"Challenge and Response in Western Europe: the Origins of the European
Community (1945 - 1950)"
Project directed by Professor Alan Milward Project Paper No. 4
E U I W O R K I N G P A P E R No. 79
THE ORIGINS OF THE MONNET PLAN
by
PHILIPPE MIOCHE
January 1984
EUI G 20650
BADIA FIESOLANA, SAN DOMENICO (FI)
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This paper should not be reproduced in whole or in part without the prior permission of the author.
Paper presented in the conference held on 17 and 18 November 1983 entitled
"National and International Economic Recon struction in Western E u r o p e ,1945-1950"
(C) Philippe Mioche 1984
Printed in Italy in January 1984 European University Institute
Badia Fiesolana - 50016 San Domenico(FI) Italy I
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THE ORIGINS OF THE MONNET PLAN: HOW A TRANSITORY EXPERIMENT RESPONDED TO DEEP ROOTED NEEDS.1
The Monnet Plan and the way it was designed and then exe cuted is quite puzzling for the historian. Firstly, Jean Monnet was not a planner and President Mendes France was to say about him that he was an anti-planning liberal. Indeed the first general commissioner of planning did not take part in the planning ex periments of the nineteen twenties nor in those of the Vichy
government and had nothing to do with the Soviet ideas. Strangely enough, he was the man who gave birth not only to a planning
experiment within a liberal economy but also to the French pro totype of planning used as a reference in international debates.
Secondly, thanks to the French Resistance proposals and also to those of Fighting France planning got a new lease of life. However, it was not during the 1945 national union that a plan was really implemented but later on, in 1946 when social and poli tical divisions reemerged.
Thirdly, the Monnet Plan was an experiment born out of the needs for the reconstruction and the modernization of an eco nomy which had stagnated since the depression and then had been nearly destroyed by the war. According to the law passed in
1946, Monnet's mission was to run for six months. In fact the "commissariat du plan" has become a lasting state-controlled institution which since 1946 has been part of the French econo mic and social system.
What were the needs met by this experiment which turned
into a lasting reality later on? We shall follow a chronological plan:
I) Genesis of the Monnet Plan, 1943-45
II) The plan and the Franco-American negotiations, January 1946-September 1946
III) Adoption of the plan, October 1946-early 1947
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I . From import programming to needs planning, 1943-1945 In September 1943, Jean Monnet and René Massigli signed the third lend lease agreement between Fighting France and the United States. Monnet had just ended — in a very personal way — the mission to generals Giraud and De Gaulle, which he had been given by President Roosevelt. In September 1943 Monnet became the commissioner of the French committee of national libera tion on a mission to the United States. The title was modest but the
task was great. Besides, a journalist called him the minister of French American affairs.
At the same time he had to organize food and medical sup plies, to win the recognition of the CFLN and to defend the French position at the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). He wanted to prevent — at liberation — the economic collapse and the social crisis of which the
communists — he said — would be the only beneficiaries. Monnet was in a good position to negotiate those imports within lend
lease, thanks to his political past and his relationship with the American Administration.
But was this position not too good to defend the French interests? That is what a collaborator at the French embassy in Washington, Maurice Couve de Murville suggested when he wrote about him in February 1945:
"Une autre erreur est d'avoir envoyé aux Etats Unis
depuis la libération, des missions ou des propagandistes pour le moins très indulgents à l'égard de Vichy, ou plus grave, défaitistes: Nous sommes entre vos mains, faites quelque chose pour nous!"2
This text raises the question of whether Monnet was actually working for the Americans.
Monnet thought that France could not carry out its recon struction and its modernization by itself but needed American aid. Armed with this conviction he was going to develop a very simple method. He was determined to present the French proposals in such a way that they would be favourably received by the
American Administration. They also had to fit Roosevelt's gene ral views for the postwar years. Was he really giving in to the Americans as the text suggests?
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Before answering this question two comments must be made. The French political and social forces agreed that credit must be obtained from the United States. Whether revival should be based on autarchy or on American aid was not the subject of discussion. The debate was rather on the financial, economic and political consequences which this aid would entail. This remained the case at least until 1948 with climaxes such as the Franco-American negotiations in May 1946.
The second comment is that one cannot speak the same way of American politics in 1944 — in a period of trust between the allied countries — as of 1947 which was in a period of tension and mistrust. To say that Monnet's action in 1944 and 1945 was in favour of the United States is an anachronism.
Since he wanted to convince the "gouvernement provisoire de la République Française" (G.P.R.F.) that his method was a good one, Monnet proposed a plan in August 1944 — which was to be the first step towards the commissariat to come.
"Nous savons d'avance que ces ressources venues de l'ex térieur ajoutées aux ressources françaises, ne seront pas suffisantes pour les besoins du pays. Il est donc essentiel d'en prévoir la répartition d'ensemble, et^ cela ne peut se faire que sur un plan d'ensemble."
