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Contingent Sameness and Necessary Identity
Alberto Voltolini
Introduction
So-called (contingent) informative identity statements represent a well-known puzzle in contemporary philosophy of language since Frege onwards. Both Fregean and post-Kripkean, or Millian, treatment of such statements present both pros and cons. By claiming that in such statements the copula means something different from what it means in (necessary) non-informative identity statement, Castañeda has made a big step forward in this debate. Yet Castañeda’s own ‘ambiguity’- solution lies on a very problematic and definitely non-commonsensical ontology, that of guises as Meinong-like correlates of property sets. In what follows, a similar ‘ambiguity’ solution is put forward that however presupposes a simpler and more commonsensical ontology of ordinary possible entities, some actually existing and some others existing merely possibly.
1. The debate on identity statements
By “statement” I henceforth mean a natural language sentence plus its semantical interpretation. From this simple definition it follows that two different statements may share their linguistic component insofar as the semantical interpretation of that component is different, as in the case of ambiguity.1 On the basis of that definition, moreover, it turns out that so-called identity statements are natural language sentences, where different singular terms, or even the same singular term taken twice, are flanked by the copula “is”, plus their semantical interpretation. Clear examples of such statements are those whose linguistic components are the following sentences:
(1) Hesperus is Phosphorus (2) Clark Kent is Superman (3) Superman is Kal-El (4) Clark Kent is Kal-El (5) Batman is Bruce Wayne (6) Hesperus is Hesperus (7) Superman is Superman (8) Kal-El is Kal-El (9) Batman is Batman
(10) Bruce Wayne is Bruce Wayne.
In the contemporary philosophy of language, a longstanding debate about such statements has been ideally originated by Frege (1892) and reprised by Kripke (1980) along with the so-called ‘direct reference’- theorists: Donnellan, Kaplan, Perry, Putnam, Wettstein, and all
1 This point will be relevant later, when we will see that to one and the same natural language identity sentence may be associated different semantic interpretations, so as to get a necessary identity statement and a contingent sameness statement.
believers in Millianism, the thesis that genuine singular terms are directly referential devices, terms that exhaust in their referent their truth-conditional contribution. Throughout this debate, the following have shown themselves to be the most important desiderata that any theory about such statements should satisfy. Here they are:
I) Some such statements have a contingent truth-value: when evaluated at different points of evaluation (typically, possible worlds), they change their truth-value.
II) Some such statements have a substantive cognitive value: if true, they convey information about the world, not about language.
III) This substantive cognitive value is the statement’s semantic content: what one learns if the statement is true is what the statement means.
IV) Such statements semantically differ from other identity statements having both a
necessary truth-value – they receive the same evaluation at every point of evaluation - and an unsubstantive cognitive value – if true, they provide no mundane information.
V) Identity statements provide no counterexample to the theory of direct reference stemmed out of Kripke (1980), namely Millianism, as some call it; to repeat, the theory according to which a genuine singular term is a directly referential device, i.e., it exhausts its semantic, or better its truth-conditional, contribution in having a certain entity as its referent.2
VI) The referent in question is an ordinary entity, i.e., an entity whose acceptance requires no bits of philosophically provided metaphysico-ontological theory, but mere commonsense (to give an example, the referent is question must be no mind-dependent entity, no qua-entity, no Platonic abstractum or any other ontological trickery typically posited by philosophers). Now, the controversy between Millianism and Fregeanism – the theory according to which a genuine singular term has to be semantically evaluated at two different levels, that of sense, i.e., the way of determining reference, and that of reference itself – has remained basically open. If we restrict our focus to identity statements only, clearly neither theory satisfies all the above desiderata. Frege’s theory of sense and reference satisfies I), II), III), IV) and VI) as well, but obviously fails to satisfy V). On the one hand, for Frege, some identity statements indeed have both a contingent truth-value and a substantive cognitive value that coincides with its semantic content, namely the fact that one and the same ordinary entity is what different senses of the genuine singular terms in question determine as such terms’ co-referent. This is not the semantic content other identity statements provide. These for Frege are the statements that contain the same genuine singular term taken twice. These latter statements trivially say that if the sense of one such term determines a certain referent for it, that sense determines that referent. So if true,3 they convey no substantial information. As a
2 As is well known, the main (though not the exclusive) target of Millianism is Fregeanism. Fregeanism precisely denies the core of Millianism by arguing inter alia that a genuine singular term has two semantically relevant layers, that of sense (the way of determining reference) and reference itself. To be precise, for Frege (1892) a natural language term may lack reference but cannot lack sense. Yet this is for him one of the improprieties of natural languages that a logically revised language would not exhibit.
