Pandemia e biodiversità, il Rapporto IPBES - SNPA - Sistema nazionale protezione ambiente

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IPBES Workshop on Biodiversity and Pandemics

WORKSHOP REPORT

*** Strictly Confidential and Embargoed until 3 p.m. CET on 29 October 2020 ***

Please note:

This workshop report is provided to you on condition of strictest confidentiality. It must not be shared, cited, referenced, summarized, published or commented on, in whole or in part, until the embargo is lifted at 3 p.m. CET/2 p.m. GMT/10 a.m. EDT on Thursday, 29 October 2020

This workshop report is released in a non-laid out format. It will undergo minor editing before being released in a laid-out format.

http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4147318

Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services

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The IPBES Bureau and Multidisciplinary Expert Panel (MEP) authorized a workshop on biodiversity and pandemics that was held virtually on 27-31 July 2020 in

accordance with the provisions on “Platform workshops” in support of Plenary- approved activities, set out in section 6.1 of the procedures for the preparation of Platform deliverables (IPBES-3/3, annex I).

This workshop report and any recommendations or conclusions contained therein have not been reviewed, endorsed or approved by the IPBES Plenary.

The workshop report is considered supporting material available to authors in the preparation of ongoing or future IPBES assessments. While undergoing a scientific peer-review, this material has not been subjected to formal IPBES review processes.

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Preamble

The IPBES Bureau and Multidisciplinary Expert Panel, in the context of the extraordinary situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and considering the role that IPBES can play in strengthening the knowledge base on biodiversity, decided that IPBES would organize a

“Platform workshop” on biodiversity and pandemics, in accordance with the procedures for the preparation of IPBES deliverables, in particular decision IPBES-3/3, annex I, section 6.1. on the organization of Platform workshops.

This workshop provided an opportunity to review the scientific evidence on the origin,

emergence and impact of COVID-19 and other pandemics, as well as on options for controlling and preventing pandemics, with the goal to provide immediate information, as well as enhance the information IPBES can provide to its users and stakeholders in its ongoing and future assessments.

The workshop brought together 22 experts from all regions of the world, to discuss 1) how pandemics emerge from the microbial diversity found in nature; 2) the role of land use change and climate change in driving pandemics; 3) the role of wildlife trade in driving pandemics; 4) learning from nature to better control pandemics; and 5) preventing pandemics based on a “one health” approach.

The workshop participants selected by the IPBES Multidisciplinary Expert Panel included 17 experts nominated by Governments and organizations following a call for nominations and 5 experts from the ongoing IPBES assessment of the sustainable use of wild species, the assessment on values and the assessment of invasive alien species, as well as experts assisting with the scoping of the IPBES nexus assessment and transformative change assessments. In addition, resource persons from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and the World Health Organization (WHO) attended the workshop.

This workshop report has been prepared by all workshop participants and been subjected to several rounds of internal review and revisions and one external peer review process.

Technical support to the workshop has been provided by the IPBES secretariat.

IPBES thanks the Government of Germany for the provision of financial support for the organization of the workshop and production of the report.

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Executive Summary

Pandemics represent an existential threat to the health and welfare of people across our planet.

The scientific evidence reviewed in this report demonstrates that pandemics are becoming more frequent, driven by a continued rise in the underlying emerging disease events that spark them.

Without preventative strategies, pandemics will emerge more often, spread more rapidly, kill more people, and affect the global economy with more devastating impact than ever before.

Current pandemic strategies rely on responding to diseases after their emergence with public health measures and technological solutions, in particular the rapid design and distribution of new vaccines and therapeutics. However, COVID-19 demonstrates that this is a slow and uncertain path, and as the global population waits for vaccines to become available, the human costs are mounting, in lives lost, sickness endured, economic collapse, and lost livelihoods.

Pandemics have their origins in diverse microbes carried by animal reservoirs, but their

emergence is entirely driven by human activities. The underlying causes of pandemics are the same global environmental changes that drive biodiversity loss and climate change. These include land-use change, agricultural expansion and intensification, and wildlife trade and consumption. These drivers of change bring wildlife, livestock, and people into closer contact, allowing animal microbes to move into people and lead to infections, sometimes outbreaks, and more rarely into true pandemics that spread through road networks, urban centers and global travel and trade routes. The recent exponential rise in consumption and trade, driven by

demand in developed countries and emerging economies, as well as by demographic pressure, has led to a series of emerging diseases that originate mainly in biodiverse developing

countries, driven by global consumption patterns.

Pandemics such as COVID-19 underscore both the interconnectedness of the world community and the rising threat posed by global inequality to the health, wellbeing and security of all people. Mortality and morbidity due to COVID-19 may ultimately be higher in developing countries, due to economic constraints affecting healthcare access. However, largescale pandemics can also drastically affect developed countries that depend on globalized economies, as COVID-19’s impact on the USA and many European countries is currently demonstrating.

Pandemics emerge from the microbial diversity found in nature

• The majority (70%) of emerging diseases (e.g. Ebola, Zika, Nipah encephalitis), and almost all known pandemics (e.g. influenza, HIV/AIDS, COVID-19), are zoonoses – i.e.

are caused by microbes of animal origin. These microbes ‘spill over’ due to contact among wildlife, livestock, and people.

• An estimated 1.7 million currently undiscovered viruses are thought to exist in mammal and avian hosts. Of these, 631,000-827,000 could have the ability to infect humans.

• The most important reservoirs of pathogens with pandemic potential are mammals (in particular bats, rodents, primates) and some birds (in particular water birds), as well as livestock (e.g. pigs, camels, poultry).

Human ecological disruption, and unsustainable consumption drive pandemic risk

• The risk of pandemics is increasing rapidly, with more than five new diseases emerging in people every year, any one of which has the potential to spread and become

pandemic. The risk of a pandemic is driven by exponentially increasing anthropogenic changes. Blaming wildlife for the emergence of diseases is thus erroneous, because

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6 emergence is caused by human activities and the impacts of these activities on the environment.

• Unsustainable exploitation of the environment due to land-use change, agricultural expansion and intensification, wildlife trade and consumption, and other drivers, disrupts natural interactions among wildlife and their microbes, increases contact among wildlife, livestock, people, and their pathogens and has led to almost all pandemics.

• Climate change has been implicated in disease emergence (e.g. tick-borne encephalitis in Scandinavia) and will likely cause substantial future pandemic risk by driving

movement of people, wildlife, reservoirs, and vectors, and spread of their pathogens, in ways that lead to new contact among species, increased contact among species, or otherwise disrupts natural host-pathogen dynamics.

• Biodiversity loss associated with transformation of landscapes can lead to increased emerging disease risk in some cases, where species that adapt well to human- dominated landscapes are also able to harbor pathogens that pose a high risk of zoonotic transmission.

