Consensus and conflict : value collectives and social conflicts in contemporary German society

D epartm ent o f Political and Social Sciences

Value Collectives and Social Conflicts in

Contemporary German Society

by

Sigrid Rolkeutseher

Thesis submitted for assessment with

a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of the

European University Institute

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Department o f Political and Social Sciences

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

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3 0001 0025 5149 9

CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT

Value Collectives and Social Conflicts in

Contemporary German Society

LIB

3 0 6 . 0 9 4 3

ROS

by

Sigrid Roßteutscher

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the Degree o f Doctor o f the

European University Institute

Examining Jury:

Prof. Stefano Bartolini (EUI)

Prof. Klaus Eder (Humboldt-Universität Berlin - Supervisor) Prof. Max Kaase (Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin)

Prof. Jan W. van Deth (Universität Mannheim)

Page

Introduction 1

PARTI:

Theoretical Introduction

Chapter 1: The Value Conflictual Society - A Theoretical Foundation 11

Chapter

2:

The Role o f Values in the Conflictual Society 33

Chapter 3: Germany Divided - Cultural Developments after 1945 56

PART 13:

Methodology and First Empirical Evidence

Chapter 4: Operationalisation o f Values and Typology Construction 90

Chapter 5: Value Collectives in East and West Germany 98

Chapter 6: A Methodological Comparison into Explanatory Potency: Ranking-,

Factor- and Cluster Types ^

PART m :

Value Collectives and Collective Action

Chapter 7: The Independent Variables - An Introduction 154

Chapter 8: The Societal Relevance o f Value Collectives in East and West Germany 181

PART IV:

The Battle over Meaning - A n Investigation into Social Inequality, Power and Cultural Hegemony

Chapter 9: Value Systems, Social Inequality and Power - A Theoretical 224 Introduction

Chapter 10: Operationalisation and Methodology 238

Chapter 11: Value Collectives and the Struggle for Hegemony - Empirical Evidence 258 Chapter 12: Conclusions: Who with W hom against W hom - The Cleavage Structure

309 o f Contemporary Germany

Postscript 353

Appendix 355

Why art we interested in societal value orientations? Squeezed between utilitarianists, structuralists and constructionists the preoccupation with values and guiding ideals seems to be awkward, old-fashioned, even conservative, and certainly not at the forefront of academic fashion. The idea of values communicates the notion of settled beliefs and change resisting attitudes formulated in early childhood or adolescent experiences as well as suggesting continuity and stability of human conduct They refer to the unbroken transmission of attitudes and culture across generations and offer themselves as the explanation for the development of social and political lifestyles. Values also promise coherence and reliability. Too much stability? Too much pre-determination? Too much boredom for the contingency- trained post-modern brain?

Values are supposed to be basic and powerful, but can this really still be convincing? Why do we not think of human beings as individualised rational choosers who act in pure accordance with preformulated and calculated interests? Why can we not see the world as a universe o f contingency open to be re-interpreted and re-structured at any given point o f time and space?

What we have to prove, therefore, is the simple fact that values - or rather societal value orientations - still play a central role in the development o f modem societies and the political conflicts that take place within these societies. Furthermore, we have to show that an emphasis on values can explain contemporary phenomena in a way that is superior or at least complementary to explanations resting on structural, constructionist or rational choice assumptions.

Background and Context: Some Introductory Remarks

Let us start w ith a sketch of the basic assumptions underlying this thesis. Historically speaking, the birth of contemporary values in their abstract and universal form can be dated back to the dawn o f modernity. In that sense modernity is the inventor and creator o f societal o r cultural beliefs because only a form o f 4 Vergesellschaftung' that liberates its members from the dictates o f natural hierarchy and religious pre­ determination can be a society in which the newly-created individual is capable of expressing ideas about the best organisation for societal togetherness. Moreover, only the disenchantm ent with ideas about pre-given human fate could turn the question of society one of social engineering. However, the construction of human organisation as a m atter of w ill led simultaneously to both the dissolution of traditional consensus and the birth o f basic value conflicts concerning organisation of society. Modem societies, therefore, are basically conflictual societies in which consensus has either to be re-established on the basis o f voluntary agreement or contract or totally abandoned in favour o f the creation of conflict- regulating - yet non-solving - mechanisms.

It is against this background of consensus and conflict that this thesis develops its m ajor arguments. In particular it is the obvious contradiction between 'integration theory4, on the one hand, and 'individualisation theory4 on the other, that has inspired m ost o f the theoretical and em pirical analyses. Indeed, for a researcher interested in value orientations both strands o f theorising are non-negligible benchmarks. Integrationalists claim the necessity of value consensus within a given society and insist on

2 the existence o f ‘the’ political culture.1 Individualisation theory, in contrast, prom otes the im possibility of collectively shared beliefs in a rapidly disintegrating world. In fact, the m ost recent variation on the theme o f the disintegration scenario - U lrich Beck's ‘risk society* - is probably one o f the m ost common references used in contemporary sociological writings. The theory o f individualisation is the ultim ate requiem on the societal relevance o f values. The apparently unsolveable tension betw een ‘integrationalists' and ‘disintegrationalists’, between the idea o f the complete rule and the claim o f th e societal insignificance of values, provides the major theoretical background for this thesis. The conflict hostility o f both approaches is striking. Integrationalists celebrate all-embracing value consensus. T he 'collectively individualised world* o f individualisation theory no longer perm its collectively-shared meaning systems. For a researcher who w as bom in the 1960s, grew up in the 1970s and 1980s and w ho now witnesses the 1990s such perspectives are strangely puzzling and sharply contradict the cornerstones o f ones* own experiences and memories.

Conflict had been a major ingredient in the recent history o f W estern and, more recently, Eastern

i

societies also. M oreover, a more long-term historical perspective dearly reveals that modem societies have experienced regular and, at tim es, harsh and violent outbursts o f conflict w ith regard to both th eir future and outlook. Thus, value conflicts have to be seen as an integral part of modem societies. Consequently, the period after the Second W orld War was an unusual period o f societal peace and value integration. The proxim ity of the conflicts o f the 1920s and 1930s, the violent struggles between socialism and fascism , the forceful attacks against liberalism and democracy by both ideologies, and finally, the Second W orld War w ith its m illions of tragic victim s, made the exceptional constellation o f societal consensus possible. Besides, value conflict was externalised and exclusively projected into the framework provided by the em erging East-W est divide, indeed, it is im possible to ignore the significance o f the Cold War w ith regard to the establishment and temporary m aintenance o f system internal inner peace. At the centre o f all these conflicts w as Germany. In the end, the defeat o f the Hitlerian regime resulted in the system ic domination o f the C old W ar and its sim ple bipolarity on German soil. However, as a result both the W estern and Eastern variants of German post-w ar societies provide extrem e b u t ultimately representative examples o f political reactions and institutional re­ arrangements little different from the developments that took place in neighbouring countries both to the East and the W est o f Germany. Therefore, using different strategies and with differing success. East and West G erm any w ere both able to establish societal consensus. However, we w ill argue, that both integration attem pts failed. In the W est, we witnessed the gradual but finally violent return o f value conflicts w ith its first peak in the late 1960s. Equally, w hilst the oppressive system o f the East could postpone and delay the emergence o f value conflicts, it too had ultim ately to give in and, as a result, vanished com pletely.

