Alberto Voltolini (University of Turin, Italy)
Can One Refer to and Quantify over Nonexistent Intentional Objects (of
Hallucination)?
Abstract
In this paper, against a view that has recently gained some popularity, I will try to show that we cannot have our cake and eat it too. This is to say, if we refer to and truly quantify over nonexistent intentional ordinary objects of hallucination and of thoughts in general, this is because they are full-fledged entities just as existent intentional objects of perception and of other mental states in general. In such a case, metaphysically speaking, both existent and nonexistent
intentionalia are concrete objects, i.e., objects that may exist; while ontologically speaking, it is
false parsimony to allow for concrete existent objects and to reject concrete nonexistent objects. Otherwise, either such intentional objects do figure in our overall ontological domain but as entities of phenomenologically unexpected metaphysical kinds, or even better, there really are no such intentionalia, but we just pretend that there are such things, even if our thoughts really fail to be about them and have instead merely proposition-like intentional contents. As a result, this proposal not only is partially ontologically committed to intentional objects, but also it re-evaluates fictionalist treatments of the matter, yet again just partially: just in some cases, it is merely fictionally that we refer to and quantify over such objects.
Keywords
Alberto Voltolini (University of Turin, Italy)
Can One Refer to and Quantify over Nonexistent Intentional Objects (of
Hallucination)?
A.D. Smith, in memoriam
1. Introduction
In (2002), A. David Smith claimed that we can refer to nonexistent objects of our hallucinations. They are the intentional objects of our hallucinations that are ordinary objects just as the existent objects of our genuine perceptions. The only difference between nonexistent objects of hallucination and existent objects of perception is that we are ontologically committed only to the latter ones. In an alternative formulation that aims at maeking the same point, Smith says that, unlike the former ones, the latter ones are entities. Tim Crane (2001, 2013) has generalized this claim to all nonexistent objects of our thoughts; also Mark Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2012) have gone in the same direction. According to them, we can truly quantify over such objects as well as have singular truths about them, even though they fail to be entities but are merely grammatical-like items or, as Crane stresses, at most schematic objects, i.e., objects that have no metaphysical nature insofar as they are thought-of. Thus for them, not only the above reference to, but also such a true quantification over, nonexistent intentionalia is not a mark of ontological commitment to such objects. Jody Azzouni (2007, 2010, 2013) also defends a similar point of view that he labels neutralism: the sentences in question can be really true even if they are not ontologically committal, they are ontologically neutral as he says.
In this paper, I will however try to show against the above view that we cannot have our cake and eat it too. If we refer to and truly quantify over nonexistent intentional ordinary objects of hallucination and of thought in general, this is because they are full-fledged entities just as existent intentional objects of perception and of other mental states in general. In such a case, on the one hand, metaphysically speaking, both existent and nonexistent intentionalia are concrete objects, where concreta can be defined as objects that may have causal powers or a spatiotemporal location – in a nutshell, they may exist. Ontologically speaking, on the other hand, insofar as they belong to the same metaphysical category, it is false parsimony to allow for
concrete existent objects and to reject concrete nonexistent objects. Otherwise, either the relevant intentional objects do figure in our overall ontological domain but as entities of phenomenologically unexpected metaphysical kinds, or even better, there really are no such
intentionalia, but we just pretend that there are such things, even if our thoughts really fail to be
about them and have instead merely proposition-like intentional contents. As a result, this proposal not only is partially ontologically committed to intentional objects, but also it re-evaluates fictionalist treatments of the matter, yet again just partially: just in some cases, we refer to and quantify over such objects only fictionally.
2. The objects – entities distinction does not work
To start with, consider a sentence like:
(1) There are intentional objects that do not exist (as in the case of hallucination).
Crane (2001, 2013) claims that (1) is really true, yet (pace Quine 1952) it does not ontologically commit us to the nonexistent intentionalia it quantifies over. For him, independently of their existence, all intentionalia are schematic objects, i.e., objects that have no metaphysical nature insofar as they are thought-of. Thus for him, nonexistent intentionalia are not metaphysically bizarre entities (property bundles or correlates of such bundles, Platonic-like universals, etc.):
exotica, in Sainsbury’s (2010) felicitous expression. However, there is a substantial ontological
difference between existent intentionalia and nonexistent intentionalia. Unlike existent
intentionalia, which are entities we ontologically commit to, nonexistent intentionalia are mere
schematic objects, to which we do not ontologically commit. Hence, (1) truly quantifies over nonexistent schematic intentionalia that do not however figure in the overall ontological domain. As Smith (2002) puts it just for the hallucination case, nonexistent intentionalia of hallucination are ordinary objects as well as existent intentionalia of genuine perception, yet unlike the latter, they are no entities.
