PhD-FDEF-2020-02
The Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO Dipartimento di Diritto privato e Storia del
diritto
Corso di Dottorato in Diritto comparato, privato, processuale civile e dell’impresa
XXXII ciclo
Curriculum in Diritto del lavoro – Labour Law
DISSERTATION
Defence held on 20/01/2020 in Milan to obtain the degree of
DOCTEUR DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG EN DROIT
AND
DOTTORE DI RICERCA IN DIRITTO DEL LAVORO
by
Giulia M ARCHI
Born on 3 July 1990 in Bologna (Italy)
SOCIAL CLAUSES IN OUTSOURCING PROCESSES.
S OCIAL RIGHTS VERSUS ECONOMIC FREEDOMS IN THE PRISM OF THE MULTILEVEL LEGAL ORDER
Dissertation defence committee
Dr Maria Teresa Carinci, dissertation supervisor
Professor, Università di Milano
Dr Luca Ratti,dissertation supervisor
Professor, Université du Luxembourg
Dr Franco Scarpelli, Chairman
Professor, Università di Milano-Bicocca
Dr Giovanni Orlandini
Professor, Università di Siena
Dr Vincenzo Ferrante,
Professor, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Dr Joana Mendez
Professor, Université du Luxembourg
SOCIAL CLAUSES IN OUTSOURCING PROCESSES.
SOCIAL RIGHTS VERSUS ECONOMIC FREEDOMS IN THE PRISM OF THE MULTILEVEL LEGAL ORDER
CHAPTER I
THE FISSURED WORKPLACE AND THE WORKERS’ NEED FOR PROTECTION
1. The needs of workers’ protection in outsourcing processes ... 5 2. Origin, development and classification of social clauses in the global market.. 8 3. The linkage between fundamental rights and the market in international free trade agreements ... 12 4. Structure of the thesis ... 16
CHAPTER II
EQUAL TREATMENT SOCIAL CLAUSES: THE EQUAL TREATMENT OF WORKERS IN PROCUREMENT AND SERVICE PROVISION CONTRACTS
1. The international regulation: ILO Convention n. 94/1949 as a model for social clauses in public procurement contracts ... 21 2. The linkage between the economic interests of public administrations and the protection of workers: art. 36 of Workers’ Statute ... 23 3. Social considerations in the EU directives on public procurement ... 26 4. Social obligations in the Italian implementation of EU directives: the Code of Public procurement contracts ... 33 5. The equal treatment principle in private procurement contracts in Italy ... 37 6. The role of collective bargaining: effectiveness of equal treatment social clause in Italian collective agreements ... 39
CHAPTER III
REHIRING SOCIAL CLAUSES: THE TURNOVER IN THE PROCUREMENT CONTRACT AND THE PROTECTION OF EMPLOYMENT
1. The frequent turnover of contractors in the execution of contracts ... 43 2. Rehiring social clauses and transfer of undertakings: the notion of economic entity in the light of the Court of Justice case law ... 46 3. Employers’ turnover in service provision and transfer of undertaking: art. 29, co. 3, Legislative Decree no. 276/2003 ... 53
4. The role of collective bargaining in service provision change: varieties and effectiveness of protection techniques ... 57 5. The consequences of the application of rehiring social clauses on redundancy legislation: dismissals, exemptions from redundancy benefits and length of service ... 64
6. Employers’ turnover in public procurement contracts ... 68
CHAPTER IV
COMPATIBILITY ISSUES BETWEEN SOCIAL CLAUSES AND ECONOMIC FREEDOMS IN THE ITALIAN LEGAL ORDER
1. Right to work and private economic initiative ... 73 2. The social clauses to the test of the constitutional principles ... 77 2.1. The pursuit of public interest and the protection of employees in the award of public procurement contracts ... 78 2.2. Rehiring clauses and free economic initiative in the Code of public procurement contracts ... 80 2.3. The reference to collective agreements and the entrepreneurs’ freedom of association... 84 2.4. Consequences of failure to apply the collective agreement and effects on social dumping ... 86
CHAPTER V
COMPATIBILITY ISSUES WITH THE EU LEGAL ORDER: PROBLEMS AND CONFLICTS
1. Economic freedoms and social protection in EU law: a difficult balance ... 93 1.1. Art. 9 TFEU and the protection of social rights: the so-called horizontal social clause ... 94 1.2. Social policies and the EU common commercial policy ... 97 1.3. Freedom to provide services: justifications for restrictions to fundamental freedoms and the principle of proportionality ... 100 1.4. The protection of competition in the internal market and the collective bargaining ... 106 1.5. The freedom to conduct a business in Article 16 of EU Charter of Fundamental Rights... 109 2. In search of a balance between competition and social objectives ... 112 2.1. Minimum wages and restrictions on the freedom to provide services: from Rüffert to Regiopost ... 113
2.2. The protection of employment in the light of the principle of market access ... 119
CONCLUSIONS ... 123
BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 129
CHAPTER I
THE FISSURED WORKPLACE AND THE WORKERS’ NEED FOR PROTECTION
SUMMARY: 1. The needs of workers’ protection in outsourcing processes. - 2. Origin, development and classification of social clauses in the global market. - 3. The linkage between fundamental rights and the market in international free trade agreements. - 4.
Structure of the thesis.
1. The needs of workers’ protection in outsourcing processes
As widely acknowledged by scholars, there have been many transformations in the organization of the workplace in recent decades1.
While in the “traditional” Fordist model the companies directly carried out all the phases of the production process, today companies increasingly externalize and outsource the activities not strictly connected to the core business of the company and purchase goods and services traditionally performed in-house.
The reasons behind this choice may be different: the diverse specialization of companies, the possibility of adapting their production process to meet the rapidly changing market demand, to handle sudden or temporary reductions or increases in demand, or to reduce labour costs2. Technological progress has certainly facilitated such outsourcing processes3.
According to the neo-institutionalist economic theories, the companies prefer to purchase goods and services on the market, using supply and service contracts as cost- cutting measures. The choice of the entrepreneur to buy the productive factors rather
1 Indeed, «the modern workplace has been profoundly transformed», as stressed by WEIL D., The Fissured Workplace. Why work became so bad for so many and what can be done to improve it, Harvard University Press, 2014, 19 ss.
