Ph.D. Program in Political Theory Cycle XXVII
PARTY PATRONAGE IN PARLIAMENT:
THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE.
Ph. D. Dissertation by Michele De Vitis
Supervisor:
Prof. Leonardo Morlino
Rome, January 2016
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 5
LIST OF TABLES 8
LIST OF FIGURES 10
PART 1 – CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES 11
1. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 12
1.1 Patronage: definitions and differences 12
1.2 Functions and styles of patronage 22
1.3 Why patronage is not corruption 30
1.4 Parliamentary patronage: a step forward and some expectations 37
2. THE PHENOMENON AROUND THE WORLD 45
2.1 Patrons and clients in US: from the post offices to the platform patronage 46 2.2 Patronage in Europe: between state penetration and professional affiliation 53 2.3 Exchange politics in Africa: the ethnical networks 61 PART 2 – THE ITALIAN PARTIES AND THE PARLIAMENT: WHICH PATRONS, WHICH JOBS 68
3. THE ITALIAN PARTIES: THE DYNAMICS OF THE PATRONS 69
3.1 The Italian party system under the new electoral law 70
3.2 The Italian party switching and the legislative turnover: patronage at stake and clients at risk. 79
3.3 Reforms in party financing: the need for the state 87
3.4 New tools for parties, new occasions for clients: the primary elections. 96
4. THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT: WHICH SPACE FOR THE PATRONS? 102 4.1 Parliamentary functions:which tasks for the clients, which clients for the tasks 103
4.2 Patronages in Parliament: a preliminary distinction 110
4.3 Collective patrons: the parliamentary groups. 115
4.4 Individual patrons: the institutional office-holders 123
5. PARTY PATRONAGE IN ITALIAN PARLIAMENT: THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 135 5.1 The method and the questionnaire 137
5.2 Depth, quantity and reach of party patronage in Parliament 140
5.3 Why do patrons distribute jobs? 143
5.4 To whom do patrons distribute jobs? 146
5.5 Patronage and elections 151
5.6 A focus on the parliamentary groups 154
CONCLUSIONS 157
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 164
APPENDIX 166
REFERENCES 169
INTRODUCTION
Party patronage is a recent notion in the literature. Often confused with clientelism, corruption and other distributive practices, this concept has to do with the cartel party (ideal) type and the party-state relationships, offering new and alternative resources for the parties based on the public money.
Defined as the power of party to appoint people in public and semi-public life (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova, 2012), party patronage has been studied analysing the governmental sphere, the public and semi-public agencies and the bureaucracies in the general framework of the public administration.
But does party patronage exist only when the patrons (the parties, their leaders, their representatives) distribute public appointments? Is traceable a further dimension of party patronage within the legislative assemblies in which the parties could directly or indirectly distribute jobs?
This dissertation aims at answering these questions, providing an expansion of the definition, achieved after relevant theoretical efforts, and of the field of research, starting from common features such as the exploitation of public resources in order to fulfil party goals.
The main argument of this work is that also the analysis of parliamentary patronage is helpful to explain the relationship between party and the state, investigating here the mechanisms of party installation within the Parliament, its working to satisfy its representative and legislative functions, its internal decision-making processes, its networks inside and outside the floor.
The thesis is composed of two parts. In the first part (chapter 1 and 2) we explore the literature on patronage with its multifaceted points of view and the various historical experiences of patronage around the world, each one with its own peculiarities that contribute to the emersion of parliamentary patronage definition.
In the first chapter we will consider the intricate confusion that, not without prejudices, scholars have caused across the time about the essence of patronage and its connection
be given to distinguish more explicitly patronage and corruption. Moreover, new models of patronage will be developed on the basis of the intersections between merit and party affiliation, two categories usually conceived as mutually exclusive in the debate. A perspective on the evolution of patronage in regime changes that affect the party system or the public administration system will contribute to contextualize the phenomenon in a macro-scenario. Lastly the possible forms of parliamentary patronage in broad sense will be individuated, each one considered as a distributive relationship with different patrons and clients/recipients. It will follow a detailed focus on the specific kind of patronage object of this research, defined as the power of parties to distribute jobs in parliamentary structures.
The second chapter examines the historical, empirical and social experiences of patronage, describing the American, European and African patterns without any ambition to include the whole course of the history, but just commenting upon specific cases with the purpose to underline the main trends in party-state relationship and take them into consideration into the explanation of the empirical research. The US case (Schudson, 1998) will outline the evolution of the patronage on two sides: the object of the exchange and the features of the clients. From the findings of comparative research in 15 European countries it will not emerge a European model, but the causes and the factors that at the end make the difference from a country to another country. In the last section dedicated to the African patronage, we will focus on the ethnical networks at the basis of it as point of departure to explore (party) factionalism and its consequences on patronage.
The second part of the research consists of a preliminary and thorough study of the two dimensions of patronage in Italian experience: on one hand the party, the party system, its rules and its intra or inter party dynamics; on the other hand, the Parliament, here intended as a part of the state, its functioning and its permeability. This part prepares the ground for the empirical research and leads us to draw some hypotheses that will be present in the last chapter.
In the third chapter, the first dimension will be illustrated with an in-depth focus on the last three legislatures, starting from the new electoral system approved in 2005 and now replaced by the so-called Italicum. The reforms in party financing, the party switching
and the legislative turnover, the emergence of new tools for the re-legitimation of the parties as the primary elections even for the parliamentary offices are expounded as possible factors respectively in the increase of the need for patronage, in modifying the resources at disposal and in shaping the patron-client relationship.
Through a re-examination of the parliamentary functions and a study of the rules of procedure, the fourth chapter tries to identify the potential clients and the potential patrons in Parliament. In a first step, we zoom out on the actual development of the four types of parliamentary patronage theoretically distinguished in the first chapter. Once isolated and concretely defined the parliamentary patronage examined in this dissertation (the distribution of jobs within the Parliament), two types of patrons are found: collective (the parliamentary groups) and individual (the institutional office- holders).
The empirical research, conducted through semi-structured and conversational interviews to a mix of patrons, will be oriented to trace the general features and trends of parliamentary patronage, without going in details in the single party performances, fully aware of the slippery field of study if not observed with the proper tools.
