OLC Memorandum, Amenability of the President, Vice President and other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution while in Office, 24 settembre 1973, p.30

Septeinber 24, 1973

I

^Re: Amenabj l L t y o f t h e Fresident:, V i c e

P r e s i d e n t and o t h e r C i v i l O f f i c e r s t o

i

'

I F c d e r a l C r i m i n a l P r o s e c u t i o n w h i l e i n

i ^---

^{O f f i c e .}

I

T h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a c i v i l . o f f i c e r -. 1/ o f t h e f e d e r a l govermnent call be t h e s u b j e c t o f c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s w h i l e h e i s s t i l l in. o f f i c e b a s b e e n d e b a t e d e v e r s i n c e t h e

e a r 1 i e s . c d a y s o f hhc Z e p u b l i c . T h i s i i l q u i r y r a i s e s t h e foliowLng s e p a r a t e al-though t o some e x t e n t i n t e r r e l a t e d i s s u e s . ^-..- F i r s t ^Y w h e t h e r t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s g o v e r n i n g irnpezchment

,

viewed i n g e n e r a l t e r m s , p r o h i b i t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f f e d e r a l c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s p r i o r t o t h e exhaus t i o n of t h e impeachnent p r o c e s s , Second, i f t h e f i r s t q u e s t i o n i.s answered i n t h e n e g a t i v e , w h e t h e r and t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e P r e s i d e n t a s head o f t h e E x e c u t i v e b r a n c h

0 5 the Govern.rr.,ent i s amenable t o t h e j u r i s c i c t i o n o f t h e f e d e r z l c o u r t s a s a p o t e n i ~ i a l c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t . T h i r d _-->

i f ^:':t-. be d e t e r n i n e d t h a t t h e PresS.dent i s irnmune from c r i m i ~ a l p r o s c c c l t i o n b e c a u s e o f t h e s p e c i a l n a t u r e o f h i s o f f i c e ,

w h e t h e r and t o s h a t e x t e n t s u c h i c m u n i t y i s s h a r e d by t h e Vlcc P r e s i d e n t .

Fiust tfic I m p a c l ~ m e n t P r o c e s s b e Completed E e f o r e CrFi71i a a l

-

P r o c e e d i n g s May be I n s t i t u t e d A g a i n s t a P e r s o n ^- Who i s L i a b l e t o Impeachment?

A . T e x t u a l and H i s t o r i c a l S u p p o r t $ o r P r o p o s i t i p n t h a t Iml>eackment Need Not ? r e c e d e I n d i c t m e n t .

1/ F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f " c i v i l o f f i c e r " as

-

t h a t term i s u s e d i n A r t i c l e

]:I,

s e c t i o n 4 o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , s e e pp.

8-3 -

i n f r a .

I

I

1

1.

Views o f c a r l y c o r m > e n t r ~ t c r s . Articl-e

IT, s e c t i o n

4

of

the C o n s r i t u t s i o n p r o v i d e s :

- "T!le Presiden;:, t h e Vicz Presiderat and a l l C i v i l OffLcers of the U n i t e d States, s h d l be removed

f r o n O f f i c e

on

h p e a e h e n t :or, and

Conviction

of

Treason,

3rLber7, o r o t h e r h i g h crimes a n d I~lfsdemanors. ^{I I}

- ,

-. A r t i c l e I ,

s e c r i o n 3 ,

^clause 7 p r o v i d a s :

...

"3udgoent

in cases

of Lnpeachent: s h a l l n o t extend f u r t h e r than t o

r c ~ o v a l

from O f f i c e , and

disquali-

f i c a t i o n t o h o l d

and

e n j o y

any Of ?ice of honor,

Trust o r P r o f i t

under

t h e U n i r e d States; b u t

the Party

convicted s>xill n e v e r t h e 3 . e ~ ~ be

liable

_and subject _{t o} I n d i c t n e n c , T r i a L , J u d p t n t and

Punlsh-

n m t , a c c o r d k g to

Law,''

The

suggestion has been ~ t l d s that

Article I,

section

3 ,

clause 7 p r o h i b i t s

the i n s t f t u f t ~ n

of

ckLi7hal

proceedinis a g a i n s t a person s u b j e c t to iapeilc';.szent

prior

to t h e ternina-

t b n of

%npeachmlerzt p r s c e e d h g s . ? , / S c p p o r t

for

t h t s n r g u ~ e n t

--

-

itas been s o u g h t in Alexander r t w l i l t o n

'

^a description of

thz

p e r t i n e n t cons

tlrsti~nzl

prs-$ision

LQ

t h e F e d e r a l i s t Nos. 65,

69 and 77, whl'ch ex?!-iiLz t h a t aftzb- rremovzl.

by

way of +ha- p e a c h w n t the offender 3 3

s t l l ? .

l i a b l e to c r h i n a i proszcu-

r i o n in

t h e ozdinary coorse of

la%.

2 / ^{W e} are u s i n g r h e ^tern ' ' t e n h a t i o n of t h e - h p e a c b c n t pro-

-

ceed-ings" _- r a t h e r than "t-ezoval by way a £ i U i i e a c ~ w n t 1 ' i n

viev of

t h e statement i n S t o r y ,

-

C ~ ~ m z n z a r i ~ s on t h e Constitution o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s i Vo1.

X,

s e c , 782, q u o t e d below, chat

. c r l n h a l p r o c e e d b g s

-

ray be instituted, e i t h e r a f t e r an

-

^ac-

quittal o r c o n v i c t i o n in t h e court ^o2 3.i"-peach~ent. T h e con- c l u s i o n t h a t acquittal by t h e S s x i c o d o e s n o t S a r c r i e h a l prosecution follows from t h a c o n s i d e r a t i o n that

such

_an ac- quittal r a y be b a s e d , ss d i v s u s s e d h f r a , on j-xxisdictional g r o u n d s ,

-

^{e.g., t h a t the} d e f e n d a n t is not

a n

o f f l c e r of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t h e constitutional s s n s e , o r oit d i s c r e r i o f i a q grounds,

e.g.,

^{t h a t}

^{t h ~}

d e f e n d a n t no l o n g e r I s

an

o f f i c e r of t h e United S t a t e s and unl-f.'ely t o be rea?pointcd o r

reelected,

o r

on grounds w h i c h are p a r e l y j u r i s d i c ~ i o n a l and p a r t l y sub- s t a n t i v e ,

c.g.,

_{t h a t} the o g f e n s z ^{w a s} n o t of a n h p e a c h a b l e

n a t u r e .

