camera apostolica". His chances of success were conveyed, coo:
"questo papa presents non da xai volute :in a qui ai acstra volerne
«ac*ituire un dinaro con dire cheJl non vole Da*are veruno de 11 iebiti de papa Flo, ni quisti, ai altri, II che quando tuose seria gran botta a dicti fiorentini* <43 >.
If the ruling group already ¿new this, then it must be assumed that the mission was to placate the merchants so far as possible, simply by trying to appear concerned for their money. If, on the other hand, the r u l i n g g r o u p w a s not a l r e a d y a w a r e that the m a t t e r s t G o d t h u s , t h e n i t would indeed have been a great blow, Muna gran botta", to them. In either case, the prospects remained discouragingly low. Without doubt Piero knew that the likelihood of success was slim, for simultaneously the pope was seeking money from the Florentines to finance a venture against the Turks in Albania. Timoteo Xaffei had written to him on May 15 to express the pope's latest wish: "turn dolorem tuasque lachrymas, quas pro irruptione Turcorum in Albania emisisti, gratias habuit; sed gratiorem oblationem quam illi tuo nomine tuoque iussu feci..,* (50). So for Piero it cannot have been altogether unexpected that the pope took a hard line and demonstrated his reluctance to pay for the extravagances of his predecessor.
Once he had arrived in Rome, the Signoria increased their demands on Palmier! and wrote him frequent letters, urging him to recommend various people and benefices, and to beg the pope to send grain (51). At the same time that they were pressing him to act, the Signoria
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praised /iatteo'S conscientij'js IOrreSpGIiueri.Ce, alrl hi S cecii-at ion to his taSrC '• T w • . l "r” not every C<ne SUCCuHI ted tO ai.lSien 'S C ; t^ie OC J»r WckS par~icj*ar_y reca-citrant. "VIcemus *=x postremis ¿itteris tuis irustra ac id tempus labcrasse #ut te summus pontifex audiret", wrote the Signorla
;5 3 5. In the next letter Xatteo was told that he was being given an additional ten days to pursue the unfinished business •54.*. Xatteo must have used the time well, because the ban on the Florentine merchants who traded with the Turks, preventing them frcm taking communion, was lilted soon after. But the chief issue of the merchants* claim remained unresolved, and the Signoria once again exhorted Xatteo to do his utmost
<55 >,
Pope Paul II was not an easy man to deal with awing to his stubborn nature and to his love of tinkering in political affairs. For Palmier! to have wrung any concession from him was a major achievement, and having accomplished what he sought in the question of communion for Florentine merchants, little more could have been expected. Besides, success in the matter of the Florentine merchants* debts would certainly have constituted a coup, since Paul had already forcefully and explicitly declared himself unprepared to pay back the sums due. As a consequence, it is no surprise to discover that Palmieri failed to persuade Paul to pay the debts of Pius II, nor does any discredit reflect on him for having been rebuffed. Recording the ambassador*s departure from Rome at the end of his stay, Agostino explained the situation with some sympathy to Sforza:
"similiter a quisti di ancora partire de qui d, Xattheo Falmero oratore fiorentino, senza conclusione alcuna de cosa avesse ad fare, maxime intorno a la satisfactions de quilli loro bancheri dovevano havere dinari da la sancta memaria de Papa Pio spesi in beneficio de
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(57). From the Milanese reports, it is clear that the
pGpe
did talk with the ambassadors reasonably often and, moreover, that the problems in Florence were discussed (56). Unfortunately this is hardly conclusive proof of Xatteo’s presence, still less of his influence, as the solution tc the Florentine troubles was being debated both before Palmier! arrived in Rome and after he left. And if Xatteo's influence at Boise is hard to gauge, so too is the effect that Rome had on him. Judging by his omission of this episode in his Annales. it is probably best imagined that the effect was not especially pleasing. All of which gives him an elusive character, and makes it difficult to pin him down at any given moment. By focussing on how he was treated afterwards in Florence, a Florentine appreciation at least of Palmieri's work is revealed; more than this the material will not yield.According to the Florentine records, Xatteo arrived back in Florence on August 5 (59). During his absence* the internal struggle for power within the city had been continuing. It reached a climax on September 2 when a Signoria favourable to Piero allowed a parlamento to be called. Vith Piazza della Signoria surrounded by soldiers in Piero's pay, the crowd realized that the most sensible course of action was to
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agree to the request to institute a Balia for four months. This signified a victory for the Medireaas, and it was not long before it was iacided to Send to each of the ma^or Ita^ian stages ambassadors who would explain tne recent events in Florence, and report the news of a Medici triumph. For Xatteo to have been chosen as one of these ambassadors suggests that it was thought that he had performed well in Rome. He was not» however» given one of the most important embassies to undertake. These went to the more experienced Tommaso Seder ini, laconic Guicciardini, Antonio Siaolfi and Giovanni Canigiani* It should also be pointed out that the choice was more limited in September than in Xay because of the ban of exile imposed on several former principali. All the same, this was an indication of a new found respect for Xatteo's abilities as an ambassador.
