1. In relation to the Srebrenica Enclave before 11 July 1995
473. Recalling that “background issues” can be used to prove an issue relevant to the charges such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, or knowledge of the Accused,1672 the Trial Chamber makes the following findings on Vidoje Blagojević’s knowledge of actions of the Bratunac Brigade in relation to the Srebrenica enclave before 11 July 1995.
474. Having found that elements of the Bratunac Brigade were involved before the attack in blocking humanitarian supplies and convoys from entering the Srebrenica enclave at Žuti Most and in blocking the return of DutchBat soldier to the enclave,1673 including after Colonel Blagojević became commander of the Bratunac Brigade on 25 May,1674 the Trial Chamber considers that the evidence before it does not suggest that Colonel Blagojević either ordered or actively supported the blocking of humanitarian or supply convoys after his appointment as commander of the Bratunac Brigade. There is, however, sufficient evidence before the Trial Chamber to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević was aware that the Bosnian Muslims were in need of basic supplies such as food and fuel, and that DutchBat was operating far below capacity in terms of manpower, fuel and ammunition.1675
475. Upon taking up his duties as commander of the Bratunac Brigade, Colonel Blagojević must have been informed that elements of his Brigade, namely his assistant commander for security and intelligence, Captain Momir Nikolić, and members of the Bratunac Brigade Military Police, were actively involved in checking the convoys that entered the Srebrenica enclave.1676 Furthermore, Momir Nikolić testified that the purpose of blocking these supplies was to ensure that DutchBat would not be ready for combat and not be able to carry out its task in the enclave, and to make life within the enclave impossible for the civilian population.1677 As Colonel Blagojević would have needed to know the state of preparedness of DutchBat before the attack began on 6 July, he would have been informed of this information by his superiors in meetings preparing for the operation as well as by Captain Nikolić, who also served as a liaison between the Bratunac Brigade and DutchBat. The Trial Chamber finds that this information would have put
1672 See supra para. 137.
1673 See supra paras 138-140.
1674 The evidence of DutchBat witnesses confirms that the blocking of convoys continued after 25 May 1995. See supra section II. C. 3, specifically paras 111-112, 117.
1675 Ex. P851, Dutch Ministry of Defence, “Report based on the Debriefing on Srebrenica”, dated 4 October 1995, p.
17.
1676 See supra section II. C. 3.
1677 Momir Nikoli}, T. 1634-35
him on notice about DutchBat’s readiness – or rather, inability – to deal with the humanitarian situation created by the attack on the Srebrenica enclave.
476. The Trial Chamber furthermore finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević had knowledge that elements of the Bratunac Brigade, including the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, were involved in sniping and shelling of the Srebrenica enclave in the months before the enclave was attacked,1678 as well as in the attack on the DutchBat OP Echo in early June 1995.1679 Under the operating practices in place within the Bratunac Brigade, Colonel Blagojević would have met regularly with his subordinate commanders of the four battalions and would have received regular reports from them about their activities. Colonel Blagojević, as commander of the Bratunac Brigade, had an obligation to know what the units within the Brigade were doing. As the primary concern of the Bratunac Brigade was the Srebrenica enclave, Colonel Blagojević certainly would have requested regular updates in relation to attacks from or against the enclave. There is insufficient evidence before the Trial Chamber to lead it to conclude that the regular reporting procedures were not in place between 25 May and early July 1995. The Trial Chamber finds that these actions assisted Colonel Blagojević in preparing for and planning the attack on the enclave.