2 See AIMO M., IZZI D., Decentramento produttivo ed esternalizzazioni nell’era dell’impresa a rete:
note introduttive, in AIMO M.,IZZI D. (a cura di), Esternalizzazioni e tutela dei lavoratori, Utet, Torino, 2014, XVIII; DE LUCA TAMAJO R., Diritto del lavoro e decentramento produttivo in una prospettiva comparata: scenari e strumenti, in RIDL, 2007, I, 3 ss; SPEZIALE V., Le «esternalizzazioni» dei processi produttivi dopo il d.lgs. n. 276 del 2003: proposte di riforma, in RGL, 2006, I, 3 ss; CORAZZA L., Contractual integration e rapporti di lavoro, Padova, 2004; CORAZZA L., Contractual integration, impresa e azienda, in DLRI, 1999, 385 ss; QUADRI G.,Processi di esternalizzazione: tutela del lavoratore e interesse dell’impresa, Jovene, 2004; LO FARO A., Processi di outsourcing e rapporti di lavoro, 2003, dattiloscritto; DEL PUNTA R., Mercato o gerarchia? I disagi del diritto del lavoro nell’era delle esternalizzazioni, in Dir. Mer. Lav., 2000, 49 ss; AA.VV, Diritto del lavoro e nuove forme di decentramento produttivo. Atti delle giornate di studio di diritto del lavoro Trento, 4-5 giugno 1999, 1999;
MARIUCCI L., Il lavoro decentrato. Discipline legali e contrattuali, Milano, 1979.
3 WEIL D.,The Fissured Workplace, 27 ss. FERRUGGIA A., Le esternalizzazioni «relazionali» nel decentramento di attività dell’impresa, in RGL, 2013, 4, 809, who underlines «la progressiva perdita di consistenza del “profilo attrezzistico e impiantistico” delle produzioni contemporanee e la crescita di rilievo del know how e delle dotazioni immateriali nella determinazione di valore aggiunto di beni e servizi hanno concorso nella direzione di consolidare lo schema di un’impresa leggera».
than to carry out the activities in-house is based on transaction costs and on the assessment of the economic convenience: he will outsource whether it will turn out to be more convenient compared to employment contracts within a hierarchical internal structure4.
In some scholars’ opinion, the so-called relational contract theory is more suitable to describe those outsourcing and workplace fragmentation phenomena. According to such theories, long-term relationships such as supply and service contracts are characterised by the collaboration between the enterprises, which is based on “non-contractual”
relationships and informal agreements, founded on loyalty, cooperation or influence5. Such business integration is particularly problematic when it takes on a hierarchical form, because of the dependence caused by the «hierarchical forms of outsourcing», in which a company is in a dominant position. In particular in this respect, there is the need for introducing specific protections for workers6.
More generally, due to the seeking of economic efficiency, the workers affected by the outsourcing processes turn out to be particularly weak and their contractual weakness increases, since they aren’t directly employed by the user company7. Usually, the workers employed in the so-called «fissured workplace» are more vulnerable, as a result of the decision of the company not to perform directly all the production phases and to entrust services to other companies. These practices result in a competition between such enterprises, which often is based on labour cost and working conditions8.
Furthermore, the globalization has produced significant changes in the production processes and the organization of work. Considering the decentralization in the global market, the internationalization of markets, the regulatory competition that allows the employers to select the most convenient legal order, the social dumping and the other risks connected to law shopping practices, the need for fundamental social rights protections is even more evident. Such practices aimed at fostering competitiveness generate a “competitive devaluation” of social rights with the view of attracting investments and making economic operators more competitive at international level9.
4 COASE R. H., La natura dell’impresa, in Impresa, mercato e diritto, Il Mulino, 1995, 73 ss;
WILLIAMSON O. E., Markets and Hierarchies: some elementary considerations, in The American Economic Review, 1973, 63, 2, 316 ss. See also, in Italian literature,DEL PUNTA R., Mercato o gerarchia?
I disagi del diritto del lavoro nell’era delle esternalizzazioni, 49 ss; ICHINO P., Il diritto del lavoro e i confini dell’impresa, in DLRI, 1999, 220 ss; CORAZZA L., Contractual integration, impresa e azienda, 385 ss.
5 FERRUGGIA A., Le esternalizzazioni «relazionali» nel decentramento di attività dell’impresa, 809 ss;
LO FARO A., Processi di outsourcing e rapporti di lavoro, 37 ss; D.CAMPBELL,The Relational Theory of Contract: Selected Works of Ian Macneil, London, 2001; BAKER G., GIBBONS R., MURPHY K. J., Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002,117, 1 39 ss; RULLANI E., La teoria dell’impresa nei processi di mondializzazione, in Dem. dir., 1988, p. 69.
6 FERRUGGIA A., Le esternalizzazioni «relazionali» nel decentramento di attività dell’impresa, 819.
MAZZOTTA O.,Rapporti interpositori e rapporto di lavoro, Milano, 1979, 127 ss,
7 GAROFALO D., Presentazione, inGAROFALO D. (eds), Appalti e lavoro. Volume secondo. Disciplina lavoristica, Giappichelli, Torino, 2017, XVII; LOZITO M., Tutele e sottotutele del lavoro negli appalti privati, Cacucci, Bari, 2013, 12 ss.
8 WEIL D., The Fissured Workplace, 42 ss; FERRUGGIA A., Le esternalizzazioni «relazionali» nel decentramento di attività dell’impresa, 809.
9 Concerning the need for protection of fundamental social rights in the glogal market, see PERULLI
A., voce Clausola sociale, in Enc. Dir., Annali VII, Milano, 2014, 187 ss; PERULLI A., Diritto del lavoro
In this panorama of changes and transformations, the same attention paid to trade liberalization, protection of free competition and, more generally, of economic interests has not been paid to the protection of workers’ rights. Indeed, as stressed on several occasions, international operators have avoided as far as possible the issue concerning the relationship between the economic interests of the companies and the protection of social rights: the lex mercatoria seems not to consider social concerns and, in many cases, it even hinders such interests10.
Furthermore, the so-called “imperfect harmonization” of the labour law in the European Union integration process and the Court of Justice case law on the economic freedoms are not a sufficient limit to correct this current trend; actually, sometimes they justified social dumping and law shopping practices11.
