﺔﻟوﻭدﺩ
ﻲﻓ "سﺱﺎﻣﺣ
وﻭﻠﺳوﻭأﺃ دﺩﻌﺑ ﺔﯾﻳﻧﯾﻳطﻁﺳﻠﻔﻟاﺍ ﺔطﻁﻠﺳﻟاﺍ وﻭ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ نﻥﯾﻳﺑ دﺩﯾﻳاﺍزﺯﺗﻣﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﺑﺎﺷﺗﻟاﺍ لﻝﯾﻳﻠﺣﺗﺑ مﻡوﻭﻘﻧ ،٬قﻕﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ ﻲﻓ .ةﺓزﺯﻏ
نﻥﻣ
لﻝﻼﺧ
ﺳرﺭﺎﻣﻣ
ﺎﮭﻬﺗ
ءﺎﻧﺑ ﺔﻠﺣرﺭﻣ وﻭ ﻲﻣوﻭﻛﺣﻟاﺍ دﺩاﺍدﺩﺑﺗﺳﻻاﺍ
اﺍ
مﻡﺳﻘﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ دﺩﻛؤﺅﯾﻳ وﻭ .ﺔﯾﻳﻣوﻭﻛﺣﻟاﺍ تﺕﺎﺳﺳؤﺅﻣﻟ
ﺑ
ﻣﻟاﺍ نﻥﺄ
ﺔﯾﻳﻟوﻭدﺩﻟاﺍ ﺔﻌطﻁﺎﻘ
زﺯﯾﻳزﺯﻌﺗﺑ مﻡﺎﻗ رﺭﺎﺻﺣﻟاﺍوﻭ
ةﺓوﻭﻗ
اﺍ
ةﺓدﺩﺎﯾﻳﻘﻟ
ﺔﯾﻳﻠﺧاﺍدﺩﻟاﺍ
عﻉﺎطﻁﻗ ﻰﻠﻋ
نﻥزﺯاﺍوﻭﺗﻟاﺍ لﻝوﻭﺣﺗ وﻭ ،٬
ﻲﻠﺧاﺍدﺩﻟاﺍ
ةﺓدﺩﺎﯾﻳﻘﻟ
ﻟ
"جﺝرﺭﺎﺧﻟاﺍ" نﻥﻣ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ
."لﻝﺧاﺍدﺩﻟاﺍ" ﻰﻟإﺇ
ﻰﻠﻋ ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻟاﺍ رﺭﺎﺛآﺁ مﻡﯾﻳﯾﻳﻘﺗ ﻰﻟإﺇ رﺭﯾﻳﺧﻷاﺍ لﻝﺻﻔﻟاﺍ فﻑدﺩﮭﻬﯾﻳوﻭ
ﻟاﺍ
ﻟ ﻲﻠﺧاﺍدﺩﻟاﺍ لﻝﻛﯾﻳﮭﻬ
ﻠ
ﺎﻧھﮪﮬﻫ نﻥﺣﻧ .سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ﺔﻛرﺭﺣ ﻲﻓ ﺔطﻁﻠﺳ
وﻭ ﺎھﮪﮬﻫرﺭﺎﺑﺗﻋﺎﺑ ﺔﺣﻟﺎﺻﻣﻟاﺍ ﺔﯾﻳﻠﻣﻋ لﻝﻠﺣﻧ
نﻥﻣ ةﺓدﺩﺣاﺍ
تﺕاﺍرﺭﯾﻳﺛﺄﺗﻟاﺍ
وﻭ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻠﻟ ﺔﯾﻳﺳﯾﻳﺋرﺭﻟاﺍ
ىﻯرﺭﻧ ﺎﺿﯾﻳأﺃ
نﻥأﺃ
ﻲﻠﻌﻓوﻭ ﻲﻘﯾﻳﻘﺣ لﻝﻛﺷﺑ ﺔﺣﻟﺎﺻﻣﻟاﺍ ذﺫﯾﻳﻔﻧﺗﻟ ﻲﺳﯾﻳﺋرﺭﻟاﺍ زﺯﺟﺎﺣﻟاﺍ لﻝﻛﺷﯾﻳ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ﺔﻛزﺯﺣ لﻝﺧاﺍدﺩ مﻡﺟﺎﻧﻟاﺍ بﺏﺎطﻁﻘﺗﺳﻷاﺍ
.