- ^{2 --}

I A r t i c l e

I,

s e c t i o n

3 ,

c l a u s e 7,

however,

does

not

say

I

^{>- t h a t 8 person} s u b j e c t to i q e a c h m n t nay

L e

t r i e d

only after

I the conyletion cf that process, I n s t e a d the

c o n s t i t u t i o m l

I

I p r o v i s i o n uses t h e

term "neverrheless." 3/ The

p u r p o s e

of

t h L o clavue rhtls

is

iso permit criminal p?osecution

Fn

s p i t e

of chs

p r i o r s d f v d i w t i o n by t h e

Senate, - - ^i,e.,

^to forestall,

a

b u b l c ~ j c ~ p a r c i y ~ a r g m n t .

t '

-

- I

^{k speech l a d e b y b;+-har} :-5;rrtin--who had been a

member _of

t h e C m s t i t u t i o c a l Convention--durhg t h e bpeachmmt

proceedirtgs

- of

3ust9cs

Chase ohowa

t h a t Article

I, section 3 ,

c l a d s e : was d e a i g e d to

overcoae a

c l a h

of

double j e o p a r d y ra?hez Chan to require t h a t

i q m c b n t mst pre-

I

cede

any erknkal proceedings. iirnals 0 2

C o n q e s s , 8th Cons.,

26 S e s s

. ,

^col

.

^{4 3 2 .} S - h i l a r l y ^Xr. Justice S C o r y f

eaches

i n

h i s

C o ~ n e r a r i e s oa the

Coostitztian:

-- -

"12 eA.5

^{court of} h p e a c P a e s t s

is ~ K P

^to

I ~

PL~Q~IOUICC a s=teilco. of removal.

from off

ice and

"be L..' other disabiLities7 t h e n

it

5 s h d i s p e n s a b l e tlm:: 2 r o ~ ; ~ i m shoul3 ha w - d e

t h g r

the

coriimn

c r i h u n a ' i s of JustLce sirculd te a@ 21Certy 2 0 e n t a r t a i z jmisdict2c.m

of

the o2f

ence

f o r

the

purpes e .=I # in? liccS.ng

the c w m n

punisiment .

o;;:?llca'c2.e 5s snoff F c q ~ l

oEfw.ders.

Otherwise, . .

iz

m5gSt be

uartcr

^of e x t r e m doubt: w h e t k r ,

consl.stenrly w i t h . t h e p e a t -xFs above acntfmed, e s t a h l - l s h e d f o r L\e

security of t h e life

and

l M v and 1 1 5 e r t y of

t h e c i t i z e n , a second t r i a l

$or g k l e sare o f f e n c e c a u l d ^7%

had,

e i t h e r a f t e r an a c q i t t d

or a

~ c m ~ c t i m ,

in the

court

of

b p e a c h n e n t s . " 'dol.

I,

s e e , 782.

b w l e , zyot'ner e a r l y cocaentator, states

in his

V i e w on the C m s t i t u r i . o n of the _United S t a t e s oE A'nerica ( 1 8 2 9 ) at p.

2iS:

"-

- .

3 / ";his provisdan was

renderzd necessary because

the.:Consti-

-

t u t l o n 1iaits t h e j u d . p ~ a t of iropeachment to rcmoval and .I d i s q u a i - 1 f i c a t i o n , r,~'nilo under P n f i i s h

law

the llouse o f b i d e

! i dLd

a130

ixpose severe criminal sanctions i n c l u d i n ~ t h e

das'c1.l penalty !.a cases of c m v i c t i o n on bpeachmenic.

_{S t o q ,}

1

op. c i t . , V o L .

'i, $ 5

7 8 4 , 7'5; B a w l e , A V i m ot' the Consti-

i

I t u t i o n , p . 2 L 7 .

.!

I

^P - 3 -

I

1 "But t h e o r d i n a r y t r i b u n a l s , a s w e s h a l l see,

I

! .. a r e n o t p r e c l u d e d , e i t h e r b e f o r e o r a f t e r a n

,

i

impeachment, from takLng c o g n i z a n c e o f t h e

1 p u b l i c and o f f i c ' i a l delinquency;"- (Emphasis

j ^{. .} . a d d e d . ) -

.< I

\?. I

'*{ 2 . I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e impeachment c l a u s e by

I o f f l c i a l b o d i e s . The p r a c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e Cons t i -

I '- t u t i o n h a s been t o t h e same e f f e c t . During t h e l t f e o f t h e

i I R e p u b l i c impeachment p r o c e e d i n g s have b e e n i n s t i t u t e d o n l y a g a i n s t 12 o f f i c e r s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . C o n g r e s s i o n a l D i r e c t o r y , 93 Cong., 1 s t S e s s . , p. 4 0 2 . 1 n t h e same t i m e , presumably s c o r e s , i f n o t h u n d r e d s , o f o f f i c e r s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s have been s u b j e c t t o c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s f o r o f f e n s e s f o r which t h e y c o u l d have been impeached.

I t may b e s u g g e s t e d t h a t i t i s no answer t o s a y t h a t i n most i n s t a n c e s t h e o f f i c e r presumably had r e s i g n e d o r b e e n removed by t h e t i m e h e had been t r i e d . I f i t r e a l l y i s

t h e i m p o r t o f A r t i c l e I , s e c t i o n 3 , c l a u s e 7 , t h a t a n o f f i c e r o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s may b e s u b j e c t e d t o c r i m i n a l proceed- i n g s o n l y a f t e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f che impcact~ment p r o c e d u r e , t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r he i s s t i l l i n o f f i c e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e c r i m i n a l t r j - a 1 can b e viewed as i n m a t e r i a l . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t e x t does n o t c o n t a i n xny e x p r e s s e x c e p t i o n t o t h a t e f f e c t . Moreover, r e s i g n a t i - o n o r removal a r g u a b l y does n o t t e r m i n a t e t h e impeachment power a s a m a t t e r o f law.

51

I t i s t r u e t h a t a s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , t h e House o f Repre-

s e n t a t i v e s and t h e S e n a t e a r e r e l u c t a n t t o e x e r c i s e t h e i r t i m e - consuming impeachment f u n c t i o n s a f t e r a c a s e h a s become o f

l e s s moment, b e c a u s e t h e o f f e n d e r i s no l o n g e r i n o f f i c e , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r h e had renounced a l l monetary c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .

5 /

However, b e c a u s e t h e s a n c t i o n s f o r

impeachment i n c l u d e - d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n t o h o l d a f e d e r a l o f £ i c e

,

4 / The C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , A n a l y s i s and

-

I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , S. Doc. No. 39, 8 5 t h Cong., 1st S e s s . , p. 556; H . Rept. 1639, 7 9 t h Cong.,

2d

S c s s . . pp. 38-39.

5 1

S e e t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t S e n a t o r

-

B l o u n t and former S e c r e t a r y o f War Belknap, and H. Rept.

1639, s u p r a , pp. 1 - 2 .

a s w e l l a s removal, a n impeachment p r o c e e d i n g instituted

s u b s e q u e n t t o c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e t e r m , r e s i g n a t i o n , o r d i s m i s s a l , would n o t be a b o o t l e s s a c t . And y e t i t would seem t o b e a n u n r e a s o n a b l e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n oT t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n t o move from

t h e l a t t e r p r o p o s i c i a n t o t h e conc l u s i n n - - n e c e s s a r y under t h e argument t h a t in?peachment must p r e c e d e i n d i c t m e n t - - t h a t a n o f f e n d i n g f e d e r a l o f f i c e r a c q u i r e s a l i f e t h e immunity a g a i n s t i n d i c t m e n t u n l e s s t h e Congress t a k e s t i m e t o impeach

11 _{i n .}

-.