To my lights, there are three semantical readings of Crane’s claim. Yet none of them works, as I will try to show in what follows.
First, suppose that “to exist” in (1) is read as a second-order predicate, i.e., as a predicate that applies not to individuals but to properties. Then, as I think Crane himself would admit, (1) is not true, for it involves a contradiction. For when “to exist” is so read (1) merely means the same as:
(1’) There are intentional objects that are such that there are no such things (as in the case of hallucination).1
Second, if “to exist” in (1) is read as a first-order universal predicate, i.e., a predicate of individuals that applies to all the individuals in the overall ontological domain, pace Crane (1) is not true. Indeed, if one does not commit to nonexistent intentionalia, what is true is not (1), but (1)’s contradictory, namely:
(2) There are no nonexistent intentional objects (as in the case of hallucination), i.e., it is not the case that there are intentional objects that do not exist (as in the case of hallucination).
Third, if «to exist» in (1) is read as a first-order nonuniversal predicate, i.e., a predicate of individuals that applies to just a subdomain of them, (1) is undoubtedly true. Yet pace Crane, it is then hard not to read it in an ontologically committal way, as Meinongians read it: that is, as truly predicating a nonuniversal property of existence to nonexistent individuals that already are in the overall ontological domain. As Crane himself (2013:17) says, the two following sentences have the same syntax:
(3) Some characters in the Bible existed and some did not (4) Some kings of England died violently and some did not.
However, (4) admittedly says that in the overall ontological domain, some items have a certain property, while some others fail to have it. Yet since (3) says something of syntactically the same kind, how can we avoid interpreting it as ontologically committal as the latter?
3. Ontological neutralism does not work either
Clearly enough, there may be other ways of interpreting the idea that problematic existentially quantified sentences like (1) are really true and yet non ontologically committal. A similar approach is the neutralist account defended by Azzouni in various occasions (e.g. 2007, 2010, 2013). According to this account, all true existentially quantified sentences are ontologically
neutral. Aby such sentence goes on meaning the same thing, regardless of whether we are
effectively ontologically committed to the entities it apparently involves (so, it must not be paraphrased if it turns out that there is no such committment). Simply, they are true for different reasons: they have truth-makers if committal, truth-value inducers if noncommittal. Moreover, the mark of onticity that may distinguish them comes from rhetorical devices or addenda to such sentences. In this respect, consider the following true existentially quantified categorical sentences:
(5) There are atomic particles (6) There are fictional superheroes.
As far as the existential locution in them is concerned, both (5) and (6) have the same kind of meaning, to be given truthconditionally according to the schema “‘(x) (Px)’ is true iff there is something that is PM”. Indeed, both can be respectively reformulated as:
(5’) Some things are atomic particles (6’) Some things are fictional superheroes.
Yet only (5) is used in an ontologically committal way on a par with analogous yet merely empirical sentences, e.g.:
In order to show that we use (5) in an ontologically committal way and (6) in an ontologically noncommittal way, we can appeal to some rhetorical devices or to additions of some linguistic material, respectively:
(5a) There really are subatomic particles (5b) There are subatomic particles that exist (6a) There really are no fictional superheroes
(6b) There are fictional superheroes yet they don’t exist.
In the second kind of addition, “exists” is a first-order predicate (Azzouni 2007), in particular a contrastive one (Azzouni 2010) dividing the overall ontological domain in two subdomains. Hence the first-order property of existence it expresses is nonuniversal (not everything has it, e.g. fictional superheroes lack it). But if this is the case, then we encounter a problem that was raised by Crane’s alleged third interpretation of “to exist” in (1). Is there a real distinction between a neutralist saying that sentences like (6b) show that some ‘things’ fail to have the mark of onticity that makes them entities, and a Meinongian saying that such sentences show that there are things viz. entities that lack a non-universal first-order property of existence?2
To be sure, Azzouni might reply that, since only genuine things possess that first-order property, it is universal (as he puts in 2010:233, “Pegasus does not exist” means the same as “(y) (y = Pegasus)”). But if this were the case, then again we encounter the problem Crane’s alleged second interpretation of “to exist” in (1) raised. Sentences like (6b) would not be really true. For what would be true would be (6b)’s negation, namely:
(8) There are no nonexistent fictional superheroes, i.e., it is not the case that there are fictional superheroes that do not exist.