وﻭ
اﺍذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ ﻲﻓ
لﻝﻣﺎﻌﺗﻧ لﻝﺻﻔﻟاﺍ
ﻊﻣ
ةﺓرﺭﻛﺳﻌﻟاﺍ
ﻟاﺍ
وﻭ ةﺓزﺯﻏ ﻲﻓ ةﺓدﺩﯾﻳاﺍزﺯﺗﻣ
لﻝﺧاﺍدﺩ
يﻱرﺭوﻭﺷﻟاﺍ سﺱﻠﺟﻣ تﺕﺎﺑﺎﺧﺗﻧاﺍ دﺩﻌﺑ سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ ﻲﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ بﺏﺗﻛﻣﻟاﺍ
ﻋ ﻲﻓ
مﻡﺎ
2012
ﺎﺿﯾﻳأﺃ وﻭ .
لﻝوﻭﺎﻧﺗﻧ
ﻟ ةﺓزﺯﻏ ﻲﻓ ةﺓدﺩﺎﯾﻳﻘﻟاﺍ فﻑﻗوﻭﻣ
ﺔﻣوﻭﺎﻘﻣ
تﺕاﺍرﺭﯾﻳﯾﻳﻐﺗ يﻱأﺃ
نﻥﻋ ﺔﻣﺟﺎﻧ
ﻰﻠﻋ ،٬ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻟاﺍ
ﻟاﺍ
وﻭ. ﻲﻧطﻁوﻭﻟاﺍوﻭ ﻲﻣﯾﻳﻠﻗﻹاﺍ ىﻯوﻭﺗﺳﻣ
ﺎﻣﻛ
لﻝﺻﻔﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ لﻝﻠﺣﯾﻳ
ﺞﮭﻬﻧ
لﻝﻌﺷﻣ دﺩﻟﺎﺧ
ﺔﺣﻟﺎﺻﻣﻟاﺍ وﻭ ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻟاﺍ هﻩﺎﺟﺗاﺍ
ﻲﺟﯾﻳﺗاﺍرﺭﺗﺳاﺍ دﺩﮭﻬﺟﻛ ﺔﯾﻳﻧﯾﻳطﻁﺳﻠﻔﻟاﺍ
.ةﺓزﺯﻏ ﻲﻓ سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ةﺓدﺩﺎﯾﻳﻘﻟ ﺔﯾﻳﻣﺎﻧﺗﻣﻟاﺍ ةﺓوﻭﻘﻟاﺍ ضﺽﯾﻳوﻭﻘﺗﻟ
أﺃ وﻭ
ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟاﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻟاﺍ نﻥﺄﺑ حﺡاﺍرﺭﺗﻗﻹﺎﺑ ﺔﺳاﺍرﺭدﺩﻟاﺍ اﺍذﺫھﮪﮬﻫ مﻡﺗﺧﻧ ،٬اﺍرﺭﯾﻳﺧ
زﺯرﺭﺑاﺍ
ذﺫﻧﻣ سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ ﺔطﻁﻠﺳﻟاﺍ لﻝﻛﯾﻳھﮪﮬﻫ لﻝﺧاﺍدﺩ ﺔﯾﻳﺧﯾﻳرﺭﺎﺗ تﺕﺎﻋزﺯﻧ
ﺎﻧﻧﺈﻓ .ﺎﮭﻬﺋﺎﺷﻧإﺇ
دﺩھﮪﮬﻫﺎﺷﻧ نﻥأﺃ نﻥﻛﻣﯾﻳ ﻻ نﻥﺄﺑ مﻡﯾﻳﻘﻧ
سﺱﺎﻣﺣ ﻲﻓ تﺕﺎﻣﺎﺳﻘﻧاﺍ
رﺭﯾﻳﺻﻘﻟاﺍ ىﻯدﺩﻣﻟاﺍ ىﻯدﺩﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ
نﻥﻛﻟ وﻭ
تﺕﻗوﻭﻟاﺍ سﺱﻔﺗ ﻲﻓ
ﻧﺟﻸﻟ ﻲﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ لﻝﻘﺛﻟاﺍ دﺩاﺍزﺯ
ﺣ
اﺍ ﻊﯾﻳﺑرﺭﻟاﺍ لﻝﻼﺧ ةﺓزﺯﻏ عﻉﺎطﻁﻗ ﻲﻓ ﺔﯾﻳرﺭﻛﺳﻌﻟاﺍ ﺔ
ﻲﻣﺎﻋ نﻥﯾﻳﺑﻓ ،٬ﻲﺑرﺭﻌﻟ
2011
وﻭ
2013
ﻋ تﺕرﺭﻔﺳأﺃ ﻲﺗﻟاﺍ وﻭ سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ ﺔﯾﻳﻠﺧاﺍدﺩﻟاﺍ ﺔﺳﻓﺎﻧﻣﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺎﯾﻳﺟﯾﻳرﺭدﺩﺗ ةﺓدﺩﺎﯾﻳزﺯ تﺕﻧﺎﻛ
نﻥ
اﺍ
،٬ﺔﯾﻳﺣﺎﻧ نﻥﻣ :نﻥھﮪﮬﻫاﺍرﺭﻟاﺍ ﻊﺿوﻭﻟاﺍ ﻰﻠﻋ ظﻅﺎﻔﺣﻟ
ﺔﯾﻳﻧﻣﻷاﺍوﻭ ﺔﯾﻳﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ ﺎﮭﻬﺗرﺭطﻁﯾﻳﺳ ضﺽوﻭﻘﺗ دﺩﻗ ﺎﮭﻬﻧأﺃ نﻥﻣ ﺎﻓوﻭﺧ ﺔﺣﻟﺎﺻﻣﻟاﺍ تﺕﺎﯾﻳﻠﻣﻋ دﺩﺿ ﺔﻣوﻭﺎﻘﻣﻟﺎﺑ ةﺓزﺯﻏ ﻲﻓ ةﺓدﺩﺎﯾﻳﻘﻟاﺍ تﺕﻣﺎﻗ
،٬ةﺓزﺯﻏ عﻉﺎطﻁﻗ ﻰﻠﻋ
ﻗ ،٬ىﻯرﺭﺧأﺃ ﺔﯾﻳﺣﺎﻧ نﻥﻣ وﻭ
لﻝﺟأﺃ نﻥﻣ ﺔﺣﻟﺎﺻﻣﻟاﺍوﻭ ﺔﯾﻳﻣﯾﻳﻠﻗﻹاﺍ تﺕﺎﺿوﻭﺎﻔﻣﻟاﺍ ﻲﻓ ﺔﻛرﺭﺎﺷﻣﻟﺎﺑ لﻝﻌﺷﻣ رﺭرﺭ
ةﺓدﺩﺎﯾﻳزﺯ
.سﺱﺎﻣﺣﻟ ﺔطﻁﻠﺳﻟاﺍ لﻝﻛﯾﻳھﮪﮬﻫ لﻝﺧاﺍدﺩ ﺔﯾﻳﺳﺎﯾﻳﺳﻟاﺍ ﮫﻪﺗوﻭﻗ ﺔﯾﻳوﻭﻘﺗﻟاﺍ
Transliteration table
اﺍ Ā ā بﺏ B b تﺕ T t ثﺙ Ṯṯ جﺝ Ğ ğ حﺡ Ḥ ḥ خﺥ Ḫḫ دﺩ D d ذﺫ ḏ Ḏ رﺭ R r زﺯ Z z سﺱ S s شﺵ Š š صﺹ Ṣ ṣ ضﺽ Ḍḍ طﻁ Ṭ ṭ ظﻅ Ż ż عﻉ ʿ غﻍ Ġ ġ فﻑ F f قﻕ Q q كﻙ K k لﻝ L l مﻡ M m نﻥ N n هﻩ H h وﻭ W ū يﻱ Y ī ةﺓ hI.Roots of Political Islam in Palestine