In order to avoid that entrepreneurs, reduce the remunerations and other workers protections, causing a downward competition, based entirely on cutting labour costs, with the view to be more competitive in outsourcing processes, often a minimum level of protection has been provided for by the law or collective agreements. The establishment of a level playing field, by preventing a competition based only on low wages and poor working conditions, is also a way to protect entrepreneurs from unfair competition12
In the course of time, at international level, with the aim of introducing minimum social protection and in the attempt of achieving a “fair globalization”, various measures have been taken, such as the action of the International Labour Organization and ILO Conventions and Recommendations, the generalized system of preferences (GSP), the corporate social responsibility statements, the codes of conduct, and the social clauses in international free trade or investment agreements13.
e globalizzazione. Clausole sociali, codici di condotta e commercio internazionale, Padova, 1999, XII ss;
BARBERA M., «Noi siamo quello che facciamo». Prassi ed etica dell’impresa post-fordista, in DLRI, 2014, 4, 631 ss;VOLPE M., Delocalizzazioni e dumping sociale. La prospettiva delle teorie economiche, in LD, 2011, 1, 45 ss; PESSI R., Dumping sociale e diritto del lavoro, in RDSS, 2011, 617 ss; SCARPONI S. (a cura di), Globalizzazione, responsabilità sociale delle imprese e modelli partecipativi, Trento, 2007.
Concerning the competition between different legal order, see BELLAVISTA A., Armonizzazione e concorrenza tra ordinmaneti nel diritto del lavoro, in WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”. INT – 47/2006.
10 For exemple, the WTO has paid a little attention to social considerations. See TREU T., Globalizzazione e diritti umani. Le clausole sociali dei trattati commerciali e negli scambi internazionali fra imprese, in Stato e mercato, 2017, 1, 7 PERULLI A., Fundamental social rights, market regulation and EU external action, in International Journal of Comparative labour law and industrial relations, 2014, 1, 29; MARELLA F., Lex mercatoria e diritto del lavoro, in RGL, 2015, 4, 691 ss.
11 Cfr. TULLINI P., Concorrenza ed equità nel mercato europeo: una scommessa difficile (ma necessaria) per il diritto del lavoro, in RIDL, 2018, I, 199 ss.
12 See, in the past, S.WEBB, The Economic Theory of a Legal Minimum Wage, in Journal of Political Economy, 1912, 20, 975 ss.
13 On this issues, see CAGNIN V., Diritto del lavoro e sviluppo sostenibile, Wolters-Kluwer-Cedam, 2018; TREU T., Trasformazioni del lavoro: sfide per i sistemi nazionali di diritto del lavoro e di sicurezza sociale, WP CSDLE “Massimo D’Antona”, 371/2018, 24; PERULLI A.,BRINO V., Manuale di diritto internazionale del lavoro, Giappichelli, Torino, 2015. Concering the codes of conduct and corporate social responsability, see GOTTARDI D., CSR da scelta unilaterale datoriale a oggetto di negoziazione collettiva: la responsabilità sociale contrattualizzata, in GUARRIELLO F., STANZANI C. (a cura di), Sindacato e contrattazione nelle multinazionali, Franco Angeli, 2018, 59 ss; PERULLI A. (a cura di), La responsabilità sociale dell’impresa. Idee e prassi, Il Mulino, 2013; LASSANDARI A., Globalizzazione e ruolo del sindacato, in SCARPONI S.(a cura di), Globalizzazione, responsabilità sociale delle imprese e
2. Origin, development and classification of social clauses in the global market Due to the spread of outsourcing practices in modern production systems, social clauses have become a topical theme: more and more often, competition occurs between the workers employed in procurement contracts14 and their pay and working conditions are lower than terms and condition that they would enjoy if they were employee of the clients. The weakness of such workers is due to the instability of employment in contractors’ companies, which operate in a highly competitive market and whose performances are strongly influenced by the decisions of the clients15.
At a first glance, social clauses can be defined as those statutory or contractual provisions establishing minimum standards of protections for workers involved in outsourcing and, in particular, employed in procurement contracts.
In many cases, the decentralization consists in the transfer of a part of the undertaking, which, in a second phase, is re-internalised through the procurement contract, which is the main «legal instrument allowing the company to acquire from the market some phases or parts of economic activity», indirectly taking advantage from the performance of contractor’s employees16.
modelli partecipativi, Trento, 2007, 107 ss; SCARPONI S., Globalizzazione, responsabilità sociale delle imprese transnazionali europee e modelli partecipativi, in SCARPONI S. (a cura di), Globalizzazione, responsabilità sociale delle imprese e modelli partecipativi, 5 ss; ROGOWSKY N.,OZOUX P.,ESSER D., MARPE T.,BROUGHTON A., Restructuring for corporate success. A socially sensitive approach, ILO, Geneve, 2005.
14 RIVERSO R., Cooperative spurie ed appalti: nell’inferno del lavoro illegale, in Questione giustizia online, 30 April 2019.
15 WEIL D., The Fissured Workplace, 477 ss.
16 Cfr. CARINCI M. T., Il concetto di appalto rilevante ai fini delle tutele giuslavoristiche e la distinzione da fattispecie limitrofe, in CARINCI M.T.,CESTER C.,MATTAROLO M.G.,SCARPELLI F.(a cura di), Tutela e sicurezza del lavoro negli appalti privati e pubblici. Inquadramento giuridico ed effettività, Utet, Torino, 2011, 5; AIMO M., Stabilità del lavoro e tutela della concorrenza. Le vicende circolatorie dell’impresa alla luce del diritto comunitario, in LD, 2007, 417 ss. On the notion of procurement contract in italian academic debate, see CARINCI M.T., Il concetto di datore di lavoro alla luce del sistema: la codatorialità e il rapporto con il divieto di interposizione, in CARINCI M.T. (a cura di), Dall’impresa a rete alle reti d’impresa. Scelte organizzative e diritto del lavoro, Milano, 2015, 3 ss; CARINCI M.T.,La somministrazione di lavoro altrui, in CARINCI M.T.,CESTER C.(a cura di), Somministrazione, comando, appalto, trasferimento d’azienda, Ipsoa, Milano, 2004, 5 ss; CARINCI M.T., La fornitura di lavoro altrui.
