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Appendice documentaria
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Doc.n.5
From: Alexander Lyakhovsky,
The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan
GPI Iskon, Moscow, 1995, pp.109-112
Alexander Lyakhovsky—Major General, General Staff of the Russian Army. During the war in Afghanistan served as assistant to Commander of Operative Group of the USSR Defense Ministry in Afghanistan General V. I. Varennikov.
On December 8, 1979, a meeting was held in L. I. Brezhnev’s private office, which was attended by the narrow circle of the CC CPSU Politburo members: Yu. Andropov, A. Gromyko, M. Suslov and D. Ustinov. They took a long time discussing the present situation in Afghanistan and around it, considered all the pros and contras of introducing the Soviet troops in the area. Yu. Andropov and D. Ustinov cited the reasons justifying the necessity of such step, such as: the efforts, undertaken by the CIA of the USA (U.S. resident in Ankara--Paul Henze), for creating a ―new Great Ottoman Empire,‖ which would have included the Southern republics of the USSR; the absence of a reliable air defense system in the South, so that in the case of stationing of the American missiles of the ―Pershing‖ type in Afghanistan, they would threaten many vital Soviet objects, including the space center Baikonur; the danger that the Afghan uranium deposits could be used by Pakistan and Iraq for building nuclear weapons; [possible] establishment of opposition regimes in the Northern areas of Afghanistan and annexation of that region by Pakistan, and so on.
At the end of the meeting they have decided, as a preliminary plan, to develop two options: (1) to remove H. Amin by the hands of KGB special agents, and to put Babrak Karmal in his place; (2) to send some number of Soviet troops on the territory of Afghanistan for the same purposes.
On December 10, 1979, the Defense Minister of the USSR D. F. Ustinov summoned Chief of General Staff N. V. Ogarkov, and informed him that the Politburo had reached a preliminary decision of a temporary introduction of the Soviet troops into Afghanistan, and ordered him to prepare approximately 75 to 80 thousand people. N.
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V. Ogarkov was surprised and outraged by such a decision, and said that 75 thousand would not be able to stabilize the situation, and that he was against the introduction of troops, calling it ―reckless.‖ The Minister of Defense cut him off harshly: ―Are you going to teach the Politburo? Your only duty is to carry out the orders . . .‖ On the same day, Nikolai Vasilievich [Ogarkov] was promptly summoned to L. Brezhnev’s office, where the so-called ―small Politburo‖ (Yu. Andropov, A. Gromyko and D. Ustinov) was in session.
The Chief of General Staff once again tried to convince those who were present, that the Afghan problem should be decided by the political means, instead of relying on using force. He cited the traditions of the Afghan people, who never tolerated foreigners on their soil, warned them about the possible involvement of our troops in military operations, -- but everything was in vain. However, in the end of the conversation they tentatively determined that for the time being they would not make the final decision on the immediate military assistance, but, in any case, the troops should start preparing. In the evening, D. Ustinov gathered the Ministry of Defense Collegium and informed the narrow circle of officials from among the highest military leadership that possibly in the near future the decision would be made to use the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and that they had to start preparing the appropriate forces. For this purpose Directive # 312/12/00133 was sent to the troops. Beginning from December 10, D. F. Ustinov started giving oral instructions to the Chief of General Staff regarding formation of a new Army in the Turkestan military district. On the basis of these instructions, selective mobilization of troops was carried out, and airborne and other military units were transferred to the Turkestan military district. All arrangements were carried out in secret, and noted on the maps.