Ḥamās is an offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood and considers itself as the Palestinian branch of the mother organization1. Due to the analogies between Ḥamās’s ideology, political discourse and characteristics, a deeper analysis into the development and history of the origins of Ḥamās must entail the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine.
This chapter will address the early developments of political Islam in Palestine, from the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Palestine, to the establishment of Israel in 1948, all through the outcome of the 1967 war and the dynamics that led to the spark of the 1st Intifāḍah. In particular, this chapter argues that the peculiar and specific political events that took place in the occupied territories between 1948 and 1987 had a significant impact on the development of political Islam in Palestine, as they caused the partition of the occupied territories that paved the way for the current geographical and political division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the two different varieties of political Islam that characterize the two areas.
Secondly, this chapter will argue that the resurgence of political Islam in Palestine was the result of the coupling of domestic and regional determinants, starting from the decline of nationalism in with the1967 defeat. On the one hand, the 1967 highlighted the bankruptcy of nationalist ideology in the wider region, but it also paved the way for new inter-Arab politics that were increasingly influenced by the Palestinian cause, thereby the Arab states sought to exploit and manipulate the Palestinian nationalist dimension in order to gain control of the newborn PLO, and achieving legitimacy in the region2. The
regional determinants include Israeli divide and rule policy in the early ‘70s aimed at weakening the PLO, decline in PLO standing after Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, but also more regional events as the Iranian Revolution, the Gulf War and the Muğāhidīn in Afghanistan.
The Establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and the Nakba
The Muslim Brotherhood had been founded in Egypt by Ḥassan al-Banna in 1928 and was committed to a reformist approach. Its main goal was to tackle the overall declining
1 Ḥamās Charter: http://www.palestine-studies.org/files/pdf/jps/1734.pdf
2 The author agrees with Beverly Milton-Edwards in asserting that the 1967 war did represent a hard blow
for Arab nationalism in the region, however, it did not cause the end of Palestinian nationalism that, on the contrary, represented the major ideological force throughout the ‘70s. Accordingly, political Islam was weak in Palestine in these years, and re-emerged as a powerful political force only at the end 1970s with the Iranian revolution, and developed through the 1980s and 1990s. See Milton-Edwards B., Islamic Politics in
morality in the Egyptian society and to revive the Islamic doctrine by dint of promoting an Islamic daʿwa that would bring the Islamic values close to the hearts and minds of the people, with the aim of eventually transforming society as close as possible to that established by Prophet Mohammed3. This would entail the establishment an Islamic state based on Islamic law (šarīʿah) and values. Despite the worldwide consensus among the Islamic community to adopt the Prophet’s ideals as well as the call to return to the “Righteous Ancestors” (Al-Ṣalāf al-Ṣalīḥ), the modern Islamic movements show significant differences within the determined boundaries, communities, national identities, political parties and social movements.
Namely, there are two main distinguished schools of thoughts and practice within the Islamic reformism: one is the revolutionary approach that aims at Islamize society by seizing power and adopting a top-down approach on society. On the other pole there is the reformist approach, which implements a long-term, continuous work of Islamization of society through social and educational activities, and prioritizes the bottom-up strategy4. The early years of the Brotherhood in Egypt strived to perform this second form of reformist Islam focused on education and social activities.
The idea of establishing a Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood stemmed from the attentions that the Egyptians Iḫwān were paying to the current development of the Palestinian cause, and for the symbolic importance of Jerusalem in the world Islamic heritage. The first connection between the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Palestine dates back to 1935, when Ḥassan Al-Banna’s brother, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Banna, was sent to Palestine to spread the Brotherhood’s message. In that occasion, al-Banna’s brother met with Hağ Amīn al-Ḥusseīnī, Muftī of Jerusalem and head of the Higher Islamic Council, to discuss the most crucial issues of the moment and to show the Muslim Brotherhood’s support with the Palestinian cause, but there is no evidence that this visit resulted in the official/formal establishment of a Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood5.
During the years of Jewish immigration to Palestine under the British mandate, the Muslim Brotherhood delayed the establishment of local branches but actively participated during the anti-British and anti-Zionist revolts in 1936-39, by materially supporting the revolts through the “General Committee to Aid Palestine”, and morally by the “Palestine
3 Ziād Munson. "Islamic Mobilization. Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood". The
Sociological Quarterly, vol. 42, No.4 (2011), p. 488.
4 Mishaul &Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, Columbia University Press, New York 2000, p. 28.
Piaster” campaign, that was aimed at raising awareness about the revolt via pamphlets and other propaganda declarations6.
It is also relevant to note the political ambiguity of the Muftī of Jerusalem al-Ḥusseīnī in brokering with the British authorities in Palestine and in promoting a moderate form of institutional Islam that was mainly addressed to members of his own class and that, more than once, contributed to the detriment of the local peasant population. Similarly, Hāğ al-Ḥusseīnī, did not play an active role prior the spark of the 1936 revolts and kept a moderate profile that allowed him not to be deported or arrested, as many other leaders of the revolt7. Therefore, the establishment of the Palestine Muslim Brotherhood at the end of the Second World War gathered overall support from the local Muslim community and from the leaderless ʻUlamāʾ.
There is not complete agreement concerning the exact date of the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. Some argue that the first branch was established in Jerusalem in 19458, while others claim that it dates to 19469. However Ḫālid Ḥrūb argues that the Palestine branch of the Iḫwān was inaugurated in Gaza under the leadership of Šaīḫ Zāfer al-Šawwā, at the end of the Second World War, and soon expanded to the cities of Ḥarāt al-Zaytūna, Ḥarāt al-Darağ, Ḫān Yūnis and Rafaḥ. According to his version, the Muslim Brotherhood further opened their official central office in Jerusalem, in Šaīḫ Jarrāḥ on 6 May 194610.
The years prior to the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 represented a fertile period for the Brotherhood, which could flourish through new branches and had the strength to mobilize local population by disseminating anti-Zionist propaganda. Significantly, between 1946 and 1947, the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine held conventions in Haifa with delegations from Trans-Jordan and Lebanon, with the aim of discussing issues of political and national concerns, such as the British mandate and the illegitimacy of Jewish immigration to Palestine11. According to Ziad ‘Abū ʿAmr, and confirmed by Milton Edwards, by 1947
6 For a detailed account of the 1936 revolt in Palestine and the role played by the Muslim Brotherhood see
Šihadā' Musā, Ṯawrat ʻām 1936 fī Filasṭīn: dirāsah sūsiūlūğīyah, Beirut: Bāḥiṯ lil-Dirāsāt, 2004. For further information about the Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian question see: Ziyyād ‘Abū Ġanīmah,
Al-Ḥarakat al-Islāmīyyah wa Qaḍīyyah Filasṭīn [The Islamic Movement and The Palestine Question], Amman:
Furqan House, 1985 and ʿAbd el-Fattāḥ el-Awaīsī, Taṣwwūr Iḫwān Muslimīn lil-Qaḍīyyah
al-Filasṭīnīyya, Cairo: Dār al-tawzī‘ wa al-našr al-Islāmīyyah 1989.
