1
www.countthecosts.org
Contents
Introduction ��������������������������������� 2
• Theeconomicdynamicsofillegaldrugmarkets
andcriminality��������������������������� 3
• Makingabadproblemworse��������������� 4 Thecrimecostsofthewarondrugs:
1�Streetcrime������������������������������ 4
2�Criminalisationofuse ��������������������� 4
3�Massincarceration������������������������ 5
4�Organisedcrime�������������������������� 6
• Moneylaundering������������������������� 6
• Corruption������������������������������� 7 5�Violentcrime����������������������������� 7 6�Crimesperpetratedbygovernments/states���� 9 7�Economiccostsofdrugwar-relatedcrimeand
enforcement����������������������������� 10 Aretherebenefits?��������������������������� 10 Conclusions��������������������������������� 12
TheWaronDrugs:
Creatingcrime,
enrichingcriminals
Theglobalwarondrugshasbeenfoughtforover50years,
toachieveitsstatedgoalofa“drug-freeworld”�Yetdespite
theeverincreasingresourcesspentonpoliceandmilitary
effortstosuppresstheillicitdrugtrade,supplyhasmore
thankeptpacewithrisingglobaldemand�Indeed,most
indicatorssuggestdrugsarecheaperandmoreavailable
thaneverbefore�
Butbeyondthisstrikingfailure,thedrugwar’spunitive,
enforcement-basedapproachhashadaseriesofdisastrous
“unintendedconsequences”,asidentifiedbytheExecutive
DirectoroftheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(1) (UNODC),theveryUNagencythatoverseestheglobaldrug
controlsystem�Henotedthat:
“The first unintended consequence [of the drug control system] is a huge criminal black market that now thrives in order to get prohibited substances from producers to consumers. Whether driven by a ‘supply push’ or a ‘demand pull,’ the financial incentives to enter this market are enormous. There is no shortage of criminals competing to claw out a share of a market in which hundred fold increases in price from production to retail are not uncommon.”
Thisbriefingsummarisesthecrime-relatedcostsstemming
fromthewarondrugs,whichinclude:
• Organisedcrimearisingfromtheillicitdrugtrade,
anditsknock-oneffectsintermsofmoneylaundering,
corruptionandviolence
• Street-levelcrimecommittedbydruggangsandby
dependentdrugusersattemptingtosupporttheirhabits
• Thecriminalisationofusers,excessivelevelsof
incarceration,andcrimescommittedbygovernments
underthebannerofthedrugwar
• Theeconomiccostsofdrugwar-relatedcrime,andthe
criminaljusticeresponsetoit
ThereisoverlapwithotherareasoftheCounttheCosts
initiative–humanrights(includingadetaileddiscussion
ofprisonissues),securityanddevelopment,discrimination
andstigma,publichealth,theenvironmentandeconomics�
Forbriefingsandmoreresourcesonthesecosts,see
www�countthecosts�org�
CounttheCostsisacollaborativeprojectbetweennumerous
organisationsfromacrosstheglobethat,whilepossessing
diverseviewpointsandexpertise,allshareadesiretoassess
theunintendedcostsofthewarondrugs,andexplore
alternativesthatmightdeliverbetteroutcomes�
Introduction
The1961UNSingleConventiononNarcoticDrugs(2)–the
legalbasisoftheglobalwarondrugs–hastwoparallel
functions�Alongsideestablishingaglobalprohibitionof
somedrugsfornon-medicaluse,italsostrictlyregulates
manyofthesamedrugsforscientificandmedicaluse�
InstarkcontrasttotheConvention’slanguagedescribing
medicaluse,therhetoriconnon-medicaluseframesitasa
threattothe“health and welfare of mankind”,anda“serious evil”whichtheglobalcommunitymust“combat”,settingthe
toneforthedrugwarthathasfollowed�
TheConvention’sparallelfunctionshavealsoledtoparallel
markets–oneformedicaldrugscontrolledandregulated
bythestateandUNinstitutions,theotherfornon-medical
drugscontrolledbyorganisedcriminals,insurgents,
separatistsandparamilitaries�Thereisastriking
comparisontobemadeinthelevelofcriminalityassociated
withproductionandsupplyintheseparalleltrades�The
legalmedicalopiatemarket,forexample,accountsfor
aroundhalfofglobalopiumproduction(3)butentailsnone
oftheorganisedcrime,violenceandconflictassociatedwith
itsillicittwin�
Bythemid-80stheemphasisandrhetoricofinternational
drugpolicyhadshifted,fromitsearlierfocusondruguse,
towardsthegrowingconcernwiththeproblemsrelating
tocriminallycontrolleddrugmarkets�(4)Thistrendwas
reflectedinlaw,specificallythethirdoftheUNdrug
conventions,whichfocusesontacklingtheexplosionofthe
“illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances”
sincethe1961SingleConvention�
Overthelast50years,thethreattopublichealthfromdrug
usehasbeeninterwovenwiththethreattopublicsafety
(andnationalsecurity)fromdrugwar-relatedcrime�“Drugs
andcrime”havebecomefusedtogetherinpoliticalrhetoric
“ Politicians cannot hope to win a war on drugs when their policies ensure that only the most efficient trafficking networks survive. Not only do they survive, but they thrive because law enforcement has destroyed the competition for them by picking off the unfit traffickers and letting the most evolved ones take over the lucrative trafficking space.
The destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels, for instance, only created a vacuum for hundreds of smaller (and more efficient) operations. Now the police cannot even count the number of smaller cartels that have taken over – much less try to infiltrate and disrupt them.”
Sanho Tree DirectoroftheDrugPolicyProjectattheInstituteforPolicyStudies
2007
3
(the“drugthreat”),institutionsliketheUNOfficeonDrugs
andCrime,alongwithdomesticpolicyandlaw�Thishasled
toananomalousandmalfunctioningsysteminwhichdrug
useisacknowledgedasprimarilyapublichealthissuebut
responsesarecriminaljustice-based,primarilydealtwith
bypoliceandmilitaryenforcementaimedatdrugusers,
dealersandproducers�
Ironically,astheUNODChasbelatedlyacknowledged,
itisthesesamepunitivedrugenforcementpoliciesthat
arecreating,orfuelling,muchofthedrugmarket-related
criminalityinthefirstplace�
The economic dynamics of illegal drug markets and criminality
Thelinksbetweendrugsandcrimearecomplex�However,
thereisaneconomicdynamicatplaywhichactivelyfuels
thecriminalitythatenforcementissupposedtoeliminate�
Thesqueezingofsupplyinademand-ledmarkethas
twokey“criminogenic”effects,resultingmainlyfrom
enforcementincreasingprice�Thefirstisthecreationof
avastopportunityforcriminalentrepreneurs(see “How much is the illegal drug trade worth?”,p�6)�Thesecondis
acquisitivecrimecommittedbylow-incomedependentdrug
userstosupporttheirhabits�
Thispriceincreasereflectsbothenforcementrisksbeing
incorporatedintoillicitdrugpricing,andfromunregulated
profiteering(see Figure 1)�Thisisthe“alchemyof
prohibition”(5)bywhichlow-valueagriculturalproducts
becomeliterallyworthmorethantheirweightingold�
Druglawenforcershighlightthe
futilityofdruglawenforcement
“I invite you all to imagine that this year, all drugs produced and trafficked around the world, were seized:
the dream of law enforcement agencies. Well, when we wake up having had this dream, we would realize that the same amount of drugs – hundreds of tons of heroin, cocaine and cannabis – would be produced again next year. In other words, this first dream shows that, while law enforcement is necessary for drug control, it is not sufficient. New supply would keep coming on stream, year after year.”(6)
Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UNODC, 2007
“If demand [for drugs] persists, it’s going to find ways to get what it wants. And if it isn’t from Colombia it’s going to be from someplace else.”(7)
Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, 2001
“As long as there is a demand for drugs in this country, some crook is gonna figure out how to get ’em here...”(8) George W Bush, US president, 2002
“Over the past 10-15 years, despite interventions at every point in the supply chain, cocaine and heroin consumption have been rising, prices falling and drugs have continued to reach users. Government interventions against the drug business are a cost of doing business, rather than a substantive threat to the industry’s viability.”(9)
UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit Drugs Report 2003 Figure1:Howthepriceofdrugsisinflatedthroughtheillicitmarket
Making a bad problem worse
DruglawenforcementcanalsohaveaDarwinian“survival
ofthefittest”effect�Theleastcompetentcriminalsarenot
onlycaughtmoreoftenbylawenforcement(especially
whendrivenbyarresttargets),butarealsomorelikelyto
besuccessfullyconvicted,leavingthemarkettothemost
powerful,efficientandruthless�
Whilstenforcementcanshowseeminglyimpressiveresults
intermsofarrestsandseizures,impactsonthemarket
areinevitablymarginal,localisedandtemporary�Indeed,
astheUNODCacknowledges,oneoftheunintended
consequencesofthewarondrugsistheso-called“balloon
effect”,wherebyratherthaneliminatingcriminalactivity,
enforcementjustmovesitsomewhereelse�When
enforcementdoestakeoutcriminals,italsocreatesa