Apparently, the final step was made after they received the report from the KGB representative, General-Lieutenant B. Ivanov, stationed in Kabul, with his evaluation of the situation in Afghanistan. This report was on the table of the Defense Minister at the moment when he was leaving for the CC CPSU Politburo meeting in the morning of December 12. General-Major V. P. Zaplatin, who was at that time adviser to the Chief of Political Administration of the Afghan army testified about it. The day before, the USSR Defense Minister summoned him to Moscow to report on the situation as the man with the most thorough knowledge of the state of affairs in the army of the
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Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, since principal military adviser S. Magometov, who had just arrived [in Afghanistan], did not fully grasp the Afghan situation yet. However, when the General expressed his disagreement with the assessments of the Afghan Army provided by our special services, and presented his arguments to the effect that they had dramatized the situation developing in Afghanistan excessively, D. F. Ustinov showed him a coded telegram signed by the KGB representative, and said, ―You cannot come to an agreement there, but we need to make a decision [here].‖ On December 12, at the session of the CC CPSU Politburo (or rather its elite), on the initiative of Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov, and A. A. Gromyko, the final decision was made unanimously—to introduce Soviet troops into Afghanistan, although in the interest of secrecy, it was called ―the measures.‖ The Soviet leaders believed that that step was intended to promote the interests of strengthening the state, and pursued no other goals. The protocol of that session, handwritten by K.U. Chernenko, which for a long time was super secret, was not shown to anybody, not even those among the highest leadership and was kept in a special safe, survived in a special folder of the CC CPSU.
This document to a large extent clarifies who were the initiator and executor of the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. The protocol was signed by all the CC CPSU Politburo members, who were present at the session. In those times nobody spoke ―against‖ [it]. Every Politburo member knew how a disagreement with the opinion of General Secretary would be received, and therefore all proposals were ―received with unanimous approval.‖ The principle of collective cover-up ruled the day. It is significant that A.N. Kosygin, whose position on this issue was negative, did not attend the session. In the document, the letter ―A‖ signified Afghanistan, and the word ―measures‖ signified the introduction of Soviet troops into that country. Therefore, all the false rumors, and inconsistencies regarding who was responsible for making the decision to introduce troops into Afghanistan have been removed.
The coded telegrams coming from Afghanistan looked as if they provided confirmation that the steps undertaken by the USSR leadership in regards to Afghanistan were the right ones.
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There was no Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the issue of the introduction of troops. All orders were given orally. That was justified by the need to ensure secrecy and the need to confuse H. Amin.
In those times, such actions were possible as a result of the existing practice of making important political decisions: in reality, after their adoption by the CC CPSU Politburo (the highest organ of the ruling party), they were, for the main part, simply formally ―approved‖ by the state organs, and were announced to the people. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that if that issue was raised at the Supreme Soviet, it would have been decided unanimously positively. Because that was the era of ―unified thinking,‖ and the strict system of hierarchy created by the party nomenclature did not allow even one step outside the line determined by the CC CPSU Politburo; the people who occupied the key posts in the government, were under the total control of that system.
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Doc.n.6
When and Why the Decision to Send Troops [to Afghanistan] Was Made.
[from Georgy M. Kornienko, The Cold War: Testimony of a Participant, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994, pp. 193-195]
[In the period] from March to October 1979, A. A. Gromyko and I often exchanged opinions regarding the requests from the Afghan government to send in Soviet troops, and every time we came to a shared understanding that such a step would be impermissible. I have not noticed any doubts on that issue on the part of Yu. V. Andropov or D. F. Ustinov either until October. However, some time in October, after the physical removal of Taraki by Amin, Gromyko became ―locked in‖—in his conversations with me he no longer touched upon the issue of the expediency (or inexpediency) of sending Soviet troops into Afghanistan. From my conversations with him, already after the introduction of troops, I concluded that it was not Gromyko who said ―A‖ in favor of such decision, but that he was ―pressured‖ into it by Andropov and Ustinov together. Which one of those two was the first to change their initial point of view and spoke in favor of sending the troops, one may only guess.