3 Literally, Frege (1892) says that these statements are true in virtue of reason alone. This is however an oversimplification for he must of course also admit th at the genuine singular term involved has both a sense and a reference. As we have seen in the previous footnote, in natural language this is not to be taken for granted – cf. for instance “the greatest prime number”. As a result, for Frege the statement presented by “the greatest prime
matter of fact, they are necessarily true. Yet of course, in order to hold all that, Frege must deny that genuine singular terms are directly referential devices and therefore for him identity statements constitute a counterexample to Millianism. Millians, on the other hand, obviously satisfy V), and also VI). This may lead them to also satisfy II) but at the cost of rejecting I), III), and IV), at least if the focus is on identity statements that contain genuine singular terms, i.e., directly referential devices. For Millians, identity statements containing different yet co-denoting definite descriptions, such as those statements respectively presented by:
(11) The evening star is the morning star
(12) The superhero from Krypton is the bespectacled reporter of the Daily Planet
may well be contingent, substantially informative, and different in semantic content from identity statements containing different directly co-referential devices that take (in context)4 the very same ordinary entity as such co-referent, such as (1) and (2). Now, these latter statements may well have for Millians a mundane cognitive value, yet that value cannot be their semantic content. Such a semantic content, however, is the same as the semantic content of an identity statement that has no mundane cognitive value and contains only one such device taken twice (in context),5 such as (6) and (7) respectively. As an identity statement of the latter kind is necessarily true, so is an identity statement of the former kind.
In this debate, Castañeda’s (1989) Guise Theory has brought some fresh air. In Guise Theory, the first three desiderata are clearly satisfied. For according to such a theory, some identity statements have both a contingent truth-value and a substantial cognitive value that coincides with their semantic content. By means of some accommodation, also the fifth
desideratum is satisfied. In Guise Theory, definite descriptions are the paradigmatic singular
terms having a semantic value insofar as they designate particular referents. Although Castañeda is not completely explicit on that, such a particular referent is not a definite description’s Russellian denotation, namely what a definite description is paired with once it is ‘eliminated away’ via its contextual definition in such a way, that the existence condition and the unicity condition that figure in the sentence yielding that definition are satisfied. Rather, the way such descriptions designate their referents is admittedly direct.6 The fourth
desideratum is also satisfied, for the above identity statements semantically differ from the
identity statements containing one and the same definite description taken twice, which instead are necessarily true and cognitively poor. Here are the sentences presenting the prototypical cases of either statement, again:
number is the greatest prime number” is truthvalueless.
4 This specification accounts for the case in which such directly co-referential devices are indexicals, as in “That’s me”. From now on, I will mostly take this specification for granted.
5 Also this specification accounts for the case in which such a directly co-referential device is an indexical. Again from now on, I will mostly take this specification for granted.
6 Literally for Castañeda – cf. e.g. (1977:318), (1989) – each definite description refers to a particular guise, more or less in the same sense as, for the early Russell, each such description stands for a denoting concept. Moreover, such a reference is not a Russellian denotation. For the definite description is not for Castañeda an incomplete symbol; in it, the definite article stands for the individuator operator. Cf. (1988:95). Finally, in Guise Theory, unlike proper names, definite descriptions are the paradigmatic singular terms. For proper names are a sort of indexical terms that designate nothing unless a specific context is provided. Cf. e.g. Castañeda (1990).
(11) The evening star is the morning star
(12) The superhero from Krypton is the bespectacled reporter of the Daily Planet and:
(13) The evening star is the evening star
(14) The superhero from Krypton is the superhero from Krypton
The reason for this semantic difference basically is an ambiguity thesis concerning the copula. In (11)-(12), “is” means something different from what it means in (13)-(14). For in Guise Theory, a contingently truth-evaluated and cognitively substantial identity statement is a statement whose natural language sentence contains two definite descriptions standing for different entities, what Castañeda calls guises, and a copula typically meaning an external relation between such guises, consubstantiation.7 As a result, the semantic content of such a statement coinciding with its cognitively substantial value is the contingently truth-evaluated content to the effect that a certain guise, what the first definite description stands for, is consubstantiated with another guise, what the second definite description stands for. Now, that statement contrasts with an identity statement containing one and the same definite description twice, where the copula typically no longer means consubstantiation, but rather the internal relation of strict identity (as Castañeda calls it).8 As a result, such a statement says that a guise is strictly identical with itself and is thereby both trivially and necessarily true. Yet all those merits notwithstanding, the sixth desideratum is not satisfied in Guise Theory. For guises, the descriptions’ referents, are not ordinary entities, but are Castañedean versions of Meinongian objects, unfailing targets of (human) thoughts that are given prior to their very being thought. More precisely, guises are individual correlates of set of properties constituted by one such set and a so-called individuator operator (what the definite article in a definite description stands for), i.e., what turns a set of properties into a guise. Such entities are in-between Platonic entities, as set-theoretical entities are, and mind-dependent entities, depending on how exactly the individuator operator is supposed to work.9 However they are exactly conceived of, guises are definitely not entities that a man in the street would accept.10
Now, is there a way for all the above six desiderata to be satisfied? In what follows, I will try to show that this is the case. I will indeed exploit Castañeda’s main merit, namely the ambiguity thesis concerning the copula. Yet I will stretch it in a different direction. For with respect to Castañeda’s theory my account will be both ontologically different, for it does not appeal to admittedly unusual entities like guises but rather to mere ordinary entities, and
7 Castañeda actually believes in a bunch of different relations linking guises and still expressed by the copula, which is therefore multiply ambiguous: to quote just some of them, conflation, consociation, transubstantiation,
transconsociation. For the present purposes, however, I can leave this complication aside.