• Pathogens of wildlife, livestock and people can also directly threaten biodiversity, and emerge via the same activities that drive disease risk in people (e.g. the emergence of chytridiomycosis in amphibians worldwide due to the wildlife trade).

Reducing anthropogenic global environmental change may reduce pandemic risk

• Pandemics and other emerging zoonoses cause widespread human suffering, and likely more than a trillion dollars in economic damages annually. This is in addition to the zoonotic diseases that have emerged historically and create a continued burden on human health. Global strategies to prevent pandemics based on reducing the wildlife trade and land-use change and increasing One Health¹ surveillance are estimated to cost between US$22 and 31.2 billion, decreased even further (US$17.7 - 26.9 billion) if benefits of reduced deforestation on carbon sequestration are calculated – two orders of magnitude less than the damages pandemics produce. This provides a strong economic incentive for transformative change to reduce the risk of pandemics.

• The true impact of COVID-19 on the global economy can only be accurately assessed once vaccines are fully deployed and transmission among populations is contained.

However, its cost has been estimated at $8-16 trillion globally by July 2020 and may be

$16 trillion in the US alone by the 4th quarter of 2021 (assuming vaccines are effective at controlling it by then).

• Pandemic risk could be significantly lowered by promoting responsible consumption and reducing unsustainable consumption of commodities from emerging disease hotspots, and of wildlife and wildlife-derived products, as well as by reducing excessive

consumption of meat from livestock production.

• Conservation of protected areas, and measures that reduce unsustainable exploitation of high biodiversity regions will reduce the wildlife-livestock-human contact interface and help prevent the spillover of novel pathogens.

Land-use change, agricultural expansion, urbanization cause more than 30% of emerging disease events

• Land-use change is a globally significant driver of pandemics and caused the emergence of more than 30% of new diseases reported since 1960.

• Land-use change includes deforestation, human settlement in primarily wildlife habitat, the growth of crop and livestock production, and urbanization.

1 One Health is an approach that integrates human health, animal health and environmental sectors.

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• Land-use change creates synergistic effects with climate change (forest loss, heat island effects, burning of forest to clear land) and biodiversity loss that in turn has led to

important emerging diseases.

• Destruction of habitat and encroachment of humans and livestock into biodiverse habitats provide new pathways for pathogens to spill over and increase transmission rates.

• Human health considerations are largely unaccounted for in land-use planning decisions.

• Ecological restoration, which is critical for conservation, climate adaptation and provision of ecosystem services, should integrate health considerations to avoid potential

increased disease risk resulting from increased human-livestock-wildlife contact.

The trade and consumption of wildlife is a globally important risk for future pandemics

• Wildlife trade has occurred throughout human history and provides nutrition and welfare for peoples, especially the Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in many

countries.

• About 24% of all wild terrestrial vertebrate species are traded globally. International, legal wildlife trade has increased more than five-fold in value in the last 14 years and was estimated to be worth US$107 billion in 2019. The illegal wildlife trade is estimated to be worth $7-23 billion annually.

• The USA is one of the largest legal importers of wildlife with 10-20 million individual wild animals (terrestrial and marine) imported each year, largely for the pet trade. The number of shipments rose from around 7,000 to 13,000 per month from 2000 to 2015.

This trade has led to the introduction of novel zoonoses (e.g. monkeypox) and disease vectors or hosts (e.g. tick reservoirs of the cattle disease heartwater) into the USA.

• Wildlife farming has expanded substantially, particularly in China prior to COVID-19, where ‘non-traditional animal’ farming generated US$77 billion dollars and employed 14 million people in 2016.

• The farming, trade and consumption of wildlife and wildlife-derived products (for food, medicine, fur and other products) have led to biodiversity loss, and emerging diseases, including SARS and COVID-19.

• Illegal and unregulated trade and unsustainable consumption of wildlife as well as the legal, regulated trade in wildlife, have been linked to disease emergence.

• The trade in mammals and birds is likely a higher risk for disease emergence than other taxa because they are important reservoirs of zoonotic pathogens.

• Regulations that mandate disease surveillance in the wildlife trade are limited in scope, disaggregated among numerous authorities, and inconsistently enforced or applied Current pandemic preparedness strategies aim to control diseases after they emerge.

These strategies often rely on, and can affect, biodiversity.

• Our business-as-usual approach to pandemics is based on containment and control after a disease has emerged and relies primarily on reductionist approaches to vaccine and therapeutic development rather than on reducing the drivers of pandemic risk to prevent them before they emerge.

• Vaccine and therapeutic development rely on access to the diversity of organisms, molecules and genes found in nature.

• Many important therapeutics are derived from indigenous knowledge and traditional medicine.

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• Fair and equitable access and benefit sharing derived from genetic resources, including pathogens, have led to more equitable access to vaccines and therapeutics, and

broader engagement in research, but some access and benefit sharing procedures may impede rapid sharing of microbial samples.

• Intellectual property is an incentive for innovation, but some have argued it may limit rapid access to vaccines, therapeutics and therapies, as well as to diagnostic and research tools.

• Pandemic control programs often act under emergency measures and can have

significant negative implications for biodiversity, e.g. culling of wildlife reservoirs, release of insecticides.

• Introduction of travel restrictions to reduce COVID-19 spread have severely reduced ecotourism and other income.

• Reduced environmental impacts from economic slowdown during the ‘global COVID-19 pause’ (e.g. reduced oil consumption) are likely temporary and insignificant in the long term.

• Diseases that emerge from wildlife and spread widely in people may then threaten biodiversity outside the pathogen’s original host range.

• Pandemics often have unequal impacts on different countries and sectors of society (e.g. the elderly and minorities for COVID-19). The economic impacts (and disease outcomes) are often more severe on women, people in poverty and Indigenous Peoples.

To be transformative, pandemic control policies and recovery programs should be more gender responsive and inclusive.

Escape from the Pandemic Era requires policy options that foster transformative change towards preventing pandemics:

The current pandemic preparedness strategy involves responding to a pandemic after it has emerged. Yet, the research reviewed in this report identifies substantial knowledge that provides a pathway to predicting and preventing pandemics. This includes work that predicts geographic origins of future pandemics, identifies key reservoir hosts and the pathogens most likely to emerge, and demonstrates how environmental and socioeconomic changes correlate with disease emergence. Pilot projects, often at large scale, have demonstrated that this knowledge can be used to effectively target viral discovery, surveillance and outbreak investigation. The major impact on public health of COVID-19, of HIV/AIDS, Ebola, Zika, influenza, SARS and of many other emerging diseases underlines the critical need for policies that will promote pandemic prevention, based on this growing knowledge. To achieve this, the following policy options have been identified:

Enabling mechanisms:

• Launching a high-level intergovernmental council on pandemic prevention, that would provide for cooperation among governments and work at the crossroads of the three Rio conventions to: 1) provide policy-relevant scientific information on the emergence of diseases, predict high-risk areas, evaluate economic impact of potential pandemics, highlight research gaps; and 2) coordinate the design of a monitoring framework, and possibly lay the groundwork for an agreement on goals and targets to be met by all partners for implementing the One Health approach (i.e. one that links human health, animal health and environmental sectors).