7 Milton-Edwards, Islamic politics...op. cit., p.28-29.
8 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Ğihād.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1994, p.3; Mishaul & Sela, The Palestinian Ḥamās.. op.cit., p.16.
9 Amnon Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Reigme: 1949-1967, Cornell
University Press 1982,p.144; Muḥammad Šadīd, "The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1988), p. 659.
10 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās....op.cit, p.15.
11 Al-Hoūt, Bayān Nuwayḥīd, Qīyyadāt wa Mu'assasāt al-sīyyāsīyyah fī Filasṭīn, Beirut, Institute of Palestine
there were 25 branches in Palestine and membership ranging from 10,000 to 20,00012, drawn from both ruling elite and lower classes13. The consensus for the Iḫwān was further enhanced by their participation in the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, when Brotherhood members volunteered to fight against Israel.
The 1948, the Nakba, as the Palestinian refers to the establishment of Israel, represents a watershed in the history of the Middle East that not only paved the way for future rounds of conflict in the region, but also significantly shaped a new historical phase for the development of political Islam in Palestine, and gave birth to the geographical division of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Gaza and in the West Bank. It is estimated that following the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, 80% of the Palestinians who lived in major areas of Palestine, upon which Israel was established, became refugees, reaching up to 700,000 the number of Palestinian who left their homes between 1947 and 194914. Refugees became a fundamental part of the Brotherhood constituency, especially in the Gaza Strip, where they could establish a strong presence in the refugee camps, where the traditional elite could not reach out15.
The Muslim Brothers participated in huge numbers in the 194816 war against Israel, with evidence that hundreds of members of the Brotherhood volunteered from neighboring countries, mainly Egypt, Jordan and Syria. According to Ḫālid Ḥrūb, quoting ‘Aref al-‘Aref’s detailed account of the events, the Brotherhood joined the Ğihād al-Muqaddas and also formed their own fighting squadron. The involvement of the Brotherhood in military actions during the war is of significant importance as it highlights the Brotherhood’s commitment to the Palestinian cause and, more importantly, the great popularity that they gathered among the refugee population. Also, the physical presence of volunteers along the Egyptian-Gazan border increased the contacts between the Brotherhood and the Palestinians in the Gaza area and, after 1949, many of the Brotherhood members who had fought the 1948 war in the Egyptian troops, moved to Palestine and contributed to the establishment of new branches in Hebron, Jenin, Qalqilya, Jerico and other villages17.
At the political level, the 1948 war saw the division of Palestine in two separately controlled territories: the West Bank, under Jordanian control, and the Gaza Strip under
12 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit. p.3, Milton Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit, p.33. 13 Jeroen Gunning, Ḥamās in Politics. London: Hurst Publishers Ltd 2007, p.27.
14 For a detailed analysis of the Nakba, see Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem
Revisited, Cambridge University press 2004; For details about the UN General Assembly for the
Commission of Palestine see official records:
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/93037e3b939746de8525610200567 883
15 Gunning, Ḥamās in politics...op.cit., p.27. 16 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit., p.3. 17 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit.,p.16.
the Egyptian administration18, deeply affecting the subsequent course of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine. As Milton-Edwards writes in her detailed analysis of the evolution of political Islam in Palestine, “the political framework of both the Jordanian and Egyptian administrations were each other a reflection, not of the needs of the Palestinian community, but of the respective political orientations and agendas of King Farūq and Ğamāl ʿAbd Al-Nāṣir in Egypt, and King ʿAbdullāh of Jordan”19. Significantly, the links between the two Brotherhoods weakened and the two entities acquired distinctive and characteristic traits that still distinguish them today: while the Brotherhood in Cairo, under the influence of the Egyptian administration acquired more revolutionary and military traits, the West Bank’s counterpart took on a more political and quietist approach 20.
The Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip after 1948
The Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreement signed in Rhodes in 1949 officially ratified the inclusion of 200,000 refugees on a territory of 360 squared kilometers, with an existing population of 60-80,00021. As stated before, the refugee population in Gaza allowed the Muslim Brotherhood in this area to provide welfare and community services, highlighting the weaknesses of institutional Islam, and especially of government institutions.
