1 INTRODUCTION: STEPS TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. 4 1.1 From the idea of a united Europe to the birth of the EEC. 5 1.2 Denmark in the period from World War II and the Marshall Plan. 15 1.3 First and second veto to United Kingdom’s entry in the EEC. 31 1.4 From the entry of the United Kingdom to the Single European Act. 36
1.5 The Last Years. 47
2 DENMARK AND THE EU. 54
2.1 Brief history of Denmark until the Second World War. 55 2.2 Post war period: the small state tradition. 66
2.3 The 50’s. 71
2.4 The 60’s and Denmark’s candidacy to the EEC. 75 2.5 The 70’s and Denmark’s membership. 80 2.6 The 80’s: from the European Council of Milan to the Danish referendum of 1986. 88
2.6.1 The integration process in the 80s. 88
2.6.2 Denmark. 91
2.7 The debate after the 1986. 102
2.8 The three main questions in Danish debate on Denmark’s participation in the EC and the differences in
the debate after 1986. 111
2.9 Maastricht and the Danish opting-‐outs. 120
2.9.1 a. Danish Parties and the Maastricht Treaty. 120
2.9.2 b. The National Compromise. 124
2.9.3 c. The opts-‐out. 128
2.9.4 d. The British initiative. 132
2.9.5 a. The Yes-‐side. 138
2.9.6 b. The “no” side. 144
2.10 The Edinburgh agreement. 151
2.11 The implications of the Edinburgh agreement. 159 2.12 Analyzing the vote of the referendum of 2 June 1992. 163
2.13 Amsterdam and the EMU 168
2.14.1 The Currency. 176
2.14.2 The Euro-‐outsiderness. 185
2.14.3 Justice and Home Affairs. 198
2.14.4 The fight against terrorism. 223
3 CONCLUSION. 236
4 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 241
1 INTRODUCTION: STEPS TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION.
“La federazione europea non si proponeva di colorare in questo o quel modo
un potere esistente. Era la sobria proposta di creare un potere democratico
Europeo.” (Altiero Spinelli)
1.1 From the idea of a united Europe to the birth of the EEC.
“Era indispensabile che all’Europa non comunista fosse offerto un obiettivo positivo per aiutarla a colmare l’attuale vuoto ideologico e morale.”1
The concept of European unification dates back in origin to the fourteenth century, when the medieval view of the world, with its more dynastic ideas of unity, was losing currency. The French lawyer, Pierre Dubois, is said to have drawn up the first plan for the political
unification of Europe (1305-07). Since then, there have been at least 182 documented proposals for European unification but, until the end of the Second World War, there were none, which specifically envisaged a federal union of states. The central aim was rather to
establish a peaceful association of European states.2 The proposals of Abbé de Saint Pierre3
was limited in scope and adhered essentially to the concept of an association of states without recognizing the need for any more extensive limitation of national sovereignty.
The First World War saw the break-up of Europe’s power and supremacy. While it was also becoming ideologically separated from the Soviet Union, new plans were put forward for European integration.4
Between the two world wars, the expression “unification of Europe” became the goal of a diplomatic action for changing the structures of the relations among States. In his work
1 G. Mammarella, Destini Incrociati: Europa e Stati Uniti 1900-‐2003, Società editrice il Mulino, Bologna 2002, p. 163.
2 F. Capotorti, M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, J. P. Jacque: The European Union Treaty: Commentary of the Draft adepte by the European Parliament on 14 February 1984, Clarendon Press-‐Oxford, 1986, p. 1.
3 In “Memoire pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe”, 1713.
4 F. Capotorti, M. Hilf, F. G. Jacobs, J. P. Jacque: The European Union Treaty: Commentary … Op. Cit., p. 2.
“Paneuropa”, published in 1923, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi argued in favor of a pan-European federation together with the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand. The proposal for the “organization of a regime of a Federal Union of Europe”, put forward from Briand in May 1930 to European Countries and to the League of Nations, was the first
diplomatic effort to organize Europe around the new relations between France and Germany.5
6
Walter Lipgens, wrote in 1977 a book on the first attempts at European Integration between 1945 and 1947, stating that European civilization is founded on four unifying principles:
1. Respect for the human personality, the freedom and dignity of the individual. 2. Respect for small communities and their right to self-government.
3. Respect for objective truth, the belief deeply rooted in Christian and Greek conviction that truth can be objective.
4. The sense of social responsibility for the weak springing from respect for the individual; the basic principles of help and protection, of justice and human brotherhood.7
At the end of the Second World War, the Soviet army occupied all Europe East of the line drawn from the Potsdam agreement of July 1945. In this scenario, the French ambition to become the protagonist of the new European structure was understandable. France did not take part in the Conference of Teheran (1943), Yalta (1945) and Potsdam, but had to ally
5 The “Briand Memorandum”, published in 1930.
6 B. Olivi, R. Santaniello; Storia dell’ integrazione europea. Dalla guerra fredda alla Costituzione dell’ Unione; Società editrice il Mulino, Bologna 2005, pp. 14-‐15.
7 Daniele Pasquinucci: Between Political Commitment and Academic Research. In: European Union History, Themes and Debates, edited by: W. Kaiser and A. Varsori, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 70.
itself with the Western forces and to be subject to the allied positions about Germany and the
European politics: this showed the beginning of the Cold War. 8
But the crisis of the nation-state did not translate into the birth of a European federation during 1945-47: the Soviet Union and the United States in particular played a decisive role in holding back supranational projects in this period, but not on the same level. The Soviet Union categorically opposed European federation because Europe’s fragmentation into a jumble of states suited its goal of spreading communism across the European continent. Meanwhile, the US was at that time under the illusion that international order could be achieved based on collaboration with the SU. Only when this became impracticable, the US government became a fervent supporter of European integration.