vacuum,andevenmoreviolence,asrivalgangsfightfor
control�
TheCrimeCostsofthe
WaronDrugs
1�Streetcrime
Thereisdebateoverhowmuchdrug-relatedstreetcrime
resultsfromdrugpolicyandlaws,asopposedtodruguse
andintoxication,ortowhatextentinvolvementincrime
leadstodruguse,ratherthantheotherwayround�(10)There
arealsomanyculturalandeconomicfactorsthatimpacton
bothstreetcrimeanddruguse,includinginequalityand
deprivation�
However,whileestimatesarehardtoformulateandoften
contentious,(11)itisclearthatasignificantproportionofthe
streetcrimeandsexworkblightingurbanenvironments
hasitsrootsinthewarondrugs�Theseproblemsresult
fromthecriminallycontrolledsupplyanddramatically
inflatedpricesthedrugwarhascreated�
FromMexicotoLondon,druggangactivity,especially
“turfwars”overterritoryandmarkets,isamajorsource
ofviolence,intimidationandotherantisocialandcriminal
behaviour,withvulnerableyoungpeopleinparticularbeing
drawnintosuchpatternsofoffending�
• AccordingtotheUSDepartmentofJustice,900,000
criminallyactivegangmembers–athirdofthem
juveniles(12)–in20,000streetgangs,inover2,500cities,
dominatetheUSdrugstrade(13)
• Low-incomedependentdruguserscommitlarge
volumesofpropertycrimetofundtheirhabits�Astudy
bytheUKPrimeMinister’sStrategyUnitin2003stated
thatdrugusersareresponsiblefor56%ofallcrimes,
including:“85% of shoplifting, 70-80% of burglaries, [and] 54% of robberies�”(14)
• Low-incomedependentusers(mostlywomen)also
oftenresorttostreetsexworktobuydrugs�TheUK
HomeOfficeestimatedthat80-95%ofstreetsexworkis
drug-motivated�StudiesfromAsia,RussiaandUkraine
showinjectingdrugusersaremorelikelythanother
sexworkerstoengageinstreetsoliciting�(15)Drugusing
streetsexworkersalsofaceincreasedriskofarrest,and
ofviolencefromclients,pimpsandpolice(16)
Bycontrast,theseproblemsarevirtuallyabsentfromlegal
alcoholandtobaccomarkets,underliningthattheystem
fromthecurrentlawenforcement-basedapproachrather
thandruguseperse�
Whilstthereis,ofcourse,criminalityinvolvedinalcohol
andtobaccosmuggling(andasmallerproportionof
counterfeiting),andalsostreetcrimeassociatedwithalcohol
intoxication,therearefewifanyoftheproblemsofstreet
dealing(licensedsalesnegatingtheneed),violencebetween
rivalretailers(brewers,publandlordsandtobacconists
donotattackeachother),orfundraisingcrimecommitted
bydependentusers(alcoholortobaccodependencecan
bemaintainedatafractionofthepriceofheroinorcrack- cocainedependence)�
2�Criminalisingusers
Despiteitsaimofreducingoreliminatingillegaldruguse
entirely,globalusagehasrisendramaticallysincethewar
ondrugsstarted�Asaresult,thecurrentapproachhas
criminalisedvastnumbersofotherwiselaw-abidingpeople�
TheUNODCestimates,conservatively,thatbetween155and
250millionpeopleworldwide,or3�5%to5�7%of15-64-year- olds,usedillicitsubstancesatleastonceinthelastyear�
Globallifetimeusagefiguresprobablyapproachonebillion�
5
Whilethedecriminalisationofdrugsissometimesportrayed
asalibertarianapproach,infactdruglawscriminalising
possessionforpersonaluseareatoddswiththelawin
mostcountriesasitappliestocomparablepersonalchoices
regardingsovereigntyoverone’sbodyandfreedoms
regardingindividualrisk-takingdecisions�Theseinclude
freedomoverwhatweeat,whatmedicineswetakeand
howweconsumelegaldrugssuchasalcoholandtobacco,
throughtooursexualhabits,involvementwithdangerous
sportsorotherpotentiallyhigh-riskconsensualactivities�
• Theimpactofcriminalisationandenforcementvaries,
withsanctionsagainstdrugusersrangingfromformal
orinformalwarnings,finesandtreatmentreferrals
(oftenmandatory),tolengthyprisonsentencesand
punishmentbeatings�Withinpopulationsimpactsalso
vary,butareconcentratedonyoungpeople,certain
ethnicandotherminorities,sociallyandeconomically
deprivedcommunities,andproblematicusers
• Punishmentsforpossession/useareoftengrossly
disproportionate,violatingakeytenetofinternational
law�InUkrainethepossessionofminimalamountsof
drugs(from0�005g)canleadtothreeyearsin
