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EU R O PEA N U N IV E R SIT Y IN ST IT U T E , F L O R E N C E

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

E U I W O R K I N G P A P E R N o . 8 8 / 3 6 0

ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND CMEA

by

DOMENICO MARIO NUTI

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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All rights reserved.

art of this paper may be reproduced in any form without permission of the author.

© Domenico Mario Nuti Printed in Italy in Novemberl988

European University Institute Badia Fiesolana - 50016 San Domenico (FI) -

Italy © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND CMEA _1 Domenico Mario Nuti,

European University Institute, 50016 Florence, Italy.

1. CMEA: "Common Plan" versus "Common Market"

The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA,

also known as Comecon2), set up in 1949 by the Soviet Union

and the European countries which had adopted a Soviet-type

socialist system after the War, was partly the formal

expression of economic solidarity within the newly formed

bloc, partly a response to the challenge of the Organisation

for European Economic cooperation, set up in 1948 by 16 West European nations.

CMEA is an economic community sui generis. It is

not a common market because no country has direct access to

internal markets (if any) in the other countries. It is not

a customs union because in all these countries state

monopoly of foreign trade and compensatory taxes and

1. Paper presented at the Seminar on "Horizonte de la

Union Europea 1992", organised by the Association of

European Journalists and the European University Institute,

Florence, at the Menendez Pelayo International University,

Santander (Spain), 12-16 September 1988. The first two

sections of this paper draw extensively on Maciejewski and

Nuti, 1985; the author has also benefitted greatly from

discussions with the participants in a Workshop which he

held on this general topic at the E U I , Florence, on 30

August-2 September 1988, and in particular with Marie

Lavigne and Klaus Schneider, though they should not be

associated with any of the views, errors or omissions to be found in this paper.

2.. Comecon is a Western label, more euphonic than CMEA

(SEV in the Russian initials) but avoided in Eastern Europe because it originated in Cold War sovietological literature;

it is associated with Cominform and Comintern and it leaves

out the element of "assistance" (van Brabant, 1988); this is

why "CMEA" is now preferred in economic literature and used

in this paper. Founder members were Albania, Bulgaria,

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR,

joined 'in 1950 by the GDR; Albania’s membership lapsed in

1961, Mongolia joined in 1962, Cuba in 1972 and Vietnam in

1978. Forms of associate membership have been given to

Yugoslavia (1966), Finland (1973), Iraq and Mexico (1975)

and Angola (1976). The six East European full members of

CMEA are often designated as the EE6, while EE7 includes

also the Soviet Union.

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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subsidies make custom duties a purely formal and irrelevant

complication. It is not a monetary union because individual

currencies are separately managed and rates of exchange have

a perfunctory role, while the so-called "transferable

rouble" is neither transferable without prior agreement nor

a rouble (in that it does not lead to a direct and

unconditional claim on goods and services even in the Soviet

Union). There is no factor mobility (except for technical

knowledge and minor and controlled labour movements) even

within CMEA; there is no policy integration in the sense of

concertation of current policy instruments. There is, of

course, a strong measure of political integration, because

of the similarity and indeed the near identity of their

political systems as well as Soviet hegemony but, although

the CMEA is used to maintain and consolidate political

integration, this pre-dates the establishment of CMEA and is

not a stated intention of that community; there is no

provision for supranational authorities and technically each member is not bound by decisions with which it disagrees

(CMEA Charter, 1961; see Marer and Montias, 1981;

Maciejewski and Nuti, 1985).

International economic integration is best

understood as a pattern of resource allocation which would

not be altered •if national borders were removed3. Thus a

Common Market for goods and production factors, with

transactions conducted competitively with convertible

currencies under policy coordination, is not a necessary element of economic' integration, which can be achieved - in

theory - through a Common Plan. This is, at the risk of

oversimplification, precisely the nature of CMEA, i.e. a

commitment to planned integration of both current and future

trade, between state monopolies of foreign trade, operating

in economies which are centrally planned through

administrative means, along the Soviet-type model. In

addition, CMEA has imposed a restriction on the type of

integration to be achieved, by trying to establish

infrasectoral rather than sectoral specialisation, according to the principles of a "socialist" international division of labour aimed at avoiding the polarisation between primary producers and industrialised countries.

Within this framework, CMEA commitment to economic

integration could be regarded as intermediate between that

of members of the EEC and of the European Free Trade

Association. Namely, CMEA has a higher degree of

cooperation and integration than EFTA countries intended,

and in this respect is closer to the European Community; at

the same time CMEA, like EFTA, has never adopted

supranational objectives of the nature envisaged in the

Treaty of Rome (though in the early 1960s there were

3. Such a pattern is never unique, not only for the all

the reasons causing multiple solutions in the theory of

general economic equilibrium, but because it is conditional

on a particular policy of regional development.

2 © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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attempts at establishing them); CMEA members "maintain

individual tariffs and trade policies towards third parties

and undertake obligations only with respect to their mutual trade" (Kaser and Ransom, 1969).

2. The evolution of CMEA

The implementation of this general design has

progressed at a changing pace over the last forty years (see

Robson, 1984). Until the mid-1950s CMEA cooperation was very

limited. Pre-war trade flows were drastically diverted from

Western Europe towards the Soviet Union (though some

diversion was the reinstatement of pre-1917 economic links), but this occurred independently of Council activity, through

the year-by-year bilateral exchange of surplus outputs. In

1955-1962 there was a determined attempt at greater CMEA

coordination and integration, with the emergence of joint

enterprises and joint investment projects, the setting up of

several sectoral and functional Standing Commissions^, the

publication of the CMEA Charter and of the "Basic principles

of international socialist division of labour" (1960).

These developments under Krushchev’s leadership were also

stimulated by rival developments in Western Europe, with the birth and rise of the European Economic Community and EFTA.

