569
Enforcing the Bargain v. Materiality
Requirement
The Future of Disclosure-Only Settlements
Post-Trulia
I. Introduction………...571
II. Doctrinal and Policy Defects in Requiring Materiality...576
A. Performance of Legal Duty is No Consideration...576
B. Materiality Requirement as an Incentive to Withhold Information for the Sake of Settlements...578
C. To Encourage or to Deter? What is the Public Policy?...579
III. Market Mechanisms and Judicial Assessment...582
A. Enforcing the Bargain: Achieving Fairness Through Market...582
1. Fairness Matters in Contract Law...583
2. Gross Disparity in Exchange as Unconscionable...585
B. The Plaintiff Firm Market...591
C. Judicial Assessment of Merits and Attorney Fees...596
1. Three-Scales Fee Awards...597
2. Scope of the Release Proportionate to the Scope of the Disclosures...602
D. Gordon v. Verizon: The Best Interest of the Putative Class is to Enforce the Bargain...602
IV. Challenges to the Finality of Settlement: Ex-Post Remedies to Overbroad Release...604
A. Fraud...604
B. Overbroad as Unconscionable...605
Enforcing the Bargain v. Materiality
Requirement
The Future of Disclosure-Only Settlements
Post-Trulia
By Hao Jiang*
Abstract
In In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery broke away from its tradition of routinely approving disclosure-only settlements and required disclosures to be material in order to cure the conflict of interest between plaintiff’s counsel and the plaintiff class. I argue that fairness of settlement is the only standard in approving class action settlements and fairness will not be achieved by requiring materiality. Shareholders are legally entitled to all material information, as the board’s fiduciary duty dictates. Thus, material disclosures are enforcement of a legal duty that is no consideration for the release of shareholder claims. On the other hand, fairness could be achieved by enforcing the bargain if the bargaining process was conducted fairly and in good faith. The agency problem and the conflict of interest between the plaintiff’s counsel and the plaintiff class can be resolved by judicial assessment on whether there was adequate representation based on the effort of the plaintiff’s counsel and the appropriate attorney fee award according to the well-established three-scale system in quantifying the appropriate attorney fees. In addition, overbroad releases can be rescinded under the contract doctrines of fraud and unconscionability if such settlements were fraudulently induced or the release is overbroad compared to the benefit that the disclosures conveyed.
* Copyright © 2018 by Hao Jiang. Visiting Assistant Professor, Tulane Law School. Visiting Fellow at Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany. J.D., S.J.D.,Tulane Law School. I would like to thank Jim Gordley, Onnig Dombalagian, Ann Lipton and participants of Tulane Law School Faculty Workshop and UCLA Corporate and Securities Litigation Workshop. I am also grateful for the research support that I received at Max Planck Institute.
I. Introduction
A settlement agreement is a contract, and its terms are usually enforced by courts as such. In contract law, normative doctrines and theories are not concerned about the fairness of the terms so long as they were freely negotiated in the marketplace. Delaware courts, as the de facto national business lawmaker, have an even stronger desire to respect freedom of contract and favor the terms in the voluntary settlement.1
In approving class action settlements in Delaware, just as in other states, the law is more paternalistic to protect the weaker party, the plaintiff class. The court has to assume the fiduciary duty to independently examine the fairness of the class action settlement before approving it.2 Such an approval
“‘requires more than a cursory scrutiny by the court of the issues presented.’ The [c]ourt must exercise its own judgment to determine whether the settlement is reasonable and intrinsically fair.”3 In determining the fairness of the
settlement, the court also has to evaluate “‘the reasonableness of the “give” and the “get,”‘ or what the class members receive in exchange for ending the litigation.”4 Supposedly, when it is
clear that there is gross disparity between the two sides of the proposed class action settlement, it is the Court’s statutory duty to disapprove it.
A disclosure-only settlement is a non-monetary form of settlement where the plaintiffs, a class of stockholders, release any breach of fiduciary duty claims they may have against a company in connection to the sale of a company. In return, they receive supplemental disclosures. Meanwhile, the only money changing hands would be the plaintiff’s attorney fees, which are paid by the corporations under the corporate benefit
1. Rome v. Archer, 197 A.2d 49, 53 (Del. 1964) (Explaining Delaware has long favored the voluntary settlement over litigation).
2. Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 58-59 (Del. 1991). See also DEL.CH. CT.R. 23.
3. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891 (Del. Ch. 2016). See also DEL.CH.CT.R. 23.
doctrine.5 Such settlements are often described as “a
peppercorn and a fee[,]”6 a peppercorn for the plaintiff class
and a sizeable fee for the plaintiff’s counsel. Supposedly, so long as the settlement is not one sided, the Court has no reason to disapprove the settlement. The Court’s fiduciary duty is to ensure the fairness of the bargain in the class action settlement rather than to police the minimum price. Therefore, if information is the only consideration, the release of meritorious claims deserves meaningful disclosure, or even material disclosure. The broad release of meritorious claims deserves material information, or information that has value that equals the release of the claims. On the other hand, it should not offend a court that non-meritorious claims were released for disclosures that have basically no value or only therapeutic value.
Traditionally, the Delaware Court of Chancery routinely approved such settlements as they were proposed. In recent years, virtually all major merger transactions in Delaware have resulted in shareholder litigation. The percentage of shareholder litigation arising out of transactions of $100 million or more increased from 39.3% in 2005 to 94.9% in 2014.7 Such litigation would be filed right after the
announcement of a proposed transaction and its existence would pose a threat to the closing of such transaction. Half of such transactions result in disclosure-only settlements. Given the proliferation of litigation, the Chancery Court is now concerned that approving disclosure-only settlements and awarding fees as proposed will result in court-approved, overbroad release of liabilities for the contracting parties, directors, officers, and advisors for disclosures that did not convey any benefits to the plaintiff class. This is due to the agency problem between the plaintiff’s counsels and the
5. When a plaintiff pursues a cause of action relating to the internal affairs of a Delaware corporation and generates benefits for the corporation or its stockholders, Delaware law calls for the plaintiff to receive an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses determined based on the factors set forth in Sugarland Indus. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142 (Del. 1980).