During a mission the commissioner obtained the creation of an import committee. The purpose of this committee was to make plans for imports, to assign priorities and to draw up a balance
sheet. But this committee was to be powerless as it was cri ticized by Paul Giacobbi (the commissioner for goods and pro duction) and by Pierre Mendès France (the finance commissioner). Monnet took up this idea again and perfected it in autumn 1945.
Up to this date — that is September-October 1945 — there was no real attempt to undertake a plan in France. This might be surprising since the making of an economic plan was part of the National Resistance Council's programme.
In 1944 and until April 1945, when he resigned, Mendès France tried to organize the building up of a general reconstruction plan. But he failed because of numerous opposition but mainly because of the lack of enthusiasm he met. When he resigned, the
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first planning studies of the liberation were nearly abandoned. René Pleven, the Minister of Finance and National Economy managed to have the responsibilities of the plan shared between
several ministries. The plan was no longer centralized, and in September 1945 Pleven,resolutely hostile to planning, re
moved the direction du plan from his own ministry . This decision produced a sharp reaction from Georges Boris, state councel-
l o r , a great supporter of planning ideas and a collaborator of Mendès France:
"Combien elle serait surprise cette opinion, si elle savait que ces plans, n'étant ni conçus selon des directives générales communes, ni adaptés les uns aux autres, ni coordonnés dans le temps sont dépourvus de toute signification p r a t i q u e ,(...) ils ne sont que des trompe l'oeil, plus propres à discréditer l'idée du plan qu'à la promouvoir." 4
In this text, Boris feared that public opinion would be dis-, appointed.
However, in 1945 planning continued to arouse interest. For instance in Les Nouvelles Economiques some leading econo mists such as Charles Rist, René Courtin, Robert M o s s é , and Afta
lion, gave their views on a plan which did not yet exist. One m a y think that in 1945 when the French momentarily managed to get rid of their daily worries, the idea of a plan
still raised hopes in their minds. And the idea of a plan was favourably looked upon mostly thanks to the prestige of the Soviet policy in this period. It is interesting to note that
Monnet's work was to benefit from this support. All the more so as the Monnet plan was presented to the public at the end of 1946 and so was not associated in people's minds with the difficul ties of 1945-46.
But if the idea of the plan was still alive in Autumn 1945 there was no one left to build it up. Political parties had their own prejudices. The Communist Party thought at the time that a plan was possible only if the state was really
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in the hands of the working class. The liberals did not agree because for them the plan was a step forward to state d i r igisme.
Lend lease was to end in September 1945, and the United States wanted to call an international conference liberalizing
trade. Monnet proposed then to General de Gaulle and to President Truman to prepare for this conference with bilateral negotiations where France could be guaranteed its share in international trade in order to regain its rank as an economic power. Both presidents agreed. M o n n e t 1s cares were shifting. The priority was no longer imports but, according to him, the maximum credits which France could get out of these bilateral negotiations. France had to demonstrate its intention to reco ver its economic rank and Monnet did not hide how risky those proceedings were. He gathered together a few collaborators (René Auboin, Etienne Hirsh, Felix Gaillard, René M a r j o l i n ) , and
drafted the "Statistic elements for the Washington negotiations". These first results describing how the French economy had stag nated added weight to M o n n e t 's action.
Monnet's project (bilateral followed by multilateral nego tiations) seems to have taken shape in November 1945. James Byrnes and Robert Lacoste exchanged four official letters that spoke about these two negotiations. However, there were pro blems on both sides. On the one hand the Americans were worried about French policy towards Germany; on the other hand René
Pleven did not, although he was on good terms with Monnet, agree with this exchange of letters: probably because he wanted to keep the colonial market ffom the dynamic American economy.
He wanted the Franco-American negotiations to take place immediately after the Anglo-American ones in December 1945, which meant a little before the international conference where France was expected to present a plan for economic revival which was to be three months later, in March 1946.
But this scenario was changed in the course of December 1945. At this time, the contents of the plan (re-equipment and modernization) and its targets (to get credits) were clearly
specified but no administrative or political form had been adopted
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for them yet. The final touch was given to the Commissariat du Plan after the parliamentary elections. New communist ministers then entered the government and were controlling economic power. In order to intervene in economic affairs Gaston Pawlesky asked General de Gaulle and Jean Monnet to put the Commissariat for modernization and re-equipment directly under the authority of the "Président du Conseil". They both agreed, and the Commissa riat was created in January 1946. The place of this new admini
stration was the result of a political operation rather than a genuine project.