,+,

T h e r e have been s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s o f 1 e g i s l a t i ~ : e a c t i o n s e n v i s a g i n g t h e c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n o f p e r s o n s w h i l e s t i l l i n o f f i c e , and o f t h e a c t u a l i n s t i t u t i o n o f c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t f e d e r a l o f f i c e r s w h i l e i n o f f i c e .

i. S e c t i o n 2 1 of t h e Act 0 2 A p r i l 3 0 , 1790, 1 S t a t .

1 1 7 ,

t h a t a j u d g e c o n v i c t e d of h a v i n g a c c e p t e d a b r i b e " s h a l l f o r e v e r b e d i s q u a l i f i e d t o h o l d any o f f i c e o f h c n o u r , t r u s t o r p r o f i t u n d e r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . " The d i s - q u a l i f i c a t i o n p r o v i s i o n o f t h i s s e c t i o n t h u s i n d i c a t e s t h a t Congress a n t i c i p a t e d c r i m i n a l t r i a l s f o r b r i b e r y - - a n irnpeach- a b l e o f f e n s e - - p r i o r t o a j u d g ~ n m t o f t h e S e n a t e p r o v i d i n g f o r

t h e removal and d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n c f t h e o f f e n d e r . I t s h o u l d b e remembered t h a t t h i s s t a t u t e was e n a c t e d by c h e F i r s t

Congress many members o f s d ~ l c h had been members o f t h e C o n s t i - t u t i o n a l Conventicn. Obviously t h e y , and P r e s i d e n t Washington who approved t h e l e g i s l a t i ~ n , d i d n o t f e e l t h a t i t v i o l a t e d

t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . The d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n c l a s e i s now a p a r t o f t h e g e n e r a l b r i b e r y s t a t u t e and a p p l i e s t o e v e r y a f f i c e r o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . 18 U.S.C.

5

2 0 1 ( e ) .

ii. I n 1796, A t t o r n e y General Lee a d v i s e d t h e House o f ~ e ~ r e s e n t a t i v e s t h a t i f a j u d g e i s c o n v i c t e d o f a s e r i o u s crime h i s "removal from o f f i c e may and c u g h t i:n b e a p a r t o f t h e punishment." H e c o n t i n u e d t h a t , s i n c e t h e j u d i c i a l t e n u r e i s d u r i n g good b e h a v i o r , a j u d g e c o u l d n o t b e r e m v e d u n l e s s l a w f u l l y c o n v i c t e d o f some o f f i c i - a 1 rnLsconduct by way o f

I I i n f o r m a t i o n , o r by an i n d i c t n e n ~ b e f o r e a n o r d i n a r y c o u r t , o r by impeachment b e f o r e t h e S c n a t e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . "

The A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l c ~ n c l u d e d Chat w h i l e i m p e a c h n ~ e n t i " s e e m s , i n g e n e r a l c a s e s , t o b e b e s t s u i ~ e d t o t h e t r i a l o f s o h i g h and i m p o r t a n t an o f f i c e r " i t was n o t tile o n l y method, and i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s hc r e c ~ ~ n e n d e d t r i a l o f t h e j u d g e by i n f o r m a t i o n o r i n d i c t m e n t . 3 H i n d s , P r e c e d e n t s of

the 'rlouse

of

Reprcscntaclves

982-933,

Alner!.can State P a p e r s (;.!isc.) Vol.

I.,

p .

151. The

House C o i r ~ z i t t e e , to _which the rzarter h a d been

referred,

_concurred

in

t l ~ a e : recommendation.

I I i n d s ,

--

< b i d . , Annals 02 Congress, 4th Coag.

,

2d S e s s . ,

col.

2321). IIsrc aqain ^{it w a s felt at} t h a t

early

s t a g e

of

OUT con-

s t 2 m t f o n a l

liEa that, at l e a s t

.In regard Po judges, impeach- ment did

not

have

to precede

tha

instifrution

of criminal

proceedings. Xence,

Congress

could p x o v i d e

f o r r e n ~ v d of a

juiige f o r

bad

Sehavior, evidenced by

a

c r i n k a l

convic,+,iun,

although it has

n o r

done

so,

e x c e p t h t h e

instancs of a bribery convict~on. 61

%if. Circuiz Judga Davis

retirod .i-t 9339

under t h e * p r o v i s i o n s -

of ghat

is no%

28 U.S.C. =LCD). 7 / Borlc-ln,

-

^The

C o r r u p t Judqa,

116. In 1941

_hrr

w s

ia&icted-for

05structing justice

and t r f e d txdcs. 3 3

both cases

the jury

was unable

-

to ag-nze zmd t h e

IndicPmnt

was *dtima"Lly ddismissed.

--

^{I d}

^*

p .

119. On17 *en dld

the Atbolney General request

Congress

PIG hpeadl Judga

D d s ,

T h e Larter theuc2t~r)on

resignal E r o m

o f f i c e

w a i d g

d.1

rarirment

aa.d p a l s i o n rlght3. Sd_,, at p .

120. T h i s

b effeck m0tc4 the need f o r fmpeachment,

but

ar,;=uably not tha power of i z p e a c l ~ s n t . Szs

--

^su7ra.

IT.

Judge A l b e r t W , .32bson w a s

inv~st5,i;a~~d

by a grace? jury

-

n d t e s t i f e e d b s f o r a T"i p r i s r i-3 h3.s r 2 s i g m t i o n f m ofElce, See F i n d h q

0 2

Fzc:;: 2 3

in .7ohnsoz --- v. Unfted

S t a t z s , 1 2 2

C.

21.

100, IOi

( 1 9 5 2 ) .

v. T ~ s

Cepartmnt

cf

21r3.e;lce concluded 5 2370

m

the s'irength

- of

precedents

43 f

m - d $ 2 , ^{E L V ~}r z h a t , ^~

z r h i n a l

proceedings

z d d be t m t i w t z d

a g a h s t

a s i t t h s

^Justfce

^of

t h e 3 ~ p r e m e Court. Slzogaa, A

- ^fZuestinn

^{0 5 Jud,wnt_, 230-233,}

6 / Coanerce Judge Arch'odd w a s

kvesr5gatad by

t h e

Ceparmsnt

.-

of Justice p r i o r to

his

~ h p z a c h i t Fn

1312.

I*L I S ,

howev?r,

not a p p a r a t - whether t h i s was a _fo-m2. g r a d jury fmestiga-

t i o n .

Carpenter, JudieJ.al T e u u r e 5 tho United States,

145;

Shogan,

A

Q ~ e s t i o n of Jud:y.ene,

232.

7/

A

r e t i r e d judga remins i n oE2ice; _{h e} ?ogsssses 'LheiiigSt

-

to receive

the

salary

of h l s office

m d retains Khe capacity

to

perfarm j u d i c i a l

fxnctionu

upon c l e s i p a t f o n and assignment, 28

U.S.C.