Following partly the scheme of Kopecky, Mair and Spirova, we will assess the reach, the depth and the motivations of parliamentary patronage, adding then new elements of analysis based on the stressed differences between the institutions where patronage grows. Lastly we will draw the profile of the clients involved in parliamentary patronage.
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Party allegiance and merit: internal patronage models 1.2 Party systems and states: external patronage models 1.3 Patronage and corruption
1.4 Different forms of parliamentary patronage.
1.5 Managerial patronage and parliamentary patronage.
2.1 Factionalism and patronage
3.1 Incidence of party switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies (2006-2015)
3.2 Collective party switching in the Senate from the same provenience from the same destination – Leg. XVII
3.3 Collective party switching in the Chamber of Deputies from the same provenience from the same destination – Leg. XVII
3.4 Legislative turnover, Chamber of Deputies, XVI- XVII legislatures (%) 3.5 Legislative turnover, Senate of the Republic, XV-XVII legislatures (%)
3.6 Verified expenses and reimbursements received by the parties until 2014 in elections from 1994 to 2013
3.7 Percentage breakdown of public/private/other funding with respect to major political parties revenues.
3.8 Valid choices of voluntary contributions from 2 ‰ Irpef
4.1. Amount of bills proposed in Parliament in last three legislatures
4.2. Amount of bills whose examination was concluded by the parliamentary committees in the last three legislatures
4.3 Bills definitely approved by the Parliament in the last three legislatures (XV-XVII leg.)
4.4. Presented and concluded initiatives for both political control and address to the government.
4.5 Funds for parliamentary groups (2008-2014) 4.6. Standing committees in Italian Parliament.
4.7 Chairpersons per group in XV legislature and ratio between the number of the members of each group involved and the sum of the members of all groups involved
4.8 Chairpersons per group in XVI legislature and ratio between the number of the members of each group involved and the sum of the members of all groups involved 4.9 Chairpersons per group in XVII legislature and ratio between the number of the members of each group involved and the sum of the members of all groups involved 4.10 Funds for staff of institutional office-holders from 2012 to 2014
4.11 Funds for the reimbursement of the expenses related to the MP office 5.1 Extent of party patronage in Parliament
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Patronage and clientelism 2.1 Index of Patronage
3.1 Index of bipolarism and bipartitism
3.2 Switching behaviour and parliamentary cycle
3.3 Numbers of Political Groups Chamber of Deputies (2006-2015)
4.1 Internal composition and bodies of a parliamentary group by statute (MPs) 4.2 Basic internal organization of a parliamentary group (employees)
5.1 Distribution of individual and collective patrons in the interviewees 5.2 Motivation of patronage in Parliament (one option). Total
5.3 Motivation of patronage in Parliament (one option). Individual and collective patrons
5.4 Client profile in parliamentary patronage (one option). Total
5.5 Client profile in parliamentary patronage (one option). Individual and collective patrons
5.6 Client profile in parliamentary patronage (two options). Total
5.7 Client profile in parliamentary patronage (two options). Individual and collective patrons
5.8 Party affiliation in internal bodies of parliamentary groups.
PART 1
CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES
CHAPTER 1
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
‘There is nothing more practical than a good theory.
Lewin (1952, 169)
The state, which is invaded by the parties, and the rules of which are determined by the parties, becomes a fount of resources through which these parties not only help to ensure their own survival, but through which they can also enhance their capacity to resist challenges from newly mobilized alternatives. The state, in this sense, becomes an institutionalized structure of support.
Katz and Mair (1995, 16)
1.1 PATRONAGE: DEFINITIONS AND DIFFERENCES
The evolution of party organizations has shaped the relationships between party and the state. In this sense, the emergence of cartel party model (Katz, Mair, 1995), replacing the mass-party (Duverger, 1954), represents a Kuhnian paradigm shift in the conception of party as institutional and political actor related to civil society and state.
On one hand, the decreasing role of the parties as point of connection for both citizens and voters has progressively unfastened the ‘transmission belt’ linking parties and specific groups by social cleavages at national or local level (Webb and White, 2007). The gradual ‘privatization’ of political life in a more and more complex society has dramatically weakened identities, ideologies and grand narratives, creating alternative forms of interest aggregation and other tools for social integration, depriving parties of memberships and traditional issues used to get electoral support (Whiteley, 2011).
The exercise of citizenship took place in other collective and no partisan entities such as voluntary, charity associations or interest groups, or it happened in an individualized scenario dominated by modern media, such as tv or internet, without
face-to-face relationships. The ownership of politics slipped out of parties and social elites and became widespread in various peripheral centres. (Schudson, 1998)
The decentering of the parties in the political ground moved the attention and the interest of citizens and their energies out from the traditional organizations recognized as mass parties. This detachment in the bottom-up support caused the slackening of the grasp of the political class on ruled class and on those organizations such as unions, associations and factions usually blended and confused with parties. As Burnham observed, parties had “the character of an item of luxury consumption in competition with other such items, an indoor sport involving a host of discrete players rather than the teams of old” (1967, 305).
Furthermore, the collapse of party activism and the difficulties to mobilize even their own membership forced parties to look for new and modern incentives to the participation. Material and solidary incentives, such as basic fringe benefits or social recognition, were already overcome in developed democracies and richer and secularized societies. (Clark, Wilson, 1961)
For all these reasons, parties were obliged to find refuge elsewhere, away from the civil society, in order to survive and to secure the organization and the working of democratic life. As an instinctive resistance reaction, parties took shelter in an incompletely explored arena: the state. In this new context, parties have turned in quasi- governmental agencies or public utilities, focusing more on governmental functions and on the control of public resources and becoming more and more dependent on the state.
(Epstein, 1986; Biezen, 2004; Ignazi, 2012, 2014).
Rephrasing Sartori’s minimal definition of a party (1976, 63), we could define the modern parties as political groups identified by an official label that run at elections, and are capable of allocating, before or after the elections, public resources.
In recent years the space of domestic policy-making process in EU countries has been significantly restricted by European institutions: the progressive Europeanization promoted an integration on national ‘policies, politics and polities’ (Börzel and Risse, 2003) that asked also for policy coherence commitments and, especially in some countries, spending standards “by authoritative European rules” (Risse et al. 2001, 3).