The communists did not protest because they were associa ted with the making of the plan. Moreover, three communist min i s ters were expected to take part in the next negotiation with the United States. Monnet, who had expected from the start that the plan would arouse widespread interest was quite satisfied with this participation. He said,
"Puisque l'éxécution du plan exigera la collaboration de tous, il est indispensable que tous les éléments ^ vitaux de la nation participent à son élaboration."
These arrangements were questioned when de Gaulle resigned in January 1946. The new socialist minister of finance and eco nomy, André Philip, wanted to put the commissariat under his own authority. He would have wanted the plan to escape the general commissioner's empiricism. Monnnet threatened to re
sign, and Philip dropped his project.
The design of the plan was delayed a little but Monnet
managed to convince the French political leaders that his method was good. He was helped in his work by the first results of
the modernization commissions in which there were employers, ad ministration officials, and trade-unionists. The working atmos
phere that prevailed in the commissions was very good, and he asserted:
"Au lieu d'apparaître comme une création d'intellectuels en chambre, le plan se présente comme l'expression des possibilités de l'économie nationale et de la volonté de ses agents actife. " 6
After this first success Monnet had to convince the Americans that France was about to be modernized very quickly, to share in world trade and that it must be provided with a large loan.
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I I . The Monnet Plan and the United States
Several difficulties were clouding Franco-ftmerican relations in early 1946. The Americans had decided not to provide France with such a large loan as they had given Great Britain mostly because of its policy towards Germany. Monnet,under these cir cumstances, could not expect any success from the Franco-Ameri- can negotiations; he stated,
"La question de la négociation d'un emprunt important aux U.S.A.sera certainement liée par le Département d'Etat à celle d'une modification par le gouvernement français de sa politique allemande." 7
The United States was using its financial power as an instru ment of its international policy. Monnet tried to interfere in order to satisfy the American requests. But he was not entirely supported by the government. Indeed, for him, the loans for
modernization were more important than the success of the French ambitions in Germany. However he spoke for the first time — and the last — of another solution that could eventually suit France if the negotiations happened to fail.
"Il nous faudra alors adopter une ligne politique tendant à utiliser au maximum nos propres ressources; à dévelop per la production de produits synthétiques quel qu'en soit le prix de revient intérieur; à utiliser la puis sance de production industrielle de l'Allemagne."®
The plan took up a double meaning. Its purpose was to get loans from the United States but it could become the basic document for a reconstruction policy without any aid.
The expected negotiations which finally opened after much delay at the end of March 1946 lasted until May and came to be known as the "Blum-Byrnes negotiations". Monnet presented to his partners an outline in order to prove French good will. But the results of the Blum-Byrnes accords were disappointing. The financial results of the winding up of lend lease were satis factory but those for equipment and modernization were not suf ficient. Monnet obtained one of the two or three billion d o l lars he had asked for.
Many sources reveal that before the opening of the talks the American authorities had not decided to give complete satis faction to the French demands. However, the American officials were highly interested in the preliminary plan. That is for
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stance what the communist minister François Billoux noted in a report for the headquarters of the Communist Party:
"Ce furent en effet le texte et les chiffres du plan quinquennal qui servirent de base de discussion avec les Etats Unis(...) Toujours d'après mes informations, les Américains ont accepté immédiatement cette manière de voir et ont commencé à examiner nos chiffres en com paraison avec ceux qu'ils p o s s é d a i e n t ^
The method and the objectives of the plan were favourably received. They fitted the general views of postwar American policy. Monnet had probably discussed the matter with members of the Roosevelt team in 1943 when they were working on the Victory programme and he was- not mistaken when he presented
the plan in 1946. But the evolution of international relations delayed the execution of this American world policy. France had to wait for its loans and Monnet was still convinced that it would get them.
The complete implementation of the plan was delayed by the results of the Blum-Byrnes negotiations; the French finan cial means did not meet the financing required to reach the targets of the plan. But as Henri Bonnet, the ambassador in Washington noted, the negotiations did not alter the plan in any way.
"Ce travail n'a porté que sur l'évaluation des ressources et des dépenses, à aucun degré sur la contexture du plan." The objectives of production foreseen in the March 1946 preli minary plan were taken up in nearly the same terms in the
official plan in November 1946. The plan was now less credible because it seemed difficult to put it into effect but it appeared m u c h less dependent on Franco-American relations. The United States, by declining to give the full necessary amount of credits in May 1946, actually benefited the plan. It became an obvious symbol of national renovation for French public opi nion. In April 1948 the ZFOP (French Institute of Public O p i nion) organized an inquiry about the plan.
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Table I : "Quelle est parmi les définitions suivantes du Plan Monnet celle qui vous paraît la plus exacte?"