From the early 1960s to the end of the decade CMEA activity stagnated; this was due to the lack of further progress in the multeralisation of intrabloc trade in spite of the setting up of the International Bank for Economic

Cooperation (1963), to the generalised slowdown of economic

activity throughout the area, resistence to supranational planning by Romania supported by Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and experimentation with economic reform which were widely

regarded as the necessary prerequisite of further

integration; infrabloc trade stagnated though more joint

projects were launched.

The 1970s saw generalised opening to foreign trade

within the Council, with the launching of the fifteen and

twenty years “Comprehensive Programme for Socialist Economic

Integration" (1971), an International Investment Bank

(1971), the adoption in 1975 of the long-term special

purpose programmes for cooperation (1978 and 1979). The oil

crisis created a unique opportunity for CMEA, as an energy

self-sufficient economic bloc; CMEA pricing criteria for

intra-bloc trade, linking prices to a moving average of

world prices, stabilised the intra-bloc price of Soviet

4. These Commissions were set up to cover areas such as

agriculture, building and construction, chemicals, coal,

research coordination, currency and finance, economic

questions, electric power etc., with headquarters in Moscow

and other Eastern European capital cities.

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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traded but by and large CMEA countries did not adjust to the

oil crisis either individually or collectively. They

maintained domestic absorption resorting to international

borrowing, boosting East-West trade until the early 1980s,

when the exhaustion of credit and the burden of debt induced a drastic intra-bloc retreat.

At present intra-CMEA trade is dominated by the

decline in Soviet export earnings and terms of trade, due to

the delayed diffusion of oil price fall to USSR oil exports, which constrains the growth of intra CMEA trade and because of its unplanned and uncertain nature - leads to

unexpected trade surpluses (especially for Hungary, 3bn TR

last year) embarassingly large because they cannot be offset against parallel payments deficits with Western countries.

In practice CMEA countries have achieved a degree of economic security in coordinating their internal supply

of energy - through Soviet oil and Polish coal - and raw

materials, and a high degree of integration as measured by

the share of intra-bloc trade (which rose from 9% in 1948 to

52% in 1981). However CMEA economies are comparatively much

less open to trade than countries at a similar level of

economic development; in the planning process exports are

treated as a "necessary evil" for obtaining essential

imports, instead of opportunities for enhancing efficiency

and productivity. Also, the generalised policy of high

investment and accelerated industrialisation, with emphasis

on heavy industry, coupled with the anti-diversification

bias of so called "socialist division of labour" (see

previous section) has given all East European countries a

somewhat similar structure, preventing the rise of

complementarities. Further integration has been limited

also by other systemic factors: bilateral bias in the

absence of convertible national currencies (let alone a

common currency), not only by country but also by commodity

groups according to the degree of their "softness" in

international trade (van Brabant, 1973); the inertia built

into administrative central planning, combined with the

rigidities of economies characterised by persistent excess

5. Intra-CMEA planned trade refers to an average of

world prices. In 1958 the rule known as the "Bucharest

principle" was agreed, whereby intra-CMEA prices were fixed

for a five-year period, at average world prices for the

previous five years. In 1975 this was replaced by the

"Moscow principle", whereby prices, on a moving five-year

average, were to be revised every year (except for 1975 when

a three year 1972-1974 average was used). With the drastic

rise in oil price Soviet oil lagging behind world prices

gave rise to a gain for CMEA oil importers, which many

regarded as an implicit subsidy (for instance, Marrese-

Vanous, 1983). However the alleged subsidy was more in the

nature of a loss for the fulfilment of a long term contract; in any case the same price formula is now making Soviet oil gradually catch up with and exceed the spot price.

4 © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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demand for both goods and labour; mutual fear of exploitation in the face of transactions not taking place at world prices; inability to appropriate fully the returns on joint investments; political limitations to the movements of labour.

The current wave of political renewal and radical economic reform which is taking place in the Soviet Union with Gorbachev’s perestroika and in most East European

countries (with the exception of Romania and the GDR) is

making itself felt within CMEA. First, a major

reorganisation is under way, with the liquidation of many of

the "Standing or Permanent Commissions" through which CMEA

cooperation was administratively articulated; these

Commissions can be regarded as the international equivalent of national Branch Ministries, also reduced in number in the

process of national reform. Second, direct links are being

established directly at the enterprises level in CMEA

countries, with exporters being’ allowed to retain some of

the export revenue and to convert it into commodities without prior administrative arrangements; this development, which has been agreed bilaterally between the Soviet Union and both Czechoslovakia and Hungary, paves the way towards

multilateral convertibility. Third, for the first time in

thirty years, there is now talk of a "unified socialist

market"6, spurred both by the development of domestic

markets and by the example of the EC "Internal Market"

expected by 1992.

3. CMEA-EC relations: three phases

Relations between the European Community and the

CMEA "state trading countries" (which is their official EC

designation) have gone through three main phases. The first

phase goes from 1957 to about 1971 and is characterised by

CMEA "total rejection of the European Community as something

which could develop into a new subject of international law"

(Seeler Report, 1986). This attitude was embodied in 17

theses on the Common Market, published by (Communist in 1957,

and reiterated in the 32 theses on imperialist integration in Western Europe published by Pravda in 1962 (though it was also stated there that its existence did not rule out

fi. The pressing need for such a unified market was

advocated for instance by the Polish Prime Minister Zbigniev Messer at the CMEA Summit meeting in Prague in July 1988

(FT, 7 July 1988). © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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cooperation between the two blocsZ). This was the result of a miscalculation about the degree of permanence of the EEC, and of the crude application of marxist-leninist theories of capital concentration and imperialism.

