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www.countthecosts.org

Contents

Introduction ��������������������������������� 2

• Theeconomicdynamicsofillegaldrugmarkets

andcriminality��������������������������� 3

• Makingabadproblemworse��������������� 4 Thecrimecostsofthewarondrugs:

1�Streetcrime������������������������������ 4

2�Criminalisationofuse ��������������������� 4

3�Massincarceration������������������������ 5

4�Organisedcrime�������������������������� 6

• Moneylaundering������������������������� 6

• Corruption������������������������������� 7 5�Violentcrime����������������������������� 7 6�Crimesperpetratedbygovernments/states���� 9 7�Economiccostsofdrugwar-relatedcrimeand

enforcement����������������������������� 10 Aretherebenefits?��������������������������� 10 Conclusions��������������������������������� 12

TheWaronDrugs:

Creatingcrime,

enrichingcriminals

Theglobalwarondrugshasbeenfoughtforover50years,

toachieveitsstatedgoalofa“drug-freeworld”�Yetdespite

theeverincreasingresourcesspentonpoliceandmilitary

effortstosuppresstheillicitdrugtrade,supplyhasmore

thankeptpacewithrisingglobaldemand�Indeed,most

indicatorssuggestdrugsarecheaperandmoreavailable

thaneverbefore�

Butbeyondthisstrikingfailure,thedrugwar’spunitive,

enforcement-basedapproachhashadaseriesofdisastrous

“unintendedconsequences”,asidentifiedbytheExecutive

DirectoroftheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(1) (UNODC),theveryUNagencythatoverseestheglobaldrug

controlsystem�Henotedthat:

“The first unintended consequence [of the drug control system] is a huge criminal black market that now thrives in order to get prohibited substances from producers to consumers. Whether driven by a ‘supply push’ or a ‘demand pull,’ the financial incentives to enter this market are enormous. There is no shortage of criminals competing to claw out a share of a market in which hundred fold increases in price from production to retail are not uncommon.”

Thisbriefingsummarisesthecrime-relatedcostsstemming

fromthewarondrugs,whichinclude:

• Organisedcrimearisingfromtheillicitdrugtrade,

anditsknock-oneffectsintermsofmoneylaundering,

corruptionandviolence

(2)

• Street-levelcrimecommittedbydruggangsandby

dependentdrugusersattemptingtosupporttheirhabits

• Thecriminalisationofusers,excessivelevelsof

incarceration,andcrimescommittedbygovernments

underthebannerofthedrugwar

• Theeconomiccostsofdrugwar-relatedcrime,andthe

criminaljusticeresponsetoit

ThereisoverlapwithotherareasoftheCounttheCosts

initiative–humanrights(includingadetaileddiscussion

ofprisonissues),securityanddevelopment,discrimination

andstigma,publichealth,theenvironmentandeconomics�

Forbriefingsandmoreresourcesonthesecosts,see

www�countthecosts�org�

CounttheCostsisacollaborativeprojectbetweennumerous

organisationsfromacrosstheglobethat,whilepossessing

diverseviewpointsandexpertise,allshareadesiretoassess

theunintendedcostsofthewarondrugs,andexplore

alternativesthatmightdeliverbetteroutcomes�

Introduction

The1961UNSingleConventiononNarcoticDrugs(2)–the

legalbasisoftheglobalwarondrugs–hastwoparallel

functions�Alongsideestablishingaglobalprohibitionof

somedrugsfornon-medicaluse,italsostrictlyregulates

manyofthesamedrugsforscientificandmedicaluse�

InstarkcontrasttotheConvention’slanguagedescribing

medicaluse,therhetoriconnon-medicaluseframesitasa

threattothe“health and welfare of mankind”,anda“serious evil”whichtheglobalcommunitymust“combat”,settingthe

toneforthedrugwarthathasfollowed�

TheConvention’sparallelfunctionshavealsoledtoparallel

markets–oneformedicaldrugscontrolledandregulated

bythestateandUNinstitutions,theotherfornon-medical

drugscontrolledbyorganisedcriminals,insurgents,

separatistsandparamilitaries�Thereisastriking

comparisontobemadeinthelevelofcriminalityassociated

withproductionandsupplyintheseparalleltrades�The

legalmedicalopiatemarket,forexample,accountsfor

aroundhalfofglobalopiumproduction(3)butentailsnone

oftheorganisedcrime,violenceandconflictassociatedwith

itsillicittwin�

Bythemid-80stheemphasisandrhetoricofinternational

drugpolicyhadshifted,fromitsearlierfocusondruguse,

towardsthegrowingconcernwiththeproblemsrelating

tocriminallycontrolleddrugmarkets�(4)Thistrendwas

reflectedinlaw,specificallythethirdoftheUNdrug

conventions,whichfocusesontacklingtheexplosionofthe

“illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances”

sincethe1961SingleConvention�

Overthelast50years,thethreattopublichealthfromdrug

usehasbeeninterwovenwiththethreattopublicsafety

(andnationalsecurity)fromdrugwar-relatedcrime�“Drugs

andcrime”havebecomefusedtogetherinpoliticalrhetoric

Politicians cannot hope to win a war on drugs when their policies ensure that only the most efficient trafficking networks survive. Not only do they survive, but they thrive because law enforcement has destroyed the competition for them by picking off the unfit traffickers and letting the most evolved ones take over the lucrative trafficking space.

The destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels, for instance, only created a vacuum for hundreds of smaller (and more efficient) operations. Now the police cannot even count the number of smaller cartels that have taken over – much less try to infiltrate and disrupt them.

Sanho Tree DirectoroftheDrugPolicyProjectattheInstituteforPolicyStudies

2007

(3)

3

(the“drugthreat”),institutionsliketheUNOfficeonDrugs

andCrime,alongwithdomesticpolicyandlaw�Thishasled

toananomalousandmalfunctioningsysteminwhichdrug

useisacknowledgedasprimarilyapublichealthissuebut

responsesarecriminaljustice-based,primarilydealtwith

bypoliceandmilitaryenforcementaimedatdrugusers,

dealersandproducers�

Ironically,astheUNODChasbelatedlyacknowledged,

itisthesesamepunitivedrugenforcementpoliciesthat

arecreating,orfuelling,muchofthedrugmarket-related

criminalityinthefirstplace�

The economic dynamics of illegal drug markets and criminality

Thelinksbetweendrugsandcrimearecomplex�However,

thereisaneconomicdynamicatplaywhichactivelyfuels

thecriminalitythatenforcementissupposedtoeliminate�

Thesqueezingofsupplyinademand-ledmarkethas

twokey“criminogenic”effects,resultingmainlyfrom

enforcementincreasingprice�Thefirstisthecreationof

avastopportunityforcriminalentrepreneurs(see “How much is the illegal drug trade worth?”,p�6)�Thesecondis

acquisitivecrimecommittedbylow-incomedependentdrug

userstosupporttheirhabits�

Thispriceincreasereflectsbothenforcementrisksbeing

incorporatedintoillicitdrugpricing,andfromunregulated

profiteering(see Figure 1)�Thisisthe“alchemyof

prohibition”(5)bywhichlow-valueagriculturalproducts

becomeliterallyworthmorethantheirweightingold�

Druglawenforcershighlightthe

futilityofdruglawenforcement

“I invite you all to imagine that this year, all drugs produced and trafficked around the world, were seized:

the dream of law enforcement agencies. Well, when we wake up having had this dream, we would realize that the same amount of drugs – hundreds of tons of heroin, cocaine and cannabis – would be produced again next year. In other words, this first dream shows that, while law enforcement is necessary for drug control, it is not sufficient. New supply would keep coming on stream, year after year.”(6)

Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UNODC, 2007

“If demand [for drugs] persists, it’s going to find ways to get what it wants. And if it isn’t from Colombia it’s going to be from someplace else.”(7)

Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, 2001

“As long as there is a demand for drugs in this country, some crook is gonna figure out how to get ’em here...”(8) George W Bush, US president, 2002

“Over the past 10-15 years, despite interventions at every point in the supply chain, cocaine and heroin consumption have been rising, prices falling and drugs have continued to reach users. Government interventions against the drug business are a cost of doing business, rather than a substantive threat to the industry’s viability.”(9)

UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit Drugs Report 2003 Figure1:Howthepriceofdrugsisinflatedthroughtheillicitmarket

(4)

Making a bad problem worse

DruglawenforcementcanalsohaveaDarwinian“survival

ofthefittest”effect�Theleastcompetentcriminalsarenot

onlycaughtmoreoftenbylawenforcement(especially

whendrivenbyarresttargets),butarealsomorelikelyto

besuccessfullyconvicted,leavingthemarkettothemost

powerful,efficientandruthless�

Whilstenforcementcanshowseeminglyimpressiveresults

intermsofarrestsandseizures,impactsonthemarket

areinevitablymarginal,localisedandtemporary�Indeed,

astheUNODCacknowledges,oneoftheunintended

consequencesofthewarondrugsistheso-called“balloon

effect”,wherebyratherthaneliminatingcriminalactivity,

enforcementjustmovesitsomewhereelse�When

enforcementdoestakeoutcriminals,italsocreatesa

vacuum,andevenmoreviolence,asrivalgangsfightfor

control�

TheCrimeCostsofthe

WaronDrugs

1�Streetcrime

Thereisdebateoverhowmuchdrug-relatedstreetcrime

resultsfromdrugpolicyandlaws,asopposedtodruguse

andintoxication,ortowhatextentinvolvementincrime

leadstodruguse,ratherthantheotherwayround�(10)There

arealsomanyculturalandeconomicfactorsthatimpacton

bothstreetcrimeanddruguse,includinginequalityand

deprivation�

However,whileestimatesarehardtoformulateandoften

contentious,(11)itisclearthatasignificantproportionofthe

streetcrimeandsexworkblightingurbanenvironments

hasitsrootsinthewarondrugs�Theseproblemsresult

fromthecriminallycontrolledsupplyanddramatically

inflatedpricesthedrugwarhascreated�

FromMexicotoLondon,druggangactivity,especially

“turfwars”overterritoryandmarkets,isamajorsource

ofviolence,intimidationandotherantisocialandcriminal

behaviour,withvulnerableyoungpeopleinparticularbeing

drawnintosuchpatternsofoffending�

• AccordingtotheUSDepartmentofJustice,900,000

criminallyactivegangmembers–athirdofthem

juveniles(12)–in20,000streetgangs,inover2,500cities,

dominatetheUSdrugstrade(13)

