206. The Prosecution alleges that “for forty-four months, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps implemented a military strategy which used shelling and sniping to kill, maim, wound and terrorise
383 Kolp, T. 8310; Harding, T. 4445-6.
384 Karaveli}, T. 11905.
385 The troops were divided into thirteen or fourteen brigades, Cutler, T. 8995; Mole, T. 11080; Kolp, T. 8299;
Karaveli}, T. 11917; D144 (Decision on the units composing the 1st Corps signed by President Izetbegovi}). In addition to brigades, special forces and an artillery unit were part of the 1st Corps, Briquemont, T. 10116.
386 Karaveli}, T. 11787; Bukva, T. 18325. The Radinovi} Report (para. 133) estimates that the inner ring of Sarajevo numbered between 33,000 to 50,000 soldiers.
387 Carswell, T. 8383; O’Keeffe, T. 9179-81. In December 1992, there were 7 or 8 LIMAs (Cutler, T. 8009-10); in June 1993, 11 LIMAs (Garmeister, T. 8976); from September 1993, 6 or 7 (Garmeister, T. 8976). PAPAs were between 3 and 6 (Cutler, T. 8899-8900; Gardmeister, T. 8970).
388 In January-February 1994, the monitors increased due to the need to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weaponry;
Niaz, T. 9067.
389 Cutler, T. 8901; Carswell, T. 8330; 8358; In|i}, T. 18793-4.
390 Radinovi} Report, paras 105; 134.
391 Kolp, T. 8256; Rose, T. 10187-8; 10259.
392 Mandilovi}, T. 1011-2; Radinovi} Report, paras 105, 135.
the civilian inhabitants of Sarajevo. The shelling and sniping killed and wounded thousands of civilians of both sexes and all ages, including children and the elderly”.393 The Defence submits that the “City was neither shelled, nor targeted from snipers. When the SRK units acted, they always acted in self-defence, and only and exclusively on legitimate military targets in the city and on enemy’s firing position”.394 It argues that a war was being waged in an urban setting, which
“always includes collateral damages, especially when one side is not respecting its own obligations, like it was the case with the Muslim side, namely the obligation to remove civilians from the zone of military activities”, and “despite all precautions, it is not possible to control the opening of fire and the firing in urban conditions to avoid civilian casualties”.395 The Defence argues that the BiH Presidency intentionally attacked civilians on its side, pretending it came from the other belligerent party, to provoke the sympathy of the international community in favour of the BiH Presidency.396 207. In this section, the Trial Chamber reviews the evidence of deliberate sniping and shelling of civilians, both under the heading of scheduled incidents and at a more general temporal and geographical level. In fairness to the Accused, but also because of the amount of evidence relating to the scheduled incidents and the manner in which it was introduced and dealt with, the Trial Chamber recalls that it paid due attention to those incidents. It tried to the extent that was possible and reasonable to assess each scheduled incident on its own terms, but also with a limited reference to other evidence concerning the situation of civilians in Sarajevo. By this method, the Trial Chamber will make findings on whether the Prosecution has proved that the SRK deliberately carried out any of the alleged scheduled sniping and shellig attacks attacks against civilians or against persons whose status should have been presumed to have been civilian.
208. The Majority wishes to clarify at this point its reasoning in moving from the level of specific scheduled incidents to the level of a general campaign. It would be implausible to claim that 24 sniping attacks and 5 shelling attacks amounted to a “campaign”, in the sense above. The Majority makes no such claim. Spread out over a period of two years, the total of proved attacks, if any, could not in itself represent a convincing “widespread” or “systematic” manifestation of sniping and shelling of civilians. Therefore, the evidence which demonstrates whether the alleged scheduled incidents, if proved attacks, were not isolated incidents but representative of a campaign of sniping and shelling as alleged by the Prosecution is examined with no less due attention.
209. The Trial Chamber will examine first general evidence of sniping and shelling at civilians in ABiH-held areas of Sarajevo, then turn to evidence of sniping and shelling at civilians in specific
393 See Indictment, para. 4 (a).
394 Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 11 (footnote omitted).