prison�(17)InRussia,solutiontracesinausedneedlecan
leadtooneandahalfyearsinprison�InGeorgia,drug
urinetestscanleadtoimprisonment(18)
3�Massincarceration
Thecriminaljustice-ledapproachtodrugshasfuelleda
hugeexpansionofprisonpopulationsoverthelast50years�
Whilesignificantnumbersareincarceratedforpossession/
usealone,farmoreareimprisonedfor“drug-related”
offending,overloadingthecriminaljusticesystemsof
countriesallovertheglobe�
Thesearemainlylowlevelplayersintheillicittrade,and
low-incomedependentusersoffendingtosupporttheiruse
asdescribedabove�Therehasalsobeenagrowinguseof
arbitrarydetentionmasqueradingas“drugtreatment”in
centresthatareoftennomorethanprisons,aswellasthe
useoflengthypre-trialdetentionfordrugoffenders�
• In2008,overhalfofUSfederalinmateswerein
prisonasaresultofadrugcharge(19)–asignificant
contributingfactortothestatisticthatonein100
Americansiscurrentlyincarcerated(20)
• In2005,Chinahadapproximately700mandatorydrug
detoxificationcentresand165“re-educationthrough
labour”centres,housingatotalofmorethan350,000
drugusers(21)
Currentdrugpolicieshaveledtospirallingprisonpopulations(Photocredit:CaliforniaDepartmentofCorrectionsandRehabilitation)
4�OrganisedCrime
Themarketcreatedbythecollisionofprohibitionandhigh
demandhasbeenseizedbyorganisedcrimewithruthless
efficiency,andatdevastatingcost�The“vast”illicittrade,
astheUNODCdescribesit(seebox),isoneofthebiggest
revenuegeneratorsfororganisedcrime
worldwide�(22)Ithasspawnedarangeofothercriminal
activities,includinginternationalmoneylaunderingand
widespreadcorruption�Theuntaxedprofitsarealsooften
reinvestedinexpandingcriminaloperationsinotherareas
suchasextortion,kidnappingandrobbery�
Money laundering
Moneylaunderingofteninvolvescomplextechniques
for“cleaning”the“dirty”profitsofillegalactivitiesso
astodisguisetheirillicitorigin�Thegeneraltechniques
usedincludeplacingthemoneyinthefinancialsystem,
reinvestment,andmovementbetweenjurisdictions�(23)More
specifically,thiscaninvolveinternetgambling,international
moneytransferservices,bureauxdechange,transnational
preciousmetalmarkets,realestatemarkets,andhighcash
turnoverbusinessessuchaspizzeriasandcasinos�Shell
banks,frontcompaniesandtaxhavensarealsoused�
The(oftenunknowing)involvementoflegitimatebusinesses
andfinancialservicesintheseprocesseshasblurredthe
boundariesbetweencriminalandlegitimateeconomies,
andbringswithitarangeofsocialandeconomiccosts–not
leastincreasingcriminalityinmainstreamlife�
Asaresultoftheintimaterelationshipbetweendrugprofits
andthemoneylaunderingindustry,the1988UNConvention
AgainstIllicitTrafficinNarcoticDrugsandPsychotropic
Substances(24)wasthefirstmultilateralagreementtoinclude
measuresagainstmoneylaundering�
Estimatesofthevalueofmoneylaunderedvary,because
theseactivitiesarecomplexandclandestine,andthe
proceedsofdifferentcriminalventuresareoften
intermingled�(25)However,availableestimatesdoindicate
thevastscaleoftheoperations,withdrugprofitsprobably
secondonlytofraudasasourceofmoneylaunderingcash�
• TheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)estimates
thattotalmoneylaunderingrepresents2-5%ofglobal
GDP�A2001estimateputtotaldrugprofitssuccessfully
launderedeachyearat$200billion(28)
• AccordingtoaUSSenateestimatein2011,(29)Mexican
andColombiandrugtraffickingorganisationsgenerate,
removeandlaunder$18billionand$39billionayear
respectivelyinwholesaledistributionproceeds
• TheExecutiveDirectoroftheUNODCsaidhehadseen
evidencethattheproceedsoforganisedcrimewere“the only liquid investment capital”availabletosomebanks
in2008�Hesaidthatamajorityofthebillionsindrug
profitswereabsorbedintotheeconomicsystem,and
thatasaresult:“Inter-bank loans were funded by money that originated from the drugs trade and other illegal activities ... There were signs that some banks were rescued that way.”(30)
Howmuchistheillegaldrugtrade
worth?