The second phase in EEC-CMEA relations goes from

1972 to 1984. This is characterised by CMEA expressions of

interest in a formal trade agreement with the European

Community, and by EC willingness to hold trade negotiations

only with individual members of the CMEA. The change of

attitude on the CMEA side, first indicated in a March 1972

statement by Brezhnev, was associated with detente, the

ambitious CMEA 1971 programme and probably also apprehension at the adverse effects of the European Community on CMEA

exports^. The EC, having acquired in 1974 full competence

for commercial policy, which implied termination of existing

bilateral agreements concluded by its members, proposed

individual trade negotiations to all state-trading

countries!. CMEA proposed reciprocal trade relations,

industrial technological and scientific cooperation, co­

signature by member states, the establishment of a joint committee to consider future relations (February 1976); the EC counterproposal specifically excluded all these issues

but included exchange of information, standardisation and

environmental questions (November 1976). The Community

would not accept "the CMEA becoming a kind of intermediary

between the EEC and individual CMEA countries, with power,

through the agreement between the two organisations, not

only to lay down guidelines for trade policy but also to

2. Already in the 1960s some East European countries

approached the EC with a view to alleviate the impact of

CAP, which the EC has done slowly and minimally (this was

probably a blessing in disguise for food-deficit countries

like Poland, but an obstacle to a genuine comparative

advantage for Bulgaria and Hungary).

£. The establishment of the EEC caused a modest trade

diversion away from CMEA countries, estimated at 4 per cent

of the value (at 1959 prices) of the European Community’s

imports from the CMEA in 1970; the effect was stronger for manufacturing exports, equivalent to 10 per cent on the same

basis (Balassa 1975; see also Balassa 1967). The first

enlargement of the EEC appears to have produced stronger net trade diverting effects in.industrial products, estimated at

16 per cent of the value, of the enlarged EEC in 1970

(Yannopoulos, 1985). Net effects were stronger in food and

drinks, chemicals and "other manufactures".

7. The issues involved: MFN treatment (which however is

not an issue, having been granted by the EC to all Eastern

European countries), quotas, agricultural trade, safeguard

mechanisms and credits (Pinder 1988).

6 © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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supervise the content and execution of Community agreements with individual countries" (Maslen, 1987).

This divergence led to protracted and inconclusive

EC-CMEA negotiations, which were suspended in 1980, though

direct sectoral agreements were reached with individual CMEA

countries, on steel, textiles and agricultural products,

with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and above all Romania (which

signed a comprehensive package of agreements and was given preferential status as a less developed country)10.

The third phase in EC-CMEA relations began with

the CMEA Summit of June 1984, whose Final Declaration

indicated willingness to sign an EC-CMEA agreement aimed at

promoting the further development of relations between

member countries; this was followed in October 1984 by a

proposal to reopen negotiations, without insisting on a

trade agreement between the two organisations. In further

statements, contacts and negotiations, the EC reiterated the

approach of developing closer relations with CMEA "parallel"

to the "normalisation" of relations 'between the EC and the

seven CMEA member states.il. Already . by 1986 CMEA

negotiators effectively accepted the EC "parallel" approach; but a further disagreement arose, over the status of Berlin, which delayed an agreement but was resolved eventually by

means of a compromise formulai.2. A Joint Declaration was

ID. Trade restrictions came down not only for steel and

textiles covered by special agreements, but also for other

products (for instance, in 1985 the EC removed 200

restrictions on Romanian products) but there are still quite

a few still in force.

1 1 . "Normalisation" here was understood to mean

"willingness to negotiate an overall trade agreement with each country, the accreditation of diplomatic missions with

the Community and the abandonment of anti-community

disruptive action in international organisations" • (Seeler

Report, 1988).

12. All EC agreements have a territorial clause about

their applicability to all of its territory, which includes West Berlin; in agreements with the EC individual CMEA

countries (except Romania) had added a unilateral

declaration t acknowledged by the EC though not part of the

agreement - that the territorial clause did not alter the status of Berlin as agreed in the Four-Power Agreement of 3

September 1971. This compromise at first was not acceptable

to the Soviet Union, wishing to single out Berlin’s position

in any EC-CMEA agreement. This divergence delayed an

agreement but in the end was resolved by means of the same

formula (except for Romania who, not having raised this

reservation in its own bilateral agreements with the EC could not raise it at this stage).

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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signed eventually in Luxemburg on 25 June 1988, which

amounts to a pact of mutual formal recognition by the two

trading blocs and has laid the foundations for further

bilateral relations between the European Community and

individual CMEA countries.

8 © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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4. The EC "parallel" approach

The EC "parallel" approach, to the CMEA on minor

general questions and to individual CMEA members on

substantive questions of trade and cooperation, was due to two main factorsUJ:

i) the CMEA lack of common trade policy and indeed

its inability to enforce the terms of an agreement on its

own members through its own legislation, i.e. CMEA lack of

competence in trade negotiations (see above, section 1). In

practice an EC-CMEA trade agreement, if it had been

concluded with the unanimous agreement of CMEA members,

would have carried enough weight to bind CMEA member

countries as much (or indeed as little) as any individual

trade agreement; in fact over the period 1964-85 cooperation

agreements have been signed by CMEA with Yugoslavia,

Finland, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua and Mozambique. Formally,

however, the EC objection was unimpeachable.

ii) the political preoccupation that the Soviet

dominant role within CMEA would affect excessively EC

relations with the other members of CMEA (especially the

EE6); such a preoccupation is said to have been shared by at

least some of the other CMEA members themselves. The Seeler

Report makes this point and contrasts the Soviet position within CMEA with the position of the other superpower, the

United States, which does not belong to the EC. This is

seen as the reason for diversifying EC relations with the USSR and the E E 6 .

The long time taken by the negotiations between

the two trading blocs and the EC success in implementing its

"parallel" approach are best explained with reference to

some structural aspects of trade between members of EC and

CMEA. Namely, there are two basic asymmetries:

i) EC-CMEA trade represents a small fraction of EC

trade turnover, of the order of magnitude of its trade with

Sweden or Switzerland, whereas its share of CMEA trade

turnover is four or five times larger; this enabled the EC to negotiate from a position of strength.

ii) Trade with the EC is more important for the

EE6 than for the Soviet Union, both in relative size

(especially for individual countries such as Hungary, where

it represents 1/10 of national income) and structure. In

fact Soviet exports to the EC consist mostly of oil, gas and

raw materials which enter free of tariff or quota, are

13 Additional reasons were also given by the EC (see

Seeler Report) but are not very plausible: the uneven

development level of CMEA members, which however is no more

uneven than that of an enlarged EC; the presence of non-

European members within CMEA, which however could have been handled by already existing forms of association.

