ContentslistsavailableatScienceDirect
Journal
of
International
Financial
Markets,
Institutions
&
Money
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e :w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / i n t f i nInternational
capital
markets
structure,
preferences
and
puzzles:
A
“US–China
World”
夽
Guglielmo
Maria
Caporale
a,
Michael
Donadelli
b,∗,
Alessia
Varani
caDepartmentofEconomicsandFinance,BrunelUniversity,London,UnitedKingdom
bResearchCenterSAFE,HouseofFinance,GoetheUniversity,Frankfurt,Germany
cHEC-Montréal,DepartmentofAppliedEconomics,Canada
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
i
n
f
o
Articlehistory:
Received7October2014
Accepted19December2014
Availableonline29December2014
JELclassification: F3 F4 Keywords: Macro-anomalies Financialautarky Completemarkets Long-runinnovations Homebias
a
b
s
t
r
a
c
t
TheUS–Chinadatasuggestthat(i)therealexchangerate(RER)volatilitypuzzle(high RERvolatilityrelativetoconsumptionvolatility),(ii)theBackus–Smithanomaly(negative correlationbetweentheRERandconsumptiondifferentials),(iii)theconsumption corre-lationpuzzle(relativelylowcross-countryconsumptioncorrelation)becamemoresevere intheaftermathofChina’sstockmarketliberalization.Thisindicatesthatinternational macro-anomaliesdonotshowupexclusivelyamongpairsofadvancedeconomies.Inan internationalendowmenteconomycontext,weshowthatthecombinationofrecursive preferencesandlong-runriskallowsforthesimultaneousresolutionoftheseanomalies.In contrasttostandardmacromodels,thisholdseveninthepresenceoffullfinancial integra-tion,segmentedgoodsmarketsandnon-negligiblechangesinseveralparametervalues. ©2014ElsevierB.V.Allrightsreserved.
1. Introduction
Theinternationalbusinesscycle(IBC)literatureofthelast20yearspointsoutthattherisk-sharingpredictionsofstandard modelswithinternationalcompletemarketsdonotmatchcross-countrymovementsinconsumption.Earlystudiesshow thatastandardIBCmodelwithcompletemarketsencountersdifficultiesinmatchinginternationalconsumptionandasset pricingdata(Backusetal.,1994,1995).Inparticular,itproduces(i)smoothedassetprices;and(ii)anunrealisticallyhigh levelofinternationalrisk-sharing.AsdiscussedinBackusandSmith(1993),amongothers,thisexcessamountofrisk-sharing givesrisetoaperfectpositiveco-movementbetweenRERandconsumptiondifferentialsaswellasbetweencross-country consumptiongrowthrates.Inaseminalcontribution,Lewis(1996)suggeststhathighdegreesofinternationalrisk-sharing mightbegeneratedbythenon-separabilityoftradableandnon-tradablegoodsintheutilityfunctionemployedinthemodel aswellasbythepresenceofcompletemarkets.Sheconcludesthatcapitalmarketrestrictionsandnon-separabilityareboth requiredtoexplainthelackofinternationalrisk-sharingobservedinthedata.
夽 Thispaperwaspreparedforthe4thEMG-ECBEmergingMarketsGroupConference,CassBusinessSchool(London),May8–9,2014.Wewouldliketo
thankananonymousreferee,PatrickGrüning,andseminarparticipantsatBrunelUniversity,LUISSGuidoCarli,HallInstituteofEconomicResearch,and
the12thINFINITIConferenceonInternationalFinance.Allremainingerrorsareourown.
∗ Correspondingauthorat:ResearchCenterSAFE,GoetheUniversityFrankfurt,Grüneburgplatz1,60323FrankfurtamMain,Germany.
Tel.:+496979833882.
E-mailaddresses:Guglielmo-Maria.Caporale@brunel.ac.uk(G.M.Caporale),michael.donadelli@gmail.com(M.Donadelli),alessia.varani@gmail.com
(A.Varani).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intfin.2014.12.006
Overall,theinternationalrisk-sharingmechanismembodiedinstandardIBCmodelsgivesrisetothreehighlydiscussed internationalmacroeconomicpuzzles:(i)thehighvolatilityoftheRERrelativetothevolatilityofconsumption(RERvolatility puzzle);(ii)thenegativecorrelationbetweentheRERandconsumptiondifferentials(Backus–Smithanomaly);(iii)thelow correlationofconsumptiongrowthacrosscountries(consumptioncorrelationpuzzle).1Further,traditionalmodelswith standardpreferencesdonotaddresstwowellknowndomesticassetpricingpuzzles:(i)theequitypremiumpuzzle,EPP, (MehraandPrescott,1985;Mehra,2003);(ii)therisk-freeratepuzzle(Weil,1989).
Financialintegrationanditsimplicationsfortheresolutionofbothmacroeconomicandassetpricinganomalieshave receivedconsiderableattentioninthemostrecentliterature,muchofitaddressingindividualanomalies(Benignoand Thoenissen,2008;Corsettietal.,2008;Kollmann,2012;Hamano,2013,amongothers).Relativelylittleresearch,however, hasfocusedonthejointresolutionofsomeofthesepuzzles(Bodenstein,2008;ColacitoandCroce,2013).Benignoand Thoenissen(2008)developastandardIBCmodelwithnon-tradedgoodsandincompletemarkets.Theyshowthatunder strongcomplementarybetweendomesticandforeigntradablesthemodelreproducestheBackus–Smithcorrelation. Simi-larly,Corsettietal.(2008)arguethatinternationalfinancialmarketsarenotdevelopedenoughtogeneratefullrisk-sharing andshowthatstandardmacromodelswithincompletemarketsmayaccountfortheBackus–Smithcorrelation.Inparticular, ifthereisahighlevelofcomplementarybetweenexportedandimportedgoods,thenthemodelproducessubstantial move-mentsintheRERaswellasanegativecorrelationbetweentheRERandrelativeconsumption,andreducesthecorrelation betweendomesticandforeignconsumption.However,theseresultsarenotrobusttotheintroductionofasecondtrade asset(seeBenignoandKücük-Tuger,2012).2Kollmann(2012)showsthattheBackus–Smithanomalycanbeexplainedbya simplemodelwhereonlyafractionofhouseholdscantradeassetsfreelyincompletefinancialmarkets.FollowingCorsetti etal.(2008),Thoenissen(2011)showsthatastandardIBCmodelwithincompletemarketsisabletosolvetheRERvolatility puzzle,theRERpersistencepuzzleandtheBackus–Smithanomaly.However,thesuccessofthemodelheavilydependson thechoiceoftheelasticityofsubstitutionbetweendomesticandforeignproducedgoods.Inparticular,therangeofelasticity valuesthatallowsthemodeltoaddressthemacro-puzzlesisverynarrow,suggestingthatthemodel’sperformanceisnot sufficientlyrobust.Bodenstein(2008)developsaninternationalendowmenteconomywithcompleteassetmarketsand limitedenforcementforinternationalfinancialcontractswheretheabilitytoshareriskdependsonthedegreeofpatience oftheagents.Heshowsthat,ifagentsaresufficientlyimpatient(i.e.marketsareincomplete),themodeljointlysolves theRERvolatilitypuzzle,theBackus–Smithanomalyandtheconsumptioncorrelationpuzzle.Inlinewiththesestudies, Hamano(2013)showsthatmarketincompleteness(i.e.aninefficientinternationalrisk-sharingenvironment)iscrucialfor theresolutionoftheconsumption-realexchangerateanomaly.