Yet even the first addition to the existentially quantified sentences, “really”, does not work. For, as Evans (1982:370) originally said, “really” is an operator which, when prefixed to a sentence, produces a sentence such that an utterance of it is true iff the sentence it nests is such that there is
2 The same problem holds for Fine’s (2009) saying that there are things that are not real, where reality is for him the mark of onticity.
a proposition it expresses when uttered in a make-believe game and that proposition is true, not merely true in that game, i.e., fictionally true. But this shows that sentences like (6) are at most merely fictionally true, as the following argument shows. To begin with, to say that (6a) is true is to say that:
(9) Not: there really are fictional superheroes
is true. For, if Evans is right, unlike the case of (5a), the corresponding ‘really’- positive sentence is false:
(10) There really are fictional superheroes.
So, (9) is true iff (10) is false, that is, iff it is not the case that (6), i.e., the sentence nested in (10), when uttered in a make-believe game expresses a true proposition. Thus, (6) is not true, at most it is fictionally true (true in a make-believe game).3
In the end, therefore, not even ontological neutralism satisfactorily accounts for the difference between the ontologically committal and the ontologically noncommittal reading of relevant problematic existentially quantified sentences.
4. The partially ontologically committal proposal
To be sure, I have not provided an exhaustive survey of all the possible attempts at keeping the real truth of problematic existentially quantified sentences like (1) without buying their apparent ontological commitment. Yet in the lack of really convincing such attempts,4 I think it is now
3 The other reading of (6a), “There really are no fictional superheroes”, is also true. For the nested sentence is such that it expresses a proposition in the relevant make-believe game and that proposition is true. But this is not the intended reading of (6a), which must be the negation of the positive sentence (10).
4 Another traditional such attempt consists in paraphrasing the original existentially quantified sentence by means of a sentence where an ontological commitment to problematic entities no longer appears. By following Talmy (1996), one might even put forward a sophisticated form of paraphraseism, which consists in providing a sentence both with
fictive truthconditions, which fictionally commit one to the problematic entities, and with factive truthconditions,
which altogether dispense with such a commitment. Yet, as we know at least since Kripke (2013), it is quite unlikely that any such attempt works, in particular when it is claimed to dispense with such a commitment. Indeed, Crane
better to pass on putting forward my positive account on the matter, which is Quinean in spirit (although clearly it is not literally Quinean, for Quine would have obviously disliked ontological commitment to the problematic items sentences like (1) quantify over). I indeed want to stick to the Quine-like claim that, if we want a sentence like (1) to be really true, we must take it as ontologically committing us to nonexistent intentionalia. Indeed, I also claim, one may derive (1) e.g. from these two true further sentences, where «Daggy» refers to the nonexistent intentionale of Macbeth’s hallucination:
(11) Macbeth hallucinated Daggy (12) Daggy does not exist.
These two sentences are ontologically committal as well.
Normally, people who hold the above claims are Meinongians of some sort or other. Yet there is room to hold the above claims while not sticking to a Meinongian metaphysics of nonexistent intentionalia. For that metaphysics makes them metaphysically bizarre kinds of things, exotica again. Rather, I can endorse Crane’s claim that intentionalia are as such, i.e., qua objects of thought, schematic objects. Yet I reject his distinction between mere schematic objects (to which we do not ontologically commit) and entities (which are the subsets of schematic objects to which we ontologically commit to). How is this possible?
To begin with, let me start by recalling that qua schematic objects, intentionalia are objects that have no metaphysical nature as long as they are thought-of. Yet on the metaphysical side, as Crane himself (2001:15-17, 2013:63-4) acknowledges, out of their being thought-of,
intentionalia may have a metaphysical nature, actually a different one; they indeed belong to
metaphysically different kinds. Thus on the ontological side, to check whether we must be ontologically committed to a certain intentionale, we must simply see whether it belongs to an
instantiated metaphysical kind. If its metaphysical kind is instantiated, then we are ontologically
committed to it; if not, we are not so committed. The proposal I thus want to defend is merely
partially ontologically committal: only if existentially quantified sentences are really true, we are
ontologically committed to the intentionalia they quantify over.