The growing hostility between the two super powers was accompanied by the re-emergence of nationalism in Britain and France. The British Labour government elected in 1945 attempted to maintain Britain’s role as a global power, while in France de Gaulle’s line in
foreign policy could not have been more remote from the spirit of the European federalists.9
On 1949, after the birth of the West Germany as an independent country and the creation of the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Co-operation), the Hague Congress took place. Wanted by Winston Churchill, it assembled the leaders of seventeen Countries. The resolution voted by the Congress proposed the creation of a European Assembly for the
examination of the implications of a European Union or Federation.10 From this resolution,
the 5th of May 1949 the European Council was born.The USA, led by President Truman,
8 B. Olivi, R. Santaniello, Storia..., Op. Cit., p. 13. 9 Daniele Pasquinucci: Between Political, Op. Cit., p. 71. 10 B. Olivi, R. Santaniello, Storia..., Op. Cit., p. 17.
discovered in the same period the need of a standing military coalition with other Countries; therefore the North Atlantic Alliance took place and the post-war situation was organized for the first time: for the Western the possibility of a global agreement resulted immediately
impossible, due to the aggressiveness of the Soviet empire.11 The American (and English)
answer to this attitude was the “Containment” doctrine.
The 9th of May 1950, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, made the French
Council of Ministers approve the Schuman Declaration and presented it to German and other
Western European Countries.12 In the early post-war period France was crucially dependent
on American support for its policy initiatives; France needed American ERP funding and US cooperation to guarantee its external security, but this also gave the US some leverage over French European policy. Thus, the French push to create a common market for coal and steel in 1950 derived to some extent from the requirements of the domestic modernization plan developed by Monnet, but it was also a response to US pressure to lift all remaining limits on German production and to take a decisive step towards a more federal form of integration. Just like the Pleven Plan for a European army later in the same year, the Schuman Plan was born out of an emergency situation to avoid leaving the initiative for the formulation of policy towards Germany entirely to the Americans.From the diplomatic activity started by the
Schuman Declaration the European Coal and Steel Community was born.13
The Treaty of Paris, signed the 8th of April 1951, created it the 27th of July 1952. With this Treaty six European Countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Luxemburg and
11 Ivi p. 19.
12 Ivi p. 20.
13Michael Gehler, At the Heart of Integration. In: European Union History, Themes and Debates, Op. Cit., p. 91.
Netherlands) gave to independent Institutions all the powers concerning the coal and the steel, both matters taken away from the sovereignty of the signatory Countries. The sector of steel and coal was the first common market and it anticipated the future European Common
Market.14In the same time the French Government started an other initiative, the Pleven Plan
for the creation of a European Defense Community. This Plan was proposed by the Prime Minister in response to the American call for the rearmament of West Germany. The intention was to form a European defense force as an alternative to Germany's proposed accession to NATO, meant to harness its military potential in case of conflict with the Soviet Bloc. The EDC was to include West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux Countries. Contemporaneously, Italy proposed to create a unified political power of Europe. Alcide De Gasperi obtained that the Project of the Treaty included the Article n. 38, prefiguring the elaboration from the future EDC Assembly of a federal or co federal structure for Europe. The ad-hoc Assembly, presided by Paul-Henry Spaak, a federalist, wrote the project of a
European Political Community, approved the 10th of March 1953.15
At the time the treaty instituting the EDC was being discussed, de Gaulle made a blistering analysis of it. He contested the aim of establishing a European army and disputed that France would thus be ensured of powerful American support. In his view, the treaty subordinated France to American strategy without guaranteeing that she would be defended in the event of attack, and would lead directly to the hegemony of the Reich in Europe. Dissecting the text of the treaty, he demonstrated that the European Army was in fact a tool in the hands of the
14 B. Olivi, R. Santaniello, Storia..., Op. Cit., p. 24. 15 Ivi p. 26.
Atlantic Commander in Chief, in other words, the American Commander in Chief in Europe.1617
The fall of the EDC project in front of the French National Assembly the 30th of August 1954
signed the end of the first initiative regarding a federal structure for Europe.
After all, in 1954 the situation in Europe and in the rest of the world was changed: while French was busy liquidating its colonial empire, Germany was showing everybody its
power.18 During 1952-54, the German government fully supported the French plan for a
European Defence Community. Its rejection by the French parliament came as a blow to Germany’s European policy. However, the western Allies quickly found an
intergovernmental substitute in the form of Germany’s integration into NATO and the newly
created Western European Union (WEU).19
The London (September/October 1954) and Paris agreements (October 1954), which
sanctioned the creation of the WEU and German membership in NATO, seemed destined to mark a turning point also in the territorial and boundary balance of the “old continent”; in particular, the possibility of German re-unification began to fade, as West and East Germany strengthened their military and political ties with the two opposing blocs.20
16 During the Press Conference at the Hotel Continental, the 25th of February 1953.
17 Maurice Vaisse, De Gaulle and the Defence of Europe. In: Europe 1945-‐1990’s: The end of an Era? Edited by: Antonio Varsori, MacMillian Press Ltd, Great Britain, 1995, p. 117.
18 B. Olivi, R. Santaniello, Storia..., Op. Cit., p. 28.
19 Michael Gehler, At the Heart of Integration. Op. Cit., p. 88.
20Antonio Varsori, The Geneva Summit Conference (1955). In: Europe 1945-‐1990’s: The end of an Era?, Op. Cit., p. 223.