However,thedebateonwhetherornota“financialautarky”ora“single-bondeconomy”regimesmayrepresentarealistic financialenvironmentisstillopen.Ontheonehand,numerousinternationalfinancestudiesshowthatbothdeveloped andemerging(inparticularBrazil,ChinaandIndia)capitalmarketshave becomeincreasingly integratedoverthelast twodecades(Cheungetal.,2006;LaneandSchmukler,2007;Donadelli,2013;MaandMcCauley,2013;amongothers). Forexample,Fitzgerald(2012)findsthatfinancialrisk-sharingamongdevelopedcountriesisnearlyoptimal.Jappelliand Pistaferri(2011),showthattheincreasingdegreeoffinancialintegrationacrossinternationalfinancialmarketshaslargely improvedhouseholdsconsumptionsmoothing(i.e.risk-sharing).Thissuggeststhateithera“financialautarky”ora “single-bondeconomy”regimescannotbeemployedtomodelthecurrentinternationalcapitalmarketsstructure.Ontheotherhand, sometheoreticalstudiesdirectlyarguethatthesetworegimesdonotrepresentrealisticfinancialenvironments.Crucini (1999)andSantosMonteiro(2008)pointoutthatstandardincompletemarketsmodelsareproblematicbecausetheyare characterizedbylimitedconsumptionrisk-sharingatboththedomesticandinternationallevel.Kollmann(2012)argues thatinternationalcapitalmarketsallowforanalmostfrictionlesstradingactivityinalargevarietyofsecurities(e.g.equities, futures,options,CDS,bonds).HeathcoteandPerri(2002)stressthatanefficientinternationaltradingactivityisimportant forthecross-countrybusinesscycles.
Theaimofthepresentpaperistocomparethemacroeconomicquantitiesandpricesproducedbytwodifferent inter-nationalendowment economies: (i)one in which agents can tradeassets for consumption smoothing purposes only domestically(i.e.financialautarky);and(ii)onewhereallagentsareallowedtoefficientlysharetheirconsumptionriskby tradingincompletefinancialmarkets.Inotherwords,weaskthequestionwhetheralimitedamountofinternationalrisk sharingisnecessarytosimultaneouslysolvetheabovementionedinternationalmacroeconomicanomaliesaswellastwo wellknownassetpricingpuzzles.Inaddition,weexaminewhetherthesepuzzlesexistinthecaseoftheUSandChina,an issuenotpreviouslyinvestigated.
OuranalysisiscarriedoutbyusingtheinternationalendowmenteconomydevelopedbyColacitoandCroce(2010, 2013).Inthiseconomy,(i)homeandforeignagentsdisplayrecursivepreferences;(ii)endowmentprocessesembodya long-runriskcomponentalàBansalandYaron(2004)andareco-integrated(seealsoTretvoll,2013).Inthissetup, capi-talmarketsarecompletebothdomesticallyandinternationally,andagentshavepreferencefordomesticgoods(i.e.home biasinconsumption).Thechoiceofthismodelismotivatedbyseveralfactors:(i)itreflectsaperiodofincreasing finan-cialintegrationbyassumingcompletemarkets;(ii)itcancaptureboth thefirstandsecondmomentsofassetpricing;
1 Foradditionaldetails,seeBodenstein(2008).
2 Specifically,theysay“...theperformanceofthesemodelsworsensconsiderablywhenwemoveawayfromasingle-bondeconomy...”(Benignoand
(iii)itaccountsforconsumptionhomebias(assuggestedbyinternationaltradedata);(iv)itembodiesanovelrisk-sharing mechanismwhichdoesnotrelyonanyfinancialmarketimperfections.
Ourpapercontributestotheexistingliteratureinseveraldimensions.First,itfocusesonUS–Chinadataovertwodifferent periods:(i)the“financialautarkyregimeera”whichrunsfrom1972to1990(beforeChina’sstockmarketliberalization), and(ii)the“internationalcompletemarketsera”whichrunsfrom1991to2009(afterChina’sstockmarket liberaliza-tion).WeobservethattheRERvolatility–consumptionvolatilityratio,theBackus–Smithcorrelationandthecross-country consumptioncorrelationchangedintheaftermathofChina’sequitymarketliberalization.Inparticular,theRER-volatility puzzleandtheBackus–Smithanomalybecamemoreapparentinthemid-90s.Therefore,internationalmacropuzzlesmay arisealsoamongdevelopedandemergingcountries.Second,asinBodenstein(2008),itisaimedataddressingtheRER volatilitypuzzle,theBackus–Smithpuzzleandthelowconsumptioncorrelationpuzzlesimultaneously.Weshowthatthe employedtwocountry/two-goodmodelwithrecursivepreferences,long-runriskandcompletemarketscanaddressthe puzzlessimultaneously,eveniftherearenofinancialmarketimperfections.3Bycontrast,amoderateamountofhomebias inconsumptionisrequired.Third,itexaminestherobustnessofthemodelandshowsthattheresultsholdforarelatively largerangeofparametervalues.Inparticular,realisticchangesintheRRA,IES,consumptionhomebiasparameterand cross-countrylong-runshockscorrelationonlyweaklyaffecttheRER-consumptionvolatilityratio,theBackus–Smithcorrelation andthecross-countryconsumptiongrowthcorrelation.
Therestofthepaperisorganizedasfollows.Section2presentssomestylizedfactsforChinaandtheUS.Section4outlines themodel.Section4discussestheresults.Section5concludes.
2. ThebackgroundoftheUS–Chinarelationship 2.1. WhyUS–China?
Mostinternationalfinance,RBCandIBCstudieshavefocusedexclusivelyondevelopedeconomies(orWestern,Educated, Industrialized,Rich,andDemocratic,WEIRD,societies).AssuggestedbyHeinrichetal.(2010),thesepapersimplicitlyassume thatthereisnovariationacrosscountries(i.e.humanpopulations).However,low–middleincomesocietiesaccountformore than80%oftheWorldpopulation.Inparticular,(i)Chinaaccountsfor20%oftheWorldpopulation;(ii)thesumofUSand ChinaGDPsisalmostonethirdoftheWorld’sGDP.4Atpresent,theliteratureonmacroeconomicanomaliesinemerging economiesisratherthin.Withthisstudy,wealsoaimtofillthisgapatleasttosomeextent.5
TheChinesestockmarketwasclosedfornearlyhalfacenturyandreopenedlessthan25yearsago.Inthelate1980s, Chinatransformedmanystate-owned-enterprisesintostockcompanies.ThefirststockmarketinthehistoryofthePeople’s RepublicofChina,theShanghaiStockExchange,openedonNovember26, 1990.ShenzhenStockExchangeopenedon April11,1991,andinitiallyonlyoneclassofshares(publicAshares)wereallowedtotradeonQualifiedForeignInstitutional Investor(QFII).Thisallowsustoanalyzetwodifferentinternationalcapitalmarketregimes,afinancialautarkyone(i.e.before 1991)andacompletemarketsone(i.e.after1991).Specifically,weestimatetheRERvolatility–consumptionvolatilityratio, correlationbetweenRERandconsumptiondifferentials,andcross-countryconsumptioncorrelationovertwodifferent sub-samples:(i)pre-liberalizationera(i.e.1972–1990);(ii)post-liberalizationera(i.e.1991–2009).Consequently,international macroeconomicquantitiesandpricesarecomputedbyimposingthesetwodifferentregimes.