• Low-incomedependentdruguserscommitlarge

volumesofpropertycrimetofundtheirhabits�Astudy

bytheUKPrimeMinister’sStrategyUnitin2003stated

thatdrugusersareresponsiblefor56%ofallcrimes,

including:“85% of shoplifting, 70-80% of burglaries, [and] 54% of robberies�”(14)

• Low-incomedependentusers(mostlywomen)also

oftenresorttostreetsexworktobuydrugs�TheUK

HomeOfficeestimatedthat80-95%ofstreetsexworkis

drug-motivated�StudiesfromAsia,RussiaandUkraine

showinjectingdrugusersaremorelikelythanother

sexworkerstoengageinstreetsoliciting�(15)Drugusing

streetsexworkersalsofaceincreasedriskofarrest,and

ofviolencefromclients,pimpsandpolice(16)

Bycontrast,theseproblemsarevirtuallyabsentfromlegal

alcoholandtobaccomarkets,underliningthattheystem

fromthecurrentlawenforcement-basedapproachrather

thandruguseperse�

Whilstthereis,ofcourse,criminalityinvolvedinalcohol

andtobaccosmuggling(andasmallerproportionof

counterfeiting),andalsostreetcrimeassociatedwithalcohol

intoxication,therearefewifanyoftheproblemsofstreet

dealing(licensedsalesnegatingtheneed),violencebetween

rivalretailers(brewers,publandlordsandtobacconists

donotattackeachother),orfundraisingcrimecommitted

bydependentusers(alcoholortobaccodependencecan

bemaintainedatafractionofthepriceofheroinorcrack- cocainedependence)�

2�Criminalisingusers

Despiteitsaimofreducingoreliminatingillegaldruguse

entirely,globalusagehasrisendramaticallysincethewar

ondrugsstarted�Asaresult,thecurrentapproachhas

criminalisedvastnumbersofotherwiselaw-abidingpeople�

TheUNODCestimates,conservatively,thatbetween155and

250millionpeopleworldwide,or3�5%to5�7%of15-64-year- olds,usedillicitsubstancesatleastonceinthelastyear�

Globallifetimeusagefiguresprobablyapproachonebillion�

(5)

5

Whilethedecriminalisationofdrugsissometimesportrayed

asalibertarianapproach,infactdruglawscriminalising

possessionforpersonaluseareatoddswiththelawin

mostcountriesasitappliestocomparablepersonalchoices

regardingsovereigntyoverone’sbodyandfreedoms

regardingindividualrisk-takingdecisions�Theseinclude

freedomoverwhatweeat,whatmedicineswetakeand

howweconsumelegaldrugssuchasalcoholandtobacco,

throughtooursexualhabits,involvementwithdangerous

sportsorotherpotentiallyhigh-riskconsensualactivities�

• Theimpactofcriminalisationandenforcementvaries,

withsanctionsagainstdrugusersrangingfromformal

orinformalwarnings,finesandtreatmentreferrals

(oftenmandatory),tolengthyprisonsentencesand

punishmentbeatings�Withinpopulationsimpactsalso

vary,butareconcentratedonyoungpeople,certain

ethnicandotherminorities,sociallyandeconomically

deprivedcommunities,andproblematicusers

• Punishmentsforpossession/useareoftengrossly

disproportionate,violatingakeytenetofinternational

law�InUkrainethepossessionofminimalamountsof

drugs(from0�005g)canleadtothreeyearsin

prison�(17)InRussia,solutiontracesinausedneedlecan

leadtooneandahalfyearsinprison�InGeorgia,drug

urinetestscanleadtoimprisonment(18)

3�Massincarceration

Thecriminaljustice-ledapproachtodrugshasfuelleda

hugeexpansionofprisonpopulationsoverthelast50years�

Whilesignificantnumbersareincarceratedforpossession/

usealone,farmoreareimprisonedfor“drug-related”

offending,overloadingthecriminaljusticesystemsof

countriesallovertheglobe�

Thesearemainlylowlevelplayersintheillicittrade,and

low-incomedependentusersoffendingtosupporttheiruse

asdescribedabove�Therehasalsobeenagrowinguseof

arbitrarydetentionmasqueradingas“drugtreatment”in

centresthatareoftennomorethanprisons,aswellasthe

useoflengthypre-trialdetentionfordrugoffenders�

• In2008,overhalfofUSfederalinmateswerein

prisonasaresultofadrugcharge(19)–asignificant

contributingfactortothestatisticthatonein100

Americansiscurrentlyincarcerated(20)

• In2005,Chinahadapproximately700mandatorydrug

detoxificationcentresand165“re-educationthrough

labour”centres,housingatotalofmorethan350,000

drugusers(21)

Currentdrugpolicieshaveledtospirallingprisonpopulations(Photocredit:CaliforniaDepartmentofCorrectionsandRehabilitation)

(6)