8 I say “typically” for sentences like (13)-(14) may also present identity statements of the first kind, meaning that a certain guise is consubstantiated with itself, i.e., exists. Cf. again Castañeda (1989).
9 For a mentalistic interpretation of the individuator, see Orilia (2002:148).
10 Guises are among those entities that according to Saul (2007) raise the so-called Aspect Problem, namely, the problem of accounting for a sentence’s truth-conditions by appealing to entities whose metaphysico-ontological status is unclear.
semantically different, for it appeals to direct reference to distinct ordinary entities, thereby
entailing a further ambiguity for the directly referential devices involved.
2. Contingent sameness vs. necessary identity
In a nutshell, this is my proposal. Necessary identity statements are statements semantically meaning strict identity with itself of the one and the same designatum of the directly referential devices involved. Insofar as this is the case, the information such statements convey is not substantial. For, if they are (necessarily) true, one is simply informed of the (co)-referentiality of such devices.11 As (at least some) Millians wish, in their precisely equating genuine singular terms with directly referential devices.12 Yet such statements are unlike other statements having a substantial cognitive value coinciding with their proper semantic content, as Fregean wish. Even though, pace Fregeans, the latter statements contain directly referential devices, and, pace Millians, those latter devices are not co-referential. Now, the “is” occurring in the natural language sentences constituting such statements does not express strict identity, as in the previous statements, but rather another relation. Following Castañeda, I will claim that one such statement means as well as substantially informs, if true, that there is a contingent relation of sameness holding between different entities. Yet unlike Castañeda, I also claim that this relation is a contingent relation of ontological contraction holding between some ordinary entity(ies) and another entity of the same kind: the former entity(ies) is (are) none other than the latter entity. This relation of being none other than is what the copula in such a case expresses; all the ordinary entities involved by such relation are directly referred to by the appropriate devices, which therefore are directly referential yet non co-referential terms. So, while (7-10) present typical examples of necessary identity statements, (1)-(6) present typical examples of contingent sameness statements.
One may well find my treatment of necessary identity statements involving directly referential terms rather standard nowadays, so (for the time being) I will not expand on it.13 Yet more words are definitely required to understand what is it for statements of contingent sameness to state such a sameness. What is it for one or more ordinary entities to be ontologically contracted on another such entity, for the former to be none other than the latter? First of all, let me clarify that ordinary entities are possible entities, some of which actually exist whereas some others exist merely possibly. There indeed is no metaphysical difference, for instance, between my merely possible twin and myself. In the world in which my possible unique homozygotic twin existed, nobody would draw a difference in kind between him and myself: we would both be humans. Moreover, if in a world in which only that twin existed, some people there maintained that I differ in kind from him for I do not exist there, they would be clearly wrong: I am there the same guy as I am here, I simply do
11 One may well add that, when one such statement contains just one directly referential device taken twice (in context: see fn.5), it is true in virtue of its form, whereas when it contains two such devices, it is true just in virtue of its meaning, for if such devices do not co-refer (in context: see fn.4), as is impossible in the other case, then the statement is (necessarily) false.
12 The unsubstantive cognitive value of necessary identity statements prompted a Millian like Salmon (1986) to hold that necessary identity is always a priori, yet it can be not recognized as such, when one merely fails to recognize that the two directly referential devices involved are co-referential.
not exist there. Thus, if I am an ordinary entity, so is such merely possible twin.14 This said, here comes the definition for ontological contraction. An ordinary entity(ies) is (are) none other than another entity of the same kind iff:
i) the former entity(ies) do(es) not exist(s) even if it (they) might, while the latter entity exists, even if it might not;
ii) for any contingent, existence-entailing and individual property (i.e., a property that cannot be exemplified by more than one object at a given time), which could be falsely attributed to the former entity(ies) in the erroneous conviction that it (they) existed, this property is possessed either by the latter entity or by nothing.
