Roberta Medda-Windischer and Patricia Popelier (eds.),
Pro-Independence Movements and Immigration. Discourse,
Policy and Practice (Brill Nijhoff, Leiden, 2016) ISBN:
978-90-04-29438-7 (hardcover)
Davide Strazzari*
The increasing immigration influx to Europe, coupled with the territorial rescaling of public functions, both at the supranational and at the sub-state level,1 have contributed to the development of a multiple sense of belonging of the individual to territorial institutions other than the state.2 The traditional notion of citizenship as defining the membership of an individual to the political community of a state is increasingly subject to tensions.
An example of this trend is represented by the notion of “regional citizenship”.3 The more the subnational authorities are empowered to act in areas affecting individuals’ daily life, for example welfare, the more the ties of these individuals with the sub-state institutions strengthen and a “regional citizenship” notion develops. In turn, this may follow inclusive or, on the contrary, exclusionary attitude towards immigrants, according to the notions of “ethnic” or “civic” citizenship.
The idea of a regional citizenship may become even stronger in states characterized by a multinational structure of population,4 or where linguistic-national minorities are set. These subnational units with a considerable number of persons belonging to such a national minority, with the latter thus constituting a majority in that territorial unit, may feel the need to preserve their cultural-linguistic identity with respect to new
1* Dr. Davide Strazzari is a researcher in the Comparative Constitutional Law, Sociology and Social Science Department at the University of Trento, Italy.
See Michael Keating, Rescaling the European State: The Making of Territory and the Rise of the Meso (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013).
2 See Willem Maas (ed.), Multilevel Citizenship (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2013).
3 See Roberta Medda-Windischer and Karl Kössler, “Regional Citizenship: A Tool for Inclusion of New Minorities in Subnational Entities?”, in 13 EYMI (Special Focus, 2014), 61-78.
4 I refer here to Stepan’s definition of multinationalism as a system in which significant historical communities, sharing linguistic, religious, cultural or ethnic factors, claim important political
autonomy, or even independence, for the territories they occupy. This definition is expressly referred to in the editors’ introduction, p. 5. See A. Stepan, “Towards a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, Multinationalism, and Democracy”, in E.L. Gibson (ed.), Federalism and Democracy in Latin America (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2004), 39.
immigrants, especially when the latter are deeply motivated to learn the majority language (i.e. the dominant official language in the country). Due to such situations, sub-state authorities have a strong interest in agreeing with the national authorities to have special powers in selecting immigrants and/or to encourage immigrants to learn the language of the national minority. Quebec is the most prominent example in this regard.
The relationship between “new minorities”, resulting from migration flows, and the traditional linguistic/national minorities has increasingly drawn the attention of scholars, especially political scientists and political philosophers.5. Kymlicka has highlighted the “legitimacy dilemma” faced by sub-state nationalism in relation to immigration. The sub-state nation building process, whenever based on factors such as language, culture or common history, tends to imply the exclusion of migrants. In turn, this exclusion may undermine the nation building process itself as this could be perceived, externally, as illiberal and xenophobic.6
The volume Pro-independence Movements and Immigration, edited by Roberta Medda-Windischer and Patricia Popelier, is a new contribution in this research field. According to the editors’ introduction, the purpose of the book is twofold: to examine how pro-independence movements in multinational states fit immigrants into their call for independence and to analyse how immigrants approach independence projects in the relevant sub-state units.7
The analysis is specifically focused on “pro-independence movements” defined by the editors as those “movements and political parties striving for independence as
opposed to parties that strive for greater autonomy within the central state”.8 Although separatism and sub-state nationalism are certainly two distinct concepts, since the
5 See especially the chapter “Minority Nationalism and Immigrant Integration” in Will Kymlicka,
Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2001); Joseph H. Carens, “Immigration, Political Community, and the Transformation of Identity: Quebec’s Immigration Politics in Critical Perspective”, in Will Kymlicka (ed.), Is Quebec
Nationalism Just’ Perspectives from Anglophone Canada (McGill University Press, Montreal, 1995),
20-81; Ricard Zapata-Barrero, “Setting a Research Agenda on the Interaction between Cultural Demands of Immigrants and Minority Nations”, 5(4) Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies (2007), 1-25; Ricard Zapata-Barrero, Immigration and Self-Government of Minority Nations (Peter Lang, Brussels, 2009); Eve Hepburn and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (eds.), The Politics of Immigration in
Multilevel States – Governance and Political Parties (Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2014).