Note immediately that, unlike Crane’s, this proposal is utterly independent of whether the
intentionale in question exists. Pace Crane, there may be nonexistent intentionalia that however
belong to instantiated metaphysical kinds, so that we are ontologically committed to them. This is precisely the case with the ‘Macbeth’ example. Metaphysically speaking, the nonexistent intentionale, Daggy as I have called it, Macbeth hallucinates is a concrete object just as an object of genuine perception: i.e., an object that may exist, even if it does not actually exist, For the nature of a concretum is that of being an object that may have causal powers, or a spatiotemporal location (Cocchiarella 1982, Priest 20162). Ontologically speaking, moreover, we
are committed to all concreta. In general, from an ontological point of view, it is a false ontological parsimony to allow for objects of a certain metaphysical category and not to allow for other objects of the same category (Thomasson 1999, chaps 8-9). This is the case also with nonexistent concreta, as Lewis (19862) stressed.5 Indeed, it is false parsimony not to
ontologically allow for concrete nonexistent objects (mere possibilia) since we so allow for concrete existent objects (actual possibilia), which are just other objects of the same metaphysical kind. Thus, one must admit that the metaphysical kind of being concrete has both actually existent and actually nonexistent instantiations. Hence, we are ontologically committed to Daggy as well. This makes (11)-(12) true, as well as (1).
But now suppose per absurdum that nonexistent intentionalia were, metaphysically speaking, exotica. Well, ontologically speaking we are not committed to exotica: pace Meinongians, we do not want to overpopulate the overall ontological domain with bizarre kinds of things. If this were the case, then (1) would simply not be true. More in detail, if nonexistent
intentionalia were exotica, e.g. items that (essentially) possess the properties by means of which
they are qualified, as Meinongians claim,6 since there are no exotica (1) would be false. Put
alternatively, Daggy is not an exotic dagger but a merely possible concretum that, since it fails to exist, it is merely hallucinated to be a dagger. Since there are no exotica but there are merely possible concreta, then there are nonexistent intentional objects of hallucination that are identical with such concreta; namely, Daggy itself.
This actually happens in the case of intentionalia that turn out metaphysically to be impossible objects. Metaphysically speaking, impossible intentionalia are not concreta, precisely
5 I have reprised this idea in my Voltolini (2007). 6 For this idea, cf. notoriously Routley (1980:46).
because they are impossible: they cannot exist. Yet ontologically speaking, most people reject impossible objects: the price to pay for accepting them is standardly reputed to be too high (e.g., such objects violate logical laws).7 Thus, we must reject impossible intentionalia as well. Thus, a
sentence like:
(13) There are intentional objects that cannot exist
turns out to be false as well.
Clearly enough, this partially ontologically committal proposal is methological, insofar as, from the ontological side, it conforms with the received view, or at least the most popular view, as to the items of a certain metaphysical nature. If for instance, unlike what I just said, it turned out that ontologically speaking there are no concreta, in particular no concreta that are merely possible, however bizarre this may seem then a sentence like (1) would be as false as (13). For in such a case there would be no intentionalia that are concreta.8
5. Objections, replies, and further developments of the proposal
Clearly enough, the above partially ontologically committal proposal faces many objection. Let me scrutinize just some of the most important ones, for by replying to them I may further develop the proposal itself.
To begin with, Crane (2013) would insist that (1) is both really true and non ontologically committal. True enough, he says, (1) can be inferred from a sentence like (11) (and (12), of course), which is however non ontologically committal as well. For (11) is made true by the real fact that Macbeth has a Daggy-hallucination; namely, that he actually entertains a representation that involves a «Daggy» mental file – a labeled repository of information – which however refers to nothing. Thus in general, for him a real truthmaker can make a sentence really true even if the sentence is not ontologically committal, as is the case with (11), hence with (1) itself.