Interposizione, comando, lavoro temporaneo, lavoro negli appalti, in SCHLESINGER P. (diretto da), Commentario al Codice Civile, Milano, 2000; DEL PUNTA R., Le molte vite del divieto di interposizione nel rapporto di lavoro, in RIDL, 2008, I, 129 ss; DEL PUNTA R., Appalto di manodopera e subordinazione, in DLRI, 1995, 625; ROMEI R., L’elisir di lunga vita del divieto di interposizione, in RIDL, 2005, II, 726 ss;BELLOCCHI P., Interposizione e subordinazione, in Scritti in memoria di Massimo D’Antona, I, Milano, 2004, 265 ss; DE LUCA TAMAJO R., Metamorfosi dell’impresa e nuova disciplina dell’interposizione, in RIDL, 2003, I, 167 ss; MAZZOTTA O.,Rapporti interpositori e rapporto di lavoro, cit.; M. T., AVOGARO
M., Appalto, somministrazione di lavoro e trasferimento di ramo d’azienda tra giurisprudenza e prassi delle commissioni di certificazione, in RGL, 2017, 3, 413; CARINCI M. T., Utilizzazione e acquisizione indiretta del lavoro: somministrazione e distacco, appalto e subappalto, trasferimento d’azienda e di ramo, Giappichelli, Torino, 2013, 113; ALBI P., Il contratto di appalto, in Trattato di diritto del lavoro, diretto daPERSIANI M.,CARINCI F., vol, VI, Il mercato del lavoro, a cura di BROLLO M., Padova, Cedam, 2012, 1595 ss; MARESCA A.,ALVINO I, Il rapporto di lavoro nell’appalto, in CUFFARO (a cura di), I contratti di appalto privato, in RESCIGNO,GABRIELLI (diretto da), Il trattato dei contratti, Padova, 2011, 405 ss; CORAZZA L.,La nuova nozione di appalto nel sistema delle tecniche di tutela del lavoratore, in WP CSDLE “Massimo D’Antona”.IT – 93/2009; SCARPELLI F., Interposizione e appalti di servizi
In this field, social clauses are aimed at protecting workers by requiring employers to meet certain minimum standards of protection as a condition for legitimately carrying out their economic activities.
The first social clauses date back to the end of the Nineteenth century, well before the well-known Convention n. 94/1949 of the International Labour Organization concerning labour clauses in public contracts.
Since the end of the Nineteenth century, similar provisions have been adopted in the field of public procurement in order to deal with the weakness of the workers employed in this sector. The first provisions of this kind, the Fair Wages Resolutions, were approved by the British government in 1891, following the recommendations of a commission set up by the House of Lords (the Selected Committee on the Sweated Trades), which had highlighted the serious problem of labour exploitation and the high number of workers, especially women and home-workers, who were paid very low wages and to whom disgraceful working time and conditions were imposed. This provision required the insertion in the procurement contracts of a clause aimed at guaranteeing the payment of the rate of wages not lower than that generally accepted as current for a competent worker in the same trade17. This provision was one of the first measures for the protection of workers and introduced a sort of “private protection”
through the procurement contract, without jeopardizing the unquestionable principle of non-intervention of the government in the market18. Preventing competition based exclusively on lowering wages and encouraging competition focused on improving productivity and “industrial efficiency” were considered the best way to pursue the public interest19. The Fair Wages Resolutions were modified in 1909 and 1946. In the
informatici: un interessante «obiter dictum» della Cassazione sul ruolo del «know-how» di impresa, in FI., 1992, I, 524, nota a Cass., S. U., 19 ottobre 1990, n. 10180; SCARPELLI F., Interposizione ed appalto nel settore dei servizi informatici, in ASSOCIAZIONE LAVORO E RICERCHE, Nuove tecnologie e rapporti fra imprese. Profili giuslavoristici degli appalti di opere e servizi informatici, Milano, 1990, 43 ss. On the notion of procurement contract under art. 1655 od Civil Code and art. 29 of legislative decree n. 267/2003, see ALVINO I., La tutela del lavoro nell’appalto, in AMOROSO G.,DICERBO V.,MARESCA A. (a cura di), Il diritto del lavoro. Costituzione, codice civile e leggi speciali, I, Giuffrè, Milano, 2017, 1740 ss;ORRÙ
T.,Appalto e somministrazione di lavoro. Codatorialità e tecniche di tutela, in RGL, 2014, 143 ss;
ANGIELLO L., L’appalto di servizi, in GALANTINO L. (a cura di), La riforma del mercato del lavoro.
Commento al d.lgs. 10 settembre 2003, n. 276 (artt. 1-32), Torino, 2004, 321 ss; MAGNANI M., Le esternalizzazioni e il nuovo diritto del lavoro, in MAGNANI M., VARESI P.A. (a cura di), Organizzazione del mercato del lavoro e tipologie contrattuali. Commentario ai decreti legislativi n. 276/2003 e n.
251/2004, Torino, 2004, 283 ss; SCARPELLI F., Appalto e distacco. Art. 29, in GRAGNOLI E.,PERULLI A.
(a cura di), La riforma del mercato del lavoro e i nuovi modelli contrattuali. Commentario al decreto legislativo 10 settembre 2003, n. 276, Cedam, Padova, 2004, 435 ss; ALLEVA P., Articolo 29, in GHEZZI
G. (a cura di), Il lavoro tra progresso e mercificazione. Commento critico al decreto legislativo n.
276/2003, Ediesse, 2004, 165 ss.
17 BRUUN N.,JACOBS A.,SCHMIDT M., La convenzione 94 dell’ILO alla luce del caso Ruffert, in RGL, 2009, 4, 649; MCCRUDDEN C., Buying social justice. Equality, government procurement, & legal change, OUP, Oxford, 2007, 42 ss; BERCUSSON B., Fair Wages Resolutions, Mansell, London, 1978, 11 ss.;
ROCCELLA M., I salari, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1986, 30 ss;OSBORNE C., “Fair wages” in government contracts, The Economic journal, 1896, 6, 153 ss.