Similarly, even because of this pressure, the presence of the state in the economy of a country, particularly the Southern ones, started to draw back. The higher degree of economic liberalism in the industrial policies lessened the traditional concentration of distributive powers in the hand of the state, both as law-maker and political player.
Nevertheless, parties still keep playing an important role within the state, conserving their distributive powers and self-managing their organization and campaigning, by controlling the legislation and providing rules for media access and legal framework for their existence and activities. (Biezen, Kopecky, 2007, 2014)
A huge variety of public resources is available for parties. Public funding, even if nowadays called into discussion and reformed or abolished in many countries, clearly symbolizes the growing relevance of the state in financing party activities or in refunding electoral campaigns. In turn, the availability of public sources for their subsistence has made less attractive for parties to try to obtain private resources, by reactivating and strengthening relationships with social groups.
However, the social and democratic value of public funding has not to be neglected here since state resources to the parties guarantee the participation in politics to groups otherwise excluded from the electoral competition or able to take part in political arena only if they represent special interests and achieve particular goals, supported by specific fund givers.
Patronage is a further means used by the parties to increase their legitimacy both within and outside the state. In Biezen and Kopecky scheme, patronage embodies and measures the third key dimension of the party-state relationship, in addition to the dependence on the state (public funding) and the management by the state (party regulation).1
Scholars from different fields of research have tried and found several ways to define ‘patronage’ in a continuous multidisciplinary struggle that involves particularly political science, comparative politics and public administration studies (Stokes, 2009;
1 This dimension has slightly evolved during the time: in 2007 they define it “the extent to which parties themselves control the state” in terms of “party rent-seeking”, where as in 2014 it is more emphasized as
“the capture of the state by parties”. That said, party patronage emerges as a powerful tool of penetration in the state to gain benefits for the party.
Bearfield, 2009). Conceptualizing patronage has also changed because of the evolution, in the time and in the space, of party organizations and political life. Equally, remarkable progresses have been reached by refining approaches and strategies to operationalize this concept in order to purify it from anthropological bias and moral and negative prejudices.2
Starting from Sorauf (1959, 115, 117), patronage was described as “essential to a strong and vital party organization”, “a bastion of party”. Although its domain in the American civil service at the time was extremely more limited compared to the past, as we will see in the next chapter, the abilities of parties to administer patronage, the necessity of patronage for effective parties, the vitality of patronage as reward or incentive are lucidly pointed out as push factors for the good working of the parties3.
This demonstrates that some features of patronage are not affected by the time, but remain essential and almost constitutive of the practice. Blondel (2002, 241) provided a summarizing definition of patronage ad “distribution of favours to individuals in exchange for political advantages accruing — or being expected to accrue- to those who give the favours.”
A further micro definition (Kaufmann, 1974, 285) points at the presence of a patron and a client, not hierarchically equal, equally involved in an ‘interpersonal exchange’ relationship ‘based on the principle of reciprocity’, mutually valid until if each actor is satisfied by the exchange4.
Like in the prisoner’s dilemma, the classical game theory scenario, this dyadic relationship lasts until the two actors cooperate in achieving mutual goals, but, unlike the prisoners, they know each other and establish a stable contact and a faithful alliance in order to be familiar with each other and know how to cooperate.
2 This ambiguity and the orientation to generic definitions of both practices have crossed different works:
Graziano (1976); Lemarchand and Legg (1972); Gellner and Waterbury (1977); Shefter (1977);
Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984), Kahane (1984); Kristinsson (1996); Warner (1997); Martz (1997);
Kitschelt (2000), Müller (2000); Hopkin and Mastropaolo (2001); Gordin (2002); Eaton (2004); Taylor- Robinson (2006); Benton (2007); Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007); Levitsky (2007); Manzetti and Wilson (2007); Wang and Kurzman (2007).
3 Already in 1937, Pollock noted that “employees who are politically appointed are naturally expected to attend political meetings, make speeches, canvass voters, and do all the other things involved in political activity.” (p. 32)
4 An alternative, but similar definition is later given by Lande: “vertical dyadic alliance … between two persons of unequal status, power or resources each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself (1977, p. xx)
From this minimal and timeless definitions of patronage at micro-level, it would follow that party patronage considers the party acting as a patron that distributes benefits in exchange of something, but that definition is still so skeletal and basic that draws a vague and zoomed out picture of how patronage is actually understood5.
Indeed, in the course of the literature, patronage has been better explained for differences with other similar phenomena such as corruption and clientelism (Scherlis 2010, Kopecky and Scherlis 2008). Clientelism and patronage have been brands used for too long time as synonymous to explain the same practices. Moreover, many have seen it both as evil practices of manipulation related to rural or not developed society and have considered the client as a socially marginalized actor, forced to get resources from the patron in order to survive (Blok, 1974; Chubb, 1982).
Democratization processes, economic growth and citizen empowerment weaken this assumption: clients may now count on a number of personal and material resources higher than in the past and they do not necessarily need party support. Citizens and groups become more independent in their choices even when they play the role of clients. Actually, the demise of parties as political machines and social linkage providers extends the power of clients, now free to select the patrons they prefer (Piattoni, 2001). These dyadic relationships are not anymore enduring as in the past, with an increasingly shaded nuance of paternalism and far from primitive lure.
A denotative approach helps us to distinguish clientelism and patronage. What makes the difference is the object of the exchange between patron and client. Patronage distributes only jobs, both at lower (contracts) and upper level (appointments), whereas clientelism uses different type of resources such as goods and material benefits (food, water, medicine in the poorest contexts, pensions or other subsidies in less emergency areas). (Stokes, 2007)
Clientelism may also distribute jobs, but only at low level and just in exchange of electoral support. In this sense, clientelism represents “an electoral tool in which benefits are delivered to obtain the recipients' vote” (Kopecky, 2011, 282) and looks
5 Patronage as “the submission of public officials to an overlord” that “diminishes their ability to serve the public interest at large” is mentioned among negative consequences to be prevented by a civil service act in a short paper published by SIGMA Support for Improvement in Governance and Management, a joint initiative of the OECD and the European Union to improve public governance (Cardona, 2002).
like a non-professional-oriented practice limited to a mutual and personal exchange, closed in a one-to-one relationship.