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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supply-determined and easily switchable to other outlets; Soviet manufacturing exports are modest and in low tariff

fields, while the EE6 are trying to export to the EC

agricultural goods (now exported to the Soviet Union) and

low technology manufactures subject to EC protection

(Pinder, 1988).

These factors explain why there was never a great incentive for either the USSR as a CMEA prime mover or the

EC to reach a comprehensive EC-CMEA agreement. Soviet

interest in such an agreement, however, must have increased over time in view of several factors: i) the persistent CMEA

economic slowdown, which made it necessary to rely

increasingly on West European technology imported no longer

on credit but on trade; ii) the slump in EC-CMEA trade and

deterioration of terms of trade in 1985-87 and the prospect

of further trade diversion that might be generated by the

enlargement and unification , of the European "Internal

Market" in 1992, regardless of whether this diversion may or

may not be overcompensated by the boost that the net gains expected by the EC (put by the Cecchini Report at ECU 200

bn) might give to EC external trade; iii) political factors

such as the new detente, Gorbachev’s perestroika, or

possibly the desire to "use these improved contacts with the EC to drive a wedge between the European Community and the United States" (Seeler Report, 1986).

5. Prospects for EC-CMEA collaboration

Shortly after the June 1988 Joint declaration five CMEA members requested official diplomatic relations with

the EC (GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the

Soviet Union), followed by Poland; Romania has not made the

request but is involved in trade negotiations all the same.

The first five requests have been officially welcomed and obtained a "favourable response", after the endorsement by the July meeting of EC foreign ministers of a proposal by

the E C ’s external relations commissioner, Mr Willy Le

Clercq, to widen trade talks with CMEA countries to include

the Soviet Union; Poland’s request is still under

consideration but apparently only because of its later

submission.

These developments are not purely nominal. The EC

has recently agreed to end quotas on Hungary’s exports by

1995; is renegotiating a 1980 trade and cooperation

agreement with Romania, and is negotiating ’ an industrial

trade arrangement with Czechoslovakia. There is no shortage

of issues for discussion and areas for cooperation; the

1970s negotiations had indicated a number of ^possible fields

for official relations: i) better statistical information

(demanded by the EC already at the first sessions of the

CSCE at Helsinki) about both plans (perhaps more of a matter

for joint committees set up by the EC and individual

countries) and actual performance; ii) planning and

forecasting; iii) standardisation, becoming more important

with the 1992 schemes for further standardisation within the

10 © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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EC, iv) the environment, dramatically come to the fore since

the Chernobyl disaster, which however would require the

involvement of other neighbouring countries outside EC And

CMEA (such as for instance Austria, Yugoslavia and Finland)

and therefore might be handled better by the UN Economic Commission for Europe.14

The list of possible areas for cooperation could

be lengthened to include: i) non-tariff barriersl.5; ii)

trade multeralisation; iii) countertrade, which thrives on

trade constraints and may have to be reduced or regulated

with the gradual removal of those constraints; iv) the

extension of financial facilities, including the possible use of the ECU for the "financing, invoicing and payment of

foreign trade transactions"; v) joint ventures, including

joint EC-CMEA projects such as those mentioned in the Seeler

Report, namely research on "the exploration of new sources

of energy, and notably nuclear fusion but also alternative

sources of energy", "scientific cooperation...provided that

the proper necessary strategic interests of Western Europe

are properly guaranteed", “the development of an energy

system for the whole of Europe, particularly for the supply of electricity, so as to establish a major inter-European

network of energy supplies and mutual services",

"cooperation ... as regards reactor security and mutual aid

in cases of reactor malfunctioning", the development of

transport infrastructures in Europe"; possibly, also joint

action vis a ’ vis the Third world.

5. Obstacles and incentives

The further development of EC-CMEA cooperation

runs into a number of obstacles, which deserve further

consideration. Mostly they are general obstacles to trade

between different economic systems, namely the questions of effective reciprocity, trade denial, and debt burden.

"Effective reciprocity" of any concession and

trade barrier reduction offered by the EC. Eastern traders complain about tariff and non-tariff trade barriers but - as long as the traditional administrative allocation of hard currency and trade licencing system are maintained (whether

1A

The UC-ECE was 'set up in 1947 in Geneva by the

Economic and Social Council of the United Nations; it

includes all European countries, the USA and Canada and is already dealing with environmental questions as well as energy and transport.

1 5 . Tariffs are discussed within GATT, of which

Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania are members

while Bulgaria is an observer; Romania benefits from the EC

general scheme of preferences, but Bulgaria does not because

of its higher level of industrialisation.

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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or not state monopoly of foreign trade is dismantled) Western trade with the East meets a generalised, implicit,

arbitrary and uncertain barrier. At the same time, Western

markets are exposed to price policies which can be as

disruptive as the most aggressive "dumping” . The problem

however is not insormountable. Usually East European

imports are constrained by export revenues, not by demand;

their recent and persistent trade surplus with the EC could

be handled by EC-wide ties linking concessions to trade

levels; there is every expectation that any reduction of

trade barriers would be matched by higher East European

imports or repayment of debt. Protection of EC industries

is not a case for trade restrictions, because protection

whenever necessary can be enacted via anti-dumping duties if

there is actual injury to EC producerslg. There are Western

countries which have very close relations with a centrally planned economy, such as between West and East Germany17 or

l_fi. Pinder, 1988.. Anti-dumping duties are applicable

when a product is sold at less than its normal value,

usually defined as "the comparable price actually paid or

payable in the ordinary course of trade"; given the

difficulty of defining the ordinary course of trade in a

centrally planned economy, EC and GATT have used price in

analogue country, or the existing price of an close

substitute in the importing country.