A second m ajor source that stim ulated this thesis was a side-aspect o f the recent ‘value change* debate that was initiated by the work o f Ronald In glehart This entire discussion is based upon the assumption that contem porary W estern societies witnessed a change o f values from one value system towards a 1 This is not only the case with regard to Talcott Parsons and his followers but applies to system theory ft la David Easton and most political culture theory in the tradition of Almond and Verba. At the moment it witnesses a revival with regard to the debate about value pluralism, consensus and multiculturalism (e.g. Hepp 1996, Winkel 1996, Tibi 1996).

second ‘newer* * value system. Indeed, even the fiercest opponents o f the theory o f ‘postmaterialism* are strangely committed to the idea that one can distinguish traditional from modem, pre-modem from modem and post-modem ideals. It is clear that such a perspective must lead to the neglect o f conflict as a basic element o f contemporary societies. Indeed, the evolutionary point o f view results in an almost normative proclamation o f societal developm ent In the modem society, modem values have necessarily to triumph over traditional values, and post-modem ideals w ill inevitably assert themselves against modem ideals which had already previously supplanted pre-modem concepts o f societal organisation. Consequently, theories o f value change are as conflict-hostile as are integration theories & la Parsons and individualisation theories

k

la Beck. In the value change perspective, conflicts can hardly be more than resentments and outbursts of discontent originating from ‘traditionalists’, ’modernists1 or ‘pre- modernists * who fight their last rearguard action against what is in the final analysis the inevitable progress o f time. Accordingly, the major source o f value change is located on the macro level of society, where growing levels o f prosperity, the development o f new technologies, new means o f communication or the expansion o f education and the public sector in general are seen as the factors behind the change o f individual orientations.1 Value change is a straightforward response to previous changes in the environment; its carriers are the individuals who are most clearly exposed to these trends.

However, our own conception o f modem societies as inevitably value conflictual applies a far more open idea about future developments. This is because we doubt both the evolutionary perspective and the quasi pre-determination of the final outcome of value conflicts, we therefore arrive at an image of a plural society that determines its future outlook through the course o f its value conflicts. If this battle has no a-priori ’winners1 and ’losers1 which are determined alone by the progress o f tim e, we arrive, moreover, at an image of a society in which social resources, skills, power and patterns o f inequality m atter significantly. Indeed, it is this apparent and strange neglect of the social dimension of value conflicts that inspired the theoretical and em pirical analysis o f the final part o f this thesis. In its standard version value change theory even claims that value conflicts succeeded and replaced older social conflicts that were located in issues like social inequality, power and material re-distribution. This assumption stands in direct opposition to our own conception o f society as being inevitably value conflictual. The post-war decades were not dominated by now outmoded (or solved?) social conflicts, but were an extremely fortunate period in which Western societies experienced the extraordinary - and short-term - extinction o f value conflicts.

There can be no conflict without, at least, tw o opposing protagonists.1 Besides, every conflict follows the logic o f producing ’winners* and ’losers*. Even if compromise is the most frequent outcome, this does not contradict the basically dichotomous nature o f conflicts. Value conflicts are about the ideal societal organisation, about the definition o f what is good and what is evil, about the control o f the public discourse. Therefore, there can be no value conflict that is not, potentially at least, a conflict which concerns social power. If the outcome o f such conflicts can not be determined by natural laws of evolution, social inequality, privileges or disadvantages m ust have a decisive im pact on the course of

1 Logically, thus, the major protagonists of the value change are the 'new* generations, the profiteers of ’new* technology, the ’new* middle class, public sector employees, the highly educated....

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4 these conflicts. F or these reasons, a m ajor part of this thesis is dedicated to an investigation into th e social dim ension of collective value conflicts. Antonio Gramsci was. one o f the first writers w h o systematically thought about the tense relationship between battles over meaning and social power. H is ideas o f cultural hegemony and social alliances will be the theoretical cornerstones o f the fourth p art o f this thesis.

The Western Response

Whilst the construction o f a w elfare state was the political reply to the violent conflicts in the previous decades, functionalist thought w as a theoretical answer to the inherent instability and ultim ate collapse of inter-w ar societies. Thus, the notion o f basic value consensus was re-introduced into the realm o f modem dem ocratio societies - politically and theoretically. In that sense, Talcott Parsons was th e intellectual force behind the modem w elfare state. M oreover, for many years the strategies o f re ­ distribution and m aterial appeasement that were characteristic o f postw ar societies seemed to be highly successful. Particularly in West Germany w ith its traumatic history, the incomparable economic success of postw ar politics resulted in an unquestioned celebration o f the "soziale M arktwirtschaft". T h is consensus, however, was paid fo r by the authoritarian culture o f the 1950s when the lack o f confrontation w ith the national-socialist past, and the new anti-communism, created a rather unpolitical and privatistic culture which rested on the priority o f work, fam ily, consumption and leisure-tim e activities.4 A dm ittedly, although interest groups and parties fought about both the m ethod and am ount o f redistribution, the final aim o f politics, i.e. the general organisation o f society w as hardly ev er questioned. In th is very concrete sense, therefore, the blossom ing w elfare state established a consensus of values. D uring the period of basic consensus, as Bomschier (1988: 168), conflicts remained on th e level o f realisation conflicts, i.e. if a dispute emerged it originated from the com parison between th e broadly accepted value realm and the reality o f implementation, w hat he calls "social inconsistencies*' between the ideal and the reality. In short, post-war welfare societies experienced such a 'b asic consensus*.