TheUNODChasmadeseveralattemptstovaluethe
globaldrugmarket�Its2005WorldDrugsReport,
forinstance,putsthemarket’svalueatUS$13bnat
productionlevel,$94bnatwholesalelevel(comparable
withtheglobaltextilestrade)andUS$332bnatretail
level�Furthermore,ina2011reporttheagencystated
thattheillicitdrugtradeisthemostprofitablecriminal
sector,accountingforonefifthoftheestimated
US$1�5tngeneratedbyalltheworld’scrime�(26)
Thereportfocusedonthemarketforcocaine,probably
themostlucrativeillicitdrugfortransnationalcriminal
groups�Traffickers’grossprofitsfromthecocainetrade
stoodataround$84billionin2009�Noestimatesare
availableofnetcriminaldrugprofitsglobally�
The2007WorldDrugsReportputthesesumsinto
perspective,notingthatthevalueofglobalhuman
traffickingwasestimatedbytheInternationalLabour
OrganizationtobeUS$32billion,whiletheSmallArms
Surveyestimatedthevalueoftheillicitfirearmstrade
tobearoundUS$1billion�(27)
7
Corruption
Corruptioninevitablyflowsfromthehugefinancial
resourcesatthedisposalofhigh-levelplayersintheillicit
drugtrade�Theirwealthenablesthemtosecureandexpand
theirbusinessintereststhroughpayingofficialsatalllevels
ofpolice,thejudiciaryandpolitics�Thepotencyofthis
corruptionisenhancedusingthethreatofviolencetoforce
theunwillingtotakebribes(astheyputitinMexico,“plomo
oplata”–“leadorcash”)�Drugcartelsalsotakeadvantage
ofvulnerableinstitutionsandindividualsbyconcentrating
productionandtransitinregionswherepovertyandweak
governanceexist�Theresulthasbeenadramaticerosion
ofgoodgovernance(orpreventionofitsdevelopment)and
actualorthreateneddestabilisationofentirenationstates
andregions(31)(seetheCounttheCostsdevelopmentand
securitybriefingatwww�countthecosts�orgforfurther
information)�
AstheUNODChasdescribedit:
“The magnitude of funds under criminal control poses special threats to governments, particularly in developing countries, where the domestic security markets and capital markets are far too small to absorb such funds without quickly becoming dependent on them. It is difficult to have a functioning democratic system when drug cartels have the means to buy protection, political support or votes at every level of government and society. In systems where a member of the legislature or judiciary, earning only a modest income, can easily gain the equivalent of some months’ salary from a trafficker by making one ‘favourable’ decision, the dangers of corruption are obvious.”(32)
• Guinea-Bissau,oneoftheworld’sleastdeveloped
countries,hasrecentlybecomeamajorcocaine
traffickinghub(enroutefromLatinAmericato
Europe),asdrugsarebeingsmuggledintothecountry
withthehelpofthemilitary,policeandjudiciary�This
systematiccorruptionhaspoliticalinvolvement,allthe
wayuptoheadofstatelevel(33)
• Between1993and1997,roughlyhalfofallconvictions
ofUSpoliceofficersthroughFBI-ledcorruptioncases
werefordrug-relatedoffenses(34)
• TransparencyInternationalhasreportedthat:“Mexico’s police and armed services are known to be contaminated by multimillion dollar bribes from the transnational narco-trafficking business. Though the problem is not as pervasive in the military as it is in the police, it is widely considered to have attained the status of a national security threat.”(35)
• TheUNODCestimatesthatdrugsandbribesarethetwo
largestincomegeneratorsinAfghanistan,amountingto
abouthalfofthecountry’sGDP(36)
• TheWorldBankfoundthatbribeswerepaidin50%of
allColombianstatecontracts,andthatcorruptionin
Colombiacosts$2�6billionannually,theequivalentof
60%ofthecountry’sdebt(37)
5�Violentcrime
Absenttheformalregulationusedinthelegitimate
economy,violenceisthedefaultregulatorymechanismin
theillicitdrugtrade�Itoccursthroughenforcingpayment
ofdebts,throughrivalcriminalsandorganisationsfighting
toprotectorexpandtheirmarketshareandprofits,and
throughconflictwithdruglawenforcers�
Gangsorcartelsthatareprimarilyfinancedbythesaleof
illicitdrugshavebeenimplicatedinasubstantialproportion
ofstreetviolenceandhomicides�InLosAngeles,for
example,gang-relatedhomicidesaccountedfor43%ofthe
Byitsverynature,thewarondrugsgeneratesviolentandorganised
crime(Photocredit:“macwagen”)
1,365homicidesthattookplacebetween1994and1995,94%
ofwhichinvolvedfirearms�(38)
However,farfromlawenforcementreducingviolence,it
oftenexacerbatestheproblem�Asacomprehensivereview
bytheInternationalCenterforScienceinDrugPolicystates:
“Contrary to the conventional wisdom that increasing drug law enforcement will reduce violence, the existing scientific evidence strongly suggests that drug prohibition likely contributes to drug market violence and higher homicide rates.”(39)
Andthesefindingsare:
“consistent with historical examples such as the steep increases in gun-related homicides that emerged under alcohol prohibition in the United States and after the removal of Colombia’s Cali and Medellin cartels in the 1990s. In this second instance, the destruction of the cartels’ cocaine duopoly was followed by the emergence of a fractured network of smaller cocaine-trafficking cartels that increasingly used violence to protect and increase their market share.”
