Work and Social Pathologies: Learning from the Past While the idea of ‘health’ has been further elaborated in order to

refer to the physical and psychological wellbeing of people oper-ating in a collective dimension, the meaning of ‘work’ is still based on capitalism (²⁵), as it only expresses a productive dimen-sion. While recognizing the role of many thinkers in contrib-uting to this economic definition (²⁶), in the context of this pa-per reference will be made to the insights contained in Marx’s Capital. Nineteenth and twentieth century industrialism embrac-es the Marxist theory of value: ‘work’ and Marx’s ‘exchange val-ue’ overlap, being the latter the amount of work needed for a specific commodity (²⁷). The modern conception of work

attrib-(²⁵) A. GORZ, Metamorfosi del lavoro. Critica della ragione economica, Bollati-Boringhieri, 1992, p. 21. This consideration is contained in the first chapter of the text, which concerns the ‘invention of work’. The A. points out that

“until […] the eighteenth century, the word ‘work’ had referred to the activi-ty of servants who produced both consumer goods and services necessary to life, which required ongoing work. Conversely, artisans who manufac-tured durable items did not ‘work’ but they ‘operated’, so they could use the

‘labour’ of other men to perform less qualified tasks” (p. 24). Arendt also makes this distinction between ‘labour’ and ‘work’ in Vita activa.

(²⁶) See A.SMITH, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), It. trad. La ricchezza delle nazioni, Utet, 1975, and D.R^ICARDO, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817), It. trad. Principi di economia politica e dell’imposta, Utet, 1947.

(²⁷) Marx speaks of ‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’. ‘Use value’ refers to the value the good takes on for the individual who uses it, so it depends on

con-utes to workers’ ‘labour power’ the value of ‘exchange goods’, so it goes beyond workers themselves (²⁸). Objectified, abstract human work – Marx’s labour power – must be contained in a good in order to have exchange value. Because of the modern abstraction of this contractually defined exchange, work be-comes an abstract item which is traded on the labour market like a commodity, thus devoid of any human and relational implica-tions. Referring to the idea of ‘exchange value’ – i.e. without its anthropological value – the modern notion of ‘work’ is just an abstract idea made of a set of human activities generating eco-nomic value (²⁹). This is done neglecting the worker’s personal dimension, which can be seen in the way they carry out work and develop skills. This way, the objectification of work emerg-es, which results from the progressive separation between the man who works, his body and time, his ambitions and desires, which began in the Roman era and developed with modernity (³⁰). As Marx argued, “The continuation of this relationship [that

sumption (K. M^ARX, Das Kapital (1867), It. trad Il capitale, Utet, 1974). On the contrary, ‘exchange value’ represents the degree of exchangeability of two commodities.

(²⁸) The objectification of work draws on the conceptual distinction between

‘work’ and the ‘body’ that takes place in the early Middle Ages. The operae can be objectified thanks to people who distance themselves from the operae.

The law recognizes the worker’s obligatory relationship on their operae. See V.B^AVARO, Il tempo nel contratto di lavoro subordinato. Critica sulla de-oggettivazione del tempo-lavoro, Cacucci, 2008, pp. 27-29.

(²⁹) SeeH.MARCUSE, op. cit. The A. argues for the need to provide a philo-sophical foundation to the concept of work, stressing that “the economic concept of labour has decisively influenced the conception of the essence of labour in general - including labour outside the economic sphere” (p. 9).

The economic approach to the concept of labour has affected what is to be understood as work, up to the point of recognizing as labour only economi-cally defined activities, without considering productive activities (e.g. arts).

(³⁰) Cf. V.B^AVARO, op. cit. In the first chapter, Sull’ontologia giuridica del lavoro e del suo tempo, the A. looks at the evolution of the legal relationship between work, body and time – featuring the bound between the slave and his master – which then evolved into human labour, moving on from slavery to wage labour.

between the worker and the owner of money, or the capitalist]

requires that the owner of labour power always sells it only for a certain time. Otherwise, he sells himself, so he is transformed from a free man into a slave, from someone owing goods into a commodity” (³¹). Selling a commodity for a limited period of time – until work is performed – is the first element helping us to distinguish between ‘slavery’ and ‘free work’. There is a corre-lation between the concept of work as ‘property’ and its objecti-fication as a ‘commodity’, which is exchanged on the market.