Compared to patronage, clientelism takes place outside from the state, both in a legal and illegal way whether allowed or forbidden by the law. Even if patrons may use public money, coming from party funding, to foster clientelistic relationships, they still do not hold public offices and do not necessarily distribute state resources6 (Stokes, 2011).
The nature of the client here ranges from ordinary citizens, willing to get immediate and individual benefits from the personal vote-selling, to specific social groups organized to improve their own conditions conveying collective and mobilized support to a certain candidate or party. Usually these groups, especially when organized in constituencies or districts, are able to attract a richer quantity of resources, generally funds. They could receive it privately, without formal identification and recognition, or publicly, through particular public policies.
The latter is called pork barrel legislation or pork barrel politics (Müller, 2007, 251), a legal method to target benefits to specific groups, passing laws or provisions directed mainly to people that share the place where they live (Lancaster and Paterson, 1990; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). This particular exchange consists of buildings, infrastructures or any other form of public intervention distributed in favour of few and well defined geographic blocs of citizens, but paid by the whole community (Aldrich 1995, 30). These pork barrel policies are generally condemned as unethical or immoral since based on a veto power of the patrons/legislators, called instead by the constitutions and the norms to serve their own communities, representing their needs and desires during the mandate.
To be honest, pork barrel legislation leaves large room for free riders: one can benefit from new roads and take advantage from new constructions, without paying any electoral money to the patron. As in the rational choice theory (Olson, 1965; De Mucci, 2009), individuals could have no personal incentive to support a specific candidate if they consider high the cost of voting such candidate and take for granted that they will receive in any case some benefits.
6 In the case of pensions, patrons are in the condition to ask and receive benefits through personal
The withdrawal from the electoral action in favour of that candidate deprives patrons of the traditional power and that hierarchical and superior positions, so widely recognized from the scholars. If every member of the specific constituency makes the same calculation, no one would vote for that candidate that promises benefits in change of electoral support. The attempt to avoid this paradox, at the extreme extent, and the need for the patrons to affirm their power in a given community have had a relevant effect on the legislation writing and making process, particularly in the budget laws: the more specific a law provision is, the higher is the probability to reach a distinct array of people that have secured electoral support.
Coming back to patronage and clientelism features, the first one allocates public jobs and appointments by discretional criteria. These criteria are not limited to the electoral support, but they found strong motivations in alternative goals, such as parties’
organizational necessities, mainly in electoral campaigning stage. In its basic meaning, patronage shares with clientelism reward-oriented functions and the core principle of
‘take there, give here’ (Graham, 1997), but a distinctive point between these two practices is represented by the nature of the clients in patronage relationships.
Patronage clients do not inevitably have to belong to a party or to demonstrate electoral affiliation with their patrons. In patronage, patrons and clients are reciprocally reliant on each other and their relationship is less asymmetrical and time-limited than in the clientelism since clients give something more than the their ‘simple’ vote. Here we state ‘simple vote’ because in the democratic play the right and the act of vote is available for every eligible citizen, potentially a client that demands benefits on the clientelism market.
If patronage is a topdown concept, stressing the central importance of the patron/party in a network, clientelism, on the contrary, could represent a bottom-up perspective, more related to a wider social context and more focused to the role of the client as part interested in being involved in a clientelistic relationship to secure electoral allegiance.
For this reason, clientelism potentially reaches more individuals and social slices than patronage. Its vastness is related to the lack of special prerequisites that the benefit recipients are not asked to satisfy. In patronage mechanics, the requirement of minimal skills, albeit statically pointed out in terms of study title, income, age or gender, works
as filter in the selection of the client, selected on a merit based system, not officially licensed, but discretionally defined time by time.
There are good reasons for it. Parties can stand as patrons in clientelistic exchanges before the election in the form of a central or local committee or factions or candidates. Later, once accomplished their primary goals like getting electoral consensus and seats in Parliament and offices in the cabinet and in the government, they take the form of office-holder parties, that is to say political groups that now prepare themselves to confirm and extend their power until the control of decision making process.
We can suggest here that clientelism as ‘vote of exchange’ (Parisi and Pasquino, 1979; Katz, 1986; Parisi 1995) is a preliminary condition for the patrons to involve new clients in patronage exchanges, most effectively named ‘spoil system’. Without a solid electorate, that parties could significantly extend also through clientelistic channels, it is impossible for them to cross the electoral threshold or achieve a notable quota of seats in order to play as parliamentary subjects able to influence polity and policies7.
To sum up, the existence of widespread ‘clientages’, definable in nutshell as adherents or supporters consciously ready to tie with a patron, does not directly imply clientelism or patronage. In fact, if this clientage, both at individual and collective level, relies on direct electoral purposes, it follows that clientelism occurs, whereas if clientage is connected with a party or a politician without direct electoral reasons, but with other motivations to contribute to party/candidate’s success, patronage happens8.
The figure that follows suggests an iconic representation and a synthesis of the difference between the two phenomena: what separates clientelism from patronage is an electoral result for the parties acceptable enough to go beyond the gate that separates civil society and the state. Once they overstep it, probably through the distribution of material and particular benefits, they are ready to distribute public jobs and appointment
7 Some scholars argue that electoral systems with personal vote encourage clientelism (Kitschelt, 2000).
Even if others (Stokes, 2011) do not completely agree and the argument is still discussed, we could state with more certainty that patronage is not affected by the electoral system. An attempt to explain and observe a ‘post-electoral patronage’, in the form of “revolving doors” available for not elected candidates, is given by De Mucci et al, 2009.
8 As Hilgers (2011, 575) wrote: “Patronage is closely linked to clientelism, although its key defining characteristic, the discretionary distribution of public office, is not necessarily shared by clientelism.
Patronage entails the distribution of public sector jobs by a candidate or party to loyal supporters who have helped to generate votes. The votes in question are often produced through clientelism.”
derived from their installation within the state. It is self-evident that this process is cyclical and fluctuating: in order to keep their patronage power within the state, parties have to secure a solid electoral base. Clientelism can be practiced to reach this purpose9.
Figure 1.1 Patronage and clientelism
The most recent and comprehensive definition of patronage frames it as “the power of parties to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life” and as
“an organizational resource” (Mair and Kopecky, 2006; Kopecky, Mair, and Spirova, 2012). This dissertation follows their understanding, observing this practice in Italian parliamentary context and aiming at enlarging the realm of what has been conceived so far as ‘state’.