Now, as Simons (1997:265) underlined, a truthmaker must provide (not only necessary but also) sufficient conditions for the truth of a sentence. Yet in the above case the relevant
7 Notable expections are Berto (2013) and Priest (20162).
conditions are not sufficient. Take the following hypothetical case. On Twin Earth, Twin-Macbeth entertains another Daggy-representation whose mental file is identical with the file Macbeth mobilizes via his Daggy-representation, as the following considerations show. First, the same narrowly identified information (being a dagger, etc.) is listed under the same label, «Daggy». The information so listed is indeed narrow, for if Macbeth and Twin-Macbeth suddenly and unnoticedly swapped their positions, no change in their mental file would occur. Second, given the Twin Earth hypothesis no environmental factor may produce any causally relevant difference in the twins’ mental life. In particular, since for Crane the two kings are acquainted with no existent object, there is no way to tell their mental files by appealing to different acquaintance relations. If this is the case, however, then a certain mental file identically tagged is not a truthmaker of (11), for it would make (per impossibile) true also the following different sentence:
(14) Twin-Macbeth hallucinates Twin-Daggy.
thus violating the sufficiency condition in order for something to be a truthmaker.
Moreover, according to Sainsbury and Tye, there are many cases in which we have to allow for really true existentially quantified sentences that however ontologically commit us to nothing. Indeed, from the noncommittal:
(15) I desire a sloop
one may infer:
(16) There is something I desire – namely, a sloop
as well as from the noncommittal:
(17) Jane is friendly
(18) There is something Jane is – namely, friendly
although in both cases, they say, there is nothing one is ontologically committed to. Thus, they add, this must be the case with respect to (1) as well, or a more specific variant:
(19) There is something Macbeth hallucinates – namely, Daggy
that may be inferred9 by what is for them the actually noncommittal (11).10
Yet it may be questioned whether in the ‘Jane’ and ‘sloop’ cases one is not quantifying over genuine items, namely entities that belong to metaphysical kinds that are such that there are items of those kinds. This is clearly the case with the ‘Jane’ case, which involves a way of being – being friendly – that can be equated with something of a kind we tend to ontologically allow for; namely, a property. But it is also the case with the ‘sloop’ case, in which from a metaphysical point of view the item one truly quantifies over is not an entity of the metaphysical kind that one phenomenologically expects, i.e., that it seems to one that it is the kind of entity involved; namely, a generic individual, what a desired sloop in the case of (16) is expected to be, but rather an entity of a different kind;11 namely, a generic content. Indeed, while there are no generic
individuals,12 in the overall ontological domain there may rather be entities of a similar
metaphysical structure, namely instantiable or satisfiable entities. Generic contents are this kind of entities, once they are metaphysically construed as propositional-like items, provided of course that propositions are items that we ontologically accept: in the ‘sloop’ case, the content that there is some sloop or other.13 Thus once again, one may stick to the claim that sentences (16) and (18),
9 Curiously enough, pace Crane (2013:56) himself. 10 Cf. Sainsbury (2010:317), Sainsbury-Tye (2012:114).
11 As Priest himself (20162:241-2) underlines with respect to the different case of «I am thinking of dogs», from the metaphysical side the entity one is there ontologically committed to may be phenomenologically unexpected. As se he says, something is such that I am thinking of it; not pluralities, however, which is the kind of entity of would phenomenologically expect, but either certain particular dogs (say, Fido, Lassie, and Rex) or the type itself dog. 12 As Priest (20162:241) convincingly maintains.
13 In this respect, consider Sainsbury’s (2017) further examples: «Felicity feared something worse than mere
words», «Julie thought about getting David to dance», «Walter is worried about what to do about the mortgage»,
as well as (19), are really true, but only if all of them are ontologically committed to
intentionalia, which must respectively be equated with items admittedly of different yet
instantiated metaphysical kinds.
At this point, however, one may question whether the present proposal is really merely partially committal. For even in the problematic cases, one may say that in the overall ontological domain there is an entity one is truly quantifying over that is identical with the intentionale the relevant existentially quantified sentence mobilizes. Simply, that entity is of a metaphysical kind that is phenomenologically unexpected. For instance as to (13), one may say that it does not truly quantify over intentionalia that are impossibilia, as one would believe, for admittedly there are no impossible objects, but rather over intentionalia that are entities that we ontologically allow for; namely, generic contents that are impossibly satisfied. So for instance, when Twardowski thinks of Twardy, the impossible wooden cannon made of steel, the intentional object of his thought is not an impossibile, as Twardowski himself may believe, but rather a certain generic proposition-like content, a Twardian content if you proposition-like: the content that there is something proposition-like a wooden cannon made of steel. Thus, a sentence like:
(20) There is something Twardowski thinks of – namely, Twardy
is really true, insofar as it quantifies over an intentionale that is a generic content we are ontologically committed to.