Accordingly, it is necessary to define a unit of measurement with which work can be assessed (the labour power) which is the el-ement exchanged between the worker and the employer. Work-ing time is another feature of capitalism and can be found in Marx’s theory of value, though today working hours can be af-fected by new ways of working and the use of technology.

Working time has been used as a tool to calculate labour power as a defined amount which can be marketed in the context of the relationship between the parties. The labour market as un-derstood now – which was established at the end of the nine-teenth century – is based on time. In other words, the worker gives the capitalist their labour power for a certain amount of time (³²). This labour power is then measured through the em-ployment contract considering the time unit (³³). Marx insists on the freedom of those owning labour power, understood as an opportunity to use their own labour force as a commodity with-out interference, but also as the lack of other tools for engaging in work (³⁴). Examining Marx’s Capital, it was Gorz who referred

(³¹) SeeK.M^ARX, op. cit., p. 209.

(³²) The contractual theory of free labour implies a ‘certain time’ – “for a certain time” as Locke puts it – which can be pre-established and deter-mined. Otherwise, slavery might arise, preventing man from exercising his freedom.

(³³) Cf. V.BAVARO, op. cit., pp. 36-39.

(³⁴) Describing the essential conditions for the capitalist to find the labour power as a commodity on the market, Marx points out that “the possessor of money must find on the commodity market the free worker. He must be

to the “realm of freedom” beyond productive labour (³⁵). As stressed by Marx, “the kingdom of freedom begins where the work determined by necessity and external purposes ends. It is therefore by its nature beyond the sphere of material production […]. Beyond it begins the development of human capabilities, which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom” (³⁶). Ac-cording to Marx, meaning and personal fulfilment can be achieved only in free time, as people at work experience only exploitation to the point of feeling ‘alienated’ (³⁷). Work is aimed at satisfying the conditions necessary for survival and sustenance of the individual and his family. Therefore, it is not conceived as an opportunity for self-realization. Coherently to the abstract idea of work, modern industrialism elaborates the Taylorist

free in the sense that he can use their power, though he has no other com-modity to sell” (K.M^ARX, op. cit., p. 209).

(³⁵) SeeA.GORZ, op. cit., p. 23. Gorz argues that work as an activity aimed at satisfying vital needs was considered an occupation that excluded those en-gaging in it (e.g. slaves) from participation in public life and from the exer-cise of freedom. In Greece’s polis, family life – within which most working and productive activities took place – was determined by the need of sub-sistence and reproduction. Only in the public sphere was it possible to expe-rience freedom. Gorz argues that Marx did not ascribe to the dimension of freedom the productive activities aimed at sustaining the necessities of life.

He points out the substantial difference between work in Greek polis (carried out at home) and in capitalist society (developed in the public sphere).

(³⁶) SeeK.MARX, Il capitale, Einaudi, 1975, Libro III, chap. 48, p. 1102.

(³⁷) See K. MARX, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844 (1932), It. trad. Manoscritti economico-filosofici del 1844, Einaudi, 2004, p. 71.

The Manuscripts have popularised the Marxist concept of ‘alienated labour’, arising from the product of labour, the act of production and from labour itself. In relation to the second form of alienation, Marx argues that it con-sists “in the fact that work is external to the worker, that is, it does not be-long to his being, and therefore in his work he does not affirm himself but denies himself, he feels unsatisfied” (idem). Contrary to what was argued by Hegel in relation to the servant/master relationship in the famous Phenome-nology of Spirit (1807), Marx believes that the worker can feel in harmony with himself outside work, while at work he would feel “outside himself”.

model (³⁸) based on the technical division of production (³⁹) and the productive cycle, which is separated into some elementary activities carried out by specialized workers. This allows for the rationalization of physical efforts, total control over production, as well as the optimization and overall increase in efficiency. The final good is ensured by the assembly line, in the context of which the worker is nothing but a cog. The plant was then bro-ken down and then reunified according to the techniques of production organisation (⁴⁰). Between the 19th and 20th century, the factory became the place where subordination (⁴¹) and the division of labour produced the first examples of industrial mass

(³⁸) See F.SEGHEZZI, La nuova grande trasformazione. Lavoro e persona nella quar-ta rivoluzione industriale, ADAPT University Press, 2017, pp. 30-31.