2.2. US–Chinastylizedfacts
Fig.1suggeststhat thesetwocountrieshavesubstantiallyincreasedtheirdegreeofopennesstowardinternational marketsafter1990,andthatfluctuationsoftheircurrencieshavesignificantlyincreasedaftercapitalmarketliberalizations. ThisisclearfromthedynamicsoftheratiosofthesumofUSandChinatradetoworldtradeandthesumofUS-owned assetsabroadandforeign-ownedassetsintheUStothesumofUSandChina’sGDPs.Bothmeasuresareincreasingover time(Fig.1,top-leftpanel).Wearguethattheincreasingdegreeofintegrationacrossbothequityandgoodsmarketshas alsolargelyinfluencedtheRERvolatility–consumptionvolatilityratioandtheBackus–Smithcorrelation.6Theformerhas increasedsharply(Fig.1,top-rightpanel),whereasthelatterhassignificantlydecreased(Fig.1,bottom-leftpanel).7 The ratiobetweentheRERandconsumptionvolatilityisconstantlyaboveone.Overthepost-liberalizationperiodtheaverage is5.2,amuchhighervaluethantheoneusuallyproducedbystandardmacromodels.ThecorrelationbetweenRERandreal consumptiongrowthdifferentialsdeclinedsharplyimmediatelyafter1990andstartedtobecomenegativeinthemid-90’s
3ThisisinstarkcontrasttoBodenstein(2008),whosemodelrequiresaninefficientinternationalrisk-sharingenvironmenttoaddressmacroeconomic
anomalies.
4Source:WorldDevelopmentIndicators(WorldBank).
5Inthisrespect,ourworkismostcloselyrelatedtoJahan-Parvaretal.(2013).
6DonadelliandParadiso(2014)showthatfullrisk-sharing(i.e.thepresenceofperfectlyintegratedmarkets)tendstoproducearelativelyhighRER volatility.
7TwofactsarenoteworthyforthedynamicsoftheRERvolatility–consumptionvolatilityratioandBackus–Smithcorrelation:(i)theRenminbi(RMB)
hasappreciatedbyalmost38%since1994evenifChinaadoptedafixedexchangerateregime;(ii)amanagedfloatingexchangeratesysteminChinastarted
G.M. Caporale et al. / Int. Fin. Markets, Inst. and Money 36 (2015) 85–99 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Trade and Financial Openness
Trade Financial 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
RER Volatility-Consumption Volatility Ratio
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Backus-Smith Correlation -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Cross-Country Consumption Correlation
Fig.1.Financialandtradeopennessvs.puzzles.Notes:tradeopenness(TO)isdefinedasfollows:TO=EI/GDP,whereEIrepresentsthesumofexportsandimportsoftheUSandChina,andGDPisthesumUS andChinaGDPs.Financialopennessisdefinedasfollows:FO=(USOA+FOA)/GDPwhereUSOAdenoteUS-ownedassetsabroad(i.e.inChina),FOAareChina-ownedassetsintheUnitedStates.Theratiobetween theRERvolatilityandconsumptiongrowthvolatility,thecorrelationbetweentheRERandconsumptiondifferentialsandthecross-countryconsumptioncorrelationarecomputedusingarollingwindowof20 years.DetailsondatasourcesaregiveninAppendixA.
(Fig.1,bottom-leftpanel).Inparticular,itispositiveunderfinancialautarky(0.34overtheperiod1972–1990),andnegative aftertheequitymarketliberalization(−0.56overtheperiod1991–2009).AtoddswiththeresultsofastandardIBCmodel withcompletemarkets,thecorrelationbetweentheUSandChinarealconsumptiongrowthratesiswellbelowone(Fig.1, bottom-rightpanel).However,weobservea sharpincreaseover theperiod1995–2003(i.e.afterliberalization),which appearstobeduetoarapidexpansionoffinancialandtradelinkagesacrosstheUSandChina(Fig.1,top-leftpanel).Still, theconsumptioncorrelationpuzzleseemstobemoresevereifemerginganddevelopedeconomiesarejointlyconsidered. 3. Themodel
ThissectiondescribesaninternationalendowmenteconomyalongthelinesofColacitoandCroce(2010,2013).Many elementsofthemodelarestandardinthelong-runriskliterature(seeforexampleBansalandYaron,2004;Bansaletal., 2012;andBeelerandCampbell,2012)aswellasintheIBCliterature(seeforexampleTretvoll,2013andGrüning,2014). Whatisnewisthatpricesandquantitiesarecomputedunderseveralscenarios,which,amongothers,includedifferent degreesofeconomicandfinancialintegration,andcross-countrylong-runshockscomovement.Thisallowsustotestthe robustnessofthemodelinaddressingmacroeconomicanomalies.
3.1. Consumptionstructure
Theeconomycomprisestwocountries,home(H)andforeign(F),andtwogoodsGhandGf.Thehome(foreign)countryis
endowedwithgoodGH(GF).Inourworld,thehomecountryistheUS.Theagents’preferencesaredefinedoveraconsumption
aggregateofbothhomeandforeigngoods.Formally, Ch,t=(gh,th ) ˛ (gf,th)1−˛ (1a) Cf,t=(gh,tf ) 1−˛ (gf f,t) ˛ (1b) whereCh,t(Cf,t)istheconsumptionaggregateinthehome(foreign)country,gh,th (gfh,t)andgf,th (gf,tf )denotethe
consump-tionofgoodGhandgoodGfinthehome(foreign)countryattimet,and˛∈(0,1)representsthehomebiasparameter.
3.2. Preferences
3.2.1. Standardpreferences
First,asincanonicalstudies,weassumestandardpreferences:
Uh,t= Ch,t1−−1 1− (2a) Uf,t= Cf,t1−−1 1− (2b)
wherecapturesrelativeriskaversion(RRA). 3.2.2. Recursivepreferences
Inthesecondpartofouranalysisweturnourattentiontoascenariowherehouseholdsareequippedwithrecursive preferences: Uh,t=[(1−ı)(Ch,t)1−/+ıEt[(Uh,t+1)(1−)] 1/ ] /1− (3a) Uf,t=[(1−ı)(Cf,t)1−/+ıEt[(Uf,t+1)(1−)] 1/ ] /1− (3b) where 0<ı<1isthesubjectivediscount factorand ı−1−1therateoftime preference,=1−/1−1/ ,and is the intertemporalelasticityofsubstitution.Inthissetup,if−1/ >0,householdscareaboutfutureuncertainty.8
8Thispreferencespecificationisconsistentwithrecentexperimentalstudies.Specifically,therecentexperimentalworkofBrownandKim(2014)reveals
thatmostsubjectsdisplayrelativeriskaversiongreaterthanthereciprocaloftheelasticityofintertemporalsubstitution,confirmingthattheyexhibit
3.3. Endowments
AsinTretvoll(2013),endowmentsarecointegratedprocesses.Inaddition,theyembodyalong-runriskcomponent. Formally,
logGh,t=+ωh,t−1+(logGf,t−1−logGh,t−1)+
SRh,tlogGf,t =+ωf,t−1+(logGh,t−1−logGf,t−1)+
SRf,tωh,t = hωh,t−1+
LRh,tωf,t = fωf,t−1+
LRf,t.(4)
whereisthelong-runendowmentgrowthrate,∈(0,1)denotestheco-integrationparameter,ωh,tandωf,tarehighly
persistentAR(1)processes,
SRh,tand
SRf,tareshort-runshocks,andh,tLR andLRf,tarelong-runshocks.Shocksaredistributedasfollows
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
SR h,t SR f,t LR h,t LR f,t⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
∼i.i.d.N
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎝
0 0 0 0⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
0 ,
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
2 SR h SR h, SR f 0 0 SR f , SR h 2 SR f 0 0 0 0 2 LR h LR h, LR f 0 0 LR f , LR h 2 LR f⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
whereisvectorofshocksandrepresentsthevariance–covariancematrixofthecross-countryshort-andlong-run shocks.
