Japan as a Climate Leader?
The Future between Renewable
Energies and Official Development
Assistance (ODA)
Master’s Degree
In Comparative International Relations
Final Thesis
Supervisor
Ch. Prof. Stefano Soriani Assistant Supervisor
Ch. Ma. Prof.ssa Rosa Caroli Graduand
Antonio Gennarelli
Matriculation Number 851540 Academic Year
Dedico questo lavoro ai miei genitori,
i quali non hanno mai smesso di insegnarmi
l’incommensurabile valore umano
di sacrificarsi per ciò che si ama.
I
NDEX
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ... 5
LIST OF FIGURES ... 7
LIST OF TABLES ... 8
ABSTRACT ... 9
1.JAPAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY:AFIRST APPROACH ... 14
Introduction ...14
Environmental Policy: Actors and Process ...15
The All Japan Business Federation, Keidanren ...18
International Agreements: Multilateral and Bilateral ... 19
The Kyōtō Protocol ...19
The Paris Agreement ...24
Economic Diplomacy and Partnership Agreements ...27
The Energy Sector: Policy and Economic Measures ... 30
The Government’s Energy Strategy ...30
Environmental Finance ...35
Carbon Tax ...37
Feed-In Tariff Scheme ...39
Green Bonds ...41
2.RENEWABLE ENERGIES:A“DOMESTIC LEADERSHIP”OVERVIEW AND HURDLES FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS ... 44
Renewable Energy: Implementation and Progress ... 44
Wind ...47 Offshore Installations ...49 Geothermal ...51 Marine Energy...52 Biomass ...54 Technological Constraints ... 56
Electricity Industry and Grid Network Limitations ...56
National Structure ...57
Grid Constraints ...59
Enhancement Policies ...62
Battery and Storage Technologies ...64
Technology Characteristics ...65
Institutional Framework of Support ...68
A First Evaluation: Is Japan on the Right Path for Climate Leadership? ... 70
3.THE SOLAR ENERGY SECTOR:OPPORTUNITY FOR LEADERSHIP ESTABLISHMENT?... 71
The Lost Leadership: Rise and Fall of the Japanese Solar PV Industry (1945-2012)... 72
The Sunshine Project and the Leading Phase ...72
Sector Slow Down and Rise of Competition ...75
First Evaluation of the Sector Development Trend until the Introduction of the Feed-In Tariff Scheme ...76
International Comparative Analysis of the Current Solar Outlook: China and Germany ... 77
Innovation and Technological Development ... 81
Floating Solar Panels ...81
Solar Roads ...84
Virtual Power Plants (VPP) ...85
The Sustainability of Mega-Events: Green Olympics and Tōkyō 2020 ... 88
Tōkyō 2020: A Global Showcase for the Future ...90
4.ENVIRONMENT AND COOPERATION:FOCUS ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF JAPAN’S OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) TO SOUTH-EAST ASIA ... 93
ODA Introduction – What is It? ... 96
Typologies, Allocation and Institutions ...96
ODA in the 21st Century: A Tool for Energy and Environmental Sustainability ...100
Japanese Institutional Structure for International Cooperation ... 103
Institutional Development and Main Actors ...104
ODA Statistics and Allocation ...106
Japan’s Aid Philosophy ... 108
From Recipient to Largest Donor: Japan’s Transformation in the International Aid Community ...109
Rise of Strategic Aid and Recent Trends ...115
Japanese Green Aid for South-East Asia: A Data-Based Analysis ... 119
Japan’s Environmental ODA Paradigm ...119
Development Assistance in the Energy Sector ...122
The Sustainability of Aid to ASEAN Countries ...126
Cambodia ...129 Indonesia ...133 Lao PDR ...149 Malaysia ...153 Myanmar ...155 Philippines ...160 Thailand...166 Timor-Leste ...173 Vietnam ...174 Data Analysis ...184
Acknowledging the “elephant in the room”: China ...184
Major DAC Donors’ Evaluation ...188
5.CONCLUSIONS ... 192
List of Abbreviations
AIIB ANRE ASEAN BRI CBD COP CO2 CRS DAC DPJ EIA EPA EPCO EV EXIM FIT FY GDP GHG GNI GVC ICB IMF IPCC IRENA ISEP JAMA JBIC JICA JOGMEC JPEA LDP LNG LPG MDG MITI METI MLIT MOE MOFA NDC NEDO NGO OCCTO ODA OECD OECF OOFAsian Infrastructure Investment Bank Agency for Natural Resources and Energy Association of South East Asian Nations Belt and Road Initiative
Convention on Biological Diversity Conference of the Parties
Carbon Dioxide
Creditor Reporting System
Development Assistance Committee Democratic Party of Japan
Environmental Impact Assessment Economic Partnership Agreement Electric Power Companies
Electric Vehicle
Export Import Bank of Japan Feed-In Tariff
Fiscal Year
Gross Domestic Product Greenhouse Gas
Gross National Income Global Value Chain
International Cooperation Bureau International Monetary Fund
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change International Renewable Energy Agency Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies Japan Automobile Manufacture Association Japan Bank for International Cooperation Japan International Cooperation Agency
Japan, Oil, Gad and Metals National Corporation Japan Photovoltaic Energy Association
Liberal Democratic Party Liquified Natural Gas Liquified Petroleum Gas
Millennium Development Goals
Ministry of International Trade and Industry Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Ministry of Environment
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nationally Determined Contributions
New Energy and Industrial Technological Development Non-Governmental Organization
Organization for Cross-regional Coordination of Transmission Operators Official Development Assistance
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
PDCA PDR PM PV RE R&D SDG TEPCO UNCDD UNFCCC UNICEF VPP WTO Plan-Do-Check-Act
People’s Democratic Republic Prime Minister
Photovoltaic Renewable Energy
Research and Development Sustainable Development Goals Tokyo Electric Power Company
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations Children’s Fund
Virtual Power Plant World Trade Organization
List of Figures
Figura 1 – Emissioni di Gas a Effetto Serra del Giappone su base annua. Fonte: Ministero dell’Ambiente del Giappone
... 9
Figura 2 - Struttura del Sistema di Approvvigionamento Energetico del Giappone. Focus sulle Fonti Fossili. Fonte: METI ... 10
Figure 3 - Photovoltaic Panel Output in Japan. Source: IRENA ... 11
Figura 4 - Outputic Energetico dei Panelli Solari in Giappone. Fonte: IRENA ... 12
Figure 5 - Cumulative CO₂ Emissions in 1998. Source : Global Carbon Project (GCP), Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC) ... 20
Figure 6 - Emissions in the Energy-conversion Sector in 2005. Source: Central Environmental Council... 24
Figure 7 - Emissions in the Industrial Sector in 2005. Source: Central Environmental Council ... 24
Figure 8 - Japan's Emission Compared to the Paris Agreement's Target and Policies Implemented. Source: Climate Action Tracker ... 25
Figure 9 - Japan and its Economic Partnership Agreements. Source: MOFA, based on METI data. ... 29
Figure 10 - FY2030 Energy Mix Projection. Source: METI... 31
Figure 11 - Total Primary Energy Supply and Total Final Consumption in 2013 and 2030 Projections. Source: IEA based on METI data ... 32
Figure 12 - Japan's Reliance on Middle East Crude Oil of Total Imports. Source: The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan ... 33
Figure 13 - Green Bonds Issuance (2018). Source: Green Bond Initiative ... 41