1 7 . Under the EEC Treaty Protocol on German internal

trade the GDR has tariff-free access to the FRG, so that

many have regarded the GDR as a member of both CMEA

(official) and the EC (unofficial). Recently West German

circles have claimed that closer links between the two blocs implied abandoning the Federal Republic’s pledge to seek reunification with East Germany (for instance, Mr Egon Bahr,

the East-West strategist of SPD; see FT, 5 August 1988).

The claim does not seem to follow necessarily, especially in

view of the EC "parallel" policy which cuts out CMEA

intermediation; also, it could be argued that closer

relations between the two blocs are a precondition for further progress towards closer infra-German links.

12 © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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between Finland and the Soviet Unionl8; their experience indicates that trade relations between different economic systems can go much further than current EC-CMEA relations.

"Trade denial" is built into EC-CMEA relations as antagonistic alliances protecting their own security and

political systems using economic weapons to influence

policies through threat and retaliation. The strictest

security-minded constraint applicable to EC-CMEA is that

administered over the last forty years by the Coordination

Committee for Multilateral export Controls, known as CoCom,

including all NATO countries minus Iceland plus Japan and

operating from Parisl9. Although the implementation of

CoCom policies is left to national authority, there is no

reason why the EC should not formulate a policy about the list administered by CoCom, especially in view of the more

accomodating policy increasingly adopted by Japan. Economic

weaponry includes trade embargoes, asset freezing or

impounding,’ credit and trade limits or vetoes. Economic

sanctions are are costly to implement and are rarely

effective. The EC participated in economic sanctions

following Polish declaration of Martial Law (December 1981), imposing Community import restrictions on the Soviet Union

worth about US$100 mn. Restrictive US policies towards the

USSR have been costly for Europe (including boycott of

exports of equipment for the production and transport of

energy) and divisive, especially in view of the

retroactivity and extra-territoriality claimed by the US.

Economic inducements such as the FRG policy of "change by

trade" (Wandel durch Handel) may be more effective

(Schiavone, 1987).

IS. Finnish-Soviet trade takes place at spot

international prices (i.e. there is no price formula such as those of Bucharest or Moscow discussed above), but according to long medium and short term plans, and quota systems for a

list of goods; the Finnish government is not committed to

trade but only to do its best to ensure that trade

corresponds to agreements. The Finnish-markka/rouble rate

is effectively determined by the USSR because it is linked

to Soviet rouble-dollar rate; "clearing roubles are

convertible to dollars (via the Finnish markka) at the

official Soviet dollar-rouble exchange rate for firms

exporting to the Soviet Union" (See Oblath, 1988). Because

of Finnish lack of control over the exchange rate, Finnish

exports are subject to licencing (in practice only Finnish

products containing ,less than 20 per cent imports are

exportable). This formula for limited convertibility seems

a useful example for others to follow in East-West and intra-CMEA trade, though there is no reason why the exchange rate should be in line with Soviet cross-rates.

1.9. The peak of CoCom restrictions was reached in 1953

when 260 items were embargoed, 90 were under quantitative

control and 100 were under surveillance (Schiavone, 1988).

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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Another obstacle to the development of further

relations with the EC is the buriden of servicing and

repaying CMEA debt (now of the order of about US$100 bn),

combined with the unwillingness and/or inability to raise

new capital, and aggravated by lack of currency

convertibility even within CMEA and state ownership of

national assets. Different countries are differently

affected, and here the "parallel” approach pursued by the EC

is bound to be appropriate; for a country like Poland,

indebted beyond visible possibilities of redemption, joint

EC-CMEA cooperation in debt relief and economic assistance

may be essential to economic recovery and political

progress; the alternative is economic and political

involution, which is the high price paid by Romania for

reducing its debt. Occasional calls for a Marshall-like

plan for Eastern Europe are best taken as expressions of the need for a selective and concerted East-West plan of action to deal with the debt problem worldwide.

On the more positive side, there are also economic

and political incentives. There «re mutual gains from an

intensified international division of labour, especially if

expected to last; not only conventional (static and dynamic)

gains from trade and financial relations which may be

expected from the reversal of the post-War trade diversion

(see above) but also those deriving from a certain

"systemic" complementarity between capitalist countries

characterised by unemployed capacity and labour and

socialist countries characterised by endemic excess

demand2Q. Gains from trade bring about mutual dependence,

which raises the cost of conflicts and promotes peace.

There are also two basic political incentives. The first is

that of aiding the process of market-oriented radical reform and political renewal in CMEA countries, since a measure of economic improvement is essential to the consolidation and

2.Q.. This kind of complementarity has nothing to do

with the alleged CMEA-EC complementarity as primary

producers and industrialised countries, rightly criticised

by Graziani, 1987. 14 © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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progress of reformgJL. The second is the possibility of "driving a wedge" between the Soviet Union and the other

East European countries; more generally, the possibility

"gradually to overcome the problem of the division of Europe and change substantially the spirit of Yalta with regard to

the division of zones of influence and control between the

two superpowers" (point G of the motion submitted by the

Committee on External Economic Relations to European

Parliament, see Seeler Report, 1988). REFERENCES

BALASSA B. (1967), "Trade creation and trade diversion

in the European Common Market", The Economic Journal, March BALASSA B. (1975), European economic integration, North Holland, Amsterdam

DENTON R.G. (Ed.) (1969), Economic integration in

Europe, London.

GRAZIANI G. (1987), "La CEE e il Comecon: concorrenza e complementarità’", in Parboni and Wallerstein, 1987

KASER M. and C.F.G. RANSOM, (1969), "Relations with

Eastern Europe", in Denton, 1969.