L34
FaImieri's rise within che redime wao coniirnec and consolidated immediately by receiving an embassy to go to Bologna. The Milanese ambassador in Florence, Siccdemo Tranchedini, described ~o Galeazzo Maria Sicrza m a *etter or September 20, 14oò new che decision was reached to send ambassadors to the various states:
uf o poy rasónato, de mandare doy (ambasciatori) a Bologna et Ferrara perchè io Illustrissimo Duca de Modena richiede a Piero uno a luy ben fidato, etiam perche a costoro pare essere molto obligati a Bolognesi in questo loro caso, et ilo; sono veramente ..." (60). Three days later, Palmieri was elected by che Council 02 One Hundred to undertake this embassy to Bologna, indicating a broad acceptance of his increased status. Piero’s support will doubtless have been instrumental in promoting Matteo's candidacy for the considerable honour of thanking the Bolognese for their help. There could hardly have been a clearer demonstration of Medicean faith in Palmieri's loyalty.
In his Annales. Matteo himself made much of the Bolognese contribution to the safety of the Xedicean regime in Florence. It was the Bolognese who warned the Signoria that:
‘'nelle terre del Duca di Modena s'era ragunato molta gente per venire a Firenze per certe novità que parabantur in perni tiem libertatis. La qual novità non sendo nota, nostri Signori ..." (61). Perhaps because it ties in with the main stream of the narrative rather more neatly than the trip to Rome, he also mentions that he was sent to Bologna as an ambassador "ad significandum quietem et pacem civitatis et civium*1 (62). The official brief for Palmieri similarly makes plain the immense gratitude that Florence felt for the timely assistance and
friendship sc freely site red to tnem in their hour of neea. And it was
"jxi rencerai m iiniti ^ra ~ie . ..ce ¿ranciss*iui raven ^ne in ouesti rios^n oe* i^u*. e'v w<«4m<u«. naij*.u.l.' **3.vu^i -.«¿¿a ^wc*.a ¿uiia,i*.j. —'„a _>-*. _ .d ... *» i,»^r was this simply empty rhetoric, as can be judged from a letter sent by Sicodemo to Sforza in October. Vhile dealing chiefly with the whereabouts and intentions of Piero's adversaries, Nieodemo had also discussed with Piero the future of Bologna, stressing that the city “importi molto a ie cose de Vostra Celsitudine, et de esso Piero“ <54';. All of which serves to emphasise the key role being played by Palmieri.
Since the embassy was so straightforward, Xatteo was given just a fortnight tb complete it, and he left Florence on September 30, 1466 <65). There is no further correspondence in the republics records, and it can be safely assumed that he returned in the time allowed, his mission successfully accomplished. In any case, his next recorded presence in Florence was on November 3, when he spoke in a meeting of the pratlca, so if he exceeded his time limit it cannot have been by much ■ Co). None of the most readily available Bolognese chronicles records this embassy, despite recounting the help offered by Bologna and the efforts of the exiles to continue their fight (67).
As an interesting and connected episode, it is perhaps worth painting out that while Palmieri was in Bologna thanking the papal legate for past actions, Piero and liicodemo were interviewing Giovanni Bentivoglio's chancellor with the aim of discovering the intentions of the Bolognese (63). Xedicean diplomacy was based on personal contact as much
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as on formal ambassadorial missions. It was simpler for Piero to write to rsntivcglio aad for him to send his chancellor to talk directly, than to go through the lengthy rigmarole of appointing formally and briefing ambassadors. As a consequence, it need not be understood as stewing a lack of confidence in Palmieri; rather, it was tust a quicker aeans of communicating confidentially and informally when no resident ambassador
was on nand. '
Once more, with so little evidence to go on, the success cf Xatteo's mission can best be estimated by how he himself fared in the period following the embassy. Only three months later, in January 1467, he was elected as ambassador to iilan, so it seems reasonable to' suppose that he was again judged to have fulfilled his task admirably.
ir i ^ i 4£ rt _- x — L.