18 ROCCELLA M., I salari, 31 ss; BERCUSSON B., Fair Wages Resolutions, 11 ss. It was also defined as a “weak” version of statutory minimum wage. See ROCCELLA M., Il salario minimo legale, in PD, 1983, 2, 262.
19 WEBB S., The economics of direct employment, with an account of the fair wages policy, Fabian Tract. N. 84, 1898, 5 ss; MCCRUDDEN C., Buying social justice, 42.
latter version, the resolutions stated that suppliers of good and services to the State had to guarantee pay and working condition not lower that those provided for in collective agreements stipulated by trade unions and employers’ associations “significantly”
representative in a specific trade and district. In the absence of contractual provisions, the contractor had to guarantee wages and working conditions not less favourable than those ensured by employers in similar situations in the same sector and in the same area20.
Between the end of the Nineteenth century and the early Twentieth century, similar provisions spread in many European countries21. For example, in France, in 1899 the Millerand decrees introduced a comparable obligation to guarantee a wage not lower than the salary normally paid in the place where the work was performed22. In the Italian legal system, the principle of equal treatment was introduced in law n. 272/1906 concerning the railways sector for the first time; it introduced the obligation for public administrations to «establish and submit to the approval of the Minister of public works the provisions guaranteeing an equal treatment to the staff, as well as disciplinary sanctions and procedures for their application, with similar rules to those applicable to the State Railways administration»23. In all these legal orders, such clauses have been particularly important, as they paved the way to general provisions protecting working conditions, in particular with regard to minimum wages, and supporting collective bargaining24.
These provisions are the antecedents of the so-called “equal treatment” or “minimum treatment” social clauses or, in order to distinguish them from other types, “first- generation” social clauses. Such clauses require the contractor to guarantee to his employees minimum working conditions or wages, terms, and conditions not less favourable than that guaranteed to the employees of the client or provided for by a specific collective agreement. These provisions are aimed at guaranteeing minimum treatment to workers already employed in the same economic activity.
In the field of public procurement contracts, equal treatment clauses have been defined by influential academics as that particular type of normative provision
20 BERCUSSON B., Fair Wages Resolutions, 310 ss; CENTOFANTI S., Art. 36, in Commentario dello statuto dei lavoratori. Tomo II, diretto da PROSPERETTI U., Milano, 1975, 1194 ss. The Fair wages resolutions were definitively repealed by Thatcher in 1982. See BERCUSSON B, RYAN B.,The British case:
before and after the decline of collective wage formation, in BLAINPAIN R.,BLANKE T.,ROSE E. (eds.), Collective Bargaining and Wages in Comparative Perspective, Kluwer Law International, 2005, 53 ss.
21 Similar provisions spread also in the US. See MCCRUDDEN C., Buying social justice, 39 ss; BRUUN
N.,JACOBS A.,SCHMIDT M., ILO Convention no. 94 in the aftermath of the Rüffert case, in Transfer, 2010, 473 ss.
22 Also the French provision referred to collective agreements. See MCCRUDDEN C., Buying social justice, 53 ss.
23 Art. 21, law n. 272/2906. See NAPOLETANO D., Appalto di opere pubbliche e tutela dei diritti del lavoratore, in RGL, 1953, 275 ss; GHERA E., Le c.d. clausole sociali: evoluzione di un modello di politica legislativa, in DRI, 2001, I, 133.
24 On the relevance of these provision in fostering the application of collective agreements, see BRUUN
N.,JACOBS A.,SCHMIDT M., La convenzione 94 dell’ILO alla luce del caso Ruffert, 654; KAHN-FREUND
O., Labour and the Law, 1977, Londra, 159 ss. See BERCUSSON B., The new Fair Wages policy. Schedule 11 to the Employment Protection Act, in ILJ, 1976, 134 ss, who adopts a more critic point of view and criticizes such provisions, since they established only a minimum level and did not provided for appropriate sanctions.
establishing, for companies interested in granting financial benefits or in awarding of contracts for the execution of public works and concessions, the obligation to guarantee their employees a minimum standard of protection, mainly regarding to the salary, by ensuring compliance with collective agreements25. Today, the academic definition has found a statutory corroboration in art. 3, paragraph 1, lett. qqq), of the Public Procurement Code (Legislative Decree n. 50/2016), which describes social clauses are those «provisions requiring an employer to respect certain social and labour standards as a condition for awarding and carrying out public contracts or concessions or for granting legal and financial benefits».
Such clauses pursue more than one objective: they are aimed at achieving a «right balance in the employment relationship»26, protecting the worker as weaker party of the relationship, and guiding the activity of public administrations and employers towards social aims; finally, they also intend to ensure a level playing field for competing contractors27. First-generation social clauses have also an “indirect” purpose of promoting collective bargaining and trade unions’ activity, since often, especially in public procurements, the law refers to collective agreements to identify the protection standards to be guaranteed to contractor’s employees, thus extending the scope of application of collective agreements28.
Since the 2000s, scholars highlighted a «functional mutation of social clauses» in relation to some statutory or collective provisions29: besides equal treatment or first- generation social clauses, indeed, there is another kind of social clauses. The so-called
“rehiring”, or “employment stability”, or “second-generation” social clauses aim at
25 GHERA E., Le c.d. clausole sociali: evoluzione di un modello di politica legislativa, 133; ORLANDINI G., Clausole sociali, in Diritto online, Treccani.it, 2015; COSTANTINI S., Limiti all’iniziativa economica privata e tutela del lavoratore subordinato. Il ruolo delle c.d. “clausole sociali”, in Ianus, 2011, 201;
LOZITO M., Tutele e sottotutele del lavoro negli appalti privati, cit., 17; FORLIVESI M., Le clausole sociali negli appalti pubblici: il bilanciamento possibile tra tutela del lavoro e ragioni del mercato, in WP. C.S.
D. L.E., “Massimo D’Antona”. IT, 275/2915, 9.
26 NAPOLETANO D., Appalto di opere pubbliche e tutela dei diritti del lavoratore, 267 ss; GHERA E., Le c.d. clausole sociali: evoluzione di un modello di politica legislativa, 134.
27 ORLANDINI G., Clausole sociali. Cfr. PALLINI M.,Diritto europeo e limiti di ammissibilità delle clausole sociali nella regolazione nazionale degli appalti pubblici di opere e servizi, in DLRI, 2016, 3, 525 ss.