MARRESE M. and J. VANOUS (1983), Soviet subsidization

of trade with Eastern Europe: a Soviet perspective,

Institute of International Studies, UC, Berkeley.

MACIEJEWSKI W. and D.M. NUTI, "Economic integration

between CMEA countries and prospects for East-West trade", Conference paper, EUI, Florence, 1985.

MARER P. and M. MONTIAS (1981), "CMEA integration,

theory and practice", in JEC-US Congress, East European

Economic Assessment, Part 2, pp. 148-195.

MASLEN J. (1988), "European Community-CMEA:

institutional relations", Colloquium on "The political and

legal framework of trade relations between the European

Community and Eastern Europe", University of Ghent, 17-18

December.

21

. If a CMEA country were to implement radical reform

fully and unambiguously it would have to be removed from the

list of "state-trading countries". At present such category

is not defined, so that a change in status would not be

automatic. A likely candidate is Hungary: already in 1969,

when it approached GATT for accession, Hungary claimed that its reform - which had just been launched - was to "replace

the previously employed administrative directives by

economic regulators" and that its enterprises "have full

autonomy to decide what to produce and how much, where to buy and where to sell"; at that time GATT was not convinced

and allowed import restrictions against Hungary, but

subsequent reform has led to further claims of this kind, in negotiations with the EC and with GATT.

© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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OBLATH G. (1988), "Internal regulation of foreign trade with respect to socialist trading partners: a comparison of the Finnish and the Hungarian system", Conference on "The challenge of simultaneous economic relations with East and West", Bellagio, 29 February-5 March.

PARBONI G. and I. WALLERSTEIN, (1987), L ’Europa e

l ’economia politica del sistema-mondo, Angeli, Milano.

PINDER John (1988), "The EC and Eastern Europe under

Gorbachev: how normal could relations become?", NATO

Economics Directorate, Conference paper, 23-25 March 1988, Brussels.

ROBSON P. (1984), The economics of international

integration, 2nd edition, Allen and Unwin, London.

SCHIAVONE G. (1987), "Export controls: the general

framework", Colloquium on-"The political and legal framework

of trade relations between the European Community and

Eastern Europe", University of Ghent, 17-18 December.

SEELER H.-J. (Rapporteur) (1986), Report on relations

between the European Community and the Council for Mutual

Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Eastern European member

states of the CMEA, drawn up on behalf of the Committee on

External Economic Relations, Working Documents of the

European Parliament, document A 2-187/86, 19 December

van BRABANT J.M. (1973), Bilateralism and structural

bilateralism in intra-CMEA trade, Rotterdam UP, Rotterdam.

van BRABANT J.M. (1988), "Integration reform - new

horizons for the CMEA and East-West economic relations?", mimeo., New York

YANNOPOULOS G.N. (1985), "The impact of the European

Economic Community on East-West trade in Europe", University of Reading Discussion Papers in Economics, Series A, n. 165.

16 © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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WORKING PAPERS ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT

86/206: Volker DEVILLE Bibliography on The European Monetary System and the European Currency Unit. 86/212: Emil CLAASSEN

Melvyn KRAUSS

Budget Deficits and the Exchange Rate

86/214: Alberto CHILOSI The Right to Employment Principle and Self-Managed Market Socialism: A Historical Account and an Analytical Appraisal of some Old Ideas

86/218: Emil CLAASSEN The Optimum Monetary Constitution: Monetary Integration and Monetary Stability

86/222: Edmund S. PHELPS Economic Equilibrium and Other Economic Concepts: A "New Palgrave" Quartet 86/223: Giuliano FERRARI BRAVO Economic Diplomacy. The Keynes-Cuno

Affair

86/224: Jean-Michel GRANDMONT Stabilizing Competitive Business Cycles 86/225: Donald A.R. GEORGE Wage-earners’ Investment Funds: theory,

simulation and policy

86/227: Domenico Mario NUTI Michal Kalecki's Contributions to the Theory and Practice of Socialist Planning 86/228: Domenico Mario NUTI Codetermination, Profit-Sharing and Full

Employment

86/229: Marcello DE CECCO Currency, Coinage and the Gold Standard 86/230: Rosemarie FEITHEN Determinants of Labour Migration in an

Enlarged European Community 86/232: Saul ESTRIN

Derek C. JONES

Are There Life Cycles in Labor-Managed Firms? Evidence for France

86/236: Will BARTLETT Milica UVALIC

Labour Managed Firms, Employee Participa­ tion and Profit Sharing - Theoretical Perspectives and European Experience. 86/240: Domenico Mario NUTI Information, Expectations and Economic

Planning

86/241: Donald D. HESTER Time, Jurisdiction and Sovereign Risk

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2

86/242: Marcello DE CECCO Financial Innovations and Monetary Theory 86/243: Pierre DEHEZ

Jacques DREZE

Competitive Equilibria with Increasing Returns

86/244: Jacques PECK Karl SHELL

Market Uncertainty: Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium in Market Games 86/245: Domenico Mario NUTI Profit-Sharing and Employment: Claims and

Overclaims

86/246: Karol Attila SOOS Informal Pressures, Mobilization, and Campaigns in the Management of Centrally Planned Economies

86/247: Tamas BAUER Reforming or Perfecting the Economic Mechanism in Eastern Europe

86/257: Luigi MONTRUCCHIO Lipschitz Continuous Policy Functions for Strongly Concave Optimization Problems 87/264: Pietro REICHLIN Endogenous Fluctuations in a Two-Sector

Overlapping Generations Economy

87/265: Bernard CORNET The Second Welfare Theorem in Nonconvex Economies

87/267: Edmund PHELPS Recent Studies of Speculative Markets in the Controversy over Rational Expecta­ tions

87/268: Pierre DEHEZ Jacques DREZE

Distributive Production Sets and Equilibria with Increasing Returns

87/269: Marcello CLARICH The German Banking System: Legal Foundations and Recent Trends

87/270: Egbert DIERKER Wilhelm NEUEFEIND

Quantity Guided Price Setting

87/276: Paul MARER Can Joint Ventures in Hungary Serve as a "Bridge" to the CMEA Market?