Figure 14 - Green Bonds Investments in Japan by Typology of Issuers. Source: Green Bonds Initiative ... 42
Figure 15 - Renewable energy, total thousand toe, 2008 – 2017. Source: OECD ... 45
Figure 16 - Regional Renewable Potential and Demand. Source: Wakiyama et al. ... 46
Figure 17 - Installed Generation Capacity of Geothermal Plants Per Country. Source: IEA ... 51
Figure 18 - Installed Capacity of Biomass Power. Source; Aikawa ... 55
Figure 19 - Japanese Electrical Grid Network and Inter-regional Capacity of Transmission. Source: Wakiyama et al. 58 Figure 20 - Modelled network of high-voltage power transmission line in Japan. Source: Komiyama et al. ... 59
Figure 21 - Energy Storage Deployment in 2017. Source: Aria ... 65
Figure 22 - Budgets of the Sunshine Program, 1974-1999. Source: Kimura et al. ... 73
Figure 23 - Solar PV Market Share by Country. Source: Aria (data) ... 78
Figure 24 - Locations of Floating Solar Panels in Japan. Source: Pouran ... 82
Figure 25 - Global Market for Floating Solar Panels by Manufacturers. Source: Aria ... 84
Figure 26 - Structure of a Virtual Power Plant. Source: ENECHO, METI ... 86
Figure 27 – Japan bilateral ODA by region (gross disbursements, 2017). Source: OECD ... 116
Figure 28 - Composition of Assistance by Sector in FY2017. Source: JICA ... 118
Figure 29 - Overlaps in DAC members' aid marked under the environment marker and the Rio markers (2009-10). Source: OECD... 128
Figure 30 - China's Estimated Net Foreign Aid (US$ billion). Source: Kitano ... 186
Figure 31 - Japan's Environmental ODA by sector as percentage of total amount disbursed in US dollars (2011). Source: Koppenborg ... 191
List of Tables
Table 1 – Feed-In Tariff Scheme – 1. Source: Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, METI ... 40
Table 2 - Feed-In Tariff Scheme – 2. Source: Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, METI ... 40
Table 3 - Denmark, Hokkaidō and Kyushu Electricity Structure Comparison. Source: IEA ... 61
Table 4 - Electricity and Investment Costs for Solar PV Panels, International Comparative Analysis. Source: METI (data) ... 79
Table 5 - Major DAC Donors' Environmental Energy Projects in Cambodia, 2006-2017. Source: OECD ... 129
Table 6 - Major DAC Donors' Environemental Energy Projects in Indonesia, 2006-2017. Source: OECD ... 133
Table 7 - Major DAC Donors' Environmental Energy Projects in Lao PDR, 2006-2017. Source: OECD ... 149
Table 8 - Major DAC Donors' Environemental Energy Projects in Malaysia, 2006-2017. Source: OECD ... 153
Table 9 - Major DAC Donors' Environmental Energy Projects in Myanmar, 2006-2017. Source: OECD... 155
Table 10 - Major DAC Donors' Environmental Energy Projects in Philippines, 2006-2017. Source: OECD ... 160
Table 11 - Major DAC Donors' Environemental Energy Projects in Thailand, 2006-2017. Source: OECD ... 166
Table 12 - Major DAC Donors' Environmental Energy Projects in Timor-Leste, 2006-2017. Source: OECD... 173
Table 13 - Major DAC Donors' Environmental Energy Projects in Vietnam, 2006-2017. Source: OECD ... 174
Table 14 - Geographical distribution of ODA by East Asian and other DAC donors (gross disbursements, 2012). Source: Stallings et al. ... 188
Abstract
Il Giappone è la terza economia mondiale per Prodotto Interno Lordo (PIL)1, è membro del G7 ed è globalmente riconosciuto come uno dei paesi più avanzati dal punto di vista tecnologico e dello sviluppo industriale. Questi sono solo alcuni dei motivi per cui il Giappone è considerato come uno dei possibili leader nella lotta al Cambiamento Climatico. Questa ambizione è alimentata dal grande livello di interesse e preoccupazione per questo fenomeno condiviso trasversalmente dalla società giapponese: società civile, burocrazia, industria, Governo etc. Buoni risultati in tal senso sono già stati evidenziato dal Ministero dell’Ambiente in riferimento alle emissioni di gas serra nell’anno fiscale 2017: le emissioni sono state ridotte dell’1% rispetto all’anno precedente, oppure dell’8.2% se paragonate ai livelli del 20132 (Figura 1), per un totale di 1,294 milioni di tonnellate.
Figura 1 – Emissioni di Gas a Effetto Serra del Giappone su base annua. Fonte: Ministero dell’Ambiente del Giappone
Il rapporto diffuso dal Ministero mette in evidenza anche i fattori più importanti che hanno contribuito misura maggiore alla riduzione dei livelli di CO2: una minore rilevanza delle fonti fossili nell’energy mix giapponese, oscurate sempre più dal crescente utilizzo delle energie rinnovabili e la riattivazione di alcune centrali nucleari3. Queste due motivazioni non sono una sorpresa: il settore energetico rappresenta infatti l’86.3% delle emissioni totali di CO2 del Giappone prendendo come riferimento i dati dell’anno fiscale 2016. In particolare, il 37.1% di queste emissioni derivano dalle
1 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2019, 2019. Accessible at:
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/ADVEC/JPN
2 MOE, Japan’s National Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Fiscal Year 2017 (in Japanese), 2018, pp. 1 3 MOE, op. cit., pp. 1-2
attività dell’industria pesante, centrale nell’economia del paese4. È quindi necessario tenere bene in considerazione il settore energetico ogni qualvolta si cerchi di affrontare il tema dei cambiamenti climatici, in particolar modo in Giappone. Non a caso, la sussistenza energetica è una necessità strategica per il Governo di Tokyo, ma tutt’altro che scontata in un paese insulare e dalle scarse risorse domestiche. Nel 2017, il Giappone ha importato risorse energetiche per il 90% del proprio fabbisogno, una percentuale crescita esponenzialmente in particolar modo dopo il disastro di Fukushima de 2011 e il conseguente spegnimento di tutti gli impianti nucleari del paese5. Il Giappone è divenuto il terzo paese al mondo per importazioni di petrolio (di cui è anche consumatore, Figura 3), appena dietro Cina e Stati Uniti. Allo stesso modo, l’importazione di carbone e di gas naturale liquefatto sostiene quasi completamente l’intera domanda interna (rispettivamente 99.7% e 99.5%). Per questo motivo, la dipendenza dalle fonti fossili rappresenta una sfida alla sicurezza energetica del paese, un tema strettamente legato alla prossima transizione energetica e le relative fonti di energia ad emissioni zero6.
Figura 2 - Struttura del Sistema di Approvvigionamento Energetico del Giappone. Focus sulle Fonti Fossili. Fonte: METI
Inoltre, la città di Kyoto, antica sede dell’Imperatore e capitale del Giappone, ha ospitato la Conferenza delle Parti nel quadro della Conferenza sui Cambiamenti Climatici delle Nazioni Unite nel 1997: il documento prodotto in quell’occasione ha rappresentato la prima forma di governance globale in merito ai cambiamenti climatici con potere vincolante per le parti firmatarie. Tale passo è
4 Ibidem.
5 US Energy Information Administration, Country Analysis Brief: Japan, 2017, pp. 1
6 Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. “Japan's Energy 2018 - 10 Questions for Understanding the Current
tenuto altamente in considerazione del Giappone, e consolida le aspirazioni del paese a divenire a tutti gli effetti un leader per la questione ambientale e climatica in particolare.