4�OrganisedCrime

Themarketcreatedbythecollisionofprohibitionandhigh

demandhasbeenseizedbyorganisedcrimewithruthless

efficiency,andatdevastatingcost�The“vast”illicittrade,

astheUNODCdescribesit(seebox),isoneofthebiggest

revenuegeneratorsfororganisedcrime

worldwide�(22)Ithasspawnedarangeofothercriminal

activities,includinginternationalmoneylaunderingand

widespreadcorruption�Theuntaxedprofitsarealsooften

reinvestedinexpandingcriminaloperationsinotherareas

suchasextortion,kidnappingandrobbery�

Money laundering

Moneylaunderingofteninvolvescomplextechniques

for“cleaning”the“dirty”profitsofillegalactivitiesso

astodisguisetheirillicitorigin�Thegeneraltechniques

usedincludeplacingthemoneyinthefinancialsystem,

reinvestment,andmovementbetweenjurisdictions�(23)More

specifically,thiscaninvolveinternetgambling,international

moneytransferservices,bureauxdechange,transnational

preciousmetalmarkets,realestatemarkets,andhighcash

turnoverbusinessessuchaspizzeriasandcasinos�Shell

banks,frontcompaniesandtaxhavensarealsoused�

The(oftenunknowing)involvementoflegitimatebusinesses

andfinancialservicesintheseprocesseshasblurredthe

boundariesbetweencriminalandlegitimateeconomies,

andbringswithitarangeofsocialandeconomiccosts–not

leastincreasingcriminalityinmainstreamlife�

Asaresultoftheintimaterelationshipbetweendrugprofits

andthemoneylaunderingindustry,the1988UNConvention

AgainstIllicitTrafficinNarcoticDrugsandPsychotropic

Substances(24)wasthefirstmultilateralagreementtoinclude

measuresagainstmoneylaundering�

Estimatesofthevalueofmoneylaunderedvary,because

theseactivitiesarecomplexandclandestine,andthe

proceedsofdifferentcriminalventuresareoften

intermingled�(25)However,availableestimatesdoindicate

thevastscaleoftheoperations,withdrugprofitsprobably

secondonlytofraudasasourceofmoneylaunderingcash�

• TheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)estimates

thattotalmoneylaunderingrepresents2-5%ofglobal

GDP�A2001estimateputtotaldrugprofitssuccessfully

launderedeachyearat$200billion(28)

• AccordingtoaUSSenateestimatein2011,(29)Mexican

andColombiandrugtraffickingorganisationsgenerate,

removeandlaunder$18billionand$39billionayear

respectivelyinwholesaledistributionproceeds

• TheExecutiveDirectoroftheUNODCsaidhehadseen

evidencethattheproceedsoforganisedcrimewere“the only liquid investment capital”availabletosomebanks

in2008�Hesaidthatamajorityofthebillionsindrug

profitswereabsorbedintotheeconomicsystem,and

thatasaresult:“Inter-bank loans were funded by money that originated from the drugs trade and other illegal activities ... There were signs that some banks were rescued that way.”(30)

Howmuchistheillegaldrugtrade

worth?

TheUNODChasmadeseveralattemptstovaluethe

globaldrugmarket�Its2005WorldDrugsReport,

forinstance,putsthemarket’svalueatUS$13bnat

productionlevel,$94bnatwholesalelevel(comparable

withtheglobaltextilestrade)andUS$332bnatretail

level�Furthermore,ina2011reporttheagencystated

thattheillicitdrugtradeisthemostprofitablecriminal

sector,accountingforonefifthoftheestimated

US$1�5tngeneratedbyalltheworld’scrime�(26)

Thereportfocusedonthemarketforcocaine,probably

themostlucrativeillicitdrugfortransnationalcriminal

groups�Traffickers’grossprofitsfromthecocainetrade

stoodataround$84billionin2009�Noestimatesare

availableofnetcriminaldrugprofitsglobally�

The2007WorldDrugsReportputthesesumsinto

perspective,notingthatthevalueofglobalhuman

traffickingwasestimatedbytheInternationalLabour

OrganizationtobeUS$32billion,whiletheSmallArms

Surveyestimatedthevalueoftheillicitfirearmstrade

tobearoundUS$1billion�(27)

(7)

7

Corruption

Corruptioninevitablyflowsfromthehugefinancial

resourcesatthedisposalofhigh-levelplayersintheillicit

drugtrade�Theirwealthenablesthemtosecureandexpand

theirbusinessintereststhroughpayingofficialsatalllevels

ofpolice,thejudiciaryandpolitics�Thepotencyofthis

corruptionisenhancedusingthethreatofviolencetoforce

theunwillingtotakebribes(astheyputitinMexico,“plomo

oplata”–“leadorcash”)�Drugcartelsalsotakeadvantage

ofvulnerableinstitutionsandindividualsbyconcentrating

productionandtransitinregionswherepovertyandweak

governanceexist�Theresulthasbeenadramaticerosion

ofgoodgovernance(orpreventionofitsdevelopment)and

actualorthreateneddestabilisationofentirenationstates

andregions(31)(seetheCounttheCostsdevelopmentand

securitybriefingatwww�countthecosts�orgforfurther

information)�

AstheUNODChasdescribedit:

“The magnitude of funds under criminal control poses special threats to governments, particularly in developing countries, where the domestic security markets and capital markets are far too small to absorb such funds without quickly becoming dependent on them. It is difficult to have a functioning democratic system when drug cartels have the means to buy protection, political support or votes at every level of government and society. In systems where a member of the legislature or judiciary, earning only a modest income, can easily gain the equivalent of some months’ salary from a trafficker by making one ‘favourable’ decision, the dangers of corruption are obvious.”(32)