87/277: Felix FITZROY Efficiency Wage Contracts, Unemployment, and Worksharing

87/279: Darrell DUFFIE Wayne SHAFER

Equilibrium and the Role of the Firm in Incomplete Markets

87/280: Martin SHUBIK A Game Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Money and Financial Institutions

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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3

-87/283: Leslie T. OXLEY Donald A.R. GEORGE

Perfect Foresight, Non-Linearity and Hyperinflation

87/284: Saul ESTRIN Derek C. JONES

The Determinants of Workers’ Participation and Productivity in Producer Cooperatives 87/285: Domenico Mario NUTI Financial Innovation under Market Socialism 87/286: Felix FITZROY Unemployment and the Share Economy:

A Sceptical Note

87/287: Paul HARE Supply Multipliers in a Centrally Planned Economy with a Private Sector

87/288: Roberto TAMBORINI The Stock Approach to the Exchange Rate: An Exposition and a Critical Appraisal 87/289: Corrado BENASSI Asymmetric Information and Financial

Markets: from Financial Intermediation to Credit Rationing

87/296: Gianna GIANNELLI On Labour Market Theories

87/297: Domenica TROPEANO The Riddle of Foreign Exchanges: A Swedish-German Debate (1917-1919) 87/305: G. VAN DER LAAN

A.J.J. TALMAN

Computing Economic Equilibria by Variable Dimension Algorithms: State of the Art 87/306: Paolo GARELLA Adverse Selection and Intermediation 87/307: Jean-Michel GRANDMONT Local Bifurcations and Stationary

Sunspots 87/308: Birgit GRODAL

Werner HILDENBRAND

Income Distributions and the Axiom of Revealed Preference

87/309: Eric PEREE Alfred STEINHERR

Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Foreign Trade

87/312: Pietro REICHLIN Output-Inflation Cycles in an Economy with Staggered Wage Setting

87/319: Peter RAPPOPORT Lucrezia REICHLIN

Segmented Trends and Nonstationary Time Series

87/320: Douglas GALE A Strategic Model of Labor Markets with Incomplete Information

87/321: Gianna GIANNELLI A Monopoly Union Model of the Italian Labour Market: 1970-1984 © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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A -87/322: 87/323: 87/324: 88/329: 88/330: 88/331: 88/332: 88/333: 88/335: 88/337: 88/338: 88/339: 88/340: 88/341: 88/344: 88/345:

Keith PILBEAM Sterilization and the Profitability of UK Intervention 1973-86

Alan KIRMAN The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory

Andreu MAS-COLELL An Equivalence Theorem for a Bargaining Set

Dalia MARIN Assessing Structural Change: the Case of Austria

Milica UVALIC "Shareholding" in Yugoslav Theory and Practice

David CANNING Dalia MARIN

Keith PILBEAM

Convergence to Equilibrium in a Sequence of Games with Learning

Trade and Scale Economies. A causality test for the US, Japan, Germany and the UK.

Fixed versus Floating Exchange Rates Revisited.

Felix FITZROY Kornelius KRAFT Domenico Mario NUTI

Pietro REICHLIN Paolo SICONOLFI

Piece Rates with Endogenous Monitoring: Some theory and evidence

On Traditional Cooperatives and James Meade’s Labour-Capital Discriminating Partnerships

Government Debt and Equity Capital in an Economy with Credit Rationing Alfred STEINHERR The EMS with the ECU at Centerstage:

a proposal for reform of the European rate system

Frederick VAN DER PLOEG Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Inter­ dependent Economies with Capital Accumulation, Death and Population Growth David CANNING Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy

without a Forward Market for Labour Joerg MAYER Intervention Mechanisms and Symmetry

in the EMS

Keith PILBEAM Exchange Rate Management and the Risk Premium © The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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- 5

88/348: Milica UVALIC The Investment Behaviour of the Labour- Managed Firm: an econometric analysis 88/351: Alan P. KIRMAN On Ants and Markets

88/352: Gianna GIANNELLI Labour Demand, Pricing and Investment Decisions in Italy: An econometric Analysis

88/353: Niall O'HIGGINS The Progressivity of Government Taxes and Benefits in Ireland: a comparison of two measures of redistributive impact

88/356: Mary MCCARTHY Lucrezia' REICHLIN

Do Women Cause Unemployment? Evidence from Eight O.E.C.D. Countries

88/357: Richard M. GOODWIN Chaotic Economic Dynamics 88/358: Fernando PACHECO

Eric PEREE Francisco S. TORRES

Duopoly under Demand Uncertainty

88/360: Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Relations between the European Community and CMEA

88/361: Domenico Mario NUTI Remonetisation and Capital Markets in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies 88/362: Domenico Mario NUTI The New Soviet Cooperatives: Advances

and Limitations

Spare copies of these working papers and/or a complete list of all working papers that have appeared in the Economics Department series can be obtained., from the Secretariat of the Economics Department.

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(25)

it \ //

// ln r

■ -* ,

:

W O R K IN G

EUI

____

PAPERS

EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the European University Institute, Florence,

A complete list and copies of Working Papers can be obtained free of charge - depending on the availability of stocks - from:

The P ub lica tion s O fficer European U niversity Institute

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P U B L I C A T I O N S O F T H E E U R O P E A N U N I V E R S I T Y I N S T I T U T E

To The Pub lica tion s O fficer European U niversity Institute Badia Fiesolana

I - 50016 San D om enico di Fiesole (FI) Italy

From Nam e ... Address ...