Throughout this thesis we will use the metaphor o f the V elfare society' or *welfare consensus' to underline this very particular phase in the development o f modem society. It refers to the consensual model that em erged in most W estern countries after the Second W orld W ar and which lasted throughout the 1950s and into the early part o f the 1960s. In short, the 'welfare society* is a synonym for a sim ple formula: capitalism plus parlamentarianism plus social justice.*

Why has this successful model recently lo st its capacity to create value consensus? The answers to th is question are num erous and contradictory. However, we argue that the welfare consensus inevitably h ad to come to an end because it represented an 'anomaly* w ithin the conflictual history o f m odernity. Thanks to th e then still vivid memories o f the ideological conflicts o f the pre-war decades, the horrifying * 1

4 For more details see the historical account in Chapter 3.

1 Ralf Dahrendorf prefers the label 'social democratic consensus* for the same phenomenon. He defines this model as "a strong but benevolent government in a democratic system tempered by corporatism, a managed but market-oriented economy exposed with a degree of cushioning to world trade and monetary arrangements, and a society of far-reaching solidarity by entitlements and progressive taxation as part of a general propensity fo r equality in generally liberal conditions** (1988: 116).

experience o f the Second World W ar and the emerging East-W est confrontation. W estern societies • and this is particularly the case for W est Germany - found themselves in a political and social environment that was especially suited to the creation o f widespread consensus. The peaceful solution o f the Cuba crisis*, the growing temporal distance from the war and the appearance o f a new generation who knew the conflictual and violent history only from hearsay dem ystified, and thus concluded, the almost transcendental fate o f the welfare model and re-introduced 'normality*, at least in the sense that conflict could once again become an integral part o f the political agenda.

Today the welfare state is under severe attack from both the political left and right.* 7 As we will later show, the basic value trinity of the welfare consensus - the ideal o f individual autonomy, the belief in rationality and progress and the legitim ization of persistent inequalities by the m eritocratic principle o f achievement - harboured the explosive pow er of basic value conflicts. Indeed, all three values led to contradictions that threatened the validity o f the values themselves. Therefore, individual autonomy became a counter-position to the proliferating welfare bureaucracy. The Club o f Rome’s growth report and alarming ecological disasters have shaken the belief in progress and technical reason. Finally, societal success appeared as less and less determined by m erit and achievement and more by social exclusion based upon ascriptive, non-achieved criteria. As we w ill also show, these contradictions inherent in the value basis of the welfare consensus contributed greatly to the cleavage structure of contemporary society.

What is diagnosed is not the end o f the welfare state but the end o f the welfare consensus because modem policy is once again conflictual, particularly value conflictual. Indeed, the modem welfare state was a robust and successful attem pt to overcome the fatal value conflicts and basic inequalities of its various predecessor models, however, the progress of time has revealed that the consensus model suffers from several mate contradictions.

In short, this thesis rests on the strong assumption that the welfare state is no longer sacred but rather a target of critiques which go beyond mere disputes over the method and means o f redistribution being focused instead, to a large extent, upon the ends and aims of politics itself. 'T h e secular faith of the postmetaphysical era has gone the way o f religious faith" (Betz 1991: 158). W hat is true for the welfare consensus is likewise true for its m ajor theoretical protagonist The Parsonian dream of value integration has lost much of its visionary attraction. On the other hand, nor have we entered a world of mere individualisation. As we will show, the systematic nature o f contradictions places (and has placed) different groups (whether they be generations, gender-specific groups, the highly educated or marginalised parts o f the population, or even traditional classes) in distinct positions within this arena of cleavage. Hence, the W estern model, finally, dissolved itself into a pluralism of value-laden conflicts.' * The Cuba crisis clearly signaled that the world is not seriously threatened by an atomic war between the superpowers.

7 Following Dahrendorf, the project of modernity is the eradication of inequality. Already in 1979 he formulated the provocative question of what is likely to happen when the project is completed. The answer is simple and pessimistic. The day when the welfare state receives general acknowledgment is simultaneously the end of what he terms the "Social Democrat consensus" and the end of its visionary attraction (Dahrendorf 1979). In a later publication he formulated that “a historical force has lost its momentum”. Furthermore, “great social forces die at the moment of victory” (1988:117).

* As van Deth writes: I n this way, the concept of changing values is at the core of interpretations of almost every aspect of political change in advanced industrial societies" (van Deth 1995a: 2).

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The Eastern Response

Socialism both as an ideology and as a systemic implementation is strictly based on values. M oreover, it rests on the exclusion of contradictory values and ideologies. In this sense, the Eastern model represents an attem pt to create consensus v ia the realisation of one value system and the sim ultaneous eradication of any deviant and contradictory options. Socialism, thus, is a particular response to the conflictual nature o f m odernity. Like every other 'clo sed ' ideology it attem pts to restore the ultim ately lost n atu ral order through the hegemony and exclusive legitimacy o f one single frame o f th o u g h t Consequently, a n evaluation o f consensus is more d ifficu lt In the W estern context it is rather sim ple to observe periods o f consensus and periods which see the revival o f value conflicts. In the socialist system - a t least since th e military interventions in the 1950s and 1960s - open dissent w as, if at all, a phenom enon restricted to parts o f the intellectual elite. W ith hindsight it is o f course easy to conclude th at socialism n e v e r managed to create socialist personalities and a value consensus based upon the principle o f M arxism - Leninism. However, is this really correct?

The central value o f socialism, obviously, is equality (equality o f outcome, rather than opportunity). Indeed, the uncontested dominance of this value made the socialist systems produce huge welfare a n d security apparata. This parallel construction of welfare bureaucracy in the East and the W est evoked in the 1960s and 1970s a neo-M arxist variant of convergence theory which accused both sides o f an alienating and de-human ising im pact on its respective citizens. Notwithstanding the clear ideological (and anti-W estern) component o f this strand o f critique w e will show that socialist w elfare systems w ere, indeed, suffering from social contradictions that were sim ilar to their W estern counterparts. B asic inconsistencies between a celebrated ideal and a gray reality, tarnished the ideals and led in countries where it was politically possible to the em ergence o f harsh political conflicts, Hungary, and particularly Poland, being prom inent examples. Furthermore, the socialist system created econom ic and social security to an extent that was probably greater than the more loosely woven security w eb o f the W e s t However, one m ay question, w hether this assumed sense o f security led to the same am ount and quality of "life w orld opposition". After all socialism was an authoritarian regime that reserved the option o f individual autonom y for a future period when re-education had engineered the socialist 'personality' to the point w here they were able to use their autonomy in a system-adequate manner. H ence, the socialist infiltration o f daily-life may have resulted rather in the construction of an (apolitical?) civil society. The m ajor prom ise o f socialism w as a day when equal citizens, liberated from soppression, would live in harmony and w ealth. However, from the 1970s onwards it became apparent that the system would not be able to keep its prom ise. Eastern econom ies not only suffered from stagnation but life quality • at least in comparison to th e capitalist world - declined. The immense social security system led directly to economic collapse, a profound failure th at split the population into "still believers” and "lapsed believers". H ow ever, socialist w elfare states also suffered from a pronounced idealistic contradiction because instead o f an oppression-free society citizens faced indoctrination and the need to sub-ordinate their own w ill to an increasingly fake ideology and bureaucratic elites that were m ore and m ore insensitive to the population's day to day problem s. Indeed, both the East German 1989 movement w ith

its slogan o f "we are the people" as w ell as the "Third Way" approach o f dissident groups, expressed increasing dissatisfaction with the ideological output o f the system.