According to Altiero Spinelli, the years between 1947 and 1954 were those in which the “great moderate ministers of Europe” effectively worked towards the birth of a European federation, having been pushed in that direction by a fear of communism and by the
“democratic missionary spirit” of the US at the time.21
After the fall of the EDC project, the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the six member
countries of the European Coal and Steel Community (Messina 1st-2nd of June 1955) decided
to create an Intergovernmental Committee to study the possibility of integration in some economical sectors. Paul-Henri Spaak was appointed President of this Committee. Its final Report, presented to the Conference of the Foreign Ministers (May 1956, Venice), contained concrete proposals for the creation of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) and
the European Economic Community (EEC).22
On 25th of March 1957 Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and West
Germany signed the Treaty of Rome, officially the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. Between the two Treaties signed in Rome, the one establishing the EAEC seemed to be destined to a quick success, while the other that had to create the
Common Market was more complex: this Treaty contained only the hint about the final aims, without defining the fulfillment times and the legislation to effectuate them.23
The 1st of January 1958 the institutional activity of the EEC and the EAEC started.
21 Daniele Pasquinucci: Between Political Commitment and Academic Research. In: European Union History, Themes and Debates, Op. Cit., p. 74.
22 B. Olivi, R. Santaniello, Storia..., Op. Cit., p. 29. 23 Ivi p. 31.
On May 1958, barely four months after its start, the EEC found itself in the middle of the crisis in Paris and in Alger. General de Gaulle was called again to power and became the new
French Prime Minister.24
Crucially, with the partial exception of France, the question of participating in core Europe integration was not heavily disputed, and a broad domestic consensus developed soon on the desirability of membership in the funding member states of the EEC. In contrast, with the exception of Spain and Portugal, national policy towards integration in “latecomer” countries remained highly controversial domestically for a long time, even after accession, as in the cases of Britain and Denmark.25
In the 1960’s, efforts to achieve European political unity were resumed. In the Bonn
Declaration of 18th July 1961, the Heads of State and Government of the EEC Member States
expressed their readiness to bring about closer political co-operation and political unity. The Declaration itself provided only for regular meetings between representatives of the Member States and did not propose the establishment of institutions. It did, however, lead to the setting up of the Fouchet Committee, which was to draw up proposals for co-operation. On 2 November 1961 the Fouchet Committee submitted to the governments of the EEC Member States the draft statute for a European Conferedation of States.
The Parliament of the European Communities approved the draft in principle on 23
November 1961, but criticized the absence of any supranational aspect. The draft was also
24 Ivi p.35.
25 Michael Gehler, At the Heart of Integration. In: European Union History, Themes and Debates, Op. Cit., p. 103.
examined by the Member States and, after discussions at governmental level, a second draft treaty establishing a confederation of states was submitted to the Fouchet Committee by the French representative. The other delegations, however, were not prepared to accept the second draft as a basis for discussion.
On 25 January 1962, the other five delegations submitted their own draft treaty. No agreement could be reached between the Member States on these drafts and, on 17 April 1962, the negotiations came to a standstill. Although this meant the failure of another fundamental attempt at integration, further progress was achieved with the conclusion on 8 April 1965 of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the
European Communities.26
The common market promised new prospects for economies of scale and increased exports. Equally, the wish to avoid exclusion from this larger market motivated Britain’s initiative to create a larger free trade area in 1956-57, and was one reason for the EEC application in 1961.
The attraction of the common market and later the single market programme, were strong incentives for other later-comers for reconsidering their attitude to EC membership as in the case of Austria, when it applied for membership in July 1989.
Foreign policy concerns were especially important for Britain as a declining global power. What makes Britain a special case is its “special relationship” with the USA.
This relationship was crucial for Britain in retaining a national nuclear deterrent that in turn was seen as indispensable for supporting its claim to continued great power status of some
sort. On the insistence of Britain and other countries, however, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation had a strictly intergovernmental institutional framework.
Subsequently, strong American support for the supranational principle and core Europe formation in the ECSC/EEC posed hard questions for those countries that decided to stay outside. At the same time, the Soviet Union made the argument that neutrality was incompatible with EEC membership and thus minimized the options of several outsiders, especially Austria.27
1.2 Denmark in the period from World War II and the Marshall Plan.
After the Second World War, Denmark and the others Scandinavian Countries did their better to avoid being involved in the emerging East-West struggle. These Countries stated again their traditional neutrality and laid their trust in the United Nations as international arbitrator and peacekeeper.
In 1945-1946 Denmark and Sweden tried to act as intermediaries between USSR and the
West, avoiding to align themselves in the incipient Cold War.28
The Danish Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft announced: “We will not place our country in any coalition. We are members of the United Nation and we will do what we have to as a Nordic country.”29
In 1945, the Social Democrats presented their post-war program, The Future of Denmark, which was a clear manifestation of the change in approach to economic policy that had taken place during the war. The program presented a new general economic policy to transform and modernize Danish society into an industrial economy, thereby laying the foundation for economic growth in the post-war period. The program was addressed to “the whole of the working population”- by this meaning not only the working class, but also agricultural labour, small farmers, fishermen, artisans, and the small-scale industrialist. The program assumed that the experience of the inter-war period had prepared the ground for a general acceptance in major parts of the Danish population of an active anti-crisis policy intended to
28 A. Landuyt, Idee d’Europa e integrazione europea, Società editrice il Mulino, Bologna 2004, p. 270. 29 T. Miljan, The reluctant europeans: the attitudes of the Nordic Countries to European Integration, Hurst, London 1977, p. 80.