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9 Ultimately the work of the high-level council may lead to countries setting mutually agreed goals or targets within the framework of an accord or agreement. A broad international governmental agreement on pandemic prevention would represent a landmark achievement with clear benefits for humans, animals and ecosystems.

• Institutionalizing One Health in national governments to build pandemic preparedness, enhance pandemic prevention programs, and to investigate and control outbreaks across sectors.

• Integrating (“mainstreaming”) the economic cost of pandemics into consumption, production, and government policies and budgets.

• Generating new green corporate or sovereign bonds to mobilize resources for biodiversity conservation and pandemic risk reduction.

• Designing a green economic recovery from COVID-19 as an insurance against future outbreaks.

Policies to reduce the role of land-use change in pandemic emergence:

• Developing and incorporating pandemic and emerging disease risk health impact assessments in major development and land-use projects.

• Reforming financial aid for land-use so that benefits and risks to biodiversity and health are recognized and explicitly targeted

• Assessing how, effective habitat conservation measures including protected areas and habitat restoration programs can reduce pandemics, and trade-offs where disease spillover risk may increase. Developing programs based on these assessments.

• Enabling transformative change to reduce the types of consumption, globalized

agricultural expansion and trade that have led to pandemics (e.g. consumption of palm oil, exotic wood, products requiring mine extraction, transport infrastructures, meat and other products of globalized livestock production). This could include modifying previous calls for taxes, or levies on meat consumption, livestock production or other forms of high pandemic risk consumption.

Policies to reduce pandemic emergence related to the wildlife trade:

• Building a new intergovernmental health and trade partnership to reduce zoonotic disease risks in the international wildlife trade, building on collaborations among OIE, CITES, CBD, WHO, FAO, IUCN and others.

• Educating communities from all sectors in emerging infectious diseases hotspots

regarding the health risks associated with wildlife use and trade that are known to pose a pandemic risk.

• Reducing or removing species in wildlife trade that are identified by expert review as high-risk of disease emergence, testing the efficacy of establishing market clean-out days, increased cold chain capacity, biosafety, biosecurity and sanitation in markets.

Conducting disease surveillance of wildlife in the trade, and of wildlife hunters, farmers, and traders.

• Enhancing law enforcement collaboration on all aspects of the illegal wildlife trade.

Closing critical knowledge gaps on:

• Supporting One Health scientific research to design and test better strategies to prevent pandemics.

• Improving understanding of the relationship between ecosystem degradation and restoration and landscape structure, and the risk of emergence of disease.

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• Economic analyses of return-on-investment for programs that reduce the environmental changes that lead to pandemics.

• Key risk behaviors - in global consumption, in rural communities on the frontline of disease emergence, in the private sector, in national governments - that lead to pandemics.

• Valuing Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities’ engagement and knowledge in pandemic prevention programs

• Undiscovered microbial diversity in wildlife that has potential to emerge in future, or to be used to develop therapeutics or vaccines.

• Analyzing the evolutionary underpinnings of host shifts that are involved in zoonotic disease spillover and the adaptation of emerging pathogens to new host species.

• Climate change impacts and related extreme weather events (e.g. flooding and droughts) on disease emergence, to anticipate future threats.

• Obtaining data on the relative importance of illegal, unregulated, and the legal and regulated wildlife trade in disease risk.

Foster a role for all sectors of society to engage in reducing risk of pandemics

• Educating and communicating with all sectors of society, and especially the younger generations, about the origins of pandemics.

• Identifying, ranking, and labelling high pandemic risk consumption patterns (e.g. use of fur from farmed wildlife) to provide incentives for alternatives.

• Increasing sustainability in agriculture to meet food requirements from currently available land, and subsequently reduced land areas.

• Promoting a transition to healthier and more sustainable and diverse diets, including responsible meat consumption.

• Promoting sustainable mechanisms to achieve greater food security and reduce consumption of wildlife.

• Where there is a clear link to high pandemic risk, consideration of taxes or levies on meat consumption, production, livestock production or other forms of consumption, as proposed previously by a range of scientific organizations and reports.

• Sustainability incentives for companies to avoid high pandemic-risk land-use change, agriculture, and use of products derived from unsustainable trade or wildlife farming identified as a particular zoonotic disease risk.

Conclusion

This report is published at a critical juncture in the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, at which its long-term societal and economic impacts are being recognized. People in all sectors of society are beginning to look for solutions that move beyond business-as-usual. To do this will require transformative change, using the evidence from science to re-assess the relationship between people and nature, and to reduce global environmental changes that are caused by unsustainable consumption, and which drive biodiversity loss, climate change and pandemic emergence. The policy options laid out in this report represent such a change. They lay out a movement towards preventing pandemics that is transformative: our current approach is to try to detect new diseases early, contain them, and then develop vaccines and therapeutics to control them. Clearly, in the face of COVID-19, with more than one million human deaths, and huge economic impacts, this reactive approach is inadequate.

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11 This report embraces the need for transformative change and uses scientific evidence to identify policy options to prevent pandemics. Many of these may seem costly, difficult to execute, and their impact uncertain. However, economic analysis suggests their costs will be trivial in

comparison to the trillions of dollars of impact due to COVID-19, let alone the rising tide of future diseases. The scientific evidence reviewed here, and the societal and economic impacts of COVID-19 provide a powerful incentive to adopt these policy options and create the

transformative change needed to prevent future pandemics. This will provide benefits to health, biodiversity conservation, our economies, and sustainable development. Above all, it will provide a vision of our future in which we have escaped the current ‘Pandemic Era’.

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Sections 1 to 5

Introduction

The emergence of COVID-19 in late 2019 as a major global pandemic is part of a pattern of disease emergence that highlights linkages among biodiversity, global environmental change and human health. COVID-19 and other pandemics are rooted in biodiversity. They are caused by micro-organisms that are themselves a critical part of biodiversity and are hosted and

transmitted by diverse animal species, including humans ¹. COVID-19 is the latest in a series of diseases that are caused by wildlife-origin viruses and have emerged due to anthropogenic environmental changes that bring wildlife, livestock and people into closer contact ². These diseases include SARS, Ebola and Nipah virus disease, Zika and influenza, and reflect a predominance of zoonotic (animal origin) viral diseases among the emerging infectious diseases affecting people over the last few decades. Over the past few years, a series of scientific papers have been published that suggest the same environmental changes that threaten biodiversity loss on a global scale (e.g. land use change, such as deforestation or encroachment into wildlife habitat; climate change; unsustainable trade and consumption of wildlife; agricultural intensification; globalized trade and travel) are also driving the increasing spillover, amplification and spread of these novel viral diseases.