Although Fieri'3 adversaries had left the city, either tnrough exile or flight, their opposition to the regime did not cease, consequently, instead ct combatin-v tne er.emv witmn tne city's comin.es, Piero was obliged to shift his attention abroad. Even be: ore the ambassadors naci lett at the end. or SeC'temoer to reassure tne various powers in Italy that all was settled in Florence, plots were being hatched by the exiles to rout Piero, Writing to Pigello Portinari, factor of the Medici Bank in Milan and a close friend of Piero, Antonio Secho thought it wise to pass on what he had learned: "intendo che messer Dietisalvi (lieroni; et esso Nicold (Soderini) fanno molto proferte al capitanc Barthaiameo (Coileoni), oonfortandolo a torre la impresa contra Fiorenza'* ^59). Nothing resulted immediately from this initiative, but it remained close to the hearts of Dietisalvi Neroni and Piccolo Soderini, and Piero was told directly of their continuing efforts in a letter of November 20, 1466 (70). All that had been done, it seemed, was to distance the threat to the Medici regime; the threat itself had not been completely suppressed.
Quite the contrary, in fact, because according to Francesco Guicciardini the number and strength of those desiring to oust Piero was increasing, and the Venetians, Borso d'Este and the pope were all interested in supporting Bartolomeo Colleoni against Florence (71). Confronted with such a show of force, Piero wanted to resuscitate the alliance of Milan, Naples and Florence in order to demonstrate that the Medici grip on Florence was not so weak as her enemies wanted to believe.
As Jiccdeaio Tranchedini commenced later, "chi ha compagnia, ha signoria” . w 'd'rZ'~ ~ f w__- •Tiiwi.ai ¿ * '1 ^ 4U « -AjL-'Ci 1 J. w U •.. OU* V * ' J , - ^ J ! , Xv
‘
10
Ci\i«ci to BéTiU aiabassadors t^c jiap-^s ine Xi^aii, a day ^ a ^ r . by tie ^ouncii 02 Gilè Hundred, XàttéO Wà5 CÌiGSen àS t:ie à305535>iGr tG go to Milan ¿73). His increased ambassadorial experience sad Lis higher status in the regine qua li: led aia to receive such a rrucial embassy. For this embassy was of greater value to the republic than these to Rome and Bologna had been, being this time concerned with no less significant a matter than arranging for the security of the city with Florence's closest ally, the Duke of Xilan. Unfortunately, there is nothing that sheds light on why Palmieri was thought suitable for this embassy. Nonetheless, as it was his third embassy in eight months, presumably his friendship with, and certain loyalty to, Piero were highly significant.Yet Satteo did not relish the prospect of the journey to Xilan, and decided in his prudent way that it would be more sensible not to go. It is from Sicodemo that we learn his reasons for refusing: "Matheo ha renuntiato, credo perchè el temporale è pur fredo, et fangoso, etiam lui è grave de la persona, et anche antiquo" <74). Palmieri was 61 years old, and this is the first occasion on which he expressed his worry about his health. A year later he was to complain of his health again after returning from one embassy, and he then refused another embassy because of his poor health. In his place as ambassador *to Xiian was elected Luigi Guicciardini, who had last gone to Xilan as ambassador to offer Florence's condolences on the death of Francesco Sforza. Besides being a good friend of Palmieri's, Luigi was probably one of the two most influential men in Florence after Piero. In the same letter that Jficodemo
told Blanca and Galeazzo Maria Sforza of Palmieri‘3 refusai, STicodemo described a meeting that took place, ’’questa sera sene venuti a &£ tesser Tb.c12a.ec Sederino et messer Loyse Guicardino per parte de loro compagni de la pratica (75). That Xatteo should have been given preference over Luigi again highlights his new found prominence in tne regime, nowever. Iraimieri was e^e*--. i.ed at «ne wnvi of ^a^uar / a^ ^ììc «-*•*■ v*Ae w^-o .ix Guardia, so he stayed very much at the centre or the city’s politics <76).