create economic growth and to encourage social democracy. The “new democratic society” was not a break with capitalism as such, but with the “old forms of capitalism”, plagued by crisis and unemployment that affected not only the working class, but the whole working population. 30
Instead of the old forms of capitalism directed by free market forces, the program put forward economic planning and demand management as the means of securing an economic
development that would serve the interests of the whole population. The program expressed the development in the Social Democratic conception of economic policy that had taken place during the war.31
During the war, the Social Democratic had already pointed out that the economic policy of the 1930’s, in which protectionist barriers and special privileges had created a protected domestic market, had resulted in Danish industry’s lack of efficiency and in 1945 The Future of Denmark expressed grave doubts over the efficiency of Danish industry: according to the Social Democratic, Danish industry, through its reliance on “old fashioned” protectionism,
had not managed to adapt itself to international competition and technological development.32
In 1945, the SD party, influenced by the employment problems connected with the dismantling of the huge employment schemes of the war, was convinced that one of the major problems of the immediate post-war years would be unemployment in the countryside. The Future of Denmark, then, represented on the whole an end to the SD’s alliance with agriculture and the realization that the largest employment potential lay in an expansion of
30 V. Sørensen, Denmark’s Social Democratic Government & the Marshall Plan 1947-‐1950, Museum Tusculanum Press, University of Copenhagen 2001, p. 33.
31 Ivi p. 34 32 Ivi p. 38
industrial production. Even so, there is no doubt that the party also saw the agricultural sector as an important employer in the first decade after the war.
The very optimistic mood of the SD was proved unfounded in the election held on 30 October 1945. The SD lost 18 seats and was unable to form a government. Instead
agricultural interests were strengthened considerably. The Liberal party gained 10 seats and formed a government with the support of the Conservative party and the Social Liberal party (the old coalition partners of the SD from the 1930’s) and the SD found itself in the
opposition for the first time in 16 years.33
Until 1945, issues of foreign policy had never been of great importance in the SD party. The party’s historical background and the development of an SD pragmatic reformist policy had not left space for the development of a specifically SD foreign policy.
In the two periods when the SD headed a coalition government, 1924-26 and 1947-50, there
were no obvious candidates for the position of Foreign Minister within the party itself.34
In the pre-war period, the foreign policy issue with which the SD was most concerned – apart from the policy of political and military neutrality – was cooperation between the
Scandinavian countries. Since the beginning of the century there had been close cooperation between the SD parties and trade unions in Scandinavian countries. This cooperation was formalized in the Nordic Cooperation Committee where party and trade unions leaders met several times a year to discuss economic and political problems.
33 Ivi p. 39
From 1940-45, the SD party was the main party focusing on defending Danish national interests against the German occupation forces. In 1945, the foreign policy problem that loomed largest for the SD was how to preserve a policy of neutrality.
The German occupation had clearly shown that neutrality on its own was worthless; only with some kind of cooperation with other countries would “neutrality” be respected. This impression was strengthened both by the change in the geopolitical position of Scandinavian in the post-war world and by the growing tension between the US and the Soviet Union. However, apart from some very vague remarks about a policy of neutrality, the SD completely ignored the question of foreign policy in the immediate post-war years. The “Future of Denmark” did not mention foreign policy at all. This was in contrast to the two other Scandinavian parties and the British Labour party, whose programmes dealt with
foreign policy issues in great detail. Especially in the Norwegian and the British programmes, the conception of Europe as a bridge between East and West was very dominant in 1945-47. The Danish SD’s chief concern in the period 1945-47 was to regain the lost confidence of the working class and to reduce communist influence in the trade unions.
The acceptance of the Marshall Plan resulted in a decisive change to the traditional SD attitude towards foreign policy and strongly influenced the party’s approach to the post-war world.35
First, the acceptance of the Marshall Plan was the first step away from the policy of neutrality towards the final inclusions of Denmark in the Western bloc. Secondly, the Marshall Plan entailed that the SD accept a commitment to international cooperation through the OEEC and this was the beginning of the realization that Denmark was economically closer to Europe
that to Scandinavia. Thirdly, as in all other Western European social democratic/socialist parties, the Marshall Plan also meant the final break with communism and the Soviet Union. In the Scandinavian countries it resulted in the development of extreme anti-communist parties. Finally, the Marshall Plan meant that there developed inside the Danish SD party a consciousness of the importance of foreign policy.
During the first yeas of the Marshall Plan the party realized that its economy policy no longer depended exclusively on national political and economical developments; on the contrary, with the Marshall Plan, Denmark had become part of an international community and it was clear for the SD that the success of the national recovery policy was totally dependent on developments in the international economy and the initial stages of Western European integration.
It was a Liberal government, which had to decide on Denmark’s attitude to the speech by General Marshall and to the conference which followed it in Paris in July 1947.
For the Liberal government (1945-47), the immediate problems of the Danish economy carried much greater weight than foreign policy considerations and it was therefore the economic aspect more than the obvious foreign policy implications which dominated the government’s discussion of the Marshall Plan. This attitude was not surprising considering Denmark’s acute economic problems in the summer of 1947. The government had liberalized a major part of Denmark’s imports in 1946 and this had immediately resulted in a serious deterioration in the balance of payments, and particularly the accumulation of a huge deficit with Britain.36
36 Ivi p. 48
The economic prospects were worsened by the expectation of a bad harvest in 1947, which led to a considerable reduction in livestock, which in turn reduced agricultural production available for exports.
Still another factor in the reception of the Marshall Plan in Denmark was that especially the Conservative party had already begun to discuss the necessity of giving Danish foreign policy a more pro-Western stand, in contrast to the neutrality of the 1930’s.
The Danish saw Truman’s speech of 12 March 1947, announcing American economic aid to Greece and Turkey, as the first open anti-communist and anti-Soviet action by the American government and as a harbinger of the coming cold war. By 1947, the Danish leaders realized that political neutrality could only be maintained through an alliance with countries of some military strength and that the economic development of Europe was the best way to fight
communism.37
In most of the European countries, the signing of the bilateral agreements connected with the European Recovery Programme attracted a great deal of public and political attention. The bilateral negotiations involved the potentially explosive issue that had been the centre of all political discussion of the Marshall Plan since General Marshall’s speech in June 1947: was the US going to set any political preconditions for the allocation of aid?