The Egyptian authorities in Gaza pursued a policy that generally reflected the overall government’s attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood22. Therefore when in December 1948, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was banned, the Brotherhood in Gaza had to face the same destiny and tried to re-assemble the group under a different façade. Namely, on May 18 1949, Zāfer al-Šawwā established the “Unification Association” (Ğamʿīat Tawḥīd), that was aimed at re-assembling the former Brotherhood’s secretariat23. Significantly, after 1948 war, the Muslim Brotherhood, under the Association’s activities in Gaza, saw a fertile development phase as the new refugee camps were a fruitful ground for the expansion of the Brotherhood’s values, and it is no coincidence that it is precisely in Gaza where Ḥamās found its stronghold in 1987. Indeed, it is exactly in the refugees that we should read the success of the Muslim Brotherhood’s particular form of political Islam that
18 Ibid., p.19.
19 Milton Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., p.36. See also: Muṣṭafā al-Ḥammārina, al-ʻAlāqāt
al-Urdunīyah-al-Filasṭīnīyah: ilā ayn? : arbaʻat sīnaryūhāt lil-mustaqbal, Markaz al-dirāsāt al-Istirātīğīyah, Amman 1998.
20 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit., p. 20. 21 Ivi.
22 Muḥammad Šadīd (1988). "The Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza", Third
World Quarterly, vol. 10, No. 2 (1988), p.660.
23 Jean-Pierre Filiu,"The origins of Ḥamās: militant legacy or Israeli tool?", Journal of Palestine Studies,
characterized the Gaza Strip and that paved the ground for the subsequent establishment of Ḥamās24.
By concentrating its activities in the refugee camps, the Association sponsored social and cultural activities, building a strong base of popular support and stepping into the gap left by the Waqf authorities. As a matter of fact, prior to 1948, the Gaza district was relatively neglected by the British mandate administration and with the transfer of leadership to the Egyptian authorities, the course of the development of the Waqf in Gaza did not significantly improved. Unlike the West Bank that was directly incorporated into the Jordanian administration, the Gaza Strip was kept a separate administration from the Egyptian one, but was never able to achieve total independence25. Due to this relative independence, the Gaza leadership remained at the forefront of the military confrontation against the Israeli occupation and emerged as the leading political movement in the Gaza Strip until 195526, while the West Bank’s branch adopted a policy of acquiescence and compromise with the Hashemite government in Jordan. By 1954, the Brotherhood in Gaza was one of the largest organizations, with membership ranging around more than 1000, especially among the school students in the refugee camps27.
The Brotherhood in Gaza could set up a network of social and political activities thank to the support of the Brotherhood in Egypt and to other donations from international Brotherhood’s members or sympathizers in the Gulf28. These activities were severely affected by the military coup of the Free Officers who seized power in Egypt in 1952 and that, in a couple of years, sought to control and limit the Brotherhood’s political influence, that was perceived as a threat to their nationalist political plans. At the beginning, the Muslim Brotherhood wholeheartedly welcomed the military coup, but supported General Neguib to Colonel Nāṣir29. The relationship with the Egyptian authorities worsened in 1954 with the presumed attempt to Nāṣir’s life that also provided Nāṣir with the scapegoat for launching a fierce and repressive military campaign against members of the Brotherhood. Following Nāṣir’s repression, the movement was banned or kept underground, membership dropped and many leaders fled the country30.
It is precisely Nāṣir’s outlaw of the Brothers in Gaza that gave to the Islamic activists in the Gaza Strip the green light for the establishment of decentralized and clandestine
24 Paola Caridi, Ḥamās: from Resistance to Government. New York: Seven Stories Press 2012, p.41.
Al-Hoūt, Al-Qīyyādāt at Wal-Mu’assasāt...op.cit., p.523.
25 Michael Dumper, "Forty Years without slumbering: Waqf Politics and administration in the Gaza strip
1948-1987", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1993), p.177.
26 Naṣṣār Ibrahīm, interview with author.Beyt Saḥūr, March 2013 27 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit., p.8.
28 Ibid.
29 Filiu, The origins of Ḥamās...op.cit, p.59. 30 Ḥrūb , Ḥamās...op.cit., p.23.
organizations, characterized by revolutionary and military actions in the name of national anti-Zionist struggle31. Following the Egyptian revolution, large numbers of Palestinian activists were arrested, especially those who were suspected to be Islamic militants. Among them, there was a young Aḥmad Yāsīn, mastermind and founder of The Islamic Resistance Movement in 1987, who was accused of trying to topple the regime in Egypt32.