Obiettivo di questo studio è quello di delineare con chiarezza le caratteristiche che potrebbero definire il Giappone come leader climatico, e se questo status possa effettivamente essere ottenuto dal paese asiatico in questione. Dato l’elevato grado di sviluppo tecnologico e le grandi capacità e risorse economiche di cui il Giappone gode, può il paese fungere da apripista nella creazione di una società più verde, basata sull’uso se non principale quantomeno centrale delle energie rinnovabili, non solo a livello domestico ma anche internazionale? Questa può essere considerata la domanda a cui aspira rispondere questo elaborato. Come particolare focus di analisi, sarà presa in considerazione l’eventuale ristrutturazione del settore energetico giapponese: rappresentando la fonte principale di emissioni di CO2 del paese, un adeguato livello sostenibilità ambientale non potrà che basarsi su un netto miglioramento delle performance di questo settore. La valutazione del Giappone in quanto leader sarà riproposta di volta in volta in ogni sezione dell’elaborato, sia dal punto di vista delle politiche nazionali (legislazione, domanda energetica) che internazionale (Nazioni Unite, accordi economici e politiche per lo sviluppo e la cooperazione). L’idea di un tale approccio è nata da un articolo pubblicato nell’ottobre del 2018 dal Japan Times, quotidiano giapponese, dal titolo “Will
Japan be a climate leader or a climate laggard?” (Il Giappone diventerà un leader climatico o rimarrà
un “peso” climatico?)7. In particolare, l’articolo esplora le politiche ambientali poste in essere in seguito all’Accordo di Parigi del 2015, mettendo in discussione la dichiarata ambizione del paese di guidare il processo di evoluzione della società verso standard più green.
L’analisi prende come punto di inizio proprio il quesito posto dall’autore dell’articolo sopracitato: quali sono le politiche che il Governo giapponese ha implementato o sta sviluppando al fine di creare una società più sostenibile? L’analisi proposta nel primo capitolo prende in considerazione gli sviluppo sia a livello internazionale, in particolar modo nelle discussioni presso le Nazioni Unite e la relativa Conferenza Quadro sui Cambiamenti, e le misure legislative nazionali adottate con l’obiettivo di concretizzare gli sforzi per una maggiore sostenibilità e di conseguenza rafforzare la propria pretesa di leadership. In particolar modo saranno evidenziate anche le misure di natura economica e le politiche atte ad una maggior coinvolgimento dei maggiori gruppi industriali giapponesi, i più grandi riuniti nella Japan Business Federation (Keidanren).
7 Johnston, Eric. “Will Japan Be a Climate Leader or a Climate Laggard?”, The Japan Times (2018). Accessible at:
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/09/national/will-japan-climate-leader-climate-laggard/#.XXZTbi1aZAY
Last Access: 9th September 2019, 3:29 PM.
Il nucleo dei capitoli successivi, in particolar modo il due e il tre, sarà rappresentato dalle energie rinnovabili e dalla struttura del loro relativo mercato giapponese. In particolar modo, il secondo capitolo affronterà lo studio delle maggiori energie rinnovabili già presenti nel paese (vento, geotermica e biomasse), mentre il terzo si focalizzerà esclusivamente sull’energia solare. Tale scelta è giustificata dal ruolo predominante del solare nell’energy mix del paese, e dalla sua particolare storia di sviluppo attraverso gli interessi della burocrazia giapponese, fino a diventare elemento di leadership del paese negli anni ’90. Al contrario, il secondo capitolo affronterà lo studio non solo del mercato giapponese delle rinnovabili ma anche del relativo settore elettrico, adottando una prospettiva più tecnica e tecnologica, la quale aiuterà a mettere in evidenza i limiti strutturali del settore energetico giapponese per quanto riguardo l’introduzione di queste nuove forme di energie. In generale, è possibile evidenziare come il ruolo delle rinnovabili sia cresciuto esponenzialmente negli anni successivi al disastro di Fukushima del 2011 non solo dal punto di vista della Ricerco e Sviluppo ma anche dall’installazione pratica di nuovi impianti attraverso tutto il paese (Figura 3).
In particolar modo, come ultima sezione del terzo capitolo sarà introdotto anche il possibile ruolo di catalizzatore che i Giochi Olimpici di Tokyo 2020 (in programma per l’estate 2020) nell’introduzione più decisa di tecnologia fotovoltaica e altre misure atte ad incrementare il grado di sostenibilità dei Giochi. In tal senso, una breve introduzione del ruolo dell’ambiente prima e della sostenibilità poi nell’organizzazione delle Olimpiadi, in particolare dal punto di vista del Comitato Olimpico Internazionale (IOC, International Olympic Committee), sarà presentata. Per quanto riguarda le energie rinnovabili e l’approccio intrapreso da questo studio, dei report economici sul loro mercato giapponese pubblicati dal EU – Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation (una joint venture
2661 3599 4890 6430 12107 19334 28615 38438 44226 55500 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Photovoltaic Panels Output (GW) Figura 4 - Outputic Energetico dei Panelli Solari in Giappone. Fonte: IRENA
tra la Commissione Europea e dal Ministero dell’Economia, Commercio e Industria giapponese) sono stati ampiamenti utilizzati e tenuti in considerazione grazie soprattutto ad un periodo di tirocinio svolto presso questo ente durante la stesura dell’elaborato.
Oggetto di analisi dell’ultimo capitolo sarà la capacità del Giappone di porsi come leader climatico da un punto di vista internazionale, e soprattutto nei confronti dei paesi in via di sviluppo della regione del sud-est Asiatico nell’ambito della transizione energetica. In effetti, tale area geografica sta attirando un numero sempre maggiore di attenzioni in merito alla sfida strategica tra due paesi leader emergenti, ovvero il Giappone, il paese oggetto della trattazione, e il suo vicino gigante asiatico, la Cina, la quale vede il sud-est asiatico come sua zona di influenza8. L’atteggiamento di quest’ultima è anche legato al ruolo sempre più attivo delle aziende giapponesi nella zona e ai relativi investimenti del paese in progetti strategici nella zona del Mekong, come il Corridoio Economico Ovest-Est. Tali zone infatti, partendo in particolar modo dalla Tailandia e altri paesi partner, sono storicamente integrate nella value chain delle multinazionali giapponesi, e tale ruolo sarà sempre più concreto nei prossimi anni dato lo sviluppo della classe media e lo sviluppo di mercati nuovi come il Vietnam. In tal senso, obiettivo del capitolo è quella di disegnare una mappa degli Aiuti Ufficiali allo Sviluppo (ODA, Official Development Assistance) in prima battuta dal punto di vista storico e politico, per poi arrivare ad una analisi secondo i parametri di sostenibilità ambientale ed energetica. In tal senso, sarà importante studiare in che modo gli aiuti sono implementati, e se questi possono essere considerati degli elementi utili per il rafforzamento della leadership climatica del Giappone nella regione dell’Associazione delle Nazioni del Sud-est Asiatico (ASEAN, Association of South-east Asian Nations). L’analisi prenderà in considerazione i singoli progetti implementati nei singoli paesi dell’ASEAN grazie alle informazioni rilasciate dall’Agenzia per la Cooperazione Internazionale Giapponese (JICA, Japanese International Cooperation Agency) e quelli del Governo giapponesi riportati all’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione Economica e lo Sviluppo (OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).
In conclusione, verrà proposta una valutazione finale che tenga conto di tutti gli sforzi del Giappone evidenziati nell’elaborato. Questa parte finale si propone di chiarire gli elementi fondamentali di una eventuale leadership in merito alle politiche già messe in atto dal paese, tenendo anche in considerazione i limiti mostrati e i possibili trend futuri nello sviluppo energetico e sostenibile dal Giappone.