The Danish letter of intent, delivered on 20 April 1947, raised no objections to the European Economic Cooperation Act, but stated that the decision on projects and increased
production/productivity through the Marshall Plan should in principle be left to the Danish
government.38
37 Ivi p. 59-‐60.
In the summer of 1947, this discussion was still in progress and the issue was not openly discussed for reasons of domestic politics, since both the Social Liberal party and the SD party favoured neutrality, or possibly a Scandinavian military alliance. So, the immediate reaction of the government to the Marshall Plan was to cooperate closely with the two other Scandinavian countries and to stress the economic importance of the Marshall Plan,
expressing its severe regret at the Soviet decision not to participate.39
At the beginning of June, American pressure was put on all the participating countries through their embassies to conclude the bilateral agreement before the 3rd of July. On 29 June, Denmark signed the bilateral agreement with the US. The agreement was presented to Parliament together with the Convention of European Economic Cooperation of 16 April. Both agreements were accepted by all parties except the Danish Communist party, though the Liberal party criticized again the agreement, stating that changes in several of the articles were desirable. But in the end the party voted for the agreement, not daring to sacrifice the consensus on the Marshall Plan for the wish to oppose the SD government’s policy in general.
France and Britain invited all European countries, with the exception of Spain, to participate in a Conference in Paris on July 12, 1947. The purpose of the Conference was to form a committee of cooperation with “the task of drawing up a report relative to the available
39 Foreing Office: Referat af moede i Udenrigspolitisk Naevn 10/7-‐1947. UMA 73B54a. Available in: V. Sørensen, Denmark’s Social Democratic…, Op. Cit., p. 49.
resources and needs of Europe in the course of the next 4 years”, to be delivered to the USA before 1st September 1947.40
During the preparation the Scandinavian countries stayed in close contact in order to develop a common Scandinavian attitude to the conference. Danish final decision to participate in the Paris Conference was taken on 10 July in a meeting of the Foreign Policy Board of the Folketing with the unanimous assent of all parties. The more strictly political implications of the Paris Conference were discussed at a meeting of the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers in Copenhagen, on 9 July. During that meeting, Norway and Sweden were against establishing a special commission to facilitate the Marshall Plan; in order to play down the East-West tensions, Norway and Sweden decided that it was important to give this task to the OEEC (now OECD). The Danish government tended to disagree, believing that the implementation of the Marshall Plan would not proceed smoothly under the aegis of the OEEC. At the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers’ conference, both Norway and Sweden stressed the importance of involving the OEEC in the Marshall Plan, or alternatively, that the Commission of Cooperation in Paris should only be temporary.
Fearing that an insistence on the ECE would prolong the discussions over or – even worse – block the Marshall Plan altogether, the Danish government somewhat reluctantly accepted the Norwegian and Swedish suggestions under the condition that the matter could be
reconsidered among the Scandinavian countries during the conference.41
The Danish government was mainly concerned with two problems. First, though the government wanted Marshall Aid, the degree to which Denmark could actually profit from
40 French yellow book documents of the Conference of foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. held in Paris from the 27th June to the 3rd July, 1947, Published by the authority of the French Govt. p. 71-‐72. Available in e-‐book at Det Kongelige Bibliotek, Copenhagen. 41 V. Sørensen, Denmark’s Social Democratic Government, Op. Cit., p. 51.
the aid was still uncertain. Thus the government wanted to keep the door open for other forms of cooperation that might ease the serious Danish economic situation. Secondly, the
government was concerned about the domestic political implications of the Marshall Plan – a question that it did not raise at the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers’ meeting. The Liberal government was strongly opposed to the economic planning and to any kind of State
interference in the economy and feared that the Committee of Cooperation in Paris would be dominated by social democratic governments which would attempt to use the Committee to further economic planning on a European level. Consequently, the government was of two minds about the American suggestion that a report be made dealing with European economic needs over a four years period, the so-called “long-term programme”. The government realized that Denmark would not receive aid without giving the relevant information, but it wanted to limit this information as much as possible to prevent outside interference in
Danish economic policy.42
After the meeting in Paris, the Soviet Union repudiated the Marshall Plan as an American attempt to subjugate Europe to “American dollar-imperialism”. Despite US intentions to offer the Marshall Plan to the Soviet Union, the Soviet attitude and the pressure that the Soviet Union put on the Eastern European countries not to participate, were interpreted by the socialist parties in the West as a Soviet attempt to esclate the East-West conflict.43
On August 1947, as a reaction to the Marshall Plan, the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers decided to create the Joint Nordic Committee for Economic Cooperation, headed by C. W. Bramsnæs, president of the Danish National Bank.
42 Ivi p. 52.
At the conference in Paris and throughout the summer, the Scandinavian delegates tried hard to sustain their position. Already during the first days of the conference, the Scandinavian countries had been forced to give up all ideas about the ECE as an official framework for the implementation of the Marshall Plan. What remained was the Norwegian and Swedish insistence that the Committee of Cooperation should only be a temporary nature and not be given any specific powers. Over the summer, the difference among the three governments’ attitude to the Marshall Plan and to the negotiations in Paris became clear: while Norway and Sweden were trying to limit the power and scope of the Committee in every possible way, the Danish government became increasingly apprehensive about this policy. The Danish
economic situation had not improved over the summer and the British decision to stop convertibility of sterling in August 1947 had turned the situation into an economic crisis. Consequently, the government’s greatest worry was that the Scandinavian policy towards the Committee might delay the Marshall Plan as a whole. Therefore the Danes appealed to the other Scandinavian countries not to provoke the Americans.