Please send me:

□ a complete list of EUI Working Papers □ the following EUI Working Paper(s):

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22

PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE NOVEMBER 1938 87/315: Serge NOIRET Nuovi motivi per studiare i meccanismi

delle leggi elettorali. Una

riflessione metodologica a proposito della legge del 1919 in Italia 87/316: Alain GOUSSOT Les sources internationales de la

culture socialiste italienne à la fin du 19e siècle et au début du 20e siècle. Problèmes de la composition de l'idéologie du PSI et ses rapports avec la circulation des idées en Europe

87/317: Eamonn NOONAN Württtemberg's exporters and German protection, 1931-36

87/318: Jean-Pierre CAVAILLE Theatrum Mundi. Notes sur la théâtralité du Monde Baroque. 87/319: Peter RAPPOPORT and

Lucrezia REICHLIN

Segmented Trends and Nonstationary Time Series

87/320: Douglas GALE A Strategic Model of Labor Markets with Incomplete Information

87/321: Gianna GIANNELLI A Monopoly Union Model of the Italian Labour Market

87/322: Keith PILBEAM Sterilization and the Profitability of UK Intervention 1973-86

87/323: Alan KIRMAN The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory

87/324: Andreu MAS-COLELL An Equivalence Theorem for a Bargaining Set

88/325: Angela GROPPI "La classe la plus nombreuse, la plus utile et la plus précieuse".

Organizzazione del lavoro e conflitti nella Parigi rivoluzionaria.

88/326: Bernd MARIN Qu'est-ce que c'est "Le Patronat"? Quelques enjeux théoriques et observations empiriques

88/327: Jean BLONDEL Decision-Making Processes, Conflicts, and Cabinet Government *

88/328: Ida KOPPEN The European Community's Environment Policy.

From the Summit in Paris, 1972, to the Single European Act, 1987 *

:Working Paper out of print

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23

PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE NOVEMBER 1988 88/329: Dalia MARIN Assessing Structural Change: The Case

of Austria *

88/330: Milica UVALIC "Shareholding" in Yugoslav Theory and Practice

88/331: David CANNING Convergence to Equilibrium in a Sequence of Games with Learning 88/332: Dalia MARIN Trade and Scale Economies. A causality

test for the U.S., Japan# Germany and the UK

88/333: Keith PILBEAM Fixed versus Floating Exchange Rates Revisited

88/334: Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'OLIVEIRA

Die EWG und die Versalzung des Rheins 88/335: Felix Fitzroy and

Kornelius Kraft

Piece Rates with Endogenous Monitoring Some Theory and Evidence

88/336: Norbert LORENZ Die Ubertragung von Hoheitsrechten auf die Europaischen Gemeinschaften - verfassungsrechtliche Chancen und Grenzen einer europaischen Integration erlautert am Beispiel der

Bundesrepublik Deutschland# Frankreichs und Italiens

-88/337: Domenico Mario NUTI On Traditional Cooperatives and James Meade's Labour-Capital Discriminating Partnerships

88/338: Pietro REICHLIN and Paolo SICONOLFI

Government Debt and Equity Capital in an Economy with Credit Rationing 88/339: Alfred STEINHERR The EMS with the ECU at Centerstage:

A proposal for reform of the European Exchange rate system

88/340: Frederick VAN DER PLOEG Monetary and Fiscal Policy in Interdependent Economies with Capital Accumulation, Death and Population Growth

88/341: David CANNING Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy without a Forward Market for Labour 88/342: Gunther TEUBNER "And God Laughed..."

Indeterminacy, Self-Reference and Paradox in Law

88/343: Jean BLONDEL Ministerial Careers in Western European Governments

:Working Paper out of print

© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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24

PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE NOVEMBER 1988 88/344: Joerg MAYER Intervention Mechanisms and Symmetry

in the EMS

88/345: Keith PILBEAM Exchange Rate Management and the Risk Premium

88/346: Efisio ESPA The Structure and Methodology of International Debt Statistics 88/347: Francese MORATA and

and Jaume VERNET

Las Asambleas Régionales en Italia y Espana: Organizacion Institucional y Réglas de Funcionamiento

88/348: Milica UVALIC The Investment Behaviour of the Labour-Managed Firm: An Econometric Analysis

88/349: Massimo PANEBIANCO Inter-Regional Co-Operation in the North-South Dialogue

Latin America and the European Community

88/350: Gregorio ROBLES La Cour de Justice des CE et les Principes Généraux du droit 88/351: Alan KIRMAN On Ants and Markets

88/352: Gianna GIANNELLI Labour Demand, Pricing and Investment Decisions in Italy: An Econometric Analysis

88/353: Niall O'HIGGINS The Progressivity of Government Taxes and Benefits in Ireland: A Comparison of Two Measures of Redistributive Impact

88/354: Christian JOERGES Amerikanische und deutsche Traditionen der soziologischen Jurisprudenz und der Rechtskritik 88/355: Summary of Conference,

debates and abstracts of selected interventions

The Future Financing of the EC Budget: EPU Conference 16-17 October 1987 88/356: Mary MCCARTHY and

Lucrezia REICHLIN

Do Women Cause Unemployment?

Evidence From Eight O.E.C.D. Countries 88/357: Richard M. GOODWIN Chaotic Economic Dynamics

88/358: Fernando PACHECO Eric PEERE and Francisco S. TORRES

Duopoly Under Demand Uncertainty

88/359: Jaakko NOUSIAINEN Substance and Style of Cabinet Decision-Making © The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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25

PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE NOVEMBER 1988 88/360: Domenico Mario NUTI Economic Relations between the

European Community and CMEA

88/361: Domenico Mario NUTI Remonetisation and Capital Markets in the Reform of Centrally Planned Economies

88/362: Domenico Mario NUTI The New Soviet Cooperatives: Advances and Limitations

88/363: Reiner GRUNDMANN Marx and the Domination of Nature Alienation, Technology and Communism 88/364: Tony PROSSER The Privatisation of Public

Enterprises in France and Great Britain

The State, Constitutions and Public Pol icy

:Working Paper out of print

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© The Author(s). European University Institute. version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research Repository.

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