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The Problem of Popular

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(1)

Regulating the Platform Economy:

The Problem of Popular Representation

Ruth Berins Collier

University of California, Berkeley

(2)

Argument

1. World of Work: Labor platforms accelerate a longer-term change in the world of work and compensate for the pathologies of the off-line labor market. It raises worker and public interest issues.

2. Democracy 2.0: Labor platforms reinforce shift in popular interest regime.

Collective action problems lead to demobilization of productionist issues.

3. US Uber politics: elite-driven politics of concentrated actors and surrogate representation of dispersed actors—workers and consumers. Regulatory

capture.

(3)

While the platform economy is disruptive in many ways, it continues a longer-term trend toward

1. Contingent work

2. More complex, mediated employment relations; the fissured workplace (David Weil)

Raises work, social policy, public interest issues.

(4)

Low-wage dynamic of labor platforms

1. Crowdsourcing Platforms

Construct an international labor market that integrates high and low wage economies. Requesters are businesses.

2. On-demand Platforms

Grow by making cheap services available down the social hierarchy. Requesters are customers.

Labor Platforms: technology makes the market not the worker more efficient.

Income increases with more gigs IF the greater number of gigs “outrun” the lower price per gig. A bigger problem with on-demand platforms.

(5)

Fissured workplace:

Labor platform triangle:

Mediated Labor Relations

Worker

Labor Platform

Requester Lead firm  outsourced firm

franchised firm  worker

(6)

Popular Interest Regime

Democracy 1.0: Onset of mass politics

Growth of factory production/work force Labor unions predominant

Democracy 2.0: End of 20

th

c.

Growth of atomized contingent work force Unions on the defensive

More pluralistic: many kinds of organizations

(7)

Popular Interest Regime

Unions SMOs, CSOs,

Think tanks, Foundations Organizational traits Party-affiliated, members, dues, in-

person meetings, peak/hierarchical

Staff-centered, dispersed

sympathizers/constituencies; networks

Issues Micro & macro productionist Rights, risks, consumptionist,

distributive, corruption/accountability

Repertoire of Action Wide: economic and political;

workplace to national politics;

strikes to institutionalized negotiation

Contention, lobbying, policy analysis Collective action problems

(8)

Uber in the US: Disruptive Regulation

1. Elite-driven politics among concentrated interests

Challenger vs. Incumbent (Uber vs. Taxis) Substantial regulatory capture by Uber

2. Surrogate representation of dispersed interests

A. Drivers: job creation, labor issues

B. Consumers/public: hi supply, lo cost, consumer protection, safety

(9)

Surrogates Representation of Dispersed Actors

Uber

Customers Drivers

Aligned on hi supply, lo cost

Aligned on

market presence

Taxis

Aligned on consumer

benefits, safety

Labor issues:

depend on unions, regulatory

agencies, courts

Riferimenti

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