395 Id., para. 13.
geographical areas of Sarajevo to consider whether, as alleged by the Prosecution, the sniping and shelling at civilians was conducted throughout the city of Sarajevo, that is in urban and rural neighbourhoods of Sarajevo.
1. General Evidence of Sniping and Shelling at Civilians in ABIH-held Areas of Sarajevo during the Indictment Period
210. The city of Sarajevo came under extensive gunfire and was heavily shelled during the Indictment Period. This is documented by UN reports, and other UN sources, which offer general assessments of the death or injury of Sarajevo civilians in the course of such attacks.397 John Hamill, a military observer who served with UNPROFOR from May 1993 to July 1994,398 explained that “Very, very few ₣shellingğ incidents actually stand out” in his mind because there were “a whole series of attacks that went on killing civilians in the city of Sarajevo” during his stay there.399 Francis Thomas, a Canadian officer who oversaw UNMOs in Sarajevo from October 1993 to July 1994,400 testified that upon his arrival the bulk of the shelling was directed at the city of Sarajevo and he could detail cases in which UN representatives observed “artillery fire on the ground, hitting civilians”.401 A 1993 UNPROFOR report indicated that shelling had resulted in a
“High level of civilian casualties relative to recent months”.402
211. The Defence submits however that the evidence suggests that the ABiH carried out attacks againt their own civilians to attract sympathy of the international community. The Prosecution accepts that the Trial Record discloses that elements sympathetic or belonging to the ABiH may have attacked the Muslim population of Sarajevo although it argues that this evidence was inconclusive.403 The Trial Chamber notes in this respect that Pyers Tucker, a British officer who
396 Id., paras 837-849.
397 See, for example, P358 (UNPROFOR report for November 1992); P618 (UN report for December 1992); D1826 (UNPROFOR weekly situation report for the period between 12 to 18 February 1993); D66 (Annex VI to 1994 UN report; P918 (UNPROFOR report of March 1993 – admitted under seal); P932 (UNPROFOR report of March 1993–
admitted under seal); P3689 (UNPROFOR report of October 1992 – admitted under seal). There is no dispute either that there was intense fire from within the city into SRK-controlled territory.
398 Hamill, T. 6059-60.
399 Hamill, T. 6165.
400 Thomas, T. 9255-7.
401 Thomas, T. T.9265, 9394. Thomas added that in the specific cases that he referred to, UN representatives “knew that there were nobody else ₣other than civilians at theğ location ₣of the shelling incidents.ğ”, Thomas, T. 9394.
402 P1963 (UNPROFOR situation report on 13-14 December 1993– admitted under seal). See also P2578 (UNMO summary for 4 March 1994 to 29 April 1994):”05 ₣Marchğ … civilian wounded vicinity Holiday Inn … 08 ₣Marchğ … 1 X BiH civilian wounded by ₣small-armsğ fire in Dobrinja area … 09 ₣Marchğ … 3 X BiH civilians wounded by
₣small-armsğ fire … 11 ₣Marchğ … 1 X BiH cilvian wounded by ₣small-armsğ fire … 13 ₣Marchğ 2 X BiH civilians wounded … 16 ₣Marchğ 3 X BiH civilians wounded by ₣small-armsğ fire, Dobrinja area … 17 ₣Marchğ … 3 X BiH cilivians wounded … 23 ₣Marchğ 1 x BiH civilian wounded ₣by small-armsğ fire … 15 ₣Aprilğ … 4 x BiH civilians wounded after ₣shootingğ … 23₣Aprilğ 1 x BiH civilian wounded ₣by small-armsğ fire … 26 ₣Aprilğ … 1 x BiH civilian wounded by ₣small-armsğ fire.” For the purpose of determining non-combatant status in P2578, “women and children were automatically considered civilians,” Thomas, T. 9474.