According to this definition, for one or more ordinary entities to be contracted onto another ordinary entity means that the latter entity exists in its (their) place in the possible worlds in which the relation holds, in such a way that in those worlds the former entity(ies) manifest(s) itself (themselves) only as aspect(s) of the latter entity. For it (they) merely seem(s) to have properties that indeed characterize the latter entity. Now, it (they) manifest(s) itself (themselves) as aspect(s) of the latter, but are not such. If it (they) were aspect(s), a typical sample of an entity of a proper philosophical, yet not commonsensical, commitment – aspects are object-dependent entities, i.e., entities dependent on the existence of other entities for their existence – it (they) would not be (an) ordinary entity(ies). Yet it (they) is (are) such (an) entity(ies). As is shown by the fact that in the worlds in which the relation in question does not hold, such (an) entity(ies) full-fledgedly exist(s).
From the above definition it immediately turns out that the contraction relation is neither reflexive nor symmetric. For an entity cannot contract itself on itself, on pain of existing and non-existing at the same time. Nor, if an entity contracts itself on another entity, the latter does not contract itself on the former, for the very same reason: symmetry would require that both entities existed and did not exist at the same time. Granted, the relation is transitive, but only vacuously. If a is none other than b and b is none other than c, then a is none other than c, yet one of the two conjuncts in the above antecedent is false, so that the very antecedent is false as well. For if a is none other than b then b exists, so it is not the case that b is none other than c; whereas if b is none other than c then it does not exist, so it is not the case that a is none other than b.
If the above is the case, clearly enough ontological contraction is not strict identity, for strict identity is not only transitive, but also both reflexive and symmetric. Yet we may be legitimated in considering it a weaker relation of sameness. For given the clause ii) of the above definition, as I said before the entity(ies) to be contracted on another entity manifest(s) itself (themselves) as aspect(s) of the latter entity. Clause ii), moreover, clearly explains why this relation of ontological contraction has a variable poliadicity, in that its left-hand side
14 I hold that this way of presenting a possibilist approach to ordinary entities is quite commonsensical. What is not commonsensical is the metaphysical form in which one frames it, either in terms of the ‘multiple domain’ model of Lewis’ (1986) Modal Realism, according to which all possibilia, those which actually exist included, are world-bound individuals, or in terms of the ‘fixed domain’ model à la Priest (2005), according to which even non-actually existent possibilia are cross-world individuals, i.e., they already in the domain of the actual world though as nonexistent items. As my text has actually shown, I endorse the second kind of Possibilism, yet this is not essential for my present purposes.
member may consist of one entity only or rather of more than one entity. For more than one thing may manifest itself as an aspect of another thing, as our original examples already show. To begin with, consider the Batman – Bruce Wayne case, and pretend (as is customary in these philosophical contexts) that it is not fictional. Once we know how things really are, we all have the feeling that Batman is nothing but Wayne in disguise – but not the other way around. Such a feeling can be justified if we take the statement presented by:
(5) Batman is Bruce Wayne
as meaning that Batman is none other than Wayne, in the above sense. If the statement that (5) presents is true, then unlike Wayne, Batman does not exist, and for any contingent, existence-entailing and individual property that has hitherto being attributed to Batman erroneously, for he does not exist – e.g., driving the Batmobile at Gotham City one minute before midnight on
New Year’s Eve 2011 – only Wayne, if any, can actually have it.
Now, let us consider the Clark Kent – Superman – Kal-El case, again pretending it is not fictional. In such a case, not only Clark Kent is none other than Kal-El – as any enlightened person on Earth feels, the former is the latter in disguise, but not the other way around – but also Superman is none other than Kal-El – as any enlightened person on Krypton feels, the former is the latter in disguise, but not the other way around. In this predicament, both statements presented by:
(3) Superman is Kal-El (4) Clark Kent is Kal-El
respectively meaning that Superman is none other than Kal-El and that Kent is none other than Kal-El as well, are true. Both Kent and Superman do not exist, Kal-El exists in their place, and for any contingent, existence-entailing and individual property that has hitherto being respectively attributed to Kent and Superman erroneously, for they do not exist – e.g.,
working at a certain desk of Daily Planet one minute before midnight on New Year’s Eve 2011, flying with Lois Lane over the very top of the Daily Planet’s building at midnight on New Year’s Day 2012 – only Kal-El, if any, can actually have them. Given such predicament,
moreover, literally speaking (2) Clark Kent is Superman
should present a false statement. For, insofar as both Kent and Superman do not exist and manifest themselves as aspects of a third existing entity, Kal-El, it is not the case that Kent is none other than Superman. Yet our strong tendency to consider what (2) presents as true may be justified once we take (2) as elliptical for (2’), i.e., as presenting the same as what is presented by the latter sentence:
(2’) Clark Kent and Superman are none other than Kal-El.
(2”) Clark Kent and Superman are the same supernatural individual, namely Kal-El more naturally conveys.