• Guinea-Bissau,oneoftheworld’sleastdeveloped

countries,hasrecentlybecomeamajorcocaine

traffickinghub(enroutefromLatinAmericato

Europe),asdrugsarebeingsmuggledintothecountry

withthehelpofthemilitary,policeandjudiciary�This

systematiccorruptionhaspoliticalinvolvement,allthe

wayuptoheadofstatelevel(33)

• Between1993and1997,roughlyhalfofallconvictions

ofUSpoliceofficersthroughFBI-ledcorruptioncases

werefordrug-relatedoffenses(34)

• TransparencyInternationalhasreportedthat:“Mexico’s police and armed services are known to be contaminated by multimillion dollar bribes from the transnational narco-trafficking business. Though the problem is not as pervasive in the military as it is in the police, it is widely considered to have attained the status of a national security threat.”(35)

• TheUNODCestimatesthatdrugsandbribesarethetwo

largestincomegeneratorsinAfghanistan,amountingto

abouthalfofthecountry’sGDP(36)

• TheWorldBankfoundthatbribeswerepaidin50%of

allColombianstatecontracts,andthatcorruptionin

Colombiacosts$2�6billionannually,theequivalentof

60%ofthecountry’sdebt(37)

5�Violentcrime

Absenttheformalregulationusedinthelegitimate

economy,violenceisthedefaultregulatorymechanismin

theillicitdrugtrade�Itoccursthroughenforcingpayment

ofdebts,throughrivalcriminalsandorganisationsfighting

toprotectorexpandtheirmarketshareandprofits,and

throughconflictwithdruglawenforcers�

Gangsorcartelsthatareprimarilyfinancedbythesaleof

illicitdrugshavebeenimplicatedinasubstantialproportion

ofstreetviolenceandhomicides�InLosAngeles,for

example,gang-relatedhomicidesaccountedfor43%ofthe

Byitsverynature,thewarondrugsgeneratesviolentandorganised

crime(Photocredit:“macwagen”)

(8)

1,365homicidesthattookplacebetween1994and1995,94%

ofwhichinvolvedfirearms�(38)

However,farfromlawenforcementreducingviolence,it

oftenexacerbatestheproblem�Asacomprehensivereview

bytheInternationalCenterforScienceinDrugPolicystates:

“Contrary to the conventional wisdom that increasing drug law enforcement will reduce violence, the existing scientific evidence strongly suggests that drug prohibition likely contributes to drug market violence and higher homicide rates.”(39)

Andthesefindingsare:

“consistent with historical examples such as the steep increases in gun-related homicides that emerged under alcohol prohibition in the United States and after the removal of Colombia’s Cali and Medellin cartels in the 1990s. In this second instance, the destruction of the cartels’ cocaine duopoly was followed by the emergence of a fractured network of smaller cocaine-trafficking cartels that increasingly used violence to protect and increase their market share.”

Eventheillegalcannabismarkethasreachedascalethat

meansitisincreasinglycharacterisedbyviolence�Supply

totheUSisnowamajorpartoftheMexicandrugcartels’

profits(estimatesrangefrom15-60%(40)),withavalueof

around$1�5billion�(41)Similarly,thecannabismarketin

BritishColumbia,Canada,isestimatedtobeworthabout

C$7billionannually,mainlythroughsupplyingtheUS�

Itisthelucrativenatureofthismarketthathasledtoa

ferociousgangwarbeingwagedtocontroltheprofits�(42)

Drugprofitsarealsofuellingviolenceinwidernational

andregionalconflicts�Manyaffectedcountries,suchas

Colombia,AfghanistanandBurma,havelonghistoriesof

internalandregionalconflict�However,drugmoneyhas

playedamajorroleinmotivatingandarmingseparatist

andinsurgentgroups,anddomesticandinternational

terrorgroups,blurringthedistinctionbetweenthem

andcriminalgangs�Inthelongerterm,violencecan

traumatisepopulationsforgenerations,inparticular

fosteringacultureofviolenceamongstyoungpeople�

• TheopiumtradeearntheTalibanandotherextremist

groupsalongthePakistan-Afghanistanborderupto

$500millionayear,similartothecocainerevenues

thatfundColombia’sFARC(RevolutionaryArmed

ForcesofColombia)(43)

• AttheheightoftheColombiandrugwarsin1990,

theannualmurderratewasoneper1000ofthe

population–3timesthatofBrazilandMexico,and10

timesthatoftheUS(44)

• InSoutheastAsia,thegrowingmethamphetamine

tradeislinkedtoregionalinstabilityandconflict�

MinoritygroupsfromtheWaandShanstatesare

fundinginsurgencyoperationsagainstBurma’s

militaryjuntathroughthemanufactureand

Prohibition creates violence because it drives the drug market underground. This means buyers and sellers cannot resolve their disputes with lawsuits, arbitration or advertising, so they resort to violence instead.

Violence was common in the alcohol industry when it was banned during Prohibition, but not before or after.

Violence is the norm in illicit gambling markets but not in legal ones. Violence is routine when prostitution is banned but not when it’s permitted. Violence results from policies that create black markets, not from the characteristics of the good or activity in question.