Réponses : augmenter la production 29% nous suffire à nous mêmes 11% utiliser les crédits américains 6%
produire moins cher 7%
améliorer les conditions de tra
vail 7%
diminuer le gaspillage 20%
ne répondent pas 37%
(Total sunéripur 5 100 car certaines personnes ont donné deux réponses).11
The theme of national independence was clearly dominant among the French who knew about the plan. The precise details which we shall study now given to the plan in autumn 1946
were going to stress this feeling which has become part of the collective memory.
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I I I . The adoption of the Monnet Plan
Before its adoption there were new ordeals for the plan. When the French gradually discovered the real results of the May agreements, the political consensus made around the plan in March 1946 broke up. Coming back to France Monnet found a report from Robert Marjolin on the studies of the commissions. There he could read about B.Frachon, the Communist Secretary-General of the C.G . T . ,
"Il est très inquiet de la partie commerciale de nos accords qui selon lui livre l'industrie française à l'Amérique. Très hostile aux accords cinéma (C'est la position du P.C.)".1^
The behaviour of the French Communist Party towards the plan shifted during the summer of 1946. The Communists agreed with the method of the plan at the beginning and they gave their sup port to the objectives of production. They took part in the Washington negotiations by officially sending Auguste L e c o e u r ,
the Secretary of State for Coal. In the summer the Communist Party took part in the protest movements against the cinema agreements. In September it reacted against Byrne's speech in Stuttgart. Both the American policy towards Germany and the plan were condemned.
"Quant à la France, dont on limiterait sous prétexte de "planification" les activités industrielles, voir
agricoles; elle ne serait plus qu'un vassal docile des dirigants anglo saxons de ce bloc occidentale...) Tel est le plan de regression française qui nourrit
l'imagination des hommes des trusts, outre Atlantique, outre Manche et même dans notre pays." ^
The Communist Party agreed only with the objectives of m o d e r nization and production of the plan but rejected the political conditions linked with the obtaining of American loans; whereas for Monnet the two things worked together. From autumn 1946
the Monnet plan was not disapproved of but it was utilized to denounce the trusts' refusal to modernize the country.
The M.R.P. (Mouvement républicain populaire) ministers, Robert Schuman and François de Menthon of the new Georges Bi dault government started to criticize M o n n e t 's plan as well. At the interministerial economic committee Gaston Cusin, the Secretary of State for National Economy was backed by the two
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ministers when he defended the import programme adopted in July; he said,
"Contrairement à l'opinion de M.Monnet, il estime qu'en établissant un programme d'importation d'un a n (...) le Ministère des Finances s'est placé dans une hypothèse raisonnable, rompant avec le pessimisme^... ) Dans ce domaine l'expérience des accords financiers franco amé ricains nous incite à la prudence en raison des servi tudes qui peuvent être imposées à une partie importante des crédits accordés."1^
The trust given to Monnet's strategy in March had vanished in September. The planning commissioner was rather isolated when the day to have the plan adopted arrived. In September-October 1946 Monnet intended to adapt the presentation of the plan to make it acceptable to the different political and social for
ces. He introduced two new ideas into the plan; he made up a schedule and assigned priorities. In November 1946, there was a one-year plan for 1947 that could use the loans received in May and a four-year plan, which was m o r e general and had inde finite means of financing. This decision made the first phase of the plan clearer but worried those who were in favour of real planning like Georges Boris,
"Le Plan Monnet n'est véritablement tracé que pour l'an née 1947, et l'on a vu que les chances de réalisation pour 1947 sont faibles. Passée cette date, il s'agit beaucoup plus d'objectifs à viser que de plan propre ment dit à réaliser, et le calendrier n'aurait, semble-
t-il dans l'esprit des auteurs du Plan qu'un caractère indicatif."15
The criticism was justified. But in this way Monnet managed to keep the general framework of the plan, which was not a n ticipated at first, until France could obtain American credits. Because of the delay at the beginning the plan was extended until 1952 and finally it ran for six years.
The second new idea in autumn 1946 was the priorities. The preliminary plan in March did not assign priorities. In Octo ber Monnet and his friends chose six industrial sectors and called them basic sectors (coal, electricity, steel, building materials, national transport and farm m a c h i n e r y ) . The oil
industry was to be added to this list in 1947. For all those industries the plan should have been applied imperatively but it was so only for state-controlled sectors. Although the plan
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was remarkably followed in the electricity sector nothing hap pened in the farm machinery industry. By focusing on some prio rity sectors the plan became more selective and could mobilize a greater number of people.
But despite these precise details and changes brought to the original draft Monnet was not sure of regaining the consensus he had had in March of that year. Also the planning caitnissioner was going to use the political instability of the time to the benefit of the plan. He chose to arrange the second session of the Planning Council the day before the Bidault government resigned
(28 November). Monnet organized a third session in January which was merely a repetition of the previous one. The plan was offi cially adopted a week before the resignation of the Blum govern ment.