6. This term was coined by former Chancellor Allen. Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., CIV. A. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 1995).
plaintiff class.
The Chancery Court has grown wary of the divergent or conflicted incentives plaintiff firms might have in reaching a disclosure-only settlement. Once they reach a disclosure-only settlement, they would normally be awarded a six-figure attorney’s fee. If the market were perfect, and plaintiff firm’s incentive was compatible with the plaintiff, the court would not have to worry about the fairness of the settlement as a contract. If it were a monetary settlement, the Court would pay less attention to the adequacy of the consideration and simply give deference to the settlement terms.8 When there is
no monetary award to the shareholders, the Court is troubled by the plaintiff counsel’s divergent incentive to quickly deliver a settlement that does not confer any benefits to the plaintiff class.
In the notable recent case, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery broke away from the tradition of approving non-monetary disclosure-only settlements and made it clear that such disclosure settlements “[will] be met with continued disfavor” unless supplemental disclosures are “plainly material” and the scope of release is proportionate to the claims.9 Materiality turns on whether
“there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [the disclosure] important in deciding how to vote.”10 “It does not require proof of a substantial likelihood
that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote.”11 But the disclosure of
omitted facts “would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
8. See In re Cox Radio Inc. S’holders Litig., Civil Action No. 4461-VCP, 2010 WL 1806616, at *1, (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010) (only a one dollar increase in the tender offer price resulted from the settlement, but the Court approved the settlement despite objector’s claim that it was only a modest benefit).
9 In re Trulia,129 A.3d at 898 (“To be more specific, practitioners should
expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing more than disclosure claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning the sale process, if the record shows that such claims have been investigated sufficiently.”).
10. Tsc Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 11. Id.
information made available.”12
The triggering event of this policy change was the patently inadequate representation the Court found in In re Rural Metro Corp. Shareholders Litigation. In that case, the board of directors were found liable for breach of fiduciary duty and the bankers were found to have aided and abetted the breaches in the sale of corporation.13 The original plaintiff firm sought to
secure a $475,000 attorney fee award by accepting supplemental disclosure after a low-cost investigation, which only incurred less than $15,000 in out-of-pocket expenses, including expert fees.14 Things got turned around when the
objector surfaced and the replacement counsels took over and investigated the facts vigorously. The new counsels incurred over $1.1 million in expert expenses and 6953 hours of attorney time.15 As a result, a partial settlement was reached at $11.6
million.16 An attorney fee award of $2.9 million was awarded
based on the benefit of $11.6 million in “cold hard cash.”17
A lot has been written on how to resolve the agency problem.18 In In re Trulia, the court adopted the materiality
12. Id. See also Unanue v. Unanue, No. Civ. A. 204-N, 2004 WL 2521292, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004).
13. See generally In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014).
14. Joel Edan Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of Disclosure Settlements, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 877, 907 (2016) [hereinafter Rural/Metro].
15. Id. at 908. 16. Id.
17. Id. at 892 (quoting Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 27-28, In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 2013 WL 7137206 (Del. Ch. Nov. 19, 2013) (No. 6350-VCL)).
18. See, e.g., Rural/Metro, supra note 14; Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L.REV. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Correcting Corporate Benefit]; Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas eds., forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Private Ordering Post-Trulia], https://ssrn.com/abstract=2855950; Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bathwater: Deterring Frivolous Stockholder Suits without Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate Claims, 40 DEL.J.CORP.L. 491 (2016); Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware Court of Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA.J.BUS.L. 669 (2013).
requirement proposed by one article.19 In Of Babies and
Bathwater, the authors provide a two-part test that aims to “eliminate the weakest two-thirds of all stockholder litigation.”20 The first test is that the disclosure must be
material, without which there cannot be consideration to support a disclosure-only settlement.21 The second part, is that
the Court shall not approve an overbroad release.22 The
release shall instead be limited to the benefit of the disclosures obtained.23 The first part was adopted by Trulia; the second
part has also been part of the Court’s practice24 and set out to
protect meritorious claims that were not “properly vetted” from being released.25 This test “would require a demonstration that
the proposed release is directly related to the claims pursued in the litigation and proportionate to the supplemental disclosures . . . .”26
After Trulia, practitioners and commentators predicted that disclosure-based agreements, “if not entirely dead . . . are on life support with only the faintest hint of a pulse.”27 Sean
Griffith, an academic who has been following the development of disclosure-only settlements, concluded that the heightened standard of materiality is now a “condition for the approval of disclosure settlements” in Delaware.28 Seemingly, the Court
put its foot down and established a new rule in approving disclosure-only settlements. Now, it is required that disclosures be material.
In this article, I would like to examine whether the new materiality requirement in approving disclosure-only settlements is doctrinally coherent with contract law doctrines,
19. See generally Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18. 20. Id. at 492.
21. Id. at 491-92, 498. 22. Id. at 492. 23. Id.
24. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing and the Court’s Ruling, In re Medicis Pharm. Corp. S’holders Litig., 2014 WL 1614336 (Del. Ch. 2014) (No. 7857-CS).
25. Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18, at 492. 26. Id. at 538.
27. Eric Waxman, Disclosure-Based Settlements, Not Business as Usual, WALL STREET LAW.,Mar. 2016, at 1.
operates to resolve the agency problem, and ensures fairness in class action settlements. I will argue that enforcing the bargain as agreed to is a better approach, and that the requirement of materiality would be contradictory to the doctrine of consideration by giving the board of directors policy incentives to withhold material information, instead of disclosing it in the first place. Market competition among plaintiff firms and judicial assessment of appropriate attorney fee awards can realign the interest between the plaintiff’s counsel and the plaintiff class. Lastly, the concern about the overbroad release of liabilities by approving disclosure-only settlements can be resolved by challenging the finality of the settlement. I will discuss how such settlements can be rescinded by contract law doctrines of fraudulent misrepresentation and unconscionability. In the end, I will conclude that enforcing the bargain is a better approach than the judicial mandate of materiality in approving disclosure-only settlements and should be the future.