8 Jackson, Steven F. Does China Have a Monroe Doctrine? Evidence for Regional Exclusion. Strategic Studies
1. Japan and Environmental Sustainability: A First Approach
Introduction
In order to assess the degree of commitment Japan is displaying in leading the fight against Climate Change, it is of fundamental importance to understand where, at the time being, the country positions itself at both the national and international level. As these two aspects are closely linked, an overall view of how domestic policy interacts with the global governance process and vice versa is introduced. To clarify this mutual relation, the main domestic actors involved in the proposal and the draft of climate policies are introduced. Stemming from this interaction is the Japanese position held during the international forum of discussion, being them bilateral or multilateral. On the other hand, the role of multilateral diplomacy will be also highlighted insomuch as it contributed to influence Japanese policy at home. This section will be intended as a preliminary framework to better understand how Japan has been acting in the realm of climate governance.
Moving further into the analysis, the main object of this chapter is to overall present the Japanese situation in terms of policies already implemented at the domestic level, while providing a more general background of the international agreements that Japan has firstly helped develop and then undersigned. The latter will be presented first: How Japan has helped shaping the discussion at UN-level forums and which targets has set for itself according to the agreements undertaken afterwards.
The environmental stance that Japan has is going to be closely looked at from both the historical and political point of views as well: To grasp how much it has changed and according to which principles it has evolved will eventually lead us to the modern and future directions of the Japanese environmental developments. For what the already well-implemented policies are concerned, the main focus of both this chapter and the whole essay, as briefly explained in the introductory chapter, is toward the energy strategy that Japan has been trying to adopt and present to citizens and global governments: While specific aspects are going to be provided in the following chapters, concerning in particular RE, of paramount importance is to include the vision Japan has for the future of its energy supply already in the early pages of this paper. Such vision is summarized in the Fifth Strategic Energy Plan, and to a different extent in the Long-Term Strategy Under the Paris Agreement.
The guidelines Japan has given itself can only be fully comprehended through the lenses of the economic measures the Government has sponsored, all the more so since the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) came back into power in 2012 under the leadership of the present Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (at the time of writing). Mr. Abe has made economic policies the fundamental core of his political
action9: Among such policies, those concerning specifically a more business-friendly introduction of new energy technologies and, in general, related to the energy sector, are going to be presented as the last section of this chapter.
Environmental Policy: Actors and Process
As in many countries in the world, the legislative process involves various actors from different areas of the society: From civil actions to formal parliamentary work, environmental policies make no exception to this dynamic.
Modern environmental discourse in Japan has taken hold in the early ‘90s. The Japanese Government, acknowledging the principle of sustainable development as defined by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 in the “Our Common Future” report, largely known as “Brundtland Report” from the name of its author, established a Council of Ministers for Global Environmental Conservation10. This act produced its very first outcome in 1993, when the Basic Environmental Law, the “ancestor” of modern Basic Environmental Plans, entered into force11. These initiatives stimulated other stakeholders to take action in this regard, and so did the Keidanren, the heavy industries’ association of Japan, with a document released in 1990, according to which a more environmental-friendly approach would have been undertaken throughout the industries12. The many concerns of business are taken into consideration by the powerful Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which actively participate in the environmental debate representing a pro-business position.
On the other hand, the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) has often undertaken a policy discourse which goes partially against, or at least in a different direction if compared to the voluntary and business-friendly approach of METI. In fact, such Ministry has been promoting plans of action aiming at reducing pollution and environmental load, taking in smaller consideration the needs of businesses. Nonetheless, MOE was promoted to the status of ministry only in 200113, and therefore cannot count on a wider political base of support as METI can, which instead, has nurtured its relationship with many Japanese companies, the firsts among them represented by the Keidanren.
9 For a specific analysis of the economic policies implemented under the supervision of Shinzo Abe as Japanese Prime
Minister: Hausman, J., Wieland, J., Overcoming the Lost Decades? Abenomics after Three Years. Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity (Fall 2015), pp. 385-413.
10 Goto, Sukehiro. “Japan's Changing Environmental Policy, Government Initiatives, and Industry Responses.”
Engineering, National Academy of. The Industrial Green Game: Implications for Environmental Design and
Management. Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1997. 234-253, pp. 234.
11 Kameyama, Yasuko. “Can Japan Be an Environmental Leader? Japanese Environmental Diplomacy since the Earth
Summit.” Politics and the Life Sciences September 2002: 66-71, pp. 67
12 Goto, op. cit., pp. 236
The complexity of environmental responsibilities in the Japanese bureaucracy is notorious: Even though MOE is in charge of drafting the Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures, it is beyond the Ministry capabilities to coordinate a concerted effort with the many companies involved in the energy sector. Many of them are indeed affiliated to the Keidanren, which finds the more natural solution in cooperating with METI. As highlighted in the introduction, the Japanese energy sector makes up for around 90% of Japan’s emission, and any Japanese actor willing to tackle the Climate crisis, cannot simply disregard it.
To complete the bureaucratic landscape, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) should be introduced. While not directly participating in the domestic debate, the task assigned to MOFA is to engage in international negotiation whose quality must always live up to the Japanese leadership that it has wielded in environmental diplomacy. Such operation is not always simple, given the sometimes-confused situation in national policy, which does not always produce a coherent position or brand-new tools to present to the international partners. This is what happened during the negotiation of the Kyoto protocol, for which the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister had to intervene and act in first person14. In fact, the main role of this latter institution is mostly to coordinate (and mediate) the positions of METI and MOE. In addition, MOFA is also responsible of the ODA management15.
While leaving in the next section the detailed discussion concerning the Kyoto Protocol, it can be already introduced an important principle which, firstly introduced in 1997, it has then been revised in 2015 in occasion of the Paris Agreement debate. The first international arrangement established a legally binding and one-size fits all approach, something that it has been widely criticized by many stakeholders. On the other hand, the later agreement implemented a bottom-up approach, which should theoretically empower smaller parties and countries themselves on a voluntary basis to do their part in fighting Climate Change. For this reason, greater importance can be accorded to stakeholders outside the high politics realm, as for example the public opinion and the interest groups (such as the already-introduced Keidanren).
Concerning the first aspect, the population in Japan has developed a somewhat contradictory opinion with regard to environmental policy. While 83% of the citizens wishes for fewer Greenhouse Gases (GHG) emissions, only 45% would engage in the fight against Climate Change16. Such data can also be interpreted in light of the Fukushima incident in 2011 and the retain of power by the LDP.
14 Harro van Asselt, Norichika Kanie, Masahiko Iguchi. “Japan’s position in international climate policy: navigating
between Kyoto and the APP.” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 9.3 (2009): 319-336, pp. 332
15 Céline Pajon, Japan’s Ambivalent Diplomacy on Climate Change, Health and Environment Reports, n. 5, 2010, pp.
29-30.
Regarding the former, in the aftermath of the disaster, Japanese public opinion shifted from a more aggressive stance against Climate Change toward a safe and stable supply of energy: Indeed, while nuclear reactors supplied 30% of the whole national energy demand, by 2015 all of them were shut down. Such demand was met by a rise in the use of carbon-intensive sources, such as oil imported from abroad, increasing the overall cost of electricity17. Moreover, from 2012 on, the main highlight of policy discussions in the country regarded economic growth, an aspect that finally replaced Climate Change as one of the main concerns for Japanese citizens. The prioritization of the economy over the climate effectively steered the perception of the environmental problem from a domestic to a mere global-level issue (which, undoubtedly, it is). However, it is understated that relative climate policies must not hinder the well-being and standard of living of the population. This view is also corroborated by the widespread belief, shared in Japan as well, that developing countries are going to suffer the most from Climate Change-related events18, something that, on the other hand, has been partially refuted by Prime Minister Abe in September 201819.