294,

v i . C i r c u i t Judge IZerner was r e c e n t l y s u b j e c t e d t o a g r a n d j u r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n , i c d i c t e d , and c o n v i c t e d w h i l e

-

s t i l l i n o f f i c z . The q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s c a n p r e c e d e impeaclment h a s b e e n r a i s e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e o n a p p e a l .

.- I n sum, t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e t e x t o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n and . i t s p r a c t j . c a 1 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n

d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h e t e r m i n a t i o n

02

impeachment p r o c e e d i n g s b e f o r e an o f f i c e r o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s may be s u b j e c t e d t o c r i m T n a l p r o c e e d i n g s . The c a v e a t i s t h a t a l l o f t h e above

i n s t a n c e s c o n c e r n e d j u d g e s , who p o s s e s s t e n u r e u n d e r A r t i c l e

-

111 o n l y d u r i n g good b e h a v i o r , " a p r o v i s i o n n o t r e l e v a n t t o 11

.

^- o t h e r o f f i c e r s . However, a l t h o u g h t h i s c l a u s e may b e t h e b a s i s f o r a c o f i g r e s s i o n a l power t o remove j u d g e s by p r o c e s s e s c t h e r t h a n impeachment, i t i s n o t d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i v e t o t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r impeachment must p r e c e d e c r i m i n a l i n d i c t m e n t , n o r was t h e c l a u s e t h e b a s i s f o r t h e a c t i c n s i n t h e h i s t o r i c

i n s t a n c e s n o t e d above.

B . Troublesome I m p l i c a t i o n s o f a P r o p o s i t i o n t h a t Impeachment ^{;.Ills t} P r e c e d e I n d i c t m e n t .

The o p p o s i t z c o n c l u s i o n ,

-

v i z . , t h a t a p e r s o n who i s

s u b j e c t t o i m p e a c h e n t i s n o t s u b j e c t t o c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n p r i o r t o t h e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e i m p e a c h r e n t p r o c e e d i n g s would c r e a t e s e r i o u s p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t13e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h e c r i - m i n a i law, A s s h a l l b e documented, i n f r a , e v e r y c r i m i n a l t n v e s t i g a t i o n and p r o s e c u t i o l 3 o f p e r s o n s employed by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would g i v e r i s e t o complex p r e l i m i n a r y q u e s t i o n s . These i n c l u d e , f i r s t , w h e t h e r t h e s u s p e c t i s o r w a s a n o f - f l c e r o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i t h i n t h e meaning o f A r t i c l e 11, s e c t i o n

4

o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , and s e c o n d , w h e t h e r

t h e o f f e n s e i s o n e f o r which h e c o u l d b e impeached, T h i r d , t h e r e would a r i s e t r o u b l e s o m e c o r o l l a r y i s s u e s and q u e s t i o n s i n t h e f i e l d o f c o n s p i r a c i e s a n d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e l i m i - t a t i o n s o f c r l ~ t i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s . An i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e Cons t i t u i io n which i r l j e c t s s u c h c o m p l i c a t i o n s i n t o c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s i s n o t l i k e l y t o b e a c o r r e c t o n e . I n d e e d ,

i m p r a c t i c a l o r s e l f - d e f e a t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t e x t s must b e a v o i d e d . The Framers w e r e e x p e r i e n c e d gnd

p r a c t i c a l men. T h i s f a c t , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e p u r p o s i v e s p i r i t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s e t by C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l ,

h a s d i e e n t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h e e n d u r a n c e o f o u r c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l s y s t e m f o r 186 y e a r s .

1, D e f i n i t i o n o f " c i v i l o f f i c e r . " I f l i a b i l i t y t o i m -

-

^{peachment i s a} p r e l i m i n a r y b a r t o c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n t h e

..

^%--. .+ - q G e s t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y a r i s e s as t o who i s a " C i v i l O f f i c e r o f

. - - - t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s " w i t h i n t h e meaning o f A r t i c l e 11, s e c t i o n 4 , o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n . An o f f i c e r o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s b e e n d e f i n e d as a p e r s o n a p p o i n t e d by o n e o f t h e methods p r a v i d e d f o r i n A r t i c l e 11, s e c t i o n 2 , c l a u s e 2 o f t h e Con-

- .

s t i t u t i o n , - i . e . , - by t h e P r e s i d e n t b y a n d w i t h t h e a d v i c e o f S e n a t e , o r , o n t h e b a s i s o f a s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i z a t i o n , by

t h e P r e s i d e n t a l o n e , t h e C o u r t s o f Law, o r a Head o f a D e p a r t - ment. U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307 ( 1 8 8 6 ) .

But as C h i e f J u s t i c e M a r s h a l l , w h i l e s i t t i n g as a C i r c u i t J u s t i c e , p o i n t e d o u t i n F n i t e d S t a t e s v . Mailrice, 2 Brock. 9 6 ,

1 0 3 , 25 Fed. Cas. 1211, 1214 (No. 15747) (C.C. V a .

,

1 8 2 3 ) n o t e v e r y p u b l i c employment i s a n " o f f i c e . " The l a t t e r t e r m

"embraces t h e i d e a s o f t e n u r e , d u r a t i o n , emolument, a n d d u t i e s . "

U n i t e d S t s t e s v . H a r t w e l l , 5 W a l l . 385, 393 ( 1 8 6 7 ) ; U n i t e d -- S t a t e s v . Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511-512 ( 1 8 7 8 ) ; Auffmordt v . H e d d e ~ , 137 U.S. 310, 326-328 ( 1 8 9 0 ) . The n o t i o n o f " o f f i c e "

i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e n s e t h u s presupposes a c e r t a i n d e g r e e o f c o n t i n u i t y , a s ? e c i f i c a t i o n o f d u t i e s , a n d o f c o m p e n s a t i o n . The most i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f t h i s d e f i n i t i o n a p p e a r s t o b e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f t e n u r e and d u r z t i o n . An a s s i g n m e n t which en- v i s a g e s t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f a s i n g l e s p e c i f i c t a s k , o r o f

o c c a s i o n a l a n d i n t e r m i t t e n t d u t i e s , t h e - - a d hoc p o s i t i o n , i s n o r m a l l y n o t c o n s i d e r e d t o b e a n o f f i c e . U n i t e d S t a t e s v.

Germaine, s u p r a ; Auffmordt v . Hedden, s u p r a ; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . M a u r i c e , s u p r a ; 37 Op. A . G . 204; The C o n s C i t u t i o n o f t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America, A n a l y s i s and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , S . Doc.

3 9 , 8 8 t h Cong., 1st S e s s . , pp. 497, 500. - 8 /

8 / I t i s q u e s t i o n a b l e w h e t h e r t h e u s u a l e x c e p t i o n o f t h e a d

-

-

hot p o s i t i o n from t h e t e r m " o f f i c e " i s a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e impeachment power; t h i s r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n v ~ h e t h e r , f o r >

i n s t a n c e , a P r e s i d e n t i a l a g e n t a p p o i n t e d t o p e r f o r m a!single d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n ( S . Doc. 3 9 , s u p r a , pp. 499-5013 c o u l d b e impeached f o r b r i b e r y .