Armed with this analysis of the Clark Kent – Superman – Kal-El case, we can easily see the famous Hesperus – Phosphorus case as another case of the same kind of ontological contraction, namely a case in which more than one entity is none other than a further one.15 Indeed, also in this case, once we are enlightened on the real situation at issue, we have the feeling that both Hesperus and Phosphorus are something else in disguise. Instead of uttering: (1) Hesperus is Phosphorus
we may well utter:
(1”) Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same planet, namely Venus.
This strongly suggests that what (1) presents is true insofar as we take (1) as elliptical for (1’), i.e., as presenting the same as what is presented by the latter sentence:
(1’) Hesperus and Phosphorus are none other than Venus
which has to be analyzed accordingly. This analysis, therefore, may be easily generalized to all the cases traditionally discussed in the literature, which raise as soon as there is a subject who does not know that – to put it in the most neutral terms – the entities she thinks are involved in the relevant case are the same: Cicero and Tully are the same Latin orator, Paderewski (the pianist) and Paderewski (the politician) are the same Polish guy, and so on.16
Let me now go back once again to the idea clause ii) of the definition should justify, namely that, when ontologically contracted, entities manifest themselves as aspects of the contracting entity which exists in their place. This idea can be better clarified by the fact that ontological contraction holds contingently.17 In a possible world in which such entities are not
15 An advantage of the present theory is that, pace Predelli (2004:120), we may treat all cases of so-called informative identity statements involving genuine singular terms as cases of the same kind. All such cases appear indeed to be cases of the same kind insofar as they are all characterized by the fact that some subjects do not know that – in a sense to be analyzed – certain entities are the same ones. By providing a common analysis of all such cases as cases of contingent sameness in my sense, I provide a justification for such an appearance. 16 Pitt (2001) provides a somehow similar analysis for the Batman – Bruce Wayne case and for the Clark Kent – Superman – Kal-El case. Yet Pitt’s analysis differs from the present one both ontologically and semantically. It differs ontologically insofar as it postulates, as direct referents for the names that for me stand for contracted yet ordinary entities, alter-egos, i.e., entities that he actually conceives either (to put it roughly) as tropes of ordinary entities that particularize general roles or as fusions of time-slices of such entities. It also differs semantically insofar as it takes sentences (1)-(5) as all false yet pragmatically imparting other contents which are literally and truly said by other identity-involving sentences, e.g. “Bruce Wayne is the person whose alter-ego is Batman” (as a replacement for (5)) and “the person whose alter-ego is Superman is the person whose alter-ego is Clark Kent” (as a replacement for (2)).
17 A consequence of this idea is there are also worlds in which Wayne is Batman in disguise, or Hesperus is both Phosphorous and Venus in disguise, etc. Simply, those worlds are not this world.
contracted, they well exist, yet from a phenomenological point of view everything remains exactly the same as in the actual world for a subject that, in the actual world, does not grasp that they are the same as another ordinary entity.
Kripke partially captures this idea when he acknowledges that there is a metaphysically possible world containing a Hesperus – Phosphorus – Venus triad of three different celestial bodies all existing there in which however a subject, in perceiving all of them, is exactly in the same phenomenological situation as she is in the actual world where she fails to grasp that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same planet Venus (in my terms, that Hesperus and Phosphorus are none other than Venus).18 Yet Kripke puts things in a rather clumsy way when he adds that this metaphysically possible situation is a mere epistemic, but not metaphysical, possibility that Hesperus is the same as Phosphorus.19 The point is simply that Kripke fails to grasp that not only the copula, but also the directly referential devices “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are actually ambiguous terms.20 For over and above directly co-referring to the actually existing Venus, they directly refer to the actually nonexistent Hesperus and the actually nonexistent Phosphorus. Or to put it more precisely, they pass to also directly co-referring to the actually existing Venus once it is discovered that the Hesperus “Hesperus” previously directly referred to is the same as the Phosphorus “Phosphorus” previously directly referred to, in my sense of “being the same”: i.e., that Hesperus and that Phosphorus are none other than Venus. So, clearly enough Kripke is right in denying that it is metaphysically possible that Hesperus is not the same as Phosphorus, if this means that Venus
is not identical with itself. Since it is a necessary property for Venus to be identical with itself,
it is not metaphysically possible that Venus is not such. Yet Kripke is wrong in denying that it is metaphysically possible that Hesperus is not the same as Phosphorus, if this means that that
other Hesperus and that other Phosphorus, the two actually nonexistent planets, fail to be
none other than Venus. For, as Kripke himself admits, there is a possible world that contains the well existing triad that Hesperus – that Phosphorus – Venus, in which everything goes as it appeared to us before we discovered that Hesperus is the same as Phosphorus.