Monnet had achieved his aims. But this success had its d i s advantages because the adoption of the plan almost passed unno ticed and the Commissariat partly missed its date with public opinion.
Then, during the winter of 1946 the plan was approved by the trade unions and the professional federations. This was a decisive factor in favour of the plan and we m u s t analyze this support and focus on the "Confédération générale du travail"
(C.G.T.) and the "Conseil national du patronat français" (CNPF). At the beginning, in early 1946, the C.G.T. was rather critical of the plan. The two representatives within the commissariat, Pierre Le Brun and Benoit Frachon did not share the same v i e w point on the matter. In January 1946 Le Brun commented on the birth of the commissariat in "Le Peuple" :
"La situation actuelle de la France justifie-t-elle que son gouvernement s'offre et nous impose de tels pa labres?" 16
Until November 1946 he stuck to this position. To the second session of the Planning Council where he was the only C.G.T. representitve he brought "l'adhésion réfléchie" of the confe deration. He accepted the restrictions anticipated in the report
"En outre, dans les limites admissibles, mais sous r é serve d'un équilibre judicieux, à établir au départ, entre les salaires et les prix, le plan prévoit des r e strictions de la consommation."17
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Le Brun became later on a resolute partisan of the plan, and he was to keep a positive attitude towards the commissariat until his death (in 1965) . In March 1946 Benoit Frachon said that the plan was a positive initiative. In January 1947 he presented with Le Brun "l'adhésion sans réserve" of the C.G.T.
The first man who was not a communist but a planner had supported Léon Jouhaux's views since 1934, and was convinced by M o n n e t 's method. The second man, a trade union and commu
nist leader wanted in 1947 to use the plan as an argument against eventual attempts to cut the objectives. The two men had d i f
ferent motivations. Le B r u n 's were more theoretical whereas those of Frachon were more tactical. The C.G.T.'s attitude
was different from that of the Communist Party and of socialist planners like Philip. Within the C.G.T. itself there were d i f ferent positions as union officials represented federations from various traditions. The following table reveals that the C.G.T. was broadly associated with the deliberations of the commissions.
Table I I . Répartition des participants aux commissions de modernisation du Plan Monnet (18 commissions en
1946, y compris agricoles, soit 300 personnes environ) C.G.T. 17% C.F.T.C. 3% Patronat 31% Administration 29% Experts et divers 20% 100%
The C.G.T. presided over four commissions and reported for
three other commissions. The C.G.T.'s participation in the plan was widely commented upon in the union press in 1947 and those favourable criticisms have contributed to the making of a las ting and positive picture of the plan within the C.G.T.
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That was not the case with the CNPF. In November 1946 Pierre Ricard, its official representative spoke in an ambi guous way. He found that the plan was "a most remarkable piece of work" but explained that he was speaking in his own name and not for the CNPF. He underlined the optimism that — he said — characterized the plan and he stressed that "trust" was the necessary condition for really undertaking the plan. A letter from Ricard to Monnet showed that some aspects of the plan did not seem acceptable to the CNPF. For instance the re port of the labour commission engaged, he said, the responsi bility of the manager:
"Certains dirigeants de la C.G.T. entendent faire par exemple, des comités d'entreprise ,comme préfiguration des soviets d'usines et ceci nous oblige à un jeu très serré." 18
But confidentially he was to add to Monnet,
'Si vous connaissiez l'état d'esprit présent des milieux patronaux, vous seriez convaincu que je joue le jeu avec vous, non seulement avec le maximum de fair-play, mais avec le maximum d'efficacité." 19
Within the modernization commissions the employers did not represent the CNPF but were there in their own names. So their behaviour was very varied. In 1946 the CNPF had a nega tive attitude towards the Monnet Plan. It shared the idea that prevailed among the employers of the time which was hostility to state dirigisme. Some of them took an individual position in favour of the plan. Industrial sectors often shared the same attitude. Briefly speaking the more the sector was concen trated the more the Monnet Plan was favourably regarded.
The participation of the C.G.T. and the CNPF meant different things. There was no real consensus. Monnet did not face any total and overt rejection and from January
1947 he could implement the first phase of the plan. In early 1947 he did not ask for anything else.
o
o o
Jean M o n n e t 's action was not the result of a theoretical reflection. The idea of planning for modernizing came from his
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wish to present French requests for American aid in a ..favourable light. But the plan cannot be reduced to a mere transformation of an import programme. The plan did not appear out of the blue. It took its roots in planning experiments that France had
attempted since the First World War. Those origins met in 1946 the wish to regain economic power that expressed itself in the desire to modernize industrial equipment. The Monnet Plan in early 1946 was submitted to two interpretations. The plan was to rebuild and modernize the country and to get American loans. Those two targets were not experienced in a contradictory way until the summer of 1946. After that they were analyzed dif ferently, according to the actors of the plan, and the rhythm of national and international events. The Monnet Plan did not invent the necessity to rebuild nor the will to modernize. The plan enabled the development of attitudes favour
able to modernization among trade unionists and some employ ers. This was the strength of the modernization commissions and the explanation for the success of the plan in France. Except the C.G.T., nobody eventually approved of the Monnet Plan. But the confederation's approval did not mean the same thing when it was given by Le Brun or by Frachon. Nobody was clearly opposed to the Plan. This is what history will remember.