The assumption of appointment power, linked to the cartel party (ideal) type, has put forward several original contributions in the literature of patronage, reshuffling old explanatory models. The penetration and the control of public offices and job resources have revitalised the weak power of parties to attract citizens in the political sphere. They potentially allow parties to find fresh and, till then, unexploited energies and reinforce organizational structure, even promoting their advancement in the society.
The collusive neighbourhood with other parties, in order to exclude, as a ‘cartel’, other new, upcoming or small political actors from the arena, has not been fully confirmed so far by the facts. The broad agreements in Parliament in reforming electoral
9 The circle closes with Downs’ definition of political parties as “a team of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (1957, 25).
system, typically in the direction of raising the threshold required to running lists for the entry in legislative assemblies, could provide an evidence of party veto power to new comers in the electoral market. By this bi-partisan agreement, they disincentive the electoral presence of other political formations stimulating not only electoral, but also organizational fusions.10 It is though easier to imagine parties, even the major parties, as fighting each other in the electoral arena trying to increase at maximum their rent- seeking power. This competition takes place also in the intra-coalitional dynamics once parties have won preeminent positions within the cabinet and the government.
In this scenario, electoral contests work as a preparatory step, an external test for management abilities and problem-solving skills in a political debate communicated by the media, with passive citizens that vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ like in the referendum scheme.
To win the contest, parties are obliged to address electorate through generic and so inclusive platforms founded on minimal common values. Interclass ‘catch-all’ parties (Kircheimer, 1966), born to widen the traditional audience of a party, provide still today valid notion to analyse the political life, especially in times of volatile, if not fleeting, electorates (Bartolini and Mair, 1990) and of progressive decline in turnout, at the beginning fearfully considered as a deterioration of democracy and now commonly accepted as an evolved form of civic independence from the politics.
With an unmoved society and a growingly relevant government, parties have to embrace the opportunity to turn to the state, cover governmental functions and dismiss their function of representative agency, that is the typical motivation of the parliamentary initiatives.
But do they really totally dismiss the representative function when they deal with patronage? Or, better, do they deal with patronage when they serve as “means of representation” (Sartori, 2005, 24) and legislative parties within the proper institutions?
Does patronage exist only in government arenas, in agencies and in administrative bureaus? This dissertation would answer these questions enriching the study on patronage and exploring a so far hidden distributive process: the parliamentary patronage. This phenomenon is here understood as the patronage that takes place within the legislative assemblies, and not as the patronage of the Parliament as a whole.
10 An example is constituted by the reform for the election of Italian members at European parliament in 2009, passed few months before the elections (Natale, 2009).
Rewording Kopecky and Mair definition, parliamentary patronage is the power of parties to distribute jobs within parliamentary structures. In doing so, we examine how parties establish themselves in a constitutional body, how they arrange themselves within the Chamber or the Senate in order to develop their working inside and outside these institutions.
After this first introductory section, now we deal with the functions and the styles of patronage as underlined in the recent studies (Kopecky et al. 2012, Bearfield 2009). This scheme will be useful to theoretically define parliamentary patronage and formulate some expectations in the last part of the chapter.
1.2 FUNCTIONS AND STYLES OF PATRONAGE
The huge variety of patronage definitions has shown the different dimensions of this many-sided concept. Now, in order to ascend to a more macro-level comprehension, we set down functions and styles of patronage intended as the power of parties to distribute positions within the state structure.
Although fruitful and innovative, the governmental definition of patronage is still in the early stages and to some extent in a minority position in the literature developed until now. The obstacles to operationalization process, put by the anything but unanimous conceptualization and the variety of (difficult) measurement methods, have hindered and delayed the ‘installation’ of a common and shared basis.
This section contributes to circumscribe properties and quality of patronage intended as a dimension of ‘party-state’ relationship, going beyond the derby between patronage intended as electoral/reward or governmental/control resource (Kopecky et al., 2012) and trying to achieve an essential pattern of patronage capable of involving any contextualization of this practice. By doing so, we will be able to apply this pattern to parliamentary patronage.
In brief, in our assumption, party patronage as organizational resource represents a means to:
Support party activities at financial level in a lateral and indirect way;
Build and reinforce party internal organizations;
Increase the professionalization of party management.
The first two functions compensate the otherwise decaying financial sources and organizational networks, whereas the third function equips parties to face modern challenges, especially in the electoral campaigning.
First, changes in public party funding oblige parties to find alternative legal ways in order to secure their financial independence and sustain their activities both at national and local level. The presence of party within the state guarantees in this sense a minimal insurance from the risk to completely disappear from the political landscape.
Parties staff their structures, mainly at central level, with low level patronage and guarantee party activities’ working and functioning ruled by professional staff comparable to those ones on the regular party pay-roll (Webb, Kolodny 2006) Using public state resources, parties reduce the recourse to private funding to sustain certain activities. In this way they have a larger margin to manoeuvre in their budgets to spend money in other directions according to their priorities.
Moreover, clients are often asked to contribute to the party budget with a certain percentage of their salaries as a return for appointments and jobs (Sorauf, 1969). This is also true at higher level when MPs are called to destine a quota of their parliamentary income to the party. It could be matter of debate whether this kind of patronage is legal or not, but here we assume that this practice respects the legal constraints, especially when party activities overlap the range of activities run by other state organizations that can offer patronage. In this sense, patronage represents an indirect surrogate of public financing.
Second, patronage can be used as intra-party cohesion and organizational loyalty facilitator (Panebianco, 1988a): the distribution of selective incentives to party members in exchange of stable external support could help to stimulate and reinforce, as a glue, the unity of internal structures at political level and keep party stable in its connections with local entities. This is true both for big and small parties. In the big parties with catch all ideologies, the internal use of patronage recognizes the existence of different factions that could stand as a party within the party. A shared management of patronage mechanisms and distributive processes keeps the party united in all its heterogeneous components, preventing party splits and conflicts (Giannetti, Benoit 2009), “wielding the different blocs within the party into a unified whole” (Sorauf, 1969). With the same
scheme and for the same purposes, patronage practices also are managed in coalitional government and contexts not only during the constitutive moments. As for the small parties, patronage is necessary to reinforce and motivate ties in a limited dimension. The absence of available patronage resources could weaken the internal cohesion, especially in majoritarian contexts, and discourage the belonging to small sized entities. In proportional contexts, on the contrary, small parties, in particular if they hold a veto power, could maximize their rent-seeking orientation, providing discrete quantity of patronage resources to their membership.