Šaīḫ Aḥmad Yāsīn was born in 1938 in the southern Palestinian village of Al-Ğoūrah, near the town of Al-Mağdel that is now the Israeli city of Aškelon. During the 1948 conflict, Yāsīn with his family was forced to flee the village and became refugee in Al-Shati refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. After the accident that left him quadriplegic, he spent most of his young age studying at home, where he read widely on religious and philosophical matters. Through his job as an Arabic Language teacher, he significantly contributed to the growth of the Islamic movement in Palestine, which –during the early years- mainly focused on the central importance of Islamic education prior to engaging in any form of Ğihād33. Yāsīn’s vision advocated intifāḍah change as a powerful tool to bring about change in the whole society. He’s role has an inspiring educator been pivotal in paving the way for the subsequent appeal of the Islamic movement among university students.
The Gaza Brotherhood’s active and direct involvement in the demonstrations that took place between 1954-55 against a proposed plan to resettle Palestinian refugees in the Sinai desert in Egypt marks the most successful visible political activity of the Brotherhood in the ‘50s34. After Nāṣir outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, also the Palestinian branch in Gaza was severely compromised, membership drastically dropped and activities went underground. In this regard, ‘Abū ‘Azza, in his complete analysis about the early relationship between the Brotherhood and the newly established Fataḥ, mentions that Šaīḫ zafer al-Shawwa, leader of the Brotherhood in Gaza, declared its support for the Cairo government and its punitive measures against the Egyptian Muslim Brothers35. Specifically, the 1956 Suez war represented a major shift in the regional balance of power, because on the one hand it demonstrated the limits of Arab military, and at the same time it opened a new window of opportunity for the brotherhood to re-organize itself,
31 Robinson, Ḥamās as a Social Movement...op.cit, p.120.
32 ʿAṭif ʿAdwān, “Šaīḫ Aḥmad Yāsīn: Ḥayātihi wa Ğihādihi: P.III [‘Uns ʿAbd Raḥmān], Qaḍīyyah
al-Filasṭīnīyya Bayn Miṯāqayn: al Miṯāq al-waṭanī al-Filasṭīnī wa a-Miṯāq Ḥarakat al-Muqāwwama al-Islāmīyyah (Ḥamās). Kuwait: Maktab Dar al-Bayān.p 43.
33 Ivi
34 ‘Abū ʿAmr, Islamic Fundamentalism...op.cit.,pp. 9-10.
35 ‘Abū ‘Azza, Ma’a al-Ḥarakat al-Islāmīyyah fil-aqtār al-‘arabīyya. Kuwait: al-Qalam publishing house (1992),
but more importantly, for the underground activists to gather around a new movement which was established to openly confront Israel for the sake of national liberation36.
Therefore, with the 1956 Suez war, the Brotherhood became openly involved in the Palestinian national military struggle as they could reorganize themselves under the Israeli occupation and far from Nāṣir’s tight control. Specifically, when the Brotherhood advocated armed struggle against the 1956 invasion, membership extensively increased, widening the gap with the Communist and Ba’athist constituencies, which advocated non-armed struggle37. However, when Gaza was returned to Nāṣir, the Brotherhood had to face a new wave of secularism and nationalism that turned against religious-political activists38. Consequently, since late ‘50s until 1967, the Gaza Brotherhood membership was highly weakened, with most of its leaders finding asylum in the Gulf region.
It is noteworthy to underline that some Brotherhood’s members established certain military cells in the Gaza Strip in the early ‘50s that had a significant impact on the further development of the Gaza Brotherhood in the following years. These paramilitary organizations, namely The Youth for Vengeance and The Battallion of Justice (Katibāt al-Ḥaq)39, were formed with the purpose of engaging in armed struggle against Israel and, due to their lack of ideological discourse, they managed to shield away the animosities that affected the Muslim Brotherhood and the Regime. Therefore, being bypassed by Nāṣir’s crackdown, later on most of their leaders joined Fataḥ40.
The establishment of Fataḥ movement between 1957-1958 represented a hard blow for the Islamic movement in Palestine, which was severely and definitely weakened following the execution of Islamic leader Saʿīd Qutb in 1966 that led the way to Nāṣir’s final repression of the Islamic movement in Gaza41. In the late ‘60s the Iḫwān had begun to lose some of its members to the newly established Fataḥ movement that was overly committed to the liberation of Palestine.
Moreover, in immediate period before the 1967 war, Nāṣir’s hostile propaganda and rise in Arab nationalism produced a significant spark of anti-brotherhood feeling in Gaza and criticism towards the relative passive policies of the Brotherhood vis-à-vis the Israeli occupation42. Therefore, when the Six Day War erupted, the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza
36 Anat Kurz, Fataḥ and the Politics of Violence. The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle. The Jaffee
Center for strategic Studies 2005, p. 17.
37 Aḥmad Hišām, interview with author. September 2013. 38 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., pp. 53-54. 39 ‘AbūʿAmr, Usūl al-Ḥarakat al-sīyāsīyyah, p.77. 40 Ḥrūb , Ḥamās...op.cit., p. 25.