In sum, we can observe similar contradictions (even if they are partly open deficits, rather than inherent contradictions) in the E ast However, an analogous conclusion regarding value pluralism appears to be less straightforward. First of all, socialism - and particularly its E ast German variant • could successfully suppress obvious value dissent Indeed, alm ost up to the very end, conflict was barely visible. Hence, the proposition that there was a 'natural1 return o f value conflicts after a period o f 'unnatural' consent is far more questionable with regard to the E a st For many reasons. East German society was a puzzling society that provoked countless speculations and hypotheses, partly because we lack clear evidence regarding so many o f its facets.

d*

The Content o f this Thesis

This thesis is interested in collectively shared values. It asks w hether there are, and indeed how many, different value communities exist in the contemporary societies o f East and W est Germany. Furthermore it also asks whether these value communities ate potentially conflictual or n o t Values are understood as inteipretational schemata or devices that help to understand and thereby provoke reaction against the manifold stim uli that exist in the modem world. Indeed, if values facilitate choices and enable a meaningful interpretation o f basically contingent events and demands, then value communities are themselves likely to provoke both common choices and lines o f action. Thus, shared value systems are seen as intimately linked to the problem o f collective action. The conceptualisation o f society as a ’battle field' of competing and possibly conflictual meaning systems leads directly to the m ajor question this thesis seeks to address, namely, how are value collectives embedded in systems o f inequality? In other words, have value collectives different resources regarding the competition between interpretations o f the world?

Thus, the thesis concentrates on three m ajor issues:

1. The existence and conflictuality of value communities in two different societies. East and West Germany.

2. The relationship between shared meaning systems and the problem o f collective action. 3. The strength of the social foundation o f value collectives and their respective power potential.

P a rt I of this thesis introduces the general theoretical foundation o f our arguments.

Chapter 1

is a direct response to the basic assumptions spelled out above. To that end, it establishes the notion o f the Value conflictual society' and argues that pluralised modem societies are inevitably conflictual regarding the question o f how society should be organised. Furthermore, it argues that the postwar welfare state established an extraordinary level o f consensus that is increasingly dissolving into a plurality of conflicts with regard to an optimum future society. Moreover, the welfare state itself is now understood as an active and accelerating factor in the process o f pluralisation and individualisation. Theoretically, the chapter contrasts the Parsonian concept o f the necessity o f value consensus w ith the Beckian notion of the collectively individualised world in which collectivity retreats in favour o f self-constructed narratives and modes o f insular existence. Understanding both approaches as extreme concepts that match only parts o f social reality, this chapter attempts to 'conflictualise' integration theory and

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'collectivise* individualisation theory. Ideas of Durkheim, Simmel, Blau and Elias are introduced in o r d e r to establish the notion of the value conflictual society.

Chapter 2

introduces the major analytical tools of the thesis. T o that end. it presents and then d iscu sses the four m ajor traits of value orientation which underline the significance o f values in the co n flictu al society. Firstly, values are preferences th at shape an actor's choice and provide the basic script reg ard in g the world's interpretation and give meaning to social phenomena. Secondly, values are intra-individually characterised by relative autonomy and stability. Thirdly, values are, by necessity, co llectively distributed. Finally, value orientations, as group-specific phenomena, are inevitably conflictual. T h e chapter concludes with a definition o f the m ajor concepts and the introduction o f several analytical to o ls that are supposed to facilitate the interpretation o f em pirical evidence.

Chapter 3

reflects th e significance and pertinence o f history as part o f any analysis concerning culture, in general, and v a lu e s, in particular. Therefore, it presents an account of the cultural development in both Germ an states a f te r the Second W orld War. W hile Chapters 1 and 2 laid the conceptual foundation-stone, Chapter 3 provides the historical baseline o f all further analyses.

P a rt II is concerned with prim e methodological problems and introduces the first em pirical evidence. Thus,

Chapter 4

introduces the m ajor problems of operationalisation and critically discusses a n d compares solutions chosen by different approaches. Finally, it presents the m ethod o f ‘cluster analysis* as the m ost effective method and discusses the method's advantages in comparison to m ore frequently used procedures such as factor analysis.

Chapter 5

contains the basic empirical analyses and answers th e first m ajor question concerning the existence and conflictuality o f value collectives in East and W est Germany. M oreover, the chapter introduces the single value collectives and discusses th e ir particularities, before a variety o f test procedures are employed to assess the statistical significance a n d reliability o f the described value system s. The single value collectives, the focus o f the chapter, w ill b e the m ajor protagonists of all further analyses. Consequently,

Chapter 6

contains a m ethodological comparison betw een different operationalisation strategies and modes of typology construction. In particular, the chapter compares the Inglehart-Index w ith a Klagesian factor-typology and the value collectives as they were discussed in the previous chapter. The basis o f the com parison is an investigation into the three typologies' explanatory potency concerning several attitudinal syndromes like authoritarianism , conformism o r socialism and actual behaviour as measured via voting decisions. P art

in

addresses the second m ajor issue o f this thesis: the relationship of shared m eaning systems to the problem of collective action.

Chapter 7

assumes that a value collective's ability to provide clear action guidelines is an indicator o f its potential societal relevance and discusses the rather restricted access o f survey methods concerning collective action phenomena. M oreover, it introduces fo u r substitute concepts that permit an indication w ith regard to these action dispositions, firstly, issues o f political culture in general, secondly, attitudes and beliefs concerning democracy and socialism , thirdly, issues touching on the welfare state and, finally, a more direct assessm ent o f the ability to act through voting intentions and membership behaviour. To obtain this the chapter also shows the respective distribution o f such patterns in both E ast and W est Germany on a com parative basis.

Chapter 8

contains the em pirical evidence and assesses the action ability o f each value collective separately and concludes with a discussion o f the theoretical contradiction between the traditional understanding o f values as

__________ _ iiflj fM i ip i'll j i in i

hierarchically organised systems that facilitate choice and the prevailing celebration o f value synthesis in the more recent debates about value change. This theoretical problem is juxtaposed against the empirical evidence.