3.4. Capitalmarketstructureandoptimalallocations 3.4.1. Financialautarky
AssuggestedbyColeandObstfeld(1991),inafinancialautarkyregimetradeinthegoodsmarkettakesplaceanditmust bebalancedineveryperiod.Formally,thebudgetconstraintforthehomeandforeigncountry:
gh
h,t+ptgf,th =Gh,t (5a)
gh,tf +ptgf,tf =ptGy,t (5b)
whereptisthepriceofgoodGf,tintermsofgoodGh,t.Underfinancialautarkyagentscannottradesecuritiesinternationally.
Inpractice,marketsarecompleteonlydomestically.Therefore,thereisnoroomforinternationalconsumptionsmoothing. Thiscapitalmarketstructuregivesrisetothefollowingoptimalallocation
gh
h,t=˛Gh,t,gh,tf =(1−˛)Gh,t (6a)
gf,th =(1−˛)Gf,t,gff,t=˛Gf,t (6b)
Inthissetup,therealexchangerateissimplyrepresentedbythehome-biasadjustedcurrentrelativesupplyofthehome andforeigngoods.Formally,
et=(2˛−1)(gh,t−gf,t)≡ch−cf (7)
3.4.2. Completemarkets
Inordertoemphasizethattheresolutionofthepuzzlesdoesnotrelyonanyfinancialmarketimperfections,wealso accountforcompleteandfrictionlessmarkets(i.e.fullrisk-sharing).Completemarketsarealmostinvariablyassumedin internationalfinanceandIBCstudies(ColacitoandCroce,2010;Readyetal.,2013,amongothers).Suchenvironmentis supportedbyrecentstudiesshowingthatrisk-sharingviafinancialmarketsisnearlyoptimal,andthattradefrictionsin goodsmarketsarenotnegligible(Fitzgerald,2012).However,thedebateonwhetheremerginganddevelopedfinancial marketsarefullyintegratedisstillopen.OnemayarguethattheUS–Chinacapitalmarketarestillincompleteandembody frictions.Anyhow,similartootherworks(seeBacchettaandvanWincoop,2013;Readyetal.,2013;Tretvoll,2013),the modelaccountsforpartialrisk-sharingbymeansofgoodmarketsfrictions.
Undermarketcompletenessthefollowinghomeandforeignbudgetconstraintshold: gh,th +ptgf,th +
st+1gh,tf +ptgff,t+
st+1
Pt+1(st+1)Af,t+1(st+1)≤ptGf,t+Af,t (8b)
whereAh,t(st)(Af,t(st))denotestheclaimofcountryhome(foreign)totimetconsumption ofgoodGh,t,and Pt+1 isthe
state-contingentprice(i.e.thepriceofoneunitoft+1consumptioncontingentontherealizationofst+1attimet+1).In
equilibrium,thefollowingholds: Ah,t+Af,t=0
∀
t.Theefficientallocationisthesolutionofaplanner’sproblemchoosingasequenceofallocations{gh
h,t,gh,tf ,gf,th,gf,tf } +∞ t=0to
maximize
Q=WhUh,0+WfUf,0
subjecttothefollowingfeasibilityconstraints: gh,th +gh,tf =Gh,t; ghf,t+g
f
f,t=Gf,t
∀
t≥0whereWhandWfarethedatet=0non-negativeParetoweightsattachedtotheconsumerbytheplanner.Byassuming
St=Wh,t/Wf,t,thefirstorderconditionsofthesocialplanningproblemgiverisetothefollowingoptimalallocation9
gh h,t=˛Gh,t
1+(1−˛)(St−1) 1−˛+˛St , gf h,t=(1−˛)Gh,t
1+ ˛(St−1) 1−˛+˛St (9a) gf,th =(1−˛)Gf,t
1+ ˛(St−1) ˛+(1−˛)St , gf,tf =˛Gf,t
1+(1−˛)(St−1) ˛+(1−˛)St (9b) where St=St−1MMh,t f,t ech,t ecf,t
andMh,t(Mf,t)isthehome(foreign)stochasticdiscountfactor.Inthepresenceoffullfinancialintegration,theRERgrowth
isequaltothedifferencebetweenthelogoftheforeignanddomesticstochasticdiscountfactors.
e=logMf,t−logMh,t (10)
3.5. Thestochasticdiscountfactor 3.5.1. Standardpreferences
CRRApreferencesimplythefollowingstochasticdiscountfactor Mh,t+1=ı
Ch,t+1 Ch,t − (11a) Mf,t+1=ı Cf,t+1 Cf,t − (11b) forthehomeandforeigncountry,respectively.3.5.2. Recursivepreferences
AsshowninEpsteinandZin(1989),thestochasticdiscountfactorinthehomeandforeigncountrytakesthefollowing form Mh,t+1=ı
Ch,t+1 Ch,t −(1/ ) U1− h,t+1 Et[Uh,t+11− ] (1/ −)/(1−) (12a) Mf,t+1=ı Cf,t+1 Cf,t −(1/ ) U1− f,t+1 Et[Uf,t+11− ] (1/ −)/(1−) (12b)9ThedetailedsolutionoftheParetoproblemassociatedwiththiseconomycanbefoundinColacitoandCroce(2013).Forasimilarproblem,seealso
Table1
Benchmarkcalibration.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Endowmentlong-rungrowthrate 2.00% ˛ Consumptionhome-bias 0.97
SR
Short-runshockvolatility 1.87% Co-integrationparameter 0.055%
LR
Long-runshockvolatility 4.4%SR ı Subjectivediscountfactor 0.9825
h, f Long-runcomponentpersistence 0.985 RRA 8
LR h
LR f
Long-runshockscorrelation 0.90 IES 1.5
SR h
SR f
Short-runshockscorrelation 0.05
4. Calibrationandresults
RecentIBCstudiesarguethatinternationalconsumptionandfinancialrisksharingisincomplete(HeathcoteandPerri,
2002;Bodenstein,2008;Corsettietal.,2008;DevereuxandYetman,2010;Kollmann,2012,amongothers).Forthisreason, canonicalmacromodelswithcompletemarketsdonotaddressclassicinternationalmacroeconomicpuzzles.Inaddition, byassumingstandardpreferences,frictionlessandcompletemarkets,thisclassofmodelsinheritsalldomesticassetpricing puzzles.Inthissection,wedemonstratethat,ifagentshaverecursivepreferencesandthereisarelativelyhighpositive cross-countrylong-runshockscorrelationandhomebiasinconsumption,marketincompletenessandfinancialfrictionsare notnecessarytoaddresstheaforementionedmacroeconomicpuzzles.Inthissetup,wealsosolvedomesticassetpricing puzzles.However,ifagent’spreferencesarerepresentedbypowerutility,thepresenceofcompletemarketsonlyallowsfor theresolutionoftheRERvolatilitypuzzle.