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NOTES
1. P. Mioche, Origines et démarrage de la planification en France, 1941-1946, thèse de troisième cycle, Université de Paris I, Paris, March 1983.
2. "La position de l'Amérique à l'égard de certains pro blèmes français", Rapport de Couve de Murville, 20 February 1945. AN F60 1003.
3. "Propositions de Jean Monnet au CEI", 1 August 1944. AN F60 896.
4. "La politique du plan, un choix nécessaire". September 1945. Georges Boris. Archives de Raoul Dautry.
5. "Propositions au Général De Gaulle", 4 December 1945. Jean Monnet in Mémoires de guerre. Le S a l u t , pp. 634-639.
6. "Note sur l'exécution et l'élaboration du plan", 23 April 1946. Archives Jean Monnet. AMF 5/2/1.
7. "Avant projet concernant les négociations à engager par la France au sujet de l'Allemagne", 15 February 1946. AMF 4/3/93.
8. "Brouillon d'une note de synthèse", Jean Monnet, s.d., AMF 3/5/10.
9. "Les négociations de Washington". Rapport de F. Billoux au secrétariat du PCF, Summer 1946. Archives de F.Billoux.
10. Télégramme de H.Bonnet à F. Gouin, 27 May 1946. A r c h i ves diplomatiques A . 194-5.
11. "L'opinion et les problèmes économiques. Plan Monnet- Plan Marshall", IFOP, June 1948. AMF 14/8/1.
12. "Note pour J.M o n n e t " , Robert Marjolin, 6 June 1946. AMF 5/2/36.
13. France Nouvelle. Hebdomadaire du PCF no. 43, 14 Sep tember 194 6.
14. "Compte rendu du CEI", 25 July 1946. AN F60 902.
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15. "Observations sur le Plan", Georges Boris, 9 December 1946. AMF 7/3/1.
16. Floraison de commissions", Le P e u p l e , P. Le Brun, 5 January 1946.
17. "Déclaration de P. Le Brun au Conseil du Plan", Archi ves de Pierre Le Brun.
18. Lettre de P.Ricard à Jean Monnet, 5 January 1947. AMF 12.8/2. 19. Ibidem.
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Working Papers published in connection with the conference on "National and International Economic Reconstruction in Western Europe, 1945 - 1950" within the research project Challenge and Response in Western Europe: The Origins of the European Community (1945 - 1950):
Working Paper No. Project Paper No. 1
76 Richard Griffiths, ECONOMIC RECON STRUCTION POLICY IN THE NETHERLANDS AND ITS INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES, MAY 1945-MARCH 1951
Working Paper No. Project Paper No. 2
77 Scott Newton, THE 1949 STERLING CRISIS AND BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Working Paper No. Project Paper No. 3
78 Giorgio F o d o r , WHY DID EUROPE NEED A MARSHALL PLAN IN 1947?
Working Paper No. Project Paper No. 4
79 Philippe Mioche, THE ORIGINS OF THE MONNET PLAN
Working Paper No. Project Paper No. 5
80 Werner Abelshauser, THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF LUDWIG ERHARD
Working Paper No. Project Paper No. 6
81 Helge Pharo, THE DOMESTIC AND INTER NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF NORWEGIAN RECONSTRUCTION
Working Paper No. Project Paper No. 7
82 Heiner R. Adamsen, INVESTITIONSPOLITIK IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
1949 - 1951 Working Paper No.