P a rt IV addresses the third major, and maybe most, im portant issue of this thesis. It asks whether and how deeply value collectives have been established in systems o f inequality.

Chapter 9

begins with an assumption, namely, that a collective's social position, as well as its ability to accumulate social privileges or disadvantages, interferes and determines its success or failure within the permanent competition, that takes place between conflictual value systems. In other words, it assumes that value systems' ability to influence society as a whole depends largely on a value collective's social power within any given society. Theoretically, this chapter applies a modified version of Antonio Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemony, i.e. it conceptualises societal conflicts as battles over meaning and ascribes social inequality a major role with regard to value collectives' power position within the battle. Furthermore, in order to conduct an analysis of social power, the chapter moves on to discuss the more recent debates about issues such as the diminishing importance o f class, the leveling o f living conditions in contemporary societies, the emergence o f *new' forms of inequality and the revival o f old inequality under the conditions o f economic crisis. The chapter seeks, therfore, to understand which dimensions of inequality are of relevance in contemporary societies. To that end, it distinguishes roughly between aspects of 'old' achievement related vertical inequality and 'new' ascriptive or horizontally organised aspects of inequality. Consequently,

Chapter 10

describes the operationalisation o f inequality and power and discusses the distribution and relevance o f these indicators in both East and W est Germany.

Chapter

11

presents the actual empirical evidence and discusses all value collectives w ith regard to their socio- structural position within contemporary Germany.

Chapter 12

, which concludes the thesis, contains a final summary of the previous analyses, w hilst a theoretical introduction presents the concept of political cleavage and discusses the usefulness o f this concept in this context Furthermore, it relates the idea o f cleavage to the contradictions within the welfare consensus and, then, concludes w ith a thorough examination o f potential cleavage. Empirically, it follows Gramsci's idea o f 'social alliances' in describing the major protagonists and antagonists, including their potential coalition partners, with regard to the entire cleavage space in the contemporary German society.

Acknowledgments

If I were to thank everyone who has given me valuable advice - academically o r otherwise • this section would be several pages long. 1 must, therefore, beg forgiveness from all the friends and relatives who are not mentioned explicitly. Nonetheless, their help and encouragement was highly appreciated and they shall be assured of my particular thanks.

I am deeply indebted to my two supervisors Professors Klaus Eder and Yossi Shavit who have not only accompanied the development o f this thesis but, who have also procured an immeasurable degree o f valuable advice. I m ust offer particular thanks to the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence and the 'Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst' (DAAD) who gave me the financial assistance, which enabled me to conduct research in a m ost inspiring environm ent Working within an international

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community th at combines a wide range of differing academic traditions and approaches, with an e v e n wider range o f national perspectives, allowed this thesis to develop both substance and outlook.

M ost particular thanks are, also, due to Professors M ax Kaase and Bettina W estle, both formerly o f th e University o f Mannheim, who offered me a superb opportunity to collaborate w ith them , in a project th a t provided the em pirical sources without which this thesis would not have been possible.

1 am, also, grateful to Dr. Lars 1. Andersson, who not only made him self an expert in a topic outside o f his genuine range o f interest but also read this thesis page by page and footnote by footnote. 1 would n o t have wanted to m iss any of the numerous, and sometimes heated discussions, that in the end c h ie fly contributed to the development o f this thesis. Finally, very particular thanks to D r Julian L indcy-F rench for the E nglish corrections, as well as for the numerous, amusing comments on the content o f th is thesis.

Theoretical Introduction

Page

Chapter 1 The Value Conflictual Society - A Theoretical Foundation 11

1.1 The Point of Departure: Value Consensus versus Disintegration 11

1.1.1 The Story o f Integration 11

1.1.2 The Story o f Disintegration 17

1.2 Between the Extremes 20

1.2.1 The Issue of Socialisation: Over* versus Under-Socialisation 20 1.2.2 The Idea of Criss-Crossing or Intersectional Circles 23 1.2.3 The History o f Civilisation and Individualisation 26 1.3 The Value Conflictual Society: Towards a Conclusion 28

Chapter 2 The Role o f Values in the Conflictual Society 33

2.1 Value Orientations* M ajor Properties 33

2.2 Shift, Stability or Value Decline: The Inglehart Case 40

2.3 Understanding Value Orientations 48

2.3.1 The Value Collective: The Major Agent o f the Conflictual Society 51

Chapter 3 Germany Divided - Cultural Developments After 1945 56

3.1 W est Germany: From Tacit Consensus to Conflictual Pluralism 57 3.2 East Germany: Between Tacit Consensus and Political Alienation 67

3.2.1 Political Consensus or Escape into Privatisai? 70

T he V alue Conflictual Society - A Theoretical Foundation

Maybe not surprisingly, the idea o f the societal importance o f values, the necessity o f value consensus, had its breakthrough with theories o f functional differentiation in modem societies. Indeed, the loss o f natural order and the structuration of societies into a m ultiplicity o f diverse and interdependent role systems rendered the concept o f value cohesion the crucial link between society and community, 'Gesellschaft* and 'Gemeinschaft*. The problem of the legitimacy o f a functionally differentiated society, the problem of a conflict-free acceptance o f roles o f which some are supposed to be preferable and others unattractive, demanded forms o f measurement which prevented individuals from permanently questioning and quarreling. Durkheim's "conscience collective" and Parsons' "value patterns" served this appeasing need. Value consensus and norm subordination, therefore, became the necessary prerequisites o f differentially organised modem societies. Maybe it is not surprising, that, as a consequence, the idea o f values and value coherence is totally abandoned in writing that is based upon the post-modem world. In Ulrich Beck's version of reflexive modernity as a "risk society" (1986,1992), values in general and societal consensus in particular, find themselves victim to ever increasing individualisation and - in the worst case - atomisation of unconnected and isolated individuals. Indeed, in the post-modem world value transmission and coherence are neither necessary nor possible, because from the perspective of permanently changing modes and fashions the idea of values w ith their im plicit notion o f stability and continuity appear suspicious and - a t best - old-fashioned and misplaced.

This chapter is dedicated to the question of, whether value consensus is still a necessity as well as a prerequisite for modem society. I f so, is value transmission and coherence still a viable option or has human life become so diverse, so full o f contingency that the idea of value consensus has outgrown itself? In short, are contemporary societies still based on values and do they need value consensus?