403 T. 21992-3.
served with UNPROFOR, testified that with respect to the firing upon a funeral taking place in a cemetery north of Koševo hospital, “people from ₣the United Nationsğ headquarters Sector Sarajevo, and I can name them if you need, told me that they had carried out investigations ₣…ğ and that they believed that that fire had come from Bosniak forces”.404 Similarly, a Canadian officer with the UNPROFOR testified that it was “‘common knowledge’ that ₣investigations carried out by the United Nationsğ strongly pointed to the fact that the Muslim forces did, on occasion, shell their own civilians” though, “for political reasons,” that information was not made public.405 Richard Mole, Senior UNMO from September to December 1992, testified that he was “sure – though ₣he could notğ give evidence of fact – that incidents occurred where, to perpetuate ₣the view that the population of Sarajevo was beleagueredğ … the Presidency forces may well have fired upon their own city to maintain that beleaguered viewpoint”. He added that United Nations investigations of certain incidents occurring in the Sarajevo during the conflict had concluded that “there was an element of doubt as to ₣whether the SRK or the ABiHğ had done the damage”.406 According to Michael Rose, the British general who commanded UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina from January 1994 to January 1995, what “was certain is that the Bosnian governement forces would, from time to time, fire at the Serbs, at particular moments of political importance, in order to draw back fire on to Sarajevo so that the Bosnian government could demonstrate the continuing plight of the people in Sarajevo”.407
212. On other occasions, UN sources also attributed civilian injuries and deaths to SRK actions, including deliberate targeting. According to General Francis Briquemont, who commanded UN forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 12 July 1993 to 24 January 1994,408 “There is no doubt that during the shelling” of Sarajevo by the SRK, “civilians were hit.”409 An ABiH source also attributed responsibility for civilian injuries and deaths in the city to the SRK. By letter dated 9 December 1993, ABiH General Rasim Delić complained to UNPROFOR that “the city of Sarajevo has been exposed to heavy shelling”, leading to “a great number of casualties among civilian population ₣...ğ I take this opportunity to inform you that I have warned ₣the SRKğ to stop the actions against the city of Sarajevo, otherwise I will have to issue an order to the units of the ₣ABiHğ to respond to the same level.”410
213. The Defence repeatedly proposed to witnesses who served the UN in Sarajevo that the physical damage was greater on the front line than in the city, implying that the casualties inflicted
404 Tucker, T. 9895-6; 9940.
405 Henneberry, T. 8734.
406 Mole, T. 9500-9501, 10997-99.
407 Rose, T. 10184-6, 10210-1.
408 Briquemont, T. 10037-9.
409 Briquemont, T. 10103.
in the city were unintentional. The Trial Record shows however that there was more shelling going into the city and that civilians, and the civilian population as such, in ABiH-held areas of Sarajevo were targeted from SRK controlled territory.
214. Hamill recounted an admission by an SRK officer to whom he spoke in relation to the Markale incident in February 1994: Colonel Cvetkovi} “was the commanding officer of the Bosnian Serb army artillery regiment based in Mrkovi}i. We interviewed him in connection with this incident because he was designated by Republika Srpska authorities to deal with us. ₣…ğ he also said that in the previous year, they had fired 30 to 40,000 rounds into the city and why were we so concerned about one round when they had fired so many”.411 An undated UNPROFOR military assessment of the situation in the city stated, without indicating its basis for doing so, that “Not all
₣SRKğ shelling is provoked. The ₣SRK soldiersğ often deliberately shell civilian targets in order to create civilian casualties.”412
215. John Ashton, who arrived in Sarajevo in July 1992 as a photographer,413 remembered that during his stay in Sarajevo, “The majority of things – the targets I saw were civilian targets. I saw a lot of people go out to water lines. These were targeted specifically. And I saw people try to cut down trees. I saw snipers actually shoot at people.”414 Morten Hvaal, a Norwegian journalist covering the conflict from September 1992 to August 1994,415 witnessed civilians being shot at
“more or less every day, if not every day”416 and estimated that he saw, or arrived within 30 minutes of, “50 to a hundred”417 instances where civilians were actually hit by small-arms fire.