To be sure, in spreading ontological commitment to intentionalia, this generalization would entail the thesis that whenever it seems to one that one’s thought is about something, i.e., that it has an intentionale, that thought is really so.14 For there really is something that thought is flew». All such sentences present both grammatical-like and intentional objects. Such objects are items one can truly
quantify over depending on whether they are equated with genuine items, i.e., entities of the right metaphysical kinds, i.e., the kinds that are such that there really are items of those kinds. In the first two of the above cases, things are simple. As Sainsbury himself suggests, the items in question are events and action-types, and we ontologically allow for such things. In the remaining cases, one must find the right metaphysical kinds for the intentional objects involved: they may again be action-types (the last case) or (the other cases) possible courses of action (e.g., tying the
bow tie this way rather than tying the bow tie that way), if not generic contents for possible courses of action (e.g. all
the possible ways of behaving with respect to the mortgage, all the possible ways for Jules to behave)
14 Crane (2001, 2013) endorses this thesis as well, but he wants not to derive it from the claim of a generalized ontological commitment to intentionalia, which as I said above he does not hold.
about, simply its metaphysical nature is not the kind of nature one would have phenomenologically expected. E.g. in the case of impossibilia, whenever it seems to one that one is thinking about something, there really is something one’s thought is about, yet it is not an
impossibile, as one would have believed, but an ontologically more palatable generic content that
is simply impossible to satisfy. This generalization would therefore have the further advantage that it saves the intuition that intentionality is uniform:15 a thought is always a thought about
something, i.e., it always has an intentionale.
Yet unfortunately, there is a reason for not utterly endorsing such a theoretically welcome result. (I say “not utterly” for, as we will see later, there is a way to partially vindicate that result.) In some cases, people seem to think about different objects. But if what they think about were generic contents, then depending on the metaphysics of content one endorses it might implausibly turn out that, their phenomenological expectations notwithstanding, they are thinking about the
same thing. For instance, suppose that a subject seems to think about the set of sets that are not
members of themselves, whereas another subject seems to think about the property of being a property that does not apply to itself. Intuitively, they seem to think about different things. Yet suppose one claimed not only that what they really think about are generic contents but also that, owing to one’s particular metaphysical theory of propositions, such generic contents are the same proposition; say, the same necessary false proposition, i.e., an intension from possible worlds to the False. This would mean that, appearances notwithstanding, they are thinking of the same
intentionale. Now as we have already seen, it may well be the case that phenomenology fails to
be a good guide to metaphysics. One may believe that what one is thinking is an object of a
certain metaphysical kind, whereas in point of fact it is an object of another metaphysical kind.
To find a rather obvious example, consider childrens’ thinking of Santa Claus, who they assume to be a concrete entity whereas in point of fact it is a kind of fictional entity, a mythological entity. Yet phenomenology is a reliable guide to metaphysics at least as to the number of objects, if any, that are involved by one’s thoughts. Now, in the case at issue one phenomenologically counts two objects – the paradoxical set and the paradoxical property – where metaphysically speaking just one thing would be at stake, a certain proposition. In the overall ontological domain there would then implausibly be just one intentionale, i.e., a certain proposition, the two subjects would be thinking about.
This problem suggests that in certain cases at least, it is better not to identify intentional objects with generic contents. Thus, I go on claiming that in such cases the thought in question is not really about something, it has no intentional object, since that object does not really figure in the overall ontological domain. Given such an ontological failure, moreover, the metaphysical structure itself of the thought does not involve a relation to an intentionale. Rather, that thought merely has an intentional content.16 At this point, nothing prevents one from equating in turn this
intentional content with a certain generic, proposition-like, content. This seems also to be the case with respect to impossibilia. For not only impossibilia are such that we are not ontologically committed to them. But also, even though there is here no problem of a difference in the relevant number of items between what one phenomenologically expects and what there really is, the
intentionalia that one believes one’s thought are about are expected to be, qua impossibilia, still
metaphysically too different from generic contents. Thus, it is rather unplausible for the former to be equated with the latter and thereby to really figure in the overall ontological domain. For there is a deep difference in categorical structure: the latter, as I said before, are instantiable or satisfiable entities, while the former are particulars. So coming back to the ‘Twardowski’ case, there is no Twardy, for qua impossible we do not ontologically allow for it, nor can we equate it with a certain ‘Twardian’ generic, proposition-like, content. Rather, Twardowski’s thought has a different metaphysical structure: instead of being about a certain intentional object, it has an intentional content, which may then be equated with that generic content. Thus, the strategy of equating intentionalia with generic contents does not hold across the board. Sometimes, as in the ‘sloop’ case, it seems sensible to perform such an equation, and then to stick to the real truth of (16). Some other times, however, as in the ‘Twardowski’ case, it is better, first, to first reject that identity, second, to hold that the relevant thought is not about anything but it just has an intentional content, so as to stick, third, to the real falsehood of (20).