28 GHERA E., Le c.d. clausole sociali: evoluzione di un modello di politica legislativa, 134;
CENTOFANTI S., Art. 36, 1194 ss; MANCINI F., Sub art. 36, in ROMAGNOLI,MONTUSCHI,GHEZZI,MANCINI (a cura di), Statuto dei diritti dei lavoratori, Commentario del codice civile, SCIALOJA,BRANCA (a cura di), Zanichelli, Bologna-Roma, 1972, 546. In fact, outsourcing processes may hinder trade unions activity, as stressed by ALVINO I., La disciplina collettiva dell’appalto e della somministrazione, in MARESCA A.
(a cura di), Somministrazione di lavoro e appalti di servizi. Tra conflitto e competizione, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2009, 70 ss.
29 GHERA E., Le c.d. clausole sociali: evoluzione di un modello di politica legislativa, 143 ss. See also BASENGHI F., Decentramento organizzativo e autonomia collettiva, in Frammentazione organizzativa e lavoro: rapporti individuali e collettivi. Atti delle giornate di studio di diritto del lavoro. Cassino, 18-19 maggio 2017, Giuffrè, Milano, 2017, 243; RATTI L., Le clausole sociali di seconda generazione:
inventario di questioni, in RGL, 2017, 3, 469 ss; ORLANDINI G., Mercato unico dei servizi e tutela del lavoro, FrancoAngeli, 2013, Milano, 161 ss; MUTARELLI M. M., Contrattazione collettiva e tutela dell’occupazione negli appalti, in FERRARO G. (a cura di), Redditi e occupazione nelle crisi d’impresa, Torino, 2014, 303 ss; LOZITO M., Tutele e sottotutele del lavoro negli appalti privati, 107 ss; COSTANTINI
S., Limiti all’iniziativa economica privata e tutela del lavoratore subordinato: il ruolo delle c.d. “clausole sociali”, 199 ss.
regulating the turnover of several contractors in the same procurement contract. These clauses may have different contents: sometimes they impose obligations on the employer to take on the workers of the previous contractor, already employed in the same contract; in other cases, they provide for a simple obligation to inform and consult trade unions with the view of finding the most suitable solution to guarantee the employment stability of the workers involved in the change of the contractors.
The aim pursued by these provisions is completely different compared to first- generation social clauses, which refer to a different phase of the employment relationship: the second-generation social clauses are intended to «regulate social effects of the market liberalization processes and of the privatization of companies operating in certain sectors»30. They also support trade unions’ role in handling employment issues in corporate restructuring processes31.
Also second-generation clauses are intended to regulate the competition: they are aimed at avoiding that the change of contractors in the execution of the contract is based exclusively on a reduction of labour costs. By imposing on the contractor taking over the contract the obligation to rehire all or a part of the workers previously employed in the same contract, they promote a model of “virtuous” entrepreneur and limit the risk that outsourcing practices cause unjustified and irrational reductions in employment levels. Indeed, contracts should be awarded to the contractor guaranteeing the most efficient management of the service, which shouldn’t necessarily have negative impact on the workers employed in the contract32.
Due to the limitation that first- and second-generation social clauses entail, they may reduce the contractors’ freedom to carry out their economic activity and limit their freedom of trade union association: therefore, they risk to contrast with the constitutional and European provision those freedoms33.
3. The linkage between fundamental rights and the market in international free trade agreements
Usually, besides domestic rules requiring employers to guarantee to workers a minimum standard of protection, in the notion of social clauses are included also provisions aimed at ensuring the protection of fundamental social rights in international free trade or investment agreements.
Social clauses or social chapters, containing provisions aimed at preventing and tackling labour exploitation, is increasingly spreading: usually, they require a commitment by the States stipulating the trade agreement to control and ensure the
30 GHERA E., Le c.d. clausole sociali: evoluzione di un modello di politica legislativa, 144 ss.
31 GHERA E., Le c.d. clausole sociali: evoluzione di un modello di politica legislativa, 146; AIMO M., Stabilità del lavoro e tutela della concorrenza. Le vicende circolatorie dell’impresa alla luce del diritto comunitario, in LD, 2007, 419.
32 BASENGHI F., Decentramento organizzativo e autonomia collettiva, 243 ss.
33 GHERA E., ., Le c.d. clausole sociali: evoluzione di un modello di politica legislativa, 147 ss;
SCARPELLI F., Regolarità del lavoro e regole della concorrenza: il caso degli appalti pubblici, in RGL, 2006, 757.
compliance of economic operators with minimum standards of protection. These clauses are also defined as “trade-labour social clauses”, because of their important role in the linkage between fundamental rights and the market34.
Concerning this issue, international agreements stipulated by the United States and the European Union with other countries are of particular interest.
Originally, the main objective of international trade policy was to prevent unfair competition. Thus, for example, the 1922 US Tariff Act gave to the President of the United States the power to adapt prices of goods to balance diverging production costs between domestic products and those from other countries with lower labour costs. Only later, since the 1980s, in US trade policy, a greater attention was paid at ensuring minimum protection for workers, not exclusively relying on protectionist purposes. One example is the social clause included in the US Generalized System of Preferences in 1984: in a rewarding perspective, in order to enjoy the favourable tariff treatments granted by this agreement, the State concerned had to undertake to guarantee certain rights to workers, such as the right of association and trade union organization, the right to stipulate collective agreements, the prohibition of forced labour, as well as the guarantee of certain minimum working conditions concerning wages, working hours and measures relating to health and safety at work35.
The social clause, or social chapter, takes different forms and contents in the various international agreements36. Some contain provisions aimed at fostering a dialogue between the stipulating parties and monitoring the established protection standards;
others require the States to comply with certain minimum standards of protection under penalty of sanctions; others contain clauses imposing certain minimum levels of protection as a condition for the conclusion of the agreement37.
In “first-generation” agreements, such as 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), agreed by the US, Canada and Mexico, the clauses relating to social rights were placed outside of the agreement, in an attached document, namely the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC), in the case of NAFTA.
In succeeding agreements, the so-called second-generation international agreements, the chapter concerning social rights has been inserted directly into the agreements, as an integral part38.