Additional evidence that became available to me recently, leads me to suggest that it was Ustinov after all, who said ―A‖ in this sad affair. The push to change his former point of view of inexpediency of sending Soviet troops in Afghanistan came from the stationing of American military ships in the Persian Gulf in the fall of 1979, and the incoming information about preparations for a possible American invasion of Iran,
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which threatened to cardinally change the military-strategic situation in the region to the detriment of the interests of the Soviet Union. If the United States can allow itself such things tens of thousands of kilometers away from their territory in the immediate proximity from the USSR borders, why then should we be afraid to defend our positions in the neighboring Afghanistan?—this was approximately Ustinov’s reasoning. As far as Andropov is concerned, who at that time was Chairman of the USSR KGB, in this situation he was a hostage of his own apparatus, which on the one hand exaggerated the danger for the USSR of Amin’s continuation in power, because he was being portrayed as an American agent, and on the other hand, exaggerated the power of the USSR to change the situation in the desirable for the USSR direction. I was aware of the existence of such mood and perceptions in the KGB apparatus.
Among the leadership of the General Staff, people like Chief of General Staff N. V. Ogarkov, his First Deputy S. F. Akhromeev, and Head of Main Operations Department V. I. Varennikov, the idea of sending troops to Afghanistan did not inspire any enthusiasm, according to my information. For understandable reasons, they justified their objections against it by professional rather than political considerations, supporting them by [referring to] the American experience in Vietnam: the impossibility to cope with Afghanistan with the forces that could be used [for it] without substantially weakening the Soviet groups of forces in Europe and along the border with China, which was not acceptable in those years. However, in the end, Ustinov disregarded their opinion. As far as I know, experts of the International Department of the CC CPSU regarded the decision to send troops to Afghanistan as a mistake as well, and tried to let their considerations on that issue be known to the highest leadership, but without any success.
As far as I was able to reconstruct the development of the events later, the difficult deliberations of the ―three‖ over the problem of whether to send the troops or not continued all through October, November, and the first part of December. On December 10, 1979, Ustinov gave an oral order to the General Staff to start preparations for deployment of one division of paratroopers and of five divisions of military-transport aviation, to step up the readiness of two motorized rifle divisions in the Turkestan Military District, and to increase the staff of a pontoon regiment to full staff without setting it any concrete tasks.
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However, the final political decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan was made in the second part of the day on December 12, 1979 by a narrow group of Soviet leaders: Brezhnev, Suslov, Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko (some publications also mention Kosygin, but according to my information, he was not present there because he was ill on that day). Thus the fateful decision was made by not even full CC CPSU Politburo, although a handwritten Resolution of the Politburo was prepared after the fact, which was signed by almost all the members.
After that, accelerated preparations of [military] units and formations that were assigned [the task of] entering the neighboring country began in the military districts on the border with Afghanistan. On December 24, Ustinov convened the highest leadership of the Defense Ministry and made an announcement of the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan without explaining the purpose of that mission. On the same day, the first printed document signed by the Defense Minister was prepared—the directive, which said that the decision was made to ―send several contingents of Soviet troops deployed in the southern regions of the country into the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for the purposes of rendering internationalist assistance to the friendly Afghan people, and also to create favorable conditions to prevent possible anti-Afghan actions on the part of the bordering states.‖
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Doc.n.7
On the Changing Mission of the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan,
[from Alexander Lyakhovsky, The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan, Moscow, GPI “Iskon,” 1995]
One has to emphasize that up until a certain moment the USSR leadership and our military command tried to avoid responding to Babrak Karmal’s requests for help in fighting with the military formations of the opposition. Leaders of the operative group of the USSR Defense Ministry Marshal of the Soviet Union S. L. Sokolov and General of the Army S. F. Akhromeev argued that they did not envision participation of the units and formations introduced into Afghanistan in combat activities in the DRA territory. They [the troops] could only respond if forced to do so under an immediate fire impact on the part of the rebels, or undertake operations for liberation of our military advisers. However, after the mass anti-government uprisings in Kabul in the end of February 1980 (…), and after another appeal to the Soviet government from B.Karmal, who was frightened by that uprising, the command of Soviet forces in Afghanistan received a categorical order from Moscow: ―Begin active operations for destruction of the formations of the armed opposition together with the DRA Army…‖ Of course, this was a deviation from the original plans, but the order came from the government, and the troops were obligated to carry it out.