II. Doctrinal and Policy Defects in Requiring Materiality A. Performance of Legal Duty is No Consideration
As we have discussed, the threshold in approving disclosure-only settlements has become that the supplemental disclosures must “address a plainly material misrepresentation or omission.”29 In Of Babies and Bathwater, the influential
article that promoted the heightened standard, the authors reasoned that, in disclosure-only settlements, “[a] disclosure that is not material as a matter of law is not consideration as a matter of fact. Without consideration, there should be no settlement.”30 However, such an argument would open itself
up to two doctrinal objections.
First of all, as the Restatement (Second) of Contracts put it, performance of legal duty is no consideration.31 Meanwhile,
29. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016).
30. Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18, at 498.
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
the board of directors has a fiduciary duty to disclose all material information fully and fairly even when there is no initial duty to disclose the information.32 The fiduciary duty is
a statutory duty under Delaware General Corporate Law, and logically disclosing supplemental information that is material is only a fulfillment of such duty and will not constitute legally sufficient consideration.33
The rationale is simple: If the legal duty is already owed to the promisee, then the promisor did not give up any legal right by performing such duty. Therefore, the performance was not bargained for. Such an exchange raises a suspicion as to whether it is a genuine exchange. As the comments of the Restatement point out, “[a] claim that the performance of a legal duty furnished consideration for a promise often raises a suspicion that the transaction was gratuitous or mistaken or unconscionable.”34
Material supplemental disclosures as consideration is a bargain for forbearance to commit a tort, breach of fiduciary duty. Such forbearance is not consideration and the promise may be unenforceable as against public policy.35 That is, the
promise of a broad release of managerial liabilities out of the sale process would be unenforceable when it was supported by merely material disclosures, which is not legally sound consideration.
As we discussed, Rule 23 imposes on the Court the fiduciary duty to examine the fairness of the class action settlement.36 Fairness is not preserved when material
disclosures are given in exchange for a release because the plaintiff class is legally entitled to such disclosures. Fairness is also not preserved when valuable, but non-material disclosures, that the defendant did not have pre-existing legal duty to provide, were given in exchange for weak claims that had no value.
32. Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1987). Moreover, duties of fiduciaries are within the scope of Restatement § 73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. b.
33. DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (1991).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 cmt. a. 35. Id. § 73 cmt. b.
On the other hand, consideration need not be adequate.37
Any performance which is bargained for is consideration.38
This rule does not require that “consideration have an economic value equivalent to that of the promise.”39 It does not
matter whether supplemental disclosures are meaningful, only of marginal and therapeutic value, or are simply helpful, any value conveyed through disclosures would be legally sufficient to constitute consideration. However, this does not mean fairness will not be achieved without having an adequacy requirement in the doctrine of consideration. As we will discuss in Part III, market competition will ensure fairness of the bargain and all that the Court has to do is to enforce the bargain.
B. Materiality Requirement as an Incentive to Withhold Information for the Sake of Settlements
On the policy front, requiring materiality in supplemental disclosure is not sound either. Normally, enforcement of a half-completed bargain is beneficial to the society. It allows freedom of individual action and exercise of judgment that increases productivity and efficient allocation of resources in the economy.40
Supposedly, a court shall enforce the broad release when the material disclosures were given in exchange for that release. However, since disclosing material information was only performance of a pre-existing legal duty, such a bargain shall not be enforced as a matter of public policy. Enforcing a pre-existing legal duty gives rise to the strong possibility that “the promise was obtained by an express or implied threat to withhold performance of a legal duty, the promise does not have the presumptive social utility normally found in a bargain.”41 Thus, since all major transactions attract
shareholder litigation and half of these cases are settled by disclosure-only settlements, the board of directors would
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79. 38. Id.
39. Id. § 72 cmt. d. 40. Id. § 72 cmt. b. 41. Id. § 73 cmt. a.
benefit from hiding material information in the first place in anticipation of shareholder claims. Enforcing the materiality requirement would only encourage the board to withhold disclosures that would be deemed material so that they can disclose such information to settle the highly-anticipated shareholder claims that would otherwise not be settled without a monetary compensation.
C. To Encourage or to Deter? What is the Public Policy? Normally, freedom of contract is respected in all Western jurisdictions.42 Freedom of contract has long been the leading
public policy in Delaware and courts are supposed to enforce the plain terms of a contract freely entered by parties.43 Still,
each system “must reserve the right to declare a contract void if it is illegally or morally offensive . . . or ‘contrary to public policy.’”44
Since there are no concerns towards the legality of such settlements, the only normative objection over a freely-entered settlement would be the public policy ground. As such, is there a public policy reason to deny all the disclosure-only settlements?
In approving disclosure-only settlements, the Chancery Court has two conflicting public policy goals in mind. The first is to lower the “deal tax.” This means the court would have the
42. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT &HEIN KÖTZ,INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 380 (Tony Weir trans., 3d rev. ed., 1998).
43. See, e.g., Gildor v. Optical Solutions, Inc., No. 1416-N, 2006 WL 4782348, at *7 n.17 (Del. Ch. Jun. 5, 2006) (“It is imperative that contracting parties know that a court will enforce a contract’s clear terms and will not judicially alter their bargain, so courts do not trump the freedom of contract lightly.”); Douzinas v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, Inc., 888 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“[T]his court’s duty is to respect the contract freely entered into by all the members . . . .”); Aspen Advisors LLC v. United Artists Theatre Co., 843 A.2d 697, 712 (Del. Ch. 2004) (ruling that enforcing the “plain terms” of a contract furthers Delaware law’s goal of promoting reliable and efficient corporate and commercial laws); see also Marino v. Grupo Mundial Tenedora, S.A., 810 F. Supp. 2d 601, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The policy of the Delaware Act is ‘to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.’”) (citation omitted).
incentive to make a plaintiff’s non-meritorious claims go away as cheaply as possible by approving disclosure settlements and mooting the claims. The second is to reject such settlements when it is not convincing that the plaintiff class received adequate representation and reasonableness or equivalence between “give” and “get” is preserved. The Court is conscientious about preventing corporate defendants from being released from future claims without having them vigorously vetted by the plaintiff’s counsel.
