Fertility-related pensions and fertility disincentives
Luciano Fanti Luca Gori
University of Pisa University of Pisa
Abstract
Since recent studies have argued that a pro-natalist effect could be obtained by introducing fertility-related pension systems for contrasting, especially in European countries, the plague of below-replacement fertility and the resulting problem of financing the widespread pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension benefits, we built up an overlapping generations (OLG) general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility, to investigate whether and how a fertility-related pension reform increases population growth. We show that if the capital’s share in production is high enough, such a reform, in contrast with the suggestions of the preceding literature, always reduces the long-run fertility rate.
Citation: Fanti, Luciano and Luca Gori, (2008) "Fertility-related pensions and fertility disincentives." Economics Bulletin, Vol.
10, No. 8 pp. 1-7
Submitted: January 12, 2008. Accepted: June 9, 2008.
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