One may also put things in the following way: that Hesperus and that Phosphorus, which are the different actually nonexistent intentional objects of a subject actually looking at the sky before the discovery, are still the yet existent intentional objects for that very subject so looking at the sky in a possible world in which no such discovery can occur, for each of them actually follows its own orbit along with the (again existing there) Venus. More in general, the different ordinary yet actually nonexistent entities that are referred to in a statement of contingent sameness are the intentional objects of those who do not recognize that such entities are contingently none other than another, actually existent, ordinary entity, and for whom the truth of such a statement amounts to a substantial mundane discovery.
Mutatis mutandis, the same holds when ontological contraction only involves two ordinary
entities, a nonexistent and an existent one, as in the Batman – Wayne case. Here the existent entity (Wayne) is already also an intentional object for the subject who does not recognize
18 Cf. Kripke (1971:157fn.15), (1980:103-4,143). 19 Cf. Kripke (1971:150), (1980:103).
20 To make things easier, I put the issue regarding names in terms of ambiguity. In point of fact I should put in terms of “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” being a particular kind of indexicals respectively having different direct referents in different contexts. For more details on my indexical theory of proper names – which has some points of contact with the afore-mentioned theory of Castañeda (1990) – see my Voltolini (1995).
that another, yet nonexistent, entity she intentionally directs upon (Batman) is none other than the former entity.
3. Some linguistic consequences
As a result of this (admittedly complex) situation, a series of linguistic consequences arise. Firstly, sentences like (1)-(5) are ambiguous between two readings and therefore each of them occurs in two different statements, one in which the copula expresses strict identity and the names explicitly involved directly co-refer to one and the same ordinary actually existing entity (Venus, Kal-El, Bruce Wayne respectively) and another one in which the copula expresses ontological contraction and the names explicitly involved directly co-refer to distinct ordinary entities, most actually nonexistent (the left-hand side relata of ontological contraction) and some others actually existent (the right-hand side relata of that relation) – the nonexistents Hesperus and Phosphorus, the nonexistents Kent and Superman, the nonexistent Batman and the existent Wayne.
Secondly, the very same predicament may also hold of sentences like (6)-(10), insofar as it may turn out that even such sentences are ambiguous between the above readings. Consider the following sentence:
(15) Paderewski is Paderewski.
This sentence is ambiguous between one reading expressing the necessary identity of a
certain Paderewski with himself and a reading expressing the discovery that Paderewski (the
pianist) and Paderewski (the politician) are the same Polish guy, i.e., a certain contingent sameness to the effect that the above two nonexistent Paderewskis are none other than a third existing ordinary entity.21
Thirdly, the fact that both sentential groups present this ambiguity clearly explains why there seems to be a failure of substitutivity in some epistemic contexts, but not in all of them. Consider the following triad:
(16) Clark is believed by Lois to be sexually insignificant (2) Clark Kent is Superman
(17) Thus, Superman is believed by Lois to be sexually insignificant.
The argument is invalid for it leads from true premises to a false conclusion. But in order to take that this is so, we have to take (2) as presenting a statement of contingent sameness that Lois Lane does not know, namely, that Kent and Superman are the same supernatural individual, are none other than Kal-El. So, here apparent failure of substitutivity arises for
21 The same also holds for sentences containing indexicals, i.e., directly referential devices in context. A sentence like “that is that” may express (in context) either the necessary identity of the only demonstrated entity or the contingent sameness of the many demonstrated entities, as in the case in which that, demonstrated by experiencing something from a window, is none other than that, demonstrated by experiencing something from
throughout the argument, the names “Clark Kent” and “Superman” directly refer to different (nonexistent) ordinary individuals. Yet now take this triad:
(18) Silvio is believed by his wife Veronica to be sexually addicted (19) Silvio is Papi
(20) Thus, Papi is believed by his wife Veronica to be sexually addicted
and suppose that the only thing that Veronica does not know is that his husband Silvio Berlusconi is also called “Papi” (in point of fact, “Papi” is the nickname his lovers, but not Veronica, gave to the former Italian Prime Minister). Here, the argument goes through. For (19) presents a statement of necessary identity of Berlusconi with himself that Veronica cannot simply formulate under that sentence, given her metalinguistic ignorance. Here, “Silvio” and “Papi” directly co-refer to Berlusconi throughout the argument, hence not even an appearance of failure of substitutivity arises. Thus, if (18) as much as (19) is true, so is (20) and therefore the argument is valid.
