Utilitarianism
«The day cannot be too far off in which we hear no more of it» (B. Williams,
Structure of the Class
1. General Introduction to Utilitarianism: Historical and Conceptual Questions
2. Defining Utility: Hedonism and Non-Hedonism 3. Maximizing Utility: Aggregation and its
1. A Bit of History
• Utilitarianism has its origins in the thought of David Hume.
• The first real, true and perhaps only thorough utilitarian is Jeremy Bentham.
• Classic utitlitarians are John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick and G.E. Moore .
• The most important contemporary utilitarians are J.C.C. Smart, Derick Parfit and Peter Singer.
1. History cont.
• Original utilitarians were so-called
'Philosophical Radicals' with a progressive and reform-minded political program: the
extension of democracy, penal reform, welfare provisions, etc.
• Today utilitarians remain radical in particular on the topics of global justice and animal
1. What is Utilitarianism?
• Utilitarianism is one of the possible answers to the question of «What should I do?».
• The answer utilitarianism gives is: Maximize well-being. Act on the principle of utility-maximization.
• In this sense, utilitarianism is a form of moral consequentialism. It is the contrary of a deontological ethics (Kant).
• As a political theory it claims that justice requires the
maximization of utility and that governments are bound by the moral principle of utility.
• Utilitarianims is a political theory of aggergation and not of redistribution.
1. The Logical Structure of Utilitarianism
• The only moral good are determinate states of affairs that contain well-being, calculated in
terms of utility (problem of the naturalistic fallacy).
• Hence, morality requires us to maximize well-being, total utility.
• We have the moral obligation to bring about a world through our actions that maximizes well-being.
1. The Origins of Utilitarianism
• What do we do, when we act? What is the principle underlying our actions?
• Hume: "When we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a
consequent emotion of aversion and
propensity, and are carried to avoid and embrace what will give us uneasiness or
satisfaction" (Treatise of Human Nature, Book 2, Section 3, p. 414)
1. The Origins of Utilitarianism cont.
Bentham draws a moral conclusion from this empirical, psychological fact. Given that life is about the pursuit of happiness, morality can
only require us to maximize happiness as much as possible (problem of the fact-value
1. How to be a Utilitarian
What do we need to be good utilitarians? What do we have to know whenever we want to
undertake a utilitarian action?
1. What is happiness or well-being?
2. What makes people happy or well-off?
3. How much utility do people get from their happiness?
1. Kymlicka's Thesis
• According to Kymlicka, step 1-3 is not
particularly problematic. The problems that
arise determining happiness, welfare and utility is not particular to utilitarianism. Also other
theories have to struggle with this problem.
• The real problem for Kymlicka is aggregation and the principle of maximization of utility.
• We analyze first the question of utility and then the maximization of utility.
2. The Mother of all Questions: What is
Happiness?
• Bentham gives the perhaps most intuitive
answer: the experience of pleasure. What else could make you happy than to be in a
pleasurable state of mind? Could you probably be happy in the absence of whatsoever
pleasurable sensation?
• This definition of happiness in terms of pleasure is called hedonism.
2. Hedonism
• Bentham: "Pushpin is as good as poetry."
• The quality of the pleasure you experience in watching Sex and the City or in reading the poems of Rilke is always the same. Pleasure, being a chemical reaction, feels always alike, whatever it is that stimulates pleasure.
2. Hedonism
• Two of Kymlicka's non-hedonistic versions of utility, namely non-hedonistic mental state utility as much as preference satisfaction,
could fall into the larger category of hedonism. • In fact, Kymlicka addresses them with the
more or less same critical point he makes concerning hedonism.
2. Critique of Hedonism
• Most of the activities we undergo cannot be accounted for in terms of pleasure. Most of
the time, the pain an activity involves does not stop us from pursuing it.
• Nozick: Pleasure can be induced artificially via drugs for example (pleasure machine). Few
would indeed be happy with this sort of happy life.
2. Critique of Hedonism cont.
• Smart: "Indeed if a contented idiot is as good as a philosopher, and if a contented sheep is as good as an idiot, then a contented fish is as good as a
contented sheep, and a contented beetle is as good as a contented fish. Where shall we stop?"
(Utilitarianism: For and Against, p. 16)
• Smart argues that we must be happy to be happy. We do not just want the experience of writing
poetry, we want to write poetry. Happiness is a partly evaluative concept.