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From the beginning of March 1980, the formations and units of the LCST [Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops] began their operations in the Kunar Province. They found themselves pulled into the internecine war in Afghanistan and began to fulfill tasks related to suppression of the rebel movement, which initially did not figure in the USSR plans at all. …
According to the documents from the Archive of the Main Operations Department (MOD) of the General Staff, … in the end of February 1980, the Soviet leadership worked on the issue (supposedly on L. I. Brezhnev’s initiative) of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, because it was believed that having overthrown Amin and having solidified the new Afghan government of B. Karmal, they have fulfilled their main task. However, at that time, they did not do that for several reasons. D. F. Ustinov and Yu. V. Andropov (possibly A. A. Gromyko as well), were against withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. In their opinion, at that time, withdrawal of troops would have meant a concession to the aggressive policy of the United States; would have strengthened the positions of the proponents of the harsh course toward the Soviet Union in the United States and in other Western countries, would have hurt the prestige of the Soviet Union as a state abiding by the treaties it signed, would have led to further destabilization of the situation in the DRA as a result of the weakness of the party and state apparatus and the armed forces, which in the end could have led to the loss of Afghanistan; and would have led to rapid growth of Muslim extremism near the borders of the Soviet Union. Taking [the above reasons] into account, it was proposed to return to consideration of the issue of withdrawal of troops later, as the party and state forces get stronger, and the political situation in the country stabilizes. It is possible that the worsening of the situation in Kabul in the end of February influenced their decision; in any case—the [decision] to leave the Soviet troops in Afghanistan inevitably led to their involvement in the civil war.
When it became obvious that the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops was to stay in Afghanistan for a long time, they started to replace all the military reservists with enlisted officers and regular conscripted personnel. The full replacement of reserve personnel with enlisted personnel was completed as follows: officers—by November 1980, sergeants and soldiers—by March. Altogether 33,5 thousand people were replaced, among those 2.2 thousand officers, and 31.3 thousand sergeants and soldiers.
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At the same time, all automobiles and other machines supplied by the civilian sector were replaced with the military equipment.
[Lyakhovsky, pp. 176-177]
Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, The National Security Archive.
Doc.n.8
“Pravda” Correspondent I. Shchedrov’s letter to the CC CPSU on the Situation in Afghanistan, November 12, 1981
According to the conference of party advisors, as of October 1981, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan controlled 5 thousand hamlets out of the total number of 35 thousand, i.e. less than 15%, as well as the majority of district centers, and all 29 cities in the provinces. Overall, in this respect, there have been no significant changes in the situation from the summer of the last year.
So far, not one province has been fully liberated. In the rural areas, controlled by the rebels there is not a single guerilla unit to be found, not one big active underground group of the PDPA, DOMA or of any other revolutionary organization of the DRA.
[…]
The big operations aimed at destroying the bands and the rebel strongholds in the rear of the counter-revolution, which are undertaken in the situation where 85% of the hamlets still remain under the control of the rebels, do not have much of an effect. Upon completing such an operation, the Afghan-Soviet troops as a rule return to their
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bases and the regions fall back under the control of the rebels. The practice of leaving [groups] of people’s regime in some isolated settlements without a permanent cover by the military forces does not change the situation. In addition, the tactics of hot pursuit of the rebels and that of destruction of rebels’ nests on their own territory is facing growing criticism on the part of the local population. In the course of those operations, the housing and the agricultural fields are often destroyed, the civilian population is killed, and in the end everything remains the same. The rebels return and control the territory again. The experience of the last year has shown that there was no significant increase in the territory controlled by the DRA after such operations, and it is not happening now. Moreover, in the majority of the provinces, peasant visitors from the regions controlled by the rebels come secretly to the provincial centers with requests to help them in creating units of defense of the revolution and of the popular regime, but with one condition – during the first stage, until the peoples regimes get stronger, to protect them from the punitive raids of the rebels, for which [they ask us] to move the mobile or the permanent units of the DRA armed forces closer to those provinces. The experience of Farah and other provinces has already produced positive results.