COVID-19 is a pandemic: a disease that has caused epidemics of sustained community transmission in multiple countries on two or more continents ³. Its significance cannot be overstated. It is the first, high-mortality (>0.5% case fatality rate), truly global pandemic since the emergence of HIV/AIDS in the 1970/80s. In efforts to curtail its spread, social distancing and travel bans have led to a significant economic impact (trillions of US$ of global market loss), and the pandemic has disrupted normal life for many months in most countries on the planet, with societal and economic impacts lasting years ahead. The precise chain of events leading to the emergence of COVID-19 is not yet fully known. However, the virus that causes it (SARS-CoV-2) almost certainly originated in (and recently spilled over from ⁴) insectivorous bats because it is part of a clade of closely-related SARS-related CoVs found almost solely in Rhinolophus spp.

bats in nature ⁵. SARS-CoV-2 is able to infect other mammals, including mustelids (e.g. mink, ferrets), viverrids (e.g. civets), felids (including lions and tigers in a zoo and domestic cats), raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes spp.), pangolins (Manidae), domestic dogs, a range of lab animals and people. Substantial evidence points to a likely origin in South China or neighbouring

countries, where the greatest diversity of SARS-related coronaviruses is found ⁶, where contact among people and bats is common ^7,8, and where human populations are expanding and encroaching into a rapidly changing landscape ⁹. Epidemiological evidence suggests that SARS-CoV-2 was transported either in people, or animals, or both, into a live animal market in Wuhan in late 2019 ^5,10. The involvement of live animal markets and the wildlife trade in the emergence and spread of both SARS and COVID-19 have led to public calls for efforts to reduce this trade in an effort to prevent future pandemics.

Pandemics are a subset of emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) that are caused by pathogens that have recently infected people for the first time, or are showing a trend of increasing frequency of infection or geographic spread ^3,11,12. Pandemics are EIDs that have spread internationally and seeded epidemics of human-to-human transmission in different continents.

EIDs tend to originate first in rural regions of tropical or subtropical countries with high wildlife diversity (and therefore likely high viral diversity), human populations that are growing rapidly, and where land use change is driving closer contact among people and wildlife ¹³. Therefore, rural communities in developing countries are often on the frontline of disease emergence.

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13 Additionally, these countries may have less resources for early detection of outbreaks, and to combat spillover and spread. Once a new pandemic has developed sustained community transmission in people, global emergence is intimately tied to urbanization, domestic trade networks, globalized trade and international travel patterns. Thus, richer and more developed countries that are highly dependent on globalized trade and travel are often rapidly affected once a pathogen spreads in people, as happened with COVID-19. There is also growing evidence that pathogen spillover, amplification and spread is largely driven by the consumption patterns set up by globalized production and trade that drive encroachment into tropical

ecosystems, particularly forested regions (e.g. for crop and livestock production, timber, mining and manufacturing of goods), and exponentially rising rates of international trade and travel.

Thus, efforts to identify ways to prevent pandemics will likely need to understand the whole system of interacting drivers and policy options that would affect points along these cycles and pathways.

This workshop was launched to review the scientific evidence behind the origin, emergence and impact of COVID-19 and other pandemics as it relates to biodiversity and the changes that are affecting both. The goals of the workshop were to provide a scientific basis on which to identify potential policy options, and implementation pathways that could reduce pandemic risk and ultimately prevent their emergence, while at the same time having a positive impact on biodiversity conservation. To do that, the experts reviewed scientific evidence on the known pandemics, and the 500 or so EIDs for which there are data on origins, underlying causes, reservoir hosts and impact ^11,14. Almost all pandemics, and the majority of EIDs, are caused by wildlife-origin pathogens. This means that areas with high wildlife diversity that are important for biodiversity conservation are also places where pandemic origins are most likely to occur. This report therefore provides an assessment of trade-offs between the goals of pandemic

prevention and control and biodiversity conservation. This includes evidence that the

anthropogenic environmental changes that drive pandemics also drive biodiversity loss. Thus, reducing human impacts on the environment to benefit conservation, may also reduce

pandemic risk and benefit health.

This report is published at a critical juncture in the COVID-19 pandemic, and in the Great Acceleration of the Anthropocene ¹⁵: a point at which governments in most countries are beginning to realize the long term societal and economic impacts of COVID-19, and many people are looking for solutions rather than hoping to continue business-as-usual. A movement towards preventing pandemics would be a transformative change: the current approach to dealing with pandemics is to try to detect them early, contain them, and rapidly develop

vaccines and therapeutics. Clearly, in the face of COVID-19, this is inadequate, with no vaccines widely available ten months after emergence, and at least a million people dead ¹⁶. This report fully embraces the need for transformative change and uses scientific evidence to identify policy options to prevent pandemics, and the organizations and agencies that might implement them. These options aim to reduce pandemic risk, and provide benefits to human health, biodiversity conservation, economies and sustainable development. Above all, they recognize that the current strategy of waiting for diseases to emerge, then hoping for vaccines and therapeutics to be developed, is not a realistic way to escape from what has been termed the ‘Pandemic Era’ ^17,18.

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14 Figure 1: The Huanan Seafood Market, Wuhan in January 2020. This is the site where some of the earliest cases of COVID-19 were identified, although it is likely that the disease first emerged elsewhere (Photo: REUTERS – permission pending).

Section 1: The relationship between people and biodiversity underpins disease emergence and provides opportunities for pandemic prevention, control and response measures

Disease emergence is rooted in human interaction with the biodiversity of microbes and their reservoir host species

There are clear links between pandemics and biodiversity. New pathogens usually emerge from a ‘pool’ of previously undescribed, potentially zoonotic microbes that have co-evolved over millions of years with their wildlife hosts ¹⁴. The diversity of microbes likely increases proportionally with the biodiversity of their hosts. RNA viruses are particularly important as emerging pathogens because they have high mutation rates, undergo recombination and have other characteristics allowing them to evolve diverse assemblages over time ^19-21. An estimated 1.7 million viruses occur in mammals and water birds (the hosts most commonly identified as origins of novel zoonoses), and of these, 631,000-827,000 could have the ability to infect humans ²². This far exceeds the current catalogued viral diversity from these hosts of less than 2,000 (even if lower estimates of viral diversity prove correct ²³) and suggests that less than 0.1% of the potential zoonotic viral risk has been discovered ²². Previous authors have

concluded that this results in a high potential for the emergence of novel viral pathogens from wildlife, if the current trajectory of environmental change continues, and pushes closer contact among people, livestock, wildlife and the diverse assemblage of potential pathogens they are hosts to ¹⁴.