Third, the discretional power of parties to distribute state jobs is a lever to raise the professional level of party management. In the electoral professional party, contacts between politicians and citizens are mediated by professionals, ‘so-called experts, technicians with specialist knowledge’ (Panebianco, 1988a, 264). The lack of stable points of connection with the civil society makes necessary the use of professionals to taps communication channels and develop policy proposals and platforms. The notion of patronage as control resource (Kopecy, Mair, Spirova, 2012), purified by any reference to governmental sphere and to the partyness of government (Blondel, Cotta, 2000), can be easily reconducted in this function.
What their theoretical framework argued about the point remains valid with a broader sense: “By staffing the state with trusted individuals, political parties can make their policies flow more effectively, can be better informed, and can thereby enhance their policy-making capacity and reputation”. “Through patronage, and through the appointment of party personnel to key agencies and institutions, parties can hope to gain an oversight of the likely demands posed to political leaders, as well as of the likely policies and programmes that are needed to meet these demands. In this sense, patronage can also serve as the basis for a powerful network of communication between policy-making sectors, expressed both vertically and horizontally”. (2012, 10, 11)
The professionalism in party working deserves more attention in patronage studies, not only to understand patron’s motivation, but also to focus more clearly on clients. Patronage studies are in fact affected by a lack of analysis on clients, more independent in modern patronage. This lack has been biased by a conception of patronage as an overwhelming practice of patrons on clients at top-down level. Here we
assume that a market of clients actually exists since clients can choose their patron and change it if not satisfied by the relationship.
Professionalism has really revolutionized party patronage. Clients now offer expertise and competence tied by autonomous, entrusted and contractualized ways (Wilensky, 1959; Brante, 1990; Webb and Fisher, 2003). Compared to traditional party bureaucrats, they have more status, a more professional commitment free from personal acritical devotion, but fully engaged in party’s mission.
A further decisive contribution to patronage literature has been given by Bearfield (2009, 68-73) by pointing out four “styles” of patronage according to the principal or principle goals pursued by patrons. Even if these styles are formulated starting from the American experience, this typology has remarkable relevance for the object of this dissertation and for the future studies. The four patronage styles are:
1. Organizational patronage, “used to strengthen or create political organizations”;
2. Democratic patronage, a means “to achieve democratic or egalitarian goals”.
3. Tactical patronage, used “to bridge political divisions or cleavages as a means of achieving political or policy goals”.
4. Reform patronage, a paradox situation in which “those committed to reforming the existing patronage system themselves engage in the practice as the means of replacing the corrupt political regime that preceded them”.
We have already considered with other labels the organizational and the tactical patronage in the previous pages. Democratic patronage and reform patronage open interesting scenarios for reflection and debate. According to Bearfield, democratic patronage is “the most vulnerable to distortion and abuse”, but actually “can be a useful tool for creating a representative bureaucracy”. His considerations take the cue from Jacksonian experience with the ‘rotation of the offices’ against patronage as a prelude to corruption and a detachment from public interest, but can also be extended to consensual or consociational democracies. In Netherlands, for example, the politics of accommodation secured political stability and political pluralism (Lijphart, 1968). In his study about Dutch political system, Lijphart pointed out that “the Netherlands presents a paradox. On the one hand, it is characterized by an extraordinary degree of social
cleavage. On the other hand, Holland is also one of the most notable examples of a successful democracy”, stable and effective.
The spirit of accommodation among political elites is one of the decisive factors to explain this political miracle in terms of democratic management. Accommodation means “settlement of divisive issues and conflicts, where only a minimal consensus exists” (1968, 103) and, in order to be feasible, it could be rendered even into jobs, official positions and appointments reallocated and distributed among the ‘self- contained blocs’.
As highest and most explicit example of this practice, we could mention the Lebanese National Pact, established in 1943. Negotiated between the Shi'ite, Sunni and Maronite representatives, it stated in unwritten form that the president would have been always a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunnite Muslim, the speaker of the National Assembly a Shīʿite Muslim, the Deputy Speaker of the Parliament and the Deputy Prime Minister Greek Orthodox. According to this pact, the ratio of Christian to Muslim representatives in Parliament would have been six to five. 11
In Italy, a country with low rational-legal authority in Max Weber’s meaning, the so-called lottizzazione explains the democratic quality of patronage as means of power sharing and guarantee of pluralism. Mancini (2009) showed how during the First Republic the Italian public service broadcaster (RAI) has been object of pervasive party patronage according to party quotas, even by internal factions of the parties (a
‘lottizzazione within lottizzazione’, Padovani, 2005). This consolidated scheme practically applied the principle of pluralism and assured their presence and their representation in the media.
Economically expensive, democratic patronage has been considered as the prelude of corruption. Lijphart study (1999), though, denied the virtues of majoritarian democracies in terms of limited corruption and demonstrate the no significant relationship between consensus democracies and corruption, arguing on the contrary
11 As Zahar puts (2005), “the legislature turned into a private club as leaders promoted their protégés. The elites almost secured a monopoly of representation. Hence patronage politics did not bode well for legislative responsiveness to popular demands”.
that “consensual democracies are slightly less likely to be corrupt than majoritarian democracies” (2008, 97).
Reform patronage allows us to introduce a snake-biting-its-tail process. What if reformist parties elected against a given patronage system try to install their new patronage system? “If they stick to their ideals of not using (or, in their minds, abusing) patronage, the movement will die once the zeal of their initial supporters has waned”
Bearfield wrote (p.72). “However, if the reformers build their own political machine and opt to use patronage to staff the organization with people loyal to their cause, they would appear as hypocrites, making themselves vulnerable to both political rivals and the next wave of reformers”.
This ironic paradox, overcome - according to the author - by the implementation of
“a new patronage network under the guise of meritorious hiring of experts based on a specific set of experiences or credentials” (p- 73), concerns a serious issue about patronage and regimes, their consolidation and crisis.