Mirsad Kučanin, a criminal inspector with the Centre of the Security Service in Sarajevo,418 performed more than a hundred investigations of shooting and shelling incidents in the city of Sarajevo, and “in all of them, casualties were civilians.”419 Kučanin knew of at least 30 instances during the conflict when UNPROFOR was informed of shooting directed at civilians and took action such as placing armoured personnel carriers to block lines of sight.420 Mustafa Kovać, who
410 P1928 (Letter from Rasim Delić dated 6 December 1993).
411 Hamill, T. 6109.
412 P2442 (Collection of UNPROFOR documents), p. 37.
413 Ashton, T. 1204. Ashton was still present in Sarajevo in early 1994. Ashton, T. 1226-7.
414 Ashton, T. 1227. For example, Ashton helped in January 1993 a person who had been shot at night while cutting wood somewhere along “the main boulevard way downtown ₣andğ all the way out at to the PTT ₣buildingğ,” at a location where no military presence could be seen, Ashton, T. 1228-30.
415 Hvaal, T. 2249-50.
416 Hvaal, T. 2276.
417 Hvaal, T. 2277.
418 Kučanin, T. 4499.
419 Kučanin, T. 4556.
420 Kučanin, T. 4621-2. Witness Y, an UNPROFOR officer, confirmed that both the local authorities of Sarajevo and UNPROFOR erected barriers to protect the population of the city from shooting and shelling during the conflict,”notably along the access facing the Serb quarters, Serb neighbourhoods,” Witness Y, T. 10850-2. See also Kovać, T. 872-3.
worked with the Civil Defence organization in Sarajevo,421 explained that frequent shelling had caused civilian casualties in the city in 1992.422
216. Akif Mukanovi}, soldier with the ABiH, said that he felt more secure at the frontline than elsewhere in Sarajevo because “fire was opened less often” at the confrontation lines.423 This is concordant with the explanation given by Milan Mandilovi}, surgeon at the State Hospital, as to why civilian patients received at the State Hospital out-numbered combatants at least four to one.424 He said:
Sarajevo is a relatively large city with quite a large population, and you couldn’t keep that entire population in a basement. The population had to move around. People went to work. They had to go and fetch foodstuffs or humanitarian aid. ₣...ğ And it is precisely because of that that there were far more injured and wounded civilians coming into hospital. The soldiers were on the outskirts of town, and probably in trenches too, so that they did have some protection, and there were fewer of them, fewer soldiers than there were civilians.425
217. The Trial Record also contains evidence that civilians were deliberately targeted while engaged in civilian activities or while in civilian locations.
218. Ashton testified about fire-fighters targeted when tending fires started by shelling. He observed “an attack which lasted for an hour right next to the PTT building which hit a factory. The firemen came out to fight the fire and then of course there was a lull in the shelling and as soon as the firemen arrived they started firing again, the shells started coming in again.”426 In another occasion, during the shelling of a bakery compound, “the fire department responded despite the fact the shells continued to come down.” According to that witness, in that instance, UNPROFOR determined that the shelling had come from Grbavica, SRK-held territory.427
219. Ambulances were also targeted. They were sometimes driven at night, without flashing their lights, and not on main roads to avoid being fired upon.428 Witness AD, an SRK soldier, testified that the Commander of the Ilija{ Brigade gave orders to his mortar battery to target ambulances, a marketplace, funeral processions, and cemeteries further north from the city, in Mrakovo.429
421 Kovać, T. 839.
422 Kovać, T. 841-3.
423 Mukanovi}, T. 3086.
424 Mandilovi}, T.1022.
425 Mandilovi}, T.1036-8.
426 Ashton, T.1216.
427 Ashton, T.1390-1. Ashton took photographs of the incident in October 1992; its location is marked “P3” on map P3645 and the photograph is part of P3641, being ERN 0039 1285.
428 Mulaomerovi}, T.1632.
429 Witness AD, T. 10741-2 (closed session); 10756 (closed session). The witness also stated that he saw “artillery fire from, almost from the cemetery itself” from his lines. Witness AD, T. 10687 (closed session).