1.1 The Point o f Departure: Value Consensus versus Societal Disintegration

1.1.1 The Story cf Integration

Emile Durkheim was thè first to address this question systematically. If, therefore, societal structure is determined by a differentiated division of labour, integration becomes a problem. Basically, Durkheim saw three possibilities for overcoming this dilemma. First, through a strong and forceful state, à la Hobbes, that enforces society's maintenance via coercion. Second, a competitive disintegrated society in which individuals act in accordance w ith personal calculations o f utility and desires o f utility maximisation. Finding both options rather unattractive, Durkheim was left w ith a third solution, in which societies have a "conscience collective", through which individuals, basically unconsciously, internalise society's norms as the result o f a process of socialisation. Moreover, these norm s become a part of the personality and remain mainly unquestioned, because they are perceived as external facts or "faits socieux" as Durkheim calls them. Coherence, thus, is achieved by the undifferentiated coinage of all members o f a given collective. In pre-modem societies collective consciousness ruled human conduct

12

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in all details. The modem society of division o f labour, however, allows its members a wide range o f autonomy. Certainly, the "conscience collective" is constitutive and normative and, yet, for the first tim e in human history it has been limited to the rather abstract realm o f the public sphere. Moreover, a s societies develop a common conscience they are obliged to react against social diversity an d "consequently to become more abstract" (I960: 287ff.). Durkheim, therefore, could adm it to private diversity and autonomy whilst still insisting on public or social conform ity.1

It was Talcott Parsons who placed Durkheim's approach w ithinin a general system theoretical framework. Equally, Parsons acknowledged the division o f labour as the basic cause o f the necessity o f collectively shared values: 'Internal differentiation which is a fundamental property o f all system s, requires integration." A t the core is the problem o f role allocation or "the problem o f who is to get w hat, who is to do what" (Parsons/Shils 1962b: 197). In order to avoid the 'state o f nature1, the war of a ll against all, societies depend upon a general moral consensus regarding rights and obligations. Furthermore, to solve the problem o f differential role allocation different actors have to be integrated into a common system o f value orientation, hence, the general tendency o f all systems to share cultural orientations. Obviously, cultural systems are highly complex constellations o f both an "actor's modes o f m otivational orientations" encompassing cognitive, cathetic and evaluative elements and "basic cultural orientations" as system s o f beliefs and Ideas, systems o f expressive symbols and system s o f value orientations. From the functional perspective each o f these cultural patterns provide solutions fo r different types o f orientation problems. Y et, the overt emphasis on values renders "The Theory o f Action" a theory o f values. Constitutive o f role expectations and sanctions, value orientations are o f "particularly decisive significance" (1962a* 21). Value patterns, in essence, organise the behaviour o f adult members o f society and, through socialisation they become established within the personality structure o f new adults.

Parsons and Shils' emphasis on maintenance and stability stemmed from a single pervasive question which guided their work. How is the survival o f a system possible, particularly if systems a rt highly differentiated and roles o f different quality and status have to be allocated to its members w ithout causing perm anent conflict and dissatisfaction? In the aftermath o f the Second W orld W ar this question appeared to be o f particular importance, because the problem o f social peace and societal integration led to an im perative for common cultural orientations within a given social system. According to Parsons, value consensus w as not only a viable possibility but an absolute necessity in order to keep a social systems' equilibrium .

Not surprisingly, Parsons' system theory provoked countless critiques. This was even more the case for his positivist successors (e.g. Almond/Verba 1963) who were frequently blamed for an Anglo-American and conservative status-quo bias.* 3 However, our concern is less a theoretical discussion o f Parsons' merits or m isperceptions than of the question o f what was, certainly, the most sophisticated theory o f

1 Compare Geulen (1991:22f.).

3 e.g. Michael Mann 1970, Carol Pateman 1971, Bob Jessup 1974. The reproach of conservatism was forcefully rejected by systemtheory itself. I t bears repetition that systems analysis does not possess a built-in conservative bias." Following the harsh critique, the terms of system maintenance or stability have been substituted by the notion of system persistence in which the possibility of system change became equally important to the possibility of stability (Easton/Dennis: 1973:49).

values ever written is still of any use today as an explanation o f contemporary phenomena. To answer that question we have to answer two basic queries. The first concerns directly the im plications of the theory, whilst the second is of a more methodological quality. Indeed, having said that contemporary societies (especially Western w elfare societies) are becoming conflictual again and, moreover, value conilictual, we must, firs t inquire as to whether Parsons was actually insensitive to conflict and the phenomena o f value change. If this is so, we would be best adviced to follow the advice o f Anthony Giddens and perform a "radical break" with Parsonian theory (Giddens 1984: XXXVI).

The Problem of*Abstractness'

The second problem arises from Parsons' hermeneutic W eberian perspective. Parsons him self never specified his theory in a way that operationalisation, especially in a positivist understanding was feasible.3 On the contrary, Parsons’ value patterns were im plicit and only detectable by careful observation and interpretation. "The overt or explicit culture almost always appears fragmentary at first, and its parts seem disconnected" (1962a: 22). Thus, the im plicit culture therefore must be detected by the observer. Let us consider one example. Parsons put forward five different pattern variables of which two, especially, are decisive for the common cultural orientation o f a given society. The first concerns the difference between universalism and particularism, the second the choice between ascriptive and achievement-based patterns of role allocation.4 * According to Parsons, the unifying and unquestioned '.'ethos" of the American society is the belief in equal and universal rights and a m eritocratic distribution of roles. Indeed, this combination o f universalism and achievement characterises the very particular nature of American culture. However, there are several problems here. First, if values are formulated at an overly abstract level, consensus can be found virtually everywhere - even between the m ost fierce of opponents. Hence, we may ask whether a slightly less abstract conceptualisation o f values would - even in the countries Parsons had in mind - reveal conflict rather than consensus. Secondly, abstraction is not only an obstacle for the observation o f cultural differences within one social system, but also between different systems. The belief in universality and achievement, for example, was certainly accepted not only within the United States of America but within most o f the W estern world3 - at least during the decades after the Second World W ar. How then can we explain why the Western world did not integrate into one social system but insisted on its existence as a heterogeneity o f differing nation-states?6 Thus, again, cultural conflicts and value differences have to be sought on a less abstract level. Thirdly and m ost important o f all, even these abstract and apparently non-discriminating principles appear today as conflictual. For example, if an overarching and unquestioned belief in achievement produces a basic acceptance and a legitimacy for role allocation in a differentiated society, we have to consider the fact, that this very legitimacy seems to be in decline. Empirically, we observe a rather strong refusal to accept

3 To this point, see also Spates (1983:36ff.)

4 The three other patterns are: affectivity versus neutrality, self-orientation versus collectivity orientation and specifity versus diffuseness. Following Parsons and Shils an actor must make "five dichotomous choices" before any situation will have “a determinate meaning" (1962b: 76).