The first policy concern led to the routine approval of disclosure settlements before Rural Metro Corp., while the second concern led the Court to the materiality requirement set forth in Trulia.45 Both efforts were made to fulfill the Rule 23
duty to ensure the reasonableness and substantive fairness of the two sides of the settlement.46
Major mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals attract litigation, and most of them are weak claims that could not have succeeded in litigation. The benefit of disclosure-only settlements is that when the plaintiff class receives additional information through the help of the plaintiff’s attorneys and recognizes that their initial claims were weak or groundless, the board of directors are released from liabilities relating to the transaction once and for all. It also increases the transparency of deal making.47
In light of this, the public policy would be to encourage quick settlement, especially non-monetary settlement, and the Chancery Court shall deem such settlements as beneficial. Therefore, when the defendants offer to settle the case by giving out supplemental information and a relatively small but substantial attorney fee for the plaintiff’s lawyers, the court would assume that negotiations have been conducted at arm’s length and in good faith.48 Therefore, the public policy of the
45. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016); In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54 (Del. Ch. 2014).
46. See DEL.CH.CT.R.23.
47. As a result, companies are willing to provide disclosures “that would have never been in a proxy statement 20 years ago” and such disclosures have, in Strine’s words “gotten increasingly more informative.” Sumpter, supra note 18, at 687.
court would be to promote deal efficiency by approving such settlements regardless of the materiality of the supplemental information.
On the other hand, the Chancery Court has to face the challenge of evaluating such settlements through a non-adversarial process.49 The Delaware Chancery Court has a
legitimate concern that routine approval of all disclosure-based settlements would result in the loss of valuable claims through the broad release.
The defendants would have the incentive to pay a relatively small fee to obtain a broad release50 as deal
insurance. Such an incentive is compatible with the plaintiff’s counsel’s incentive to obtain a quick attorney fee award by agreeing to the disclosure-only settlement. Such broad release, which often includes all possible claims related to the events,51
along with “claims that could not have been litigated in the settled action, such as federal securities claims,”52 is being seen
as disproportionate to the benefit of the disclosures obtained. Chancellor Bouchard blamed the Court of Chancery’s willingness to give blind approval of such settlements as the cause of the explosion of deal litigation.53 Would blind denial
unless disclosure is material work the magic then?
Denial of all disclosure-only settlements would make the shareholder claims more expensive to settle, and would not necessarily preserve fairness.54 Plaintiffs might flee Delaware,
179-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
49. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 887.
50. Peter J. Walsh Jr. & Aaron R. Sims, Delaware Insider: Trulia and the Demise of “Disclosure Only” Settlements in Delaware, BUS.L.TODAY, Feb. 2016, at 1.
51. See Brinckerhoff v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 986 A.2d 370, 385 (Del. Ch. 2010).
52. Id.
53. See In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 894 (“It is beyond doubt in my view that the dynamics described above, in particular the Court’s willingness in the past to approve disclosure settlements of marginal value and to routinely grant broad releases to defendants and six-figure fees to plaintiffs’ counsel in the process, have caused deal litigation to explode in the United States beyond the realm of reason.”).
54. Mathematically, equivalence cannot be achieved by requiring one side of the equation to have value without knowing whether the other side has any value. Fairness is therefore not preserved when valuable disclosures that would otherwise not have been legally required to be disclosed is given
or the claims might be re-litigated after the denial, or defendants would have to provide a small monetary settlement ($1 increase per share) as we have seen in Cox Radio.55 In the
later scenario, stockholders might still be undercompensated. The only legitimate public policy remains that the Chancery Court shall ensure the fairness of the settlement. Approval of settlement agreement has depended and will continue to depend on whether the court has been convinced that the two sides of the contract are equivalent. Mathematically, equivalence cannot be achieved by requiring one side of the equation to have value without knowing whether the other side has any value.
III. Market Mechanisms and Judicial Assessment
A. Enforcing the Bargain: Achieving Fairness Through Market
As it has been discussed, fairness remains the only criteria in approving disclosure-only settlement. The core argument of this article is that fairness of disclosure-only settlement is achieved by enforcing the bargain as it is. In contract law, normative doctrines and theories do not concern about the fairness of the terms so long as they were freely negotiated in the market place. Fairness does not seem to matter in contract law but fairness is otherwise preserved through the use of the doctrine of unconscionability. The idea is that when the market is competitive, market information would freely flow and everyone would have access to the market price. As a result, when negotiation was at arm’s length, the settlement would normally be reached at market price as no one would be willing to give more or receive less when they have access to market price. If it was found out later that the settlement was induced by misrepresentation or omission of material facts, the settlement could be rescinded based on the doctrine of fraud or
in exchange of meritless claims.
55. See In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civil Action No. 4461-VCP, 2010 WL 1806616 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010), at *1.
misrepresentation.56 If the two sides of the settlement were
overall imbalanced, the performance of the settlement can be denied. If settlement terms are deemed unconscionable, the settlement can be set aside. A combination of procedural and substantive unconscionability can result in rescission of the agreement even after a settlement is reached between two parties and approved by the court.57 In addition to that, gross
disparity alone will be enough to result in a denial of specific performance.58
1. Fairness Matters in Contract Law
Formally, as Stephen Smith describes, fairness does not play in a role in contract law theory.59 He went further to
argue that substantive fairness has to be excluded from a ground under the heading of unconscionability.60 The majority
view is that just price does not have a doctrinal place in contract law theory, and fairness is considered irrelevant in contract law.61 Once a defender of substantive fairness,62
Stephen Smith observed that support for substantive fairness is not part of discourse of contract law, nor is it defended by many contract law scholars.63 It has been said that the idea of
“fair price” is meaningless in a modern economy and inconsistent with the idea of freedom of contract.64 However,
even Smith had to admit that the lack of fairness would create problems: it will result in more unjust redistribution;65 it will
reduce contracting;66 it will harm people’s abilities to plan an
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. Law. Inst. 1981).
57. See id. § 71. 58. Id.
59. Stephen A. Smith, In Defence of Substantive Fairness, 112 LAW Q. REV. 138, 138-39 (1996) [hereinafter Substantive Fairness].
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY
OF CONTRACT LAW 118,191 (Peter Benson ed., 2001); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J.698 (1981).