(³⁹) Aristotle too investigated the division of labour. However, it was Adam Smith who identified the division of labour as a tool to promote productivi-ty in his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Durk-heim argued that “The division of labour is a generalized phenomenon who can be noticed by everyone. We can no longer have any illusions about the tendencies of modern industry, which is moving towards the use of power-ful mechanisms, forces and capital, and consequently towards an extreme division of labour. Within the factories the separation and specialization of occupations proceed endlessly” (É.D^URKHEIM, La divisione del lavoro sociale, Il Saggiatore, 2016, p. 67).

(⁴⁰) SeeF.S^EGHEZZI, op. cit., p. 58.

(⁴¹) See F.SEGHEZZI, op. cit., who argues that within certain limits identified by the contract, which protects the worker from misconduct, the entrepre-neur can use workers in their working time, depending on the organization of work. The contract as an instrument of subordination makes it possible to define a hierarchical system whereby the worker follows the employer’s instructions. An anthropological implication also emerges in this context.

This state of affairs is both a form of protection for the worker, though the exchange with the employer constitutes an unequal exchange if Taylorism is considered. An analogy also arises with slavery: if slavery is about using an-other person, without this dynamic being sanctioned by an exchange and a contract. Similarly, subordination is concerned with using certain potentiali-ties of a person, in the form of wage labour, by virtue of an agreement be-tween two parties.

production (⁴²). Human work is subject to a process of com-modification turning it into a productive factor (⁴³) to which market laws apply while the salaried worker is deprived of his humanity (⁴⁴), bending to technology and production. It is against this backdrop that, at the start of the 1930s, Weil, worked as a metalworker with other women in French factories and experienced “work dehumanization” (⁴⁵). Weil’s attention is on modern slavery, which determines the condition of the worker, whereby the employer owns the factory, equipment as well as working time. In this sense, “the subordinate merely plays the role of a thing manipulated by the intelligence of oth-ers” (⁴⁶). This progressive annihilation (⁴⁷) of the working class is based on the division of labour which leads the worker to “re-nounce thought” (⁴⁸). From a capitalistic perspective, Fordism allowed the rationalization of the physical efforts of the work-force, ensuring total control over the progress and pace of pro-duction, at the detriment of a separation between work and its human contribution (⁴⁹). In addition to following instructions,

(⁴²) Idem, p. 43.

(⁴³) Idem, p. 35: “labour becomes a factor of production like any other, and this results in the subordination to those who govern the expertise and pos-sess the means of production”.

(⁴⁴) SeeA.GORZ, op. cit..

(⁴⁵) SeeA.S^UPIOT, Il pensiero giuridico di Simone Weil, in RGL, 2011, No. 3, I, p. 606.

(⁴⁶) S.WEIL, Lettre à un ingénieur (1936), in S. WEIL, La condition ouvrière, It.

trad. La condizione operaia, Edizioni di Comunità, 1980, p. 205.

(⁴⁷) As pointed out by Weil in the Réflexions sur les causes de la liberté et de l’oppression sociale (1955), It. trad. Riflessioni sulle cause della libertà e dell’oppressione sociale, Adelphi 1983, p. 17, “Our entire civilization is based on specializa-tion, which implies the subjugation of those who execute to those who co-ordinate”.

(⁴⁸) SeeA.S^UPIOT, op. cit., p. 607.

(⁴⁹) SeeF.SEGHEZZI, L’uomo fordista tra economia e società. Appunti per una rilet-tura eretica di Gramsci, in E.DAGNINO, F.NESPOLI, F.SEGHEZZI (eds.), La nuova grande trasformazione del lavoro. Lavoro futuro: analisi e proposte dei ricercatori ADAPT, ADAPT University Press, 2017.

the worker also risks alienation when performing a task which does not need an active approach, leading to emotional and spir-itual detachment (⁵⁰). During Fordism, salaried workers perform a series of tasks “without being interested in them and without understanding them” (⁵¹). This is so because they are part of a longer and more complex process of which they fail to under-stand the meaning and purpose. In time, these operations be-come automatic, up to a point in which they are similar to me-chanical activities, turning the individual into a ‘machine’ (⁵²). He

“is no longer the living cell of a living organism […], but only an inert mechanism started by an external component that always moves in the same direction and in the same way” (⁵³). What is performed is an abstract scheme that indicates automatic and repeatable movements (⁵⁴), without considering personality and hampering involvement. Specialization on a single task prevents the development of human faculties. When performing a task which is part of a larger process, the worker misses the value of his contribution. The alienating nature of this production emerges, as the worker does not own the final product and does not control the process. While artisan work (⁵⁵) reversed the re-lationship between material execution and decision-making

au-(⁵⁰) SeeK.MARX, Manoscritti economico-filosofici del 1844, cit., pp. 71-72.