4.1. Benchmarkcalibration
Wecalibratetheparametersofthelong-runriskcomponents,ωh,tandωf,t,inlinewiththelong-runriskliterature.
Inparticular,wefixthepersistenceofωh,tandωf,ttobe h= f=0.985asinColacitoandCroce(2010),andLR tobea
smallpercentageofthestandarddeviationofendowment(i.e.LR
=0.044SR ).Cross-countryshort-andlong-runnewsare
correlatedasinColacitoandCroce(2010).AsinTretvoll(2013)andColacitoandCroce(2013),thecointegrationparameter isassumedtobeverysmall.Weset=0.055%.Theconsumptionhomebiasparameter,˛,isequalto0.97,suggestingthat agentsinthedomesticcountryconsumeonly3%offoreigngoods(i.e.3%oftotalconsumptionisrepresentedbyimported goods).10Giventheobservedgrowthininternationaltradesincethe80sthisvaluemayappearunrealistic.However,the averageratiobetweenUSimportsfromChinaandUStotalconsumptionisaround2%overtheperiod1999–2009(source: bea.gov).Itturnsoutthatthechoiceof˛=0.97fitsourUS–Chinaworld,andislinewiththebenchmarkcalibrationofColacito andCroce(2013).11ThisparameterchoiceisalsoinlinewithErcegetal.(2008)whoshowthatforeignconsumptiongoods accountforonly3–5%oftheUSconsumption.Alltheotherparameters(i.e.,ı,, )arecalibratedfollowingstandard long-runriskstudies(BansalandYaron,2004;Bansaletal.,2012;Pancrazi,2014)(Table1).
4.2. Results:financialautarkyvs.marketcompleteness
Toexaminetheroleofthenovelrisk-sharingmechanismembodiedinthemodel,wecomparetheresultsobtainedin aninternationalcompletemarketsregime(i.e.post-liberalization)withthoseobtainedunderfinancialautarky(i.e. pre-liberalization).First,wepresenttheresultsofthemodelwithstandardpreferencesandbothlong-runriskandnolong-run risk.Second,weturnourattentiontothemodelwithrecursivepreferences.12
4.2.1. Standardpreferences
Underfinancialautarky,theratioofdomesticandforeignconsumptiondeterminestheRERratebetweentwocountries (seeEq.(7)).ItturnsoutthatthecorrelationbetweenconsumptiondifferentialsandtheRERequalsunity.Becauseofstandard preferences,thisholdseveniftherearecompletemarkets.Ofcourse,fullrisk-sharingtendstoproduceahighdegreeof comovementbetweendomesticandforeignconsumptiongrowthrates.Itisalsowellknownthattraditionalmacromodels withpowerutilitydonotaddressdomesticassetpricingpuzzles.WereviewmostofthesefindingsinTable2,whichreports internationalmacroeconomicquantitiesandpricesestimatedoverthepre-andpost-liberalizationperiodsalongwiththe resultsforthebenchmarkcalibrationfortwodifferentcapitalmarketstructures(i.e.financialautarkyandcompletemarkets), bothinthepresenceandabsenceoflong-runrisk.
10 AmoderateamountofconsumptionhomebiascanbefoundalsoinThoenissen(2011)andCorsettietal.(2008),whointroducepreferencestowards
domesticgoodsinastandardIBCmodelwithincompletemarkets.
11 Foradetaileddiscussionontheroleofhome-biasinconsumptionandequityinaIBCcontext,seeTretvoll(2008).
Table2
Modelvs.data:macroeconomicquantitiesandprices.Notes:thistablereportstheaverageequitypremium,ERP,risk-freerate,E(Rf),realexchangerate
volatility–consumptiongrowthvolatilitypuzzle,(e)/(c),thecross-countryconsumptiongrowthcorrelation,Corr(ch,cf),andtheBackus–Smith
correlation,Corr(ch−cf,e),simulatedunderdifferentinternationalcapitalmarketstructures.Theriskpremiumisnotlevered.Allparametersare
calibratedtothevaluesreportedinTable1.Withno-LRRthelong-runshockvolatilityandthecross-countrylong-runshockcorrelationsarere-calibrated,
LR
=0and SR h
SR f
=0.35.Momentsareobtainedfromrepetitionsofsmall-samplesimulations.TheERPandE(Rf)areannualizedandexpressedin
percentagepoints.Thepre-liberalizationperiodrunsfrom1972to1990.Thepost-liberalizationperiodrunsfrom1991to2009.Detailsondatasources
aregiveninAppendixA.
Model Data (1) (2) Data (3) (4)
CRRA US–China (Pre-Lib) Financialautarky (noLRR) Financialautarky (withLRR) US–China (Post-Lib) Completemarkets (noLRR) Completemarkets (withLRR) Macroquantities (e)/(c) 4.869 1.115 1.128 5.259 5.276 5.094 Corr(ch,cf) 0.112 0.404 0.392 0.016 0.784 0.799 Corr(ch−cf,e) 0.338 1.000 1.000 −0.557 1.000 1.000 Assetprices ERP 4.357 0.248 −0.207 7.542 0.190 −0.281 E(Rf) 1.458 16.686 15.921 0.999 16.850 16.078
InlinewiththedynamicsreportedinFig.1,weobservethat(i)theRERvolatilityinthepost-liberalizationeraishigherthan
inthepre-liberalizationera(i.e.5.259vs.4.869);(ii)thecorrelationbetweentheRERandconsumptiongrowthdifferentials ispositiveovertheperiod1972–1990(i.e.0.338)andnegativeovertheperiod1991–2009(i.e.−0.557).
Asexpected,ifbothdomesticandforeignagentsarenotallowedtoefficientlysharetheirconsumptionriskbytradingin completefinancialmarkets,themodeldoesnotproducearealisticRERvolatility.Specifically,underfinancialautarky,the RERvolatility–consumptionvolatilityratioproducedbythemodelisjustaboveone(i.e.1.115and1.128inthemodelwith nolong-runriskandwithlong-runrisk,respectively).Ofcourse,financialautarkygivesrisealsotoarelativelylow cross-countryconsumptioncorrelation.Inotherwords,specifications(1)and(2)inTable2canonlyaccountfortherelativelylow cross-countryconsumptiongrowthcorrelationinthedata.
Differently,ifallagentscanefficientlysharetheirconsumptionriskbytradingincompletefinancialmarkets,themodel producesamuchhigherRERvolatility.Thelatterisfivetimehigherthanconsumptionvolatility,allowingthemodelto addresstheRERvolatilitypuzzle(seespecifications(3)and(4)inTable2).Theresultisinstarkcontrasttothefindings ofHeathcoteandPerri(2002)andBodenstein(2008).Undercompletemarketstheinternationalproductioneconomyof HeathcoteandPerri(2002)generatesextremelylowRERvolatility.13Similarly,theendowmenteconomyofBodenstein (2008)withcompletemarketsproducesaclosetounityRERvolatility–consumptionvolatilityratio.14However,thepresence offullrisk-sharingtendstogenerateastrongerpositivecross-countryconsumptioncomovement(i.e.0.784and0.799in themodelwithnolong-runriskandwithlong-runrisk,respectively).Thissuggeststhatthemodelcannotaccountforthe lowcross-countryconsumptioncorrelationintheUS–Chinamacroeconomicdata.15Becauseofstandardpreferences,the modeldoesnotaddresstheBackus–Smithanomalyanddomesticassetpricingpuzzles.Inotherwords,forallspecifications, itproduces(i)aperfectpositivecorrelationbetweenRERandconsumptiondifferentials;(ii)anunrealisticallyhighrisk-free rate;(iii)analmostzeroERP.16
4.2.2. Recursivepreferences
Table3reportsdataontheUSandChinaforthepre-andpost-liberalizationperiodsalongwiththemacroquantities andpricesproducedbythemodelwithrecursivepreferencesforthebenchmarkcalibrationfortwodifferentcapitalmarket structures(i.e.financialautarkyandcompletemarkets),bothwithandwithoutlong-runrisk.