477. The Trial Chamber finds that Colonel Blagojević knew of the Bratunac Brigade’s participation in the attack on the Srebrenica enclave included firing on civilians in the centre of Srebrenica town, which had the effect of causing those civilians and DutchBat to take the decision to leave Srebrenica town and go to Potočari, and again while the civilians were fleeing from Srebrenica to Potočari.1680 Indeed, the Trial Chamber recalls that Mićo Gavrić testified that when he fired on 11 July in the area around which civilians were walking from Srebrenica to Potočari, his actions were pursuant to Colonel Blagojević’s 5 July order.1681 Vidoje Blagojević was at the IKM at Pribićevac during the attack on the Srebrenica enclave. As the commander of a Brigade engaged in combat, Colonel Blagojevi} would have had to have been, and, Trial Chamber finds, was in contact with his units.1682
478. Finally, the Trial Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević knew what the objective of “Krivaja 95” was, namely to reduce the Srebrenica enclave to its urban area, and that he tasked his subordinates in order to
1678 See supra para. 117.
1679 See supra para. 118.
1680 For the Trial Chamber’s findings on the participation of elements of the Bratunac Brigade in the attack, including firing at civilians, see supra section II. C.5.
1681 See supra para. 131.
1682 See supra section II. C, and para. 436.
make this operation a success.1683 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević knew that the objective of the operation changed from reducing the enclave to eliminating the enclave. Both General Krstić and Colonel Blagojević were present at the IKM in Pribićevac during the attack. Furthermore members of the Bratunac civilian authorities visited Pribićevac, including Miroslav Deronjić who went to Pribićevac and briefly spoke to Colonel Blagojević on 11 July about the Srebrenica operations having testified: “We exchanged our information as to the ending of the Srebrenica … operation.”1684 Based upon these factors, the Trial Chamber concludes that Colonel Blagojević was informed of the overall progress of the attack, developments throughout the attack and the ultimate objective of the attack: to take over the Srebrenica enclave.
2. Potočari
479. The Trial Chamber has found that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that members of the Bratunac Brigade participated in the killings that took place in Potočari.1685 The Trial Chamber further finds that there is insufficient evidence to establish that Colonel Blagojević gave either his troops or or other units present orders or instructions to kill or cause serious bodily harm to Bosnian Muslims present in Potočari. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber cannot establish a link between Colonel Blagojević and the killings in Potočari.
480. The Trial Chamber has found that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that elements of the Bratunac Brigade participated in the beatings of Bosnian Muslim civilians in Potočari.1686 The Trial Chamber further finds that there is insufficient evidence to establish that Colonel Blagojević gave either his troops or or other units present orders or instructions to beat or mistreat Bosnian Muslims present in Potočari. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber cannot establish a link between Colonel Blagojević and the beatings in Potočari.
481. The Trial Chamber found that there is insufficient evidence to establish that any member of the Bratunac Brigade participated in the abusive interrogations of Bosnian Muslim civilians in
1683 See supra section II. C.4.(a); Ex. P406, Bratunac Brigade Order for Active Combat, signed by Colonel Blagojevi}, 5 July 1995; Ex. P403, Bratunac Brigade minutes of meetings, entry for 3 July.
While the Trial Chamber does not have evidence before it to find that Colonel Blagojević was at the 5 July meeting at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters chaired by General Krstić in which the various commanders received their assignments for the Srebrenica operation, based on the fact that on the same date Colonel Blagojević held two meetings with his staff at which he presented the Drina Corps Order, Krivaja 95, and tasked the units of the Bratunac Brigade, the Trial Chamber can only conclude that Colonel Blagojević received the assignments for the Bratunac Brigade from General Krstić on that date.
1684 See supra, paras 78 and 130. The Trial Chamber recalls that by this point, Miroslav Deronjić had learned from President Karadžić that the objective of the operation had changed to the complete take-over of Srebrenica. See supra para 78.
1685 See supra para. 209.
1686 See supra para. 210.
Potočari. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to establish that Colonel Blagojević issued any orders or instructions in relation to conducting any interrogations in Potočari.