Project Paper No. 8
83 Jean Bouvier, LE PLAN M O N N E T ET L'ECONOMIE FRANÇAISE 1947-1952 Working Paper No.
Project Paper No. 9
84 Mariuccia Salvati, INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE ITALIAN RECONSTRUCTION
Working Paper No. Project Paper No. 10
85 William D i e b o l d , Jr., TRADE AND PAYMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE IN HISTORICAL PER
SPECTIVE: A PERSONAL V I E W BY AN INTERESTED PARTY
Working Paper No. Project Paper No. 11
86 Frances Lynch, FRENCH RECONSTRUCTION IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT
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PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
EUI WORKING PAPERS :
No. 1 : Jacques PELKMANS
No. 2 : Joseph H.H. WEILER
No. 3 : Aldo RUSTI CHINI
No. 4 : Màuro CAPPELLETTI/ David GOLAY
No. 5 : Leonard GLESKE
No. 6 : Manfred HINZ
No. 7 : Wilhelm BUKKUN
No. 8 : Athanasios MXJLAKIS No. 9 : Manfred E. STREIT
No. 10: Kumaraswamy VELUPTLLAI
No. 11: Kumaraswamy VELUPTLLAI
No. 12: Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI Guglielmo CHIODI
No. 13: Gunther TEUBNER No. 14: Gunther TEUBNER
No. 15: Jens ALBER
Ian BUDGE
The European Community and the Newly Industrialized Countries
Supranationalism Revisited - Retrospec tive and Prospective. The European Com munities After Thirty Years
Seasonality in Eurodollar Interest Rates
Judicial Review, Transnational and Fede ral: Impact on Integration
The European Monetary System: Present Situation and Future Prospects
Massenkult und Todessynbolik in der nazional-sozialistischen Architektur The1 "Greens" and the "New Politics": Goodbye to the Three-Party System?
Unilateralism or the Shadow of Confusion Information Processing in Future ' -,r- kets. An Essay on the Adequacy < . s ■> Ab
straction
When Workers Save and Invest: Son Kaldorian Dynamics
A Neo-Cambridge Model of Income Distil bution and Unemployment
On Lindahl's Theory of Distribution
Reflexive Rationalitat des Rechts Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modem Law
Sane Causes and Consequences of Social Security Expenditure Development in Western Europe, 1949-1977
Democratic Party Government: Formation and Functioning in Twenty-one Countries N o . 16 :
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No. 17: Hans DAALDER
No. 18: Giuseppe DI PAIMA
No. 19: Richard S. KATZ No. 20: Jürg STEINER
No. 21: Jens ALBER
Nò. 22: Don PATINKIN No. 23: Marcello DE CECOO
No. 24: Marcello DE CECCO
No. 25: Manfred E. STREIT
No. 26: Domenico Mario NUTI
No. 27: Terence C. DAILriTH No. 28: Francis C. CASTLES/
Peter MAIR No. 29: Karl HOHMANN
No. 30: Max KAASE
No. 31 : Klaus TOEPFER
No. 32: Ronald INGLEHART
No. 33: Moshe LISSAK
Jean-Paul FITOUSSI
Parties and Political Mobilization: An Initial Mapping
Party Government and Democratic Repro ducibility: The Dilemma of New Democracies Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception Decision Process and Policy Outcome: An Attempt to Conceptualize the Problem at the Cross-National Level
The Emergence of Welfare Classes in West Germany: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Evidence
Paul A. Samuelson and Monetary Theory Inflation and Structural Change in the Euro-Dollar Market
The Vicious/Virtuous Circle Debate in the '20s and the T70s
Modelling, Managing and Monitoring Futures Trading: Frontiers of Analytical Inquiry Economic Crisis in Eastern Europe - Prospects and Repercussions
Legal Analysis of Economic Policy
Left-Right Political Scales: Some Expert Judgements
The Ability of German Political Parties to Resolve the Given Problems: the Situation in 1982
The Concept of Political Culture: Its
Meaning for Comparative Political Research * Possibilities and Limitations of a Regional Economic Development Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany
The Changing Structure of Political Clea vages Among West European Elites and Publics
Boundaries and Institutional Linkages Between Elites: Some Illustrations from Civil-Military Elites in Israel
M o d e m Macroeconomic Theory An Overview No. 34:
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No. 35: Richard M. QOOCWIN/ Kumaraswairy VELUPILLAI
Econome Systems and their Regulation
No. 36: Maria MAGUIRE The Growth of Income Maintenance Expendi ture in Ireland, 1951-1979
No. 37: G. Lcwell FIELD John Higley
The States of National Elites and the Stability of Political Institutions in 81 Nations, 1950-1982
No. 38: Dietrich HERZOG New Protest Elites in the Political System of West Berlin: The Eclipse of Consensus?
No. 39: Edward 0. LAUMANN David KNOKE
A Framework for Concatenated Event Analysis
No. 40: Gwen MUORE/ Richard D. ALBA
Class and Prestige Origins in the American Elite
No. 41: Peter MAIR Issue-Dimensions and Party Strategies in the Irish Republic, 1948 - 1981: The Evidence of Manifestos
No. 42: Joseph H.H. WEILER Israel and the Creation of a Palestine State. The Art of the Inpossible and the Possible
No. 43: Franz Urban PAPPI Boundary Specification and Structural Models of Elite Systems: Social Circles Revisited
No. 44: Thcmas GAWRON Ralf ROGOWSKI
Zur Implementation von Gerichtsurteilen Hypothesen zu den Wirkungsbedingungen von Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungs- gerichts
No. 45: Alexis PAULY René DIEDERICH
Migrant Workers and Civil Liberties
No. 46: Alessandra VENTURINI Is the Bargaining Theory Still an Effective Framework of Analysis for Strike Patterns
in Europe?