62. See generally Substantive Fairness, supra note 59. 63. STEPHEN A.SMITH,CONTRACT THEORY 357 (2004). 64. Id. at 354.
65. Substantive Fairness, supra note 59, at 146-48. 66. Id. at 148-49.
autonomous life.67
According to Smith, substantively unfair bargains will make the already unjust distribution even more unjust because losers in unfair bargains are usually the less well-off of the two contracting parties.68 Also, non-competitive pricing in a
competitive market will reduce contracting.69 On the other
hand, an imposition of normal prices will benefit even those who are unsure of normal prices.70 Contracting at abnormal
prices also harms people’s ability to lead an autonomous life as our ability to plan the life is built upon the preservation of our purchasing power and abnormal prices would upset plans and one’s ability to control and direct their lives.71
As Zweigert and Kötz observed: commutative justice has always been seen to require a certain equivalence between performance and counter-performance.72 The gross disparity
between the performance and counter-performance will open a contract up for rescission in virtually all major jurisdictions.73
Normally, contract law does not require equality in exchange, but gross disparity between the two sides of the contract would allow courts to avoid the contract terms as unconscionable. As Corbin describes, “adequacy of
67. Id. at 151-56. 68. Id. at 147-48. 69. Id. at 148-49. 70. Id. at 150.
71. Substantive Fairness, supra note 59, at 150-52. 72. ZWEIGERT &KÖTZ, supra note 42, at 328.
73. Nominal consideration is not supported by either American or English law. See Restatement of Contracts (Second)–A Rejection of Nominal Consideration?, 1 VAL.U.L.REV. 102 (1966); P.S.ATIYAH,AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 126-29 (1995). American courts often apply unconscionability to correct unfair contracts. French law traditionally requires a counter-performance to reflect consideration of the real interest and be genuine and reasonable in order to maintain the cause of the contract. See Judith Rochfeld, A Future for la cause? Observations of a French Jurist, in REFORMING THE FRENCH LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, 73, 81 (John Carwright, Stefan Vogenauer, & Simon Whittaker eds. 2009); After the abolition of cause in 2016 in French civil law reforms, the new article 1143 established a new doctrine of violence économique that serves the same function. In German law, gross disparity (grobes Missverhältnis) can also render a contract void for violation of good morals (gute Sitten). See BGB § 138 and Bundesgerichtshof, 9 November 1961, BB, 1962, 156 (the court held that an interest rate of 45% should be held invalid as contrary to good morals).
consideration is not required to be adequate in the sense of equality in value.”74 Corbin also observed that judges, by
acting also as chancellors, will avoid enforcement of an unconscionable bargain when the consideration is grossly inadequate.75 He supplied two reasons: one reason is that the
gross inadequacy may be evidence of fraud, mistake, or undue influence;76 the other reason is that the relevant factors
accompanying the inadequacy would fit into the concepts of fraud, duress, misrepresentation and undue influence.77
The Second Restatement of Contracts, in its comment, insists that usually overall imbalance involves factors other than mere overall imbalance to qualify the contract as unconscionable.78 However, it also admits that “gross disparity
in the values exchanged . . . may be sufficient ground, without more, for denying specific performance.”79 The Restatement
gives courts broad discretion to avoid contract terms that would have unconscionable results.80
2. Gross Disparity in Exchange as Unconscionable Scholars might not agree on whether the value of the objects exchanged through contracts is subjective or objective, or whether there is a just price. However, it is the consensus that so long as the market functions, the Court shall enforce the bargain as they are. Fairness would be achieved by enforcing the bargains. When the market malfunctions, exploitation will likely occur when parties no longer have access to the market price. When this happens,
74. ARTHUR CORBIN,CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 188 (1952). 75. Id. at 188.
76. Id. at 185. 77. Id. at 188.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. c (AM.LAW.INST. 1981).
79. Id. See also Marks v. Gates, 154 F. 481, 483 (9th Cir.1907) (inadequacy of consideration sufficient ground for withholding specific performance if it is so gross as to render the contract unconscionable); Frank’s Maintenance & Eng’g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill. App. 3d 980, 42 Ill. Dec. 25, 31–32, 408 N.E.2d 403, 409–10 (1980) (“Unconscionability can be either procedural or substantive or a combination of both.”).
unconscionability denies a severely unequal bargain. The Bargain Principle
Melvin Eisenberg, a doctrinal scholar without any philosophical or ideological subscriptions, explains why the bargain principle of contract law—a theory taken literally from the black letter law—is a sound theory that serves both ends of contract law, efficiency and fairness, without a normative regard for fairness.81
The bargain principle can be summarized as simply as “‘courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration’ or ‘mere inadequacy of consideration will not void a contract.’”82
Eisenberg converts it to a formulation that states that “damages for unexcused breach of a bargain promise should invariably be measured by the value the promised performance would have had to the plaintiff, rather than, and regardless of, the cost or value of the performance for which the defendant’s promise was exchanged.”83 In other words, “a bargain promise
should be enforced to its full extent.”84 Normally, in a perfect
market,85 fairness of the terms can never be reviewed by the
court because the price reached through a bargained promise would be economically efficient and fair. Arguments for efficient price could be found in that the value is subjective, credit transactions would only be encouraged if the expectation that bargain promise would be kept is preserved, contract price
81. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV.L.REV. 741 (1982).
82. See id. at 745. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (AM.LAW INST.1981).
83. Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 745. 84. Id.
85. Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 746 (citing EDWIN MANSFIELD,
MICROECONOMICS:THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 196-97 (3ded. 1979) (A perfectly competitive market is defined as “a homogeneous commodity (which may consist of either goods or services); a marketplace at which perfect cost-free information concerning price is readily available (hereinafter referred to as a homogeneous marketplace); productive resources that are sufficiently mobile that pricing decisions readily influence their allocation; and participants whose market share is so small that none can affect the commodity’s price, so that each takes the market price as given by outside forces.”)).
is the most efficient price that best allocates the factors necessary for the commodity’s production.86 Such a price would
also be the fair price, as, in a perfectly competitive market, contract price normally equals the benefits conferred, everybody would use the market price when it is available, and any lower-than fair price would be eliminated by market completion.87
However, review of objective fairness of contracts would be appropriate when perfectly competitive markets are not available.88 As Eisenberg observed, the principle of
unconscionability permits enforcement of a promise to be limited on the basis of unfair price alone.89 Unconscionability,
as described in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, only addresses gross disparity.90
If Eisenberg is right, fairness is protected by contract law and would be achieved through settlement agreement so long as it resulted from a free bargain between the plaintiff class and the defendant corporation and the market was competitive. If Eisenberg is right, the plaintiff class and the plaintiff’s counsel who have meritless claims would settle for valueless supplemental disclosures, and the plaintiff class who have greater chances of proving defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty would not settle unless they receive a monetary settlement that equals the value of their claims, multiplying the likelihood of the success in trial minus the litigation cost.91 In this view,
courts shall not review the fairness of the settlement terms, but rather the bargaining process, such as adequacy of representation or bargaining in good faith. The Chancery Court can justifiably refuse to approve disclosure-only
86. Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 745-46. 87. Id. at 747.
88. Id. at 748-54. 89. Id. at 753.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
91. For those who do not think that the claims would be adequately investigated, the Chancery Court has been looking into the efforts of plaintiff counsel to determine appropriate attorney fee awards and would not approve settlements or fee awards if they did not think the case was vigorously vetted. See, e.g., In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6574–CS, 2013 WL 1191738 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013).
settlements when they are not convinced that sufficient vetting had taken place.
Fairness in Exchange
Among contract theorists, James Gordley, of Aristotelian tradition, and Peter Benson, of Kantian tradition, are the two leading advocates in recognizing the importance of fairness of price in contract law. Still, they both agree that only gross disparity in consideration shall be remedied by law. But they differ as to whether equality in exchange shall be the standard rule, or if it is only the baseline. Gordley argues that all deviations from just price are entitled to relief to preserve the purchasing power of the parties and the pre-existing distribution of wealth.92 While Benson thinks that equivalence
in exchange preserves the wills of the parties, he agrees that only gross disparity calls for correction.93
The two disagree on whether there is a just price for each contract and whether a just price can be reached or only approached. Still, both would agree that a gross deviation from the market price would call for remedy in contract law, but for different reasons. To Gordley, only gross disparity is worth pursuing for practical and evidentiary reasons. To Benson, gross disparity is evidence for vice of consent and calls for explanation.
When Value is Objective and there is a Just Price
Gordley, writing from Aristotelian tradition, thinks that just price is the market price under competitive conditions.94
Just price “varies from day to day and from region to region.”95
Such a price reflects need, scarcity, and cost.96 According to
Aristotle, every contract of exchange is an act of “voluntary
92. See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1587 (1981).
93. See BENSON, supra note 61, at 191.
94. See JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:PROPERTY,TORT, CONTRACT,UNJUST ENRICHMENT 361 (2006).
95. Id. 96. Id.
commutative justice.”97 Therefore, a party shall not be made
poorer or richer over contracting, but may become poorer or richer in the future.98 There is no reason to charge a higher
price or buy at a lower price if one is really making an exchange and has access to the market price. In making an exchange, no reasonable person intends to enrich the other party at their own expenses. However, one can become richer by buying low and selling high. One can become poorer by doing the opposite. Since the market price changes constantly, all one needs to do is to sell the same object he bought at a different location where the market price is higher, or on a different day when the market price is higher. Thus, the change of wealth happens through a series of contract transactions rather than one. In each one of these transactions, the pre-existing wealth and allocation of resources between the parties are to be preserved.
However, though just price is approachable and equality in exchange can be realized, not every disparity will be remedied. From the Roman rule of laesio enormis to the French doctrine of lesion,99 for practical reasons, only gross disparity can be
remedied. Such reasons might be that: courts are not in the best position to determine what the just price was when the contract was entered; price that seemed unfair after contracting might be fair upon conclusion – a fair bet at price fluctuation is fair; and it might not be economical to remedy every unfair price.100
To Gordley, the object of contract has an objective value that equals the fair market price, parties are willing to contract to exchange only because they themselves place a higher subjective value on the things they exchanged. According to
97. Id. at 292. 98. Id. at 363.
99. In Roman law, a contract could be rescinded when a thing was sold for less than half of the just price. A buyer can choose to either pay the difference between the just price and the price paid or rescind the transaction. See James Gordley, Contract in Pre-Commercial Societies and in Western History, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2-41 (J.C.B. Mohr, ed. 1997). French law gives relief to the unfair contract when the sale of land is for less than five-twelfths of the market value. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.][CIVIL CODE] art. 1674 (Fr.).
Gordley’s account, the price reached in a competitive market is the just price, and so long as parties negotiated at arm’s length, courts shall enforce the terms unless the price was severely wrong. The end result is that a range of normal considerations would be acceptable and only extremely unfair settlements would be subject to relief.
When Value is Subjective and there is No Just Price
Benson sees contract as a transfer of ownership and the contemporary common law contract theory as a coherent unity.101 Consideration requires two sides of the contract to be
qualitatively different, and unconscionability completes the theory by requiring two sides to be identical in value.102
In Benson’s view, contract law does not require equality in exchange, but requires equivalence in exchange, which will preserve equality in value though value is entirely subjective. By Benson’s account, parties are presumed to have the intention to transact for equal value,103 at least not the grossly
lacking of equivalence.104 In his view, no one is legally obliged
to transact for equal value.105 A party can waive the receipt of
equal value through assumption of risk or by a donative intent.106 In these two circumstances, gross inequality cannot
be remedied if the inequality has objectively been willed by the party.107
However, a contract must honor each party’s capacity to receive equal value. In the absence of donative intent and assumption of risk, gross lack of equivalence in an exchange is voidable.108 Unconscionability supplements contractual liberty
