internazionale:
1) A livello strategico si attestava la preminenza di fattori domestici
nelle considerazioni sulla sicurezza. Se durante il confronto bipolare
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il pericolo per gli stati era dato dall’aggressore esterno al loro
schieramento, con il crollo dell’URSS gli stati prendono coscienza del
fatto che, almeno in parte, la loro stabilità si lega al garantire ai
propri cittadini stabilità politica ed economica, in un mondo sempre
più interdipendente e dai confini permeabili.
792) Collegato a quanto precede, emerge l’effetto di risonanza che le
decisioni prese da uno stato per la propria stabilità interna possono
avere a livello internazionale più che in passato.
8079 “Discussing European security, German President Richard von Weizsacker
observed that the real danger lies not so much in 'military power or the pressure of those governing, but the disappointment of citizens and societies concerning withheld basic rights, economic injustice, and social insecurity.' […] In the post- cold-war period a central concern of policymakers and analysts is the prospect of national instability and, more to the point, the potential consequences of domestic instability for the wider security order. […] The Soviet example, as well as those of Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh […] make clear that the strength or weakness of the internal economic and political (and we might add social) structures of a state are integral aspects of national security. Any factor which may undermine these structures thus is of significance for national security. (Terriff, 1992: 166)
80 “Soviet reform at home and abroad, undertaken to meet the economic and
political domestic challenges, have had unintended and unforeseen, far-reaching consequences for regional and global security structures. […] Interdependence and transparent borders have created a situation in which security can no longer be strictly categorized as being national, regional or international. Domestic decisions and activity taken solely for internal purposes may have a direct adverse security consequence for other states or may not be perceived in the same way by other states […] The USA and its Western allies in the summer of 1992 were pushed to react more forcefully to the war in Bosnia by growing public outrage over the morally repulsive humanitarian abuses in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This included a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of military force to protect humanitarian efforts. Although the outcome of the interaction of domestic values and politics on state behavior is contingently unpredictable, for they may be contradictory or reinforcing, these impulses both seem bound to play a larger role in determining state security behaviour.” (Terriff, 1992: 167)
80“Former zones of confrontation and regions of contention […] have lost their
geopolitical saliency with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the East-West global competition. In the current fluidity of the political and strategic landscape it is difficult to identify a particular adversary. Current concern centres on factors which may precipitate instability. These factors have no particular geographic locus; rather they represent dangers and challenges which are diffuse, multi-dimensional, and multi-directional. Threats increasingly have to be viewed generically or sectorially, as well as territorially.”(Terriff, 1992:168).
Il concetto di ‘geoeconomia’ risulta più utile a descrivere le dinamiche del mondo post-guerra fredda rispetto a quello di ‘geopolitica’, come avanza Philippe Moreau
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3) La fine dello scontro totalizzante tra ideologie alla base del
concetto di sicurezza degli stati li ha portati a rivalutare i loro
interessi strategici e a mettere questi in linea con i propri valori
(valori che, di nuovo, guidano le politiche interne). Ora, questo
allineamento può avere effetti ambivalenti e gli esempi nell’attualità
internazionale non mancano.
814) Nell’ordine internazionale costituitosi con la caduta dell’URSS
veniva meno il nemico palesemente, geograficamente definito.
Veniva altresì meno la dimensione dello scontro basata sul ‘balance
of power’ –armato- in determinate zone strategiche del mondo.
Defarges: “In questa fine del XX secolo non si può essere certi che i conflitti a carattere ideologico siano scomparsi (ad esempio opposizioni tra occidentalismo e islamismi, tra principio democratico e principio etnico), ma questi conflitti sono multiformi, proliferano, raramente sono rappresentati in modo stabile da attori ben definiti (stati, blocchi). Ormai lo spazio mondiale non è più frazionato da linee fisse di divisione (come la cortina di ferro del periodo 1947-1989); il criterio decisivo della potenza e della stessa sopravvivenza va ricercato nella capacità di adattarsi alla competizione internazionale tecnico-economica.” (Moreau Defarges, 1994:147)
81 “Tailoring foreign and security policies to conform with national values could
provide established and agreed notions of national interest and a consistency of state behaviour, a positive development which would be likely to strengthen the evolving security order. However, an increase in the influence exerted by domestic politics on security choices could stimulate sudden shifts in state policy which could create unwarranted exigencies, or could hamper or stimulate decisions by the state leadership to react forcefully to exigencies. For example, Britain, France and the USA, confronted with public moral outcry and pressure to act, moved quickly to provide protection for Kurdish peoples being brutally attacked by Iraqi government forces in the wake of the Gulf War. More recently, the USA and its Western allies in the summer of 1992 were pushed to react more forcefully to the war in Bosnia by growing public outrage over the morally repulsive humanitarian abuses in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This included a Security Council resolution authorizing the use of military force to protect humanitarian efforts. Although the outcome of the interaction of domestic values and politics on state behavior is contingently unpredictable, for they may be contradictory or reinforcing, these impulses both seem bound to play a larger role in determining state security behaviour.” (Terriff, 1992: 167)
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