3 This exactly is Jeffrey Alexander's point. Here the construction of civil society is seen as informed by an unique set of cultural codes. Historical developments prevent full homogeneity. However, Western societies display "variations on widely-shared cultural themes" (Alexander/Smith 1993:161).

6 Of course, one could argue that attempts of integration • this may be the NATO or the European Community - mirror exactly this value convergence of Western societies.

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14 achievement values at least in certain sub-groups of contemporary societies. Interestingly enough, it is exactly the m ost highly-educated strata - in that sense a group o f actual over-achievers - who express most doubts regarding the meritocratic organisation o f society.1 The same is true fo r the second principle. Universalism. in general, is in decline, as ethnic and ascriptive principles gain weight - nowhere more so than in the United States. More and more groups opt out o f the universalistic framework in order to gain access as Blacks, Hispanics, as women, as transsexuals,... (Haselbach 1995). Moreover, this political movement towards particularity is accompanied by a bulk o f literature which de­ constructs the "myth o f meritocracy" and uncovers the heritage, ethnicity and gender related inequalities of the contem porary distribution o f social positions. In short, considering the high level o f abstraction o f Parsons' value patterns, we have to acknowledge that even these ideals - abstract as they are - arc becoming fiercely contested.

Value Conflict or Value Generalisation

Still, we have not answered the first question o f whether Parsons entailed or at least perm ited a theory o f value change and co n flict Therefore, let us once again consider "The Theory o f Action". F irst systems never achieve "perfect integration" (1962b: 17Iff.), however, on the other hand, a 'lim itlessly pluralistic value universe" is a non-existent possibility. Indeed, were this not to be the case then tte strength o f intra-societal conflict would endanger the maintenance o f the system in general. And y e t if a system is neither able to adjust to or to accommodate conflicts between the functional im peratives o f systems o f action and value orientations, Le. the equilibrium between structure and culture cannot be restored, societal change is the most likely outcome. Here Parsons and Shils discovered the paradox o f systems: "the principal source o f strain and instability is at the sam e time the most important seeds of social change" (1962b: 179). W ithout doubt. Parsons is not insensitive to social change, even to the necessity o f change in certain circumstances. However, conflict as a baric mechanism and source o f change is perceived as being som ewhat dangerous and certainly not desirable. W hat gave Parsons this strong bias towards consensus and value harmony?

The crucial point in the functionalist perspective is the belief that it is not individuals o r personalities which form the basis o f any social system. Instead, the core o f a society is based upon its distribution o f roles. Therefore, the process of role allocation is central to a system 's maintenance. Thus, integration, via common value orientations which legitim ise this allocation, is a clear necessity. "Unless this allocation is well integrated internally and with the value system so that its legitim acy is widely acknowledged, the amount o f conflict w ithin the social system m ay very well rise to the point of disintegration" (1962b: 200). Social integration does not require a single uniform set o f value orientations which is equally and universally distributed throughout the social system. "Social integration may well include a whole series o f sub-systems o f com m on value orientations varying around a basic pattern." Once again w e find here the im plicit possibility o f conflict beneath the surface of w hat are highly abstract and widely-shared ideas. G enerally, social change is alw ays a likely possibility. Because im perfect integration is the normal state and no t the exception, the possibility o f change is, therefore, inherent within every social system. Thus, Parsons' functionalist perspective left a significant degree o f room for social change. Conflict, *

’ This is a repeated result of most empirical value studies (see e.g. the works of Ronald Inglehart, Scott Flanagan or Helmut Klages).

however, is regarded as basically disturbing and a danger to the system 's survival. How then, we have to ask, can we conceptualise change if conflict is only an extreme and undesirable solution? The principle recipe is specified in Parsons’ later writings. The solution to societal strains and tensions is found within a process o f value generalisation or secularisation (1971). In short, specific values are able to carry gradually more and more meaning and dimensions and can thus be used to legitimise more and more different actions. Religious values, for example, were once lim ited to certain denominations. However, as religious pluralism developed, values became liberated from w hat had been a narrow connection until they were able to be perceived as values applicable to whole o f oecumenic Christianity. A similar process can be observed with regard to political and economic sub-systems within society, where values o f liberal democracy gradually became so generalised that they now embrace both political elites, as well as formerly politically dependent citizens. Likewise, the welfare state integrated capitalism and socialism into one common value pattern (1971: 128). Hence, value generalisation takes place on three different dimensions. First, the definition and meaning o f values becomes broader and, as a consequence, embraces more characteristics, actions and situations. Second, the circle o f value adherents enlarges. Finally, the hierarchical order o f certain values is accepted by more and more actors, collectives or societies. All three mechanism s, therefore, preserve the structural maintenance of the system. Again, all three solutions are non-conflictual because neither value eclecticism , that is the selective choice o f certain values while others are neglected, nor harsh value conflicts were options within the Parsonian perspective.*

Is the idea o f value generalisation applicable for the analysis o f modem societies? From a functionalist perspective many contemporary conflicts would not be conflicts, in the sense that groups within a population develop 'counter values' to the dominant value system, but rather new interpretations o f the old value realm (e.g. MOnch 1985: 459). For example, it would be wise to interpret the 'new social movements* not as protest movements which threaten the societal consensus through the formulation of ‘new* values, but rather as political actors who claim the validity and acceptance of 'old* values for ‘new* situations and 'new* sub-groups of the population. According to this perspective, from the protest movements o f 1968 to the new social movements of the 1980s a process of further value generalisation has taken place - a process which has continued inintemipted since the dawn o f modernity. Certainly, values like self-realisation or individual autonomy are no invention o f the late 20th century for they are at the very core of modem thinking. "For there is certainly nothing new in moral principles and demands such as the dignity and autonomy o f the individual, the integrity of the physical conditions o f life, equality and participation, and peaceful and solidaristic forms of social organisation" (Offe 1985: 849). Consequently, Claus Offe wonders why researchers are so much concerned with the emergence of these so-called "new values" when it would be for them to ask how it was possible that modem societies were for large parts o f their history, dominated by 'pre-modem* authoritarian value patterns.* 9 Indeed, from this perspective, conflicts would arise not from the existence o f oppositional value patterns but rather as

* This discussion largely followed Haferkamp (1990).

9 Almost the same argument is made by Behrmann (1987: 174) with regard to Inglehart's materialism- postmaterialism dichotomy: "Demnach mflfite nicht die Hochsch&zung dieser Werte (der postmaterialistischen, S JL) in einer Minderheit, sondeen das in westlichen Gesellschaften vorherrschende Interesse an wirtschaftlichem Wachstum, PreisstabilitSt, inneicr and ftufierer Sicherheit flberraschen.”