(⁵¹) SeeÉ.D^URKHEIM, op. cit., p. 35.

(⁵²) Ibidem.

(⁵³) Ibidem. According to S. WEIL, Riflessioni sulle cause della libertà e dell’oppressione sociale, cit., p. 110, “Technological progress and mass produc-tion give workers a passive role; they perform work without conceiving the link with the final result”.

(⁵⁴) SeeS.WEIL, Riflessioni sulle cause della libertà e dell’oppressione sociale, cit., pp.

86-87: “We are facing a paradoxical situation, i.e. the work method can be seen in the physical movements but cannot be conceived by the worker.

Since the thought that has elaborated a method is not involved in execution, such execution can be performed by machines rather than living members.

So machines know this procedure so well that they give the impression that they are the ones who think, while men are like automatons”.

(⁵⁵) Cf. R.SENNET, L’uomo artigiano, Feltrinelli, 2008.

tonomy, Fordism separates these two dimensions (⁵⁶), with the first concerning manual labour and the second becoming a fea-ture of intellectual work. The subordination of the salaried worker in the Fordist factory is to be understood not only in contractual terms, but also in existential terms. The machine fea-tures the “instrumental character of dependent work, in relation to the production outcome and the working tool” (⁵⁷). The en-trepreneur governs the worker’s expertise, which is available to him as “a means for the achievement of goals” (⁵⁸). We can therefore understand how, in Fordism, the capitalist embodies the concept of Beruf (⁵⁹), i.e. as a profession (⁶⁰) and a vocation (⁶¹). While the subordinate perceives “the matter, the tool, the body, his own soul as means for manufacturing” (⁶²), the entre-preneur bends the instrumentality of the technique to his own will, adapting it to each purpose, according to the possibilities offered by the worker’s intellectual work. In manual labour, the relational dimension is lost, as it is limited to the assembly line.

(⁵⁶) See G.V^ARDARO, Tecnica, tecnologia e ideologia della tecnica nel diritto del lavo-ro, in PD, 1986, No. 1. The paper looks at the historical-political links be-tween technological evolution and labour law developments. It is precisely the modern notion of technology as a simple instrument for human need satisfaction that underpins the division of labour into 1) the notion of work as Beruf, 2) the notion of work as a dependent worker. The distinction tween intellectual and manual work will also be found in the dichotomy be-tween entrepreneurship and labour.

(⁵⁷) Idem, p. 82.

(⁵⁸) Idem, p. 80.

(⁵⁹) The German word Beruf – ‘calling’ in English – can be translated both as

‘work’ and as ‘vocation’, so a religious sense emerges – that of performing a duty – which dates back to the Middle Ages. With reference to its Calvinist interpretation, the term has been investigated by Weber in his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (It. trad. L’etica protestante e lo spirito del capitalis-mo, Rizzoli, 2014). The salvific significance of work, which stems from un-derstanding the profession as the result of a divine vocation, has then been developed in capitalist civilization.

(⁶⁰) See M.WEBER, Il lavoro intellettuale come professione, Einaudi, 1966.

(⁶¹) See M.W^EBER, L’etica protestante e lo spirito del capitalismo, cit.

(⁶²) SeeS.WEIL, La condizione operaia, cit., p. 275.

This clearly annihilates relations, being them the result of pro-ductive needs. Ultimately, industrialism has modelled a rational-ized society inspired by the functioning of the factory, in which the technical function dominates the individual: the subjugation of the worker to the machine in the factory corresponds to that of the citizen to the bureaucratic apparatus (⁶³). In this context,

“work is no longer performed with the idea of being useful, but with the humiliating feeling of benefitting from a privilege granted by fate, a privilege from which many human beings are excluded” (⁶⁴). Weil’s words are still relevant: work has been de-prived of its formative and hedonistic dimension, and is no longer recognized as an opportunity for development and per-sonal fulfilment. Therefore, it is no longer work that shapes man, but man who performs and undergoes a job. The tool to deal with this degeneration is to place the individual centre-stage, making work the expression of individual’s free thought and free action.

3. The IV Industrial Revolution and the Individual