The decislona of cha

Suprem C o u r t d e f i n i n g the term

"officer"

in

the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l sense d i d not

involve

a f u r t h e r l a p o r t a n t element, presumably

because

it was

not

~-

^relevant

Lo the issues

raised in them, -*

viz *

^that

an

o f f i c e r

In

t h e

constitutional

sense

m s t also be

invested w i t h

some

portion of "ehe

sovereim

h n c t i o n s

of the government. Mechap,

A Treatise on the Lau

of

Pxblic, O f f l c d a n d

h b l l c Offfcers,

-

s z c s .

1,

2 , =d

4 ,

and the authorities therein cited,

H.

Tiept.

2205, S5Eh

Cong.,

3d

Sess,, pp.

43-54;

C a h v,

United

States, 73

F,

S q p .

%019, 1321 (N.D., Ill-.,

1 9 4 7 ) ;

22

Cip. A.G.

187;

ⁱ

26 id.

24, 249

(i907). Ic the

words

of

B. Rept.

2205,

at

p. 52,

a

parson e r r p l o y ~ d

in

t h e

Lkecutiie

branch

is an o f f i - cer m l y .If he enforces

the

law i n a manner

so

as

C o

a f f e c t

the rights of the people.

A

person employed

by the United

^' S t a t e s

r h o

= r e l y p e r f o r m

t h e

duties

of an

expert, o r a d v i s e s o r negotiatzs

without

being able

t o

p u t

i n t o

e f f e c t

the re- s u l t of his

advice oft

s ~ g ~ a s t l o n s t h e r e f o r e

Es

noe: a9 o f f l c e r ta r h ~

c m s t i t x t i ~ ~ w l serse. The r e q u f ~ ~ t : t b t an i>f f i c e r 3 w s t be

vented

x i t h s o m

elemznn: of

the

sovereign power of

t h e United Smtas,

necessarfly

cz~0-t~ the vast m j o r i t y oS federal c m p l ~ y e e s C m r ?

the

scope

of

t h e

irqeacfiment

j u r i s d i c -

"Lion. There a r n

9nl3

r e l a t i v e l y f e w persons !,a the Cederax e s t a b l f s b r n ~ ~ t

v b

a c m a f l y have tie power t o make

decisfons

which ccncem the p u b l i c , b u t case-by-casz d e t e z m i w t

ion

c m l d bc

diff

i c d t .

m he questions ;?!-ether the

p o s i t i o n

o:E

a person employed by

&e F e d e r a l Govemient s a t i s f i e s the requirements

of

tenure, d u r a t i o n , emolunent,

and

duties, a d whether any elements of the sovereigrity or' the U n i t e d States are v e s t e d

ia it, frequently

give

rise

to

complex questions of law

m d f a c t , Bence,

if sn

o f f i c e r

of

L l e Linited Staces

cznnot be

proceeded against criminally

p r i o r t o

t h e tennZnation o f

the

Lzeachment proceedings,

those

d i f f i c u l t issues would be In- j e t t e d i n t o

the

c r i m h a i prosecution

or' any

sitting o r

o m e r

f e d e r z l employee $3

order

to determine whether

or nor ^he is

an o f f i c e r i m m e from c r i d n a l

prosecutlon untfl

t r i a l

by

the Senare.

We seriously

q u e s t i o n that

this i s

t h e

true

mart

of the C o s s t i t a t i o n .

2 . O f f e n s e s s u b j e c t t o impeachment. I f i t were

assurned arguendo, d e s p i t e o u r otrn c o n c l u s i o n t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t at1 o f f i c e r of t h e Unitcd S t a t e s i s n o t s u b j e c t t o

c r h i n a 1 proceedings p r i o r t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f impeachment p r o c e e d i n g s , t h e scope o f t h a t immunity n e c e s s a r i l y would be I i m i t e d i-o o f f e n s e s s u b j e c t t o impeachment. Such a n a s s e r t e d r u l e a u t o m a ~ i c a l l y ' would ccreate a n o t h e r d i f f i c u l t -

t o - a d m i n i s t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n a l d e f e n s e ,

-.

^{v i z}

,

whether t h e

o f f e n s e i n q u e s t i o n i s non-impeachable and t h e r e f o r e , s u b j e c t imrrtediately t o c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s .

According t o A r t i c l e 11, s e c t i o n 4 o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , o f f i c ~ r s o f t h e United S t a t e s can b e impeached f o r "Treason, B r i b e r y and o t h e r h i g h Crimes and Plisdemeanors. 11 T h e r e i s no need ^{t g} d e f i n e t r e a s o n and b r i b e r y . But " [ a ] s t h e r e i s

no enumeration of o f f e n s e s comprised under t h e l a s t two c a t e g o r i e s , no l L t t l e d i f f i c u l t y has been e x p e r i e n c e d i n d e f i n i n g o f f e n s e s i r ~ such a way t h a t t h e y f a l l w i t h i n t h e meaning o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s . ^{I t} The C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e i j n i t e d S t a t e s , A n a l y s i s and I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , S . Doc.

No. 3 9 , 8 5 t h Cons., 1st S e s s . , p. 556.

E a r l y commentaiors i n d i c a t e d t h a t "high Crimes and M i s d e m e e z ~ r s " i s a term of a r t i n t e n d e d t o r e a c h wrongs o f a p o l i t i c a l o r o f a j u d i c i e l c h a r a c t e r , n e i t h e r l i m i t e d t o , n o r encoxpassing a l l , i n d i c t a b l e o f f e n s e s .

-

S e e ,

e . g . ,

S t o r y , Conunentari.es

---

^{9 %.}

?it.,

Vol. I , $ 5 749, 764. Some w r i t e r s s t r e s s e d ^{t h e} p o l i t i c a l n a t u r e o f o f f e n s e s o v e r which a

t r i b u n a l f o r t h e t r i a l o f impeachments would have j u r i s d i c t i o n .

111

-

The F e d e r a l i s t , No. 65, Alexander Hamilton e x p l a i n e d :

"A w e l l - c o n s t i t u t e d c o u r t f o r t h e t r i a l o f impeachments i s an o b j e c t n o t more t o b e d e s i r e d rhan d i f f i c u l t t o b e o b t a i n e d i n a government wholly e l e c t i v e . The s u b j e c t s o f i t s j u r i s d i c -

t i o n a r e t h o s e o f f e n s e s which proceed from t h e misconduct o f p u b l i c men, o r , i n o t h e r words,

<+--

-

-a

from t h e a b u s e o r v i o l a t i o n o f some p u b l i c t r u s t . They a r e o f a n a t u r e which may w i t h p e c u l i a r

p r o p r i e t y b e denominated POLITICAL, a s t h e y r e l a t e c h i e f l y t o i n j u r i e s done i m m e d i a t e l y t o t h e

.. ^_..

^.

