Les Joueurs de Carte, Paul Cezanne, 1892-95, Courtauld Institute of Art
UNIT 4. SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
Section 4.3 In a simultaneous one-shot prisoners' dilemma game:
Select one answer
a. The players’ payoffs are lower in the dominant strategy equilibrium than in some other outcomes.
b. The players will choose to cooperate to attain the socially optimal outcome.
c. Each player’s payoff is the highest in the socially optimal outcome that would be attained by cooperation.
d. Each player would choose the cooperative strategy if he or she knew that the other player would definitely also choose cooperation.
T4.1 Prisoners’ dilemma
T4.2 Altruistic preferences
Select all correct answers
a. The outcome (I, T) is attained as the dominant strategy equilibrium if Anil is completely selfish and Bala is somewhat altruistic.
b. The outcome (I, T) is attained as the dominant strategy equilibrium if Anil is somewhat altruistic while Bala is completely selfish.
c. The outcome (I, T) cannot be attained as the dominant strategy.
d. The outcome (I, I) is attained as the dominant strategy equilibrium only if both Anil and Bala are somewhat altruistic.
The following diagram shows Anil’s preferences when he is either completely selfish or somewhat altruistic, when he and Bala participate
in the prisoners' dilemma game with the payoffs shown below. Based on the graph, which of the following are correct?
Section 4.5
T4.3 Public goods game
Select all correct answers
a. The socially optimal outcome (one with the highest total net income) is when all work.
b. The dominant strategy equilibrium of this public goods game is when no one works.
c. Bruce is better off not working, irrespective of the actions of the other members.
d. Bruce’s net income when all three members work is
£80.
Bruce owns a cooperative project with two other members.
One day of work by any member costs that member £50;
this produces a total income of £120 which is shared amongst the three. So, for example, if Bruce and one other member put the work in, then the income per member is
£120 × 2 ÷ 3 = £80, leaving Bruce with a net income of
£80 - £50 = £30. Assume that a member must either put in a full day of work or none at all. Based on this information, we can conclude that:
Section 4.6
T4.5 Multiple equilibria
Select all correct answers
a. There are two Nash equilibria: (Java, Java) and (C++, C++).
b. If Astrid can choose the format first and commit to it, then (Java, Java) will be chosen.
c. If the two can make an agreement, including a
transfer of $500 from Bettina to Astrid, then (C++, C+
+) will be chosen.
d. If the two cannot make an agreement then they may end up with the (Java, C++) outcome.
The following game represents the interaction between two software engineers, Astrid and Bettina, who are working together writing code as a part of a project. Astrid is better at writing Java code, while Bettina prefers C++. The
numbers represent the pay in dollars for completion of the project. Based on this information, which of the following are true?
Section 4.11