No. 47: Richard A. GOODWIN Schumpeter : The Man I Knew No. 48: J.P. FITOUSSI/
Daniel SZPIRO
Politique de l'Emploi et Reduction de la Durée du Travail
No. 49: Bruno DE WITTE Retour à Costa. La Primauté du Droit Corn-munautaire à la Lumière du Droit Interna tional
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No. 50: Massimo A. BENEDETTELI! Eguaglianza e Libera Circolazione dei Lavoratori: Principio di Eguaglianza e Divieti di Discriminazione nella Giuris prudenza Comunitaria in Materia di Diritti di Mobilità Territoriale e Professionale dei Lavoratori
No. 51: Gunther TEUBNER Corporate Responsibility as a Problem of Company Constitution
No. 52: Erich SCHANZE Potentials and Limits of Economic Analysis: The Constitution of the Firm
No. 53: Maurizio COITA Career and Recruitment Patterns of Italian Legislators. A Contribution to the Under
standing of a Polarized Political System No. 54: Mattéi DOGAN How to Become a Cabinet Minister in Italy:
Unwritten Rules of the Political Game No. 55: Mariano BAENA DEL ALCAZAR/
Narciso PIZARRO
The Structure of the Spanish Power Elite 1939-1979
No. 56: Bere RUSTEM/
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
Preferences in Policy Optimization and Optimal Economic Policy
No. 57: Giorgio FREDDI Bureaucratic Rationalities and the Prospect for Party Government
No. 58: Manfred E. STREIT Reassessing Consumer Safety Regulations No. 59: Christopher HILL/
James MAYALL
The Sanctions Problem: International and European Perspectives
No. 60: Jean-Paul FITOUSSI Adjusting to Competitive Depression. The Case of the Reduction in Working Time
No. 61: Philippe LEPOKT Idéologie et Morale Bourgeoise de la Famille dans le Ménaaier de Paris et le Second
Libro de Famiglia, de L.B. Alberti No. 62: Peter BROCKMEIER Die Dichter und das Kritisieren No. 63: Hans-Martin PAWLCWSKE Law and Social Conflict
No. 64: Marcello DE CECCO Italian Monetary Policy in the 1980s No. 65: Gianpaolo ROSSINI Intraindustry Trade in Two Areas: Seme
Aspects of Trade Within and Outside a Custcm Union
No. 66: Wolfgang GEBAUER Euromarkets and Monetary Control: The Deutschemark Case
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No. 67: Gerd WEINRICH On the Theory of Effective Demand under Stochastic Rationing
No. 68: Saul ESTRIN/ Derek C. JONES
The Effects of Worker Participation upon Productivity in French Producer Cooperatives No. 69: Bere RUSTEM/
Kumaraswamy VELUPILLAI
On the Formalization of Political Preferen ces: A Contribution to the Frischian Scheme No. 70: Werner MAIH0FEH Politique et Morale
No. 71: Samuel COHN Five Centuries of Dying in Siena: Comparisons with Southern France
No. 72: Wolfgang GEBAUER Inflation and Interest: the Fisher Theorem Revisited
No. 73: Patrick NERHOT Rationalism and the M o d e m State
No. 74: Philippe C. SCHMIÏTER Democratic Theory and Neo-Oorporatist Practice
No. 75: Sheila A. CHAPMAN Eastern Hard Currency Debt 1970-83. An Overview
No. 76: Richard GRIFFITHS Economic Reconstruction Policy in the Netherlands and its International Con sequences, May 1945 - March 1951
No. 77: Scott NEWTON The 1949 Sterling Crisis and British Policy towards European Integration No. 78: Giorgio FODOR Why did Europe need a Marshall Plan in
1947?
No. 79: Philippe MIOCHE The Origins of the Monnet Plan: Hew a Transistory Experiment answered to Deep-Rooted Needs
No. 80: Werner AEELSHAUSER The Economic Policy of Ludwig Erhard
No. 81: Helge PHARD The Domestic and International Implications of Norwegian Reconstruction
No. 82: Heiner R. ADAMSEN Investitionspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949-1951
No. 83: Jean BOUVIER Le Plan Monnet et l'Economie Française 1947-1952
No. 84: Mariuccia SALVATI Industrial and Economic Policy in the Italian Reconstruction
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No. 85: William DIEBOLD, Jr
No. 86: Frances LYNCH
Trade and Payments in Western Europe in Historical Perspective: A Personal View by an Interested Party
French Reconstruction in a European Context
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© The Author(s). European University Institute. Digitised version produced by the EUI Library in 2020. Available Open Access on Cadmus, European University Institute Research
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