---

* s o c i e t y i t s e l f . "

. - - -

- The f o l l o w i n g y e a r d u r i n g t h e G r e a t D e b a t e o n t h e Removal Power o f t h e P r e s i d e n t , James Madison s u b m i t t e d t h a t , i f t h e P r e s i d e n t i m p r o p e r l y removed- -

"from o f f i c e a man whose m e r i t s r e q u i r e t h a t h e s h o u l d b e c o n t i n u e d i n i t

* *

^$c h e [ t h e p r e s i d e n t ] w i l l b e impeachable by t h i s House b e f o r e t h e S e n a t e f o r s u c h a n a c t o f maladmin- i s t r a t i o n ; f o r I c o n t e n d t h a t t h e wanton removal o f a m e r i t o r i o u s o f f i c e r would s u b j e c t him t o

impeachment a n d removal from h i s own h i g h t r u s t . "

Annals o f C o n g r e s s , 1 s t Cong., c o l . 498.

I n 1790 and 1 7 9 1 James W i l s o n , a s i g n e r t o t h e D e c l a r a t i o n o f I n d e p e n d e n c e and A s s o c i a t e J u s t i c e o f t h e Supreme C o u r t ,

i n h i s law l e c t u r e s , d e f i n e d t h e t e r m " h i g h misdemeanors"

as m a l v e r s a t i o n i n o f f i c e - 91 and h e a s s e r t e d :

" I n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and i n P e n n s y l v a n i a , iinpeach- ments a r e c o n f i n e d t o p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r s , t o

p o l i t i c a l c r i m e s and misdemeanors, a n d t o p o l i t i - c a l punisfiments." The Works o f James W i l s o n ^{- 9} V o l . 2 , pp. 1 6 5 , 166.

91 M a l v e r s a t i o n h a s been d e f i n e d as m i s b e h a v i o r i n o f f i c e . -

; o w i t t , D i c t i o n a r y - o f E n g l i s h Law.

Story's detailed discussion of the rules governing

impeachment, 9. "it. ^{(Vol. I,} secs. 742-813), also stresses the political nature of impeachable offenses, and assigns this as the reason why they are to be tried before a tribunal more familiar with political' practices-than the courts of law. See, e.g., secs. 749, 764-765, 800. He also points out that offenses subject to impeachment necessarily cannot be limited to statutory crimes.g/ He explained that if--

> *;

"the silence of the statute-book '[is] to be deemed conclusive in favor of the party

until Congress.have made a Legislative decla- ration and enumeration of the offences which shall be deemed high crimes and misdemeanors

.L .L

* the power of impeachment, except as to the two expressed cases, is a complete nullity, and the party is whoily dispunishahle, however, enormous may be his corruption or criminality.

10/ Section 800 contains

a

recapitulation of the numerous

- offenses which in English history had been subject to I

impeachment. They included: Mislesding the King with un- constitutional opinions; attempts to subvert the fundamental, laws, and introduce arbitrary powers; attaching the great seal to an ignominious treaty; negl-ect

to

safeguard the sea by a lord admiral; betrayal of his trust by an ambassador,

propounding and supporting pernicious and dishonorable measures by a privy counsellor; the receipt of exorbitant grants and incompatible employments by

a

confidential adviser'to the King. While Story felt that certain impeachments were unduly harsh and understandable only in the light of their age, such as giving bad counsel

to

the king, advising a prejudicial

peace, enticing the king

to

act against the advice of Parliament, purchasing offices, giving medicine to the king without advice of physicians, preventing other persons from giving counsel to the king except in their presence,

and

procuring exorbitant personal grants from the king, he suggested that others were founded in the most salutary public justice; such as impeach- ments for malversations and neglects in office, for encouraging pirates, for official oppression, extortfons, and decc$its,

and especially for putting good magistrates out of off-ice

and advancing bad ones.

I r w i l l n o t be s u f f i c i e n t t o s a y t h a t , i n t h e c a s e s where any o f f e n c e i s punished by any

s t a t u t e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , i t may and o u g h t t o be deemed a n impeachable o f f e n c e . It i s n o t e v e r y o f f e n c e t h a t by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i s s o impeachable. i t must n o t o n l y be a n o f f e n c e , b u t a h i g h crime and misdemeanor." S e c t i o n

796.

(Underscoring s u p p l i e d ) . ^r , !

I Yet t o c i t e t h e s e commentators and s a y t h a t impeachments

1

! . . ^" a r e t h o u g h t by some t o be c o n f i n e d t o wrongs of a p o l i t i c a l

I

I

c h a r a c t e r more a p t l y c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e p r o c e s s t h a n d e f i n e s I t h e o f f e n s e . I n s h o r t , i t begs t h e q u e s t i o n f o r a " p r i v a t e "

-< 1

I - o f f e n s e , o f t h e s o r t t h a t a n o n - o f f i c e r may a l s o commit,

1

may have g r o s s p o l i t i c a l r a m i f i c a t i o n s i f t h e p e r p e t r a t o r i s a p u b l l c o f f i c e r . I s a n o f f e n s e t h a t b r i n g s a n o f f i c e i n t o d i s r e p u t e and r e n d e r s i t d y s f u n c t i o n a l a " p o l i t i c a l "

o f f e n s e ?

I

I ! D i s r e g a r d i n g a f u n c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s o f t h e impeachment c l a u s e suggested by t h e above q u e s t i o n , W i l l i a m Rawle, a n o t h e r e a r l y commentator, t o o k a narrow view of t h e t e r m

"impeachaLle

offenses."

He would r e s t r i c t i t t o o f f e n s e s committed w h i l e p e r f o r m i n g t h e d u t i e s of t h e o f f i c e ?

I T T h e l c g l t i m a t e c a u s e s o f impeachment have been a l r e a d y b r i e f l y n o t i c e d . They c a n o n l y have r e f e r e n c e t o p u b l i c c h a r a c t e r and o f f i c i a l d u t y . The words of t h e t e x t a r e t r e a s o n , b r i b e r y , and o t h e r h i g h c r i m e s and misdemeanors. The t r e a s o n c o n t e m p l a t e d m u s t b e a g a i n s t t h e United S t a t e s . I n g e n e r a l t h o s e o f f e ~ c e s which may be committed e q u a l l y by a p r i v a t e p e r s o n a s a p u b l i c o f f i c e r , a r e n o t he s u b j e c t s of impeachment. Murder, b u r g l a r y , r s b b e r y , and i n d e e d a l l o f f e n c e s n o t im%edi.ately c o n n e c t e d w i t h o f f i c e , e x c e p t

t h e two expressly mentioned, a r e l e f t t o t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e of j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g , and n e i t h e r house c a n r e g u l a r l y i n q u i r e i n t o them, e x c e p t f c r t h e p u r p o s e of e x p e l l i n g t h e member

View

on t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of - t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s

o f America (1829) a t 215.