There are some examples of the opposite. In Kunduze, Shindand, and in a number of other locations, where huge overpopulated military bases of Soviet troops and Afghan units are concentrated on territories surrounded by barbed wire, units that are following the already traditional tactics of hot pursuit of the rebels on the large territories, the facts are such that a kilometer or two away from those lie the areas, which are totally controlled by the rebels, and when the night falls, and sometimes even in the daytime, they hear the sounds of nearby fighting. One of the blocks of Kabul— Podman--still remains under the control of the rebels.
[…]
The war in Afghanistan is really a special case, an undeclared war with massive participation of forces of international reaction from the abroad. But at the same time, it is also a civil war, where the counter-revolution has now switched to the new protracted tactics, where there are no big military units openly fighting against the Afghan-Soviet troops anymore, even though the general number of forces of the band formations remains the same. And the counter-revolution masks itself as if they were civilians,
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they live among the people. The rebels actively use not only terror, but also propaganda, controlling extensive areas and relying on the old age-proven relations of the tribal and feudal society.
Purely military operations aimed at destruction of a certain rebel unit, or a certain stronghold obviously bring no results in the situation where the enemy controls the extensive territory.
It is quite clear now that even under the most favorable circumstances, and with the most effective strategy and the tactics, the defeat of the counter-revolutionary formations will take years, most likely no less than five years. This opinion is shared by B. Karmal, S. A. Ketmand, and by the majority of other leaders of the central as well as the provincial structures, and by our advisors.
[from the Center for Preservation of Contemporary Documentation, Moscow, Fond 5, Opis 84, delo 855]
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Doc.n.9
Excerpt from KGB USSR and General Staff Report of December 1982
[Source: Alexander Lyakhovsky, Tragedy and Valor of Afghan, Iskon, Moscow 1995, p. 263, Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya]
…11. In connection with cde. A. F. Dobrynin’s information from Washington regarding the penetration of American citizens into the territory of the DRA:
a) we are preparing an article in the newspapers Pravda or Izvestia about U.S. interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs (subversive statements on the part of U.S. administration leaders, supplying the Afghan counterrevolution with weapons and ammunition, financing of their bandit (terrorist?) actions against the legitimate authorities, penetration of American citizens into the DRA territory—newspaper and journal correspondents joining the bands; b) Commander of forces of the TurkVO [Turkmen military district] and the Main Military
Adviser in the DRA were assigned a task to capture an American citizen acting in a band of counterrevolutionaries in the territory of Afghanistan.
c) To find among the captured rebels those who had contacts with U.S. intelligence officials during their stay in Pakistan. Undertake appropriate work with them. After that, organize a press conference in Kabul on U.S. interference in the DRA’s internal affairs.
From KGB USSR, and the General Staff of USSR Armed Forces, December 1982
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Doc.n.11
To Candidate Member of the Politburo of the CC CPSU USSR Minister of Defense
Comrade Dmitry Timofeevich Yazov Moscow, USSR Ministry of Defense
The Afghan problem continues to attract attention in the sphere of international affairs. It begins to cause a certain concern on the part of the Soviet people as well. This is precisely why I would like to present my view of the existing military-political situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the perspectives of its development, and some proposals regarding strategy and tactics for the period of the forthcoming withdrawal of the Soviet limited military contingent. I am undertaking this motivated by my understanding of the complexity and urgency of the issue, with the feeling of my party and military-professional duty, regardless of the consequences that are awaiting me. Truth and honor for me are more valuable than personal comfort.