On a global scale, the emergence of new zoonoses correlates with wildlife (mammalian)

diversity, human population density and anthropogenic environmental change ^11,13. There is also evidence that biodiversity loss may increase transmission of microbes from animals to people under certain circumstances. The potential mechanisms are complex. For some microbes with multiple reservoir host species, certain hosts may play a more important role than others, i.e.

have high ‘competence’. This may be because they are preferentially infected, produce and excrete more microbes, have higher contact rates, or otherwise contribute more to pathogen

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15 dynamics than low competence hosts ²⁴. Thus, in regions with high biodiversity a “dilution effect”

may exist for some pathogens, whereby highly competent reservoirs represent a small proportion of the available reservoirs, and transmission risk to people is reduced ^25-27. This theory has potential importance for conservation because it suggests that biodiversity loss due to anthropogenic environmental changes may lead to higher zoonotic disease risk, and that conserving biodiversity may benefit public health by reducing this risk. Evidence of the dilution effect has been observed for the West Nile virus ^28,29, Hantavirus ^30,31 and plant microbes ³². It has also been well-studied for Lyme disease ^32,33, but also widely disputed ^34,35. In particular, evidence suggests that the dilution effect is not generalizable across different disease and host systems ³⁶, and scales ^37,38, and that some of the evidence provided to support its

generalizability is weak ³⁹. Large scale analyses suggest that emerging disease risk may be highest in regions of human-altered landscapes 11,13,40-42. However, rather than this being due to a broadly effective dilution effect ^43,44, the mechanistic drivers of risk include increased contact among wildlife, livestock and people driven by settlement and land conversion and specific high- risk activities (e.g. occupational exposure to wildlife, increased hunting of disease reservoirs).

Environmental changes that drive biodiversity loss also drive disease emergence

Disease emergence has followed each step of society’s development. The domestication of wildlife beginning in the Neolithic provided the contact required for pathogens to spill over into people, and coincided with the formation of dense human populations in early cities that allowed their continued circulation ⁴⁵. Measles and smallpox viruses likely evolved from domestic

herbivore viruses through this process^45-47, while another ancient disease, tuberculosis, appears to have begun as an environmental microbe that infected people, then cycled back into

domestic animals and other wildlife ⁴⁸. Some diseases, like the viral disease mumps, or the bacterial diseases leprosy and plague appear to have their origin as wildlife microbes that spilled over directly to humans over the last few millennia ^49-52. These diseases have, over historical time become endemic in human populations and are no longer referred to as

‘emerging’, which is a phrase that usually applies to diseases that have increased in frequency or impact in the last few decades ⁵³.

There is substantial evidence that the underlying drivers of almost all recent EIDs are anthropogenic environmental changes, and socioeconomic changes, that alter contact rates among natural reservoir hosts, livestock and people, or otherwise cause changes in

transmission rates 11,13,40,42,54 (Figure 2). More than 400 microbes (viruses, bacteria, protozoa, fungi and other microorganisms) have emerged in people during the last five decades, over 70% of them originating in animals (i.e. are classed as zoonotic pathogens), and the majority of those having wildlife as their natural reservoir hosts ¹¹. Many cause little or no illness in their natural reservoirs. While some zoonotic pathogens are unable to spread from person-to-person and cause limited outbreaks, many have evolved capacity for transmission among people. In many cases, the further expansion of these emerging infectious diseases does not require animal reservoirs but occurs due to community spread through rapidly urbanizing landscapes, megacities and travel and trade networks, as occurred with COVID-19. These emerging infectious diseases have led to a series of outcomes including small clusters of cases, and in some cases significant outbreaks (e.g. Ebola, MERS, Lyme disease) that don’t quite reach the pandemic scale. The transmission (‘spillover’) of pathogens from wildlife to people can occur directly via high risk activities like hunting, farming and butchering wildlife (e.g. Ebola virus); or indirectly from wildlife through livestock to people (e.g. influenza viruses, Nipah virus). Some pathogens have multiple reservoir hosts (e.g. West Nile virus) and may circulate among those in

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16 closer contact with people when the environment is encroached upon. They may also have multiple transmission routes from wildlife to humans (e.g. Nipah virus in Malaysia via pig intermediate hosts, in Bangladesh directly from bats to people).

Figure 2: The origins and drivers of emerging zoonotic diseases and pandemics. Microbes have evolved within species of wildlife over evolutionary time (left). They undergo complex life cycles of transmission among single or multiple host species, and often have significant impacts on host population dynamics ⁵⁵. These microbes become emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) when anthropogenic environmental changes alter population structure of their reservoir hosts, and bring wildlife, livestock and people into contact (center). These interactions can alter transmission dynamics of microbes within their hosts, lead to interspecies transmission of microbes, spillover to livestock and people and the emergence of novel diseases (right). While many outbreaks are small scale or regional, some EIDs become pandemics when zoonotic pathogens transmit easily among people, and spread in rapidly urbanizing landscapes, megacities and travel and trade networks.

Pandemics are a subset of EIDs, and this report reviews the scientific evidence of linkages to biodiversity for EIDs that did not become pandemic (e.g. Ebola), as well as those that did (e.g.

COVID-19), so that patterns affecting both can be used to identify policy options to reduce the opportunities for future EID and pandemic emergence.

Truly global pandemics are catastrophic events that are rare relative to initial spillover, or small- scale outbreaks (Box 1). However, the frequency of the emerging infectious disease events that lead to pandemics is increasing ^11,56. COVID-19 has been likened to the Great Influenza

pandemic of 1918 in its impact, but pandemics occur more frequently than once per century ^1,2. Since 1918, at least six other pandemics have affected public health including three caused by influenza viruses, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, SARS and now COVID-19 ¹⁶. These represent the tip of the iceberg of potential pandemics. Today, a global population of 7.8 billion people has driven medical, industrial and agricultural progress, coupled with rapid demographic, land use, and climate change, replacement of wildlife with livestock and environmental degradation that define the Anthropocene ^15,57,58. The result is increased frequency of wildlife-livestock-human interactions especially in tropical and subtropical regions (low latitudes) rich in diversity of wildlife and their microbes, as shown in field studies of primate, human and livestock interactions and bacterial infections, for example ^59,60. The increased risk of spillover is compounded by land use change and encroachment that bring increasing numbers of people

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17 into rural regions and provide a mechanism for disease amplification and spread. The spillover risk is also enhanced by climate change that perturbs wildlife population dynamics and

distribution ⁶¹ and disrupts the services humans derive from them ⁶². Anthropogenic

environmental and socioeconomic changes have been linked empirically to the emergence of dozens of novel zoonotic pathogens, including: Hendra virus in Australia (land use change);

Nipah virus in Malaysia (agricultural intensification); Ebola virus and Marburg virus in central Africa (wildlife hunting and butchering, land use change and mining respectively); flaviviruses such as Zika and Yellow Fever in South America (land use change, travel and trade) and Dengue in Southeast Asia (urbanization); vector-borne diseases in northern latitudes such as tick-borne encephalitis (climate change); and coronaviruses causing SARS, MERS and COVID- 19 (wildlife trade, livestock production and trade and encroachment and/or land use change respectively) ^9,63-70.