Incidentally, note that in order for failure of substitutivity not even to apparently arise, one is not forced to give the relevant terms in the appropriate propositional attitude report an
external construal (i.e., out of the scope of the epistemic operator), as Castañeda (1979, 1989)
would put it. In correlative terms again mutuated by Castañeda, in order for apparent failure of substitutivity not to arise, it must not be the case that the relevant reports are referentially
transparent yet propositionally opaque, i.e., they do not have to mirror the mental perspective
of the reporter rather than that of the reportee. Definitely, it may be the case that if we adopt an external construal of “Clark Kent” and “Superman”, or, which is the same, if we give the relevant report a referentially transparent yet propositionally opaque reading, the above triad (16)-(2)-(17) goes through. For then in that triad the names “Clark Kent” and “Superman” pass to directly co-refer throughout the argument to the actually existing guy yet unknown to Lois Kal-El, so that (2) presents a statement of necessary identity of Kal-El with himself. But the triad (18)-(19)-(20) goes through as well, even if we assume an internal construal of the names “Silvio” and “Papi” (i.e., within the scope of the epistemic operator) insofar as the reports are referentially opaque yet propositionally transparent, i.e., they mirror the mental perspective of the reportee rather than that of the reporter. As I said before, the only thing that in such a case Veronica does not know is that Silvio, whom she is intentionally directed upon in her belief, is also called “Papi”. Yet, just like a rose does not lose is smell if it is alternatively called, Silvio has still the converse-intentional property of being believed by
Veronica to be sexually addicted,22 however he is called.23
By appealing to ambiguity both in the copula and in the direct reference of the terms involved, I can thus simultaneously account for both intuitions people have with respect to substitutivity in epistemic contexts, namely both that substitutivity appear to fail in such
22 For the notion of a converse-intentional property, cf. Chisholm (1982).
23 In order to signal the difference between external / internal construal of terms in epistemic contexts or between a referentially transparent + propositionally opaque reading and a referentially opaque + propositionally transparent reading of attitude reports, one may use the active vs. the passive form (“Lois believes that Clark …” rather than “Clark is believed by Lois …”). But this signal is devoid of semantical import. For, as we have just seen in the text, one can give an external construal to a term / a referentially transparent + propositionally opaque reading to a report even adopting a passive form.
contexts – the Frege cases, like in the pair (16)-(17) – and that it does not fail at all – the non-Frege cases, like in the pair (18)-(20).24 In point of fact, although I follow Millianism in accepting that genuine singular terms are directly referential terms whenever they occur, my account is Fregean in at least two things. First of all, it operates at a semantic and not at a pragmatic level: in their different readings of the attitude reports corresponding to the ambiguities at play, those reports have different truth-conditions, say different things and do not imply them.25 Moreover, it is not accdental that I have spoken of apparent substitutivity failure all along. For my account holds that in the above cases substitutivity failure is merely apparent, given that in the appropriate readings of the reports involved, there is a referential
shift making two elsewhere directly co-referential terms directly refer to different items.
Fourthly, armed with this account, we can also see why the intuition of substitutivity failure has to be treated differently with respect to epistemic contexts and with respect to ordinarily extensional contexts where it also seems to occur.26 Such contexts are those the Clark Kent – Superman – Kal-El case notoriously involves again. In both the following pairs of simple sentences that involve neither an epistemic operator nor any other kind of intensional operator, we have the impression that what is presented by the first sentence of the pair is true while what is presented by the second sentence of the pair is false:
(21) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out (22) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Clark Kent came out (23) Superman leaps tall buildings more often than Clark Kent does (24) Superman leaps tall buildings more often than Superman does.27
Now, a simple Frege-like solution is available for this cases, namely to appeal here to the pragmatic solution some Millians (so-called naïve Millians28) would appeal to in the case of epistemic contexts. That is, even if the two sentential pairs above respectively present the same statement hence say exactly the same thing, for “Kent” and “Superman” both directly co-refer to Kal-El, so that they respectively are both true and false, still their relevant utterances respectively imply different things, so that in both pairs an utterance of the first sentence yet not an utterance of the second sentence implies something true.29
In her (2007), Saul rejects one such solution. For in her lights this solution is unable to cope with what she calls the Enlightenment Problem, namely the fact the very same treatment must be provided both for the utterances of simple sentences by enlightened people – those who know of Kal-El’s double life – and for the utterances of the very same sentences by unenlightened people – like Lois Lane, who does not know of Kal-El’s double life. For both
24 For more such cases, cf. e.g. Saul (2007:14).
25 Unlike what so-called naive Millians à la Salmon (1986) or à la Soames (1988) maintain.
26 As originally intuited – although by aiming at a different treatment of the cases involved – by Predelli (1999). 27 For these examples, see notoriously Saul (1997, 2007).