On the one hand, similarly to the economy with standard preferences, under financial autarky, the RER volatility–consumptionvolatilityratioisclosetoone(i.e.1.115and1.128intheeconomywithnolong-runriskand long-runrisk,respectively)whereasinthedataitisclosetofive(i.e.4.869).17Inaddition,thecorrelationbetweentheRERand consumptiondifferentialequalsunitybothinthemodelwithandwithoutlong-runrisk.Inthisregimeresourcesdonotflow
13TheyobtainaRERvolatility–consumptionvolatilityratioequalto0.86,threetimeslowerthanthevaluesuggestedbytheirempiricalmoments(i.e.
2.76).WestressthattheydonotmatchtheRERvolatilitypuzzleevenifthereisaninefficientinternationalrisk-sharingenvironment(i.e.financialautarky
regimeorsingle-bondeconomy).TheyobtainaRERvolatility–consumptionvolatilityratioequalto1.97and0.94,respectively.Bothvaluesarestilllower
thanthe2.76theyobservedinthedata.
14Whenmarketsarecomplete(i.e.agentsarepatient⇒subjectivediscountfactorapproachesone)theinternationalendowmenteconomyofBodenstein
(2008)producesaratioequalto1.2.However,theinternationalmacro-datasuggestavaluearound5.
15Westressthatinbothcapitalmarketsregimestheresultsproducedbythemodelwithandwithoutlong-runrisk,respectively,areverysimilar.Loosely
speaking,long-runriskplaysakeyroleonlyifagentshavepreferencesforearlyresolutionofuncertainty.
16Noticethatthepre-andpost-liberalizationUSERPisequalto4.36%and7.54%,respectively.Thisgapreflectsboththegreatmoderationandthedot-com
bubbleyears,andconfirmsthattheUSERPembodiesastrongtime-varyingcomponent.
17Kollmann(2015)showsthatthisresultholdsevenifasinglebondistradedinternationally.Hearguesthatthecombinationoflong-runproductivity
shocksandrecursivepreferencesgivesrisetoarealisticRERvolatility,onlyifthereisasufficientamountofinternationalrisk-sharing.Therefore,amodel
Table3
Modelvs.data:macroeconomicquantitiesandprices.Notes:thistablereportstheaverageequitypremium,ERP,risk-freerate,Rf,realexchangerate
volatility–consumptiongrowthvolatilitypuzzle,(e)/(c),thecross-countryconsumptiongrowthcorrelation,Corr(ch,cf),andtheBackus–Smith
correlation,Corr(ch−cf,e),simulatedunderdifferentinternationalcapitalmarketstructures.Theriskpremiumisnotlevered.Allparametersare
calibratedtothevaluesreportedinTable1.Withno-LRRthelong-runshockvolatilityandthecross-countrylong-runshockcorrelationsarere-calibrated,
LR
=0and SR h
SR f
=0.35.Momentsareobtainedfromrepetitionsofsmall-samplesimulations.TheERPandE(Rf)areannualizedandexpressedin
percentagepoints.Thepre-liberalizationperiodrunsfrom1972to1990.Thepost-liberalizationperiodrunsfrom1991to2009.Detailsondatasources
aregiveninAppendixA.
Model Data (1) (2) Data (3) (4)
EZ US–China (Pre-Lib) Financialautarky (noLRR) Financialautarky (withLRR) US–China (Post-Lib) Completemarkets (noLRR) Completemarkets (withLRR) Macroquantities (e)/(c) 4.869 1.115 1.128 5.259 5.112 7.595 Corr(ch,cf) 0.112 0.404 0.392 0.016 0.768 0.578 Corr(ch−cf,e) 0.338 1.000 1.000 −0.557 1.000 −0.145 Assetprices ERP 4.357 0.237 2.610 7.542 0.189 2.470 E(Rf) 1.458 2.892 1.646 0.999 2.926 1.747 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 −2 0 2 x 10−3 Endowment 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 −2 0 2 x 10−3 RER 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 −2 0 2 x 10−3
Consumption United States China
Fig.2.Impulseresponsefunctions:financialautarky.Notes:thisfigureshowstheimpulseresponsefunctionsofendowment,exchangerateanddomestic (blackline)andforeign(pinkline)consumptiontoalong-runpositivenewstothesupplyoftheUSgood.(Forinterpretationofthereferencestocolorin thistext,thereaderisreferredtothewebversionofthearticle.)
fromthelow-marginalutilitycountrytothehigh-marginalutilityoneforconsumptionsmoothingpurposes.Inpractice,
followingpositivelong-runnewsregardingthesupplyofthedomesticgoods,agentsinthehomecountryhavenoaccessto
internationalfinancialmarketsinordertobuyinsuranceassets,and,therefore,giveuppartoftheirresources.Thisimplies
that,underfinancialautarky,foreignconsumptiondoesnotmovefromt+1onwardanddomesticconsumptionmoves
symmetricallywiththeRER(seemiddleandbottompanelsofFig.2).
Asiswellknown,recursivepreferencesallowtoseparatetheRRAparameterfromtheIES.Suchseparabilityisanecessary conditiontomatchassetpricingdata(BansalandYaron,2004;Bansaletal.,2012;BeelerandCampbell,2012;Pancrazi,2014). Therefore,incontrasttotheeconomywithstandardpreferences,specification(2)inTable3producesasizableERPanda relativelylowrisk-freerate(consistentwithassetpricingdata).18
Thepresence offullrisk-sharing in themodelwithoutlong-run risk onlyaffects theRER volatilitywhich is more thanfivetimestheconsumptionvolatility (consistentwithUS–Chinapost-liberalizationdata).Therefore, specification (3)inTable3addressesonlytheRERvolatilitypuzzle.Thisbecausethenovelrisksharingmechanismembodiedinthe
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 0 1 2 3 x 10−3 Endowment 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 −0.1 0 0.1 SWC 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 −0.02 0 0.02 Consumption 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 −0.05 0 0.05 RER
United States China
Fig.3.Impulseresponsefunctions:completemarkets.Notes:thisfigureshowstheimpulseresponsefunctionsofendowment,shareofworldconsumption,
exchangerateanddomestic(blackline)andforeign(pinkline)consumptiontoalong-runpositivenewstothesupplyoftheUSgood.(Forinterpretation
ofthereferencestocolorinthistext,thereaderisreferredtothewebversionofthearticle.)