There is however a way to partially account for the uniformity intuition concerning intentionality. As I said, when there really is no intentional object the relevant thought has no relation with such an object, but it rather has an intentional content, so that the relevant existentially quantified sentence is really false. Yet phenomenologically speaking it still seems to one that one’s thought is about a certain intentionale. I may then say that in such a case one makes as if the thought had such an object, so that the relevant existentially quantified sentence is
at least fictionally true.17 I indeed want to equate the world of phenomenology, the world as it
seems to a thinking subject, with a fictional world. Even though it is not really the case that things unfold as it phenomenologically seems to one, it is indeed as if they so unfolded. In such a world, there indeed always is an intentional object for a thought, for so it seems to its subject. Thus, in that fictional world of phenomenology, the relevant existentially quantified sentence is true, even though it remains really false, i.e., false in the real world.18
6. Partial Fictionalism
At this point, one might be rather tempted to go in the opposite direction and to endorse the
fictionalist strategy across the board. If (20) is an example of a problematic existentially
quantified sentence that is merely fictionally true, why not saying that this is the case in all problematic cases, hence e.g. with respect to (1) as well? As a matter of fact, Kroon (2011, 2013, 2015) has provided an argument that precisely aims at generalizing the fictional strategy. Suitably reconstrued, his argument runs as follows:
i) If we accept that quantified sentences such as (1), «There are intentional objects that do not exist (as in the case of hallucination)» ontologically commit us to nonexistent intentional objects, we must accept that other even more problematic existentially quantified sentences ontologically commit us to even more bizarre items;
ii) But we don’t accept the latter commitment – indeed, the relevant quantified sentence is just fictionally true;
iii) Hence, we must not accept the former commitment as well – the original quantified sentence is just fictionally true as well.
17 To be more precise, the sentence is true in a fictional narrow context of interpretation, i.e., a set-theoretical construal made by a delimited number of parameters (agent, space, time, world) whose ‘world’ parameter is saturated by a fictional, not the real, world (in this case, a phenomenological world). For more details on this idea cf. e.g. my Voltolini (2016). As a matter of fact, Sainsbury and Tye can be read as favoring this account. For, they say, the word «thing» in «something» must be meant as not being «ontologically serious» (2012:114)
18 Once one takes a phenomenological world as behaving like a fictional world, one may well interpret Smith (2002) as saying that both (11) and the existentially quantified sentence one infers from it and (12), i.e., (1) itself, are true just in a phenomenological world. But for the reasons given in the text I prefer to hold this thesis just for sentences like (20).
In order to justify his argument, Kroon originally provides the case of imaginary companions. In their games, children imagine new friends or companions as existing. In studying such cases, a psychologist may end up saying:
(21) Some imaginary companions are more closely modelled after playmates of the child’s own age, size and gender.
By uttering that sentence, however, the psychologist does not want to ontologically commit herself to bizarre items children intentionally interact with; nor do we when echoing (21). So, why should we be ontologically committed to nonexistent intentionalia by uttering (1)? As a matter of fact, for Kroon (21) is merely fictionally true: «truths about the imaginary companions that children create are true only from the point of view of such a fiction» (2011:220). Thus, in Kroon’s perspective also (1) must be merely fictionally true.
Prima facie at least, one might bite the bullet and reject premise ii) of Kroon’s argument:
appearances notwithstanding, sentences like (21) ontologically commit us to imaginary companions, at least if they are metaphysically taken to be abstract entities similar to items we already ontologically accept, i.e., fictional entities (some sort of abstract artifacts).
Yet it is better not to make this move. For, as Kroon himself points out, there are even harder cases in which it would be very odd to say that by uttering a certain existentially quantified sentence we are ontologically committed to items of an even stranger metaphysical sort – ghostly entities, to give them a vivid name. To take a further example from Kroon, consider the case of Max, the individual someone postulates by mishearing “Go to the max”. On the basis of such a case, one might conclude:
(22) There are all kinds of things that are posited simply as a result of people misapprehending what others say.