allowed by consideration with contractual fairness.109
101. See BENSON, supra note 61, at 118. 102. See id. at 193-95.
103. See id. at 187. 104. See id. at 118. 105. See id. at 191. 106. See id., at 191.
107. See BENSON, supra note 61, at 191. 108. See id.
Different from Gordley’s account, Benson thinks all the normal prices are competitive prices and values are subjective to the parties. Benson argues that “[a] competitive market price is an ideal notion which obtains at long-term equilibrium. It is only approached, and never fully realized, by actually existing market systems, even on the supposition that these are competitive.”110 As a result, there will be a range of
competitive prices and they are all enforceable. Unconscionability only deals with a gross lack of equivalence. Contracts can be avoided when the price falls out of the baseline and parties’ intention to transact at equal value can no longer be construed in light of the gross lack of equivalence. Benson’s account of contractual fairness is what I call subjective fairness. However, even this subjective account has objective criterion, which is the gross lack of equivalence. By Benson’s account, in Trulia, the plaintiff class is presumed to intend to transact for equal value in reaching the settlement. Consideration only requires the two sides to be distinctively different. Once they are, they can possibly be construed as equivalent unless there was gross lack of equivalence as measured by market prices. Such gross lack of equivalence is seen as evidence for violation of parties’ intention. So, we can infer that happens when an overbroad release was obtained in exchange for disclosure of therapeutic value, in Benson’s theory, gross lack of equivalence will warrant the avoidance of the settlement, even if the two sides are distinctively different.
B. The Plaintiff Firm Market
The incentive divergence between the plaintiff’s counsel and the plaintiff class had led to the non-adversarial nature of the settlement agreement negotiation according to the court.111
This incentive divergence further led to the systemic problem and market failure that eventually led to the over-compensation of the plaintiff’s counsel and under-over-compensation of the plaintiff class. The main complaint is that the corporate
110. See id. at 190.
111. See, e.g., In re Trulia Inc., Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 893 (Del. Ch. 2016).
defendant will willingly pay the plaintiff’s attorneys for broad releases. Many plaintiff firms make it a business model to obtain such an award as early as possible by reaching the disclosure settlement as cheaply and quickly as possible.112
Several articles have been written to propose cures for the problem.113 Such proposals include the influential one that
requires materiality in approving disclosure-only settlement,114
adjusting attorney’s fee award according to the benefits conferred to the plaintiff class,115 and shifting the attorney’s fee
to the plaintiff class.116 However, the current practice does
embody functional market mechanisms that will make the incentives of the plaintiff firms and the plaintiff class compatible.
When there is a meritorious case, the market will give plaintiff firms higher incentives to commit more resources in proving their theory and achieving a more beneficial settlement. After all, incentives between the plaintiff’s counsel and the plaintiff class can be realigned when filing meritorious claims and achieving significant benefits for the shareholders can result in seven-figure attorney’s fees, as it so happened in Rural Metro Corp.,117 and filing weak claims, obtaining low
value disclosures that moot claims that would lead to a five-figure award as in Sauer-Danfoss.118
The Court does not have the capacity to go provide the appropriate due diligence on the merits of the claims, but that should not concern most litigants, commentators, or practitioners. Since virtually all major mergers and acquisitions transactions attract litigation, the Court can often tell that there is little chance for the plaintiff class to obtain any monetary settlement in the first place. Approving a class action settlement that exchanges non-meritorious claims for a
112. See Friedlander, supra note 14.
113. See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 14; Griffith, supra note 18; Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18; Sumpter, supra note 18.
114. See Lebovitch & Kwawegen, supra note 18. 115. See Sumpter, supra note 18.
116. See Correcting Corporate Benefit, supra note 18. 117. See Friedlander, supra note 14.
118. See In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holder Litig., 65 A.3d 1116 (Del. Ch. 2011) (the court lowered the $750,000 award requested by the plaintiff’s attorney for attorney’s fees to $75,000 based on the merits of the work done).
broad release meets the fairness standard in Rule 23 of Delaware Court of Chancery Rules. On the other hand, the materiality requirement, regardless of the merits of the claims and availability of material information, will incentivize extortion and harassment toward the deep pockets. Also, the law firms that have built a business model for only delivering non-monetary settlements with the sole purpose of obtaining a six-figure attorney fee will not be sustainable in the market place. Such shops who rely on soliciting small investors and being selected by the Court as lead counsel in class action litigation will not likely succeed in landing representations when they have developed a reputation for only being able to deliver non-monetary settlements.
Based on a recent empirical study on the effectiveness of plaintiff law firms in mergers and acquisitions litigation and shareholder claims, the presence of identified top law firms is “significantly and positively associated with a higher probability of lawsuit success.”119 These top law firms are the
entrepreneurial firms that vet the claims properly and devote substantial human and financial resources necessary to uncover a theory of breach of fiduciary duty. With such transparent market information, the firms that have developed the reputation of suing on every deal with “hastily drafted complaints”120 will not likely be selected by the Chancery Court
who select firms based on reputation and merits. Once selected, their proposed settlement would undergo more critical and severe scrutiny by the court before the approval of the settlement.
Consequently, shareholders with meritorious claims would be after the first-tier firms, and first-tier firms would have the
119. See generally C.N.V. Krishanan, Steven D. Solomon, & Randall S. Thomas, Who Are the Top Law Firms? Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM.L.ECON.R. 88 (2016).
120. Many complaints were filed upon the announcement of a transaction without committing the time and resources necessary to vet the claims. An extreme example can be found in In re Cox Communications. A proposal to acquire all of the public shares of Cox was announced at 4:06 am on August 2, 2004. By 8:36 am of that same day, the first of “a flurry of hastily drafted complaints” was filed with the Court. See Sumpter, supra note 18, at 680 (quoting In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 608 (Del. Ch. 2005)).
luxury to choose from quality claims. The second-tier firms would have to settle for weak claims and it will make it even harder for them to prove their theories effectively and convincingly. Moreover, the plaintiffs would also be more likely to pursue and succeed in malpractice claims against these second-tier firms who might have cost the shareholders valuable claims. Since the plaintiff firm’s markets favor merits, it would be much harder for the weaker firms with weaker claims to survive in the marketplace in the long run.