The other important aspect in the Japanese environmental debate is represented by interest groups. From a cultural point of view, decisions in Japan tend to be taken only in the form of consensus: This can be said for companies but as well as legislative action, where discussion among stakeholders is regarded not only as a form of lobbying but also as a process of consensus-building. An important factor in this sense are the Formal Advisory Committees, which entertain a very high level of expert dialogue with the Japanese institutions. As the name suggests, such dialogue is carried out in a formal framework. This can be considered a feature of the Japanese form of association: For example, strong hierarchy in the Keidanren is granted to larger companies in comparatively large industries.20
Given indeed the strong position that Keidanren’s requests play in the legislative dialogue with METI, the consequent policies adopted by the Japanese Diet usually reflects this relationship. Without providing in this section too many details in regard of the commitments Japan undertook on both national and international level, the most common lines of policy that the country has developed through the years are the following: Demand-side reduction of emissions, disregard for adaptation policies, marginal change to the economic structure and finally the importance of developing countries in the Climate Change fight. As it can be understood, these lines stem directly from the
17 IEA, Energy Policies of IEA Countries – Japan, 2016, pp. 94.
18 Only 34% of the population is “Very Concerned” about directly experiencing climate change consequences. Carle, J.,
Stokes, B., Wike, R., Global Concern about Climate Change, Broad Support for Limiting Emissions, 2015. Pew Research Center. Accessible at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/11/05/global-concern-about-climate-change-broad-support-for-limiting-emissions/ Last Access: August 22nd, 2019. 5:46 PM.
19 Abe, S. “Join Japan and Act Now to Save Our Planet”, 2016. Accessible at:
https://www.ft.com/content/c97b1458-ba5e-11e8-8dfd-2f1cbc7ee27c Last Access: 21st June 2019, 6:01 PM. 20 Sofer, op. cit., pp. 2, 12-14
demands made by the already-mentioned stakeholders such as public opinion, bureaucracy and interest groups, in a concerted effort of consensus-taken policies.
The All Japan Business Federation, Keidanren
Given its particular role highlighted so far, t is worth looking a bit more in-depth at history of the Keidanren. The Federation as it stands now is the result of the merging between the former Keidanren and the Nikkeiren, the Japan Federation of Employees’ Associations. Originally, the Business Federation was born in 1946, soon after the end of World War II so to reorganise the business community and make an effort for the rebuilding of Japan. The Federation as was intended by the Allied occupying forces was not meant to be a regulating or will-imposing entity but only as a mere forum of discussion among the main business players in the Japanese market. Eventually, so it did: The great part the Keidanren played in the Japanese miracle was to promote a coordinating effort of all the voices in Japan’s business community, while at the same time gathering vital information on the state of the market and its players for the Japanese legislator.21
The relationship with the Japanese bureaucracy and policymakers as introduced in the previous paragraph started being formalised in the late 1950s. Uemura Kogoro, a Japanese businessman member of the Association and its Chairman a decade later, started providing in a structural fashion financial assistance from the Keidanren itself to politicians of the ruling LDP or fellow Tōkyō University graduate in the national bureaucracy, MITI included22. The LDP members to whom assistance was granted were usually senior party leader, with extensive experience in the Japanese policymaking process and bureaucracy as well23. At the same time, many of the single companies making such donations were in the banking sector (25% of all the donations), then car manufacturers, electric companies and heavy industries24 – all of them members of the Keidanren. In this way, a Keidanren-pushed concerted effort for lobbying the Japanese policymakers is thus realised. This practice only partially changed with the 1975 reform of the Political Funds Control Act, which prohibited donations to individual politicians, leaving the door open only for party-affiliated entities, and set a maximum ceiling for donations25.
In later years, the interests between the nationally oriented Keidanren and the multinational Japanese companies partially diverged, which resulted in a weaker effort for lobbying. Nonetheless,
21 Keidanren. “Annual Report.” 2019, pp. 16 and Nelson, Patricia A. “Stability and the Status Quo: Changing Power
Structures in the Optics Industry.” Söderberg, Marie and Patricia A. (ed.) Nelson. Japan's Politics and Economy.
Perspectives on Change. Routledge, 2010. 161-181, pp. 165
22 Allinson, Gary D. “Japan's Keidanren and Its New Leadership.” Pacific Affairs 60.3 (1987): 385-407, pp. 391-392 23 Ibidem.
24 Hrebnar, Ronald J. Japan's New Party System. Boulder: Westview Press, 2000, pp. 62 25 Hrebnar, op. cit., pp. 73-75
the role of the Federation has become even more institutionalised in the Japanese policymaking process. In 1993, Prime Minister Hosokawa asked the Advisory Group for Economic Structural Reform, chaired by Keidanren Chairman Hiraiwa Gaishi, to work on market liberalisation proposals: Many of the proposals made by the Group were indeed translated into law26. In more recente times, it participates in the Formal Advisory Committees regarding climate politics under the joint leadership of METI and MOE in their policymaking process27, as highlighted in the previous section. As a champion of liberalisation, the Keidanren has also been a strenuous supporter of Free Trade Agreements (which will be discussed later on in this chapter), so to open up opportunities for the export of Japanese firms (ASEAN region) while maintaining competitive prices vis-à-vis European and American companies (in Mexico, for example)28.
In terms of environmental governance, the most polluting industries in the Japanese industrial sector are represented by the Keidanren, such as the Nippon Steel for CO2 emissions. The attitude of the Federation, as seen in the previous paragraph, has been to oppose any form of regulation in terms of carbon emissions, rather focusing on voluntary programs of pollution reduction and increase in energy efficiency. From a domestic point of view, the market-friendly approach undertaken by Prime Minister Koizumi (2001-2006) favoured the Keidanren’s approach (cut of solar energy subsidies)29. On the other hand, at the international level, Japanese companies tend to the keep their standards high especially in comparison with their European competitors: In the 1991 Global Environmental Charter produced by the Keidanren, point 8 obliges the Federation’s member to respect Japanese standard of environmental protection when undertaking overseas projects through subsidiaries 30 . The environmental standard ISO 14000 is indeed taken into account by Keidanren’s member, even though at a mere competitive level.
International Agreements: Multilateral and Bilateral
The Kyōtō Protocol
In December 1997, the 160 parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) gathered in Kyōtō to undersign and finally adopt the homonymous Protocol. It
26 Pempel, T.J., et al. The Politics of Economic Reform in Japan. Australia-Japan Research Centre, 1997, pp. 38 27 Sofer, op. cit., pp. 14
28 Yoshimatsu, Hidetaka. “Japan's Keidanren and Free Trade Agreements. Societal Interests and Trade Policy.” Asian
Survey XLV.2 (2005): 258-278.
29 Moe, Espen. “Vested interests, Energy Efficiency and Renewables in Japan.” Energy Policy 40 (2011): 260-273, pp.
264
30 Nakatani, Kazuhiro. “The Voluntary Initiative of the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren) in the Measures
to Cope with Global Warming.” Barton, Barry, et al. Regulating Energy and Natural Resourecs. Oxfor Scholarship Online, 2010. 371-383, pp. 374
represented the very first legally binding document in implementing limits for industrialised countries, and it would have entered into force once 55% of total emissions and 55 parties had ratified the agreement31 (Figure 4).