28 See fn.25 above.
29 One similar different solution – pragmatic vs. semantic – for the ‘simple sentences’ cases and for the ‘epistemic contexts’ cases respectively is advocated by Barber (2000). Barber’s solution is even more Fregean for it appeals to (different) senses of the relevant singular terms involved, thus denying that such terms are directly referential ones.
the enlightened and the unenlightened have the same truth-value intuitions with respect to the relevant sentential pairs and yet, unlike the enlightened, the unenlightened cannot appeal to any implicature to which ascribing the intuited truth-value difference. For definitely the unenlightened, who thinks that she has to do with different ordinary individuals – in the case of Lois, the boring Kent and the fascinating Superman – cannot appeal to any of the ontological trickery the enlightened is supposed to appeal to in order to imply different things by uttering the sentences of the relevant pair – aspects, (linguistic) ways of presentation, modes of personification etc. of one and the same ordinary individual (Kal-El).
Yet by appealing to the present conceptual apparatus my approach can easily to give a suitable account of the situation. In grasping the simple sentences of the relevant pair, which actually present the same statement, hence have the same truth conditions, the unenlightened erroneously thinks that the relevant names directly refer in such sentences to those different ordinary individuals the reports of corresponding attitudes containing those very names would rather actually be about in their respective truth-conditions. In other terms, the unenlightened gives such sentences a different cognitive value which turns out to be the different semantic content of those very sentences once embedded in the relevant reports that are true and false respectively. Check e.g. the pairs of the following attitude reports:
(25) Lois wonders whether Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out (26) Lois wonders whether Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Clark Kent came out (27) Lois believes that Superman leaps tall buildings more often than Clark Kent does (28) Lois believes that Superman leaps tall buildings more often than Superman does in which the first member of both pairs is truw while the second member is false.
As to the enlightened, she simply is someone who knows something the unenlightened does not know, namely that (2), interpreted in the very same way as (2’), is true:
(2’) Clark Kent and Superman are none other than Kal-El.
Yet the enlightened grasps not only the fact the unenlightened fails to grasp, namely that the simple sentences in the relevant pair – (21)-(22), (23)-(24) – respectively present the same statement hence they say the same thing, for in such sentences “Clark Kent” and “Superman” directly co-refer to Kal-El, but also the fact that in each pair of the above reports – namely (25)-(26) and (27)-(28) – those two names directly co-refer to different ordinary individuals. Yet there is a grain of truth in thinking, as Saul does, that the unenlightened and the enlightened are in the same predicament. For with respect to the simple sentences of the relevant pair, the enlightened may also simulate to be the unenlightened, by pretending that those names directly refer to such different individuals also in such sentences. This pretended content is what the enlightened implies, but not say, by uttering those sentences. She plays along with the unenlightened, pretty much in the very same as she would also do in a very similar situation involving a hallucinated interlocutor, or more in general someone who did not know that what she mentally focuses on does not exist.
Consider the following exchange between again a (slightly different sort of) unenlightened and enlightened people:
(29) Albert: “That green man over there is angrily staring at me” (30) Betty: “Don’t worry, my dear. He will be away quite soon”.
By uttering (29), the unenlightened Albert, who does not know that the intentional yet ordinary object of his hallucination does not exist, thinks that by means of the complex demonstrative “That green man over there” he refers to an existing someone.30 Yet since he is merely hallucinating, that demonstrative in that sentence does not refer to anyone. A fortiori, the anaphorical pronoun “he” in Betty’s response (30) does not refer as well. Yet both (29) and (30) certainly have a cognitive value for Albert. For Albert thinks that both that demonstrative and the anaphorical pronoun refer to someone – who actually does not exist. Now, the enlightened Betty, who unlike Albert knows that the intentional yet ordinary object of Albert’s hallucination does not exist, definitely says nothing with (30). Pretty much as she would have said nothing if she had uttered (29). For in her response “he” refers to none, hence – since it is a directly referential device – it yields to (30) no truth-conditional contribution; pretty much as the complex demonstrative in (29). Yet she surely implies something by that response, insofar as she ‘plays along’ with Albert in assuming that both indexicals in such sentences refer to someone, by thus ascribing (30) – as well as (29) – an intentionally pretended content, as it were.31
Indeed, the comparison of this case with our original Clark Kent – Superman – Kal-El would even be closer if Betty had invented a name for Albert’s nonexistent intentional yet ordinary object – “Greeny”, say. For in such a case, should she talk about Albert’s hallucination via the appropriate attitude report, she would no longer imply, but rather say something about that very object by means of (the truth-conditions of) one such report: 32 (31) Albert hallucinates that Greeny is angrily staring at him.33
Department of Philosophy and Education Sciences, University of Turin via S.Ottavio 20, I-10124 Turin (Italy)
email: alberto.voltolini@unito.it
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30 I here will treat that complex demonstrative as a directly referential device. Actually, this is a complicated assumption – some defend it and some question it (cf. e.g. Borg (2000) and King (2001) respectively) – but let me put this issue aside. For my purposes, I might have peacefully used a standard directly referential device such as a proper name.
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