Eventheillegalcannabismarkethasreachedascalethat
meansitisincreasinglycharacterisedbyviolence�Supply
totheUSisnowamajorpartoftheMexicandrugcartels’
profits(estimatesrangefrom15-60%(40)),withavalueof
around$1�5billion�(41)Similarly,thecannabismarketin
BritishColumbia,Canada,isestimatedtobeworthabout
C$7billionannually,mainlythroughsupplyingtheUS�
Itisthelucrativenatureofthismarketthathasledtoa
ferociousgangwarbeingwagedtocontroltheprofits�(42)
Drugprofitsarealsofuellingviolenceinwidernational
andregionalconflicts�Manyaffectedcountries,suchas
Colombia,AfghanistanandBurma,havelonghistoriesof
internalandregionalconflict�However,drugmoneyhas
playedamajorroleinmotivatingandarmingseparatist
andinsurgentgroups,anddomesticandinternational
terrorgroups,blurringthedistinctionbetweenthem
andcriminalgangs�Inthelongerterm,violencecan
traumatisepopulationsforgenerations,inparticular
fosteringacultureofviolenceamongstyoungpeople�
• TheopiumtradeearntheTalibanandotherextremist
groupsalongthePakistan-Afghanistanborderupto
$500millionayear,similartothecocainerevenues
thatfundColombia’sFARC(RevolutionaryArmed
ForcesofColombia)(43)
• AttheheightoftheColombiandrugwarsin1990,
theannualmurderratewasoneper1000ofthe
population–3timesthatofBrazilandMexico,and10
timesthatoftheUS(44)
• InSoutheastAsia,thegrowingmethamphetamine
tradeislinkedtoregionalinstabilityandconflict�
MinoritygroupsfromtheWaandShanstatesare
fundinginsurgencyoperationsagainstBurma’s
militaryjuntathroughthemanufactureand
“ Prohibition creates violence because it drives the drug market underground. This means buyers and sellers cannot resolve their disputes with lawsuits, arbitration or advertising, so they resort to violence instead.
Violence was common in the alcohol industry when it was banned during Prohibition, but not before or after.
Violence is the norm in illicit gambling markets but not in legal ones. Violence is routine when prostitution is banned but not when it’s permitted. Violence results from policies that create black markets, not from the characteristics of the good or activity in question.”
Jeffery Miron SeniorLecturer,HarvardUniversityDepartmentofEconomics
9
wholesaledistributionofmethamphetamineand
opiumtoThailand,Chinaandothercountriesinthe
region(49)
• A2011UNODCglobalstudyintohomicideestimated
thatincountrieswithhighmurderratesdueto
organisedcrime,suchasthoseinCentralAmerica,
menhaveaonein50chanceofbeingmurdered
beforetheyreachtheageof31(50)
6�Crimesperpetratedby
governments/states
Therearearangeofillegalactsperpetratedbystates
orgovernmentsunderthebannerofthewarondrugs
(explored in more detail in the Count the Costs Human Rights Briefing at www.countthecosts.org)�Theseinclude
useofthedeathpenalty,extrajudicialkillingsand
assassinations,arbitrarydetentionwithouttrial,corporal
punishment,andotherformsoftorture,cruel,inhuman
anddegradingtreatmentorpunishment�
• Approximately1,000executionsofdrugoffenders
takeplaceeachyear,indirectviolationof
internationallaw�(51)Methodsofexecutionamongthe
32jurisdictionsthatusethedeathpenaltyfordrug
offencesincludehanging,firingsquad,beheadings
andlethalinjection
• Somegovernments,notablytheUS,openlyengage
inillegaltargetedassassinationsofsuspecteddrug
traffickers(52)
• ThefirstthreemonthsofThailand’s2003“waron
drugscrackdown”saw2,800extrajudicialkillings
thatremainun-investigatedandunpunished�The
ThaiOfficeoftheNarcoticsControlBoardsuggested
inNovember2007that1,400ofthepeoplekilledhad
nolinktodrugs(53)
• Insomecountries,notablyinIndia,EastandCentral
Asia,drugusersareroutinelysenttodrugdetention
facilities,withouttrialordueprocess–forexample,
onthewordofafamilymemberorpoliceofficer
–formonthsoryears�Whilstsometimestermed
“treatment”or“rehabilitation”facilities,theyare
oftenindistinguishablefromprisons,anddetainees
arefrequentlysubjecttotortureanddeniedaccessto
essentialmedicines(54)
• Peoplewhousedrugsoraresuspectedofdrug