During autumn 1947, the deterioration of the economic situation, doubts about the
continuation of the bridge-building policy in Norway and increased pressure from the US and
the other participating countries served to weaken the Scandinavian stand.44
In the beginning of 1948, the Nordic countries started to discuss the creation of a Nordic
defense union, to strengthen the armed neutrality of the Nordic region.45
Finally, in April 1948, the Scandinavia countries fully accepted the OEEC as a permanent organization for Western European cooperation and for the implementation of the Marshall Plan.
44 Ivi p. 53.
The Danish government saw the Marshall Plan as a purely economic measure designed by the American government to adjust the American and European economies to each other and to solve the problems of:
- European scarcity of dollars, especially the British dollar problem;
- West Germany and the necessity of building up its industry and agriculture; - Boosting American exports to Europe in order to impede the expected economic
recession.
It must be concluded that, though the Marshall Plan meant heavy US involvement in national economic policies, this involvement in most participating countries served more to encourage and strengthen existing national economic policies, than to impose US policies. If the Danish SD government committed itself through the bilateral agreement to any specific American policy it was to the very general idea that a healthy economy was the foundation for
democracy and individual freedom, and hence the best defence against communism. This was in fact stated in the preamble to the agreement:
“The government of Denmark and the government of the United States of America recognize that the restoration or maintenance in the European countries of principles of individual liberty, free institutions and genuine independence rests largely upon the establishment of sound economic relationships, and the achievement by the countries of Europe of a healthy
economy…”46
The alarming extension of the Communist power in the Eastern Europe between the 1947 and the 1948, also persuaded the Danish and Norwegian Governments to abandon their neutrality
and became the founding members of the NATO in 1949, separating themselves from Swedish and Finland for what concerned the foreign policy and the defense.
With membership of NATO, and later participation in the joint command structure, Denmark moved quite some way from its traditional low profile military policy. But still Denmark became a member on minimal conditions: no bases or nuclear weapons on Danish soil in peacetime and a relative modest defense contribution. NATO membership also meant that Denmark could keep out of the more specifically West European defense cooperation: a cooperation which was considered more binding and in which Denmark could easily become
more directly dependent on German.47
The Danish membership of NATO cannot be described as a love match. On the contrary, Denmark’s decision to join NATO in 1949 has been described as a pragmatic solution in a situation where none of Denmark’s more favoured options of a pure Nordic defense could be
realized.48 In terms of Danish political identity, NATO membership has been seen to
constitute a break in Denmark’s long-standing tradition of isolated neutrality and in belief in the notion that a small country has better “lie down” and conduct a policy of accommodation to the great powers.49
Even if the membership of NATO was far from an uncontroversial issue in Danish Policy during the cold war, it was seen to bring clear advantages compared with joining the purely
47 M. Kelstrup, European integration and Denmark’s participation, Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1992, p. 303.
48 H. Boekle, A. Johannesdottir, J. Nadoll, And B. Stahl, Understanding the Atlanticist-‐Europeanist divide in the CFSP: comparing Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 9, no. 3 (2004), p. 425.
49 Ivi p. 426. Refer. to the expression used by Peter Munch, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1929-‐40.
European security structures. Denmark has, consequently, been counted among these European NATO members that were critical of the strengthening of the European
Community’s security policy dimension even during the cold war era. This critical attitude survived the end of the cold war and led to a serious split in Danish public opinion over European integration that has persisted since 1990. Danish criticism of the European Security and Defence Policy is linked with Denmark’s critical attitude towards political integration in general. Reservations about a European political union containing supranational, or even federal elements, seem to have a solid political base in Denmark, which was occupied by Germany during World War II. From a Danish perspective, the lack of supranational
elements helped to make NATO a preferable option to an ESDP that seemed to reinforce the
EU’s development towards a super-state.50
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries created the UNISCAN, an informal way for the cooperation on economical questions. The UNISCAN became their primary forum for the consultation about the economical integration in Western Europe. During the 50’s more than twenty ministerial conferences took place under the UNISCAN flag and contribute to the birth of the European Free Trade Association in 1959.
The first Danish answer to the Schuman Plan of May 1950 and the birth of the European Coal and Steel Community gave a growing importance to the Bramnæs Report, stating that: “the creation of a Nordic trade union would brought advantages to all the Scandinavian
countries.”51
50 A. J. K. Bailes, G. Herolf and B. Sundelius, The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy, Sipri (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) and Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 52.
Despite the fact that the Social Democrats were outside the Government from the 1950 to the 1953, in Denmark they remained the most influent political force and they promoted the
Nordic cooperation and integration in all the Scandinavian countries.52
During the 50’s, the Social Democrats considered the “Little Europe” of the ECSC as a limited neo-Latin and German union, a Europe of Conservative and Catholics.
As so, the Social Democrats had no desire in become a member of a Europe where the democratic, cultural and social traditions of the Nordic countries were absent.
The 1950 stated also the beginning of an economical crisis in Denmark, and the country
decided to expand its industrial exports towards the Nordic neighbors.53
On 1954 a Commission for Nordic economic cooperation was created to examine a
proposition of Nordic customs union. But, on 1955, the ECSC proposed that Denmark could start a “special relationship” with the Community, granting a square deal on the coal and steel trade. However, on 1956, the Danish Government, still in favor of a Nordic cooperation, declined this offer.