1. The military and political situation in the country is characterized by an exceptional tension, and the increasing aggravation and instability. A deep political crisis of the Afghan society is obvious. The revolution entered the phase of ―rollback‖. The coalition of social forces continues to change in favor of the counter-revolution. The state regime is not capable of stopping the counter-revolution on its own without principally new cardinal changes.
2. We should honestly admit that our efforts over the last 8 years have not led to the expected results. Huge material resources and considerable casualties did not produce a positive end result – stabilization of military-political situation in the country. The protracted character of the military struggle and the absence of any serious success, which could lead to a breakthrough in the entire strategic situation, led to the formation
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in the minds of the majority of the population of the mistrust in the abilities of the regime. That objectively led to demoralization of the masses, and to the erosion of the social base of the revolution. The experience of the past years clearly shows that the Afghan problem cannot be solved by military means only. Within the framework of the old thinking, old approaches we are doomed to the negative end result in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). We should decisively reject our social illusions and undertake principally new steps, taking into account the lessons of the past, and the real situation in the country . . .
3. The national reconciliation, announced by the Afghan leadership, has not led to a breakthrough in the military-political situation in the country and will not lead to one.
First of all, the masses did not express their extensive or consistent support for that course. And the reason here is to be found not only in the defects of the term ―national reconciliation.‖ The people are tired from the war, they want peace. However, the people are against the source of the idea of the national reconciliation as such, i.e. against the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The regime has no serious positions in the kishlak zone, where the main mass of population is concentrated. This zone is under the complete control of the counter-revolutionary forces.
Secondly, the practice of the national reconciliation was mainly limited to the conversations about the ―decisiveness‖ without any decisive actions.
Thirdly, the policy of national reconciliation did not find extensive support in the CC PDPA either. One could not argue that it was decisively, consistently and undisputedly accepted even by the Politburo of the CC PDPA either. A similar situation exists in the state apparatus and in the armed forces. This cannot but worsens even more the weakening of the revolution and the formation of the negative content of public consciousness.
Fourth, the PDPA is not the only political organization in the DRA. The course of the PDPA leadership to the national reconciliation does not enjoy consistent support in the leadership of other democratic political parties.
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Fifth, the PDPA appeal for the national reconciliation did not find positive response on the part of the counter-revolution. Moreover, the frequency of combat actions has increased along with its exasperation and harshness . . . the counter-revolution is not planning for the search of ways to resolve the problems peacefully, but continues its course for putting an end to the regime by military means . . . At the same time, one has to keep in mind that the counter-revolution is aware of the strategic decision of the Soviet leadership to withdraw the Soviet troops from the DRA . . . The counter-revolution will not be satisfied with partial power today, knowing that tomorrow it can have it all.
Six, one of the fundamental principles of the national reconciliation – is the proposal to create a coalition government. The Afghan leadership is hoping that someone from the Peshawar ―seven‖ would accept that proposal. That is a groundless illusion, although one cannot exclude from one’s political arsenal a possibility that the former King Zahir Shah might enter the Afghan arena. In that case, S. Modjaddadi, S. Gilani, M. Nabi could join him. However, all the main forces of the counter-revolution comprise the internal base of Gulbedinn and Rabbani . . . Creation of a coalition government with Zahir Shah or with any other combination of the figures from the ―seven‖ – is not a solution to the situation.
Seven, the course on the national reconciliation has had a profoundly negative influence on the moral state of the personnel of the Afghan armed forces. The morale and the combat qualities of the officers, and the main mass of soldiers and sergeants, which were already quite low, were eroded even further. The number of desertions in the armed forces is growing. At the same time, one could predict that beyond the framework of the period of the national reconciliation that process could become massive. The army will continue loosing its confidence in achieving victory in the armed struggle with the counter-revolution more and more. Of course, this is happening not without ideological influence of the counter-revolution. And here one has to admit that in the ideological struggle the counter-revolution has succeeded in seizing the initiative. .