6 Kymlicka, op. cit. note 5, 277-278.
7 See the editors’ introduction in Roberta Medda-Windischer and Patricia Popelier, Pro-Independence
latter does not necessarily lead to independence, the literature on sub-state nationalism is deemed to be particularly relevant to the purposes of the book, “given that
separatists are simultaneously sub-state nationalists”.9
More precisely, Kymlicka’s “legitimacy dilemma” analysis and thus the related distinction between the internal dimension of sub-state nationalism, which requires the exclusion of immigrants, and the external dimension of legitimacy, which requires their integration,10 represent a point of reference for the overall book.11
Pro-independence movements must “decide whether to include migrants in public participatory tools for consulting the population on the issue of independence”12 and, in case the independent claim is successfully achieved, they need to define the status of the immigrants residing there.13 In doing so, pro-independence movements must choose to construe their national identity in ethnic or rather in more
civic/cosmopolitan terms.
The choice of the relevant case studies is fully in line with the declared purposes of the book and it includes contributions focusing on Quebec (Alain G. Gagnon and Marc Sanjaume-Calvet), South Tyrol (Andrea Carlà), Flanders (Esma Baycan), the Basque Country (Andrea Ruiz Balzola), Scotland (Neil McGarvey and Gareth Mulvey) and Catalonia (Núria Franco-Guillén and Sergi Esteve i Garcia).
The volume is ideally structured into two parts, with a preliminary chapter on the Quebec experience, which analyses both the migrant vote as a factor that has
influenced the outcome of the 1995 Quebec independence referendum and Quebec’s intercultural policy towards immigrants.
The first part, which includes the analysis of South Tyrol, Flanders and Basque Country, focuses more on the political attitude showed by pro-independence political parties in relation to immigrants. It does so mainly by analysing their political
programmes, the official positions expressed in assembly debates, and interviews with political leaders. In the case of Flanders, since one of the political party analysed (the
9 See Esma. Baycan, “Flemish pro-independence parties and Immigrants: Friends or Foes?”, in Medda-Windischer and Popelier (eds.), op. cit. note 7,86-117 , at 87.
10 Kymlicka’s legitimacy dilemma and the issue of internal/external legitimacy is referred to and deeply analyzed in Baycan’s contribution, ibid., at 88ff.
11 See the editors’ introduction in Medda-Windischer and Popelier, op. cit., note 7, at 10, where the internal/external legitimacy issue is explicitly referred to.
12 Ibid. 13 Ibid.
N-VA) is currently the major political party in the coalition that controls the Flemish government, some measures enforced by the Flemish authorities, notably the so-called
inburgering policy,14 are also considered. All the contributions also adopt a historical perspective that helps the reader contextualize the emergence of “ethnic nationalism” in the relevant cases.
The second part of the book explores cases where migrants have been concretely involved in consultative process concerning independence (Scotland) or this prospect might be under way (Catalonia). Here the focus is on how immigrants may influence pro-independence projects, emphasizing the factors that have an impact on their electoral position. The second part also includes a legal contribution by Guayasén Marrero Gonzàles who considers whether under international law there is an obligation for the successor state to extend its nationality to migrants, provided that they were entitled to vote in the respective referendum on independence.