220. Hvaal testified that during the Indictment Period he attended funerals several times a week and saw that the Bosnian Serb army would shell them. On 20 to 30 occasions he claimed to have experienced a funeral procession being shelled. Hvaal pointed out that, over time, covering a cemetery became eventually very dangerous. Because of this, by the end of 1993 it “has become the rule” that funerals would be held only at night.430 Harding, a UNMO in Sarajevo from July 1992 until January 1993, said that funerals at the Lion Cemetery “took place all the time. Sometimes three or four at a time”. “Funerals were a fairly common thing to be attacked, and so it wasn’t unusual.” The attacks came from the north and north-east, “from the Bosnian Serb forces.” He gave evidence to the effect that the front line was so close at that point and that the Lion cemetery could be observed from it.431 Such attacks “happened a lot, it became normal and because it was considered normal, we didn’t make a report on it.”432 The digging of graves and holding of funeral services were conducted at night,433 and in some cases burials were not in cemeteries at all.434 221. According to UN military personnel, trams were also deliberately targeted by Bosnian Serb forces. Fraser, an UNPROFOR representative in Sarajevo from April 1994 onwards, testified: “I can indicate to you there was one shooting in the city on the tram, where some people were shot and killed and they were identified as civilians.”435 Adrianus Van Baal, UNPROFOR Chief of Staff in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994, testified that on 16 March 1994 General Milovanovi}, the Chief of the Main Staff of the VRS, threatened that if the trams in Sarajevo continued to run, he would ensure that they and their passengers would be targeted. Van Baal said that following the threat, the trams which continued to run were indeed targeted.436
222. Civilians in ABiH-held areas of Sarajevo deferred even basic survival tasks to times of reduced visibility, such as foggy weather437 or night time, because they were targeted otherwise.
Civilians would often collect wood at night, in particular, older people, “because they couldn’t
430 Hvaal, T. 2286, 2290.
431 Harding, T.4324-6. He drew a line with the letter "S" on map to indicate the front line and a cross and "L" to indicate the lion Cemetery.
432 Harding, T. 4393. The witness stated that Major Nikolai Roumiansev, a Russian officer with UNPROFOR, did not make any suggestion that there was outgoing fire from the Lion Cemetery which may have attracted incoming fire (T.
4395). However, ABiH armoured vehicles were seen from PAPA 3 near the Cemetery itself (T. 4471).
433 [ehbajraktarevi}, a funeral director, stated that they had to dig the graves at night because Sarajevo was safer in the darkness. Funeral rites were shortened to a minimum. The witness testified of the shelling of Fatima Karcic’s funeral procession around 4 pm in June 1993, which killed eight people on the spot. “A shell fell and hit a plum tree, and killed eight people on the spot. My men went to pick up the bodies.” After that, the Municipal Assembly gave orders to conduct funerals at night, [ehbajraktarevi}, T.1777-8.
434 Kupusovi}, T.666.
435 Fraser, T. 11229-30.
436 Van Baal, T.9862-3.
437 Kupusovi}, T. 662: “people were happy when there was a thick fog in town and around it, when there was no sniping.” Thomas discussed P1927, which was a UNMO Daily SitRep of 4-5 December 1993), T. 9300-1. The document refers to reduced sniper activity as a result of poor visibility.
move as fast and they knew it was risky to travel during the day.”438 Schools were closed, and temporary neighbourhood schools were established in cellars, to minimize the distance that children had to travel to their classes, and therefore their exposure to sniping and shelling.439 Many civilians lived for a long period of time in the cellars of their buildings in order to avoid the shells.440 They learned to move around as little as possible,441 rarely leaving their apartments:442 some old people were “literally dying of malnutrition because they were too terrified to come out.”443
223. Because obtaining food and water was fraught with danger, since both involved queuing for prolonged periods with the risk of being targeted, Kova} testified that the Civil Defence varied the
223. Because obtaining food and water was fraught with danger, since both involved queuing for prolonged periods with the risk of being targeted, Kova} testified that the Civil Defence varied the