According to Morlino (1998, 2005), parties with their own organizations and patronage12 serve as ‘anchors’ “able to perform” in an asymmetrical relationship between people and elites “a hooking-and-binding effect on more or less organized people within a society” (1998, 446; 2005, 745). In so doing, the reach and the extent of patronage affect the domestic anchoring process, that is the gradual presence and adaptation of anchors and their development within a democracy with rules at electoral and decisional level.
In Morlino’s theory, anchoring process is a crucial component in the mix that leads to the complete and solid establishment of democratic structures, institution and norms, called ‘consolidation’. Only firm and fully developed anchors, after a reasonable lapse of time from the installation enough to let the dominance grow over the civil society, make possible to achieve consolidation in a context of exclusive legitimation with low consensus towards the democratic institutions and with alternative political groups out from the political field. In addition, firm anchors can prevent the emergence of a crisis.
12 In his work, Morlino referred to patronage as Kristinsson’s definition (1996, 355; 2005, 435): “the selective distribution of material benefits to individuals or small groups in change of their political support”.
The breakage of the flukes happens also when the economic, political and social cost of the anchors oversteps reasonable levels.
Even if for long time the conventional wisdom has associated patronage with waste, corruption and clientelism, this phenomenon is not a curse for democracy and government. On the contrary, it provides and guarantees the full functioning and stability of democracy although at extreme extent its freezing could bring to an inflexible and blocked system that only a crisis can unlock. Morlino’s scheme helps to rethink patronage as one of the vehicles of democracy and consubstantial to it. Its fine working and its dynamic stability represent an insurance policy for a long-lasting democratic play. Patronage is not necessarily an evil and is not the devil so black as some scholars have painted. It is the cost of patronage that makes the dangerous difference even in a condition of widespread legitimation with large consensus for the institutions and absent support for alternative regimes.
Morlino’s theoretical efforts stimulate us to draw some questions. When does a patronage system go to crisis? When does a patronage system stay below the tolerance threshold? Does reform patronage necessarily represent a patronage crisis? Answering them could contribute to widen the focus on the reasons why transitions in patronage models may occur, relying to some extent on their legitimacy. We assume here that party changes and state reforms do not affect patronage systems. We could define them external variables of patronage and we actually know that they can reduce the distribution of job positions and have an impact on how the distribution takes place, but focusing on internal variables of exchange relationships in this step allows us to underline the fundamentals.
Patronage systems could be distinguished by the intersections between merit criteria and party allegiance. Some scholars (Mainwaring, 1999, 177) have defined patronage as
“the use or distribution of state resources on a non meritocratic basis for political gain”.
Our concept of patronage does not necessarily exclude meritocratic basis since patronage, as we said, is a means to increase the professionalization of party management and attested and acknowledged professional skills are necessary whereas party allegiance does not seem enough to guarantee all alone the achievement of political goals. Democracy is an exercise that requires both expertise and commitment.
From the two dichotomies merit-based/non merit-based and partisan/no partisan patronage four different patterns emerge:
MERIT
Weak Strong
PARTY ALLEGIANCE
Weak Patronage zero Patronage by the experts
Strong Low-level patronage Patronage by partisan experts
Table 1.1. Party allegiance and merit: internal patronage models
Patronage zero represent the phase in which people with low party allegiance and low merit are recruited. Parties have little advantage to hire such persons, but actually sometimes they are ‘obliged’ to do if relatives or friends are involved. This phenomenon, called nepotism, weaken the legitimacy of both parties and states.
Patronage by partisan experts could find the highest level of acceptance if parties have a large consensus. State resources are used to engage skilful people in order to fulfil party goals within the state and their costs could be easily tolerated by the citizens. The shift from patronage to patronage shapes the substance of party-state relationship and affect the quality of patronage.
However, party-state relationship can change if party systems or the state face changes, causing the crisis of the pre-existent model of patronage. The passage from consensual to competitive party systems, for example, reduces the space for multi-party patronage especially if the pervasiveness of the state is weaker. At the same time, distributive politics in jobs and state position needs some adaptations if the number of ruling parties grows: the sharing power with oversized coalitions could require an expansion of the state in order to satisfy parties’ demands.
STATE
Weak presence Strong presence
PARTY SYSTEM
Consensual Shared patronage Diffused patronage Competitive Mono patronage Exclusive patronage
Table 1.2 Party systems and states: external patronage models
1.3 WHY PATRONAGE IS NOT CORRUPTION
In the confusional, but prosperous state of the literature, the general notion of patronage has been coloured with misleading meanings, interpreted almost as an activity with para-lobbystic influence, quite close to corruptive practices and often overlapped. This section explains why patronage is not corruption and how and when these two concepts could correspond to each other.
“Without influence, which you call corruption, men will not be induced to support government, though they generally approve of its measures” said John Mortlock, British banker, Member of Parliament, and thirteen times Mayor and Master of the Town of Cambridge in 1780s. His sentence shows a common trait between patronage and corruption: the influence, intended as an authoritative exercise of an established power in a dyadic relationship. At the same time, if we substitute the term
‘corruption’ with ‘patronage’ or ‘clientelism’, the sentence remains meaningful with its multifaceted consequences.
Like in the case of patronage, the conceptualization of corruption is not completely defined. The first effort is to distinguish between systemic and individual corruption or grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption has been summarized as that kind of corruption that “occurs at the highest levels of government and involves major government projects and programs” (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, 27), whereas petty corruption “occurs within a framework where basic laws and regulations are in place and implementing officials seize upon opportunities to benefit personally” (Rose-
Ackerman, 2007, xviii). It is to be taken for granted that usually corruption raises from petty to grand.
We may start our comparison by examining the World Bank definition of corruption as an “abuse of public office for unauthorized private gain” (2000). In this term, corruption occurs everywhere, no matter if society, government, democracy or economical sector are advanced or not. By this view, modernization thesis of corruption (Huntington, 1968; Scott, 1969; Heidenhimer, 1970) have completely failed in bringing into the proper focus the phenomenon. Those theories considered corruption like a dependent variable of the development of a society: the more a country is modernized, the less is expected to observe corruption, declined after the transitional stage.
A wider definition spells out that political corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power by political leaders for private gain, with the objective of increasing power or wealth. Political corruption need not involve money changing hands; it may take the form of ‘trading in influence’ or granting favors that poison politics and threaten democracy” (Transparency International Annual Report, 2004, 10).