The book seems to confirm previous findings that language is a key factor in defining national identity.15 When nationalism is based on territory rather than on language or other ascriptive factors, as it is the case of Scotland, other features, such as
demography and labour market needs, play a more meaningful role and push the pro-independence parties towards a more inclusionary attitude towards immigrants.16 On the contrary, in territorial contexts where nationalism is based on blood, language or descent, the attitude of pro-independence parties toward immigrants is very much dependent on the ability or efforts of immigrants to learn the language of the sub-state nation. This explains why Quebec has made efforts to attract francophone migrants17 and in South Tyrol the pro-independence party Süd Tyroler Freiheit favours a policy aimed to recruit immigrant from countries having a linguistic and cultural German background.18
14 The inburgering policy consists in a two-stage process, the first of which includes Dutch language courses, civic orientation and vocational guidance. It is mandatory for certain groups of individuals. The failure to attend a compulsory inburgering course is sanctioned with an administrative fine. For more details, see Baycan, op. cit. note 9.
15 On this point, see Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero, op. cit. note 5, 7.
16 See Neil McGarvey and Gareth Mulvey, “Identities and Politics in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum: the Polish and Pakistani Experiencer”, in Medda-Windischer and Popelier, op. cit. note 7, 134-162 and the editors’ introduction in Medda-Windischer and Popelier, op. cit. note 7, at 11.
17 See Alain G. Gagnon and Marc Sanjaume-Calvet, “Immigration, self-Government and Secessionism: The Québec Caser”, in Medda-Windischer and Popelier, op. cit. note 7, 30-57. .
18 See Andrea Carlà, “How Secessionist parties Approach Migration: South Tyrolean Nationalism and the Weight of History”, in Medda-Windischer and Popelier, op. cit. note 7, 58-85, at 71.
Whenever attracting immigrants from countries sharing common ethnic-linguistic features with the sub-national units is not viable, pro-independence parties either show a clear and xenophobic approach toward immigrants or they expect immigrants to learn their language.19 The former position is difficult to sustain, both for legal and political reason, especially in the light of the external legitimation needed effectively to pursue any independence claims.20 The second attitude may result in a more generally inclusive approach, but “it still reflects assimilatory understanding of the process of integration”,21 especially when the measures requiring immigrants to learn language are compulsory.22
The second part of the volume looks at the position of migrants towards the independence project, focusing on the Scottish and Catalan experiences. The
underlying issue—and the link with the first part of the book—is whether the adoption by the independence political parties of a model of society inclusive of migrants may push migrants to sustain the independence project. The answer seems to be no: “[p]roviding migrants with the right to vote in pro-independence referendums does not seem to have any influence on the referendum outcome”.23 As suggested in Mcgarvey and Mulvey’s analysis, migrants voted as the overall Scottish population and “the issues that seem to matter most to migrants are not unlike those of the general population with the economy, health and education highlighted
consistently”.24 In Catalonia as well, according to the analysis of Núria Franco-Guillén and Sergi Esteve i Garcia, migrants tend to split their vote as autochthonous persons do, and there is no evidence of a migrants “block vote” against the
independence project, as took place in the Quebec Case.25
19 The position of an independence movement with regard to immigrants may also change over time. Ruiz Balzola, for instance, describes how pro-independence movements have progressively reframed the national identity markers in the Basque Country from descent, through language and political affiliation, to territory. See Andrea Ruiz Balzola, “Migration and Diversity in the Discourse on Basque Sovereigntyr”, in Medda-Windischer and Popelier, op. cit. note 7, 118-133, at 119ff.
20 See Esma Baikan, “Flemish Pro-Independence Parties and Immigrants: Friends or Foes?”, in Medda-Windischer and Popelier, op. cit. note 7, 86-117, with reference to the position of the Vlaams
Block party, dissolved in 2004 after having been judged as promoting racism.
21 See Carlà, op. cit. note 18, at 82. 22 See Baikan, op. cit. note 20.
23 See the editors’ introduction in Medda-Windischer and Popelier, op. cit. note 7, at 13. 24 See Mcgarvey and Mulvey, op. cit. note 16 at 159.
25 See Núria Franco-Guillén and Sergi Esteve i Garcia, “Secession and Immigration: an Exploration of Immigrant View in the Catalan Case”, in Medda-Windischer and Popelier, op. cit. note 7, 163-186, at 182.