There is also a large number of emerging infectious diseases affecting livestock and wildlife that are driven to emerge by the same factors that drive EIDs infecting people ⁵³. This includes the wildlife disease amphibian chytridiomycosis that spread globally through the trade in wildlife for food, pets, as lab animals and the introduction of invasive alien species ^71-76; and the avian disease highly pathogenic avian influenza, that emerged due to intensification of poultry production and spread through the global trade in poultry, as well as through wild bird movement and the illegal pet trade ^77,78. On a global scale, the origins of emerging diseases correlate with environmental change (in particular land use change), human population density and wildlife diversity 11,13,14,38,42. These global changes increase the risk of repeated spillover of microbes from wildlife to people, and may explain why most emerging infectious diseases and almost all pandemics have been caused by zoonoses ³. Exceptions include the emergence of drug-resistant strains of microbes and some food-borne infections, for example.

Box 1: Pandemics begin as spillover events that cause small outbreaks which grow in scale.

Almost all pandemics start with a single infection event. For zoonoses from wildlife, this is a person, or group of people that made contact with an animal infected by a pathogen that infects them, replicates in their cells and then is transmitted to others. Surveillance data suggest that spillover events happen frequently around the world, but most infections are unable to cause further transmission among people (the burning match in the figure below). Sometimes,

pathogens spill over and are able to transmit to a handful of people, undergoing a few cycles of transmission before the outbreak dies out (the shrub fire below). Where pathogens spread into dense human communities (e.g. COVID-19 within the live animal market and city of Wuhan ¹⁰), and when they are able to easily transmit from person-to-person, they can become pandemics (the forest fire in the schematic). Preventing pandemics will require efforts to reduce the risk each of these stages occurring, through measures that diminish the underlying drivers of

spillover, their spread among people and their ability to move globally through rapidly urbanizing landscapes, megacities and travel and trade networks.

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18 Rising demand for meat consumption and the globalized food trade drive pandemic risk,

through land use change and climate change

The rising demand for meat, particularly in developed countries and emerging economies, has continued to bolster an unsustainable globalized system of intensive production that threatens biodiversity through a range of mechanisms (e.g. land use change, eutrophication), and contributes to climate change ⁷⁹. For example, global demand for meat has indirectly and directly led to deforestation, forest degradation and expansion of pasture in Brazil and other parts of the Amazon ^80-82.

By forming unnaturally dense assemblages of often closely related individuals, livestock farming has historically driven the emergence of pathogens within the domesticated species. However, the increasing expansion of livestock and poultry production, the increase in the size and acreage of farms, and in the number of individual animals at a site have led to increasing potential for transmission of pathogens to people, e.g. the emergence of salmonellosis ⁸³, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) ^84-86 and some strains of antimicrobial resistant pathogens ^87-89. It has also led to pathogen emergence across the wildlife-livestock-human interface ^90-92. For example, the emergence of novel strains of influenza has been linked to reassortment of viral genes following viral transmission among large poultry flocks mixing with wild birds, pig herds and people ^93-95. Rabies cases in Latin America are linked to vampire bats feeding on cattle hosts ^96-98. The emergence of Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in people was due to transmission of a coronavirus that is likely of bat origin ^99-105, but became recently endemic in domesticated camels ^106,107, allowing repeated transmission to people ^108-110.

The intensification of livestock production has also been linked to disease emergence. For example, a lethal zoonotic disease caused by Nipah virus emerged in Malaysia in 1998 when the virus spilled over from fruit bats into pigs ^111,112. The emergence of this virus was enhanced by specific intensive methods of pig production that led to extended transmission of the virus for a 2 year period ⁶⁸. Outbreaks of a novel bat-origin coronavirus (SADS-CoV) caused the death of over 25,000 pigs in southern China in 2017 ¹¹³. This virus is able to infect human airway cells in the lab, and represents a potential zoonotic disease ¹¹⁴. The expansion of wildlife farming for

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19 food and fur led to civets, raccoon dogs and other mammals becoming infected by SARS

coronavirus in Guangdong, China, and potentially acting as an amplification host that allowed the virus to emerge in people in 2002 ¹¹⁵. It is unknown if captive bred animals played a role in the emergence of COVID-19, but after the virus spread globally through movement of people, it infected mink farmed for fur in the Netherlands, Denmark and the USA, and in the Netherlands was able to then cause further human cases ^116,117.

Linkages among consumption, livestock farming, health, habitat destruction, climate change and emerging diseases have led to a number of calls for taxation to act as an incentive to reduce consumption and provide resources to tackle these negative consequences. These include calls for: a ‘meat tax’ on traded meat or meat products to fund zoonotic disease surveillance and prevention from a US Institute of Medicine Committee ¹¹⁸, and analysis of taxation options ¹¹⁹; a tax on meat consumption to provide incentives to reduce climate change ^120,121; a tax on red and processed meat to reduce the direct health consequences of meat over-consumption ¹²²; and a review of a ‘livestock levy’ option to tackle infectious disease threats including the rise of antimicrobial resistance and climate change ¹²³.

Unsustainable consumption drives environmental change, leading to disease emergence The proximate causes, or direct drivers, of biodiversity loss and disease emergence include changes to land use (e.g. environmental degradation, deforestation and land conversion for agricultural production), direct exploitation of organisms, climate change, pollution and invasion of alien species, among others ¹²⁴. They are caused by economic incentives, new patterns of production and consumption, population pressures, culture, ethics and values ^124-126. Cultural, economic, and political aspects of globalization have created new patterns of consumption, contributing to social and economic inequality ¹²⁷. Global demand for specific commodities such as meat, timber, wildlife products (e.g. fur) and others can be linked directly to disease

emergence and in some cases may be preferentially driven by consumption in developed countries. For example, the global demand for palm oil drives substantial deforestation and other land use changes in many tropical developing countries that have been linked to

increased mosquito abundance in disturbed land and rising cases of malaria ^128,129. During the SARS outbreak, raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides) in live animal markets were found to be infected, and are also receptive to SARS-CoV-2 infection ¹³⁰. Raccoon dogs are legally bred in many countries including China, mainly for fur that is exported to supply the fashion industry in countries with high Gross Domestic Product in Europe, North America and other regions.