The origin of such work dated back to the 1988, when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established thanks to a United Nations resolution (43/53 of December 1988)32. The scientific work the Panel undertook was massive: In the report released two years later33, the IPCC noted that emissions originated from anthropogenic sources were on the rise, and in a business-as-usual scenario, global temperature would have incremented of 1 Celsius Degree already by 2025. The report also highlighted events that the world is already experiencing at the time of writing of this essay: Melting ice caps, rising sea levels and increase in intensity and frequency of storms, for example34. In 1992, the UNFCCC started to introduce both the matters and principles that would have been taken into consideration and later discussed by the Conference of the Parties (COP): The main goal was to stabilize GHG emissions in order to protect the climate, and the first step in doing so was to have countries list the sources of national emissions, organised in the form of an inventory35. Then, one of the most important principles that featured the discussion of the Berlin Mandate and was later implemented in the Protocol is the “common but differentiated responsibilities”, under which a
31 UNFCCC, The Kyōtō Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1998, pp. 18.
Accessible at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf
32 IPCC, History. Accessible at: https://www.ipcc.ch/about/history/ Last Access: 23rd August 2019, 3:44 PM. 33 Ibidem.
34 UNFCCC, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, pp. 4-15. Accessible at:
https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf
35 Ibidem.
Figure 5 - Cumulative CO₂ Emissions in 1998. Source : Global Carbon Project (GCP), Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC)
quantified emissions limitation was to be set for developed countries (listed in Annex I), while developing countries were exonerated from any legally-binding measure36. Certain instruments were introduced later in order to meet the goals of the Protocol, such as the Emission Trading Systems or other market-based mechanism, a Clean Development Mechanism which included, for example, the Activities Implemented Jointly (between Annex I and developing countries).
The commitment of Japan was quantified in a reduction of 6% of GHG emissions, 1990 being the base year for comparison, with the enactment of effective policies in the “commitment period” of 2008-201237. Two years away from the start of such period, in 2006, the emissions of Japan were noted to have increased of 6.2%, therefore pushing the Protocol’s goal to a 12.2% reduction compared to 1990 emissions38.
The Japanese position was relatively ambiguous during the first part of the discussions. Being MOFA in charge of pushing the national agenda during the international meetings, its efforts were practically hindered by the impossibility of finding a common ground among the domestic stakeholders. This was due especially to the already mentioned “rivalry” between METI (which was still called Ministry of International Trade and Industry, MITI, until 2001) and MOE (being only the Environmental Agency, at the time). While the former complained that a quantified goal would be difficult to achieve, the latter approved and positively encouraged the Cabinet’s Office (which, in the meantime, took over MOFA in carrying on the negotiations) because of the more environmental-friendly approach the Kyōtō Protocol embraced. As said earlier, the position of Japan was felt slightly
36 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Firs Session, Held at Berlin from 28 March to 7 April 1995,
1995, pp. 4. Accessible at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf
37 MOE, Kyōtō Protocol Target Achievement Plan, 2005, pp. 2-5. 38 Harro van Asselt et al., op. cit., pp. 321.
ambiguous for its closeness with the United States, which was fundamentally against any formal commitment to the cause. Japan, on the other hand, tried to mediate between the US and the European Community, for example, in order to foster a possible common ground39. It did effectively show good level of leadership during the meeting in Bonn, when it was already clear that the United States would have not ratified the Kyōtō Protocol.40 In fact, Japan decided to press on with the agreement despite the United States’ lack of support, also in disregard of PM Koizumi opposite declaration made ahead of the Bonn forum41. In a sort of moment of pride, Japan decided to move out of US’ shadow for what international politics was concerned, wishing to gain a more credible global stance in a realm of diplomacy, the environmental one, far away from those area where Japan was considered a political dwarf due to its military history42. On the other hand, during the late 80s, Japan did receive external pressure from its allies in order to act on the international stage accordingly to its economical prowess, even though in a non-militaristic manner43.
Nonetheless, still in 2008 the United States would not budge for quantified objectives. In the meantime, the Japanese position, effectively influenced by METI and the Keidanren, started introducing a “sectoral approach”44 for the post-2012 period: Such term, which would be later clarified, meant greater attention would be paid to technological innovation in order to halve GHG emissions by 2050. Such achievement would be possible by the means of increasing investments in R&D. The idea was to capitalize on Japanese leadership in high tech efficiency through investments in developing countries: According to this reasoning, the joining to the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate by Japan can be easily understood45. The main reason behind this was the fear of a loss of competitiveness of the Japanese industry vis-à-vis to its American and Chinese competitors, free of any legal bind for their operation.
The focus on this kind of approach was intended to appease the business sector, mostly behind the lobbying effort put in place by the Keidanren and then conveyed through METI, thanks to whom a bottom-up approach would have been possible. The business strategy was already clear even before the Kyōtō Protocol was established: In fact, the Keidanren released in 1996 a “Voluntary Action Plan on the Environment” (similar to the one mentioned in the previous section), under the framework of which the industries felt exempted from government compulsion. The plan provided for “optimum”
39 Payon, op. cit., pp. 34-37
40 Harro van Asselt et al., op. cit., pp. 330 – 332.
41 Euractiv, Bleak Prospects for Bonn Climate Talks?, 2001. Accessible At:
https://www.euractiv.com/section/development-policy/news/bleak-prospects-for-bonn-climate-talks/ Last Access: 9th
September 2019, 12:17 AM.
42 Nathan Glazer, Sovereignty Under Challenge: How Governments Respond, Routledge, 2017, pp. 130-131. 43 Pajon, op. cit., pp. 24
44 Harro van Asselt et al., op. cit., pp. 321. 45 Harro van Asselt et al., op. cit., pp. 326-327
economic measures to be put in place in order to take into consideration the environment and its protection: The main points were energy conservation, higher efficiency and nuclear energy reliance.46
Such plan broke through the reservations of the Japanese government, all the more so once it became clear that Kyōtō goals were more and more difficult to achieve. Already in 2005, the Government of Japan published the “Kyōtō Protocol Target Achievement Plan”, which had at its core technological profit and innovation, effectively taking into consideration the voluntary approach of the Keidanren. According to this document, the central government would take the lead in promoting diverse policy instruments in line with Kyōtō mechanisms, especially in supporting private business activities47. In 2007, a follow-up on the Voluntary Plan was released, claiming that 13 industries out of 46 met their 1996 goals, while 18 even raised their targets48. The explanation is, however, deceitful: Many of the industries were still not expressing their targets in CO₂ emissions but only in “energy intensity”; moreover, both the Electric and Iron/Steel industries still had not met their goals, and from the following graphs it can be understood the relevance of this point; finally, there were still industries lacking a real reduction plan.
46 Keidanren, Keidanren Voluntary Action Plan on the Environment (Final Report), 1997. Accessible at:
https://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/pol058/index.html.
47 Government of Japan, op. cit., pp. 61
48 Central Environmental Council of Japan, Results and Future Issues Pertaining to the Fiscal Year 2007 – Follow up to
Figure 7 - Emissions in the Industrial Sector in 2005. Source: Central Environmental Council
For all these reasons, and the absence of great emitters such as the United States and China under the Protocol, Japan announced in 2010 that it would not commit itself to the second phase in the post-2012 period49. A new international, more comprehensive legal framework was needed.