2. Critique of Hedonism cont.
• The problem of self-knowledge: Are we really sure that we know what gives us pleasure? • The problem of adaptive preferences:
'contented slave' and the 'happy housewife'. • The problem of interpersonal comparison of
pleasure: Pleasure is subjective in the sense that only the person who is in a pleasurable state of mind can experience and feel it.
2. Non-Hedonistic Accounts of Happiness
• Mill: "It is better to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."
• Mill distinguishes between higher and lower pleasures. And higher pleasures are
intrinsically, and not only extrinsically, more valuable than lower ones.
2. Non-Hedonism cont.
• Moore thinks that the intrinsic value of certain mental states is entirely independent from the pleasure that goes along with them (sadistic pleasures).
• Kymlicka presents a version of non-hedonistic utlitarianism that is at halfway between Mill's- quasi-idealism and Moore's idealism.
2. Non-Hedonism cont.
• According to Kymlicka's version only those forms of happiness should be taken into account that are the result of informed or rational preferences.
• Utilitarianism, on this view, seeks to provide those things which people have good reason to prefer, that really make their life better off.
2. Critique of Non-Hedonism
• The question is to what extent non-hedonistic
accounts of happiness can still be considered to be some form of utilitarianism.
• Apart from the difficulty to say what is a rational preference (we will encounter this problem in Rawls's theory of justice) or what is the property that makes certain pleasures (Mill) or mental states (Moore) intrinsically more valuable than others,
non-hedonism dropped the 'experience requirement.'
2. Critique of Non-Hedonism cont.
• If we deprive the concept of happiness of its empirical, corporeal foundation, namely its occurrence in terms of actual pleasure or at least some positive sensation or feeling like love, it is unclear if we are still concerned with happiness or if we reason in some other terms, such as for example the Aristotelean eudomenia, human flourshing.
• Since nothing guarantees that an eudaemonic life or a life
conducted according to rational preferences are actually happy
lives, accompanied by the experience of some positive mental state. • Perhaps it's just a myth, but according to the statistics Western
societies are notoriously unhappier than non- Western societies. Bhutan is the happiest country of the world.
2. Critique of Non-Hedonism cont.
• Non-hedonism implies either that people wrongly believe that they are happy. Or, that the subjective experience of contentedness is not happiness.
Both assumptions are highly problematic.
• Moreover, once we give up on the subjective
experience of happiness, it is difficult to measure and aggregate utilities and to determine which course of action brings about a better state of affairs.
2. Critique of Non-Hedonims cont.
• In fact, when Kymlicka is defending a non-hedonistic
account of utilitarianism, that is based upon appropriate background conditions for the genesis of our
preferences rather than on our actual preferences and foresees the 'resourcist' solution rather than the actual maximization of utility, it is unclear if his interpretation is still a recognizable form of utilitarianisms or another
political theory altogether.
• See his claim that "nothing prevents utilitarianism from adopting whatever account its critic favour" (p. 20).
2. Recapitulation
• All we have done so far is to discuss the issue of happiness and well-being. Let's imagine we have settled upon one account of happiness.
• Then, as a second step to become a good utilitarian, we need to know what exactly makes people happy. On the hedonistic
account, the preferences of people must be somehow revealed. • In a third step, we need to know not only what people prefer, but
how strong and intense their preferences are. We need to know people's utilities. We need to know what number people are attributing or, on the non-hedonistic account, perhaps should
attribute to their preferences (A's preference for banana is 10, B's preference for chocolate is 50, etc.)
2. Recapitulation cont.
• It is clear that step 2 and 3 on our way to becomeutilitarians, at least in the hedonistic tradition, is entirely empirical. We need to gather all the relevant data about
preferences and utilities. This seems impossible, but it is not uncommon in politics. Politicians often make surveys on the popularity of certain policies. Yet, the debates in particular in economics show to what extent we actually disagree
about which policy creates greater overall well being (Keynes vs. neoclassics, Greece).
• Once we have all the information, we can start to aggregate utilities and see which aggregation maximizes utility.
3. Aggregation
• In our calculation we need to take into account all the utilities present. We must give equal
consideration to each utility. Our utility is one among many that has to be thrown into the balance.
• We have to imagine to be a person who has all these different utilities. Our task is to find the course of action that maximizes overall utilitiy.
3. Aggregation
• Of course we cannot satisfy all utilities. We have limited
resources and above all there are conflicting interests. Insofar as we have to make trade-offs and decisions about our preferences, a utilitarian policy will have losers and winners. Even if we would like to, we cannot be at the same time the Pope, Socrates,
Madonna and Maradona. As much as we have to sacrifice in our own lives certain utilities in order to maximize utility, a utilitarian policy has to disregard certain utilities.