Jeffery Miron SeniorLecturer,HarvardUniversityDepartmentofEconomics

(9)

9

wholesaledistributionofmethamphetamineand

opiumtoThailand,Chinaandothercountriesinthe

region(49)

• A2011UNODCglobalstudyintohomicideestimated

thatincountrieswithhighmurderratesdueto

organisedcrime,suchasthoseinCentralAmerica,

menhaveaonein50chanceofbeingmurdered

beforetheyreachtheageof31(50)

6�Crimesperpetratedby

governments/states

Therearearangeofillegalactsperpetratedbystates

orgovernmentsunderthebannerofthewarondrugs

(explored in more detail in the Count the Costs Human Rights Briefing at www.countthecosts.org)�Theseinclude

useofthedeathpenalty,extrajudicialkillingsand

assassinations,arbitrarydetentionwithouttrial,corporal

punishment,andotherformsoftorture,cruel,inhuman

anddegradingtreatmentorpunishment�

• Approximately1,000executionsofdrugoffenders

takeplaceeachyear,indirectviolationof

internationallaw�(51)Methodsofexecutionamongthe

32jurisdictionsthatusethedeathpenaltyfordrug

offencesincludehanging,firingsquad,beheadings

andlethalinjection

• Somegovernments,notablytheUS,openlyengage

inillegaltargetedassassinationsofsuspecteddrug

traffickers(52)

• ThefirstthreemonthsofThailand’s2003“waron

drugscrackdown”saw2,800extrajudicialkillings

thatremainun-investigatedandunpunished�The

ThaiOfficeoftheNarcoticsControlBoardsuggested

inNovember2007that1,400ofthepeoplekilledhad

nolinktodrugs(53)

• Insomecountries,notablyinIndia,EastandCentral

Asia,drugusersareroutinelysenttodrugdetention

facilities,withouttrialordueprocess–forexample,

onthewordofafamilymemberorpoliceofficer

–formonthsoryears�Whilstsometimestermed

“treatment”or“rehabilitation”facilities,theyare

oftenindistinguishablefromprisons,anddetainees

arefrequentlysubjecttotortureanddeniedaccessto

essentialmedicines(54)

• Peoplewhousedrugsoraresuspectedofdrug

Drug-relatedviolenceinMexico

TheexplosionofviolenceinMexicosinceamajor

enforcementcrackdownagainstthedrugcartelswas

announcedbyPresidentCalderonin2006hasbeenastartling

demonstrationofthepotentialunintendedconsequencesof

thewarondrugs:

• TheMexicangovernmentestimatesthat34,000peoplehave

beenkilledindrug-relatedmurdersfrom2006-2010�Other

estimateswhichinclude2011dataputthefigureatover40,000�(45)Masskillings,beheadingsandpublicdisplaysofthe

deadhavebecomecommonplace

• AccordingtotheMexicangovernment,60%ofthecountry’sdrug-relateddeathsarethoseofmembersoforganised

criminalgroups,27%aregovernmentofficialsand13%areinnocentbystanders

• Historically,victimsofdrug-relatedviolencehavebeenmainlyyoungmales�Butincreasinglywomenandchildren

arebecomingvictimstoo�(46)Asmanyas4,000womenand1,000childrenhavebeenkilledtodate,andaround50,000

childrenhavelostatleastoneparent�(47)Youngpeoplearealsobeingdrawnintotheviolence,asarecentcaseofa

14-year-oldprosecutedformurderingfourpeopleonbehalfofaMexicancartelshows(48)

Figure2:DrugwarkillingsinMexicosincethelaunchof

PresidentCalderon’soffensiveondrugcartels

(10)

offences,areoftensubjecttocruelandunusual

punishmentsincludingdeaththreatsandbeatings;

extortionofmoneyorconfessionsthroughforced

withdrawalwithoutmedicalassistance;andvarious

formsofcruel,inhumananddegradingtreatment

inthenameof“rehabilitation”,includingdenialof

meals,beatings,sexualabuseandthreatsofrape,

isolation,andforcedlabour(55)

• Judicialcorporalpunishment(aformoftortureillegal

underinternationalhumanrightslaw)ismaintained

in40countries,andinatleast12itismaintained

fordrugandalcoholoffences(Singapore,Malaysia,

Iran,Yemen,SaudiArabia,Qatar,BruneiDarussalam,

Maldives,Indonesia[Aceh],Nigeria[northernstates],

LibyaandUAE)(56)

7�Economiccostsofdrugwar-related

crimeandenforcement

Accuratefiguresforspendingondruglawenforcementare

hardtocomeby,butrecentresearchsuggeststheUSalone

hasspent,ataconservativeestimate,$640billiondollars

sincePresidentRichardNixondeclaredawarondrugswith

aninitialbudgetof$100min1971�(57)Globally,annualspend

nowcertainlyexceeds$100billion�

Thecostsofdrugwar-relatedcrimeare,however,farhigher�

Forexample,theUKgovernmentspent£4�036billionin

2003ondrug-relatedenforcement(arrests,policedetention,

courtappearancesandprisonstays),(58)butthedrug-related

crimecostsofheroinandcocaineuseinEnglandandWales

alonewere£13�9bn�(59)Inotherwords,thecostsofcrime

wereseveraltimesthatspentonenforcement�Withfigures

onthisscaleprobablyreplicatedinotherconsumer,transit

andproducercountries,thetotaleconomiccostsofdrug- relatedcrimearestaggering–inthehundredsofbillionsof

dollarseveryyear�

Aretherebenefits?