C e r t a i n l y , a c a s e c a n be made t h a t i f impeachment

i s a p r o c e s s by which t h e f a i t h i n and i n t e g r i t y and e f f e c - t i v e n e s s of t h e o f f i c e of a n o f f e n d i n g incumbent c a n b e r e s t o r e d , G / o f f e n s e s which t e n d t o b r i n g t h e o f f i c e i n t o d i s r e p u t e o r r e n d e r i t d y s f u n c t i o n a l s h o u l d be i m p e a c h a b l e w h e t h e r o r n o t committed i n a n o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y . The

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l remedy must he com-nensurate w i t h t h e c o n s t i - t u t i o n a l need. E x t o r t i o n o r f o r g e r y committed i n p r i v a t e t r a n s a c t i o n s seemingly h a s j u s t a s enormous a n impact on t h e g f f i c e a s does b r i b e r y . A s t h e Supreme Court of

L o u i s i a n a r e c e n t l y s a i d i n a c a s e i n v o l v i n g a s t a t e impeach- ment, b e c a u s e t h e r e i s "a deep and v i t a l i n t e r e s t " i n t h e o f f i c e oE J u d g e

. .

t h e o f f i c i a l c o n d u c t o f j u d g e s , a s w e l l a s t h e i r p r i v a t e c o n d u c t , i s c l o s e l y o b s e r v e d . When a j u d g e , e i t h e r i n h i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c l t y o r a s a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n , i s g u i l t y of s u c h conduct a s t o c a u s e o t h e r s t o q u e s t i o n h i s c h a r a c t e r and m o r a l s , t h e p e o p l e n o t o n l y

l o s e r e s p e c t f o r him as a man b u t l o s e r e s p e c t f o r t h e c o u r t o v e r which h e p r e s i d e s a s w e l l . "

- -

I n r e H a g g e r t y , 241 So. 2d 469 (La. 1970).

--

See a l s o A . Simpson, F e d e r a l Impeachments 50-53.

I n The a r g u x e n t upon S l o u n t ' s impeachment, i t w a s p r e s s e s w i t h g r e e t e a r n e s t n e s s t h a t t h e r e

i s n o t ³ s y i l a b l e i n t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n which con- f i n e s impeachments t o o f f i c i a l a c t s , and i t i s a g a i n s t t h e p l a i n e s t d i c t a t e s o f common-sense

I

i

, ..

i . .

i , . . !

-

11/ Congressman Summers, Chairman of t h e House J u d i c i a r y Com-

i

i m i t t e e , who was t h e Nanager of t h e impeachment of d i s t r i c t

! . . j u d g e H a i s t e d F . i r t e r i n 1.936 viewed t h e impeachment f u n c t i o n

I . a s d e p e n d i n g on t h e e f f e c t of t h e o f f e n s e on t h e o f f i c e : W e

.

. . .

i do n o t assume t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f p r o v i n g t h a t t h e

. 1

1 : ;

r e s p o n d e n t

i s

g : - ~ i l t y of a c r i m e a s t h a t t e r m i s known s o c r i m i n a l

I :. I j u r i s p r u d e n c e . We do assume t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f b r i r l g i n g

I 1

b e f o r e you a c a s e , proven f a c t s , t h e r e a s o n a b l e and p r o b a b l e

I i ! consequences of which a r e t o c a u s e p e o p l e t o d o u b t t h e i n t e g r i t y

1 i

o f t h e r e s p o n d e n t p r e s i d i n g a s a judge ^{. ' I} 8 0 C=. Rec. 5469,

! -.

5602-06 ( 7 4 t h Cong. 2d S e s s . 1936).

! !

! I

!

-

^{1 4 . -}

:

[

I n c o n f r o n t i n g t h i s i s s u e , J u s t i c e S t o r y i n h i s Commen- t a r i e s c h o s e t h e s a f e s t c o u r s e and p r e s e n t e d t h e a r g u m e n t s w i t h o u t r e s o i v i n g t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r impeachment s h o u l d be

i

c o n f i n e d t o o i f i c i a l a c t s :

t h a t s u c h r e s t r a i n t s h o u l d be imposed upon i t . Suppose a judge s h o u l d c o u n t e n a n c e o r a i d

i n s u r g e n t s i n a m e d i t a t e d c o n s p i r a c y o r i n s u r - r e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e government.- - T h i s . i s n o t a j u d i c i a l a c t , and y e t i t ought c e r t a i n l y t o be i m p e a c h a b l e . He may be c a l l e d upon t o t r y t h e v e r y p e r s o n s whom h e h a s a i d e d , Suppose a j u d g e o r o t h e r o f f i c e r t o r e c e i v e a b r i b e n o t c o n n e c t e d w i t h h i s j u d i c i a l o f f i c e , c o u l d h e be e n t i t l e d t o any p u b l i c c o n f i d e n c e ? Would n o t t h e s e L r e a s o n s f o r h i s removal be j u s t a s s t r o n g a s i f i t were a c a s e of a n o f f i c j a l b r i b e ? The argument on t h e o t h e r s i d e was, t h a t t h e power o f impeachment was s t r i c t l y c o n f i n e d t o c i v i l o f f i c e r s of t h e U n l t e d S t a t e s , and t h i s n e c e s s a r - i l y i m p l i e d t h a t

i r

must be i i n i i t e d t o malconduct i n .off i c e .

$805. It i s noc i n t e n d e d t o e x p r e s s a n y o p i n i o n i n t h e s e cominentaries a s t o which i s t h e t r u e e x p o s i t i o n o f t h e C o n s r i t u t i o n on t h e p o i n t s above s t a t e d . They a r e b r o u g h t b e f o r e

t h e l e a r n e d r e a d e r a s x a t t e r s s t i l l sub j u d i c e , t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n of which may be r e a s o n a b l y l e f t t o t h c h i g h t r i b u n a l c c n s t i t u t i n g t h e c o u r t o f impeachment when t h e o c c s s i o ~ s h a l l a r i s e . C o m e n t a r i e s , o p . c i t .

§ s

^804, 805 (1833).

I

One hundred and f o r t y y e a r s l a t e r , t h e q u e s t i o n con-

I

c e r n i n g what c r i m i n a l s t a t u t o r y ~ f f e n s e s c a n be made t h e s u b j e c t o f impeachment p r o c e e d i n g s remains open. F o r t h e

I

o f f e n s e s n o t f a l l i n g w i t h i n t h e impeachment j u r i s d i c t i o n ,

I t h e o f f e n d e r / o f f i c e r c o u l d be p r o s e c u t e d even i f t h e

i C o n s t i t u t i o n p r e c l u d e d t h e c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n of impeachable

I

I o f f e n s e s p r i o r t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f Lmpezchment. However,

1

i f impeachment were i n d e e d a c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t t o c r i m i n a l

i

^' p r o s e c u t i o n , a p e r s o n a c c u s e d of a common o f f e n s e committed w h i l e i n t h e employment o f t h e [ l n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d p l e a d

1 t h a t t h e o f f e n s e was of a p o l i t i c a l n a t i ~ r e and t h a t h g c o u l d n o t be p r o s e c u y e d p r i o r t o t h e c n n c i u s i o n o f impeachm&t

j p r o c e e d i n g s . T h i s would i n j e c t i n t o t h e t r i a l o f a c r i m i n a l

I c a s e t h e d e l i c a t e i s s u e of what

i s

a p c l i t i c a l o r impeachable

i

o f f e n s e , a n d what c o n s t i t u t e s a common no;-impeachable. c r i m e . ,

F~:rther, thFs delicate issue seemingly would be before the wrong fcrum (see Story quotation above). The actual, power to impeach

--

^{ve3. non --} jn every instance rests with the House of Representatives and not with the courts.