Drug-relatedviolenceinMexico
TheexplosionofviolenceinMexicosinceamajor
enforcementcrackdownagainstthedrugcartelswas
announcedbyPresidentCalderonin2006hasbeenastartling
demonstrationofthepotentialunintendedconsequencesof
thewarondrugs:
• TheMexicangovernmentestimatesthat34,000peoplehave
beenkilledindrug-relatedmurdersfrom2006-2010�Other
estimateswhichinclude2011dataputthefigureatover40,000�(45)Masskillings,beheadingsandpublicdisplaysofthe
deadhavebecomecommonplace
• AccordingtotheMexicangovernment,60%ofthecountry’sdrug-relateddeathsarethoseofmembersoforganised
criminalgroups,27%aregovernmentofficialsand13%areinnocentbystanders
• Historically,victimsofdrug-relatedviolencehavebeenmainlyyoungmales�Butincreasinglywomenandchildren
arebecomingvictimstoo�(46)Asmanyas4,000womenand1,000childrenhavebeenkilledtodate,andaround50,000
childrenhavelostatleastoneparent�(47)Youngpeoplearealsobeingdrawnintotheviolence,asarecentcaseofa
14-year-oldprosecutedformurderingfourpeopleonbehalfofaMexicancartelshows(48)
Figure2:DrugwarkillingsinMexicosincethelaunchof
PresidentCalderon’soffensiveondrugcartels
offences,areoftensubjecttocruelandunusual
punishmentsincludingdeaththreatsandbeatings;
extortionofmoneyorconfessionsthroughforced
withdrawalwithoutmedicalassistance;andvarious
formsofcruel,inhumananddegradingtreatment
inthenameof“rehabilitation”,includingdenialof
meals,beatings,sexualabuseandthreatsofrape,
isolation,andforcedlabour(55)
• Judicialcorporalpunishment(aformoftortureillegal
underinternationalhumanrightslaw)ismaintained
in40countries,andinatleast12itismaintained
fordrugandalcoholoffences(Singapore,Malaysia,
Iran,Yemen,SaudiArabia,Qatar,BruneiDarussalam,
Maldives,Indonesia[Aceh],Nigeria[northernstates],
LibyaandUAE)(56)
7�Economiccostsofdrugwar-related
crimeandenforcement
Accuratefiguresforspendingondruglawenforcementare
hardtocomeby,butrecentresearchsuggeststheUSalone
hasspent,ataconservativeestimate,$640billiondollars
sincePresidentRichardNixondeclaredawarondrugswith
aninitialbudgetof$100min1971�(57)Globally,annualspend
nowcertainlyexceeds$100billion�
Thecostsofdrugwar-relatedcrimeare,however,farhigher�
Forexample,theUKgovernmentspent£4�036billionin
2003ondrug-relatedenforcement(arrests,policedetention,
courtappearancesandprisonstays),(58)butthedrug-related
crimecostsofheroinandcocaineuseinEnglandandWales
alonewere£13�9bn�(59)Inotherwords,thecostsofcrime
wereseveraltimesthatspentonenforcement�Withfigures
onthisscaleprobablyreplicatedinotherconsumer,transit
andproducercountries,thetotaleconomiccostsofdrug- relatedcrimearestaggering–inthehundredsofbillionsof
dollarseveryyear�
Aretherebenefits?
Thekeybenefitpromised50yearsagoforinstigatinga
criminaljustice-leddrugcontrolsystemwastoreduce,or
eliminate,the“evil”ofdrugaddiction�This,itwasclaimed,
wouldbeachievedthroughenforcement-ledsupply
restrictionsandareductioninlevelsofdemandcaused
bythedeterrenteffectoflegalsanctionsagainstusers�
However,sincethendruguseandrelatedhealthharms
haverisenfasterthananypreviousperiodofhistory,even
acceleratingduringtheescalationofthewarondrugsin
the1980s�Despiteeverincreasingresourcesbeingdirected
intosupply-sideenforcement,thecriminalmarkethasmore
thanmetthisgrowingdemand�
Despiteitsfailuretoachieveitsstatedaims,thewarondrugscostsbillionsofdollarstoenforceeveryyear(Photocredit:MikeMahaffie)
11
Thereisalsonoevidencepunitiveenforcementsignificantly
detersuse�Comparisonsbetweenstatesorregionsshow
noclearcorrelationbetweenlevelsofuseandtoughness
ofapproach,(60)nordostudiestrackingtheeffectsof
changesinpolicy–forexampleifnewlawsdecriminalising
possessionareintroduced�(61)Inshort,anydeterrenceisat
bestmarginalcomparedtothewidersocial,culturaland
economicfactorsthatdrivedruguse�
Drugenforcementdoesofcourseleadtothearrestand
prosecutionofseriousandviolentcriminals,likeColombia’s
PabloEscobar,whoarerightlybroughttojustice�Thisseems
anobviousbenefitbothforthefamiliesandcommunities