The content of social clauses differs considerably from agreement to agreement. For example, NAALC requires the parties to promote not the implementation of minimum standards of protection provided for at international level, but the compliance with of
34 COMPA L., La clausola sociale commercio-lavoro a 20 anni dal NAFTA: il punto, in RGL, 2015, 4, 763 ss. On social clauses in free trade agreements, see also ILO, Social dimension of free trade agreements, 2015.
35 The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is a system providing tariff reduction to promote economic growth in the developing countries. SeeHEPPLE B., Labour laws and global trade, Hart, 2005, 90 ss.
36 See COMPA L., La clausola sociale commercio-lavoro a 20 anni dal NAFTA: il punto, 765, who classified free trade international agreement on the basis of the characteristic of social clauses.
37 TREU T., Globalizzazione e diritti umani. Le clausole sociali dei trattati commerciali e negli scambi internazionali fra imprese, 17 ss.
38 Sees PERULLI A.,BRINO V., Manuale di diritto internazionale del lavoro, 85 ss; HEPPLE B., Labour laws and global trade, 108 ss.
domestic labour law; moreover, it only identifies some principles to be respected, but no specific commitment. In the most recent agreements, instead, the States undertake to introduce and guarantee the application of regulations ensuring the respect of the rights of workers and to comply, at least, with the core labour standards of the ILO39.
Social clauses in free trade agreements are “conditionality instruments” in the regulation of market: the States must respect the rights provided for in such agreements to benefit of the advantages deriving from trade liberalization or to avoid penalties40. From a functional point of view, initially, these provisions were included in international agreements for economic reasons, to avoid distortions of competition caused by competitive advantages due to a reduction in the standards of protection of workers’
rights41. Only later additional goals, such as ensuring the implementation of core labour standards, emerged.
By now, all “new-generation” international agreements contain the so-called
“sustainable development clauses”, aimed at promoting a socially sustainable development. Undoubtedly, these social clauses are useful in the attempt to reduce the poverty gap between developed and developing countries42. However, the effectiveness of these instruments is reduced, because of the low levels of protection that they are intended to guarantee and for the weak enforcement mechanisms provided for. For example, in NAALC disputes on the interpretation and implementation of social rights are decided by an independent arbitration panel; however, the sanctioning system has never been fully implemented, mainly due to the lack of will of the States in this regard.
Sometimes, the only consequence of the violation of social clause is the application of fines with low effectiveness, as in Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA); in other cases, the agreements expressly exclude social issues from the system set up for the resolution of disputes, the scope of which is limited to the commercial ones; thus, their effectiveness and cogency is considerably reduced. Only in exceptional cases, as in the agreement between the US and Jordan, the mechanism set up for the violation of commercial clauses is extended to social issues and economic sanctions apply also in the event of a violation of social commitments43. In the most recent agreements, such as
39 E.g. CAFTA, which refers to the principles agreed in the ILO Declaration on fundamental principles.
See also Tras-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and CETA (Comprehensive Trade and Ecnomic Ageement). See COMPA L., La clausola sociale commercio-lavoro a 20 anni dal NAFTA: il punto, 772 ss. The debate on the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) is not considered in this research. On this topic, see CAGNIN V., La convergenza normativa in tema di diritto del lavoro tra Ue e Usa nell’accordo commerciale geopolitico Ttip, 1, 2016, in LD, 2016, 1, 87 ss; PERULLI A., Sustainability, Social Rights and International Trade: The TTIP, in The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 2015, 31, 4, 473 ss; TREU T., TTIP: Raccomandazioni europee per un labor chapter, in DRI, 2015, 4, 915 ss; GRUNI G., Law or aspiration? Proposal for a labour standard clause in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, in Legal issues of economic integration, 2016, 4, 399.
40 PERULLI A.,Commercio globale e diritti sociali. Novità e prospettive, in RGL,2016,4,735 SS; PERULLI A.,Clausola sociale, 190;SANYAL R.N.,The social clause in trade treaties: implication for international firms, in Journal of business ethics, 2001, 29, 380.
41 In this respect, see the NAALC. See TREU T.,Globalizzazione e diritti umani. Le clausole sociali dei trattati commerciali e negli scambi internazionali fra imprese, 12.
42 TREU T., Globalizzazione e diritti umani. Le clausole sociali dei trattati commerciali e negli scambi internazionali fra imprese, 8.
43 See COMPA L., La clausola sociale commercio-lavoro a 20 anni dal NAFTA: il punto, 766 ss;
PERULLI A.,BRINO V., Manuale di diritto internazionale del lavoro, 85 ss; PERULLI A., Fundamental
CETA between Europe and Canada and EPA with Japan, there are significant innovations: according to such agreements, a panel of experts with the involvement of civil society is created to provide advices and opinions on the implementation of the clauses; also a specialised court have been set up to settle disputes on the agreements with private investors44. An important step towards the effective implementation of these commitments was made by the European Commission: for the first time, on 17 December 2018, the Commission launched formal consultations with the South Korean government over the violation of the provisions of the relevant international free trade agreement. Indeed, violations have been detected regarding the non-compliance and non-ratification of four fundamental ILO conventions concerning the freedom of association, freedom of collective bargaining and forced labour45.
Concerning the linkage between fundamental social rights and economic regulation, the debate on the insertion of a social clause in the system of the World Trade Organization should also be mentioned. The attempt to highlight social standards in this multilateral framework, including them among the regulations and principles governing international trade, has failed, due to the difficulties in identifying common social standards and because of the lack of will economic operators in international trade to give up the advantages deriving from the differences in domestic labour laws46.
In social clauses provided for in international agreements, the “humanitarian” interest of rich countries for working conditions in developing countries is linked to a protectionist interest of countering the competition of those countries whose only advantage in international competition consists in low wages. Even in the most recent international agreements, besides the aims of promoting sustainable development, decent work and human rights, the economic objective of protecting the proper functioning of the market, the fair trade, and preventing dumping practices consisting in reducing the protection standards provided for in national legislation to obtain competitive advantages, is predominant47. At international level, those instruments are
social rights, market regulation and EU external action, cit., 31; HEPPLE B., Labour laws and global trade, 108 ss.