The Paris Agreement
This new framework was officially brought forward during the COP21 held in November 2015. From the name of the French capital where the deal was signed, the Paris Agreement is the latest and most comprehensive effort of global climate governance that the UNFCCC ever undertook. It was successful in terms of participation: 197 countries agreed to the document, while at the time of
49 MOFA, Japan’s Position Regarding the Kyōtō Protocol, 2010. Accessible at:
https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/cop/kp_pos_1012.html Last Access: 9th September 2019, 12:41 AM.
Figure 6 - Emissions in the Energy-conversion Sector in 2005. Source: Central Environmental Council
writing (August 2019), 185 have ratified it50. In addition, the Paris Agreement established the voluntary and bottom-up approach mentioned before and already advocated by countries like Japan. However, from this point of view, Paris could be considered a setback in the meaning that Kyōtō established mandatory and legally binding carbon emissions targets, a method that has been replaced by Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)51. In this sense, only the European Union has set up concrete legal standards concerning environmental liability (Directive 2004/35/CE on environmental liability and enforcing the “polluter pays” principle52). Despite the critics, the Paris Agreement remains a fundamental step in tackling Climate Change by adopting consensus-based measures so to involve all those countries that in Kyōtō remained outside any legal obligations i.e. China or India, for example. The parties intended to deliver a document that would “harden” international soft law on climate change thanks to awareness raising and goal setting.
The NDC presented by Japan accounts for a 26% GHG emission reductions to be achieved by FY2030 with FY2013 as base year53. In other words, this is translated with a mere 18% reduction from 1990 levels, somewhat small if compared to the declared target of the European Union of a 40% reduction by 203054. The graph in Figure 7 links historical Japanese emissions to the achievable reductions forecast given the already implemented and planned to implement policies up until 205055.
50 UNFCCC, Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification. Accessible at:
https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification Last Access: 8th September 2019, 5:21 PM.
51 UNFCCC, The Paris Agreement. Accessible at:
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement Last Access: 8th September 2019, 5:25 PM
52 EUR-lex, Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage. Accessible at:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32004L0035 Last Access: 8th September 2019, 5:31 PM 53 UNFCCC, Submission of Japan’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). Accessible at:
https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Japan%20First/20150717_Japan%27s%20INDC.pdf
54 European Commission, 2030 Climate and Energy Framework. Accessible at:
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2030_en Last Access: 8th September 2019, 5:27 PM
55 The stacked bar in the graph represents the “fair” share of emission reductions. The degree of “fairness” is calculated
by the Climate Action Tracker as an indicator for how much the reduction target is in line with the Paris Agreement
While being this a clear target, Japan also expressed its long-term goal to reduce 80% of its GHG emissions by 205056, even though it did not specify the base year. Notwithstanding the great emphasis Prime Minister Shinzo Abe showed at the COP21 summit, the Japanese position has been ambiguous and criticised as well. The 2030 target of 26% reductions has been labelled as not ambitious57, or at least not enough, compared to the task it aims to tackle, namely keeping the temperature increase well below 2 Celsius Degree if compared to pre-industrial levels. Moreover, regarding climate finance instruments, Japan has submitted, tagging along with the United States and Australia, a controversial document to the COP23 held in Bangkok in 2018. Such document58, which should have provided clearer operative tools in terms of climate finance and accountancy, nor did it not mention effective measures in this sense, but it also categorized financial help from developed countries such as Japan and the United States to developing countries as loans, an aspect that sparkled critics amongst many Parties to the conference59. However, climate finance as a topic will be thoroughly developed later in this chapter.
Similar to what happened for the negotiating process in Kyōtō, a strong stance was taken by the Keidanren ahead of the Paris Agreements implementation strategy, effectively anticipating any Japanese officials’ formulation which would have harmed the interests of the industries60. The same business-led development and disruptive innovation is indeed completely taken into account and implemented in the Long-Term Strategy Under the Paris Agreement that the Government Japan released shortly ahead of the G20 Summit held in Osaka in June 2019. In harmony with the broad consensus-building spirit of the Paris Agreement, Japan has welcomed Keidanren support in formulating both vision and policies for the future of the Japanese environmental policy, especially for what the energy sector is concerned. Despite the rise in global awareness for the climate challenge since the UNFCCC in 1992 and the later Kyōtō Protocol, the Keidanren plan has only slightly evolved from its original measures. The core principle is to capitalize on the Japanese competitive advantage in clean energy technology so to lead the global energy restructuration toward a greener and decarbonized society. The Proposal on Japan’s Long-Term Growth Strategy Under the Paris
goals, going from green (“in line”) to dark grey (critically insufficient). For a more detailed explanation:
https://climateactiontracker.org/methodology/comparability-of-effort/
56 Government of Japan, The Long-Term Strategy Under the Paris Agreement, 2019, pp. 1, 15.
57 Climate Action Tracker, Japan. Accessible at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan/ Last Access: 9th
September 2019, 11:29 AM.
58 UNFCCC, “Submission by Australia, Japan, and the United States: SBTSTA (13) Modalities for the accounting of
financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement.” 2018. Accessible at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SBSTA48.2.CRP_.i13.pdf
59 Devex, New Paris Climate Agreement Proposal Would Let Rich Countries Off the Hook, 2018.
https://www.devex.com/news/new-paris-climate-agreement-proposal-would-let-rich-countries-off-the-hook-activists-say-93373 9th September 2019, 2:23 PM.
60 Keidanren, “Proposal on Japan’s long-term growth strategy under the Paris Agreement.” 2019. Accessible at:
Agreement, released in March 2019 (3 months before the Government of Japan unveiled the public Long-Term Strategy), focuses on the strong increase in Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) investments, along with R&D platforms made possible by a government fostering a friendly business environment (especially abroad)61. Japanese industries have been reasoning in terms of a Global Value Chain (GVC), which would, in particular with investments in Eastern and South-East Asia, enhance energy efficiency and infrastructure construction thanks to the Japanese cutting-edge technology. Moreover, decarbonizing technologies can be introduced under the scheme of Joint Credit Mechanism for overseas green investments in developing countries.
On the other hand, the Japanese government, while relying on the full support and maximum use of the business and private sector, has been taking into account other means of global climate leadership. The formulation of a green economic system, already mentioned before and whose concept is introduced in the Fifth Basic Environment Plan, is one of them. Furthermore, such Plan envisions a greater role for Japan in global climate governance not only under the UN framework but also by creating strategic partnerships on a bilateral level in order to mobilize economic and technological cooperation for a sustainable development. A part of them will be analyzed in the next paragraph. However, in order to conclude this brief overview of Japanese commitment under the Paris Agreement, it must be stated that the targets Japan has set do not seem to be consistent with the final goal of limiting temperature increase below 2 Celsius Degree, let alone 1.5 Degree. International observers such as the Climate Action Tracker has judged Japanese commitment as “Highly Insufficient”62, similar to the one provided by Japanese environmental organizations63. Conclusively, measures that are going to be put in place to meet the 2030 target might not be in line with the Paris emission reduction accounting system i.e. the use of credits from the overseas crediting system (JCM), something that was not contemplated in the bottom-up approach of the Agreement.
Economic Diplomacy and Partnership Agreements
Under the UNFCCC, the main framework for global climate governance was established. Japan, as it has been explained in the previous paragraphs, is a fundamental participant to the Conference of the Parties. However, it would be only reductive and too simplistic to assume the United Nations as the only forum for climate cooperation. In fact, there is not a clear map of the labyrinth through which Japanese diplomacy efforts move to promote climate cooperation with
61 Government of Japan, op. cit., p. 95-100
62 Climate Action Tracker, Japan. Accessible at: https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan/ Last Access: 9th
September 2019, 11:43 AM
international stakeholders. An important aspect of these efforts, the Official Development Assistance (ODA), will be analyzed further on the work. However, another central aspect of Japanese diplomacy at work is through its economic prowess.