Thekeybenefitpromised50yearsagoforinstigatinga

criminaljustice-leddrugcontrolsystemwastoreduce,or

eliminate,the“evil”ofdrugaddiction�This,itwasclaimed,

wouldbeachievedthroughenforcement-ledsupply

restrictionsandareductioninlevelsofdemandcaused

bythedeterrenteffectoflegalsanctionsagainstusers�

However,sincethendruguseandrelatedhealthharms

haverisenfasterthananypreviousperiodofhistory,even

acceleratingduringtheescalationofthewarondrugsin

the1980s�Despiteeverincreasingresourcesbeingdirected

intosupply-sideenforcement,thecriminalmarkethasmore

thanmetthisgrowingdemand�

Despiteitsfailuretoachieveitsstatedaims,thewarondrugscostsbillionsofdollarstoenforceeveryyear(Photocredit:MikeMahaffie)

(11)

11

Thereisalsonoevidencepunitiveenforcementsignificantly

detersuse�Comparisonsbetweenstatesorregionsshow

noclearcorrelationbetweenlevelsofuseandtoughness

ofapproach,(60)nordostudiestrackingtheeffectsof

changesinpolicy–forexampleifnewlawsdecriminalising

possessionareintroduced�(61)Inshort,anydeterrenceisat

bestmarginalcomparedtothewidersocial,culturaland

economicfactorsthatdrivedruguse�

Drugenforcementdoesofcourseleadtothearrestand

prosecutionofseriousandviolentcriminals,likeColombia’s

PabloEscobar,whoarerightlybroughttojustice�Thisseems

anobviousbenefitbothforthefamiliesandcommunities

ofthevictims,andforthemaintenanceofcivicorder�

However,asnotedrecentlybyPierreLapaque,chiefofthe

UNODC’sOrganizedCrimeandAnti-Money-Laundering

Unit,“imprisoned criminals will be immediately replaced by others, and their activities will continue as long as crime is lucrative.”(62)TheUNODCalsonowacknowledgesthatthese

individualsarepartofthe“vastcriminalblackmarket”that

hasbeencreatedbythewarondrugsinthefirstplace�

Therearepossibilitiesforimprovingthetargetingof

enforcementeffortstowardsthemostharmfulelements

ofthecriminaltrade,(63)butthestarkrealityisthatthe

nominalbenefitsofenforcementsimplyshifttheproblem

geographically,fromonecriminalgrouptoanother,or

displaceusersfromonedrugtoanother–theUNODC’s

ballooneffectinaction�(64)

Sowhilstthewarondrugscaneliminatepeoplelike

Escobar,italsoenablestheirrisetopowerandcandolittle

ornothingtoeliminatethewidercriminalmarketthat

peoplelikehimareapartof�

Finally,theUKHomeOfficesuggeststhatcriminalisingusers

canleadtothemaccessingtreatmentthroughbeingarrested

anddrugtested�(65)Evidencefromothercountries,however,

suggeststhestigmaandfearofarrestdeterpeoplefrom

seekingtreatment,anditismoreeffectivetodivertusers

intotreatmentwithoutharmingtheirfutureprospectswith

acriminalrecordfordruguse�(66)

Theenforcement-ledaproachtodrugshasnotsucceededinbringingaboutasustainedreductioninlevelsofcrimeordruguse

(12)

Conclusions

Thebattlecrytofighta“waragainstdrugs”hashadsuch

politicalpotencythatitsnegativecostshaveundergonelittle

properscrutiny�Evaluationofdruglawenforcementstill

invariablyfocusesonprocessmeasures,likearrestsand

drugseizures,ratherthanmeaningfulindicatorsthatmight

demonstratefailure–suchaslevelsofavailability,orhealth

andsocialcosts,includingthecreationofcrime�(67)When

thesewidercostshavebeenconsidered,theconclusions

haveoftenbeensuppressedordrownedoutbyshrilldrug

warrhetoricandlawandorderpopulism�

Worsestill,aself-justifyingfalselogicnowprevails:as

thecriminaljusticeproblemsassociatedwithillegaldrug

marketsgetworse,thesesameproblemsareusedtojustify

anintensificationoftheveryenforcementmeasuresthat

arefuellingthem�

Asaresult,whilstmanygovernments,andtheUNODC,

publiclyacknowledgetheunintendedcrimecostsofthe

currentsystem,theyhaveyettomeaningfullymeasure

them,letaloneexaminepolicyalternativesthatmight

reducethem�Itisthislackofpoliticalwillthatisthemain

obstacletoprogress,notmethodologicalchallengesin

makingsuchassessments�

Inshort,thekeytocountingthecrimecostsofthewaron

drugsissimplytostarttrying�

TheUNODCinparticularneedstodirectresourcesinto

measuringcosts–forexamplebyincludingthemincountry

questionnaires,byproducingrelevantanalysesinitsWorld

DrugsReport,andbycommissioningindependentresearch

–andshowleadershipandguidancetomemberstates�

ThegoalsoftheCounttheCostsinitiativearewidelyshared

–asafer,healthierandmorejustworld�Itistimeforall

sectorsaffectedbycurrentapproachestodrugs,particularly

thoseagencies,organisationsandindividualsconcerned

withcrimereduction,tocallongovernmentsandtheUN

toCount the Costs of the War on Drugs, and explore the alternatives�

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Sanho Tree

‘WhatDarwintellsusaboutthedrugwar’,2007�

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Jeffery Miron

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(13)