Invasive alien species introduction has been linked to disease emergence

The anthropogenic introduction of invasive alien species has been recognized as a cause of disease introduction to new regions ¹³¹, and transmission to new hosts including wildlife ^132,133, livestock ^134,135 and people ¹³⁶. The globally significant wildlife disease, chytridiomycosis, has led to amphibian declines and extinctions, and has been definitively linked to a series of

introductions and escapes ^137,138 of amphibians moved internationally for the pet trade ,

laboratory use, farming ⁷¹, or as biological control agents. Substantial efforts have been made to reduce the risk of introduction or control invasive alien species to reduce their conservation impact, and there are increasing efforts to focus on the risk of disease introduction ^139,140. Investing in conservation may avoid exponentially-rising economic loss due to pandemics In addition to widespread suffering and loss of human life, the global economic losses from infectious disease outbreaks in the last decades have been significant ¹⁴¹, with the most

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20 vulnerable economic sectors being the worst affected ¹⁴². Assessments of the economic impact of emerging diseases vary in their methodology and likely accuracy, but point to often significant economic shocks, even for short, relatively regional outbreaks. In West Africa alone, the 2014 Ebola outbreak had an estimated economic impact larger than US$53 billion ¹⁴³. The UNDP in 2017 calculated that the societal and economic cost of the Zika virus in South America and the Caribbean was between US$7 and US$18 billion between 2015 and 2017¹⁴⁴. Estimates from the Asian Development Bank suggest that the cost of a 3-6 month social distancing and travel restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic could cost the global economy between US$5.8 and US$8.8 trillion (6.4-9.7 percent of global GDP) ¹⁴⁵. While the economic damages from COVID- 19 are already substantial, they are likely to continue to rise significantly until vaccines are widely available to contain transmission and reduce costly deaths and economic impacts. The overall cost of pandemics will likely also rise significantly in the future due to the projected increase in frequency of emerging infectious disease events ¹³, and the exponential increase in economic costs associated with them ^56,146-148. The true impact of COVID-19 on the global economy can only be accurately assessed once vaccines are fully deployed and transmission among populations is contained. However, it is likely to be in the tens of trillions of dollars, with estimates of $8-16 trillion globally by July 2020 ¹⁴¹ and $16 trillion in the US by a presumed containment due to vaccination by the 4th quarter of 2021 ¹⁴⁹. If we assume similar costs for other pandemics during the last 102 years (1918 influenza, HIV/AIDS and others) and add the annual burden of largescale emerging diseases (e.g. SARS, Ebola¹⁴⁶ and others), as well as the

$570 billion estimated annual cost of moderately severe to severe influenza pandemics ¹⁵⁰, the cost of zoonotic disease emergence is likely to exceed $1 trillion annually.

The economic damages from emerging diseases are similar in magnitude to those from climate change ¹⁵¹, and can be used to provide a rationale for investing in conservation programs. For example, real options modelling of the rising cost of pandemics was used to identify an urgent (by the year 2041) need to launch a global One Health strategy ¹⁵² to prevent pandemics ⁵⁶. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated that the total annual financial allocation for global biodiversity conservation was between US$78 and 91 billion per year (2015-17 average) ¹⁵³, an investment that represents a fraction of the impact of zoonotic emerging diseases. Estimates of the cost of global strategies to prevent pandemics based on the underlying drivers of the wildlife trade and land use change, and increased One Health surveillance, are between US$22 and 31.2 billion, decreased even further (US$17.7 - 26.9 billion) if benefits of reduced deforestation on carbon sequestration are calculated

141 – two orders of magnitude less than the damages pandemics produce. This provides a strong economic incentive for transformative change to reduce pandemic risk.

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21 Figure 3: Left, Social distancing measures in place at Heathrow Airport amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Passenger traffic at London Heathrow fell by 97% in April 2020 in comparison to the same month of the previous year. Right, Travelers in protective gear walk through a mostly empty John F. Kennedy Airport in New York City during the March-April 2020 travel restrictions (Photo:

Spencer Platt/Getty Images – permission pending).

Reducing anthropogenic impacts in emerging disease hotspots could reduce pandemic risk, protect biodiversity and ecosystem services

Wildlife and microbial diversity, human populations, domestic animals and landscapes are strongly interconnected, with complex dynamic feedbacks that can drive or reduce pathogen transmission. Microbes that exploit these interactions can infect any of these populations separately, and sometimes more than one ⁵³. Their emergence begins with anthropogenic drivers, and their impacts can be exacerbated by human activities. For example the introduction of cattle infected with the disease rinderpest into Africa led to infection of a wide range of

wildlife species, ecosystem disruption at a continental scale and disruption to human settlement

154. The geographic concentration of disease emergence events in specific high biodiversity regions suggests that a key way to control pandemic risk could be to reduce anthropogenic environmental changes specifically in emerging infectious disease hotspots. This would benefit global health, as well as conservation 53,141,155,156. However, there are significant challenges. The business case for nature conservation as a protection against emerging diseases needs to be made in all regions, with a major focus on countries that are under highest risk of disease emergence and have high biodiversity, including many developing countries. It will be critical to better quantify the economic costs of pandemic prevention, and the potential economic benefits, as has been done for biodiversity conservation ¹⁵⁷. Efforts to reduce environmental drivers might affect poorer countries disproportionately through a larger requirement for conservation and restoration thus reducing land use options. This could be addressed by a mechanism to

compensate biodiverse developing countries for avoiding anthropogenic environmental change.

Recent analysis shows that on average, the economic benefits of protecting 30% of the earth’s natural assets outweighs the opportunity costs of alternative land uses ¹⁵⁸. Furthermore, reducing pandemic risks substantially through better management of environmental resources would cost 1-2 orders of magnitude less than estimates of the economic damages caused by global pandemics ¹⁴¹.

Protected area systems to conserve biodiversity could also reduce risk of disease emergence

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22 The cross species transmission that may lead to pandemics depends on contact among wildlife, livestock and humans ^14,159-161, and is increased when land use change drives encroachment of communities into new regions, or livestock farms are set up in new areas, for example ^13,68,162. The reverse is also likely, that the formation of protected areas that prevent increased human activities, settlement, encroachment or introduction of livestock farming, reduce contact and therefore the risk of disease emergence ^44,77,163. Yet, how to systematically prevent increased human activities in or near protected areas remains a challenge given the diversity of social and political contexts in which they are implemented ^163,164.