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-- the policy of national reconciliation will not lead to the expected result . . . the [policy of] national reconciliation without support of active practical activity of the party and the regime led the revolution to ―run in place‖, to the formation of a political indifference not only among the working masses, but even among the absolute majority of the party members and officers of the armed forces;
-- the counter-revolution actively uses the period of national reconciliation for the purposes of its consolidation and in its forward [campaign of] state and anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda work among the population;
-- by the time the period of national reconciliation is over one should expect a rapid intensification of the armed struggle . . .
4. The main issue in the DRA – is the state of the PDPA. Incorrect information, or information, which is fed by illusions is especially dangerous in this issue. In analyzing the processes taking place in the PDPA it is especially important to be objective, and to take into account the existing situation, rather than presenting the desired for the actual. It is also important to be able to see the lessons of the road traveled, and the real future tendencies behind the grandiloquent declarations from the PDPA leadership. How do they look to me?
(a) The PDPA from the moment of its founding (January 1965) has never been a monolithic, organically united political party. It was an artificial combination of two independent political tendencies ―Khalq‖ and ―Parcham‖ . . .
(b) The fierce struggle for the leadership not only between ―Khalq‖ and ―Parcham,‖ but also between their most prominent representatives has been and will be an important characteristic of the PDPA . . .
(c) At the present time, the PDPA is the only political organization in the DRA, which relies on the organizational structure throughout the country (in all the provincial and in part of district centers). However, it is a kind of circulatory system without blood. The level of participation of the PDPA members was never adequate. At the present time, the party members can be characterized by thorough political apathy. Many of them, who see the perspectives of the development of the situation in the country quite clearly, and who are motivated by the instinct of self-preservation are now
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acting not in the interest of the PDPA, but against the interest of the party . . . Had the analysis of the PDPA situation been done on the basis of real developments, and not on the basis of reports from Leshchinsky and Petrova, it would have been quite obvious that the PDPA had already become not a party of active members, but a party of membership cards . . .
The PDPA is objectively moving toward its political death. No actions aimed at resuscitating the PDPA would produce any practical results. Najib’s efforts in this respect can only prolong the death throes, but they cannot save the PDPA from its death.
In these circumstances, we should concentrate our efforts not on fire rescue measures to save the PDPA, but rather on creating conditions for achieving our strategic goal, which I see as follows:
---to find opportunities to overcome the deepening political crisis of the Afghan society. Here we need radical measures, taking into account demands of wide masses of population as well as those of the internal armed counter-revolution;
---to prepare the withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from the DRA, as it was announced by our leadership;
---to help the progressive political forces of the country preserve the democratic content of development of the Afghan society;
---to rebuild the traditional friendship among that part of the Afghan population, which under the force of the circumstances formed hostile attitudes toward the Soviet people.
---to ensure future development of social processes in the DRA in the direction of our long-term interests.
With deepest respect, Doctor of Philosophy,
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Moscow, August 13, 1987 Colonel K.
Tsagolov
[from Alexander Lyakhovsky, The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan, Iskon, Moscow 1995, pp. 344-348]
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Doc.n.12
CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, May 10, 1988
[Source: Alexander Lyakhovsky, Tragedy and Valor of Afghan, Iskon, Moscow 1995, Appendix 8, Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya]
The decision was made in the conditions when there was a lot of uncertainty in the balance of forces within the Afghan society. [Our] picture of the real social and economic situation in the country was also insufficiently clear. We do not want to say it, but we should: at that time, we did not even have a correct assessment of the unique geographical features of that hard-to-enter country. That found its reflection in the operations of our troops against small highly mobile units, where very little could be accomplished with the help of modern military technology.