A~id this c~ngressional power

--

laying aside the possible

,.

outcome in sore future instance of alleged gross abuse

--

subsumes within it the threshhold issue of determining

.

whether an offense is impeachable. ,In a criminal proceeding a judicial conclusion in favor of the impeachable nature of the offense would oL course, not require the House of Representatives to impeach or the Senate to convict. In-

deed, a number of considerations might induce nonaction by

- the Congrcss even ir' an "offense" were held by a court to be impeachable (and therefore a jurisdictional bar to indict- ment), g.~., (1) higher legislative priorities for other

business

--

legislation, treaty approvals, confirnations of Eippointments, investigations,

(2)

political pressures not to act,

(3)

lnappropriatness of a political trial for

the given offense,

(4)

an estimate of ultimate failure tc garner the necessary simple majority in the House and two- thirds vote in the Senate, thereby precluding the attempt,

(5)

a desire not to exacerbate political relations because of the adverse effect on governmental concerns.

For the ebove reasons,

a

rule that impeachment must precede

indictment

could operate to impede, if not bar, effec~ive prosecution of offending civil of.ricers. The sensible course, as

a

general proposition, is to leave to the j~dicicry the triel of indictable criminal offenses, and to Congress

the

scope of the overlapping impeachment jurisdiction. The gross impracticalities of a rigid rule that impeachment precede indictment demonstrate that it would be an unreasonable, and imprcper construction of

the Constitution.

3.

Problerr,~ presented by corollary issues. There are also reasons of a corollary nature which counsel against the conclusion that impeachment proceedings must be completed before a civil officer may be subjected to criminal proceedings.

5=

(a) During a grand jury investigation, it may appear for instance, that one of several co-con- spirators is an officer of the United States

as was the case in Johnson v. United States, supra-.'

1 I -+'

~t would seriously interfere with the investigation -

,-

if it had to be suspended in respect to that officer,

or indeed as to the other co-conspirators, until

I I

the termination of impeachment pxoceedings. The

1

I alternative is equally unappealing. If evidence

- were nonetheless presented in respect to the other

1 ^* * - . - - -

co-conspirators, serious charges would inevitably

-..-

be levied against the civil officer who would not

! have the opportunity in a judicial tribunal to

clear himself. Further, if the civil officer actually

I

is involved in the conspiracy, his nonparticipation

1 at trial could impede prosecution of the co-conspirators.

I

(b) A similar consideration is presented by the 1 statute of limitations. If an officer cannot be

I i

prosecuted prior to impeachment, the criminal statute

1

of limitations could easily run in his favor, If

1 his immunity blocked effective prosecution of co- conspirators, the statue of limitations might run in their favor too. The Criminal Code does not con- tain and, to our knowledge, never has contained a section providing for the suspension

of

the statute of limitations in the case of an officeholder until the termination of impeachment proceedings. The

1 absence of such provision suggests Congress has

1 considered suc.11 a rule to be unnecessary. Such

I

practical interpretation of the Constitution is en-

I

i titled to great consideration. Stuart v. Laird,

1

1

Cranch 299, 309 (1803)

;

Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,

i 691 (1892); United States v. Plidwest Oil Coo 236 U.S. 459, 472-473 (1915); United States

v.

Curtlss-

I

Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 328-329 (1936).

In sum, an interpretation of the Constitution which requires the completion of impeachment proceedings before a criminal prosecution can be instituted would enable

persons who are or were employed by the Government to raise

a

number of extremely technical and complex defenses. It

also would pressure Congress to conduct

a

large numbel;,of

impeachment proceedings which would weigh heavily on

its

limited time. Such an interpretation of the Constitution

is

prima facie erroneous.

*,+. ^,

--

If3 t h e P r e s i d e n t Amenable

-

t o

Criminal

Psocccdin:,~ i : h i l c i~ O f fice'l

T i i s past

sf

the

merusrmdun

d e e l m wEth

t h e question u h c t l ~ e r

^-0

% f i a t

extent t h e President

is imme from

c r i r n h a l

prosecution w h i l e

he

_{t o}

in office.

I t

has

been suggested IrP t h e

preceding pare

^that A r t i c l e

T, sec. 3,

clause 7

of

_fi-e ConstitutFon does

n o t

s e q u i r e the

exhsuatLon of t h e . 5 r ~ w t h i n ~ ~ t

^process befora sll

o f f i c e r of the

k i t e d StaL63 can It@ subjected to

e r h i n a l

p m c e c d h g i ,

The

ques-

",ion

therefore

a r i s e s whether

an

Fnnrmnfty

of

the

P r e s i d e n t f corn erFm%nel

pt-oceed4in;:s

can be

j u s t i g i e d

on ocher:

graunds

,

fn

particular the

consideration

t h e t the

resident's

sub- j e c t i o n to

the jurisdiction of

the courts

v~oirbd be tnconsbs-

tent

w i t h h i s p o s i t i o n

as head

of t h e Executive branch.

re I--

^{~ + b =} BSPZCL i n d i c a t e d

above t h e c there is

no express provisFon

ha

the

C o n s r l n t t i o n which cafiferu

such imaimity upon the

President. Inusmuch

a s

Article I,

s e c . 6 , clause

1

expressly p h ~ v i d e ~

for

n limited hm.mLty

of t h e

members

of

the legislative _branch,

it could be argued

chat,

- -

^e

c o ~ : r r n r i o ,

the P r e s i d e n t I s

not ~ ~ t i t l e d

to

any b i m n i c y

^at

a l l . , g/

This p r o p o s i t i o n , however,

is

not

necessarily

conclusive; it c o u l d be ssFd w i z i r

eqtral validity

t h a t Areic'he

I,

s e c . 6 ,

clzuse 1

does

not:

^GO jfer any h m m i t y upcm t h e

menbers of

C

a n z r e s s ,

but rather

limits

rhe c'crnplete Lm?i?writy froxi

judicial

proceeuLngs

which

they _oChemise w-cmld

enjoy

na

members of

a brznch co-equal with tile

judiciary.

1 I

12/ In

h i s s g e e c h of

March

5 ,

1800 on The floor of

t h e Senate,

.I

-

Senator Piclcney, a former Member

sf

the

Conscltutional Conven-

I

sLon, suggested

t h a t tho f a i l u r e to

provide for

a

P r e s i d e n t l a 1 immunity

was d e l i b e r a t e .

Annals of Congress, 6th Cong.,

c o i .

74;

Farrand, Records o f t h e

Federal

Convention YoL.

XI&,

pp.

384, 385.

; ,

,

_:. -

.-.

, _.*- ..

,

^{I-' I}