482. The Trial Chamber has found that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that members of the Bratunac Brigade Military Police and the assistant commander for security and intelligence, Captain Nikolić, participated in the separations of Bosnian Muslim men from the rest of the Bosnian Muslim population in Potočari on 12 and 13 July.1687 The Trial Chamber does not find that there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević knew that the Bratunac Brigade Military Police participated in the separations on 12 July; at most, the evidence establishes that Colonel Blagojević would have known that members of this unit were present in Potočari providing security for senior VRS officers, including General Mladić and general security for the area.1688 There is insufficient evidence before the Trial Chamber to support a finding beyond reasonable doubt that he knew that separations were taking place, let alone any members of the Bratunac Brigade Military Police were participating in this process. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber does not find that there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević knew that Momir Nikolić was participating in separations on 12 July.1689
483. The Trial Chamber does find, however, that there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević would have known that those members of the Bratunac Brigade Military Police who were present in Potočari on 13 July were assisting, either directly or indirectly, in the separation of men from the rest of the Bosnian Muslim population. Throughout the day of 12 July, buses filled primarily with women, children and elderly passed through Bratunac on their way to ABiH-held territory. By the evening of 12 July, there were buses filled with only men in Bratunac town.1690 Colonel Blagojević was in Bratunac town in the evening of 12 July – he would have known, if not directly seen, the result of the separations that took place in Potočari. Thus, he would have been on notice that the activities that were on-going in Potočari in relation to providing “security” contributed to the separation of the men from the rest of the Bosnian Muslim population. As will be addressed below, the Trial Chamber does not find the
1687 See supra para. 212.
1688 The evidence shows that Colonel Blagojevi} was in Srebrenica on 11 July. He would have been aware that General Mladi} spent the night at the Hotel Fontana on 11 July and that the Bratunac Brigade Military Police was providing security at that hotel. Colonel Blagojevi} was in Bratunac in the morning of 12 July, after which he spent the day inspecting his troops. Upon his return to the Brigade, he acquainted himself with the activities of his units. Colonel Blagojevi} spent the night in Bratunac on 12 July. See supra paras 437, 438, 440, 443, 440, 449; Ex. P449, page of Military Police Log Book, entry for 12 July 1995.
1689 The only source of information about what Colonel Blagojević knew of the actions of Momir Nikolić on 12 July before the Trial Chamber is Momir Nikolić. Momir Nikolić testified that he did not meet with Colonel Blagojević after the meeting at the Hotel Fontana before leaving Bratunac for Potočari on 12 July and did not communicate with him throughout the day. Momir Nikolić, T. 1686-88, 1898-1903.
1690 See supra paras 266-268.
testimony of Momir Nikolić that on the night of 12 July he briefed Colonel Blagojević that he was acting as “co-ordinator” for activities in Potočari, including separations on 12 July, to be sufficient to establish through direct evidence that Colonel Blagojević knew of the separations by 13 July.1691 Rather, the Trial Chamber finds that it can infer from the totality of evidence before it that Colonel Blagojević would have known that separations were occurring in Potočari on 13 July, and that those members of his brigade present in Potočari, namely the Bratunac Brigade Military Police, were contributing to the separation process.1692
484. The Trial Chamber found that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that those members of the Bratunac Brigade present in Potočari contributed to the inhumane conditions to which the Bosnian Muslim civilians in Potočari were subjected. These members included members of the Bratunac Brigade Battalions and Military Police, and at least two officers: Captain Nikolić and Major Trišić, the assistant commander for logistics. There is sufficient evidence before the Trial Chamber to establish that Colonel Blagojević was aware of the situation facing the Bosnian Muslim refugees in Potočari: as one of the briagde commanders paricipating in the Krivaja 95 operation, he knew that more than tewnty thousand people, the majority of whom were civilians, had been displaced and were being held in the small space around the UN base in Potočari. The Trial Chamber has established that as the commander of the Bratunac Brigade for the six weeks before the attack, he was aware that DutchBat was facing severe food and water shortages, and was therefore not able to provide for the thousands upon thousands of refugees arriving at their base.1693 Colonel Blagojević was present in the town of Bratunac, including in Bratunac Brigade Headquarters with its communication centre, during this time.1694 While the Bratunac Brigade itself may not have been able to provide the supplies necessary, Colonel Blagojević could have summoned assistance from other organisations or agencies. Instead, there is no evidence that he did anything in this respect.
485. The Trial Chamber found that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that elements of the Bratunac Brigade participated in the destruction of personal property and effects in Potočari. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber finds that there is insufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević issued orders or instructions to seize documents or other personal effects from the Bosnian Muslims in Potočari.