44 TREU T., Trasformazioni del lavoro: sfide per i sistemi nazionali di diritto del lavoro e di sicurezza sociale, 23.
45 GRUNI G., Enforcing labour standards via EU free-trade agreements, in Social Europe, 18 February 2019, https://www.socialeurope.eu/enforcing-labour-standards.
46 MELO ARAUJO B., Labour provisions in EU and US mega-regional trade agreements: rhetoric and reality, in International Comparative law Quarterly, 2018, 67, 1, 237; ROYLE T., The ILO’s Shift to Promotional Principles and the ‘‘Privatization’’ of Labour Rights: An Analysis of Labour Standards, Voluntary Self-regulation and Social Clauses, in The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 2010, 3, 266; BENEDEK W., The World Trade Organization and human rights, in DE FEYTER K.,MARRELLA F. (a cura di), Economic globalization and human rights, Cambridge University Press, 2008, 137 ss; CREMONA M., Rhetoric and reticence: EU external commercial policy in a multilateral context, in Common market law review, 2001, 38, 359 ss. On this issue, see DORE R., Il lavoro nel mondo che cambia, 2004, Il Mulino, 96, who ciritces the idea of inserting a social chapter in the WTO sysmte: he argues that such a clause imposing the obligation to ensure better employment condition for workers on developing countries is a “protectionist” idea. In its opinion, an agreement between developing countries would be more effective in preventing downward competition.
47 Concerning the social chapter’s aims in free trade agreements, see MELO ARAUJO B., Labour provisions in EU and US mega-regional trade agreements: rhetoric and reality, 233 ss;CORVAGLIA M.
A., Public Procurement and Labour Rights: Towards Coherence in International instruments of
also intended to deal with the reducing ability of States to freely decide social policies in the context of global trade48.
This consideration is valid, in a broad sense, for all kinds of social clauses: the altruistic purposes often cover utilitarian interests, the aim of protecting social rights and guaranteeing minimum working standards entail those concerning the regulation of competition49. The interaction of such interests generates a contrast between the protection of social rights, on the one hand, protection of competition and freedom of enterprise, on the other, and the need to fairly balance these aims.
4. Structure of the thesis
In the light of these brief introductory remarks, the importance of social clauses in protecting the rights of workers involved in outsourcing processes at international level, in Italian legal system, and in the European Union, emerges50.
Due to the variety of provisions that can be included in the general notion of social clause, this study is intended to offer an in-depth and systematic analysis of some types
procurement regulation, Hart, 2017, 69 ss; SIROEN J.-M., Labour provisions in preferential trade agreements: current practice and outlook, in International Labour Review, 2013, 152, 1, 85 ss;
MCCRUDDEN C., Buying social justice, 114 ss; LIM H., The social clauses: issues and challenges, ILO;
SANYAL R.N., The social clause in trade treaties: implication for international firms, 380;SCHERRER C., The economic and political argument for and against social clauses, in Intereconimics, 1996, 69 ss.
48 PERULLI A., Alcune riflessioni sulla tutela dei diritti fondamentali dei lavoratori nel diritto internazionale, in SCARPONI S.(a cura di), Globalizzazione, responsabilità sociale delle imprese e modelli partecipativi, 81.
49 DORE R., Il lavoro nel mondo che cambia, 15 ss e 93 ss.
50 See LUNARDON F., Contrattazione collettiva e governo del decentramento produttivo, in RIDL, 2004, I, 213 ss. There are many measures aimed at regulating outsourcing practices and protecting the workers involved in decentralization processes, i.e. joint liability, health a safety measures, and the obligation to inform and consult the social partners. On joint liablity in Italian legal order, see VILLA E., La responsabilità solidale come tecnica di tutela del lavoratore, BUP, Bologna, 2017, particularly 55 ss;
GAROFALO D., La responsabilità solidale, in GAROFALO D. (a cura di), Appalti e lavoro. Volume secondo.
Disciplina lavoristica, cit., 119 ss; IZZI D., Appalti e responsabilità solidale, in AIMO M.,IZZI D. (a cura di), Esternalizzazioni e tutela dei lavoratori, 52 ss; IMBERTI L., Il trattamento economico e normativo, in CARINCI M.T.,CESTER C.,MATTAROLO M.G.,SCARPELLI F. (a cura di), Tutela e sicurezza del lavoro negli appalti privati e pubblici. Inquadramento giuridico ed effettività, 63 ss; CORDELLA C., Appalti:
nozione lavoristica e tutela dei crediti retributivi dei lavoratori, in DRI, 2016, 521 ss. Concerning health a safety measures, see ALBI P., Il contratto di appalto, in Trattato di diritto del lavoro, diretto DA PERSIANI
M.,CARINCI F., vol, VI, Il mercato del lavoro, a cura di BROLLO M., Padova, Cedam, 2012, 1595 ss;
CESTER C.,PASQUALETTO E.,Il campo di applicazione dell’art. 26 del testo unico n. 81/2008, in CARINCI
M.T.,CESTER C.,MATTAROLO M.G.,SCARPELLI F. (a cura di), Tutela e sicurezza del lavoro negli appalti privati e pubblici. Inquadramento giuridico ed effettività, cit., 99 ss; MARESCA A.,ALVINO I., Il rapporto di lavoro nell’appalto, in CUFFARO (a cura di), I contratti di appalto privato, in RESCIGNO,GABRIELLI
(diretto da), Il trattato dei contratti, Padova, 2011, 446 ss. On the obligation to inform and consult the social partners, provided for in legislative decree n. 25/2007, see ALVINO I., La disciplina collettiva dell’appalto e della somministrazione, in MARESCA A. (a cura di), Somministrazione di lavoro e appalti di servizi, 74 ss. There are many provisions also in collective agreements aimed at governing outsourcing processes, such as art. 9, section IV, Contratto collettivo nazionale metalmeccanici (metalworking industry collective agreement), which prohibit to externalise core business activities. See ICHINO P., La disciplina della segmentazione del processo produttivo e dei suoi effetti sul rapporto di lavoro, 67 ss;
MATTEI A., Scomposizione dell’impresa, lavoro esternalizzato e inclusione sociale: azioni della negoziazione collettiva, in RGL, I, 2016, 768.