In addition, [we] completely disregarded the most important national and historical factors, above all the fact that the appearance of armed foreigners in Afghanistan was always met with arms in the hands [of the population]. This is how it was in the past, and this is how it happened when our troops entered [Afghanistan], even though they came there with honest and noble goals.
Babrak Karmal became head of the Afghan government at the time. His first steps in that capacity gave grounds to hope that he would be able to solve the problems facing his country. However, nothing new had emerged in his policy, which could have changed the attitude of the significant portion of the Afghan population to the new regime to the better. Moreover, the intensity of the internal Afghan conflict continued to grow, and our military presence was associated with forceful imposition of customs alien to the national characteristics and feelings of the Afghan people, which did not take into account the multiple forms of economic life, and other characteristics, such tribal and religious ones.
One has to admit that essentially we put our bets on the military solution, on suppressing the counterrevolution with force. We did not even fully use the existing opportunities for neutralization of the hostile attitudes of the local population towards us. We have to assess critically some aspects of functioning of our adviser apparatus in Afghanistan as well. It did many things to provide assistance in strengthening the PDPA and the people’s regime. However, often our people, acting out of their best intentions, tried to transplant the approached we are accustomed to onto the Afghan soil, encouraged the Afghans to copy our ways. All this did not help our cause, it bred the feelings of dependency on the part of the Afghan leaders in regard to the Soviet Union both in the sphere of military operations and in the economic sphere.
Meanwhile the war in Afghanistan continued, and our troops were getting engaged in extensive combat actions. The situation developed, which made any way out more and more difficult as the time passed. Combat action is combat action. Our losses in dead
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and wounded—and the CC CPSU believes it has no right to hide this—were growing, and becoming more and more heavy. Altogether, by the beginning of May 1988, we lost 13,310 people [dead] in Afghanistan; 35,478 Soviet officers and soldiers were wounded, many of whom became disabled; 301 people are missing in action. There is a reason that people say that each person is a unique world, and when a person dies, that world disappears forever. The loss of every person is very hard and irreparable, it is hard and sacred if one died carrying out one’s duty.
The Afghan losses, naturally, were much heavier [than ours], including the losses among the civilian population.
One should not disregard the economic factor either. If the enemy in Afghanistan received weapons and ammunition for hundreds of millions and later even billions of dollars, the Soviet-Afghan side also had to shoulder adequate expenditures. The war in Afghanistan costs us 5 billion rubles a year.
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. May 10, 1988
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Excerpt from Statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops, February 14, 1989
[Source: Alexander Lyakhovsky, Tragedy and Valor of Afghan, Iskon, Moscow 1995, Appendix 11, Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya]
It is important to note that some people are trying to create an analogy between the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the American actions in Vietnam. It is not only unfair but even absurd to draw such parallels. There cannot be any comparison here, because these two missions are diametrically opposite both in their objectives and tasks as well as in their content and results. Starting with the fact that nobody had invited the Americans in Vietnam, whereas the Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan after numerous requests from the legitimate Afghan government. Completely different forms and methods were used [in Afghanistan]. We came in not with the goal to occupy and split the country, as it happened as a result of American actions, not with the goal capturing foreign territory, but with the goal of providing internationalist assistance in the defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. We never pursued any selfish goals or set any conditions.
Withdrawal of Soviet forces, precisely withdrawal, not flight, as was the case with the American troops in Vietnam, is carried out according to the plan, in strict accordance with the Geneva Agreements on Afghanistan, and according to the will of the Afghan and Soviet people, with the support from the world community. It demonstrated once again that the Soviet Union is true to the principles of new political thinking, its political statements and positions. In the process of withdrawal, we transferred objects and property to the Afghan people with overall value of over 830 million rubles.
At the same time, we did everything we could not to allow the withdrawal of the last Soviet soldier form Afghanistan to become the beginning of a civil war in this country. In the future we will continue to undertake all necessary measures to help the political
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settlement [in Afghanistan] in the name of bringing peace and security to the Afghan people.