However, despite similarities, the two national cases present interesting discrepancies. For instance, when assessing the position of immigrants in pro-independence
consultative referendum in Scotland and Catalonia, one may expect that the issue of the accession of the two prospective states (in case of a successful referendum) to the European Union (EU) heavily influences migrants’ vote, especially that of the EU citizen migrants residing there. This is actually the case in Catalonia, but not in Scotland, according to the McGarvey and Mulvey’s analysis. Although EU membership has been an important element for casting their vote, the majority of Polish residents in Scotland preferred to back the Scottish independence claim due to the Brexit referendum and the attitude shown by many British politicians against EU citizens migrants.26
As the editors admit in their introduction, the volume complements recent publications dealing with the nexus between “nation without states” and
immigration.27 The added value of the collected contributions relies on, according to the editors,28 the adoption of a dual approach, consisting of examining not only the perspective of the nationalist parties toward immigration, but also the immigrants’ approach towards independence movements, an issue that has been neglected thus far in the relevant literature.
However, this second perspective does not seem to be really fully explored by all the contributions, since relevant data are provided only with reference to Scotland and Catalonia. While this is understandable, due to the fact that in these two cases immigrants have been, or are possibly going to be, included in the consultative process on independence, nevertheless the lack of any survey in relation to the other selected subnational cases causes a certain level of incoherence in the structure of the book and it does not meet all expectations of the reader and the purported goal of the volume.
A further element of criticism concerns the fact that it is not always clear which category of migrants the book and the different contributions refer to and this again results in some incoherence. For instance, the analysis conducted in the second part,
26 See Mcgarvey and Mulvey, op. cit. note 16, at 155-156.
27 Namely Hepburn and Zapata-Barrero, op. cit., note 5. See also the special issue edited by Sanjay Jeram, Arno van der Zwet, and Verena Wisthaler, entitled “Friends or Foes? Migrants and Sub-State Nationalists in Europe”, 42(8) JEMS (2016), 1229-1241.
dealing with the attitude of migrants towards pro-independence project, includes EU migrants, whereas the contributions in the first part seem not to do so.
Finally, despite the editors’ statement that “the volume adopts a multidisciplinary approach, including legal and anthropologist insights, in addition to political
theory”,29 I have the impression that the multidisciplinary approach has not had such a prominent role. More precisely, my expectations, as a reviewer with a legal
background, were that the legal argument would played a more prominent role,30 and offer new perspectives on a research agenda that so far has been mostly dominated by political scientists. This expectation also relied on the fact that a significant part of the editors’ introduction is devoted to providing a legal perspective on the alleged divide between “old” and “new” minorities. However, this analysis is not taken as a refence, or even mentioned, by the other contributions.
This is a missing opportunity as a multidisciplinary approach and, as far as I am concerned, a more prominent legal insight would have contributed an added value to the analysis conducted.
For instance, the relevance of language as a marker of national identity is emphasized by many contributors. This issue is often evaluated according to the notions of
“ethnic” and “civic” nationalism. Although some contributors highlight how this distinction is too simplistic to capture the multifaceted character of national identity,31 it is nevertheless substantially applied in order to evaluate measures aimed at
compelling newcomers to learn the language of the sub-state nation. In so far as these measures are obligatory, they are viewed as an expression of “ethnic nationalism” and they are considered as promoting assimilation rather than integration and deemed incompatible with liberal-democratic principles.32
29 Ibid., at 5.
30 Only Guayasén Marrero Gonzàles’s contribution is a purely legal analysis. Guayasén Marrero Gonzàles, “The Role of Migrants in the Catalan Independence Process. A Legal Analysis, 187-208”, in Medda-Windischer and Popelier, op. cit. note 7.
31 See especially Carlà, op. cit. note 18, at 62 and 63; see also Mcgarvey and Mulvey, op. cit. note 16, who highlight that people exhibit a multiplicity of identities, at 137-138.