The economic discourse, thanks to the globalization of world politics and the progressive renouncement to war as the main tool for conflict resolution, has gained strategic importance in countries’ national strategy. Japan is no exception to this. Economic diplomacy is the concept through which strategic goals can be attained by economic means, partially disregarding the most conventional tools such as politics and war. Under this new framework, which has gained hold after World War II, economic relationships have been under the spotlight for the great deal of influence that they can have over other countries’ stability and growth64. This can be applied to climate governance as well.
Japan champions the values of free and liberalized trade, by the means of which great national problems such as energy security and international stability can be attained. In 2016, the Government of Japan published the Japan Revitalization Strategy, according to which foreign policy’s goals were closely linked to the strengthening of the economic diplomacy overseas65. The main pillars of this approach have been: Engage in global negotiations for free and open economic systems; support Japanese companies expanding overseas through public-private partnerships; promote Foreign Direct Investment in Japan. Moreover, raising the ratio of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) up to 70%, being only 19% in 2012 for example66, is another crucial achievement to be attained. Such FTAs are fundamental for an open economy and sustainable growth in a country like Japan, especially in a time of protectionist revival in the United States for example. According to the latest data provided by MOFA in the Diplomatic Bluebook 2018, Japan has signed and ratified 16 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA). 40% of its trade is conducted with countries that have an EPA with Japan, a ratio which is expected to rise up to 52% once the EPA with the European Union will be fully enforced. A more comprehensive map of these partnerships is provided by MOFA (Figure 8)67. Important to note is also the great contribution in terms of cooperation and willingness to deliver such Agreements from
64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Economic Diplomacy.” Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of. Diplomatic
Bluebook. 2018, pp. 300-301
65 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, Japan Revitalization Strategy – Short to Mid Term Progress Schedule,
2018, pp. 43 - 44.
66 MOFA, op. cit., pp. 301. 67 MOFA, op. cit., pp. 307
the business community, represented by the Keidanren and the commitment it proved on studying effects and opportunities of FTAs68.
What do these agreements mean for climate governance? Trade and market-based mechanism have proved to be important tools for the global fight against climate change, such as the European Emission Trading System for example. Moreover, unregulated global trade can push the production of carbon-intensive products which are later imported in developed countries, where stricter regulations do not permit these types of manufacture. Finally, acknowledging the Japanese strategy of a steady increase of domestic companies’ investments in decarbonised technology, EPAs do foster a more business-friendly environment which is fundamental for these economic-based climate policies.
However, among the 16 EPAs that Japan has already signed and ratified, not many of them take into account the environmental problem, or it is not held in a position of high regard. Specifically, the EPAs which have entered into force with many Asia countries usually have only one article in regard of the environment. In the Agreements with Malaysia (2006), Brunei (2007), Indonesia (2007), Thailand (2007), ASEAN (2008) and India (2011)69, the most common clause on the topic intend the
68 For example, the Keidanren set up different meetings with the Korean business community, represented by the
Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and the Korea Federation of Companies in Japan, even setting up a joint secretariat with the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Japan-Korea Economic Association. Yoshimatsu, op. cit., pp. 274-277
69 All the listed economic agreements can be retrieved from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan’s page: Free Trade
Agreements and Economic Partnerships. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/index.html
EPA “not to encourage investments by investors of the Other Party by relaxing environmental measures”, a wording that is only slightly modified across all the EPAs. On a completely different level of commitment and model of approach is the one signed with the European Union, which entered into force on February 1st, 201970. The Agreement grants a whole chapter on the topic of trade and sustainable development, being also the very first international economic agreement explicitly mentioning the Parties’ commitment under the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. The chapter takes into consideration sustainable development, environmental and labor protection and trade in environmentally conscious goods and services. Finally, it also establishes a joint Committee on Trade and Sustainable Development, in charge of carrying on the dialogue with the Parties’ civil society71.
Since the comeback made by the LDP in 2012, the economic discourse in Japan has gained a strong momentum, thanks also to the economic focus that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has conferred upon the reforms aimed at achieving a steady economic growth. Japan is a business-friendly country, which, as it has been reiterated in the case of COP summit, the requests of the industrial sector are taken in high regard. According to this framework, economic-friendly measures and policies in line with the fundamental principles of free trade and economic growth are held in the highest regard by Japanese policymakers. The paradigm for future sustainable development would only be achieved if an economic advantage and payoff is secured. Through these lenses, economic partnerships are prominent on the climate change fight’s global landscape. In line with this approach, in the next section of this chapter the economic measures that Japan has been implementing in the realm of domestic policies are going to be presented.
The Energy Sector: Policy and Economic Measures
The Government’s Energy Strategy
Ever since the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 and the consequent incident of the Fukushima Daiichi Powerplant, the Japanese energy strategy has undergone a deep process of review. It could not have been otherwise: Fukushima left a 30%-wide hole in the electric supply of the country, which has been replaced for the most part with a surge of fossil fuels imported from abroad72. Such incident fundamentally altered the energy policy Japan had estimated for the future years, a strategy that strongly relied on nuclear increase. At the COP15 in 2009, Japan pledged a GHG reduction of
70 European Commission, EU – Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. Accessible at:
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/eu-japan-economic-partnership-agreement/ Last Access: 8th September 2019, 5:13 PM.
71 Agreement between the European Union and Japan for an Economic Partnership, pp. 428 - 456 72 IEA, op cit., pp. 15
25% by 2020 compared to the 1990 level, a goal that was supposed to be met by increasing the nuclear energy share in the mix up to the 50%73. Now both METI and the Government, along with all the stakeholders involved, have been trying to foster a different policy that heavily bears in mind the effects the incident had on the energy mix and the whole country as well.
As of now, Japan has produced different policies in order to meet its future goals, mostly drafted by METI and the Government, such as the Energy White Paper in 2017, the Fifth Strategic Energy Plan in 2018, and other documents that deals with the energy topic but with a wider, mostly environmental, approach (“Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures” by MOE, in 2016). The strategic goals presented in the Fourth Plan (2014) have not been fundamentally altered in its latest version. In addition, the Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook for FY2030 released by METI in 2015 is still considered valid in its predictions. All the efforts included in these long-term policies are drafted so to meet the goals Japan vowed to achieve under the Paris Agreement. The FY2030 energy mix estimated by METI74 includes great reliance on RE, increased from the FY2013 14.4% to 22-24%, but it also prominently brings back nuclear energy in the equation: From 0% in 2013, when all the reactors were shut down, to a relevant 20-22% (Figure 9).
Japan has indeed acknowledged the fact that nuclear energy is still too relevant to be completely discarded as an option from the energy mix, and for this reason a partial re-integration is undergoing. The official policy is to reduce the reliance on this source of energy as much as possible, while at the same time meeting CO₂ reduction goals and an acceptable level of domestic self-sufficiency for what energy production is concerned: In this sense, nuclear energy is still considered a valid option. In addition, a strong reliance on coal and liquified natural gas is to be noticed: The
73 Ibidem.
74 METI, Long-Term Energy Supply and Demand Outlook, 2015. Accessible at:
https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2015/pdf/0716_01a.pdf Last Access: 12:26, 09/03/2019