As such, the term “abuse” represents the constitutive element of corruption, distinguishing corruption from patronage. The abuse of power actually generates a violation of law and so corruption treads on the borders of the law whereas patronage practices are regulated by legal and regulatory provisions with always recognizable clients and patrons. So even if corruption uses “legal means to deliver favors, for example, by rewriting bills to include or exclude certain sectors from the scope of a bill”
(Yadav, 2011, 5), its use is illegal.
An analytic typology of corruption has been advanced by Heidenheimer (1989).
He defined three types of corruption from the literature:
1) public office-centered, focused on the public official. By this view,
“corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgments of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship
rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses)”. (J.S. Nye, 1967, 966). Actually nepotism is situated at the border between patronage and corruption: when the discretional power of parties to distribute public jobs or positions also to relatives and members of the family is not limited by the law, nepotism assumes more a form of debatable favouritism that damages other potential clients than a practice that directly breaks the law;
2) market-centered (van Klaveren, 1957, 4) when “a corrupt civil servant regards his (public) office as a business, the income of which he will seek to maximize. The office then becomes a maximizing unit. The size of his income depends upon the market situation and his talents for finding the point maximal gain on the public demand curve.” Obviously, officers’ income could be maximized also by good and not corrupted performances, such as productivity and goal-oriented incentives.
3) public interest-centered, as a “deviant behaviour associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense” (Friedrich, 1972, 127). Here the contrast is between private gain and public expense since a power-holder undertakes decisions or actions that advantage all those offer illegal payments or other rewards against public interest.
The first and the third meaning of corruption are inextricably intertwined since generally public officials’ activities are supposed to be guided by strong esteem and respect for public interest. This consideration makes public offices, and civil service as a whole, value-holder entities spreading civic principles through their existence, structure and working.
Della Porta and Vannucci (1999) stated the most comprehensive definition of corruption: “a hidden (due to its illegality) violation of a contract that, implicitly or explicitly, state a delegation of responsibility and the exercise of some discretionary power; (ii) by a public agent (the bribee) who, against the interests or preferences of the principal (its public organization) (iii) acts in favor of a third part (the briber) from which he receives a rewards (the bribe)” (pp. 16-7).
Several initiatives have been taken to fight and destroy political corruption and sanitize institutions. The types of corruption control have been classified by Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991, 6). A first step, as we said, is the social strategy, the body of ethical norms, education and public vigilance that inhibit corrupt practices. No other clean up
provision (legal or political) could be forceful and compelling without the recourse of informal social sanctions. Their effectiveness depends on the level of acceptance, approval and promotion of social norms that encourage certain standards of behaviour and foster the abstract and practical respect for public interests.
Secondly, legal strategies and procedures emerge as a further factor to discourage corruption. Every country has more or less successfully erected an anti- corruption system, mainly through regulating agencies that “provide centralized leadership in core areas of anti-corruption activity” (Meagher, 2005, 70), in order to prevent the proliferation of bribes and kickbacks, especially in public works. In the last decades, public officials have been asked to show their asset situation, to abstain from conflict of interest, to refuse gifts over a certain value. Law enforcement makes the difference: a special and severe sanctionary system against corruption crimes with a strong rule of law largely intended affects the capacity of state structures to be penetrated by corrupters.
Market strategies have been considered as a third pillar. In last twenty years, policy platforms and agendas have been generally distinguished by a lower presence of the state in the economies and in the productive sectors of economic life. Government intervention in economy has actually lead to market distortion, facilitating collusions, oligopolies or ineffective monopolies that restraint perfect competition. The withdrawal of government from economic activities and the promotion of free market policies represent an additional factor to clean up corruption, avoiding strong asymmetries and disequilibria between demand and supply.
Lastly, political strategies to reduce corruption focus on authority, access to political process and administrative reforms. According to Gillespie and Okruhlik, the eradication of corrupt activities could be achieved if the decisional powers are assigned to committees, collective boards, rather than to individuals. The administrative reforms opening for more transparency, fairness and normative and administrative simplifications could reduce the bureaucratic shadowy space that allows to corruption to infiltrate. Even the law-making process has an influence on corruption practices, although it is more likely that corruption has more influence on determining bills’
writing and decision-making processes than the opposite. Some principles should guide the law-making: laws should be prospective, not retrospective and should be relatively
stable. Moreover, particular laws should be guided by open, general and clear rules that make possible a limited discretion of authoritative -delegated- powers in their application and enforcement. (Raz, 1979; Maravall, 2002)
Other strategies to fight corruptions focuses on open participation of citizens in the political processes in order to promote an effective control and scrutiny of ruled class upon the ruling class. Public officials can also be empowered as whistleblowers to denounce corruption crimes within the public administration. The degree of adhesion to this practice can vary from country to country and depends on social factors and the protection effectiveness secured to whisteblowers. Even an incentivisation of fair behaviours and good practices could be pursued by monetary benefits, increasing salaries and awarding non corrupted public officials.
To sum up, corruption has to do with rule of law more than patronage does and has much more implications with democracy at its roots than patronage. Actually, the rule of law represents a procedural dimension of democracy, one of the eight possible qualities to check how good a democracy is (Morlino, 2011), along with electoral and inter-institutional accountability, political participation and competition (each of four procedural dimensions), freedom, solidarity (both substantive dimensions) and responsiveness (outcome dimension).
In the studies on quality of democracies, the rule of law is “not only the enforcement of legal norms”, but “entails at least the capacity, even if limited, to make authorities respect the laws, and to have laws that are non-retroactive, publicly known, universal, stable, and unambiguous” (Morlino, 2011, 197). In this sense, the
“institutional and administrative capacity to formulate, implement, and enforce the law;
focus on the governance system (parliament and government) capable of ensuring the production of high quality legislation and its implementation throughout the country and a transparent policy-making process allowing for the participation of civil society, and the presence of a professional, neutral, accountable, and efficient state bureaucracy”
(Morlino, 2011, 197) represents one of the basic sub-dimensions of rule of law that include also the “effective fight against corruption, illegality, and abuse of power by state agencies; focus on the existence and implementation of the comprehensive legislative framework to prevent and fight corruption”.