32 See especially Baycan, op. cit. note 9, at 103, where he affirms that: “assimilationist tendencies become more visible in integration programmes that take the common identity as a short-term objective. They become particularly problematic when such programmes are formulated as
requirements that are legally enforced or upon which certain welfare-state services are made
conditional. In this sense, striving for a common identity in the short term Is unjustified, although such a pursuit would be fair as a longer-term expectation or aspiration.” In more general terms, see Carlà,
To this extent, according to a legal analysis, the voluntary as opposed to the
compulsory character of the linguistic-civic test is not a decisive argument to evaluate their legitimacy and a more nuanced analysis is necessary. The European Union Court of Justice (EUCJ) has admitted it is legitimate for a state to require immigrants to achieve a certain level of knowledge of the host state’s language and of its societal values, even before migrants are admitted.33 The linguistic requirements, even if compulsory, are considered as a legitimate means to pursue the aim of building national cohesion. Their legitimacy tests depend on a proportionality review and on a balancing of several elements. The Constitutional Court of Belgium expressed a similar position when reviewing a Flemish provision that required any social house tenant to show the will to learn Dutch, through attendance of the inburgering course, in order to rent a house under the social scheme.34
Requiring immigrants to acquire a certain knowledge of the official language or languages is not necessarily at odds with the idea that integration of migrants is a two-way process, implying rights and duties on both the receiving society and the
immigrants,35 and it does not mean that immigrants have to renounce to their culture, history and tradition.36 As noted in the editors’ introduction, “although individuals belonging to minorities are not under any legal obligation to integrate, they are aware that, if they wish to participate in the wider society, they should demonstrate such efforts as acquiring proper knowledge of the official language (or languages) of the dominant culture”.37
33 See ECJ, case C-153/14, K & A, judgement of 9 July 2015 [2015] EU 453. For a comment, see Daniel Thym, Towards a Contextual Conception of Social Integration in EU Immigration Law.
Comments on P & S and K &A, 18 EJML (2016), 89-111.
34 See Belgian Constitutional Court 101/2008, 10 July 2008, commented by Nicolas Bernard, “L’arrêt Wooncode de la Cour Constitutionnelle du 10 Juillet 2008, quand l’arbre (linguistique) cache la forêt”,
Journal de Tribunaux (2008), 689-698.
35 Both EU documents and state legislations highlight that the compulsory requirement of acquiring a certain knowledge of the language is perfectly in line with the idea that integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation. See Common Basic Principles for Immigrants Integration
Policy in the EU, Council Conclusions, 19November 2004 and Art. 4bis, Sec. 1, Italian Immigration Act (Decreto legislativo [Law ranking decree] No.286/1998).
36 Indeed, EU anti-discrimination legislations (Council Directive 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origins and Council Directive 2000/78, which provides remedies against discrimination on the ground of (inter alia) religion in employment and occupation) are instruments useful to protect immigrants’ cultural identity.
37 See the editors’ introduction in Medda-Windischer and Popelier, op. cit. note 7, at 18. In this regard, Article 5 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities requires state parties to adopt measures to defend and to promote cultural identities of national minorities, whilst not preventing them from adopting measures taken in pursuance of their general integration policy.
Because of the inherent ambivalence of language as a marker of both ethnic and civic nationalism and considering also the fact that linguistic requirements are not per se an instrument related exclusively to sub-state nationalism and/or independence
movements,38 I wonder whether factors other than language could have been taken into consideration in order to assess the attitude of pro-independence parties towards immigration. This is very much the case of welfare and the issue of access to social rights of migrant population, a feature that has been considered only marginally by the relevant contributions. Since social assistance is based on the principle of solidarity among members of a given community, the eligibility of immigrants to welfare or limitations that would favour persons belonging to autochthonous communities, such as long-term residency, are key factors to assess the inclusionary or rather
exclusionary approaches of the pro-independence parties towards immigrants. Despite the abovementioned weaknesses, the volume is certainly worth reading as it complements the analysis of sub-state nationalism by considering immigrants’ position towards “nation without state” independence projects. The provisional findings that immigrants do not necessarily “oppose” these plans and that their political/electoral behaviour is very much dependent on pragmatic factors, such as economy or labour perspectives, are certainly a good ground for further research.
38 Knowledge of the host state’s language and civic values is required as a condition for the immigrant’s stay (or even entry) in many European national states, such as UK, France or Germany, which are traditionally understood to put in place different integration policies.