two-country/two-goodmodelwithrecursivepreferencesandcompletemarketsproducesendogenoustimevariationinthe distributionofconsumptionandcurrencyriskacrosscountries.Itturnsoutthatthecombinationofrecursivepreferences, completeandfrictionlessmarkets,andlong-runriskcansimultaneouslyaddressthethreeinternationalmacroeconomic anomaliesaswellasthedomesticassetpricingpuzzles(seespecification(4)inTable3).Inthisenvironment,risk-sharing takesplacethroughimportsandexports(i.e.endowmentsflowfromthelow-marginalutilitycountrytothehigh-marginal utilityone).Forexample,followingpositivelong-runnewsonthesupplyofthedomesticgood,thereisalong-lastingimpact onthedomesticmarginalutility.Thisimpliesthatdomesticagentswillsteadilydecreasetheirshareofworldconsumption (viaexports)fromtimet+1onward(aslong-runnewsdoesnotaffectcurrentconsumption).Itturnsoutthatdomestic consumptiondecreasesandforeignconsumptionincreases.Becauseoftheexcesssupplyofthedomesticgood,theRER depreciates.ThelasttwoeffectsarekeytoreplicatetheBackus–Smithanomaly.ThisisclearfromFig.3,whichshows theimpulseresponsefunctionsofendowment,shareofworldconsumption,RERanddomesticandforeignconsumption followinglong-runnewsonthesupplyofthehomegood.Westressthatinthisinternationalendowmenteconomyagents areaversetobothconsumptionandutilityrisk.Thismeansthattheyarewillingtoexchangepartoftheircurrentresourcesin ordertoinsurethemselvesagainstvariationsinfutureutility.Therefore,inthepresenceoflong-runnews,domesticagents willreducetheirshareofworldconsumptiontobuyinsuranceassetsinthefinancialmarkets.Thismechanismgeneratesa substantialamountofpressureonthecurrencyandsignificantlyaffectsassetprices.Consequently,themodelwithrecursive preferences,completemarketsandlong-runriskproducesamuchhigherRERvolatility(seealsoDonadelliandParadiso, 2014).19Infact,theRERvolatility–consumptionvolatilityratiojumpstoavalueof7.595(seespecification(4)inTable3).20 4.3. Asensitivityanalysis
Table4reportsquantitiesandpricesproducedbythemodelfordifferentvaluesoftheRRA(seespecification(2)),,the IES(seespecification(3)), ,consumptionhomebias(seespecification(4)),˛,cross-countrylong-runshockscorrelation (seespecification(5)), LR
h LR f
,andthesubjectivediscountfactor(seespecification(6)),ı.Thefirstcolumn(i.e.specification (1))reportstheresultsforthebenchmarkcalibration(asinthelastcolumnofTable3).ThelastcolumnofTable4reports theempiricalmomentsforthepost-liberalizationperiod(consistentwithaninternationalcompletemarketsregime).The
19ThisresultsisinlinewithKollmann(2015)whoshowsthatalong-runrisk,recursive-preferencesmodelcanreproducearealisticRERvolatilityeven
ifonlyafractionofhouseholdsisallowedtotradeincompletemarkets.
20Noticethatthemodelproducesalsoanon-closetounitycross-countryequitymarketreturnscorrelation(seeDonadelliandParadiso,2014).This
Table4
Modelvs.data:asensitivityanalysisonmacroeconomicquantitiesandprices.Notes:thistablereportstheequitypremium,ERP,therisk-freerate,E(Rf),
realexchangeratevolatility–consumptiongrowthratevolatilitypuzzle,(e)/(c),thecross-countryconsumptiongrowthcorrelation,Corr(ch,cf),
andtheBackus–Smithcorrelation,Corr(ch−cf,e).TheERPandE(Rf)areannualizedandexpressedinpercentagepoints.Theriskpremiumisnot
levered.CM≡CompleteMarkets.EZ≡RecursivePreferences.SV≡modelwithStochasticVolatility.Momentsareobtainedfromrepetitionsofsmall-sample
simulations.DetailsondatasourcesaregiveninAppendixA.
Model(LRR) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Data CM(EZ) BM RRA↑ =10 IES↑ =2 ˛↓ ˛=0.9 CORR↓ LR h LR f = 0.75 ı↓ ı=0.96 ↓ =0 SV (Post-Lib) Macroquantities (e)/(c) 7.595 9.428 9.525 3.053 9.381 2.62 7.17 9.707 5.259 Corr(ch,cf) 0.578 0.510 0.631 0.484 −0.012 0.69 0.60 0.196 0.016 Corr(ch−cf,e) −0.145 −0.418 −0.304 −0.517 −0.639 −0.12 −0.15 −0.583 −0.557 Assetprices ERP 2.470 3.153 4.760 2.434 2.305 0.76 2.47 3.099 7.542 E(Rf) 1.747 1.408 0.700 1.773 1.843 4.91 1.75 0.081 0.999
RERvolatility,thecross-countryconsumptiongrowthcorrelationandtheBackus–Smithanomalyareweaklyaffectedby
differentRRAandIESvalues.Thesubjectivediscountfactor,thecoefficientofriskaversionandtheintertemporalelasticityof
substitutionrepresentrisk-sharingbasedparameters.Inpractice,theycontrolagent’swillingnesstosharerisk.Thisimplies
thatchangesintheseparameterstendtoaffectmainlytheagents’utilityfunctionbutleavethesetoffeasibleallocations
unchanged.Inotherwords,differentvaluesofı,and altermainlytheERPandtherisk-freerate.Asisstandardinthe
long-runriskliterature(BansalandYaron,2004;Pancrazi,2014),ahigherRRAorIESproducesahigherERPaswellasa
higherRERvolatility–consumptionvolatilityratio.Theexplanationisstraightforward.WithhigherRRAorIESvalues,agents becomemoreriskaversetoconsumptionandutilityriskandtheirwillingnesstobuyinsuranceassetsininternational capitalmarkets(forconsumptionsmoothing)increases.Therefore,assetpriceschangeandthecurrencybecomesmuch morevolatile.
Byassumingsufficientlyimpatientagents(i.e.ı=0.96),themodelisstillabletoproduceahighRERvolatility,anegative correlationbetweenRERandconsumptiondifferentials,andarelativelylowcross-countryconsumptioncorrelation.More myopicagentstendtoplacelessweightonthedistantfuture.Doingso,theycarelessaboutuncertaintyonfutureutility.As aresult,tradingactivitydecreases(i.e.(e)↓)andtheyaskforalowerequitypremium(i.e.ERP↓).Theseresultsareinline withthoseofBodenstein(2008).However,inthismodelthereisfullfinancialrisk-sharingwhereasintheBodenstein(2008)’s endowmenteconomyfinancialmarketsarecompletebuttheenforcementofinternationalfinancialcontractsislimited(i.e. agentscannotshareriskefficiently).Bycontrast,ifcontractenforcementisnotlimitedandagentsarenotimpatient,the modelbehavesasastandardIBCmodelwithcompletemarkets,thatis,itproducesaRERvolatility–consumptionvolatility ratioclosetoone,ahighercross-countryconsumptioncorrelation,andthecorrelationbetweenRERandrelativeconsumption isequaltoone.AsinBodenstein(2008),wefindthatahigherdegreeofeconomicintegration(i.elowerconsumptionhome bias–˛closerto0.5),leadstoadecreaseintheRERvolatility,andtoahigher(negative)correlationbetweentheRERand consumptiondifferentialscomparedtothebenchmarkcalibration.