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16 the result o f a battle over the interpretation o f the scope and range o f ‘older* canons of modem values. The question would not be materialism versus postmaterialism or obedience versus self-realisation but, rather, who has the right to self-determination in what situation.

Interestingly, the two most influential value change theories, Ingleharf s ‘'Silent Revolution" (e.g. 1977) and Klages* Value synthesis' (e.g. 1984), carry, at least im plicitly, the idea of consensus.10 11 Indeed, the scenario o f the 'silent revolution1 promises the coming o f a day when virtually all W estern populations would possess 'new* postmatcralist value orientations. Thus, the conflictual situation between materialists and postmaterialists is a sheer transition phenomenon that w ill solve itself - given all else remains equal - in a postm aterialist consensus. Klages' concept o f the value synthesis as the "functional correlate" o f modernising societies (1993: 29) is based less upon the idea of a struggle for hegemony between the old and the new, than the integration of both strands into one personality type. Both o f the pure forms, i.e. the one-sided adherence to duty and acceptance values as well as the one-dim ensional reference to self-realisation values, are seen as inadequate and inferior forms o f modem personalities. Therefore, we can conclude that the Klagesian conceptualisation is relatively close to Parsons* idea o f value generalisation. On the contrary, Inglehart promotes a value-conflictual vision that is incompatible with a functionalist understanding, im plying an evolutionary perspective (change via generational exchange) that is again clearly consensus-oriented. The common denominator o f both is an understanding o f contemporary politics as transitional, Le. towards postm aterialist consensus, on the one hand, and yet tow ards widespread value synthesis on the other.

As a counter point, Haferkamp claim s that value change theorists tend to see change where certain values gain im portance which had been there from the beginning o f modernity. Hence, Parsons' longer perspective appears superior to short-sighted approaches, which lose touch with larger historical perspectives (Haferkamp 1990: 166). However, can we accept that? If so, then our own emphasis on society's basically conflictual character could itself become a victim of a short-sightedness which overestimates relatively small differences and yet sees contradiction where only the reorganisation and reformulation o f consensus is at stake. Analyses of modem societies which result in concepts like the Tw o-Tertier-Society' o r which stress the R ecurrence o f ’social closure' (Parkin 1983, Murphy 1988) are, from such a perspective, simply academic exaggerations o f w hat are further processes o f differentiation, even though these processes are risky and can be accompanied by disturbances11. In the long run, however, Parsons optim istic view o f the capacity o f systems to restore equilibrium w ill turn out to be correct Em pirically, as to Haferkamp, the evidence is on the side o f Parsons. Indeed, the history o f the welfare state is a trium ph of both agreem ent and integration o f hitherto extreme and form erly deviant groups (Haferkamp 1990; 170). The new social movements, for exam ple, are no indication o f "new politics'* (H ildebrandt/D alton 1979) but instead the creators o f new cultural elements w hich became gradually and accepted by the conform public and, thereafter, consumed, on a modified scale, by the whole o f society. N aturally, such incorporation o f new elem ents inevitably changes society, however,

10 Both theories are extensively discussed in the following chapter.

11 New differentiation leads to the Tieisctzung" (release) of individuals from former secure relations. These liberated actors seek new action forms which allow a larger amount of freedom. This process of trial and error is always risky but value generalisation and the specification of norms will finally restore at least loose system integration (Haferkamp 1990:172).

the change is basically harmonious rather than conflictual. In sum, the process of value generalisation keeps societies both conflict-free and m obile at one and the same time. However, it m ust be said that Parsonian optimism is valid only for contemporary welfare state societies (Haferkamp 1990:175). Is this diagnosis acceptable? The answer, unfortunately, is not that easy. Obviously, the welfare state created consensus in a way that was unprecedented in the history o f modernity and yet, we argue that Haferkamp committed the very same error o f short-sightedness that he so fiercely accused value change theories of so doing. Pre-welfare societies were immensely conflictual up to the point at which they suffered complete system collapse. More recently, the welfare state has appeared to lose the ability to avoid conflicts and has suffered as a result from a series o f conflictual events. Obviously, history contradicts Parsons more than it supports his thought Indeed, Parsons formulated an equivalent theory for post-war societies. However, w ith regard to pre-war and contemporary societies, we argue that Parsons’ theory provided a (possibly desirable) norm for societies that were, indeed, still struggling deeply with a conflictual reality.

1.12 The Story of Disintegration

Parsons' starting-point was the problem o f role allocation, which necessitated integration through value consensus. Sim ilarly, Ulrich Beck proceeded from a structural argument, however his perspective is strictly individualistic.* 13 i.e., it is no t the general differentiation o f society which is central but, rather, the system o f inequality inherent in a differentiated society. Let us consider Beck's argum ent Modem societies, counter to all that was prom ised, have not become just and equal.13 A t the same tim e, however, life conditions have altered dramatically. W elfare state policies, economic growth and the expansion of the educational system have lifted societies to higher levels of both consumption and security. Indeed, the so-called "elevator effect" (Beck 1986: 122) has moved all strata upwards without changing the hierarchical position between single status groups. The result has been increased wealth and security for all, even formerly underprivileged segments o f the population. Original milieus gradually dissolved and inequality became a merely theoretical topic for stratification researchers and thus, less and less connected to real lifeworld experiences. Furthermore, the social security system made traditional forms o f class solidarity obsolete, whilst the dynamic o f the labour market forced more and more individuals to confront the hardships of competition and the risks of unem ploym ent Finally, the amount of time individuals spent at the workplace declined drastically. In conclusion, therefore, beneath the surface of the relatively constant relations o f inequality, an intensive push towards individualisation took place.

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13 Beck himself describes his account as the counter-position to structuralist-functionalist and macro-centered visions of Parsonian provenience (Beck/Beck-Gemsheim 1994:26ff.).

13 Generally, the children of parents who had been in the lowest third of the societal ranking thirty years ago, find themselves at the bottom of the social hierarchy (e.g. Zapf 1978, Hondrich 1982, Hradil 1982). In a large international comparison Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) show that the impact of class background on educational attainment remained stable except for Sweden and the Netherlands. Thus, the "key source of class reproduction remains largely unchanged" (Esping-Andcrsen 1994: 19). If there are changes they are mainly responses to changes within the economy or structural and institutional changes in general. As an example, the expansion of the educational system allowed higher proportions of all strata to participate. The relations between different strata, however, remained basically the same. In a recent study of intergenerational class mobility, Erikson and Goldthotpe termed this phenomenon "the constant flux" (1992).