Meanwhile, on 1951, stating a halt in the Nordic economic integration because of Norway and Sweden, Denmark proposed the creation of the Nordic Council; Danish, Norwegian and
Swedish Parliaments ratified this proposition on 1952.54
The Treaty of Rome signed in 1957, worried Denmark more than the birth of the ECSC. The Danish peasants feared to be left out of the project creating the common market for the agricultural sector, while the Danish industrials and their political partisans (Social
52 Ivi p. 273. 53 Ivi p. 274. 54 Ivi p. 275.
Democrats and Conservative), were afraid that the Danish industry was too weak to entry the EEC.
But, even so, on 1957-1958 the project of a Nordic integration was put aside, while the United Kingdom was negotiating for an area of free trade in the Western Europe. The Danish Government hoped that this agreement could open for Denmark the English, German and
Scandinavian markets in a way that was synchronized with the Nordic integration. 55
On May 1959, the Danish Prime Minister affirmed that: “For Denmark, there is no other way
than the European solution.”56
However, the end of the negotiations from Germany and France on November 1958 persuaded Norway and Sweden to abandon their plans and to entered a free trade area with Great Britain, Switzerland and Austria. Therefore, at the end of the 50’s, Denmark had to choose between entering the EFTA or join the EEC. Denmark chose the EFTA, because during those years its trade and other relations with Norwegian, Sweden and Great Britain were more considerable than those with Western Germany and the other countries of the
Community.57
The Danish Government took part in the creation of the EFTA on 1959, while other bilateral agreements with Sweden, Great Britain and Western Germany were stipulated. In spite of this, when the United Kingdom applied at EEC for the membership on 1961, the Danish Social Democrat Government did immediately the same even if it meant to abandon Sweden and Finland (that joined EFTA the same year). But, since Norwegian seemed ready to follow
55 Ivi p. 276.
56 P. Hansen, Denmark and European Integration. In: Co-‐operation and conflict, vol. IV, 1969, p. 39. 57 A. Landuyt, Idee d’Europa.., Op. Cit., p. 277.
Denmark and Great Britain in the EEC, Denmark chose the Community. After all, England
was the main Danish trade partner.58
58 Ivi p. 279.
1.3 First and second veto to United Kingdom’s entry in the EEC.
“We are linked, but not compromised. We are interested and associated, but not absorbed. We belong not to single continent, but to all.”59
The policy of the United Kingdom after the Second World War was concentrated on the “Three circles” strategy, which tried to preserve the “World Power” status of Great Britain through the organization of the Commonwealth, the special relations with USA and the cooperation with the West European countries. As opposition leader, wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill promoted European integration as in his speech at the University of Zurich in 1946, but Britain initially insisted on intergovernmental forms of
cooperation and did not participate in the core Europe organizations of the ECSC/EEC.60
The Labor government of Clement Attlee looked with favor on the Schuman’s plan to create the EAEC, but then the ministers found the country unable to participate to the new organization, so they established with it only unofficial relationships.61
Once the NATO Treaty had been signed, British attitudes towards Western Europe became increasingly those of the defensive outsider. The concept of an Atlantic Community as a global Western alliance appealed to British decision-makers, but
59 Documents of the House of Commons, Churchill, 1930.
60 Michael Gehler, At the Heart of Integration. In: European Union History, Themes and Debates, edited by: W. Kaiser and A. Varsori, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 96.
61 J. H. Haar, Looking to Europe (The EC polizie of the British Labour Party and the Danish Social Democrats), Århus University Press, 1993, p. 26.
appeared to be inadequate to deal with developments in Europe after France seized the initiative and leadership in Europe in 1950. Additionally, the British realized that federalism was anathema to British constitutional traditions and the sustenance of her global independence. She was still a world power of the second rank and not a unit in a federated Europe. Britain had more to give up in any abrogation of sovereignty than did the continental Europeans. Lastly, the Empire/Commonwealth dimension was still an accepted and beneficial dimension, not only to the psychological make-up of British life, but also to her trading patterns.
The approach the UK took towards Europe in the 1950’s was one of benign “association”. This approach was formulated during the complicated talks that led to the creation of the ECSC. It was clear after Jean Monnet’s visit to London to explain the proposal, that the French had decided to merge the twin policies of an almost cartel-like project, with that of binding the Federal Republic of German to the West through supra-national institutions. Association became the preferred policy option once the Labour Cabinet had decided that, for domestic economic, political and constitutional reasons, Britain would not join on French terms. Likewise, when the French proposed the Pleven Plan for the EDC, the British position remained the same. The association formula was recognized in the September 1951Washington Declaration, which itself will form a part of a constantly developing Atlantic Community. The three signatories, the US, UK and France,
welcomed the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan and accepted that German Occupation Statute should be abandoned with the participation of Germany in the common defence. The British wished to have the closest possible association with continental
developments. In May 1952 the so-called “Eden proposals” were put to the Council of Europe and sought to take the concept of association one stage further. It had been the British who had insisted on the inclusion of an intergovernmental Committee of Ministers
in the Council of Europe, and who insisted that defense issues were strictly the prerogative of NATO. The Eden proposals suggested that the Council of Europe institutions should absorb the institutions of the Schuman Plan, as well as those of the proposed European Defence Community with countries which did not want to participate in the latter organizations acting as observers.62
In the mid- 1950’s Great Britain wasn’t persuaded to join the originating project of the Common Market, so the English put forward in the OEEC the idea of a European zone of free trade with the exclusion of the agricultural products and without changing their relationships with the Commonwealth. But this new version was completely rejected on November 1958, when General de Gaulle decided to integrally accept the Treaties of
Rome.63
This failure produced the second European initiative of Great Britain, which ended in the Stockholm Treaty (July 1959), establishing the European Free Trade Association among Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Austria and Portugal.
Meanwhile, the French President negotiated with Adenauer, despite the German political subordination to USA. In practice, de Gaulle’s actions aimed at affirm French primacy in Europe, cutting down the EEC.