Overall,theentriesinTable4suggestthattheparameterspaceof, ,˛, LR h
LR f
andıallowingthemodeltosolvethethree classicinternationalmacroeconomicpuzzlesisrelativelylarge.Notealsothatthemodel’sperformanceispreservedevenif theendowmentprocessesarenotcointegrated(i.e.=0).Themodelfailsifthecorrelationbetweendomesticandforeign long-runinnovationsissignificantlylowerthaninthebenchmarkcalibration.Inthiscase,itproducesanegativecorrelation betweenconsumptiongrowthrates,butstilladdressestheRERvolatilityandtheBackus–Smithpuzzleaswellasthedomestic assetpricingpuzzles.Itisnoteworthythatitproducesanegativecorrelationratherthanacorrelationclosetounity(asin standardmacromodels).Therefore,inouropinion,it“partiallyfails”.21Westressthatifthecorrelationbetweendomestic andforeignlong-runshocksrangesfrom0.9(benchmarkcalibration)to0.76,theperformanceofthemodelisnotaffected, thatis,itstillsolvesthefivepuzzlessimultaneously.ThisisclearfromFig.4,whichplotstheRERvolatility–consumption volatilityratio,(e)/(c),thecorrelationbetweentheRERandconsumptiondifferentials,Corr(ch−cf,e),the
cross-countryconsumptiongrowthcorrelation,Corr(ch,cf),forvariousvaluesofthecross-countrylong-runshockscorrelation
(onthehorizontalaxes), LR h
LR f
,byassuming˛=0.97(Panela)and˛=0.9(Panelb).22
Finally,specification(8)inTable4suggeststhatstochasticvolatilitydoesnotaffectmuchthemodel’sperformance.23 Tworesultsarenoteworthy.First,andnotsurprisingly,themodelwithstochasticvolatilityproducesahigherERPaswellas ahigherRERvolatility.Second,itallowsforamuchlowercross-countryconsumptioncorrelation.Thecorrelationisalmost threetimeslowerthantheoneproducedinthebenchmarkmodel(i.e.0.196vs.0.578).However,thisismoreconsistentwith
21 ThisisinlinewithUS–Chinaconsumptiondataoverspecificperiods(seeFig.1,bottom-rightpanel).
22 Noticethatthemodelproducesacross-countryconsumptioncorrelationlowerthananempiricalcross-countryGDPcorrelation(seedottedblueline
inFig.4).Thisholdsiftheparameterspaceof LR
h LR f
isquitenarrow.
Caporale et al. / Int. Fin. Markets, Inst. and Money 36 (2015) 85–99 97
Fig.4.Puzzlesvs.cross-countrycorrelationinthelong-runinnovations:alpha=0.97(Panela)andalpha=0.90(Paneb).Notes:Thisfigurereportstherealexchangeratevolatility–consumptionvolatilityratio, (e)/(c),thecorrelationbetweentherealexchangerateandconsumptiondifferentials,Corr(ch−cf,e),thecross-countryconsumptiongrowthcorrelation,Corr(ch,cf),forvariousvaluesofthe correlationbetweenlong-runendowmentshocks, LR
h LR f
,from0.62to0.9(Panela),andfrom0.74to0.9(Panelb).ThedottedbluelinerepresentsthecorrelationbetweentheUSandChinaGDPgrowthrates (post-liberalizationsample:1991–2009).Momentsareobtainedfromrepetitionsofsmall-samplesimulations.
US–Chinapost-liberalizationdata,whichsuggestacorrelationof0.016.Overall,stochasticvolatilityimprovesrisk-sharing. Asaresults,itbringsusclosertothecorrelationbetweentheRERandconsumptiondifferentialsobservedintheUS–China dataovertheperiod1991–2009.
5. Concludingremarks
EarlyIBCstudiesshowthatastandardmodelwithinternationalcompletemarketsdoesnotaccountfortherelativelyhigh RERvolatility,thenegativecorrelationbetweenRERandconsumptiondifferentialsandthelowcross-countryconsumption correlationinthedata.Theyarguethatsuchfailureisduetothefactthatmarketcompletenessproducesanunrealistically highlevelofrisk-sharing.Therefore,morerecentIBCstudiesarguethatalowerdegreeofinternationalrisk-sharingseems tobeanecessaryconditiontosolveinternationalmacroeconomicpuzzles.Theyrelyoninternationalincompletemarket regimes(e.g.“financialautarky”and“single-bondeconomy”)orfinancialmarketimperfections(e.g.“borrowingcontraints” and“limitedenforcement”).
Thispapercomparestheinternationalquantitiesandpricesgeneratedunderfinancialautarky(withstandardand recur-sivepreferences)withthoseunderinternationalcompletemarkets(withstandardandrecursivepreferences).For this purposeitusesaninternationalendowmenteconomywithfrictionlessmarkets,highlycorrelatedlong-runinnovations andpreferencestowardsdomesticgoods,andreliesonUS–Chinamacroeconomicdata.Theanalysissuggeststhatthe RER-volatilitypuzzle,theBackus–Smithanomalyandtheconsumptioncorrelationpuzzlecanbemoreorlesspronouncedunder differentcapitalmarketregimes.Inparticular,weobservethat(i)theRER-volatilitypuzzleandtheBackus–Smithanomaly havebecomemoreapparentintheaftermathofChina’sstockmarketliberalization(i.e.after1991);(ii)theconsumption correlationpuzzle(onaverage)isevenstrongerifadevelopedeconomyandanemergingoneareconsidered.Therefore, internationalmacroeconomicpuzzlesdonotariseexclusivelyamongpairsofdevelopedcountries(e.g.USvs.Canada,US vs.UK).
IncontrasttorecentIBCstudies,wepointoutthataninefficientinternationalrisk-sharingenvironmentdoesnot rep-resentanecessaryconditiontoaddressinternationalmacroeconomicpuzzles.Instead,amoderateamountofhomebiasin consumptionisrequired.Specifically,weshowthat,inthepresenceofcompleteandfrictionlessmarkets,thecombinationof recursivepreferencesandcorrelatedlong-runinnovationsallowsforthesimultaneousresolutionofthreeimportant inter-nationalmacroeconomicpuzzles(i.e.RERvolatilitypuzzle,Backus–Smithanomaly,consumptioncorrelationpuzzle)and twoassetpricingpuzzles(i.e.EPPandrisk-freeratepuzzle).Thisholdseveniftherearenon-negligiblechangesinseveral parametervalues,suggestingthatthemodel’sperformanceisrobust.
AppendixA. Data
We base our analysis on US–China data over the period 1972–2009. Real consumption data are from the Robert Barro’s website (Barro-Ursua Macroeconomic Data, 2010, freely available at http://rbarro.com/data-sets/).The annual average China/US nominal exchange rate, and the US and China GDP deflator are collected from the St. Louis FED (FRED ECONOMIC DATA, freely available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/). The US annual average equity risk premium and risk-free rate are from Kenneth French Data Library (freely available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/datalibrary.html).TheGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)oftheUS, China,UK,andGermany(atcurrentUS$prices)arefromtheIMFWorldEconomicOutlookDatabases(WEO).
DataoninternationaltransactionsarefromBureauofEconomicAnalysis(Table12,U.S.InternationalTransactions,byArea –China,freelyavailableathttp://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm).Wecollectthefollowingseries:Exportsofgoods andservicesandincomereceipts(line1),importsofgoodsandservicesandincomepayments(line18),U.S.–ownedassets abroad,excludingfinancialderivatives(line40),Foreign-ownedassetsintheUnitedStates,excludingfinancialderivatives (line55).Allseriesareavailablefrom1999.
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