1691 See supra para 172 and 447, in relation to the meeting which Momir Nikolić testified he had with Colonel Blagojević on the night of 12 July during which he testified that he informed Colonel Blagojević of his activities and the general situation in Potočari, and Colonel Blagojević’s allegedly responded that he was aware that the situation in Potočari was as Momir Nikolić described.
1692 See supra section II. D.(e) and (f), and in particular paras 451-453, 438.
1693 See supra section II.2 and 3.
1694 See supra paras 437,438, 440, 444, 448, 449.
486. The Trial Chamber found that there is sufficient evidence to establish that numerous elements of the Bratunac Brigade, among other units of the VRS and the MUP, participated in the transfer of women, children and elderly from Potočari in various ways.1695 The Trial Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević knew that the transfer of the Bosnian Muslim population was on-going.1696 As the commander of the Bratunac Brigade, Colonel Blagojević would have known that Bratunac Brigade vehicles and fuel were used in the transfer operation; indeed, the Daily Combat Report he issued on 12 July indicated that he did.1697 In it he reported: “Logistics support is functioning satisfactorily. We will submit details of consumption of ammunition and fuel later on.”1698 Colonel Blagojević knew that elements of the Bratunac Brigade regulated traffic as the buses filled with women, children and elderly passed through Bratunac on their way to Konjević Polje, as the Bratunac Brigade command had been ordered to do so by General Živanović on 12 July.1699 Furthermore, the Bratunac Brigade Military Police log-book records that the Military Police secured the Srebrenica-Bratunac road on 12 July.1700 As commander of the Bratunac Brigade, it was Colonel Blagojević’s responsibility to check that log-book to apprise himself of the actions of his subordinates.
487. The Trial Chamber does not find, however, that there is sufficient evidence to establish that Colonel Blagojević would have known that Captain Nikolić and members of the Bratunac Brigade Military Police assisted in the transfer through the counting of people as the buses were loaded on 12 July.1701 As for their participation in these activities as of 13 July, the Trial Chamber finds that through his presence at the Bratunac Brigade headquarters on the night of 12 July when he received information about the activities of his troops and units in the field he would have learned that the Bratunac Brigade Military Police assisted in the transfer of the Bosnian Muslim population.1702
488. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević knew that members of the Bratunac Brigade participated in the transfer of Bosnian Muslim men out of Potočari. Colonel Blagojević saw the buses
1695 See supra section II. D. 1. (e) and (f), and in particular paras 172, 176, 180-183, 186 and 191.
1696 See e.g. Ex. P441, Bratunac Brigade daily combat report, 12 July 1995 and see supra sections II. D. 1. (e) and (f) and II.E. 1 and III.B, in particular paras 180, 186, 190, 265, 266, 444 and 449.
1697 Ex. P441, Bratunac Brigade daily combat report and see supra section II.D.1.(e), in particular para. 180.
1698 See supra para 180.
1699 See supra para. 186.
1700 Ex. P449, logbook of Bratunac Brigade Military Police, entry for 12 July 1995; See supra paras 186 and 438.
1701 See supra para. 188 and 195.
1702 See supra section IIII. B. and in particular paras 438, 444 and 449.
overcrowded with Bosnian Muslim men in the small town of Bratunac on the nights of 12 and 13 July, and knew that some of them had come from Potočari.1703
3. The Column
489. The Trial Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević not only knew that his units were participating in the search of the terrain for the Bosnian Muslim men who had taken off from Srebrenica in a column for ABiH-held territory, but that he had in fact ordered them to do so, in accordance with an order from the Drina Corps.1704 The evidence establishes from at least 15 July, Colonel Blagojević was directing the search operation, which included overseeing units outside of the Bratunac Brigade such as the MUP.1705 Furthermore, the Trial Chamber finds that there is sufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Colonel Blagojević knew that the objective was to capture and detain Bosnian Muslim men.1706
490. The Trial Chamber has found above that through the participation in the searching
490. The Trial Chamber has found above that through the participation in the searching