There may be risks for increasing the flow of pathogens in some landscape conservation approaches. For example, some modelling studies suggest that corridor building strategies to improve wildlife movement may inadvertently increase the flow of pathogens among wildlife leading to disease outbreaks that are a conservation threat ^163,165. However other analyses suggest that for different pathogen-host parameters, the benefits of conservation outweigh the impact of disease spread among endangered species ^166,167. Efforts to design landscape conservation programs that allow for increased wildlife movement, or patterns of agriculture mixed with human settlements and wildlife conservation zones (‘mosaic’ landscapes) may drive increased human-livestock-wildlife contact and zoonotic disease risk ^77,168. Collaboration among conservation biologists and epidemiologists should be strongly encouraged to provide scientific guidance for measures to reduce risk in these cases, such as culling of non-native species that host zoonoses ¹⁶⁹, or launching disease surveillance programs. Furthermore, empirical data that test hypotheses on how different landscape conservation strategies affect pathogen

transmission are scarce, despite their potential value in informing conservation policy ¹⁷⁰. Section 2: land use and climate change as drivers of pandemic risk and biodiversity loss

Here, land use change is defined as the full or partial conversion of natural land to agricultural, urban and other human-dominated ecosystems, including agricultural intensification and natural resource extraction, such as timber, mining and oil. Land use and climate change are two of the five most important direct drivers of biodiversity loss ¹²⁴, and are projected to cause significant future threats to biodiversity and to continue driving the emergence of infectious diseases ^124,171-

173. Changes in land use practices have benefited people through economic and social development, but have also damaged human health, driven biodiversity loss and impaired ecosystem functions and the provision of ecosystem services¹²⁴. Land use change has increased exponentially since the industrial revolution, and through a ‘Great Acceleration’ of Earth System indicators that is considered to mark the beginning of the Anthropocene ¹⁵. Between 1992 and 2015, agricultural area increased by 3% (~35 million ha), mostly converted from tropical forests ¹²⁴. By 2015, human use directly affected more than 70% of global, ice-free land surface: 12% converted to cropland, 37% to pasture and 22% as managed or plantation forests. The remaining land with minimal human use consisted of 9% intact or primary forests, 7% of unforested ecosystems and 12% of rocky or barren land ¹⁷⁴. With continued growth in global human population (a 30% increase from 6 billion in 1999 to 7.7 billion in 2019 ¹⁷⁵) and global consumption (a 70% increase in global GDP from US$84 trillion in 1999 to $142 trillion in 2019), the trend of increased land use change is expected to continue, with potentially 1 billion ha of land cleared globally by 2050 ¹⁷⁶.

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23 Figure 4: Illegal logging on Pirititi indigenous Amazon lands on May 8, 2018 (Photo: quapan/CC BY 2.0).

Land use change is a major global driver of pandemic risk

Land use change is a significant driver of the transmission and emergence of infectious diseases ^40,177-179. Land use change is cited as the cause of over 30% of emerging infectious diseases, and correlates significantly with the emergence of novel zoonoses globally ^13,180. However, the mechanisms by which diseases emerge are context-specific and scale-

dependent. Land use change leads to the loss, turnover and homogenization of biodiversity ^181-

183; it causes habitat fragmentation, creates novel ecosystems and promotes the expansion of human populations into landscapes where Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities have often lived since historical times at relatively low density. These activities create new

opportunities for contact between humans and livestock with wildlife, increasing the risk of disease transmission and the emergence of pathogens 34,59,60,184. Land use change has been linked to outbreaks of EIDs, including Ebola ⁶⁷ and Lassa fever ¹⁸⁵ in Africa, Machupo virus in South America ¹⁸⁶, zoonotic malaria in Borneo ¹²⁹, malaria in Brazil ¹²⁸ and the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 in China ⁹. Wildlife hosts of human pathogens occur at higher levels of species richness and abundance in areas with secondary forest, agricultural and urban ecosystems compared to undisturbed areas, with the strongest effects found in bats, rodents and passerine birds ^40,42. Human dominated habitats favour the invasion and expansion of rodents that are reservoirs for plague, Bartonella spp. bacteria, hantaviruses and other zoonotic pathogens ^41,187-

190. Populations of reservoirs for Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome have increased following deforestation in the Americas ¹⁹¹ and at regional and landscape levels in Central America ¹⁹². Similarly, land use change is linked to increased transmission of vector-borne diseases (albeit some of which are not pandemic threats) such as Dengue fever (with increasing urbanization), Chagas disease ¹⁹³, yellow fever, leishmaniasis ^194,195, Brazilian spotted fever ^196-198 and malaria

128,199. Even the legacy of anthropogenic disturbance can serve as a mechanistic driver of emergence by altering habitat and community structure in ways that shift disease dynamics in wildlife creating novel scenarios for pathogens to jump from wildlife to people ^200,201.

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24 Land use change leads to the loss of animal habitat and deforestation-related activities such as road building contribute to the spread of disease vectors, lead to increased contact among wildlife, people and livestock, and provide pathways for novel diseases to spread ¹²⁸. The economic drivers of land use change in tropical regions are often clearing of land for crop or livestock production, or expansion of human settlements and illegal activities such as gold mining or logging which affect traditional territories ²⁰². This process brings people, livestock and wildlife into closer proximity, increases the risk of spillover and spread of zoonoses ^203,204 and has been linked to specific emerging infectious diseases, e.g. Nipah virus ¹¹². Global expansion of livestock farming has been linked to the emergence of influenza, salmonellosis and bovine tuberculosis ²⁰⁵. Intensive livestock or poultry production can act to reduce overall animal-human contact because of lower number of workers per animal, however intensive production systems are linked to outbreaks of some diseases (e.g. influenza, Nipah virus) and dense animal

populations can amplify these outbreaks ^68,94,206. The trade-offs between low intensity production (larger area used, more connectivity, lower density) and high intensity (smaller area, higher density) are important but are often disease-specific. Reduction of this risk in the short term will likely rely on better surveillance and biosecurity around intensive farms, and efforts to distance domestic animals from wildlife. Longer term policy options that involve reducing consumption and expansion of livestock production are addressed in section 5.

Figure 5: Drone photo of an oil palm plantation in Sabah, Malaysian Borneo. Trees are removed periodically for re-planting, revealing the monoculture nature of palm oil production. Land use change for palm oil in Borneo is linked to the emergence of zoonotic malaria ¹²⁹ (Photo: EcoHealth Alliance).