• For example world poverty: The loss of utility by taking away 1% of the wealth of the richest and giving it to the poorest is by far outweighed by the gain in utility of the poorest.
3. Problems of Social Aggregation
There are two problems of social aggregation: one is individual, the other collective. These two problems are the background of Rawls' Theory of Justice and go under the heading of what
Kymlicka calls an inadequate account of equality.
The individual problem: The analogy between man and society, rational choice and social choice is flawed. An individual's rational choice to maximize his or her well-being, is not analogous to
utilitarian choices made in society.
• If I rationally sacrifice my desire to become Maradona in order to work at the post office, or sacrifice my present well-being for greater future gains, my losses are clearly compensated by the greater gains.
If, however, I have to sacrifice my well-being for greater gains in well-being of my neighbors, I don't get whatsoever compensations for my
losses (see pp. 41 ff.). I am simply screwed, and boiling with rage I will do whatsoever to put an end to this injustice.
The collective problem: An aggregative theory is indifferent to the redistributive problem as long as utility is maximized.
3. Problems of Social Aggregation cont.
This means that if there are three possible ways to maximize the overall utility of 100, and the
first has a redistribution pattern A: 90, 10, 0, the second B: 40, 30, 30 and the third C: 70, 15, 15, utilitarianism cannot say that one pattern of
redistribution is worse than another.
Utilitarianism is morally indifferent with regard to redistribution as long as utility is maximized.
3. Utilitarian Ways Out of the Problem of
Social Aggregation
Utilitarians propose solutions both on the individual as well as collective level.
Individual level: Parfit defends the analogy between man
and society on the grounds of personal identity. According to Parfit, sacrificing personal gains for social utility gains is not different than sacrificing present personal gains for future personal gains.
• The distance between me and others is not larger than between my present self and my future self. Individual identity is a matter of degrees and not essence or
3. Utilitarian Ways Out cont.
Collective level: Indirect or rule-utilitarianism, as alternative to direct or act-utilitarianism, is seen as
one possible solution to the problem of redistribution. And in fact, rule-utilitarianism might also be a solution to the problem of rights, freedom and equality, with which utilitarianism is struggling on the individual level.
• Act utilitarianism is the theory that tells us that on each occasion we have to choose the action that maximizes most utility.
3. Utilitarian Ways Out cont.
• This could mean, depending upon the cirumstances, great amounts of inequality in the distribution of
resources, violations of basic rights such as freedom (the scapegoat), racist discrimination, breaking of promises etc..
• Rule-utilitarians argue that without basic rules such as keeping promises, non-discrimination, basic liberal rights and perhaps also the gradual diminuition of
inequalities (see Joe Stiglitz: The Price of Inequality)
3. Utilitarian Ways Out cont.
• Only following certain specific rules, that the story of humanity has proved to be beneficial, overall utility can be maximized.
• Please note that the justification of rules
depends here entirely on the consequences these rules bring about and not on
deontological considerations. A utilitarian never keeps a promise for its own sake.
3. Utilitarian Ways Out cont.
• Yet, what happens if in 1941 you cross the Spree in Berlin and you see Hitler drowning? Should you really follow the rule and save his life?
• If you are a true utilitarian you can follow rules only insofar as they are really maximizing
utility. In this sense, rule-utilitarianims collapses into act-utilitarianism.
3. Further Problems of Utilitarian Morality
• Utilitarianism can be really harsh, austere and cruel. Kymlicka believes it to be even alienating and
psychologically impossible.
• Imagine you are on a sinking boat and you can save either your kid or a scientist on the verge of a new discovery about cancer that will alleviate the pain of many people.
• Most people would not think twice about what to do, but utilitarianism obliges you to save the
3. Problems of Utilitarian Morality cont.
• Utilitarianism cannot accomodate the
importance of any of our commitments. Our commitments must be simply added in with all the projects of other people, and be sacrified when can produce more utility by promoting someone else's projects.
• Utilitarianism asks that we are no more
attached to our commitments than to other people's.
3. Problems of Utilitarian Morality cont.
• Parfit's repugnant conclusion: Compare two possible worlds: world A, containing 5 billion people each of whom has an average utility of 18 units, and world B, containing 100 billion, each of whose well-being has been reduced to one unit. In world B, each person's life has
become miserable, yet the overall amount of utility has increased from 90 to 100 billion