13

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SeriesReport#6:EconomicandSocialConsequencesofDrugAbuse

andIllicitTrafficking’,NewYork,NY:UNDCP,1998,p�39�

(33)UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,‘CocaineTraffickingin

WestAfrica:Thethreattostabilityanddevelopment’,2007�

(34)UnitedStatesGeneralAccountingOffice,‘LawEnforcement:

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(35)Gutiérrez,M�,‘GlobalCorruptionReport2001:CentralAmerica,the

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(36)UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,‘Corruptionin

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Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-Eng�pdf

(37)Herrera,E�W�,andCortés,N�U�,‘GlobalCorruptionReport2003:

SouthAmerica’,TransparencyInternational,2003,p�108�

(38)Hutson,H�R�etal,‘Theepidemicofgang-relatedhomicidesinLos

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(39)WerbD�etal,‘Effectofdruglawenforcementondrugrelated

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http://www�bbc�co�uk/news/world-latin-america-12194138

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InternationalDebateEducationAssociation,iDebatePress,2011�

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(14)

(50)UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime,GlobalStudyon

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offences:GlobalOverview2010’,HarmReductionInternational,2010,

and,Lines,R,‘Thedeathpenaltyfordrugoffences:Aviolationof

internationalhumanrightslaw’,HarmReductionInternational,2007�

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Vol�I,2010,pp�15-33�

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21,2004http://www�china�org�cn/english/China/98945�htm;He,Y�and

Swanstrom,N�,‘China’sWaronNarcotics’�Seealso:‘WhereDarkness

KnowsNoLimits:Incarceration,Ill-TreatmentandForcedLaboras

DrugRehabilitationinChina’,HumanRightsWatch,2010�

(55)FormoredetailsanddiscussionseetheCounttheCostshuman

rightsbriefingathttp://www�countthecosts�org/seven-costs/

undermining-human-rights

(56)Iakobishvili,E�,‘InflictingHarm:Judicialcorporalpunishmentfor

drugsandalcoholoffencesinselectedcountries’,HarmReduction

International(forthcoming2011)�

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anyofitsgoals’,Fox News,13May2010� http://www�foxnews�com/

world/2010/05/13/ap-impact-years-trillion-war-drugs-failed-meet- goals/#ixzz1Ymp6axXC

(58)‘Measuringdifferentaspectsofproblemdruguse:methodological

developments’,HomeOfficeOnlineReport,2006�

(59)Godfrey,C�etal,‘TheeconomicandsocialcostsofClassAdruguse

inEnglandandWales,2000’,2002�http://www�homeoffice�gov�uk/rds/

pdfs2/hors249�pdf

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Cannabis,andCocaineUse:FindingsfromtheWHOWorldMental

HealthSurveys’,WorldHealthOrganization,2008�http://www�

plosmedicine�org/article/info:doi/10�1371/journal�pmed�0050141

(61)Hughes,C�andStevens,A�,‘WhatCanWeLearnFromthe

PortugueseDecriminalizationofIllicitDrugs?’,British Journal of Criminlogy,2010�

(62)Lapaque,P�,‘Tracingdirtymoney-anexpertonthetrail’,August

2011�http://www�unodc�org/unodc/en/frontpage/2011/August/tracing- dirty-money-an-expert-on-the-trail�html?ref=fs2

(63)Seediscussionin:‘RefocusingDrug-RelatedLawEnforcementto

AddressHarms’,UnitedKingdomDrugPolicyCommission,2009�

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(64)Costa,A�,2008,p�10,opcit�

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homeoffice�gov�uk/crime/reducing-reoffending/dip/(accessed31

October2011)

(66)Hughes,C�andStevens,A�,2010,opcit�

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DrugPolicyConsortium�http://www�idpc�net/publications/idpc- briefing-time-for-impact-assessment

The War on Drugs: Count the Costs isacollaborative

globalprojectsupportedby

organisationsandexpertsfrom

allsectorsimpactedbyour

approachtodrugs,including:

internationaldevelopmentand

security,humanrights,health,

discriminationandstigma,

crime,theenvironmentand

economics�

For more information,

including on how you can get involved, visit :

www.countthecosts.org or email info@countthecosts.org

TransformDrugPolicyFoundation,registeredcharityno�1100518andlimitedcompanyno�4862177 Acknowledgements and thanks to: SteveRolles,LisaMackay,George

Murkin,MartinPowell,AxelKlein,DannyKushlick(TransformDrug

PolicyFoundation);ShaleenTitle,JackCole(LawEnforcementAgainst

Prohibition);NiamhEastwood(Release);PatrickGallahue,Damon

Barrett(HarmReductionInternational);andDanWerb(International

CenterforScienceinDrugPolicy)�

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