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Xatteo's term oi office as one of the Otto turned out to be rather longer than he could have foreseen. In May 146” , the threat of war caused the Otto to be transformed into the Dieci, Accompanying the increase in membership was an increase in the powers the office was permitted to wield. As a result of its greater authority, candidates for the office of the Dieci had to be proposed by the Signoria and colleges and then confirmed by the Council of One Hundred before they could take up their positions <77'. Thus membership of the Dieci necessitated and indicated a fairly.broad acceptance within the rsggimsnto.
Xatteo’s colleagues on the Dieci included Tommaso Seder ini and Fierc da’ Medici (78). Despite the close ties between Tcmsaso and Mat tea, in his appointment as ambassador Xatteo will not been supported by Tommaso because he had been sent as an ambassador to Xilan in October 1467, and was only to return in May 1468 (79). Of the members of the Dieci, probably only the reputation of Bernardo Corbinelli stood as high as that of Matteo. As on other occasions, Palmieri's oratory and experience, combined with his loyalty to Piero made him the most suitable candidate, and he was elected by the Cento in late February to go to Rome as the Florentine ambassador <80). *
The diplomatic circumstances surrounding this embassy deserve a brief explanation. A year before, Bartolomeo Colleoni, the condctti'ere, •had joined with some of the exiles from Florence, and had started to move his troops against Florence, with the secret assistance of Venice. It was
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this development that was considered sufficiently serious in Florence tc warrant the creacion cf tie office of tie Dieci. To counter chic threat, some members of the Italian league formed an array which met Cciieoni‘3 army in an indecisive battle. A truce was agreec after this, and peace talks were initiated. These took place in Rome, where Otto Siocclini had been sent in July 14-67 to discuss the terms on bihalf of the republic. But progress was so slow chat the pope, Paul II, became impatient and on February 2, 1468 issued a bull containing a general peace without consulting the powers concerned. This peace renewed the earlier Italian league, and arranged for the contracting powers to pay fi:ced amounts to Colleoni, who would gc to Albania to take up the struggle against the Turks. Piero de’ Medici had no desire to pay sums of money to Ccllecni, who would be acting principally for the Venetians and the pope, and not for the league, and he also feared that the peace would not last (81). The Duse of Milan was vehemently apposed to the bull, and he suggested that Naples, Florence and Milan should present an alternative peace plan to the pope. Sew ambassadors were to be sent to Home in order to pursue this approach. Apparently it was thought that the “primi non fossero ben apti et bastanti ad esprimere la intentione <dei signori principali)“
(82).
It was in the light of these developments that on 24 February 1468 Matteo was elected ambassador to Rome, with the specific aim of acting jointly with Otto Siccolini to reach a satisfactory agreement (83). It is interesting to note that two days before the Signoria proposed Matteo, Lorenzo da Pesaro, the Milanese ambassador on his way to Rome, was able to inform Galeazzo Maria Sforza, from Florence, of the Florentine
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choice. Lorenzo aoproved of the selection; "io trove qua èssere horro ':en disposto di volere là pace quando le condicticne siar.c hcr.ee'e ■= ii;,;«, aitraaente asm lo compor ter arino", he wrote <24). In the acser.ce of any other reasons on why Palmieri was chosen, these sees entirely satisfactory, hinting as they do at his acral and political integrity. The two ambassadors left Florence together on February 24, and Xatteo arrived in Some on February 29, a day after Lorenzo <35;.
Having arrived in Pome, the ambassadors froa Florence, Xilan and Naples realised that the only way forward was by presenting a united front, and so they aet together on March 2 to discuss their joint plan of action. This approach was exactly what Piero had been urging on Otto ail along. Ke had written to him on February o "noi, come la amore Potentia della lega, attenderemo il parere et volontà della Maesta del Re e dello Illustrissimo Duca, et con essi ci confermeremo ..." <3ó). This had been reiterated in the latest letter the Dieci sent on February 25 to Xatteo and Otto: “ricordate in ogni cosa cogli ambasciatori de nostri collegati et seconda e pareri loro in nome della communita in ogni cosa seguitate" (87). The upshot was a decision “de parlare largamente in revccatione de le conditione attribuite ad Bartholomeo Galeone principalmente", which was the major stumbling block (88). Having then gained an audience with Paul II, the three new ambassadors in turn laid their case before the pope,