Moreover, the Court has the discretionary power to deny approval of the settlement when it is clear that there is gross disparity between the two sides of the settlement, which is a more effective tool to ensure fairness than requiring one side of the exchange to have value without knowing whether the other side has value. As it has been suggested by the Court, there are two things that the Court can do to prevent the imbalance between give and get. The Court sets the attorney’s fee award corresponding to the benefit conveyed to the plaintiff class. The idea is that when the fee award is low enough to become non-profitable and all the counsel could deliver is a disclosure that has marginal and therapeutic value to the class, it would discourage plaintiff firms from taking on cases that are frivolous or invest more in proving the theory. The second tool is to refuse the proposed settlement when the release is too broad and conveys significant value compared to the marginal value of the information the plaintiff class received.
The materiality requirement proposal accepted by the court aims to disincentivize the plaintiff firms from suing on every case and force them to screen out frivolous claims.121
However, a heightened standard for approval could make it more difficult for non-meritorious claims to go away, and go away cheaply.
As we have discussed, the first tier of top firms has the resources to investigate and screen out meritless claims, while the second-tier firms do not have the financial or human resources to do the same. Logically, they will either flee Delaware and sue in other jurisdictions or turn away most cases and deny plaintiffs access to litigation. Moreover, not
approving meager disclosures would be a denial of “deal insurance” or a punishment to the defendant, and denial of settlement leaves matters unresolved even if the court thought the claims were so weak that the plaintiff should abandon the case with prejudice.122 The reality is that the defendants will
provide modest monetary settlements in addition to the disclosures, as we have seen in In re Cox Radio Inc.
Shareholders Litigation.123 Even though the monetary
settlement of $1 increase per share only provided modest benefit,124 the Court will not second guess the monetary
consideration and have to approve the settlement with broad release.125 As a result, this practice might still result in
under-compensation of the stockholders, which makes it more expensive to dispose of weak claims.
Imposition of materiality assumes there was no good faith in bargaining because of the divergent incentive of the plaintiff’s counsel, all the shareholder claims are meritorious, and there was breach of fiduciary duty by failing to provide adequate material information in the preliminary proxy statement by the board.126 Apparently, these premises are not
always satisfied and the court is not in a good position to measure the value of the benefits that supplemental information conveys to the putative class, unless there is obvious gross disparity. The imposed materiality requirement assumes gross disparity exists in all disclosure-only settlements, which is likely not the case. On the other hand,
122. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, In re Medicis Pharm. Corp. S’holders Litig., 2014 WL 1614336 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2014) (No. 7857-CS) (“I understand, particularly from the defendants’ side, the reality that what I’ve done probably, you know, in some ways has a punishing effect, because I don’t know what else is out there that this leaves unresolved.”); In re Transatlantic Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6574-CS, 2013 WL1191738 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 2013) (“If the plaintiffs believe their claims are as weak as their brief presents, then they’re obviously welcome to dismiss their claims with prejudice as to themselves and to move on if they don’t wish to prosecute.”).
123. See In re Cox Radio, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 4461-VCP, 2010 WL 1806616, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010).
124. Id. 125. Id. at *23.
126. See id. See also Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 46 N.Y.S.3d 567 (App. Div. 2017).
enforcement of such a requirement creates an ethical dilemma that disclosing all material information would not entitle the company to the benefit of a disclosure-only settlement while withholding material information, a breach of fiduciary duty, makes it easy to settle shareholder claims.
C. Judicial Assessment of Merits and Attorney Fees
For the market mechanisms to function, the conflicted incentives of the plaintiff’s counsel have to be compatible with those of the plaintiff class. It is essential that the level of attorney’s fees corresponds to the merits of the disclosures obtained through the work of attorneys. In applying its discretion and judicial assessment,127 the Chancery Court has
adopted meticulous standards in measuring both the benefits of the disclosures and the level of attorney fees that should be awarded. Sugarland factors provide the guidance for the Chancery Court to determine an appropriate award. Such factors include:
(i) the amount of time and effort applied to the case by counsel for the plaintiffs; (ii) the relative complexities of the litigation; (iii) the standing and ability of petitioning counsel; (iv) the contingent nature of the litigation; (v) the stage at which the litigation ended; (vi) whether the plaintiff can rightly receive all the credit for the benefit conferred or only a portion thereof; and (vii) the size of the benefit conferred.128
127. ‘‘[T]he amount of an attorneys’ fee award is within the discretion of the court.’’ In re Plains Res. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 071-N, 2005 WL 332811, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 4, 2005).
128. Id., at *3 (listing the factors laid out in Sugarland Indus., Inc. v. Thomas, 420 A.2d 142, 149 (Del. 1980)).
1. Three-Scale Fee Awards
The Sugarland factors do not provide an effective tool for the Chancery Court to quantify an appropriate award given the fact that disclosure is “an intangible, non-quantifiable benefit.”129 Nevertheless, the Court has developed a three-scale
system in Sauer-Danfoss that measures the benefits conveyed by the disclosures and places each case on a scale based on the quality of the disclosures and looks to “fee awards granted for similar disclosures.”130 This fee evaluating system works to
realign the incentives between the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs’ counsel without a materiality requirement.
Traditionally, most awards are in the range of $400,000 to $500,000. Chancellor Laster uses this range as the baseline award for “one or two meaningful disclosures.”131 Meaningful
disclosures can be “previously withheld projections or undisclosed conflicts faced by fiduciaries or their advisors.”132
The award can be downgraded to the lower scale for disclosures of “questionable quality.”133 And higher awards are available
for “particularly significant or exceptional disclosures.”134
At the default level, Chancellor Laster found cases with awards ranging from $300,000 to $525,000. In this range, as Philip Sumpter observed, a few conditions have to be met: “(1) plaintiffs obtain a single meaningful disclosure, or (2) plaintiffs obtain lesser disclosures, but do ‘real work’ in litigating the case.”135
To qualify for the default level of award, all the plaintiff’s counsel must do is to obtain “one meaningful quanta of information.”136 A company’s financial projection and banker’s
analysis are regarded as meaningful.137 However, such
129. In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holder Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1136 (Del. Ch. 2011). 130. Id. 131. Id. 132. Id. 133. Id. 134. Id. at 1137.
135. Sumpter, supra note 18, at 708. 136. Id.
137. Id. at 708-10 (discussing In re Zenith, where the Court awarded $400,000 and “described the disclosure of management projections that were