Yet clearly enough, (22) is true merely fictionally, and so, holds Kroon, must be the case with (1).
Rather, in Kroon’s argument premise i) is false. For once in virtue of the above reasoning it turns out that its consequent is false – we do not have to ontologically allow for metaphysically odd entities – its antecedent remains true, provided of course I am able to show that (1) is really true, not merely fictionally true. Let us see.
To begin with, we may accept that there are many cases in which the relevant existentially quantified sentences are merely fictionally true. This is the case not only with (22), but, as Kroon himself stresses, also with:
(23) There are creatures in some fiction who are presented with too little detail to distinguish them from one another. Among such creatures are the dwarves who fought so valiantly in the War of the Dwarves and Orcs and many of whom never returned home.
Within Tolkien’s fiction, in fact, dwarves are merely generally described. Thus, it is merely fictionally true that there are such creatures, as (23) says. One may indeed hold that by (23) one goes on talking within a form of pretense just as Tolkien did in generally talking of dwarves while composing his fiction.
Yet the previous Sections of this paper enable me to explain why, unlike sentences like (22) and (23), sentences like (1) are really true. One has no ontological arguments in favor either of ghostly entities or of indeterminate fictional entities, on which (22) and (23) respectively quantify over. Being a ghostly entity and being an indeterminate fictional entity indeed are uninstantiated metaphysical kinds. So, (22) and (23) can at most be fictionally true. Yet we have seen before that there are such arguments with respect to concrete nonexistent intentionalia, which is what (1) quantifies over. Thus, (1) is really true.
Note moreover that sometimes being fictionally true and non ontologically committal does not prevent a sentence from also being really true and ontologically committal. Consider both an utterance of:
uttered when playing Luigi Pirandello’s Six Characters in Search of an Author, and another utterance of it taken as a bit of literary criticism. Clearly enough, the first utterance of (24) is fictionally true, on a par with the Pirandellean sentence:
(25) He who is known as THE FATHER is a man of about 50: hair, reddish in colour, thin at the temples19
as implicitly uttered by the pièce’s narrator. No ontological commitment is indeed required in order for them to be fictionally true. Yet the second utterance of (24) is really true, provided that we ontologically commit to fictional characters, in the reasonable supposition that there are good ontological arguments in favour of such entities.20 These remarks allow me to restate my point.
Pace the fictionalist, the problematic existentially quantified sentences are not merely fictionally
true; they are really true once we are ontologically committed to the items they quantify over. At this point, however, the fictionalist may perform another move, which is structurally similar to the ‘truthmakerist’ move Crane originally performed. True enough, the problematic existentially quantified sentences are really true, not just fictionally true. Yet there is no need for their being really true that they also ontologically commit us to the items they quantify over. For simply, one such sentence is really true iff it is fictionally true, i.e. it is true in the world of the relevant pretense.21
Yet this move does not work for the very same reason Crane’s ‘truthmakerist’ move actually fails. The fact that a sentence is true in a fictional world can hardly be a sufficient condition for it to be really true, i.e., true in the real world. Suppose that a sentence is uttered within a dream so as to be oneirically true, i.e., true in the world of the dream. This would hardly bring about that the sentence is true outside of the dream, i.e., true in the real world. In a nutshell,
19 More precisely, both utterances of (24) and (25) are fictionally true iff they are paired with a fictional narrow context of interpretation and are true in the fictional world of that context.
20 For examples of such arguments, cf. Thomasson (1999) and my Voltolini (2006).
21 For this move, see originally Walton (1990) and then Crimmins (1998). The move may be given also a pragmatic twist. The relevant existentially quantified sentence is correct (i.e., conveys a truth) iff it is fictionally true, i.e. it is true in the world of the extended pretense that affects it, where an extended pretense involves a fictional world that contains also the items the sentence quantifies over (Everett 2013).
sentences uttered in dreams (in dreamy worlds) make no real communications (in the real world); why things should be different as to sentences uttered in (a form of) pretense?
All in all, therefore, it is better to remain just partially factionalist; namely, just with respect to those problematic existentially quantified sentences for which it is also sensible not to be ontologically committed to the items they quantify over.22
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