In 1961 Great Britain, encouraged by USA, solicited the opening of a negotiation to verify the condition for the possible entry of the United Kingdom in the EEC. USA support lied with the English Prime Minister MacMillan, as President Kennedy stated in a
62 A. Deighton, Britain and the Three Interlocking Circles. In: Europe 1945-‐1990’s: The end.., Op. Cit., pp. 165-‐166.
speech in Philadelphia where he offered the “partnership” to Europe.64 To a large extent, this first rapprochement with the EEC was precipitated and accelerated by the decline of the British Empire and new uncertainties about the quality of the “special relationship” with the US.65
But in July 1963 de Gaulle stated the French “veto” to the United Kingdom entering in the EEC.
Indeed, the French President was afraid of the British relationships with the USA and feared that the entry of the United Kingdom in the Community could undermine the
French ambition to lead the EEC.66
By the early 1960’s, Britain’s Commonwealth ties had declined, and the conservative government led by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was concerned about the future of
the transatlantic relationship and Britain’s less than dynamic economy development.67
Then, after thirteen years of Conservative Governments, the Labor came back to power on October 1964.
On February 1965, Prime Minister Harold Wilson expounded the desire of a closer collaboration between the EFTA and the Common Market. Thanks to the election of March 1966, which increased the Labor majority, George Brown was nominated the new Secretary of Foreign Affairs on July.
64 Ivi pp. 44-‐45.
65 Michael Gehler, At the Heart of Integration., Op. Cit., p. 98. 66 B. Olivi, R. Santaniello, Storia…, Op. Cit., p. 46.
From that moment, Britain’s second application to the EEC was only a matter of fact.
Indeed, the 2nd of May 1967, Wilson announced that the United Kingdom decoded to
apply for the entering. The 10th of May 1967 the House of Commons approved the
application. Wilson, in his speech, underlined the undeniable advantages of the
membership.68
“All of us are aware of the long term potential for Europe, and, therefore, for Britain, of the creation of a single market of approaching three hundred million people… and of the enormous possibilities which an integrated strategy for technology, on a truly Continental scale, can create… But the Government’ purpose derives, above all, from our recognition that Europe is now faced with the opportunity of a great move forward in political
unity… Together we can ensure that Europe plays in world affairs the part which the Europe of today is not at present playing.”69
During a press conference on May 1967, de Gaulle repeated his opposition to the English entry, explaining his decision with the economic difficulties of Great Britain. The French President wanted to obtain the support of the European Commission, presided by the Belgian Jean Rey; but, still indicating British economical problems with severity, the Commission wished the opening of the negotiation to find a solution.
The other five Countries agreed with the Commission, so the statement of the Council
registered the disagreement between them and France.70
68 B. Olivi, R. Santaniello, Storia.., Op. Cit., pp. 58-‐59.
69 Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 2 May 1967, Prime Minister Wilson, pp. 313-‐314. 70 B. Olivi, R. Santaniello, Storia…, Op. Cit., p. 61.
1.4 From the entry of the United Kingdom to the Single European Act.
After the French Senate vote against a reform project supported by the President, on April
1969 de Gaulle resigned. Georges Pompidou succeeded to him, starting a different style in the foreign policy.
Meanwhile, in Germany, the new social democratic Chancellor Willy Brandy normalized
the relationships with USSR, with the beginning of the “Ostpolitik”.71
As so, the relations between France and German were changing and Pompidou chose to strengthen and expand EEC.
At the Hague Summit of December 1969, the debate on how to advance in the political unification started. The Davignon Report that held the conclusive ideas of a Committee chaired by Etienne Davignon fed this debate.
The Council approved the Davignon proposal and the Commission became chaired by the Italian Franco Maria Malfatti (the second Italian member was Altiero Spinelli). The first task of the Commission was to lead the negotiations concerning Great Britain’s
application to the EEC. These negotiations started on June 1970.72
At the same time, in the United Kingdom, the Labor Government lost the election; but the new Conservative Government, headed by Prime Minister Edward Heath, decided to continue with the negotiations.
On May 1971, when great breeding ground of anti-Europe feelings burned Great Britain, Heath had a secret meeting with George Pompidou. They examined three central
questions: the structure of the EEC, its role in the world and the monetary problems.
71 B. Olivi, R. Santaniello, Storia…, Op. Cit., p. 65. 72 Ivi pp. 67-‐68.
Heath accepted the French confederal thesis, confirming that also Great Britain would have leaned de Gaulle’s idea of Europe, and he also agreed on call a halt to the sterling
privileges, moving the United Kingdom (and Europe) away from the USA influence.73
After this meeting, the negotiations ended without any additional problem, opening in Great Britain the political debate. The Prime Minister obtained, after a period of serious disputes, three hundred and fifty six “yes” to United Kingdom’s entering in the EEC (against two hundred and forty four).
On the 22nd of January 1972, Denmark, Norway, Ireland and United Kingdom signed in
Brussels the Treaties for entering the EEC.
A referendum on joining the EEC was held in Denmark on the 2nd of October 1972 and
the result was 63.3% in favor. On the contrary, on the 25th of September 1972 Norway
refused with a referendum the membership of the EEC, becoming the only Country to have signed the Treaties and then not to entry the Community. Norway continued to be a member of the EFTA, and the EEC signed with the Association a free trade agreement on July 1972.74
At the beginning of 1974 United Kingdom experienced one of the most turbulent period in its history. On February 1974 James Callaghan, an openly Euro-skeptical politician, became Secretary of the Foreign Affairs and directed the “new negotiation” of British’s conditions for staying in the EEC.
The negotiations came to a compromise on March 1975, during the European Council in Dublin.
73 Ivi pp. 69-‐70.