ofthevictims,andforthemaintenanceofcivicorder�
However,asnotedrecentlybyPierreLapaque,chiefofthe
UNODC’sOrganizedCrimeandAnti-Money-Laundering
Unit,“imprisoned criminals will be immediately replaced by others, and their activities will continue as long as crime is lucrative.”(62)TheUNODCalsonowacknowledgesthatthese
individualsarepartofthe“vastcriminalblackmarket”that
hasbeencreatedbythewarondrugsinthefirstplace�
Therearepossibilitiesforimprovingthetargetingof
enforcementeffortstowardsthemostharmfulelements
ofthecriminaltrade,(63)butthestarkrealityisthatthe
nominalbenefitsofenforcementsimplyshifttheproblem
geographically,fromonecriminalgrouptoanother,or
displaceusersfromonedrugtoanother–theUNODC’s
ballooneffectinaction�(64)
Sowhilstthewarondrugscaneliminatepeoplelike
Escobar,italsoenablestheirrisetopowerandcandolittle
ornothingtoeliminatethewidercriminalmarketthat
peoplelikehimareapartof�
Finally,theUKHomeOfficesuggeststhatcriminalisingusers
canleadtothemaccessingtreatmentthroughbeingarrested
anddrugtested�(65)Evidencefromothercountries,however,
suggeststhestigmaandfearofarrestdeterpeoplefrom
seekingtreatment,anditismoreeffectivetodivertusers
intotreatmentwithoutharmingtheirfutureprospectswith
acriminalrecordfordruguse�(66)
Theenforcement-ledaproachtodrugshasnotsucceededinbringingaboutasustainedreductioninlevelsofcrimeordruguse
Conclusions
Thebattlecrytofighta“waragainstdrugs”hashadsuch
politicalpotencythatitsnegativecostshaveundergonelittle
properscrutiny�Evaluationofdruglawenforcementstill
invariablyfocusesonprocessmeasures,likearrestsand
drugseizures,ratherthanmeaningfulindicatorsthatmight
demonstratefailure–suchaslevelsofavailability,orhealth
andsocialcosts,includingthecreationofcrime�(67)When
thesewidercostshavebeenconsidered,theconclusions
haveoftenbeensuppressedordrownedoutbyshrilldrug
warrhetoricandlawandorderpopulism�
Worsestill,aself-justifyingfalselogicnowprevails:as
thecriminaljusticeproblemsassociatedwithillegaldrug
marketsgetworse,thesesameproblemsareusedtojustify
anintensificationoftheveryenforcementmeasuresthat
arefuellingthem�
Asaresult,whilstmanygovernments,andtheUNODC,
publiclyacknowledgetheunintendedcrimecostsofthe
currentsystem,theyhaveyettomeaningfullymeasure
them,letaloneexaminepolicyalternativesthatmight
reducethem�Itisthislackofpoliticalwillthatisthemain
obstacletoprogress,notmethodologicalchallengesin
makingsuchassessments�
Inshort,thekeytocountingthecrimecostsofthewaron
drugsissimplytostarttrying�
TheUNODCinparticularneedstodirectresourcesinto
measuringcosts–forexamplebyincludingthemincountry
questionnaires,byproducingrelevantanalysesinitsWorld
DrugsReport,andbycommissioningindependentresearch
–andshowleadershipandguidancetomemberstates�
ThegoalsoftheCounttheCostsinitiativearewidelyshared
–asafer,healthierandmorejustworld�Itistimeforall
sectorsaffectedbycurrentapproachestodrugs,particularly
thoseagencies,organisationsandindividualsconcerned
withcrimereduction,tocallongovernmentsandtheUN
toCount the Costs of the War on Drugs, and explore the alternatives�
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The War on Drugs: Count the Costs isacollaborative
globalprojectsupportedby
organisationsandexpertsfrom
allsectorsimpactedbyour
approachtodrugs,including:
internationaldevelopmentand
security,humanrights,health,
discriminationandstigma,
crime,theenvironmentand
economics�
For more information,
including on how you can get involved, visit :
www.countthecosts.org or email info@countthecosts.org
TransformDrugPolicyFoundation,registeredcharityno�1100518andlimitedcompanyno�4862177 Acknowledgements and thanks to: SteveRolles,LisaMackay,George
Murkin,MartinPowell,AxelKlein,DannyKushlick(TransformDrug
PolicyFoundation);ShaleenTitle,JackCole(LawEnforcementAgainst
Prohibition);NiamhEastwood(Release);PatrickGallahue,Damon
Barrett(HarmReductionInternational);andDanWerb(International
CenterforScienceinDrugPolicy)