41 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., p.54.
held no political power on those institutions that they had established in the ‘40s and that had represented the flouring base of their success.
The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank after 1948
Following the annexation of the West Bank to Jordan in 1950, Palestinians were granted full Jordanian citizenship, significantly altering the social balance and political equilibrium of the Jordanian society. The development of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank was rather different because of the different evolution of that area prior to 1948. Specifically, the West Bank socio-political landscape significantly differed from Gaza’s, showing a patronage that included notable families that gathered around the main newly urbanized centers of Jerusalem, Ramallah, Nablus, and Bethlehem43. Within this context, the Islamic politics in the West Bank during the Jordanian rule moved along the official institutional Islam embodied by the Waqf authorities, and the parallel organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Liberation Party.
With regard to socio-political groups and political elites, the Amman government ensured to adopt a co-optative policy and quickly established a direct dialogue with the Brotherhood’s leading cadres in the West Bank. Also, the Amman government sought to incorporate notable local leaders, and members of prominent local famlies- Našāšībī, Ṣalāḥ, al-Dağğānī- into the Jordanian economic and political life. Many West Bank politicians thought that this transitional relationship with the Hashemite would represent an intermediate step towards a more comprehensive Arab unity, which eventually would entail the opportunity to reconstruct greater Arab Palestine44. However, the Jordanian monarchy did not strive to effectively and completely integrate the Palestinians into their political system, but rather preferred to co-opt and fragment them45.
The Hashemite sought to fragment the West Bank political society by dividing its territory in seven autonomous administrative districts, so that the Monarchy could control and prevent the emergence of a unified political leadership46. Despite the vigilant control of the Waqf authorities over the Islamic movement’s activities, the Brotherhood offices in the West Bank and Transjordan succeeded in merging into one single entity that was named The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan47. Between the ‘50s and ‘60s, while the Gaza brotherhood had to face Nāṣir’s violent crackdown that weakened their political influence, the West Bankers Iḫwān acted as a loyal opposition to the Hashemite regime and
43 Ibid, p.55
44 Emile Saḥlīyyeh, The West Bank Policies since 1967. Washington: Brookings Intitution 1988,p. 3. 45 Ivi...
46 Ibid, p.15.
adopted a strategy that implied acquiescence and non-direct confrontation with Amman48, in exchange for providing legitimacy to the Hāšimī monarchy through the support of the presumed direct linkage between the Hashemite and Prophet Muḥammad. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood did not advocate military activities in the West Bank apparently provided it with benefits that other political parties could not enjoy49.
Precisely, the Brotherhood succeeded in surviving the political turmoil of the ’50 and resulted as one of the most influential political groups in Jordan, growing significantly and establishing new branches throughout the ’50s. If the Brotherhood’s avoidance of real military activities in the West Bank brought about criticism, it also allowed them to consolidate their position and to be supported by the Hashemite government with the purpose of counterbalancing nationalist and leftist trends50. Despite this mutual understanding and compromise was never altered, there have been some divergences during the ‘50s, especially regarding the British presence in Jordan and pro-Western policies of the Hashemite monarchy in providing anti-soviet support to the U.S51.
Significantly, unlike the troublesome Gaza counterpart, the Iḫwān in the Jordan-controlled West Bank distanced themselves from the nationalist dimension and focused on educational, pro-šarīʿah program that allowed them to remain lawful and also indulged by the Israeli authorities. One of the most important activities of the Brothers in the West Bank was the organization of the General Islamic Conference in Jerusalem, in 1953, which gathered Islamic supporters to the Palestinian cause form all over the Arab and Islamic world. The conference allowed the Brothers to establish a permanent office (Isrāʿ wal Mi’rāğ) with delegated from other Muslim countries52. The conference represented a powerful tool of political mobilization worldwide, and the Jordanian authorities were forced to restrict its activities in 1955. However, despite the overall control of the Monarchy over the Islamic movement’s activities, the Brotherhood was the only political party to be allowed lawful during the turmoil caused by the Suez war in 1957, when the King outlawed all other political parties.
In the ‘50s and ‘60s the West Bank Brotherhood refused to boycott the Jordanian elections, under nationalist call, and also successfully participated in the Jordanian elections, succeeding in maintaining close ties with the Monarchy53. The Brotherhood won seats in Jordanian Parliament for the cities of Hebron and Nablus in 1954, 1956 and
48 Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics...op.cit., p.57.
49 Aḥmad, Ḥamās: From religious Salvation to Political Transformation-The rise of Ḥamās in Palestinian
Society, Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 1994, p.73.
50 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit., p.20. 51 Caridi, Ḥamās...op.cit., p.46. 52 Ḥrūb, Ḥamās...op.cit, p.21.
